Migration and development

The role for development aid

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The interlinkages between migration and economic development are receiving increased attention in both academic and political discussions. The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Development epitomizes this when it recognizes both the “positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth” and the “multi-dimensional reality” of migration. The Swedish government’s policy on international development also underlines the importance of considering the positive contribution of migrants to development, not least through remittances and diaspora engagement (see Budget prop. 2018). Sweden has also committed itself to contribute to improved cooperation on international migration by signing the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) and the Global Compact for Refugees (GCR). These two compacts provide a set of jointly agreed objectives, some of which are of relevance for the design of official development assistance (ODA).

In this extensive review, Professor Robert E.B. Lucas, Boston University, synthesizes existing research on the links between migration, economic development and aid. After providing an overview of the magnitudes and composition of international migration and remittance flows, Lucas summarizes what is known and not known about the effects of migration upon economic development, and vice-versa. The conclusion is that it varies. Much of the effects on poverty alleviation and growth depend on the setting; the skill-levels of migrants, investments in infrastructure and education in developing countries and impediments to rural-urban migration.

It is our hope that the overview will not only contribute to a better understanding of the complex interlinkages between migration and development, but also be of concrete help to policymakers when designing ODA.

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Summary

The objectives of this research overview are twofold: To provide a succinct outline of what is and is not known about the links between migration and economic development in developing countries; and to inform aid agencies about the potential for Official Development Assistance (ODA) in enhancing these two-way links, in which development affects migration and migration impacts progress in developing countries. Both internal and international migration fall within the purview of this overview. Throughout, the emphasis is on economic development rather than the broader sense of development set out in the Sustainable Development Goals; within the confines of this relatively brief document it is not feasible to address this much broader set of concerns.

Migration and Remittances: Magnitudes, Drivers and Limits

The percentage of the world’s population migrating across borders has hardly changed, at least over the last quarter century. Migration to neighboring countries is common, resulting in extensive movements within regions.

Income inequality has increased, both within and between countries. The evidence clearly indicates a positive association between bilateral population movements and the gaps in GDP per capita or in mean wages. Yet nearly a quarter of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and a third of African refugees moved to a country with a lower income level than their home country.

Nearly forty percent of the world’s international migrants are estimated to be in the developing countries, with almost exactly half of these in the Low and Lower-Middle Income states. Apart from movements to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, relatively few migrants from the Low and Lower-Middle Income countries make it to the High-Income regions. The less-well educated from the Low-Income countries stand almost no chance.
Gross emigration rates are highest from countries in the mid-range of GDP per capita; a phenomenon dubbed the migration transition or migration hump. This has led a number of observers to conclude that economic development of developing countries will exacerbate emigration pressures. Yet it remains unclear that today’s Low-Income countries will resemble their better-off counterparts over time; the evidence is mixed and that on any turning point encompasses a wide range.

Both relaxation of financial constraints and improving education levels have been hypothesized to underlie any increments to emigration with rising incomes. To the extent that the OECD countries are concerned to attract better-educated migrants, the role of rising education suggests that any concerns with respect to a migration transition are really misplaced. Moreover, to deny Low-Income countries the prospect of development for fear of mounting emigration is only to postpone reaching a transition point.

The evidence clearly shows that bilateral migration flows are greater to countries with more generous social benefit structures. This refers, however, to selection of location by migrants; it is unclear whether more generous social benefits swell the total flows of migrants. Nonetheless, political pressure may lead to diminished social benefits to stay in-line with other potential hosts; a phenomenon dubbed the “race to the bottom.”

For the poor, who possess few if any assets, the dominant source of income is their labor earnings. Both internal and international migrations tend to peak in early adulthood and, consequently, youth employment has attracted a special amount of attention. This calls for the integration of migration into national planning, a concept that has been marginalized in most developing countries. It also calls for policy coherence among the ministries of host countries.

