My Research

Statement

 

(My SSRN, IDEAS, and GOOGLE links)

 


"The classical theorists resemble Euclidean geometry in a non-Euclidean world, who, discovering that in experience straight lines apparently parallel often meet, rebuke the lines for not keeping straight -- as the only remedy for the unfortunate collisions which are occurring. Yet, in truth, there is no remedy except to throw over the axiom of parallels and to work out a non-Euclidean geometry. Something similar is required in economics." --Keynes (1936, p.16)

"The sense in which I am using the terms (uncertainty) is that …there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know." -- Keynes (1937, p. 113)


My research fields are: finance and macroeconomics. My main research areas are:

·       Investment and financial policies and firm dynamics with market frictions (costly external finance, uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, and taxation)

·       Real options approach to investment under uncertainty

·       Dynamic general equilibrium models and incomplete markets models

·       Asset pricing and market microstructure

·       Applications of decision theory and behavioral economics 

 

Published or Forthcoming Papers

1.     Option Exercise with Temptation, Economic Theory 34 (2008), 473-501.

Abstract: This paper adopts the Gul and Pensendorfer self-control utility model to analyze an agent's option exercise decision under uncertainty over an infinite horizon. The agent decides whether and when to do an irreversible activity. He is tempted by immediate gratification and suffers from self-control problems. The cost of self-control lowers the benefit from continuation or stopping and may erode the option value of waiting. When applied to the investment and exit problems, the model can generate the behavior of procrastination and preproperation. In addition, unlike the hyperbolic discounting model, the model here provides a unique prediction.

 

2.     Investment, Consumption and Hedging under Incomplete Markets, with Neng Wang, Journal of Financial Economics 86 (2007), 608-642.

Abstract: Entrepreneurs often face undiversifiable idiosyncratic risks from their business investments. Motivated by this observation, we extend the standard real options approach towards investment to an incomplete markets environment and analyze the joint decisions of business investments, consumption-saving and portfolio selection. We show that precautionary saving motive affects the investment timing decision in an important way. Moreover, the precautionary saving motive interacts with the timing of investment payoffs. When the investment payoffs are given in lump sum, risk aversion accelerates investment. For an agent with sufficiently strong precautionary motive, an increase in volatility may accelerate investment, opposite to the standard real options analysis. When the agent can trade the market portfolio to partially hedge against the investment risk, the systematic volatility is compensated via the standard CAPM argument, and the idiosyncratic volatility generates a private equity premium. Finally, for the flow payoff case, the agent's idiosyncratic risk exposure alters both the implied option value and the implied project value, causing the reversal of the results in the lump sum payoff case.

 

3.     Capital Structure, Credit Risk, and Macroeconomic Conditions, with Dirk Hackbarth, and Erwan Morellec, Journal of Financial Economics 82 (2006), 519-550.

Abstract: This paper develops a framework for analyzing the impact of macroeconomic conditions on credit risk and dynamic capital structure choice. We begin by observing that when cash flows depend on current economic conditions, there will be a benefit for firms to adapt their default and financing policies to the position of the economy in the business cycle phase. We then demonstrate that this simple observation has a wide range of empirical implications for corporations. Notably, we show that our model can replicate observed debt levels and the countercyclicality of leverage ratios. We also demonstrate that it can reproduce the observed term structure of credit spreads and generate strictly positive credit spreads for debt contracts with very short maturities. Finally, we characterize the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the pace and size of capital structure changes, and debt capacity.

 

4.     A Search Model of Centralized and Decentralized Trade, Review of Economic Dynamics 9 (2006), 68-92.

Abstract: This paper presents a search model of centralized and decentralized trade. In a centralized market, trades are intermediated by market makers at publicly posted bid-ask prices. In a decentralized market, traders search counterparties. Prices are negotiated and transactions are conducted in private meetings among traders. Traders can choose which market to enter. The determinants of bid-ask spreads and liquidity are analyzed. The welfare consequence of the market fragmentation is also analyzed. It is shown that compared to the competitive market-making, monopolistic market-making may improve social welfare.

 

5.     Competitive Equilibria of Economies with a Continuum of Consumers and Aggregate Shocks, Journal of Economic Theory 128 (2006), 274-298.

