Reader's Guide to Tillich's Systematic Theology

[3] Although written seven years after Volume I, changes in concepts and thinking in the intervening years have not damaged the whole. The Systematic Theology is not deductive (unlike mathematics); its dynamic unity is open to new insights. The Leap from Volume I to Volume II, mirrors the leap from essential (Volume I) to existential (Volume II). [4] Volume II develops the estrangement of existence, which is understood in light of the development in Volume I of the nature of finitude.

Definitions:

None

Questions:

What is Tillich’s concept of the nature of finitude?

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III.Introduction.B: Restatements of Answers Given in Volume I [5-16]

III.Introduction B.1: Beyond Naturalism and Supernaturalism [5-10]

Summary:

[5] This section is a restatement and partial reformulation of the basic concepts developed in Volume I. The substance has not changed, but to simply refer to Volume I would not answer questions arising since its publication. Use of the term “Being” with reference to God received much criticism. There are three possible ways to interpret being and God: (1) spranaturalistic – God as the highest being, separate from and above/along creation; (2) naturalistic – God as power and meaning of reality; and (3) self-transcendent and ecstatic – the view espoused in the Systematic Theology. [7] Self-transcendent means that within itself, the finite world points beyond itself. [8] The reality we experience can be experienced in different dimensions, which point to one another. Finitude points to infinity, going beyond itself to return to itself in a new dimension. This is the encounter with the holy. Ecstasy is the state of mind that correlates to self-transcendence in the state of reality. The relationship between God and world, including humanity, is one of finite freedom. Divine transcendence is identical with the freedom of the created to turn away from essentiality and the creative ground of being. [9] Following publication of Volume, the issue of the symbolic knowledge of God moved to the center of philosophical interest. Symbolic knowledge of God unites the divergent views that God both shares in and transcends finite reality. A non-symbolic assertion about God comes at the point we assert that everything said about God is symbolic. That statement itself is not a symbolic assertion. This dialectical difficulty mirrors the human situation of being separated from the infinite, yet participating in the infinite. At that point God is not a symbol but a quest. [10] This dialectical situation is the condition for religious experience and receipt of revelation.

Definitions:

Supranaturalism: “Separates God as a being, the highest being, from all other beings, alongside and above which he has his existence. In this position he has brought the universe into being at a certain moment…, governs it according to a plan, directs it toward an end, interferes with its ordinary processes in order to overcome resistance and to fulfill his purpose, and will bring it to a consummation in a final catastrophe.” [6]
Naturalism: “Identifies God with the universe, with its essence or with special powers within it. God is the name for the power and meaning of reality. He is not identified with the totality of things.” [6]
Transcendent: “God as the ground of being infinitely transcends that of which he is the ground. He stands against the world, insofar as the world stands against him, and he stands for the world, thereby causing it to stand for him.” [7]
Self-transcendent: “The finitude of the finite points to the infinity of the infinite. It goes beyond itself in order to return to itself in a new dimension… In terms of immediate experience it is the encounter with the holy, an encounter which has an ecstatic character.” [8]
Ecstatic: “The phrase ‘ecstatic idea of God’ points to the experience of the holy as transcending ordinary experience without removing it. Ecstasy as a state of mind is the exact correlate to self-transcendence as the state of reality.” [9]
Finite Freedom: “The freedom of the created to turn away from the essential unity with the creative ground of its being. Such freedom presupposes two qualities of the created: first, that it is substantially independent of the divine ground; second, that it remains in substantial unity with it.” [8]
Religious Symbol: “A religious symbol uses the material of ordinary experience in speaking of God, but in such a way that the ordinary meaning of the material used is both affirmed and denied. Every religious symbol negates itself in its literal meaning, but affirms itself in its self-transcending meaning.” [9]

Questions:

By using the term “created” to refer to humanity, does Tillich imply a meaning of God as prior to and outside creation? Is that consistent with his view of God as within creation itself?
Give an example of a religious symbol and distinguish it from a sign, using Tillich’s concept of symbol.
Explain how the statement, “everything said about God is symbolic,” is not itself a symbolic expression?

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III.Introduction.B.2: The Use of the Concept of Being in Systematic Theology [10-12]

Summary:

[10] The definition of God as being-itself is attacked by nominalist philosophy as a communicative notion without any reality of its own. [11] The concept of being is not an abstraction. It is the expression of the experience of being, over non-being. The concept of God as being-itself is also attacked by personalist theology (most pronounced in biblical religion). But the personalist claim for a personal relationship between God and humanity [12] lacks an ontological search. The quest for being, for God, is irrepressible.

Definitions:

None

Questions:

How is Tillich’s definition of God as being-itself not abstract?
Can God as being-itself be experienced in a person-to-person relationship between self and God and still retain its ontological dimensions?
What does Tillich mean by his statement: “There is no ontological thought in biblical religion?”

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III.Introduction.B.3: Independence and Interdependence of Existential Questions and Theological Answers [13-16]

Summary:

[13] Existential questions and theological answers, within the method of correlation, are both independent and interdependent. Neither questions nor answers are derived from the other. Humans are the question. God as divine self-manifestation is the answer. We cannot avoid asking the question of our existence. When we do we are alone with our self, asking “out of the depth.” [14] Questions and answers are interdependent as explained by the concept of the “theological circle” in the Introduction to Volume I. [15] Systematic theologians are committed to the concrete expression of ultimate concern – religiously speaking to a “special revelatory experience,” (e.g. Jesus as the Christ is the Logos). He/She must participate in all aspects of finitude to choose the material and the form of the existential questions to ask, without reference to the theological answers to which he/she is committed. Theologians must struggle to formulate and express answers to questions arising from the human predicament. [16] Theologians do not create answers. Answers are received and expressed in a manner correlated to the way the questions are asked. In this sense revelatory experience shapes the form of the existential questions and theological answers.

Definitions:

Correlation: “Interdependence of two independent factors. It is not understood in the logical sense of quantitative or qualitative co-ordination of elements without causal relation, but it is understood as a unity of the dependence and independence of two factors.” [13]
Method of Correlation: “The correlation between existential questions and theological answers.” [13]
Existential Question: “Man himself in the conflicts of his existential situation.” [13]
Theological Circle: “The theologian as theologian is committed to a concrete expression of the ultimate concern, religiously speaking, of a special revelatory experience. On the basis of this concrete experience he makes his universal claims, as Christianity did in terms of the statement that Jesus as the Christ is the Logos. This circle can be described as an ellipse (not a geometrical circle) and described in terms of two central points – the existential question and the theological answer.” [14-15]

Questions:

Why is it impossible to receive an answer to a question one has not asked?
Does it matter substantively that Tillich describes his “Theological Circle” as an “ellipse” and not a geometrical circle? Does this serve a rhetorical purpose?
What is the relationship between the “Theological Circle” and apologetic theology?
Can anyone, whether a theologian or not, really receive or deduce and ‘answer’ or ‘answers’ to the questions of existence?

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III.I: Existence and the Quest for the Christ [19-96]

III.I.A: Existence and Existentialism [19-28]

III.I.A.1: The Etymology of Existence [19-21]

Summary:

[19] Words are both signs and symbols, arising from the human mind’s encounter with reality. “Existence” is a much abused and burdened word in religion and the humanities. Like other classical terms, considering its etymology can salvage it. [20] The root meaning of “to exist,” in Latin existere, is to “stand out.” In this usage, we stand out of non-being (Volume I). [21] To exist is to stand out of the absolute emptiness of non-being (ouk on), and to stand out of the state of potential being/relative non-being (me on), and become actual. But an actual thing does not fully stand out of potentiality insofar as it never fully exhausts its potentialities. And it does not fully stand out of absolute non-being insofar as it remains finite. In either the sense of ouk on or me on, existence means standing out of non-being.

Definitions:

Etymology: “To go back to [a word’s] root meaning and try to gain a new understanding out of its root.” [19]
Words: “The result of the encounter of the human mind with reality… They are not only signs but also symbols and cannot be replaced, as in the case of conventional signs, by other words.” [19]
Potentiality: “The power of being which, metaphorically speaking, has not yet realized its power.” [20]
Exist: “To stand out of one’s own non-being… If we say that something exists, we say that it has left the state of mere potentiality and has become actuality. It stands out of mere potentiality, out of relative non-being.” [20-21]

Questions:

How do we “stand out” of non-being identified as both ouk on and me on?
How is nothingness different than non-being?
Tillich asserts that the meaning of abused words can be “salvaged,” thereby obviating the need to continually invent new languages. Review the definitions provided in this Study Guide and identify some words Tillich has “salvaged” in such a way that their common and widely held definitions/usages have become meaningless. Comment on whether Tillich has merely rescued (salvaged) their meanings, or whether he has in fact reinvented the words. E.g., consider his use and definition of the word “reason” in Volume I.

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III.I.A.2: The Rise of the Existentialist Problem [21-24]

Summary:

[21] The split between potentiality and actuality was the first step toward the rise of existentialism. This split pre-exists Plato and the rise of philosophy. [22] Plato referred to existence as everything that is bad and to essence as everything that is good. Human beings exist and have essence. Aristotle took Plato’s thought and altered it to assert that through one’s essence, one is able to go past existence and reach the mind of God. [23] The gap between existence and essence widened with later Christian thinkers and during the Renaissance and Enlightenment. With the rise of German classical philosophy came Hegel’s idea that [24] existence is the logically necessary actuality of essence and that there is no gap or difference between the two. [24] Hegel was the “classical essentialist” who applied to the universe the Scholastic doctrine that God is beyond essence and existence. For Hegel, the world is the expression of essence and not the fall away from it.

Definitions:

None

Questions:

Why does Tillich find Hegel’s essentialism superior to other historical attempts to reconcile the “essential” and “existential” levels of reality?

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III.I.A.3: Existentialism against Essentialism [24-26]

Summary:

[24] Existentialism attacked Hegel’s essentialist idea, [25] arguing that human existence is a state of estrangement from essential nature. Hegel claimed that estrangement can be overcome and that one can be reconciled with his/her true being. The purported distinction between theistic and atheistic existentialism is false. None of the existentialist thinkers developed answers out of their questions. [26] Rather, their answers came from unrecognized religious sources. The questions of existentialism are about ultimate concern or faith and therefore the answers are always religious whether recognized as such or not.

Definitions:

Existentialism: “Existentialism gives an analysis of what it means to exist. It shows the contrast between an essentialist description and an existential analysis. It develops the question implied in existence, but it does not try to give the answer, either in atheistic or in theistic terms.” [25]

Questions:

Tillich notes that the existentialist attack on Hegel’s essentialism was a revolt “against the self-interpretation of man in modern industrial society,” yet he does not comment further on this idea. In your opinion, what, if any, is the connection between modern industrial society and the prevalence of angst, and estrangement in society (both at the time Tillich wrote Volume II, and today)?
Does Tillich simply ignore the reality of the immense influence modern industrial, scientific and technological advances have on individuals and communities?
Do you agree that all answers to existential questions are necessarily religious? If religious, are they also necessarily theistic? What is the difference?

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III.I.A.4: Existentialist and Existentialist Thinking [26]

Summary:

[26] “Existential” is a human attitude; its opposite is “detached.” This reflects the poles of object involvement (existential) and object detachment (non-existential). “Existentialism” is a philosophical school that resolves the existential predicament in terms of “involvement.” The opposite of existentialist is the “essentialist” school that describes essential structures in terms of detachment. Involvement and detachment are poles, not conflicting alternatives. By its very nature, theology is existential.

Definitions:

None

Questions:

Why does Tillich claim that “scientific philosophy” is impossible?
How do “existential” and “existentialist” differ from each other?

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III.I.A.5: Existentialism and Christian Theology [27-28]

Summary:

[27] Existentialism is an ally of Christianity insofar as it analyzed the old reality, before “the Christ,” i.e. the predicament of humanity and the world in the state of estrangement. The same is true of analytic psychology, literature, poetry, drama, art, etc. All provide material the theologian can organize to present Christ as the answer to the questions implied in existence. [28] Material is also supplied by “practical explorers” of the human predicament, such as ministers, educators, psychoanalysts and counselors. The theologian’s job is to reinterpret traditional religious symbols and theological concepts in light of all the material received from various sources. In this fashion, these symbols and concepts regain the expressive power of their lost truth. The existential elements are often harsh and hard to bear, but are always combined ambiguously with essential elements. The existential and essential elements are always abstractions from the concrete actuality of being, namely Life.

Definitions:

The Christ: “The Christ, the Messiah, is he who is supposed to bring the ‘new eon,’ the universal regeneration, the new reality. New reality presupposes an old reality.” The Christ “points by marked contrast to man’s existential situation.” [27]
Old Reality: “According to prophetic and apocalyptic descriptions, is the state of the estrangement of man and his world from God. This estranged world is ruled by structures of evil, symbolized as demonic powers. They rule individual souls, nations, and even nature. They produce anxiety in all forms.” [27]
New Reality: The Messiah conquers the old reality “to establish a new reality from which the demonic powers or the structures of destruction are excluded.” [27]
Life: “The concrete actuality of being.” [28]

Questions:

Why is the alliance between Christianity and existentialism a limited alliance?
How do the “practical explorers” of the human predicament supply material useful to the theologian?
What does the “human predicament” entail?
What separates the ‘old’ from the ‘new’ realities? It is a quantitative matter or a qualitative issue?

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III.I.B: The Transition from Essence to Existence and the Symbol of “the Fall” [29-44]

III.I.B.1: The Symbol of “the Fall” and Western Philosophy [29-31]

Summary:

[29] “The Fall,” understood as the transition from essence to existence, partially demythologizes the biblical story of Adam’s fall. It is only a partial demythologization because the idea of transition from essence to existence contains a temporal element, which applied to the divine results in persistence of myth. Idealism, including Hegel’s essentialism, reduces the fall to the difference between ideality and reality, with reality pointing toward the ideal. [30] Such idealism fails to account for human freedom and the demonic implications of history. Naturalism rejects existentialism and takes existence for granted. In the extreme, naturalism denies that there is a human predicament. Thus naturalism rejects the fall, as the transition from essence to existence or however else understood.

Definitions:

Utopianism: “The progressivistic (or revolutionary) form of the idealistic faith.” [30]
Ideology: “The conservative form of the idealistic faith.” [30]

Questions:

What is Tillich’s problem with idealism?
What do you think of when you consider the Genesis story of “the Fall” and its use as religious symbol throughout history?
In what sense is the transition from essence to existence temporal?
In what way can the idea of “the fall” be incorporated into Tillich’s system?

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III.I.B.2: Finite Freedom as the Possibility of the Transition from Essence to Existence [31-33]

Summary:

[31] Genesis chapters 1-3, understood as myth, guide the formulation of a description of the transition from essence to existence by pointing to the possibility of the fall, its motives, the event itself and its consequences. The question of how the transition from essence to existence is possible is answered in four steps: first, the solution of the polarity between freedom and destiny (Volume I); second, the solution of the polarity between being and finitude/non-being (Volume I); [32] third, through one’s freedom even from his/her freedom, such that one can surrender his/her humanity; and fourth, through the working of finite freedom within the frame of universal destiny. [33] The possibility of the fall depends on all qualities of human freedom, taken in their unity.

Definitions:

Finite Freedom: “Man’s freedom is finite freedom. All the potentialities which constitute his freedom are limited by the opposite pole, his destiny.” [32]

Questions:

How is it possible for one to deny one’s freedom and surrender one’s humanity?
Can you think of any real life examples where a person did that? What resulted?
What does Tillich mean by “destiny” as used in this section?

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III.I.B.3: “Dreaming Innocence” and Temptation [33-36]

Summary:

[33] To understand the motifs driving the transition from essence to existence, one must first have an image of the state of essential being (essence). The state of essential being is not an actual state. The metaphor of ‘dreaming innocence’ adequately describes the state of essential being. Dreaming is a state both real and unreal, like potentiality. It anticipates the actual, which is present in the potential. Innocence points to non-actualized potentiality.