Of the 25.3 million refugees at the end of 2017, only 102,800 had been resettled in third countries. Indeed, 85 percent of the world’s refugees are in the developing countries with a disproportionate concentration in the Low-Income countries. The Internally Displaced Population has risen even more quickly than the number of refugees, though almost nothing is known about the selection that occurs into those who manage to flee the country versus those remaining internally-displaced.
Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions by the US have declined substantially since the turn of the Millennium; in this sense it is unclear that any border crisis is imminent, though a humanitarian crisis has been created. Third country nationals refused entry at the external borders of the EU numbered nearly a third less in 2017 than ten years earlier, though sea and land arrivals at Europe’s southern borders clearly peaked in 2015 at just over a million but by 2018 had returned to less than two-thirds of the numbers in 2014.

Payment to smugglers for undocumented border crossings can be very high and the process of crossing is commonly dangerous too. At least on the US border with Mexico there is evidence that these costs deter return visits home and have actually resulted in a larger stock of undocumented migrants in consequence. But payments to recruiters to obtain documented entry can also be high, requiring multiple years of earnings at destination to recoup the initial entry costs.

Migration within countries is far larger than international movements, and is a key to smooth development as economies transition from predominantly rural to increasingly industrialized societies. Yet rural-urban migration is often “blamed” for the rapid increase in urbanization levels among countries where urbanization levels remain low. However, this is not obviously the case. A significant portion of the expansion in urbanization is a reflection of natural population growth, resulting in villages becoming towns and in encroachment of cities, swallowing neighboring rural areas. Recent evidence also points to the temporary nature of moves into towns, even among those establishing a usual residence in the urban sector before returning.

Climate change has two effects on migration: directly through the onset of more frequent hydrometeorological disasters; and indirectly through changing livelihoods. The bulk of the effect is on internal migration rather than emigration. Climate change is an indisputable fact and planning for its consequences, including the induced growth of urbanization is pressing, calling for urgent, advance planning.

The gap in living standards between the rural and urban populations in developing countries is extremely large and a major contributor to global inequality. Some analysts emphasize the barriers preventing many from taking advantage of the higher
urban income opportunities. Others depict this as reflecting a gap in the inherent skill levels of the rural and urban populations.

Distance is a deterrent to internal migration as in international moves. In remote rural areas this results in the absence of fellow villagers forming a welcoming network in town. Populations in remote settings are consequently increasingly isolated from any progress at the core of the economy. In almost all developing countries ethnic minorities are less likely to migrate into towns than are those from the majority community, and this is not just because these minorities tend to live in more remote settings.

Some of the very rapid expansion of reported remittances since the turn of the Millennium may reflect changing coverage and definitions; some, no doubt, reflects efforts to redirect transfers away from the largely unreported movements through informal banking agencies. The chief barriers to channeling remittances through more formal money transfer services are the costs of sending money home and the difficulties imposed by banking regulations in various countries. The costs have come down but remain high on some thinner corridors and there is far to go to meet the three percent target set in the Sustainable Development Goals.

**Economic Consequences of Migration for Developing Countries**

International migration is not a substitute for economic development at home and some aspects of migration may prove harmful to the home country. Much depends upon the setting; upon the state of policies in place and their implications for the structure of the economy. This speaks to the importance of integrating migration into the planning framework.

Whether the departure of highly-skilled persons imposes costs upon those remaining at home depends upon several elements: how effectively the highly-skilled would be deployed at home if they were to remain; any spill-over effects from loss of services or reducing productivity levels of remaining workers; the method of financing higher education at home; and whether the training actually takes place at home or overseas.
Such costs need to be weighed against advantages from having a highly-skilled diaspora; elements of ‘brain-gain.’ These include: induced additional education among the remaining population; the stimulus to bilateral trade with the host countries; the larger remittance inflows from better-educated emigrants; transfers home of technology and positive ideas; and the prospects of return with improved skills acquired abroad. Each of these has some supporting evidence though the balance between ‘brain-drain’ and ‘brain-gain’ effects lacks systematic reconciliation.