Abstract: This paper studies competitive equilibria of a production economy with aggregate productivity shocks and with a continuum of consumers subject to borrowing constraints and individual labor endowment shocks. The dynamic economy is described in terms of sequences of aggregate distributions. The existence of competitive equilibrium is proven and a recursive characterization is established. In particular, it is shown that for any competitive equilibrium, there is a payoff equivalent competitive equilibrium that is generated by a recursive equilibrium with the state space including expected discounted utilities.

 

6.     Irreversible Investment with Regime Shifts, with Xin Guo and Erwan Morellec, Journal of Economic Theory 122 (2005), 37-59.

Abstract:  Under the real options approach to investment under uncertainty, agents formulate optimal policies under the assumption that firms' growth prospects do not vary over time. This paper proposes and solves a model of investment decisions in which the growth rate and volatility of the decision variable shift between different states at random times. A value-maximizing investment policy is derived such that in each regime the firm's investment policy is optimal and recognizes the possibility of a regime shift. Under this policy, investment is intermittent and increases with marginal q. Moreover, investment typically is very small but, in some states, the capital stock jumps. Implications for marginal $q$ and the user cost of capital are also examined.

 

7.     Optimal Capital Structure and Industry Dynamics, Journal of Finance 6 (2005), 2621-2659

Abstract: This paper provides a competitive equilibrium model of capital structure and industry dynamics. In the model, firms make financing, investment, entry, and exit decisions subject to idiosyncratic technology shocks. The capital structure choice reflects the tradeoff between the tax benefits of debt and the associated bankruptcy and agency costs. The interaction between financing and production decisions influences the stationary distribution of firms and their survival probabilities. The analysis demonstrates that the equilibrium output price has an important feedback effect. This effect has a number of testable implications. For example, high growth industries have relatively lower leverage and turnover rates.

 

8.     Informed Trading when Information Becomes Stale, with Dan Benhardt, Journal of Finance 59 (2004), 339-390.

Abstract: This paper characterizes informed trade when speculators can acquire distinct signals of varying quality about an asset’s value at different dates. The most reasonable characterization of private information about stocks is that while information is long-lived, new information will arrive over time, information that may be acquired by other agents. Hence, while a speculator may know more than others at a moment, in the future, his information will become stale, but not valueless. In an environment that allows for arbitrary correlations among signals, we characterize equilibrium outcomes including trading, prices, and profits. We provide explicit numerical characterizations for different informational environments.

 

9.     A Note on Consumption and Savings Under Knightian Uncertainty, Annals of Economics and Finance 5 (2004) 299-311.

Abstract: This paper studies consumption/saving problem under Knightian uncertainty in a two period setting. The multiple-priors utility model is adopted. The effects of income uncertainty and capital uncertainty on optimal savings are analyzed by deriving closed form solutions.

 

10.  A Two-Person Dynamic Equilibrium under Ambiguity, with Larry Epstein, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 27 (2003) 1253-1288. 

Abstract: This paper describes a pure-exchange, continuous-time economy with two heterogeneous agents and complete markets. A novel feature of the economy is that agents perceive some security returns as ambiguous in the sense often attributed to Frank Knight. The equilibrium is described completely in closed-form. In particular, closed-form solutions are obtained for the equilibrium processes describing individual consumption, the interest rate, the market price of uncertainty, security prices and trading strategies. After identifying agents as countries, the model is applied to address the consumption home-bias and equity home-bias puzzles.

 

Working Papers:

 

·       Corporate Tax Policy and Long-Run Capital Formation: The Role of Irreversibility and Fixed Costs, PDF, May 2008. New

Abstract: This paper presents an analytically tractable continuous-time general equilibrium model with investment irreversibility and fixed adjustment costs. In the model, there is a continuum of firms that are subject to idiosyncratic shocks to capital. Although the presence of investment frictions lowers consumer welfare, it may raise or reduce the long-run average capital stock, depending on the degree of idiosyncratic uncertainty. An increase in this uncertainty may raise equilibrium aggregate capital, but reduce welfare. An unexpected permanent change in the corporate income tax rate affects the investment trigger and target values, and hence the size and rate of capital adjustment. Following this tax policy, the percentage changes in equilibrium quantities are larger when fixed adjustment costs are larger. These changes are significantly smaller in a general equilibrium model than in a partial equilibrium model.