[33-34] Used metaphorically herein, innocence may mean several things: lack of actual experience; lack of personal responsibility; and lack of moral guilt. [34] Awakening from dreaming, coming to actuality, entails a loss of innocence. A striking example of which is a child coming to sexual consciousness, which has a direct parallel in Genesis. The terms dreaming and innocence are used analogically to provide a psychological approach to the state of essential or potential being. The state of dreaming innocence is not one of perfection. It drives beyond itself to the possibility of existence, which is experienced as temptation. This is how the symbol of Adam before the fall must be understood. Adam was not perfect he was merely in the state of dreaming innocence, of undecided potential. [35] God’s command to Adam to not eat of the tree of knowledge presupposed a cleavage between creator and created, in which Adam had the freedom to actualize potential sin. His desire to do so was itself the loss of innocence.

The harmony of freedom and destiny in dreaming innocence is finite, open to tension and disruption at the moment finite freedom becomes conscious of itself. That causes anxiety, a state of aroused freedom, in which one experiences anxiety over losing oneself by not actualizing the self, and also fears losing oneself by actualizing the self. That anxiety drives the transition to actuality. The state of aroused freedom triggers a reactive defense to preserve dreaming innocence. In the end, Adam opts for the actualization of his finite freedom. [36] This is a monistic, versus dualistic, understanding of human nature.

Definitions:

Dreaming: “A state of mind which is real and non-real at the same time – just as is potentiality.” [33]
Innocence: “The word has three connotations. It can mean lack of actual experience, lack of personal responsibility, and lack of moral guilt. In the metaphorical use suggested here, it is meant in all three senses.” [33-34]
Dreaming Innocence: “The essential nature of man is present in all stages of his development, although in existential distortion. In myth and dogma man’s essential nature has been projected into the past as a history before history, symbolized as a golden age or paradise. In psychological terms one can interpret this state as that of ‘dreaming innocence.’ …It has potentiality, not actuality. It has no place; it is ou topos (utopia). It has no time; it precedes temporality, and it is suprahistorical.” [33]
Anxiety: Man’s awareness of his own finitude. “All creatures are driven by anxiety; for finitude and anxiety are the same. But in man freedom is united with anxiety.” [34-35]
Angst: “A central concept of existentialism. It expresses the awareness of being finite, of being a mixture of being and non-being, or of being threatened by non-being.” [34]
Aroused Freedom: “In the state of dreaming innocence, freedom and destiny are in harmony… The tension occurs the moment in which finite freedom becomes conscious of itself and tends to become actual.” [35]
State of Temptation: “Man experiences the anxiety of losing himself by not actualizing himself and his potentialities and the anxiety of losing himself by actualizing himself and his potentialities… The anxiety of the situation is the state of temptation.” [35-36]

Questions:

What is “dreaming innocence?”
How does Tillich’s analysis of temptation and freedom, regarding the transition from essence to existence, avoid dualism?
Does this discussion of the motive for the transition from essence to existence, apply to the original transition from non-being to being?
Did Adam ‘fall’ upon realizing his desire for that which was forbidden, or upon actualizing that desire?

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III.I.B.4: The Moral and the Tragic Element in the Transition from Essential to Existential Being [36-39]

Summary:

[36] The transition from essence to existence is the ‘original fact,’ actualizing and giving validity to every fact as a universal quality of finite being. It is neither temporal nor spatial. Rather it sets the conditions of spatial and temporal existence. [37] Mythologically, the transition is seen as an event of the past, in traditional theology as the fall (particularly as related in Genesis chapter 3). The psychological-ethical form of the story, and emphasis given the story over time, obscured its cosmic/mythical elements. The most consistent cosmic emphasis of the fall is the mythic motif of the transcendent fall of the soul. [38] That motif is the tragic-universal character of existence, meaning that the very constitution of existence implies the transition from essence to existence. The estranged (in existential parlance), a fallen character of being, actualizes itself in every individual act of individual freedom and universal destiny. Existence is rooted both in ethical freedom and tragic destiny. The concept of ‘original sin’ generated by the myth of the fall must be reinterpreted by theology as a [39] realistic doctrine of man in which the ethical and tragic elements of self-estrangement are balanced.

Definitions:

Original Fact: “The transition from essence to existence… It is not an event of the past for it ontologically precedes everything that happens in time and space. It sets the conditions of spatial and temporal existence.” [36]

Questions:

Is the transition from essence to existence something that happens once in an individual’s life, at the moment of conception or birth?
If not, how does the transition from essence to existence continue as a reality in an individual’s life?
Do you think the transition from essence to existence can also operate in the opposite direction, that is, can it be reversed so one transitions from existence to essence?
What is death relative to the concepts of essence and existence? Is it the state of non-essence and non-existence?

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III.I.B.5: Creation and Fall [39-44]

Summary:

[39] Humanity is held responsible in biblical and non-biblical myths of the fall. In addition, subhuman and suprahuman figures (e.g., angelic and demonic powers) are recognized for influencing human decision-making. [40] Because human freedom is embedded in universal destiny, the transition from essence to existence has both a moral and tragic character. Questions arise. How is humanity related to nature? What is the relation between creation and the fall? Contrary to biblical realism, the fall was not an event in time and space. It is rather a transhistorical quality of all events in time and space. [41] Any other notion is absurd. Theology cannot merely drop the concept of a fallen world in favor of human responsibility. That would ignore the tragic element of destiny. We cannot separate a concept of innocent nature from the concept of individual guilt because we have learned too much from science, psychology, etc. These teach that: first, humanity evolved in a slow and continuous transformation from animal to human; [42] second, within any individual there is no way to determine when individual responsibility begins/develops, and ends; third, the unconscious affects decisions and obscures motives; and, fourth, unconscious strivings have a social dimension. [43] These drives represent the force of tragic destiny in every act of freedom, thus an individual is not guilty exclusively because of individual freedom. Likewise, nature is inseparable from humanity and therefore not entirely innocent in its existence. [44] The leap from essence to existence is the original fact, and existence includes the tragic element of destiny.

Definitions:

Angels and Demons: “Mythological names for constructive and destructive powers of being, which are ambiguously interwoven and which fight with each other in the same person, in the same social group, and in the same historical situation.” [40]
The Pelagian View: The view that humanity can avoid sin, and has avoided sin altogether.
Freedom: “The possibility of a total and centered act of the personality, an act in which all the drives and influences which constitute the destiny of man are brought into the centered unity of a decision.” [42-43]

Questions:

What does it mean to say that humans are a “centered unity of decision?”
Why is it that nature and humanity cannot be separated?
How does the fall operate as a transhistorical quality of all events in time and space?
Is there any room to argue that Tillich’s theology of the fall implies a pre-existent state of innocence (essence) and a subsequent state of guilt (Fall)?

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III.I.C: The Marks of Man’s Estrangement and the Concept of Sin [44-59]

III.I.C.1: Estrangement and Sin [44-47]

Summary:

[45] It is necessary to consider the self-destructive implications of estrangement and the relationship of the concept of estrangement to sin. Estrangement is not a biblical term although biblical depictions of estrangement abound in the symbols used and stories told. [46] In this sense estrangement is not unbiblical. Estrangement cannot replace sin but it can help reinterpret the word sin from a religious point of view. The word sin has a sharpness, which accusingly points to the element of personal responsibility. Sins are the expression of sin. The words ‘original’ or ‘hereditary,’ used with sin, are so burdened with absurdities that they may be unsalvageable.

Definitions:

Sin: “The personal act of turning away from that to which one belongs. Sin expresses most sharply the personal character of estrangement over against its tragic side.” [46]
Sins: “The expression of sin.” [46]
Love: “Following Jesus… the striving for the reunion of the separated.” [47]

Questions:

How is it that individual sins are expressions of Sin?
What is the difference, if any, between estrangement and Sin?
What is the difference, if any, between estrangement and sins?

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III.I.C.2: Estrangement as “Unbelief” [47-49]

Summary:

[47] The marks of estrangement are unbelief, concupiscence, and hubris. Unbelief, in Protestant Christianity, is turning away from God and towards oneself. ‘Un-faith’ would be a more descriptive word than ‘unbelief.’ One’s essential unity, with one’s ground of being and one’s world, is lost through both individual responsibility and tragic universality. [48] Unbelief is an empirical shift from the blessedness of life to the pleasures of a separated life. Unbelief, including un-love, is the first mark of estrangement. [49] Sin refers to our relation to God, not to ecclesiastical, moral and social authorities. Sin is religious because it points to the relation to God in terms of estrangement and possible reunion.

Definitions:

Unbelief: “For Protestant Christianity, means the act or state in which man in the totality of his being turns away from God, …the disruption of man’s cognitive participation in God.” [47]
Reconciliation: The “reunion of the estranged with God.” [48]
Grace: “The infusion of love, …the power which overcomes estrangement.” [49]

Questions:

What is ‘unbelief’ and how does it come to be?
To what extent is Tillich’s Systematic Theology merely a reinterpretation, or salvaging, of traditional Christian words and ideas?
How are sin and estrangement reconciled?
How could a life separated from blessedness be pleasurable?

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III.I.C.3: Estrangement as Hubris [49-51]

Summary:

[49] Humans are the only fully centered beings possessing both consciousness and self-consciousness. One’s ability to see one’s self as the center in which all parts of one’s world converge, is at once the perfection of creation and the source of the temptation to make one’s self existentially the center of self and world. [50] Hubris has been called the spiritual sin. It is the other side of unbelief, turning to one’s self, in the totality of one’s being, as the center of one’s self and one’s world. [51] The main feature of hubris as spiritual sin is that one does not acknowledge one’s finitude. Hubris is both individual and cultural, and in all cases has disastrous consequences (as demonstrated in Greek tragedy and biblical stories of prophets and Pharisees). Demonic structures drive one to confuse natural self-affirmation with destructive self-elevation.

Definitions:

Structural Centeredness: Man’s “ability to transcend both himself and his world, to look at both, and see himself in perspective as the center in which all parts of his world converge.” [49]
Hubris: “The self-elevation of man into the sphere of the divine.” [50]
Pride: “A moral quality, whose opposite is humility.” [50]
Idolatry: “Attributing infinite significance to [man’s] finite cultural creations, elevating them into matters of ultimate concern.” [51]

Questions:

What does Tillich mean when he says humanity is the “perfection of creation?”
Identify some Greek tragic heroes who experienced a downfall because of hubris, and explain how their stories relate to Tillich’s use of hubris.
What does Tillich mean by “demonic structures?”

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III.I.C.4: Estrangement as “Concupiscence” [51-55]

Summary:

[51] What tempts a person to become centered in him/herself? [52] Because individuals are separated from the whole through finitude, we desire reunion with the whole. This poverty compels one to seek abundance. This drive is both the root of Love, and the temptation to strive for unlimited abundance, that is, concupiscence. Concupiscence refers to all aspects of one’s relation to self and world, although it is often associated (wrongly) only with sexual pleasure. [52-53] The examples of Emperor Nero, Don Juan, and Goethe’s Faust, illustrate that it was the unlimited character of striving in each case that constituted concupiscence. [53-55] Freud’s theories concerning the libido and Nietzsche’s concept of the ‘Will to Power’ includes cautions against unlimited striving, particularly because such strivings can never be satisfied. But neither Freud nor Nietzsche captures the character of concupiscence because both blur the distinction between one’s essential self-affirmation and one’s existential unlimited striving.

Definitions:

Concupiscence: “The unlimited desire to draw the whole of reality into one’s self. It refers to all aspects of man’s relation to himself and to his world.” [52]

Questions:

In what sense is striving for abundance the root of Love?
How does unlimited striving for abundance lead to sin?
How does Sin lead to the unlimited striving for abundance?
How are Freud’s attitudes about sex more Christian than Christian taboos against sex?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.C.5: Estrangement as Fact and as Act [55-58]

Summary:

[55-56] As traditionally understood, ‘Original Sin’ is absurd because it combines the human predicament with a completely free act by Adam to the exclusion of the role of destiny. [56] Adam must be understood as the essential human, symbolizing the transition from essence to existence. The only ‘original’ or ‘hereditary’ aspect to the myth is the universal destiny of estrangement. Every free act involves the destiny of estrangement and, vice versa, the destiny of estrangement is actualized by all free acts. One cannot separate sin as fact, from sin as act. One must take full responsibility for one’s acts of estrangement, while remaining aware that each act is dependent on one’s whole being, including individual and societal universal destiny. [58] One’s spiritual life is infinitely complex and includes relative and absolute elements in sin and grace.

Definitions:

Original Sin [traditional]: “Adam’s act of disobedience and the sinful disposition produced by his act in every human being. Therefore, original sin has also been called hereditary sin (Erbsünde in German). Adam’s fall, in this view, has corrupted the whole human race.” [55-56]
Original Sin [Tillich]: “The universal destiny of estrangement which concerns every man.” [56]
Sin: “As an individual act actualizes the universal fact of estrangement. As an individual act, sin is a matter of freedom, responsibility, and personal guilt.” [56]

Questions:

Does Tillich differentiate between levels of sins, or consider some sins more destructive than others?
How is it that universal estrangement is part of human destiny?
What does it mean to take responsibility for our sins?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.C.6: Estrangement Individually and Collectively [58-59]

Summary:

[58] In contrast to an individual person, a group has no natural, deciding center. [59] Therefore, a social group can neither be estranged nor reconciled. There is no such thing as collective guilt. However, there is the universal destiny of humanity, which a special group may make a special destiny, without changing its universal character. Individual guilt participates in the creation of universal destiny and the special destiny of the social group to which one belongs. But the individual is not guilty for acts of other members of his/her group. The individual is however indirectly guilty insofar as, through individual guilty acts, he/she contributes to the destiny of the group.

Definitions:

None

Questions:

If the individual is not responsible for the acts of other members of the group, or the group itself, unless he/she personally participated in such guilty acts, is it also true that the individual can claim no positive credit for the positive acts of the group or other group members?
Why is the issue of “collective guilt” significant to Tillich?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.D: Existential Self-destruction and the Doctrine of Evil [59-78]

III.I.D.1: Self-Loss and World-Loss in the State of Estrangement [59-62]

Summary:

[60] Self-contradiction drives toward self-destruction. The contradicting elements annihilate each other along with the whole. The innate structure of estrangement leads to self destruction. The basic structure of destruction is that in the polarity of self and world the loss of one entails the loss of another. Evil as a term covers everything negative. [61] In a narrower sense, evil designates both the consequence of the state of sin, and estrangement. The theodicy problem is equal to the problem of sin. Its answer lies in the necessity of freedom. Self-loss is the loss of one’s determining center, the disintegration of the unity of the person. [62] Under the control of hubris and concupiscence, the finite self strives to be the center of everything, but ends up being the center of nothing.

Definitions:

Structure of Destruction: destruction has no independent standing in the whole of reality but it is dependent on the structure of that in and upon which it acts destructively. [60]
Evil: in the larger sense “covers everything negative and includes both destruction and estrangement”; in the narrower sense, it is the “consequence of the state of sin and estrangement.” [60-61]
Self-loss: the loss of one’s determining center, the disintegration of the unity of the person. [61]

Questions:

How can the structure of self-destruction lead to the loss of self and the loss of the world?
What is “self-contradiction” as used by Tillich?
What does it mean to lose one’s determining center?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.D.2: The Conflicts in the Ontological Polarities in the State of Estrangement [62-66]

III.I.D.2.a): The Separation of Freedom from Destiny [62-64]

Summary:

[62] In the state of dreaming innocence, freedom and destiny are in harmony with each other. But in aroused freedom, freedom starts to separate itself from destiny. Hubris and concupiscence drive freedom away from relating to the objects provided by destiny. [63] When a person makes him/herself the center of the universe, he/she will be entrapped by restlessness, emptiness and meaninglessness. As freedom is distorted into arbitrariness, destiny is distorted into mechanical necessity. When freedom and destiny confront each other, it usually results in what classical theology terms the ‘bondage of will.’ The distortion of freedom and destiny is mirrored in the controversy between indeterminism and determinism.

Definitions:

Bondage of the Will: happens when a contingent motive occupies the center, but is not able to unify the motives into a centered decision. [63]
Indeterminism: a theory of person’s estranged nature; it makes the person’s freedom a matter of contingency. [63]
Determinism: a theory of person’s estranged nature; it surrenders the person’s freedom to mechanical necessity. [63]

Questions:

What are the consequences when freedom and destiny are separated from each other?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.D.2.b): The Separation of Dynamics from Form [64-65]

Summary:

[64] Essentially, dynamics and form are united in human life. Existentially, there is disruption of dynamics and form under the control of hubris and concupiscence. Dynamics in real human life are distorted into the formless urge for self-transcendence. Form, if separated from original dynamics, becomes external law. The result is legalism or rebellious outbreak. Dynamics and vitality lose themselves in their separation from form. Form, structure and law, if separated from dynamics, end in rigidity and emptiness.