The transfer of ideas, know-how, practices, and skills, by trans-migrants and from the diaspora, has come to be known as ‘social remittances’. Not all of these transfers are positive. The emerging evidence suggests that the influence of ideas upon the home country can depend critically upon the culture prevalent in the host countries, though the selection of destination may also be shaped by pre-conceived ideas.

Return migration of low-skilled workers probably has the largest impact in terms of direct poverty reduction in countries of origin. This has been a notable outcome of the mass migrations to the GCC states. Departure of low-skilled workers helps tighten the labor-market for fellow low-skill workers at home. Remittances from low-skill workers go to low-income families, and prospects of return are associated with higher remitting levels. Return migration is often an objective of the host countries too but has proved difficult to manage.

Home governments often see international remittance inflows as a resource to be exploited and complaints that these transfers are not invested are common. Such complaints are misplaced. First, transfers to families at home are actually often invested, particularly in education and housing. Collective remittances, through such organizations as home-town associations, tend to be invested in local amenities and infrastructure, though the evidence (largely from Mexico) points to the better-off communities being the main beneficiaries. Second, remittances from individuals are private transfers; even if policy-makers wish to raise the national commitment to investment, it is not obvious why remittance-recipients should be expected to bear the load. On the other hand, lack of public infrastructure investments can act as a deterrent to investing on behalf of remittance recipients.
The available evidence on return rates and experiences of returned international migrants, both voluntary and involuntary, is limited by data availability. Minor extensions to censuses could rectify much of this quite simply. Meanwhile, the extant analyses show that returned migrants tend to set up more small businesses, financed out of their retained earnings, than do non-migrants. They are also estimated to earn a premium in wage employment upon return, reflecting experience and skills gained, even after recognizing that they represented a select set of the population in the first place.

The effects of immigration upon developing, host countries’ economies and earnings has largely been neglected. Nonetheless some evidence shows that limited competition between migrant and non-migrant workers in developing countries has isolated the original population from wage depression; migrants tend to be concentrated in the informal sector compared to the non-migrant workers. Other studies demonstrate that mass refugee inflows can have mixed local effects, hurting nearby workers, helping employers, while raising prices of basic goods. More generally, some evidence points to lower economic growth resulting from mass refugee inflows into neighboring developing countries. International agencies offset some of the costs of supporting the refugees, but apparently by no means all of these costs.

Rural-urban migration is a key element in facilitating the transition to an industrialized economy. Whether this transition is proceeding efficiently remains a topic of dispute. Artificially high wages in urban areas, in the public sector and other formal sector positions, attract migrants to gamble on finding these lucrative positions. On the other hand, members of disadvantaged groups are often reluctant to relocate in towns, though whether this reflects an aversion to the risks involved, a preference for rural life, a lack of information about opportunities, or concerns they would be ostracized by urbanites, remains to be disentangled.

Whatever the underlying reasons, any such ‘barriers’ to mobility not only prevent efficient sorting of labor into the most productive activities, but also result in wide disparities in incomes; extreme poverty is concentrated in the rural areas. Both on account of efficient progress and poverty alleviation these barriers require redress.
Improving access to rural schools and the quality of that education may prove a key component in this, perhaps particularly in reaching more remote communities.

Rational decisions with respect to the location of infrastructure must be founded not only on today’s population location but on projections over decades to come. To some extent, the spread of population is, in turn, shaped by the availability of infrastructure. There is ample evidence on the role of employment and earnings opportunities in shaping internal migration decisions; opportunities which, in turn, are affected by the infrastructure available. There is far less evidence on the direct effects of amenity availability, at origin and destination, upon migration decisions; evidence that may prove critical in planning for future infrastructure placement. Postponing such plans may prove costly with continued climate change taking its toll on agriculture as a livelihood.

Seeking a job in town is a risky business. Surviving the vagaries of life in rural areas is often far riskier. A substantial body of evidence illustrates that remittances from family members in town can and do act as an insurance mechanism for those left at home when times turn bad. Having family members migrate to town (or even abroad) then offers support, staving off at least temporary episodes of extreme poverty. There is also a smaller set of studies that indicate the importance of seasonal migration as a mechanism for diminishing starvation in the agricultural lean seasons.