 

  • Firm Heterogeneity and the Long-Run Effects of Dividend Tax Reform, PDF, with Francois Gouriro, Feb 2008, Revised

Abstract: To study the long-run effect of dividend taxation on aggregate capital accumulation, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model in which there is a continuum of firms subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. We show that at any point in time, a firm may lie in one of three finance regimes: dividend distribution regime, liquidity constrained regime, and equity issuance regime. Firms in different finance regimes respond to dividend taxation in different ways. We calibrate our model to the US data from COMPUSTAT and use this calibrated model to provide a quantitative evaluation of the Bush government dividend tax reform in 2003. We find that a dividend tax cut raises aggregate productivity by reducing frictions of reallocating factors across firms. Our baseline model simulations show that when both dividend and capital gains tax rates are cut from 25 and 20 percent, respectively, to the same 15 percent level permanently, the aggregate long-run capital stock increases by about 4 percent. This result is robust to small changes of parameter values and to several extensions of our baseline model.

 

  • The Timing and Returns of Mergers and Acquisitions in Oligopolistic Industries, PDF, with Dirk Hackbarth, January 2008. Revised

Abstract: This article develops a real options model to study the interaction of industry structure and takeovers. In an asymmetric industry equilibrium, firms have an endogenous incentive to merge when restructuring decisions are motivated by operating and strategic benefits. The model predicts that (i) merger activities are more likely in more concentrated industries or in industries that are more exposed to industrywide shocks; (ii) returns to merger and rival firms arising from restructuring are higher in more concentrated industries; (iii) increased industry competition delays the timing of mergers; and (iv) in sufficiently concentrated industries, bidder competition induces a bid premium that declines with product market competition.

  • Advance Information and Asset Prices, with Rui Albuquerque, PDF, March 2008. Revised

Abstract: This paper provides an explanation for momentum and reversal in stock returns within a rational expectations equilibrium framework in which investors are heterogeneous in their information and investment opportunities. We assume that informed investors privately receive advance information about company earnings that materializes into the future. This information is immediately incorporated into prices, and thus stock prices may move in ways unrelated to current fundamentals. Investors' speculative and rebalancing trades in response to advance information generate short-run momentum, mimicking an underreaction pattern. When this information materializes, the stock price reverts back to its long-run mean, mimicking an overreaction pattern.

 

 

  • Monetary Policy and Economic Growth under Money Illusion, with Danyang Xie, PDF, Oct. 2007.

Abstract: Empirical and experimental evidence documents that money illusion is persistent and widespread. This paper incorporates money illusion into two stochastic continuous-time monetary models of endogenous growth. Motivated by psychology, we model an agent's money illusion behavior by assuming that he maximizes nonstandard utility derived from both nominal and real quantities. Money illusion affects an agent's perception of the growth and riskiness of real wealth and distorts his consumption/savings decisions. It influences long-run growth via this channel. We show that the welfare cost of money illusion is second order, whereas its impact on long-run growth is first order relative to the degree of money illusion. A monetary policy can eliminate this cost by correcting the distortions on a money-illusioned agent's consumption/savings decisions.

  • Ambiguity, Learning, and Asset Returns, with Nengjiu Ju, PDF, July 2007.

Abstract: We develop a consumption-based asset-pricing model in which the representative agent is ambiguous about the hidden state in consumption growth. He learns about the hidden state under ambiguity by observing past consumption data. His preferences are represented by the smooth ambiguity model axiomatized by Klibanoff et al. (2005, 2006). Unlike the standard Bayesian theory, this utility model implies that the posterior of the hidden state and the conditional distribution of the consumption process given a state cannot be reduced to a predictive distribution. By calibrating the ambiguity aversion parameter, the subjective discount factor, and the risk aversion parameter (with the latter two values between zero and one), our model can match the first moments of the equity premium and riskfree rate found in the data. In addition, our model can generate a variety of dynamic asset pricing phenomena, including the procyclical variation of price-dividend ratios, the countercyclical variation of equity premia and equity volatility, and the mean reversion and long horizon predictability of excess returns.

  • Risk, Uncertainty, and Option Exercise, with Neng Wang, PDF, March 2007. Revised

Abstract: Many economic decisions can be described as an option exercise or optimal stopping problem under uncertainty. Motivated by experimental evidence such as the Ellsberg Paradox, we follow Knight (1921) and distinguish risk from uncertainty. To afford this distinction, we adopt the multiple-priors utility model. We show that the impact of ambiguity on the option exercise decision depends on the relative degrees of ambiguity about continuation payoffs and termination payoffs. Consequently, ambiguity may accelerate or delay option exercise. We apply our results to firm investment and exit problems, and show that the myopic NPV rule can be optimal for an agent having an extremely high degree of ambiguity aversion.