Definitions:

Temptation of the new: A necessary element in all creative self-actualization, in distortion it sacrifices the creative for the new. [64]

Questions:

What will happen if dynamics and form are separated from each other?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.D.2.c): The Separation of Individualization from Participation [65-66]

Summary:

[65] Essentially, increased individualization means increased participation. Existentially, humanity exists with walls between each individual, lessening participation. Individuals can exist in the thick of collectivity and still be alone. This is the existential nature of humanity not the product of a given age or sociological situation. Particular situations reveal the interdependence of loneliness and collectivity, but those situations do not create that interdependence. [66] Systems which claim to describe completely isolated subjective humanity or completely objective humanity are examples of an idealized understanding of existential estrangement, rather than human essence. Ultimately, a completely isolated subjectivity reduces individuals to the level of object within a field of objects as well, and this conception of the individual as mere object is symptomatic of the structure of destruction.

Definitions:

Depersonalization: Objectification in the sense of “becoming a thing.” [66]

Questions:

Why does the separation of individualization and participation result in objectification?
How does increased individualization lead to increased participation?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.D.3: Finitude and Estrangement [66-75]

III.I.D.3.a): Death, Finitude, and Guilt [66-68]

Summary:

[66] The anxiety of death drives human life. Biblical religion believes in human mortality. [67] The fall separated human beings from eternity, and thereafter confined humanity with mortality. Participating in the resurrection of Christ overcomes human mortality. Like the beating of the heart, the anxiety over the horror of death is always present in human beings as finite existence. [68] Sin transforms one’s anxious awareness of having to die into the painful realization of lost eternity. One may deal with this anxiety by preferring annihilation to death. Under the condition of estrangement, anxiety about death makes death an evil, a structure of destruction. Estrangement transforms essential finitude into existential evil.

Definitions:

Death: the power of sin that prevents human participation in eternity. [67]
Guilt: one’s responsibility for the loss of one’s potential eternity. [67]

Questions:

In the story of the fall, was a human being responsible for introducing death and finitude to his (our?) world?
How does the biblical description of Jesus’ anxiety about his death confirm the universal character of the relation of finitude and anxiety?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.D.3.b): Estrangement, Time, and Space [68-70]

Summary:

[68] The basic structure of evil is the structure of self-destruction. Theology must be conscious of this universal form of evil. In the categories, the unity of being and non-being is manifest in all finite beings. They produce anxiety but they can be affirmed by courage. [69] The category of time treats human existence as mere transitoriness. Humanity’s reaction includes resistance and despair. Human being’s existential unwillingness to accept temporality makes time a demonic structure of destruction. Without the ‘eternal now,’ space is experienced as spatial contingency. Human beings strive for a final home yet remain actually pilgrims on earth. All attempts are bound to be defeated in the despair of ultimate uprootedness. Similar observations can be made about other categories, e.g., causality and substance. [70] Without the power of being itself, humanity cannot resist the element of non-being in all categories.

Definitions:

Time: “When time is experienced without the ‘eternal now’ through the presence of the power of being itself, it is known as mere transitoriness without actual presence. It is seen – as the myths concerning the gods of time indicate – as a demonic power, destroying what it has created.” [68-69]
Space: “When space is experienced without the ‘eternal here’ as the presence of the power of being itself, it is experienced as spatial contingency, i.e., without a necessary place to which man belongs.” [69]

Questions:

How is estrangement experienced in the categories of finitude?
What is the “despair of ultimate uprootedness?”
What does it mean to say that despair is “defeat in the resistance against time?”
How can ‘courage’ be a response to anxiety?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.D.3.c): Estrangement, Suffering, and Loneliness [70-72]

Summary:

[70] Suffering and loneliness are two human predicaments rooted in the structure of finitude. Suffering is both an element of essential finitude and an element of existential estrangement. Buddhism views suffering as an expression of finitude, and adopts self-negation as the path to salvation. Christianity however views suffering as the result of estrangement, and affirms courage as the path to overcome the destructiveness of suffering. [71] Within the Christian context, suffering can be meaningful. Aloneness is one of those meaningful sufferings. The individual human being, alone as a completely centered self, experiences ‘solitude’ as distinguished from ‘loneliness.’ Only one who is capable of solitude is able to have communion. In solitude, one experiences the dimension of the ultimate, the true basis for communion among those who are alone. [72] Loneliness drives individual selves to surrender the lonely self to the spirit of the collective.

Definitions:

Suffering: “Suffering, like death, is an element of finitude. It is not removed but is transformed into blessedness in the state of dreaming innocence. Under the conditions of existence, man is cut off from this blessedness, and suffering lays hold of him in a destructive way. Suffering becomes a structure of destruction – an evil.” [70]
Loneliness: “One of the causes of meaningless suffering – indeed, the main cause – is the ‘aloneness’ of the individual being, his desire to overcome it by union with other beings, and the hostility which results from the rejection of this desire.” [71] “In existential estrangement man is cut off from the dimensions of the ultimate and is left alone – in loneliness. This loneliness …is intolerable.” [71-72]
Solitude: “Being alone in essential finitude is an expression of man’s complete centeredness.” [71]

Questions:

In what sense can suffering and loneliness be meaningful?
How does the transition from essence to existence and essential being help one find meaning in suffering?
What is the difference between suffering as an expression of finitude and suffering as a result of estrangement?
What is the difference between aloneness as loneliness, and aloneness as solitude?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.D.3.d): Estrangement, Doubt, and Meaninglessness [72-75]

Summary:

[72] Finitude includes doubt. Accepting that doubt belongs to one’s essential being is an expression of one’s acceptance of his/her finitude. Without radically questioning everything there is not cognitive approach to an encountered reality. Essential doubt, even in the state of estrangement makes it possible [73] for one to analyze and control reality to the extent that one is willing to use it honestly and sacrificially. But finitude also includes uncertainty in every other respect, including general insecurity about the contingency of one being at all, the fact that one is “thrown into being” (Heidegger), without a necessary place or presence. It includes the doubt about being as being. The destructive character of existential insecurity and doubt is manifest in the way one tries to escape despair by trying to make absolute a finite security or a finite certainty. Humanity is capable of defenses to such despair that are brutal, fanatical, insufficient, and always insufficient and destructive. There is no security or certainty within finitude. When one’s defenses prove insufficient, the destructive force may be directed against the subject self, resulting in restlessness, emptiness, cynicism, and the experience of meaninglessness. [74] Evil is the self-destructive consequence of sin, yet sin remains present in such evil. The element of responsibility is not absent from structures of destruction such as meaningless suffering, loneliness, cynical doubt, meaninglessness, or despair. Yet each of these structures depends also on the universal state of estrangement. In this context, the difference between ‘sin’ and ‘evil’ is more of focus than content. Human estrangement from his/her essential being is the universal character of existence. It is inexhaustibly productive of particular evils in every period. [75] Structures of destruction are counterbalanced by structures of healing and reunion of the estranged.

Definitions:

Essential Doubt: It “is present in the methodological doubt of science as well as in the uncertainty about one’s self, one’s world, and the ultimate meaning of both.” [72]
Evil: “The self-destructive consequence of sin” in which sin is present. [74]

Questions:

How can the structures of destruction be both universally human and also historically conditioned?
How is the destructive character of existential insecurity and doubt manifest in the way one tries to escape despair?
What does it mean to use essential doubt “sacrificially?”
What is doubt about being as being?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.D.4: The Meaning of Despair and its Symbols [75-78]

III.I.D.4.a): Despair and the Problem of Suicide [75-76]

Summary:

[75] The structures of evil drive human beings into the state of despair. Despair is the final index of one’s predicament; it the boundary line beyond which no one should go. In despair, not death, one comes to the end of his/her possibilities. Despair is the state of inescapable conflict between what one is potentially and therefore ought to be, and on the other hand, what one actually is in the combination of freedom and destiny. Its pain consists of the agony of being responsible for the loss of the meaning of one’s existence and of being unable to recover it. The question of suicide arises whether suicide is a way to get rid of one’s self. Suicide has a much wider significance than the relatively few actual suicides suggests. First, the suicidal tendency in life generally longs for rest without conflict. Second, [76] suicide is tempting as meeting the desire to escape pain by getting rid of one’s self. Third, despair is the situation most conspicuously a situation in which the desire to rid one of one’s self is awake and the suicidal image appears in a most tempting way. Fourth, there are situations in which the will to live is undermined and a psychological suicide takes place in the form of non-resistance to threatening annihilation. Fifth, whole cultures preach negation as self-emptying, but not as psychological or physical suicide. For these reasons, theology should take more seriously the issue of self-negation of life in its many manifestations. Suicide should not be singled out for special moral and religious condemnation. That is based on the superstitious belief that suicide definitively excludes the operation of saving grace. The inner suicidal trend in everyone is an expression of human estrangement. Suicide is a successful attempt to escape the situation of despair on the temporal level, but unsuccessful in the dimension of the eternal.

Definitions:

Despair: Despair is more than “a psychological problem or a problem of ethics. It certainly is both; but it is more than this: it is the final index of man’s predicament; it is the boundary line beyond which man cannot go. …The word itself means ‘without hope’ and expresses the feeling of a situation from which there is ‘no exit’ (Sartre).” [75]
Suicide: Physically getting rid of one’s self. [74]

Questions:

Can suicide really allow one to escape from the pain of despair?
What is the role of grace in the face of despair?
What does it mean to identify despair as the state of inescapable conflict?
Why has suicide historically and in theology, been subject to special opprobrium?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.D.4.b): The Symbol of the “Wrath of God” [76-78]

Summary:

[76] The experience of despair is reflected in the ambiguous symbol of the ‘wrath of God.’ [77] One must ask whether the experience of despair justifies the use of the symbol ‘wrath of god’ to express an element in the relationship between God and humanity. For those who are aware of their own estrangement from God, God is the threat of ultimate destruction. However, even those who are reconciled with God experience the wrath of God as an experience of the God with whom they are reconciled. The divine love stands against all that is not love. Instead divine love seeks to save, not destroy, persons who have fallen into self-destruction. The only way love operates in one who has rejected love is in showing him/her the self-destructive consequences of the rejection of love. One who experiences such love may experience it as a threat to his being. One’s preliminary view is of a God of wrath. But that view is ultimately wrong. [78] Knowing that the view of God as wrath is ultimately wrong does not erase the prior experience of a wrathful God. Only the acceptance of forgiveness can transform the image of the wrathful God into the ultimately valid image of the God of love.

Definitions:

Wrath of God: In Christian theology, the wrath of God is “an expression of the negative side of the final judgment.” [77]

Questions:

In what context does Tillich affirm the reality of the personal experience of the wrath of God?
What is the forgiveness that transforms the image of a wrathful God into the image of a God of Love? What is its source?
Why is despair linked to the concept of the wrath of God?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.D.4.c): The Symbol of “Condemnation” [78]

Summary:

[78] The experience of despair is also expressed in the symbol of condemnation. Often erroneously referred to as ‘eternal condemnation.’ Only God is eternal. Rather, condemnation should be thought of as removal from the eternal. The experience of separation from one’s eternity is the state of despair. However, even in the state of separation God is creatively working in us – even if God’s creativity takes the way of destruction. We are never cut off from the ground of being, not even when we are in the state of condemnation.

Definitions:

Eternity: “The opposite of condemnation.” [78]
Condemnation: One’s “removal from the eternal.” [78]
Despair: “Separation from one’s eternity.” [78]

Questions:

Why should the term ‘eternal condemnation’ be eliminated from theological vocabulary?
Why is the expression ‘eternal death’ absurd?
How does one become separated from his/her eternity? What does that mean in historical personal experience?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.E: The Quest for the New Being and the Meaning of “Christ” [78-96]

III.I.E.1: Existence as Fate or the Bondage of the Will [78-80]

Summary:

[78] All acts of existential self-realization, freedom and destiny are united. Existence is both fact and act, and it follows that no act within existential estrangement can destroy existential estrangement. Destiny keeps freedom in bondage without eliminating it. This is expressed in the doctrine of the ‘bondage of the will’ as developed by Luther in his fight with Erasmus, [79] and in other theological elaborations. In each case the meaning of anti-Pelagianism has been misunderstood and confused with philosophical determinism, making persons objects among other objects. The anti-Pelagian emphasis does not necessarily lead to Manichaean thought. The doctrine ‘bondage of the will’ presupposes ‘freedom of the will.’ And in that sense it can only apply to human beings. Only what is essentially free can come under existential bondage. Grace does not create a being unconnected to the one who receives grace. Grace does not destroy essential freedom it reunites the estranged without destroying essential freedom. Nevertheless, the bondage of will is a universal fact for humans as finite beings. Attempts to overcome estrangement and obtain union with God in finite relations through expressions of essential freedom do not bring reunion with God. Humans in relation to God can do nothing without God. The tree produces the fruits. Attempts to overcome estrangement within the power of one’s estranged existence, lead to hard toil and tragic failure. Only the person with new being can fulfill the law joyfully, because the law is not strange to the new being. Only a New Being can produce a new action.

Definitions:

Bondage of Will: “Only what is essentially free can come under bondage. The doctrine of the ‘bondage of the will’ is a term that can apply only to man. …Only man, because he is finite freedom, is open to the compulsions of existential estrangement.” [78]
Grace: Grace “does what freedom under the conditions of existence cannot do, namely, it reunites the estranged.” [79]

Questions:

What does Tillich mean when he says nature does not have freedom? [79]
How does new being precede new acting? [79]
To what extent is ‘psychological truth’ also ‘religious truth’ in the sense of the binding of the will?
Repeatedly in discussing the forms of despair, Tillich offers courage and grace as counterbalancing functions. In what sense do courage and grace work to save one from despair?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.E.2: Ways of Self-Salvation and Their Failure [80-86]

III.I.E.2.a): Self-salvation and Religion [80]

Summary:

[80] A basic criticism of the religion and its history is that it is often equated with the history of human attempts and failures at self-salvation. Religion is not only a function of life; it is the place where life receives the conqueror of the ambiguities of life, the divine Spirit. The question of salvation can be asked only if salvation is already at work. Pure despair – the state without hope – is unable to seek beyond itself. The theological circle follows from the non-deductive, existential character of theology. The quest for the New Being presupposes the presence of the New Being. The search for truth presupposes the presence of truth. The theological circle follows from the non-deductive, existential character of theology. Thus the concept of religion must be commented on prior to its systematic treatment. Religion is not equated with the attempt at self-salvation. The tragedy of religion is that it distorts what it has received and fails in what it tries to achieve.

Definitions:

Religion: “Religion is not only a function of life; it is also the place where life receives the conqueror of the ambiguities of life, the divine Spirit. Therefore, it is the sphere in which the quest for the New Being appears over against the split between essential and existential being.” [80]
Pure Despair: “Pure Despair – the state without hope – is unable to seek beyond itself.” [80]

Questions:

In what sense is religion not just a function of life, but also a place?
What is the Theological circle?
How is religion itself tragic?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.E.2.b): Legalistic Ways of Self-salvation [81]

Summary:

[81] Legalistic ways of self-salvation are the most conspicuous and important ways of self-salvation in the history of religion. The law is a divine gift. It is the manifestation of humanity’s true nature. Legalism is almost an irresistible temptation in so far as it prescribes for human beings a set of rules and practices by which to obtain what has been lost – union with God. But the situation of human estrangement, which allows law to become commandment, is precisely the situation in which the law cannot be fulfilled. This is true of every particular commandment and of the all-embracing law of love. In the state of estrangement, love necessarily becomes commandment. But love cannot be commanded, because it is the power of the sought for reunion with God which precedes and fulfills the command before it is given. Whenever attempted, legalism as a way of self-salvation has led to catastrophe. In all cases something good becomes distorted by claiming power to overcome the state of estrangement through obedience to the commanding law. However, fallen humanity cannot fulfill the law as commandments. The greatness of legalism is its unconditional seriousness. The failure of legalism to achieve reunion can lead to rejection of the law, despair, or – through despair – to the quest for New Being

Definitions:

Legalism: The law, despite being a divine gift, within existential estrangement becomes commandments.” [81]
Law: “The law is, first of all, a divine gift; it shows to man his essential nature, his true relationship to God, other men and himself.” [81]

Questions:

Why is the legalistic way of self-salvation bound to fail?
Why is it that love cannot be commanded?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.E.2.c): Ascetic Ways of Self-salvation [81-83]

Summary:

[81] Asceticism stands in-between legalism and mysticism. It is a term used in different ways. It designates self-restriction in connection with obedience to the law. As such it is a necessary element in every act of moral self-realization. It is used in the sense of putting limits to the endlessness of libido and the will to power. It turns these to an acceptance of one’s finitude. As such it is an implement of wisdom and a demand of love. Asceticism is always in danger of being valued as a means to self-salvation. Asceticism crept into Puritan churches as self-restriction, seen as a means to obtain worldly goods and divine blessing. Ontological asceticism is the main form of asceticism. It attempts to attain salvation through a complete negation of finite reality. As an element in the processes of life, asceticism is necessary; as an attempt at self-salvation, asceticism is a dangerous distortion and a failure.