Migration, whether international or internal, often does split families. Where this isolates the most vulnerable, the elderly and the children, this can come at considerable cost, as can the conjugal separation of couples.

Official Development Assistance: The Migration Links

Although the focus here is upon links between ODA and migration, by no means the only goal of aid is to shape migration and its outcomes. The OECD defines ODA, inter alia, as “administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective.” Attempts at containing international migration have become an increasing focal point of ODA use. Not all of these uses meet the OECD definition.
Cutting-off aid for failing to contain emigration has recently been used as a threat by the US, though totally ineffectively. At an earlier stage, offers of ODA formed part of the package of the co-development schemes formulated by various European countries, though these failed to establish any coherent set of policies and were largely abandoned. Following the surge in immigration into Europe in 2015, the EU introduced an Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, soon followed by a Migration Partnership Framework combined with an ambitious External Investment Plan. These European efforts have been criticized for diverting ODA funds into objectives that are hardly aimed at “the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries”, for proving to have extremely limited success in such areas as job creation, and failing to enhance willingness of developing countries to accept returned migrants.

The conventional wisdom among policy makers has been that economic development in the sending countries will reduce emigration pressures. The conventional wisdom among contributing observers asserts that the opposite is the case; that aid to developing countries will not help to diminish incentives to emigrate but will actually increase out-migration. What does the evidence actually show?

The most cited sources of evidence that aid is positively associated with emigration rates are now outdated and may well be statistically flawed. Some of the most recent contributions point to the importance of the composition of that aid. Others even conclude the exact opposite; that more aid is associated with lesser emigration rates. The direct evidence is mixed at best.

A part of the argument goes through the migration transition evidence. If ODA raises GDP levels and emigration rates rise with income levels among the developing countries then ODA will accelerate the rate of emigration. But does ODA actually serve to increase growth? This has been a contentious field and the debate continues. If the sign of the effect of aid upon economic growth remains unclear, whether or not a migration hump exists is moot. Only if aid clearly raises income levels and raising incomes in turn witnesses rising emigration will aid accelerate emigration. In any case, to deny aid to the lowest income countries because this may enhance migration pressures is only to postpone the process; if a hump exists, hopefully
more and more countries will transit that hump in time, particularly if the turning point in incomes is as low as some of the evidence indicates.

The countries and territories in conflict or in a fragile state are the origins of two-thirds of the world’s refugees and sixty percent of the internally displaced, as of 2017. ODA to these states has risen from about 12 percent of total ODA at the turn of the millennium to over a quarter by 2017. By 2017 these countries and territories in a fragile state received nearly ten times as much ODA, relative to their gross national income (GNI), compared to receipts of all developing countries in entirety. This ratio comparing fragile states to other ODA recipients has risen from about half the level in 2002. Containing the anticipated flow of refugees ought not to be the chief criterion in directing aid towards failing situations. Rather, the focus needs to be on addressing the underlying factors that give rise to conflict in the first place. For instance, as OECD (2018, p.254) notes, “If no action is taken, more than 80% of the world’s poor could be living in fragile contexts by 2030.” Effectively delivering aid during times of conflict is generally too late and not viable. However, there are signs of improvement in aid delivery and effectiveness to states in a fragile situation prior to the onset of any conflict.

No doubt the composition of aid has an important role in shaping any effects of total aid upon migration, both internationally and internally. In discussing this it should be borne in mind, though, that aid can prove fungible; gross contribution levels to a specific sector are not necessarily equal to net incremental spending on this aspect.