 

  • Dynamic Effects of Permanent and Temporary Dividend Tax Policies on Corporate Investment and Financial Policies, PDF, with Francois Gouriro, Oct. 2007. Revised

Abstract: We develop a neoclassical partial equilibrium model to analyze the dynamic effects of permanent and temporary dividend tax policies on corporate investment and financing decisions. Facing a tax system with corporate and personal income taxes, dividend tax and capital gains tax, a firm decides how much to invest and how to finance investment by equity or debt subject to collateral constraints and capital adjustment costs. We characterize steady state and simulate transitional dynamics following tax policy changes. We find the following novel results: First, both temporary and permanent dividend tax changes do not have long-run effects on a firm's capital formation, but have short-run effects on its investment and financial policies. Second, an anticipated temporary dividend tax cut has a short-run effect of lowering investment, similar to an anticipated permanent dividend tax increase. Third, a firm responds asymmetrically to an anticipated permanent dividend tax increase versus an anticipated permanent dividend tax cut due to the collateral constraint. Finally, in anticipation of future tax changes, the firm engages in tax arbitrage by borrowing or saving in order to transfer corporate earnings across time so as to reduce shareholder's tax burden.

  • CEO Power, Compensation, and Governance, PDF, with Rui Albuquerque, January 2007. Updated

Abstract: This paper presents a contracting model of governance based on the premise that CEOs are the main promoters of governance change. CEOs use their power to extract higher pay or private benefits, and different governance structures are preferred by different CEOs as they favor one or the other type of compensation. The model explains why good country-wide investor protection breeds good firm governance and predicts a "race to the top" in firm-governance quality after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. However, such governance changes may be associated with higher rather than lower CEO pay as CEOs substitute away from private benefits. The model also provides an explanation for the observed correlation of CEO pay and firm governance as driven by CEO power.

 

  • Experimentation under Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Risk: An Application to Entrepreneurial Survival, PDF, with Neng Wang, May 2007, Revised

Abstract: We propose an analytically tractable continuous-time model of experimentation in which a risk-averse entrepreneur cannot fully diversify the idiosyncratic risk from his business investment. He makes consumption/savings and business exit decisions jointly, while learning about the unknown quality of the project over time. Using the closed-form solutions, we show that (i) the entrepreneur may stay in business even though the project's net present value (NPV) is negative; (ii) entrepreneurial risk aversion erodes option value and lowers private project value so that a sufficiently risk-averse entrepreneur may exit even when the NPV is positive; (iii) a more risk-averse or a more pessimistic entrepreneur exits earlier; and (iv) the model can generate a positive relation between wealth and entrepreneurial survival duration from undiversifiable idiosyncratic risk without liquidity constraints.

 

  • Existence and Computation of Markov Equilibria for Dynamic Nonoptimal Economies, PDF, with Manuel Santos, July 2005

Abstract: This paper presents a recursive method for the computation of sequential competitive equilibria for dynamic models with heterogeneous agents and market frictions. We first establish the existence of a Markovian equilibrium in a suitably expanded space of state variables. Then, we lay out a convergent operator whose fixed-point solutions correspond to the set of all Markov equilibria. We apply these methods to a stochastic growth economy and two financial economies.

 


Work in Progress

·       Transitional Dynamics of Dividend Tax Reform in General Equilibrium, with Francois Gourio

·       Entrepreneurial Investment and Financing Decisions under Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Risk, with Hui Chen and Neng Wang

·       Dynamic Asset Allocation with Ambiguous Return Predictability, with Hui Chen and Nengjiu Ju

·       Estimation of An Asset Pricing Model with Recursive Smooth Ambiguity Preferences, with Nengjiu Ju and Zhongjun Qu

 


The following papers are outdated and need revisions. But they are still cited by a few papers.

  • Ambiguity, Risk and Portfolio Choice under Incomplete Information, PDF, 2001
  • Stationary Equilibria of Economies with a Continuum of Heterogeneous Consumers, PDF, 2002
  • Managerial Preferences,  Corporate Governance, and Financial Structure, PDF, with Hong Liu, March 2006