Definitions:

Asceticism: “It designates self-restriction in connection with obedience to law. As such it is a necessary element in every moral self-realization. It puts limits to the endlessness of libido and the will to power and turns them to an acceptance of one’s finitude. As such it is an implement of wisdom and a demand of love.” [82]
Inner worldly asceticism: “Using ascetic restriction in relation to one finite good in order to attain another finite good.” [82]
Ontological asceticism: “The main form of asceticism … is based on the ontological devaluation of finite being.” [82]

Questions:

Why can’t asceticism lead to salvation?
What is ontological asceticism?
What does it mean to say asceticism stands between legalism and mysticism?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.E.2.d): Mystical Ways of Self-salvation [83-84]

Summary:

[83] The ontological form of asceticism usually appears in mysticism. ‘Mystical’ is, first of all, a category characterizing the divine as present in experience. Mysticism as the ‘felt presence of God’ is a category essential to the nature of religion. It has nothing to do with self-salvation. Self-salvation is evident when one tries to reach reunion through bodily and mental exercises. But this also fails to unite the finite being with the infinite. Brief experiences of transcendence through union with God do not overcome the estrangement of ordinary existence. And long periods of ‘dryness of soul’ usually follow moments of ecstasy. The conditions of existence are untouched. One concrete form of mysticism, unrecognized by theologians, is ‘baptized mysticism,’ in which the mystical experience depends on the appearance of the new reality and does not try to produce it.

Definitions:

Mystical: “Is first of all a category which characterizes the divine as being present in experience. In this sense the mystical is the heart of every religion as religion.” [83]
Baptized Mysticism: “The mystical experience depends on the appearance of the new reality and does not attempt to produce it. The form of this mysticism is concrete.” [84]

Questions:

Why does mystical ecstasy fail to bring salvific union with the Ultimate?
What is ‘concrete’ about baptized mysticism?
Is an ecstatic encounter the same thing as the experience of union with God? Can you give an experiential example?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.E.2.e): Sacramental, Doctrinal, Emotional Ways of Self-salvation [84-86]

Summary:

[84] In the Roman Catholic Church self-salvation is a matter of sacrament, with a large helping of doctrine. In Protestant Churches (especially Lutheran Churches), self-salvation is a matter of doctrine, with a large helping of sacrament. In both cases, the special manifestation of the New Being in visual or verbal form is distorted into a ritual or intellectual work claiming to conquer existential estrangement through its very performance. [85] Sacramental self-salvation is the distortion of sacramental receptivity. The mere performance of the rites or the mere participation in a sacramental act can never bring about reunion with God. In Lutheran Protestantism, the doctrine of ‘justification by faith’ was distorted into a tool of self-salvation. Faith as the state of being grasped by an ultimate was distorted and transformed into a belief in doctrine. The terrible inner struggles between the will to be honest and the will to be saved show the failure of doctrinal self-salvation. The emotional type of self-salvation is present in pietism and in revivalism of all forms. They provoke the desire for emotions that are not genuine but are artificially created. [86] The personal encounter with God and reunion with God, are at the heart of genuine religion. Yet, when distorted, it becomes ‘piety,’ a toll to achieve self-transformation. But, as with all things imposed upon the self’s spiritual life, by the self or others, it remains artificial, producing fanaticism, anxiety, and the intensification of works of piety. All ways of self-salvation distort the way of salvation.

Definitions:

None

Questions:

Deprived of sacrament, doctrine and emotional pietism, what left in Christianity whereby one may seek salvation?
What is the difference between the search for self-salvation through sacrament, and the search for self-salvation through doctrine?
What’s so bad, or ineffective, about piety?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.I.E.3: Non-historical and Historical Expectations of the New Being [86-88]

Summary:

[86] The quest for the New Being is universal because the human predicament and its ambiguous conquest are universal. [87] One can distinguish two main types of New Being. The decisive difference refers to the role of history in both types: the New Being can be sought above history, and it can be understood as the aim of history. The first type is predominantly non-historical and the second type is mainly historical. In the non-historical type, the New Being is divine power appearing within the limits of finitude, attempting to overcome the human predicament. The New Being is not the aim of history but appears in the epiphanies of the gods, in spiritual effects produced by ascetics and seers, in divine incarnations, in oracles, and in spiritual elevation. These manifestations are received by individuals and not by groups. Groups do not participate in the effects of the New Being. Humanity’s misery is not to be changed, but individuals may transcend the whole sphere of existence. In this sense the New Being is negation of all beings and the affirmation of the Ground of Being alone. This is the root of difference in the East and West in the feeling for life.

In the West religion and culture are understood historically, and have been determined by the expectation of the New Being in the historical process. The whole of reality is affirmed because it is considered to be essentially good. [88] Bearers of this process are historical groups, such as families, nations and churches. Individuals bear it only in relation to the group. New Being is the expectation of a transformed reality. Transformation occurs differently according to the forms of the historical type. It may occur in a slow process, or at its end when history is elevated to eternity. But, in Christianity the decisive event occurs in the center of history, and is precisely what gives history a center. Christ is the name which Christianity applied to the bearer of the New Being in its final manifestation.

Definitions:

Christ: “The name which Christianity applied to the bearer of the New Being in its final manifestation.” [88]

Questions:

In Western thought why is New Being understood as an historical process, experienced by an individual versus a group?
How is this fundamentally different from a non-historic view of New-Being more common in Eastern religions?

Changes in German:

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III.I.E.4: The Symbol of “Christ,” Its Historical and Its Transhistorical Meaning [88-90]

Summary:

[88] The history of the symbol of the ‘Messiah’ confirms the universal human expectation of a new reality. Messiah as a symbol has roots in the Semitic and Egyptian worlds. Initial the symbol drew heavily on kingship, and was proclaimed as ‘the anointed one.’ As that political meaning was transcended, more and more symbolic traits were attached to the symbol. But Messiah always related to history. The Messiah does not save individuals by a path leading out of historical existence. Rather, the Messiah transforms historical existence. Messianic thought does not demand that the New Being sacrifice the finite being, instead it fulfills all finite being by conquering its estrangement. This is a strictly historical (horizontal) elaboration of the character of the Messianic idea. [89] The messianic idea can be embodied in a nation, a small group, a social class, etc. As an historical type it was able to take in non-historical types of messianic figures. In so far as Christianity claims universality, it implicitly maintains that all quests for the New Being are fulfilled in Jesus as the Christ. In order to be universally valid, Christianity must unite the historical direction (horizontal) of the expectation of the New Being with the vertical one (transhistorical elements and apocalyptic/cosmic events).

Definitions:

Messiah: “The ‘anointed one,’ is the king. He conquers the enemies and establishes peace and justice.” [88]

Questions:

Is the quest for the content of New Being really universal?
What is the difference between the horizontal and the vertical quality of the Messianic expectation?
How does the universal validity of Christianity depend on its ability to unite the horizontal direction of the expectation of the New Being with the vertical one?

Changes in German:

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III.I.E.5: The Meaning of Paradox in Christian Theology [90-92]

Summary:

[90] The Christian assertion that the New Being has appeared in Jesus as the Christ is paradoxical. Paradoxical as a term must be distinguished from its various misunderstandings, such as the reflective-rational, the dialectical-rational, the irrational, the absurd, and the nonsensical. The reflective-rational realm can also be called the realm of technical reason. Paradoxical has often been confused with the dialectical. Dialectical thinking is not paradoxical it is rational. In a dialectical description one element of a concept drives to another. Life itself is dialectical. [91] The Theological paradox is not ‘irrational.’ But the transition from essence to existence, potential to actual, and dreaming innocence to existential guilt and tragedy, is irrational. This irrationality in the transition from essence to existence is experienced in everything as an irrational presence, not as paradox. Absurdity arises when logically compatible words are combined to contradict the meaningful order of reality. The absurd lies in the area of the grotesque and the ridiculous. Finally, paradox is not the same as nonsense. Theologians who insist divine truth is above human reason propagate nonsense, not paradox. [92] Something is paradoxical if it contradicts the doxa, the opinion based on the whole of ordinary human experience including the empirical and the rational. The appearance of the New Being under the conditions of existence, yet at the same time judging and conquering them, is the paradox of the Christian message. The paradox is a new reality and not a logical riddle.

Definitions:

Paradoxical: “The paradoxical must be distinguished from the following: the reflective-rational, the dialectical-rational, the irrational, the absurd, and the nonsensical.” [90] “That is paradoxical which contradicts the doxa, the opinion which is based on the whole of ordinary human experience, including the empirical and the rational”
Reflective-rational: This “can also be called the realm of technical reason, namely, the kind of thinking which not only follows the laws of formal logic (as all thinking must) but also believes that the only dimensions of being are those which can be totally grasped with the tool of formal logic. [90]
Dialectical: “Dialectical thinking is rational, not paradoxical. …In a dialectical description one element of a concept drive to another.” [90]

Questions:

What is the difference between paradoxical thinking and dialectical thinking?
Is paradox absolutely necessary for the New Being to be revealed under the conditions of existential estrangement?
Is there a meaningful order to reality?
What is the difference between paradox and nonsense? Why is this distinction relevant to theological formulations?

Changes in German:

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III.I.E.6: God, Man, and the Symbol of the “Christ” [93-96]

Summary:

[93] A proper understanding of paradox is essential to consider the meaning of Christ as the bearer of the New Being in relation to God, humanity, and the universe. Responding to such considerations requires applying the method of correlation, in which questions and answers determine each other. Christ is often conceived of as a mediator. Mediating in Christianity means reunion between infinite and finite and between the conditioned and unconditional. The mediator has a saving function; he is a savior. But every mediating and saving activity comes from God and not the mediator. God is the subject and not the object of mediation and salvation. Christ as mediator and savior is not a third reality between God and man. He represents God to humanity and shows humanity what God wants humanity to be. Christ is not an ontological reality beside God and man. [94] The paradox of the Christian message is that essential humanity has appeared in one life, under the conditions of existence without being conquered by them. Incarnation is a non-biblical term requiring close theological scrutiny. Incarnation understood as God become man is not a paradoxical statement; it is nonsensical. Other metaphors, such as ‘Son of God,’ ‘Spiritual Man,’ or the ‘Man from Above,’ are not nonsensical – but they are dangerous. They carry a polytheistic connotation and rely on mythological interpretation by which divine beings are transmuted into natural or human entities. Thus, incarnation is characteristic of paganism and not Christianity. [95] A modifying interpretation of ‘Incarnation’ follows the Johannine formulation of ‘Logos became flesh’ Christianity. And God still remains being God in each moment. Unlike a transmutation myth, ‘Logos become flesh’ asserts that God is manifest in personal life process as a saving participant in the human predicament. Although this is a truer expression of the Christian paradox, ‘Logos become flesh’ will not protect the concept of incarnation from superstitious connotations.

A question that has been carefully avoided by many theologians is the problem of how to understand the meaning of the symbol ‘Christ’ in light of the immensity of the universe, the heliocentric system of planets, the infinitely small part of the universe occupied by humanity, and the possibility of other worlds in which drive self-manifestations may appear and be received. The function of the Christ, the bearer of the New Being, goes beyond individual salvation and historical transformation. It includes renewal of the universe. The concept of essential humanity appearing in personal lives, under the conditions of existential estrangement, restricts the expectations of the Christ to historical humanity versus universal renewal. [96] Universal possibilities cannot be proved or disproved. Humanity however cannot claim to occupy the only possible place for Incarnation. The manifestation of saving power in one place implies that the saving power is operating in all places.

Definitions:

Mediating: “In Christianity means bridging the infinite gap between the infinite and the finite, between the unconditional and the conditioned. But the function of mediating is more than making the ultimate concrete. Mediation is reunion.” [93]
Incarnation: “Logos became flesh”. [96]

Questions:

Is the symbol of ‘Christ’ universally valid?
What is the foundation for Tillich’s statement that the Christ, the bearer of New Being, has as one task the renewal of the universe?
Tillich suggests that if there are non-human beings elsewhere in the universe, capable of understanding their existential estrangement, then the manifestation of the saving presence is inescapably implied. Do you agree?
If Tillich’s universal premise is correct, would that ‘saving presence’ necessarily be one and the same with the saving presence existing in relation to humanity? If the same, how likely is that given the unlimited possibility for variation in life subject to evolution in non-human environments? If different, does that introduce polytheism into the System?

Changes in German:

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III.II: The Reality of the Christ [97-180]

III.II.A: Jesus as the Christ [97-118]

III.II.A.1: The Name “Jesus Christ” [97-98]

Summary:

[97] Christianity affirms that Jesus of Nazareth, an historical person, is the ‘Christ,’ otherwise known as the New Being. Christianity was born not upon the birth of the historical person, but in the moment when one of his disciples (attributed to Simon Peter) was driven to acknowledge him as the Christ. Christianity will exist as long as there are persons who make this confession. Christianity therefore has two elements: the person Jesus of Nazareth, and the confession of faith in Jesus as the Christ. That moment of confession is also the moment that Jesus as the Christ was rejected by the powers of history. To continue to call Jesus the Christ after his death means asserting the paradox that the one who was to overcome existential estrangement was nonetheless its victim. This is the central story of the Gospel. Jesus Christ is not a first and last name combination. [98] It combines the historical figure (Jesus) with the concept of messiah, in Greek christos. Thus Jesus as the anointed one, or Jesus as the Christ, becomes truncated to Jesus Christ. It is a struggle in homiletics and liturgy to maintain the true meaning of “Jesus Christ” as “Jesus who is the Christ.”

Definitions:

Christianity: “The affirmation that Jesus of Nazareth, who has been called ‘the Christ,’ is actually the Christ, namely, he who brings the new state of things, the New Being.” [97]
The Gospel: In essence, “the statement that the man Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ.” [97]
Jesus Christ: The combination of the name for the historic individual who bore that name, with the title ‘The Christ’ …expressing in the mythological tradition a special figure with a special function.” [98]
Messiah: In Greek: Christos; “The ‘anointed one’ who has received an unction from God enabling him to establish the reign of God in Israel and in the world.” [98]

Questions:

What is the difference between the proper name, “Jesus Christ,” and the identification ‘Jesus as the Christ?’
What paradox is down-played in the term Jesus Christ?
Why is the paradox of Jesus as the Christ so important to Christianity?

Changes in German:

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III.II.A.2: Event, Fact, and Reception [98-99]

Summary:

[98] Jesus is both historical figure and subject of believing reception. Both aspects must be acknowledged with equal strength. To undercut one of these aspects of Christian belief, his humanity or his accepted messianic status, undercuts Christian theology. Jesus as the Christ conquers existential estrangement completely, thereby conquering it for all. Unless existential estrangement was conquered by one personal life, the New Being would have remained a quest and not a reality. [99] On the other hand, the believing reception of Jesus as the Christ was necessary for the final manifestation of the New Being itself. So the fact of Jesus as a man and his reception by others as the Christ are equally important. Otherwise Jesus would simply be a historically important person, perhaps heralding New Being, but not New Being itself. The receptive side of the Christian event is as important as the factual side.