How contributions to education shape migration may well depend very much on the nature of this spending, including the level of education and location within the country. More than a third of ODA for education currently goes to Post-Secondary levels. Possessing a tertiary education is associated with higher levels of emigration and emigration to the High-Income countries in particular. Whether this results in a loss (brain-drain) or brain-gain to the home country, on balance, remains debatable. On the other hand, expanding the basic and secondary levels of education typically enhances the employability of young people at home, tending to diminish departure. The evidence quite clearly indicates that providing primary schools in rural areas can have a significant effect on school completion and on earnings. Since
those with a little better education are also more likely to migrate into urban areas, this can also facilitate the process of transition out of dependence on agriculture. Moreover, there is evidence on the deterrent effect of distance-to-school impacting attendance. Provision of at least primary schools closer to remote areas may well then help to diminish the cumulative isolation of those at the periphery from economic progress at the core.

ODA to reproductive health and healthcare more generally can certainly improve the attraction of remaining at home. Moreover, there is at least some very recent evidence that ODA to Government and Civil Society may be significant in diminishing emigration pressures.

Contributions to Economic Infrastructure, predominantly in Transport and Energy, are also quite key in bilateral ODA, amounting to some 17 percent in 2017. These components can play an important role in shaping migration in at least three ways. (1) Lack of infrastructure is a significant constraint on overall economic development in many of the developing countries, ultimately limiting the potential for job creation and the attractiveness of remaining at home. (2) Investments by the diaspora and out of migrants’ remittances need to be complemented by the provision of appropriate infrastructure to render them viable. (3) The location of any additions to infrastructure probably has an important role in shaping internal migration.

ODA to agriculture presumably has two main goals: improving food security (to the extent that food imports are limited and food must be grown locally); and improving living standards in rural areas where most of the world’s poor reside. To the extent that it is successful with respect to the latter, such aid probably serves to diminish the extent of rural-urban migration. Whether providing incentives to remain in the rural zones is the best strategy in the long-run is unclear, particularly in contexts where climate change is having an increasing effect on rendering dependence upon agriculture less and less viable.

Contributions to Environment Protection are presumably productive in the longer-run, sustaining living standards and mitigating some of the consequences of climate change on population redistribution internally. Depending upon the targets
of this assistance, it may also have global, spill-over benefits. This segment is, however, quite small, totalling only about three percent of bilateral ODA in 2017.

In 2017, 90 percent of the Humanitarian Aid (12 percent of total bilateral ODA) contributed to Emergency Responses. This is clearly an important role for the donor countries. However, the contributions to Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation and to Disaster Prevention & Preparedness both amounted to less than one percent of total ODA. The former is likely to play an important role in return of both migrants and refugees; the latter is also likely to prove vital, going forward, in limiting the need for Emergency Response funding and in diminishing the adverse drivers of both international and internal migration. The emphasis here seems to be rather short-sighted.

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration sets out 23 objectives, each with a list of intended actions to achieve these goals. Not all of these objectives lend themselves to an obvious role for ODA and certainly not all possible interventions meet the Lisbon definition of ODA. Nonetheless, this overview develops some suggestions as to the nature of potential ODA in moving toward fulfilment of at least some of these objectives and intended actions. Several of the suggestions involve the need for expert assistance in moving toward fulfilment of the GCM. But the GCM also emphasizes the need to “Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin.” The emphasis on compulsion here clearly indicates that actions would be aimed at the interest of the home-country’s population, opening key roles for ODA that are also outlined in the overview. A number of other potential roles for ODA are also noted both in rendering migration more orderly and in promoting progress at home as a result of these movements. The Global Compact on Refugees is far more explicit in its calls for international assistance, though in this context the aim is to create multiple stakeholder groups, which will require multinational coordination.
Sammanfattning

Denna rapport har två syften: Det ena är att kortfattat redogöra för vilka kunskaper som finns om sambandet mellan migration och ekonomisk utveckling i utvecklingsländer. Det andra är att visa på olika möjligheter som finns för att med hjälp av bistånd förbättra det ömsesidiga förhållandet, där utveckling påverkar migration och migration påverkar ekonomisk utvecklingen i utvecklingsländer. Både intern och internationell migration tas upp men det bör poängteras att fokus för denna kunskapsöversikt riktas genomgående mot ekonomisk utveckling. Detta då utrymme inte ges, att inom ramen för denna Delmi- och EBA-översikt, behandla all typ av utveckling som rymmer inom den bredare definitionen av utveckling som beskrivs i målen för hållbar utveckling.