Definitions:

The Christian Event: The historical fact of the existence of Jesus of Nazareth and the receptive belief in Jesus as the Christ. [98]
Jesus as the Christ: “The manifestation of the New Being in time and space.” [99]

Questions:

Could Jesus have simply proclaimed himself the Christ and then fully assumed that role?
Was it important that Jesus was accepted as the Christ By his contemporaries?

Changes in German:

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III.II.A.3: History and the Christ [99-101]

Summary:

[99] If half of the paradox of Jesus as the Christ is his reception as the Christ by humanity, is his reality as bearer of New Being negated by the possibility that humanity can destroy itself. Such catastrophic destruction would result in a completely new beginning of the human race. That might leave no memory of the event of Jesus as the Christ. Now that mankind has acquired the power to extinguish itself (‘the suicide of mankind’), this question is not merely hypothetical. [100] The Gospel says that Jesus will be with humanity until the end of history, but modern humanity now has the ability to destroy itself. How do we reconcile the Gospel with the modern technological age? The structure of the universe clearly demonstrates that the conditions of life on earth are limited in time, and that the conditions for continuance of human life are even more limited. The beginning of this history is the questioning search for New being and the end will be the drastic alteration or destruction of humanity, meaning it no longer seeks New Being and Jesus as the Christ as the center is definitely broken. This moment cannot be empirically determined. [101] Whatever its causes, catastrophic self-denial would be the end of that development of which Jesus as the Christ is the center. So Christ is the center of the current specific human search for New Being, but Christian faith does not preclude alternate manifestations of the divine in other existential situations.

Definitions:

Existential Limitation: That “Jesus is the Christ for us [the savior for human beings], …but this does not qualitatively limit his significance.” [101] The divine may manifest in other forms “before or after our historical continuum.” [101]

Questions:

What does it mean for the Christ to be the fulfillment of human history.
How would it be possible for historical humanity to end? What would that mean for Christology?
Is the Christ, or the divine manifestations of God, dependent upon human history and time?
Was the appearance and death of the Christ the end or the beginning of human history?

Changes in German:

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III.II.A.4: The Research for the Historical Jesus and Its Failure [101-107]

Summary:

[101] Biblical research, which combines analytical-critical and constructive-conjectural methods, has intensified theological problems that have always existed in the Church. The historical method unites analytical-critical and constructive-conjectural elements. Biblical research became suspect from its very beginning because it criticized not only historical sources, but also the revelation contained in the sources. It appeared to be impossible to separate the historical sources from the revelation contained in those sources. Ultimately, historical criticism seemed to undercut faith itself.

[102] Facts about the historical Jesus were sought. Its motives were religious and scientific at the same time. The constructive-conjectural aspect seeks the facts of Jesus of Nazareth. Ultimately, the search for the historical Jesus, despite yielding many positive benefits, was a failure. Not only did the historical personage not appear, it receded further and further with every step. Ultimately, this search yielded the insight that there is no picture behind the biblical Jesus that could be considered scientifically probable. This is not a preliminary shortcoming of historical research itself. It results from the nature of the sources available. The reports about Jesus are those about Jesus as the Christ, given by those who received him as such. It has proven impossible to sketch a probable picture of Jesus of Nazareth that is separate from Jesus as the Christ. [103] At best the effort yields more or less probable results, incapable of sustaining either acceptance or rejection of Christian faith.

[103] Because of the critical aspect of this research people fear it will destroy doctrine, so they attack its scientific validity and assert it is theologically prejudiced. [104] The example of the treatment of New Testament miracles is rife with potential for prejudice. The historical approach to miracle stories claims to not assume either that they did, or did not, occur. Historical research can never conclude with certainty whether these miracle stories actually happened. The best that can be achieved is a high degree of probability that something did or did not actually happen. Anyone asking these historical questions must be indifferent to the results. Otherwise prejudice and presuppositions close their eyes to particular facts and open them to others. This ‘opening of the eyes’ cannot be transformed into a methodological principle. The only valid methodological procedure is to look at the subject matter and not one’s own looking at the subject matter.

[107] The inadequacy of historical research would be more obvious but for the semantic confusion about the term ‘historical Jesus.’ It means both Jesus of Nazareth and Jesus as the Christ. The former allows only fragmentary and hypothetical knowledge of the person of Jesus. The latter raises the question of faith and not historical research. Fruitful and honest discussion is possible only if the two meanings of the term ‘historical Jesus’ are clearly distinguished.

Definitions:

Historical Criticism: “Means nothing more than historical research. …applied to biblical literature.” [101]
Analytical-critical: In historical criticism, the deconstructive critique of Biblical sources and circumstances, not the critique of faith itself. [101]
Constructive-conjectural: In historical criticism, the “desire to discover the reality of this man, Jesus of Nazareth” behind the Biblical account. [101]
Gestalt: A German word meaning ‘figure’ or ‘shape’. In this section, this word refers to the attempt of the historical project to “reduce the picture of the historical Jesus to the ‘essentials’, to elaborate a Gestalt while leaving the particulars open to doubt.” [103]

Questions:

What two meanings of the ,historical’ Jesus must be considered for fruitful and honest discussion to go forward?
Can historical criticism critique faith and be a scientifically valid enterprise?
What was the aim of historical criticism? Was it successful?
What does Tillich consider the unintended result of historical criticism?
What is the problem with using the term ‘historical Jesus?’

Changes in German:

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III.II.A.5: Historical Research and Theology [107-113]

Summary:

[107] Historical research, despite its failure to find the ‘historical Jesus,’ is still useful to Christianity. It is one of the great events in the history of Christianity and even of religion and human culture. Protestantism demonstrated great courage by subjecting its holy writings to critical analysis through the historical method. [108] In the end, it became manifest that the Christian assertion that Jesus is the Christ did not contradict uncompromising historical honesty. It changed theology in several ways. First, and most importantly, theology learned to distinguish between the empirically historical, the legendary, and the mythological elements in the stories of both the Old and New Testament. The distinction between these forms has great significance for the systematic theologian. The certitude of faith does not make the historically improbable probable, or the probable improbable probable, or the probable or improbable certain. Analyzing the differences between historical, legendary and mythological in Gospel reports has given systematic theology a tool for dealing with the Christological symbols of the bible.

Christological symbols (e.g. ‘Son of David,’ ‘Son of Man,’ ‘Heavenly Man,’ ‘Messiah,’ ‘Son of God,’ ‘Logos,’ and ‘Kyrios’) develop in a four step process: [109] first, these symbols arise and grow in their own religious culture and language; second, these symbols are used by those to whom they had become alive as expressions of their self-interpretation and as answers to questions implied in their existential predicament; third, these symbols are transformed when used to interpret the event upon which Christianity is based; and fourth, these symbols are distorted by popular superstition, supported by theological literalism and supranaturalism. The symbol ‘Son of God,’ applied to the Christ, has developed in the four-step process.

[110] Christianity considers the Christ as the ‘only begotten son of God,’ thereby contrasting him to all other humans and their lost status as children of God. ‘Son of God’ becomes the title of the one in whom essential unity of God and humanity has appeared under the conditions of existence. The symbol ‘Son of God,’ reestablishes the parent and child character of every human relation with God. It becomes distorted when taken literally to project a familial relation into the inner life of the divine.

The symbols of ‘Messiah’ or ‘Christ’ must be reinterpreted in light of the four steps identified in relation to all Christological symbols. The first step points to the historical-transhistorical figure through whom Jahweh will establish his kingdom in Israel, and through Israel, throughout the world. [111] The symbol’s historical emphasis prevailed in the historical period, and the transhistorical element prevailed in the apocalyptic period. The second step is the predicament of humanity’s experience in actual existence. The Messianic idea was increasingly emphasized in the later period of Judaism and very strongly expressed in apocalyptic literature. The third step is the reception and transformation of this set of symbols by Christianity. The defeat of the Messiah on the cross remains too radical for Judaism, which continues to deny the messianic character of Jesus. Fourth is the literalistic distortion of the messianic paradox. ‘Christ’ became a proper name instead of a symbolic designation, and came to denote an individual with supranatural powers.

The final example for development of Christological symbols is the conceptual symbol of ‘the Logos.’ The rational structure of the universe is mediated through the Logos. [112] In Christianity the Logos reveals the mystery and reunites the estranged by appearing as an historical reality in a personal life. In the third step, the Logos is received and transformed by Christianity. Christianity replaces the wise man of stoicism with the Spiritual man, who is aware of his foolishness as overcome by the foolishness of the Cross. Finally, the conceptual symbol of the Logos became re-mythologized into the story of the metamorphosis of a divine being into the man Jesus of Nazareth. This is an absurd misunderstanding of ‘Incarnation’ that must be demythologized. Historical criticism is largely responsible for the development of Christological symbols which are useful for theology. [113] Historical research is important because it keeps faith and theology from becoming absurd and superstitious.

Definitions:

None

Questions:

Why is it important to combat superstition in biblical literalism? How does historical criticism do this?
Why must the historian and the interpreter of faith remain separate?
In the example of the Logos, what error about the Christ may be corrected by historical criticism?
What is meant by the symbol ‘Son of God?’

Changes in German:

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III.II.A.6: Faith and Historical Skepticism [113-117]

Summary:

[113] The historical approach led to positive and negative results. The negative assertion is that the historical approach can neither give nor take away the foundation of the Christian faith. The positive assertion is that historical research must influence Christian Theology. It influences theology in three ways: first, by analyzing the three semantic levels of biblical literature; second, by demonstrating the steps in the development of Christological symbols, and third, by providing a precise philological and historical understanding of biblical literature. All this raises the question whether acceptance of the historical method introduces a dangerous insecurity into the thought and life of the church and every individual Christian.

There are different responses to this concern. Historical analysis has not yet proven that Jesus of Nazareth either existed, or did not exist. The anxious question is whether it will disprove Jesus’ existence sometime in the future. Faith cannot rest on such unsure ground. Another response is to say that the historical foundation of Christianity is an essential element of Christian faith itself [114] and that later faith overrules skeptical possibilities (the not yet) of historical analysis. But faith can only guarantee its own foundation, namely the appearance of that reality which has created the faith, i.e. the New Being. Faith is the immediate awareness of the New Being and only participation, not historical reality, guarantees the event upon which Christianity is based. While guaranteeing the experience of a personal life in which New Being has overcome the old being, historical argument cannot prove that New Being was Jesus of Nazareth. Whatever the man’s name was, he was a bearer of New Being. Faith guarantees the existence of the Christ, though any number of historical particulars about Jesus may change. We do not need concrete evidence of New Being because the community that resulted from New Being is actually evidence of its transformative power. The New Being has power to transform those who are transformed by it.

[115] Concrete biblical material is not guaranteed by faith in terms of historical factuality, but it evidences the historical actuality of the transformative power of New Being by its creators. Only in this sense does faith guarantee the biblical picture of Jesus. Symbols founded on Christianity contain the power of New Being, not some factual understanding of the ‘real’ Jesus we have extrapolated from symbols. [116] Despite our inability to know all the historical facts about Jesus, we still know him in that we participate in his New Being intimately. This participation is both personal and universal. Faith is faith in symbols of ultimate concern, not historical facts. [117] A wrong faith can destroy the meaning of one’s life, a wrong historical judgment cannot.

Definitions:

Analogia imaginis: “Namely, an analogy between the picture and the actual personal life and the picture which it has arisen. It was this reality, when encountered by the disciples, which created the picture. And it was, and still is, this picture which mediates the transforming power of the New Being.” [115]
Analogis entis – “A way (actually the only way) of speaking of God.” [115]

Questions:

How does faith balance historical criticism?
How do we know that faith is the product of New Being? Why is this important?
What is the difference between faith in symbols and faith in historical facts? Can they be compared?

Changes in German:

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III.II.A.7: The Biblical Witness to Jesus as the Christ [117-118]

Summary:

[117] The New Testament is the foundational document wherein appears the picture of Jesus as the Christ in its original and basic form. The New Testament is also an integral part of the event it documents insofar as it represents the receptive side of that event. In that respect it provides a witness to the event. The disparate parts of the New Testament nonetheless agree with the central claim of Jesus as the Christ. The Synoptic Gospels give the picture upon which the claim is based that Jesus is the Christ. The fourth Gospel, the epistles and other readings of the New Testament elaborate the assertion of Jesus as the Chris. There is no substantial difference [118] between the message of the Synoptic Jesus and the message about Jesus given in Paul’s epistles. The Synoptic Gospels, and Paul’s message about the Christ are not in conflict. All New Testament writings are consistent in witnessing to Jesus as the Christ; this is the foundation of the church.

Definitions:

New Testament: “The basic document of upon which the event upon Christian faith rests.” [117]

Questions:

Tillich says the New Testament is the “document wherein there appears the picture of Jesus as the Christ in its original and basic form.” How is that different from witnessing to Jesus of Nazareth in his historical and original form?”
Is any one part of the New Testament more important to Christian faith than another?
What is the difference between the Synoptic Gospels and the Gospel of John?
What importance does Tillich give to the Pauline epistles?

Changes in German:

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III.II.B: The New Being in Jesus as the Christ [118-138]

III.II.B.1: The New Being and the New Eon [118-120]

Summary:

[118] Eschatological symbolism predicted that the Christ would bring about a new eon. However, after Peter’s confession of Jesus as the Christ, these expectations of the Christ were not realized. History remained unchanged and he who was to change history was destroyed by historically prevailing powers. The eschatological understanding of the Christ needed to be revised. As such, Jesus as the Christ became the sacrifice. Paul gave the frame for understanding the paradox of the Christ crucified. A first and second coming were prophesized. The second coming of the Christ would be a coming in glory, fulfilling eschatological expectations. Until then, those who participate in the New Being of Jesus as the Christ, do so under the condition of humanity’s existential predicament, i.e. fragmentarily and by anticipation.

New Being is essential being under the conditions of existence, [119] conquering the gap between essence and existence. For this same idea, Paul used the expression ‘new creation.’ Just as Christ is a new creation of the divine Spirit, according to Synoptic theology so is one who participates in the Christ made into a new creature by the Spirit. The New Being conquers the law. Where there is New Being there is no commandment and no judgment. Christ, as stated by Paul, is the end of the law. Christ is also the end of existence lived in estrangement, conflicts and self-destruction. In Christ has appeared what fulfillment qualitatively means. In that same context, one can say that in Christ history has come to an end. [120] The assertion that Christ is the end of history seems absurd in light of 2,000 years of subsequent history. It is not absurd if understood in the double sense of ‘end,’ i.e. ‘finish’ and ‘aim.’ Quantitatively, the appearance of the New Being within history is drawn into the distortions and ambiguities of humanity’s historical predicament. The oscillation between ‘already’ and ‘not yet,’ is symbolized in the tension between the first and second comings of the Christ.

Definitions:

Kingdom of God: “The new state of things that will be created with the second coming, the return of the Christ in glory. In the period between the first and the second coming the New Being is present in him. He is the kingdom of God.” [118]
New Being: “Essential being under the conditions of existence, conquering the gap between essence and existence. …The New Being is new in so far as it is the undistorted manifestation of essential being within and under the conditions of existence.” [118-19]

Questions:

Why did Christ-believers need to revise their understanding of eschatology after the experience of the Cross?
What is the nature of Jesus as the Christ between the First and Second Coming? What purpose is served by the second coming by the Christ?
How is Christ the end of history?

Changes in German:

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III.II.B.2: The New Being Appearing in a Personal Life [120-121]

Summary:

[120] The New Being has appeared in a personal life, and that is the only way it could have appeared for humanity. The potentialities of being are completely actual only in a personal life. Only in a person are the polarities of being complete. Only a person has freedom, in all its characteristics, and for that reason only a person has a destiny. Only a person has finite freedom, giving him/her the power to contradict the self and return to the self. Only in such a being can the New Being appear. All levels of reality are present in humanity. For this reason, Renaissance philosophers called humans the ‘microcosmos.’ [121] Quantitatively speaking, the universe is largely indifferent to what happens in human beings. Qualitatively speaking, nothing happens in humankind that does not have bearing on the elements that constitute the universe.

Definitions:

Microcosmos: Man “as a universe in himself. What happens in him happens, therefore, by mutual universal participation. This, of course, is said in qualitative, not quantitative terms.” [120-121]

Questions:

Why did the Christ have to be a human individual?
How does New Being in an individual human being affect the rest of the universe?
For humanity’s sake, why did the New Being have to appear in a personal life?

Changes in German:

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III.II.B.3: The Expressions of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ [121-125]

Summary:

[121] The Christ’s very being is the New Being. None of his qualities are aspects that specifically make him the Christ. New Being is not a status but a new, conquered existence without estrangement. The first expressions of Jesus as the Christ are Jesus’ words. The word is the bearer of spiritual life. Jesus himself is called ‘the Word.’ It is not just his words, but also his being which make Jesus the Christ. His deeds, suffering, and inner life are expressions of his New Being. The importance of Jesus’ words and his nature as the Word, which supersedes his spoken words, exemplifies this idea. [122] Jesus’ words as the Christ are what give them power. He instills New Being through his words, because he is New Being and the Word. The same understanding applies to his actions. His deeds are the second expression of Jesus’ New Being, and we should be like him in that we should participate in New Being, but we should not merely imitate his life empirically. [123] Jesus’ death and suffering on the cross was necessary because in this way he participated in, and conquered, the forces of estrangement in their final form. The third expression of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ is Jesus’ suffering, including his violent death. Only by taking suffering on himself could Jesus be the Christ, because only in this way did he participate completely in existence and conquer every force of estrangement that tried to dissolve his unity with God. The New Testament induced orthodox theologians to make the Christ’s decisive functioning one of sacrifice. The suffering of the Christ on the cross [124] is an inescapable implication of the appearance of the God-Manhood under the conditions of existence.

We must evaluate the rationalistic separation of the words of Jesus from his being. His being must be understood as the New Being and its expressions as manifestations of the Christ. The only way to approach the inner life of a person is through conclusions drawn from expressions of the person. Such conclusions are always questionable, especially so in the case of Jesus. His uniqueness of being makes conclusions from analogy extremely doubtful. The New Testament does not give a psychological description of Jesus’ character structure, piety or inner conflicts. They show only the presence in him of the New Being under the conditions of existence. [125] Nonetheless, by recording Jesus’ anxiety about his pending death, the New Testament writers show Jesus’ total participation in human finitude. And in that, the New Testament shows Jesus’ conquest of anxiety about his death. To experience the New Being in Jesus as the Christ means to experience the power in him that conquers existential estrangement in him and in everyone who participates in him.

Still, we must be careful not to construct a picture of the Christ from analogical accounts of his external actions or sayings. The Christ is perfectly unique. The Christ’s encounter with estrangement is all we can truly reify from biblical accounts. [125] Just as the power of God is the resistance of non-being, the power of New Being is the conquering of estrangement. The concept of the New Being establishes the meaning of grace.

Definitions:

The Word: “The final self-manifestation of God to humanity. His being, which is called ‘the Word,’ expresses itself also in his words. But as the Word, he is more than all the words he has spoken.” [121]
Teaching of Jesus: “Better used in the singular – can cover his [Jesus’] prophetic message of the presence of the Kingdom of God within himself.” [122]
Initiation: “If used at all in this context, it should indicate that we, in our concreteness, are asked to participate in the New Being and to be transformed by it, not beyond, but within, the contingencies of our life. Not his actions, but the being out of which his actions come, makes him the Christ.” [122-23]
New Being: “When applied to Jesus as the Christ, points to the power in him which conquers existential estrangement or, negatively expressed, to the power of resisting the forces of estrangement.” [125]
Being: “If used for God or divine manifestations, is the power of being or, negatively expressed, the power of conquering non-being.” [125]

Questions:

What is the difference between imitating the life of the Christ and participating in the New Being?
Why can’t we paint of a psychological picture of the Christ from his actions and words as revealed in the New Testament?
What is the difference between Jesus’ words and the Word?

Changes in German:

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III.II.B.4: The New Being in Jesus as the Christ as the Conquest of Estrangement [125-135]

III.II.B.4.a): The New Being in the Christ and the Marks of Estrangement [125-127]

Summary:

[125] The Bible portrays the Christ as the bearer of New Being or as the one in whom the conflict between the essential unity of God and humanity and humanity’s estrangement is overcome. [126] Jesus as the Christ is not estranged from anything – his world, God, or himself. In the Biblical accounts we see no evidence of hubris, concupiscence, or unbelief – quite the opposite. In various circumstances, Jesus appears to completely participate in the ground of being. Still, in this way Jesus is not ‘sinless.’ It is truer to say that he conquered existential temptation. To say he was sinless is a negative assertion which is the rationalization of other positive assertions. [127] Jesus is finite freedom. Without that he would not be equal with humanity and could not be the Christ. God alone is above freedom and destiny. In him alone are the polarities of existence eternally conquered. In Jesus they are actual. The biblical picture of Jesus shows a positive three-fold emphasis: first, the complete finitude of the Christ; second, the reality of the temptations he experienced; and third, victory over those temptations.

Definitions:

Sinlessness: “A negative term… used in the New Testament merely to show [Jesus’] victory over the messianic temptation.” [126]

Questions:

Is temptation the same thing as estrangement?
Why is the term ‘sinlessness’ not useful for describing Jesus as the Christ?
How does the Jesus of the gospels overcome estrangement?
What are the differences between God and Jesus?

Changes in German:

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III.II.B.4.b): The Reality of the Temptations of Christ [127-131]

Summary:

[127] The possibility of real temptation in the life of Jesus was necessary for him to be the union of God and humanity. A Monophystic tendency denies that the temptations of Christ were serious because if Jesus was really subject to temptation then he was fully human. Fully subject to temptation also meant the real possibility of yielding to temptation. Since that was unacceptable, theology robbed Jesus of his real finitude and attributed divine transcendence to him, raising him above freedom and destiny.

[128] The possibility of serious temptation, whether of Jesus in the New Testament, or individuals generally, presents the problematic issue of humanity’s fall from dreaming innocence in the transition from essence to existence. Our desire pushes us ahead from the very beginning of life. The question is how to evaluate that desire. The answer lies in the difference between natural self-transcendence, which includes desire for reunion with everything, and distorted concupiscence which seeks exploitation of everything and not reunion. The distinction is decisive for evaluating desire in the state of temptation. Without desire there is no temptation. But the temptation is that desire will change into concupiscence. For Adam, his desire for the fruit was not bad in itself; it was the act of eating and thereby breaking God’s commandment that became an act of concupiscence. By contrast, [129] Jesus does not yield to the same conditions that Adam faced. It was wrong to have the objects of justified desires if that meant surrendering God, or for Jesus to surrender his Messianic quality. Jesus broke the Adamic link between desire and concupiscence.

The next question to arise is how desire is possible at all in the state of unbroken unity with God. The answer is that all life is determined by the polarity of dynamics and form and the dynamic tension between those two poles. In that sense, eros and agape do not contradict each other.

This leads to the third problem arising from the seriousness of temptation with respect to Jesus. If Jesus’ rejection of temptation was a matter of contingency, then salvation of humanity depends on the contingent decision of an individual person. But that position ignores the polarity of freedom and destiny. Christ’s decision against temptation was an act of his finite freedom. [130] As with any person, finite freedom is embedded in destiny. Human freedom united with destiny is neither contingency nor necessity. The appearance of Jesus as the Christ and his resistance to the attempts to deprive him of his Christ-character are both acts of personal decision and divine destiny. Humanity’s salvation does not depend on the contingent answer of a single man. One’s destiny is determined by divine creativity, through self-determination, that is, through one’s finite freedom.

Definitions:

Monophysitic Tendency: A tendency “which runs through all church history, including theologians and popular Christianity, [that] has tacitly led many to deny that the temptations of the Christ were serious.” [127]
Concupiscence: Desire “which does not want reunion with anything but the exploitation of everything through power and pleasure.” [128]
Providence: “The directing creativity of God.” [130]

Questions:

How does the polarity of dynamics and form answer the question of whether eros and agape contradict each other?
Is all concupiscence, as used by Tillich, “distorted concupiscence?”
What was contingent about Jesus’ exercise of finite freedom to reject temptation? Does that contingency make salvation itself contingent? Why or why not?
What is the difference between temptation and ‘serious’ temptation?

Changes in German:

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III.II.B.4.c): The Marks of His Finitude [131-132]

Summary:

[131] The temptations of the Christ are serious because he is finite freedom. As a finite being he is subject to the contingency of everything that is ‘thrown’ into existence. He has to die and he experiences the anxiety of his finiteness. He experiences the lack of a definite place and appears as a stranger, homeless in the world. He experiences all the tensions of self-relatedness experienced by every finite person. Although the Fourth Gospel says Jesus is truth, this does not mean he has omniscience or absolute certainty. He is the truth in so far as the New Being in him conquers the untruth of existential estrangement. Finitude implies openness to error, and error belongs to the Christ’s participation in humanity’s existential predicament. [132] In his finitude Jesus experienced serious temptation, want, desire, doubt about his work, hesitation to put on the Messianic title, and above all the feeling of being abandoned by God. This element of finitude is one of many elements in the description of the Christ. It is necessary to argue against those who attribute omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence and eternity to Jesus.

Definitions:

None

Questions:

Why does Tillich emphasize Jesus’ finite freedom?
How does Jesus’ finite freedom refute claims about him that he was omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent?
What is the distinction between Jesus being truth and Jesus having truth? Why is this distinction necessary?

Changes in German:

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III.II.B.4.d): His Participation in the Tragic Elements of Existence [132-134]

Summary:

[132] In addition to finitude, life is marked by ambiguity. One ambiguity – greatness and tragedy – will be discussed in Volume III. For now the issue is the relation of the bearer of New Being to the tragic element of life and the ambiguity of tragic guilt. The first and historically most important example in this area is Jesus’ conflict with the leaders of his nation. Popular Christian thought holds that the leadership was unambiguously against Jesus due to their religious and moral guilt, but that they could have decided for Jesus. This ‘could’ is the problem. It removes the tragic element of Jesus’ encounter with the leaders of his day. It makes the leadership representative of unambiguous evil. But there is no unambiguous evil at play. Jesus acknowledged belonging to the house of Israel. Paul witnesses to the zeal of Jews to fulfill the law as they understood it. [133] Denying the tragic element in Jesus’ encounter with the Jews is one of the permanent sources of modern anti-Semitism. Jesus was involved in the tragic element of guilt in so far as he made his enemies guilty. It is an expression of Jesus’ existential estrangement and its implied ambiguity of creation and estrangement. Kierkegaard questioned the right of anyone to let him/herself be killed for the truth, knowing that he/she becomes tragically responsible for the guilt of those who kill him/her. The relation between Jesus and Judas raises embarrassing questions turning on the providential necessity of Judas’ act on the one hand, and Judas’ personal guilt on the other. As the story stands in its recorded versions, the innocent one becomes tragically guilty in respect to the very one who contributes to his own death. [134] Christ in the biblical picture takes on not only finitude, but also the consequences of his tragic involvement in history.

Definitions:

None

Questions:

Is there such a thing as unambiguous evil? Why or why not?
Why is the opposition of the Israelite leaders to Jesus, an illustration of tragedy versus unambiguous evil?
How does one person become responsible for another’s guilt?
In what way was Jesus responsible for Judas’ guilt?

Changes in German:

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III.II.B.4.e): His Permanent Unity with God [134-135]

Summary:

[134] The conquest of existential estrangement in the New Being, Christ, does not eliminate finitude, tragedy, death, anxiety, and ambiguity. Rather, it takes the negatives of existence into unbroken unity with God. Homelessness, anxiety about death, insecurity, etc., are accepted in the power of participation in a ‘transcendent place.’ That is not actually a place but the eternal ground of every place and of every moment of time. Jesus does not repress the truth about his finitude. One who cannot elevate his/her doubts into the truth transcending every finite truth, must repress them. They perforce become fanatical. Jesus does not appear as a fanatic in the bible. [135] The picture of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ is not the picture of a divine-human automaton. Jesus transcends the negatives of existence in the power of his unity with God.

Definitions:

Fanaticism: “Absolute certitude for a finite conviction.” [134]

Questions:

Why does finitude exist in New Being?
Was Jesus as the Christ a fanatic? Why or why not?
What is Tillich’s criticism of fanaticism?

Changes in German:

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III.II.B.5: The Historical Dimension of the New Being [135-136]

Summary:

[135] Personal life requires an encounter with other persons within a community. There can be no community without the historical dimensions of past and future. In the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ, Jesus’ personal life is not an isolated one. The New Being is not restricted to his being. The New Testament treats very seriously Jesus’ descent from the life of bearers of the preparatory revelation of New Being. Stories of Jesus lineage, interest in his mother, even the symbol ‘Son of David,’ are all symbols of the historical dimension of the past. In the twelve apostles, representative of the twelve tribes of Israel, the past is connected to the future of the church. Reception of Jesus as the Christ was essential to his becoming the Christ. The Synoptic Gospels are primarily concerned with the direction of the past. The Fourth Gospel looks to the future. [136] The divine self-manifestation through history started before Jesus was born, and continued after his death. This continuity of the power of New Being throughout history must be acknowledged by theologians. New Being has spatial breadth in the community of New Being. It has a temporal dimension in the history of the New Being. The appearance of the Christ presupposes the community out of which he came and the community he creates.

Definitions:

None

Questions:

What does it mean to say that although New Being is a quality of the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ, New Being is not restricted to Jesus’ being?
What allows Christians, centuries after the life of Jesus, to participate in New Being?
Why is it so important that the bible purports to record Jesus’ lineage and the historical preparations leading up to his birth?

Changes in German:

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III.II.B.6: Conflicting Elements in the Picture of Jesus as the Christ [136-138]

Summary:

[136] We now ask whether the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ is in fact a unified picture or a conflicting patchwork reflecting the differing views of various biblical authors. First, an historical answer is required, then a systematic answer. The historical question is partially answered by affirming that all sections of the New Testament agree that Jesus is the Christ. But there are different, and occasionally contrasting interpretations of that assertion. The Synoptics emphasize the New Being’s participation in the conditions of existence. The Fourth Gospel emphasizes the New Being’s victory over the conditions of existence. The historical failure to harmonize these divergent pictures is not important. What matters is whether such contrasts obstruct the impact of the biblical [137] picture of Jesus as the bearer of New Being. Although elements in the Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel overlap, the systematic question is unavoidable.

The self-consciousness of Jesus in his messianic identity is presented differently in the Synoptics than in the Fourth Gospel. It too is a contrast great enough to create a systematic problem. The third problem of contrast between the Synoptics and John is the way Jesus places himself in the eschatological framework. Is he merely a prophetic voice announcing the kingdom to come, the central figure in an eschatological drama, the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecies, one who will return on clouds of glory to judge the world? In John, although eschatological statements are repeated, they are also transformed into statements about eschatological processes that happen in Jesus’ presence in judgment and salvation. [138] Again the differences are strong enough to command systematic consideration.

Historically the dominance of the Fourth Gospel has made it the fulcrum for interpreting the Synoptics. That is no longer the case. The contrasts are there for all to see and deal with. The conflicts must be dealt with by distinguishing between the symbolic frame in which the picture of Jesus as the Christ appears and the substance in which the power of New Being is present. Despite contrasts between Gospel accounts, the substance is untouched and shines through as the power of New Being in a threefold color: first, and decisively, as Jesus’ undisputed unity with God; second, of one who preserves that unity against all attacks from estranged existence; and third, as the self-surrendering love which actualizes divine love in taking existential self-destruction upon himself. Nothing in the New Testament takes away this three-fold manifestation of New Being in the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ.

Definitions:

None

Questions:

How are the apparent contradictions between the Gospels treated by Tillich? Do these contradictions challenge the picture of New Being in Jesus as the Christ?
Why is it important to resolve these contradictions?
What is the difference between a systematic analysis on the one hand, and an historical approach on the other, when it comes to dealing with contradictions among Gospel texts?
What is the three-fold manifestation of the New Being in the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ?