Migration och remitteringar: Omfattning, drivkrafter och begränsningar

Andelen av världens befolkning som migrerar över gränser har knappast förändrats, åtminstone inte under det senaste kvartssektlet. Migration till grannländer är vanligt och innebär att stora omflyttningar sker inom regioner.

Inkomstskillnaderna har ökat, såväl inom som mellan länder. Det finns tydliga belägg för ett positivt samband mellan bilateralare folkomflyttningar och skillnader i BNP per capita, eller i medellöner. Trots det flyttade nästan en fjärdedel av migranter från länderna i Afrika söder om Sahara och en tredjedel av afrikanska flyktingar till ett land med lägre inkomstnivå än deras hemland.

Det uppskattas att nästan 40 procent av världens internationella migranter finns i utvecklingsländer och omkring hälften av dessa i låginkomst- eller lägre medelinkomstländer. Förutom migrationen till GCC-staterna, är det relativt få migranter från låginkomst- eller lägre medelinkomstländer som lyckas ta sig till höginkomstregioner. Möjligheterna för lågutbildade från låginkomstländer att ta sig till en höginkomstregion är nästan obefintliga.


Det finns tydliga belägg för att de bilaterala migrationsströmmarna är större till länder med mer generösa sociala förmånssystem. Detta handlar emellertid om migranternas val av mål. Det är mer osäkert om generösare sociala förmåner ökar de totala migrationsströmmarna. Likväl kan det politiska trycket leda till försämrad sociala förmåner för att anpassa sig till nivån i andra potentiella mottagarländer – ett fenomen som brukar kallas en ”kapplöpning mot botten”.

För fattiga människor med små eller obefintliga tillgångar, är arbetsinkomst den viktigaste inkomstkällan. Såväl den interna som den internationella migrationen är normalt sett störst bland unga vuxna och särskild uppmärksamhet har därför riktats mot sysselsättningsgraden bland unga. Därför behöver migration integreras i den nationella planeringen, vilket är något som negligerats i de flesta utvecklingsländer. De olika departementen i mottagarländerna behöver också samordna sin politik.

Av de 25,3 miljoner flyktingar som fanns i slutet av 2017, har bara 102 800 vidareboottsats i tredjeländer. 85 procent av världens flyktingar finns i utvecklingsländer och en oproportionerligt stor andel av dem i låginkomstländer. Antalet internflyktingar har ökat ännu snabbare än antalet flyktingar, men det är oklart vad som avgör vilka som lyckas fly landet och vilka som blir kvar som internflyktingar.

De priser som flyktingar måste betala för att bli smugglade över gränser illegalt kan vara mycket höga och passagerna kan vara mycket farliga. Åtminstone när det gäller gränsen mellan USA och Mexiko finns det uppgifter som visar att dessa kostnader avhåller människor från att resa tillbaka till hemlandet, vilket har lett till att det totala antalet papperslösa migranter har ökat. Kostnaderna för rekryterare som möjliggör en laglig inresa kan emellertid också vara höga och det kan sedan krävas åratal av arbeten för att betala tillbaka de initiala inresekostnaderna.


Klimatförändringar får två slags konsekvenser för migration: direkta, på grund av det ökande antalet hydrometeorologiska katastrofer, och indirekta, på grund av förändrade försörjningsmöjligheter. Konsekvenserna blir större för intern migration än för utvandring. Att klimatet förändras är ett vedertaget faktum och det finns ett akut behov av bättre planering för att hantera konsekvenserna av detta, däribland den ökande urbaniseringen.
Skillnaderna i levnadsstandard mellan befolkningen på landsbygden och i städerna i utvecklingsländerna är extremt stora och utgör en bidragande orsak till de globala klyftorna. Vissa bedömare pekar på de barriärer som hindrar många från att ta del av de bättre inkomstmöjligheterna i städerna. Andra anser att skillnaderna i levnadsstandard beror på kompetensskillnader mellan landsbygds- och stadsbefolkningen.