Changes in German:

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III.II.C: Valuation of the Christological Dogma [138-150]

III.II.C.1: The Nature and Function of the Christological Dogma [138-142]

Summary:

[138] The Christological problem started with the quest for New Being, [139] i.e. when humans sought to overcome their existential predicament through a new reality. Apocalyptic literature in the Old Testament points to a Messiah in whom the new reality comes. New Testament writers employ symbolism which points to Jesus as the Christ - the embodiment of the apocalyptic hope. This symbolism is not to be taken literally. The Greek term Logos was one such symbol used by the early church. The early church is not to be faulted for using Greek concepts. The work of the early church sought to explicate the Christological Dogma. [140] The negative use of dogma for political purposes is to be avoided. Christological Dogma can offer positive meaning; which is determined by answering two questions. First, did Christological Dogma reaffirm the Christian message? Second, how well were these symbols conceptualized? The answer to the former is yes; and the answer to the latter is, not very well. Christological dogma saved the church, but with very inadequate conceptual tools. This is the case because no ‘human concept’ can convey the meaning of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. [140] Greek concepts fall short, not because of an ‘intellectualistic’ tendency, but because of their tendency to Hellenize the Christian message. [141] As a result, Christianity adapted and transformed the Hellenistic elements of mystery cult, philosophical schools, and Roman state. In this regard, the problem for Christian theology involves both the substantive and conceptual failures of dogma. A substantive failure is evidenced in the distortion of the Christian message at the Councils of Chalcedon. A conceptual failure is found in the ‘the formula of Chalcedon itself,’ which did not offer a constructive interpretation of the Christian message. [142] The answer to this failure is not to reject conceptual tools, but to distinguish the concept from its substance. Theology must be free from and for the concepts it uses.

Definitions:

What is the Christological Problem: Humanity’s ‘quest for the New Being.’ [138]
What is the quest for New Being: Humanity’s awareness of its ‘existential predicament,’ and its quest to be overcome by the possibility of overcoming that predicament ‘through a new state of reality.’ [138-139]
Logos: A “conceptual symbol having both religious and philosophical roots, which was applied to Jesus the Christ by New Testament writers, as an answer to humanity’s quest for New Being.” [139]
Logos-Christology: The interpretation of Christological Symbols in the early church, which involved using Greek philosophical concepts such as logos in order to prevent a literalistic distortion of such symbols. [139]
Christological Dogma: “As Luther said, ‘protective’ doctrines which are meant to preserve the substance of the Christian message against distortions from outside or inside the church.” [139-140]
The Hellenization of the Christian Message: Three “forms of life and thought… which coalesced at the end of the ancient world.” These included the mystery cults, the philosophical schools, and the Roman state, and were transformed and adapted to the church. [140-141]

Questions:

What is the Christological problem under discussion?
How should the Christological problem be addressed?
Concepts should be employed to convey the Christian message, in a way which does not distort. How does Tillich suggest that might be better accomplished?

Changes in German:

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III.II.C.2: Dangers and Decisions in the Development of the Christological Dogma [142-145]

Summary:

[142] A conceptual interpretation can lead to either denying the Christ character, or the Jesus character of Jesus as the Christ. Theology needs to be balanced so as to avoid either of these dangers, though perfection in this regard is unattainable. The human nature of Jesus as the Christ must be affirmed, so as to show his ‘participation in the conditions of existence.’ The divine nature must be affirmed, so as to show the victory of the Christ over this existential situation. Both the divine and human elements are needed for an accurate interpretation of the Christian message: that Jesus as the Christ is the New Being. Thus, the Christological problem involves a way to include both fully divine and fully human elements in this New Being. Usage of the term nature, in an attempt to address this problem, is problematic. Nature is ambiguous when applied to humanity, and wrong when applied to God.

[143] The Nicaean controversy led to the question of whether the Logos had equal or less power than that of the Father. Both the Sabellian and the Arian heresies leaned too heavily on either the humanity or the divinity of Jesus Christ. What is needed is to show a spiritual unity of the abysmal and form elements in the idea of the living God. [143] Both the experience of the living God and the experience of the New Being in the Christ must be expressed in Trinitarian symbolism. [144] Augustine and Luther both observed a sensitivity for this issue, and showed that symbolism falls short of accurately expressing that which is inexpressible. Nicaea offered an interpretation of God - not a half-god - as that which was present in Jesus as the Christ (the New Being), but threatened the loss of the humanity of Jesus. Thus, in opposition to popular piety (which led to superstition and secondary religion), the participation of Jesus the Christ in the conditions of existence must be maintained. [145] Cyril was opposed by those who insisted on the participation of Jesus in the existential predicament of humanity. The outcome of these historic events was the preservation of both the Christ-character and the Jesus-character of Jesus as the Christ. Both the Christ-character and the Jesus-character of the event of Jesus as the Christ were, and must remain, preserved.

Definitions:

The Nicaean Controversy: “Defended by Athanasius as a matter of life and death for the church, made it impossible to deny the divine power of the Christ in revelation and salvation. In the terminology of the Nicaean controversy, the power of the Christ is the power of the divine Logos, the principle of divine self-manifestation.” [142-143] “The Nicaean formula has often been considered the basic Trinitarian statement of the church.” [143]
The Sabellian Heresy: A heresy which posited that Jesus Christ was equal in power with God the Father, to the detriment of his humanity. [143]
The Arian Heresy: A heresy which posited that Jesus Christ was a creature, to the detriment of his divinity, resulting in the conclusion that he was “Unable to save the creation.” [143]
Homo-ousios: A Greek term, meaning “of equal essence”. [143]
Semi-Arians: Those who asked the question: “how could a difference exist between the Father and the Son, and does not the picture of the Jesus of history become completely un-understandable?” [143]
The Christian Doctrine of the Trinity: A doctrine which “systematizes the idea [of the living God] and adds the decisive element of the relation of the Christ to the Logos.” [143]
Constantinople (381): A “Restatement and enlargement of Nicaea… a Christological statement added to the divinity of the Logos.” [143]
Popular and Monastic Piety/Monophysitic Tendency: Movements discontent with “The message of the eternal unity of God and man appearing under the conditions of estrangement. These pieties wanted more. They wanted a God, walking on earth, participating in history, but not involved in the conflicts of existence and the ambiguities of life. Popular piety did not want a paradox but a miracle. It desired an event in analogy with all other events in time and space, an objective happening in the supernatural sense.” [144] This led to a monophysitic tendency, which was hostile towards the natural. [144-145]
Cyril: Bishop of Alexandria, who accomplished a “Theologically cautious… alliance of popular and monastic piety.” [145]

Questions:

Why were the above heresies heretical?
What elements need to be combined in order to have a proper and balanced Trinitarian symbol?
Are the conceptual tools used to attribute symbols to God and to Jesus the Christ able to interpret the Christian message accurately? What methodology could be used to this end?

Changes in German:

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III.II.C.3: The Christological Task of Present Theology [145-150]

Summary:

The Christological task of present theology is to articulate the union of God and humanity in Jesus the Christ, without focusing too much on either the God or the human aspect. Both must be kept in dynamic relation to one another. [145] The Christ-character and the Jesus-character of the event of Jesus as the Christ must be preserved. These two primary conclusions with regard to Jesus as the Christ must be articulated and reinforced in Protestant theology. A critical attitude towards the liberal and orthodox Christologies is implicit in the Christology offered here. [145-146] Classical terminology used for an orthodox Christology, i.e., the two-nature theory, results in the impossibility of an understandable solution. [146] Liberal theology fails to account for the Christ-character in the event of Jesus as the Christ by pulling the Christ-character into the Jesus-character. Both the orthodox and the liberal Christologies fail to present the New Being who conquers existential estrangement. The ultimate criterion of a Christology is existential, and soteriological. A high Christology is problematic because it undermines the existential predicament of Jesus as the Christ, and therefore distorts a proper soteriology. [147] Divine nature and human nature are ambiguous, and should not be used for a Christology. Human nature should be replaced with the ‘dynamics’ of Jesus’ life. Divine nature should be replaced with a symbolic understanding of a God who is known through ‘his eternal creativity.’ [148] Christology should focus not on the ‘static essence’ but on the ‘dynamic relation’ of God and Humanity in Jesus Christ. This means that Jesus the Christ is the eternal unity of God and man that has become historical reality, and that the two-nature picture of Jesus Christ is replaced with concepts such as ‘Eternal God-man-unity,’ or ‘Eternal God-manhood.’ Use of the term eternal emphasizes the unity and actualization of the infinite in the finite. This actualization/unity occurred in Jesus the Christ, and existential estrangement did not disrupt this unity.

[149] Incarnational and the adoptionist Christologies depend on one another. However, the incarnation of the Logos should not be misunderstood as metamorphosis, but as his total manifestation in a personal life involving freedom and destiny. The Christology offered here presents a picture that includes the finite freedom of Jesus. [150] Like Schleiermacher, the Christology offered here rejects the two-nature Christology. Jesus is the Urbild, essential humanity prior to the existential fall into estrangement, who as the New Being enters into that existence and overcomes it. Thus New Being is an ontological concept, involving new essence and new existence, in Jesus the Christ.

Definitions:

Arianism: A Christology whose “Picture of Jesus is… a half-god.” [146]
Soteriological: “The question of salvation.” [146]
High Christology: A Christology which emphasizes the divine nature of Jesus Christ over that of his human nature, which results in a “Christology of low value, because it removes the paradox for the sake of a supranatural miracle.” [146]
Low Christology: “The Protestant principle, according to which God is near to the lowest as well as to the highest and according to which salvation is not the transference of man from the material to a so-called spiritual world.” [147]
New Being: “In his [Jesus the Christ’s] being the New Being is real, and the New Being is the re-established unity between God and man.” [148]
Eternal: A word “added to the relational description [of Jesus the Christ]… which points to the general presupposition of the unique event Jesus as the Christ.” [148]
Adoptionism: “The idea that God through his Spirit adopted the man Jesus as his Messiah.” [149]
Two-Nature Doctrine: The doctrine that Jesus Christ had both a divine and a human nature. [Passim]
Incarnation: “The symbol of his pre-existence gives the eternal dimension [of Jesus Christ], and the doctrine of the Logos, which became historical reality (flesh), points to what has been called Incarnation. … When Christianity uses the term Incarnation, it tries to express the paradox that he who transcends the universe appears in it and under its conditions. In this sense every Christology is an incarnational Christology.” [149]
Urbild: A German word, used by Schleiermacher, meaning “original image” or “essential man.” [150]

Questions:

The classical terminology used in liberal and in classical Christology included the two-nature doctrine (divine nature and human nature). Why is this terminology problematic? What is Tillich’s resolution?
This section discusses the problem that both the orthodox and the liberal Christologies fail to present the New Being as one who conquers the conditions of existence, or existential estrangement. Why is the element of the victory of New Being over estrangement so important?
Why is it important that a Christology include eternal unity of God and man? [148]

Changes in German:

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III.II.D: The Universal Significance of the Event Jesus the Christ [150-165]

III.II.D.1: The Uniqueness and Universality of the Event [150-153]

Summary:

[150] The Christological question and answer is driven by the soteriological problem. [151] The question under discussion is in what way the event of Jesus as the Christ is universally significant for both humanity and nature. First, the event of Jesus as the Christ was a unique event, including the elements of finite freedom and historical destiny. Second, Jesus as the Christ had universal significance. All of the individual traits mentioned in the gospels are directed towards his universal significance. The anecdotal, the legendary, and the symbolic are three primary ways of reading the biblical stories. The third way, which is the symbolic/mythical way, is utilized for the Christology presented here. [151-152] In order to describe the universal significance of Jesus as the Christ on the basis of the biblical literature, one must hold to the symbols and use the historical and legendary stories only in a corroborative sense. [152] Demythologization should be used to fight against literalistic distortions of symbols and myths, but it should not entirely remove symbol and myth from religious language. Symbols and myths are to be used to express the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. Symbols can show how Jesus as the Christ is New Being in relation to existence. The two primary relations of the Christ to existence given in the New Testament involve either his subjection to existence, or his conquest of existence. [153] The latter is symbolized in the Cross of the Christ, and the former in the Resurrection of the Christ.

Definitions:

Old Being: “Existential estrangement and its self-destructive consequences.” [150]
The Problem of Soteriology: The problem/question of salvation from the old being. “The problem of soteriology creates the christological question and gives direction to the christological answer. [150]
The Anecdotal Character of the Gospels: A way of interpreting the biblical records as “historical reports which were chosen according to their value in answering the questions of human existence generally, and of the early congregations especially.” [151]
Legendary Form: A way of interpreting the biblical records by emphasizing the “universal quality of particular stories through a more or less legendary form.” [151]
Symbolic/Mythical: A way of interpreting the biblical records by expressing the “universal meaning of the whole event of Jesus of Nazareth in symbols and myths.” [151]
Demythologization of the New Testament: “Demythologization can mean two things… It can mean the fight against the literalistic distortion of symbols and myths… But demythologization can also mean the removal of myth as a vehicle of religious expression and the substitution of science and morals.” [152]

Questions:

Why should the use of symbol and myth continue in theology? How should they be used, and how can they be misused?
How are symbols useful to a Christology?
What does Tillich mean by “the experience of the holy?”

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.II.D.2: The Central Symbols of the Universal Significance of Jesus as the Christ and Their Relation [153-158]

Summary:

[153] The ‘Cross of the Christ’ and the ‘Resurrection of the Christ’ are interdependent symbols. If separated each loses its meaning. The Cross symbolizes the victory over the death of existential estrangement. The resurrection symbolizes the completion of that victory, by defeating death. Cross and Resurrection are each reality and symbol - each really happened within existence. The difference between these symbols (the Cross an historical event witnessed by many, the Resurrection witnessed by few) leads to the question of the objective reality of the Resurrection. In the New Testament, the Cross is symbol, myth, fact and event. Mythically, it symbolizes the ushering in of a new eon. [154] The Resurrection shares the mythical quality of the Cross. The mythical expectation of a Resurrection following the death of the Christ can be credited to mythology. The certainty of Jesus’ Resurrection by the disciples gave birth to the Church. Because the Christ is not the Christ without the church, this made Jesus the Christ. The disciples applied the symbol of the Resurrection to the Christ, via a real experience, combining event with symbol. Therefore, both symbol and fact should be combined when discussing Cross and Resurrection. [155] Faith in these symbols is not dependent on historical research. Certainty with regard to the Resurrection (as event and symbol) does not come from historical data but from the certainty of one’s own victory over the death of existential estrangement. [155-156] Three theories attempt to demonstrate the factual side of the Resurrection: the physical, spiritualistic and psychological. The first leads to absurdity and blasphemy. [156] The second is difficult to validate. The third misses the reality of the event. What is the reality of the Resurrection event? [157] It is the reality of Jesus as the Spirit, experienced by his followers here and now in the combination of symbol and event, and is the central Christian symbol. The religious meaning of the Resurrection for the disciples, and all their followers, stands in contrast to their previous state of negativity and despair. The restitution theory offered here is a theory that Resurrection is the reinstitution of Jesus as the Christ. [158] But the experience of the New Being in Jesus must precede the experience of Jesus Resurrected. The restitution theory is most adequate to the facts, but it must be considered a theory. It remains in the realm of probability and has no certainty of faith.

Definitions:

Faith: “The experience of being grasped by the power of the New Being through which the destructive consequences of estrangement are conquered.” [155] “Faith provides the certainty that the picture of the Christ in the Gospels is a personal life in which the New Being has appeared in its fullness and that the death of Jesus of Nazareth was not able to separate the New Being from the picture of its bearer.” [158]
Physical Theory of Resurrection: “The most primitive… most beautifully expressed… rationalization of the event, interpreting with physical categories that identify resurrection with the presence or absence of a physical body.” [155]
Spiritualistic Theory of Resurrection: “Uses… the appearances of the resurrected as recorded by Paul. It explains them as manifestations of the soul of the man Jesus to his followers, in analogy to the self-manifestations of the souls of the dead in spiritualistic experiences.” [156]
Psychological Theory of Resurrection: “Resurrection is an inner event in the minds of Jesus’ adherents.” [156]
The Reality of the Resurrection Event: The event which overcomes “the disappearance of him whose being was the New Being. It is the overcoming of his disappearance from present experience and his consequent transition into the past except for the limits of memory. …In an ecstatic experience the concrete picture of Jesus of Nazareth became indissolubly united with the reality of the New Being. …He is the Spirit and we know him now only because he is the Spirit. In this way the concrete individual life of the man Jesus of Nazareth is raised above transitoriness into the eternal presence of God as Spirit, …the unity of the New Being and its bearer, Jesus of Nazareth.” [156-157]
Restitution Theory: “The unity of the New Being and its bearer, Jesus of Nazareth. …[The theory that] the Resurrection is the restitution of Jesus as the Christ, a restitution which is rooted in the personal unity between Jesus and God and in the impact of this unity on the minds of the apostles.” [157]

Questions:

What made Jesus the Christ?
What are the differences between the symbol of the Cross and the symbol of the Resurrection?
The “restitution theory” is given in response to the problems raised by the physical, spiritual, and psychological theories of Resurrection. How is the restitution theory different? Is it a better theory? Why or why not?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.II.D.3: Symbols Corroborating the Symbol “Cross of the Christ” [158-159]

Summary:

[158] The whole of Jesus’ life and the events of his life, culminate in the story of the Cross of Jesus. The events point to Jesus’ subjugation to the ultimate negatives of existence, and to the unity and inseparability of Jesus with God despite his self-subjugation. This is the primary symbol in the New Testament, the central symbol of the Cross. The New Testament contains other symbols that point to, prepare for, and corroborate it. These include self-sacrifice and self-surrender (Pauline), stories of the baby Jesus (Synoptic), and descriptions of his subjection to finitude and its categories (Gethsemane). [159] Jesus is the New Being who has placed himself under the conditions of existential estrangement and these symbols are important to emphasize this event. They are symbols of the divine paradox of the appearance of the eternal God-man unity within existential estrangement.

Definitions:

None

Questions:

What is the primary emphasis of the symbols of the New Testament?
Should these symbols be interpreted literally? Why or why not?
Why is the Cross the central symbol of the New Testament?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.II.D.4: Symbols Corroborating the Symbol “Resurrection of the Christ” [159-165]

Summary:

[159] Similar to the story of the Cross, the story of the Resurrection is symbolic and confirmed by other anticipatory symbols in the New Testament. The universal significance of these symbols is to show the New Being in Jesus as the Christ as victorious over the existential estrangement to which he subjected himself. The symbol of pre-existence must also include the symbol of post-existence. [160] The symbols relating to post-existence are not to be interpreted literally. The virgin birth is one such symbol, emphasizing the New Being as one who is independent of historical contingencies and dependent on God alone. The story of Jesus’ conversation with Moses and Elijah is a symbolically clear anticipation of the Resurrection. [160-161] The miracle stories serve to symbolize the victory of the New Being over existential self-destruction, point to his participation in the misery of the human situation, and show his power over the enslaving structures of evil. [161] The miracle stories function as signs of victory, which point to the symbol of the Resurrection and the victory over existential destruction. [161-162]

Eschatological symbols also serve to corroborate the Resurrection with regard to the Christ, his church and his world. Ascension is one such symbol. It points to the finality of the separation of Jesus the Christ from the world. [162] The symbol of Jesus the Christ sitting at the right hand of God is another. It connotes the creative power of God actualized in the Christ. The symbol of Jesus the Christ as ruler over both the church and history connotes the participation of the New Being in divine creativity. [162-163] The symbol of the millennial kingdom should receive more attention in theology, because it relates to history. [163] The utopian appropriation of the thousand-year reign symbol is demonic and demonstrates that demonic power has not yet been defeated. The symbol of the Parousia signifies that Jesus alone is the Christ. It functions to show that there will be no other New Being. Another function of this symbol is to defend the Christian assertion that Jesus is the Messiah. [164] The symbol of the Second Coming of the Christ corroborates the Resurrection by placing the Christian in a period between the kairoi… and subjects him to the infinite tensions of this situation in personal and historical existence.

The eschatological symbol of the Christ as judge of the world has generated much negativity as a result of its misuse. It symbolizes an immanent judgment subject to the ambiguities of life. [164-165] The symbols discussed in this section must not be interpreted literally. Rather, they should be reinterpreted in a way that includes both their existential and cosmic elements and emphasizes the power of what is symbolized. [165] The life and death of symbols is not under the control of the theologian. Judgment of symbols and power over their duration are subjected to the creativity of the New Being who is not conditioned by symbols.

Definitions:

Symbol of Pre-Existence: “Pre-existence in connection with the symbols of subjection was the precondition for the transcendent self-humiliation of the Christ. …It expresses the eternal root of the New Being as it is historically present in the event of Jesus the Christ. [It] cannot be understood horizontally… but vertically.” [159]
Symbol of Post-existence: An “eternal confirmation… of the historical appearance of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ.” [159-160]
Demons: “The supra-individual structures of destruction.” [161]
Miracles: “An ecstatically received understanding of constellations of factors which point to the divine Ground of Being. …[Miracles] point to the presence of the divine power overcoming existential destruction.” [161]
Parousia: “The symbol of the Second Coming.” [163]
Kairoi: “The times in which the eternal breaks into the temporal, between an already but not yet.” [164]

Questions:

Is the symbol of pre-existence to be understood literally?
Why is the vertical, rather than horizontal, understanding of the pre-existence of the Christ important?
Is the story of the virgin birth to be understood literally? What result would follow a literal understanding of this story?
What is the function of the miracle stories?
Does Christianity allow for the possibility of another manifestation of New Being?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.II.E: The New Being in Jesus as the Christ as the Power of Salvation [165-180]

III.II.E.1: The Meaning of Salvation [165-168]

Summary:

[165] Jesus as the Christ, was subjected to and ultimately victorious over existence. He is also called the Savior, Mediator, and Redeemer. The ultimate aim of salvation is eternal life. [166] Different theological paradigms offer different elements of salvation. Because humanity is in a state of estrangement, we need salvation from this state of estrangement. In this there is a split between essential and existential humanity. Salvation unites that split. In salvation we are healed from our existential estrangement, and the ultimate meaning of our existence is flfilled. For Christianity, salvation is manifest in Jesus as the Christ. This event is not to be separated from the process of salvation/healing in history, because the event of Jesus as the Christ stands in the center of the historical process of healing. [166-167] In revelation, the New Being becomes ecstatically manifest in events that are saving. [167] When the power of the New Being is accepted it is salvific and therefore healing. The notion of total salvation is absurd and demonic. At some level, all people experience the healing power of the New Being, or they would not have being at all. However, no person experiences this healing power fully. This brings us to the question of our future. [167-168] The New Being, Jesus the Christ, is the ultimate criterion of every healing and saving process. Therefore, the Christian is in a state of relativity with respect to salvation. Because Jesus the Christ is over and above any relative state of healing in a human: it is just this that makes Jesus the Christ.

Definitions:

Salvation: Salvation is “Healing and saving power through the New Being in all history.” [167]
Ultimate Negativity: “Ultimate negativity is called condemnation or eternal death, the loss of the inner telos of one’s being, the exclusion from the universal unity of the Kingdom of God, and the exclusion from eternal life.” [165]
Salvus: A Greek term, meaning ‘healed.’ [166]
Healing: “Healing means reuniting that which is estranged, giving a center to that which is split, overcoming the split between God and man, man and his world, man and himself.” [166]
Revelation: “Revelation is not information about divine things, it is the ecstatic manifestation of the Ground of Being in events, persons, and things. Such manifestations have shaking, transforming, and healing power. They are saving events in which the power of the New Being is present.” [166-167]
Total Salvation: “Total salvation, in this view, is identical with being taken into the state of ultimate blessedness and is the opposite of total condemnation to everlasting pain or eternal death. …The absolute alternative between salvation and condemnation.” [167]

Questions:

What is salvation?
How is revelation related to salvation?
How does one experience the healing power of salvation?
All of humanity partially participates “in the healing power of the New Being… or they would have no being.” How does this partial participation differ from full participation?
What are the consequences of viewing salvation as a totality that delivers human beings to a realm of bliss or blessedness?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.II.E.2: The Christ as the Savior (Mediator, Redeemer) [168-170]

Summary:

[168] Traditional theology has distinguished between the person of Jesus and the work of the Christ, as shown in the divide between Christology and Soteriology. This method is problematic because it does not involve the relation of the Christ to what made him the Christ, i.e., New Being, and fails to account for reception of Jesus as the Christ as part of what makes him the Christ. Being and work should not be separated. Thus, the principle offered here is that Being = Work, and Work = Being. Titles such as prophet, priest, and king, should not be used as separate works of the Christ. They are all consequences of his being not different roles or ‘offices’ of the Christ. [169] The term Mediator should be used with regard to the reunification of the estranged. This term is applied to Christ, but should not involve the idea of a half-god. [169-170] Soteriology should not involve the notion of a God who needs reconciliation with us. [170] God is always the one who acts, and the Mediator is the one through whom God acts. The term Redeemer, when applied to the Christ, can be used to refer to man’s liberation from demonic powers.

Definitions:

Christology: The focus of traditional theology on the person of Christ. [168]
Soteriology: the focus of traditional theology on the work of Christ. [168]
The New Being: “The power of healing and salvation - in [the Christ].” [168]
Mediator: An historically rich term, mediator connotes the notion of a bridge over the gap between God and humanity. Applied to Jesus the Christ, “he is mediator in so far as he is supposed to reconcile. He represents God toward man and man toward God.” The mediator reunites what is estranged. [169] “The Mediator is the one through whom [God] acts.” [170]
Redeemer: “Derived from redemere (“buying back”).” [170]

Questions:

What is problematic about the division of Soteriology from Christology in traditional theology?
How has Tillich articulated the relation of the person of Jesus to the work of the Christ?
How does the role of Jesus as mediator differ from the half-god understanding of mediator?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.II.E.3: Doctrines of Atonement [170-173]

Summary:

[170] The two sides to the process of atonement are its manifestation of New Being and its effect on humanity. One is active/subjective and another is passive/objective. Guilt is removed when a person receives or accepts the divine act in the New Being. Subjectively, for atonement, human response is necessary. [171] Objectively, the atonement should be seen as the victory that the Christ had over demonic powers, or existential estrangement. The symbolism of Christ’s victory over Satan used in traditional theology is better understood as the victory of the positive over the negative. [172] God’s love, not the wrath of God, should be emphasized in atonement. Justice must also be included as part of God’s love. Anselm is helpful in this regard. His doctrine of atonement includes both the justice and the love of God, as sufficient to give a good conscience to its adherents. [173] This doctrine provides a symbol-system that gives the individual the courage to accept him/herself in spite of awareness that he/she is unacceptable, yet has every chance of being accepted. Aquinas offers a doctrine wherein participation is emphasized over substitution. This provides a better understanding of atonement.

Definitions:

Atonement: “The doctrine of atonement is the description of the effect of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ on those who are grasped by it in their state of estrangement. …Atonement is always both a divine act and a human reaction.” [170]
Objective Character of Atonement: According to Origen, “That the liberation of man from the bondage of guilt and self destruction became possible by a deal between God, Satan, and Christ… But this is not the real meaning of the objective type. In Paul’s triumphant verses about the victory of the love of God which precedes the application of this experience to a symbolism involving demonic powers - consequently, the symbol of the victory of Christ over the demons.” [171]
Subjective Character of Atonement: “The subjective element is the experienced impact of the inner power of him who is externally subdued by the demonic powers.” [172]
Christus Victor: The reaffirmation of Origen’s doctrine of atonement by Aulen. [171]

Questions:

What are the two aspects of the process of atonement? Are these aspects dependent upon one another?
Can the love of God be emphasized without including the justice of God? Why or why not?
Why is love more important to atonement than wrath?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.II.E.4: Principles of the Doctrine of Atonement [173-176]

Summary:

[173] Certain principles are needed to direct the future development of the doctrine of atonement. The first is that God and God alone creates the atoning processes. [174] Therefore the Christ mediates the reconciling act of God to man. The second principle is that in God there are no conflicts between love and justice. Third, existential estrangement is involved in the removal of guilt and punishment. Fourth, in atonement God participates in existential estrangement and its self-destructive consequences. Those who participate in his participation receive the freedom given in the Christ. [175] God’s participation should be understood symbolically. He takes human suffering upon himself without contradicting his aseity. Fifth, the participation of God is manifest on the Cross. The Cross is a manifestation of God in the sense that it is the central actualization of God’s participation in the suffering of the world. The atoning act of God occurs in and through the Cross. [176] Theology must distinguish in the Cross, from through the Cross. The Cross is God’s effect, not cause. Sixth, humanity participates in the atoning act of God, in the New Being of Jesus as the Christ. The notion of substitutional suffering is problematic because it excludes the participation of humanity in suffering. The suffering of God, universally and in the Christ, is the power that overcomes creaturely self-destruction by participation and transformation. Free participation, and not substituted suffering, is the character of the divine suffering. Thus salvation has a threefold character which involves human participation in divine participation and the resulting acceptance and transformation.

Definitions:

Justice of God: “The justice of God is the act through which he lets the self-destructive consequences of existential estrangement go their way.” [174]
Aseity: God’s “being by himself and therefore beyond freedom and destiny.” [175]
Manifestations: “Something happens through a manifestation which has effects and consequences.” [175]
Substitutional Suffering: A term used to imply God’s suffering on behalf of humanity. [176]
Threefold Character of Salvation: “Participation in the divine participation, accepting it and being transformed by it - that is the threefold character of the state of salvation.” [176]

Questions:

What is atonement and why does it matter?
If God removed the consequences of existential estrangement, what would follow logically?
Why is it important to combine human participation with divine participation in the act of atonement?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.II.E.5: The Threefold Character of Salvation [176-180]

III.II.E.5.a): Salvation as Participation in the New Being (Regeneration) [176-177]

Summary:

[176] Human participation is necessary for the experience of salvation in the power of the New Being. [177] The objective side of salvation is what being in Christ means. Faith, surrender, and love are traditionally seen as subjective elements. However, in regeneration, the new eon is objectively brought by the Christ, and precedes the subjective reception of him. Conversion involves the turning of a person away from the old eon, or old reality, to the new. Therefore, the basis of faith is objective.

Definitions:

Regeneration: “Salvation as participation in the New Being.” [176] “Regeneration is the state of having been drawn into the new reality manifest in Jesus as the Christ.” [177]
The Objective Side: “The relation of the New Being to those who are grasped by it.” [177]

Questions:

Why is it important to see salvation as an objective event to which humans respond subjectively?

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.II.E.5.b): Salvation as Acceptance of the New Being (Justification) [177-179]

Summary:

[178] Salvation involves regeneration, which is a transformation of the person by the objective power of the New Being. Faith is the work of the Divine Spirit, the power creating the New Being in the Christ, in individuals, and in the church. Regeneration precedes justification. Justification also is first objective and then becomes subjective in the reception of the New Being. This is the act of God accepting the estranged as though they were not estranged. In spite of our existential estrangement, and not through our own efforts, God reversed this condition. We participate in the objective New Being. We receive the effect of which the New Being is the cause. [179] Humanity needs to accept that humanity is accepted, one must accept acceptance. This is the paradox of salvation. God alone, through grace, is the cause of justification, but the faith that one is accepted is mediated to humanity through faith.

Definitions:

Regeneration: “Regeneration can be defined as actual transformation.” [177] Regeneration is “participation in the New Being.” [178]
Justification: “Justification literally means making just.” [178]
Faith: “Faith is the work of the divine Spirit, the power which creates the New Being, in the Christ, in individuals, in the church.” [178]

Questions:

Does salvation involve human effort? What is the difference between estrangement and acceptance?
What does “justification by grace through faith” mean? How is it different from “justification through faith?”

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

III.II.E.5.c): Salvation as Transformation by the New Being (Sanctification) [179-180]

Summary:

[179] The reunion of the estranged with God happens in salvation. This includes the actual reunion of regeneration, the paradox of justification, and the process of sanctification. In sanctification, the subject becomes transformed – individually and communally. [180] Humans are determined by both essential goodness and existential estrangement. The Christ is the power of the New Being actualized in history, past and future. The proposition that ‘Christ is not the Christ without the church’ will be developed further in the next volume of the Systematic Theology.

Definitions:

Sanctification: “Sanctification is the process in which the power of the New Being transforms personality and community, inside and outside the church.” [179-180]

Questions:

What is salvation and why does it matter?
How does sanctification transform the subject?
How do regeneration, and justification, relate to sanctification? Are these all objective, subjective, both? Explain.

Changes in German:

(none listed here)

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