Avstånd försvårar såväl intern som internationell migration. När det gäller avlägsna landsbygdsområden kan det handla om att det saknas ett nätverk av personer från samma by som kan underlätta inflyttningen till staden. Befolkningen i avlägsna områden blir på så sätt allt mer avskärmade från utvecklingen i den centrala delen av ekonomin. I nästan alla utvecklingsländer är etniska minoriteter mindre benägna att migrera till städer än majoritetsbefolkningen och det beror inte bara på att dessa minoriteter bor i mer avlägsna områden.

Den mycket snabba ökningen av rapporterade remitteringar sedan millennieskiftet kan delvis bero på en förändrad syn på vad som räknas som remittering, men en del beror utan tvekan på en strävan att motverka att överföringen av pengar sker via informella bankinrättningar. De största hindren för att överföringarna ska ske via mer formella kanaler är kostnaderna för att skicka hem pengar och de svårigheter som banklagstiftningen i olika länder ger upphov till. Kostnaderna har sjunkit men de är fortfarande höga i vissa områden och mycket återstår att göra för att trepercentsmålet i målen för hållbar utveckling ska kunna uppnås.

**Migrationens ekonomiska konsekvenser för utvecklingsländerna**

Internationell migration kan inte ersätta ekonomisk utveckling på hemmaplan och vissa aspekter av migrationen kan få negativa konsekvenser för hemlandet. Mycket beror på sammanhanget, vilken politik som bedrivs och vilka konsekvenser den får för ekonomins uppbryggnad. Detta talar för att det är viktigt att integrera migrationen i staters planeringsarbete.
Huruvida utflyttningen av högutbildade personer medför kostnader för dem som blir kvar i hemlandet beror på flera olika faktorer: hur effektivt de högutbildade skulle ha utnyttjats om de hade stannat kvar, eventuella spridningseffekter av försämrad service eller minskad produktivitet bland den kvarvarande arbetskraften, hur den högre utbildningen finansieras i hemlandet och huruvida utbildningen faktiskt sker i hemlandet eller utomlands.

Dessa kostnader måste vägas mot fördelarna av att ha högutbildade personer utomlands; så kallad "brain-gain". Dessa fördelar kan bland annat vara stimulans till ökad utbildning bland den kvarvarande befolkningen, främjande av bilateral handel med mottagarländerna, ökade inflöden av remitteringar från välutbildade utvandrare, överföring av teknik och nya idéer till hemlandet och möjligheter att återvända med nya kunskaper som inhämtats utomlands. Det finns vissa belägg för samtliga dessa, men det saknas systematiska undersökningar av hur effekterna av "brain-drain" och "brain-gain" förhåller sig till varandra.

Överföringen av idéer, know-how, praxis och färdigheter från interna migranter och utvandrare brukar kallas "sociala remitteringar". Alla dessa är inte positiva. Allt mer tyder på att den mån i vilken idéer påverkar hemlandet kan vara starkt beroende av vilken kultur som råder i mottagarländerna, även om valet av land att utvandra till samtidigt kan påverkas av förutfattade meningar.

Återflyttning av okvalificerad arbetskraft har sannolikt den största betydelsen för den direkta fattigdomsminsknningen i ursprungsländer. Detta har varit ett påtagligt resultat av den omfattande migrationen till GCC-staterna. Migration av okvalificerad arbetskraft bidrar till att strama åt arbetsmarknaden för andra lågutbildade arbetstagare i hemlandet. Remitteringar från lågutbildade arbetstagare går till låginkomstfamiljer och möjligheterna att återvända är större ju större remitteringarna är. Återflyttning är också ofta ett mål för mottagarländerna, även om detta mål har visat sig vara svårt att uppnå.

Regeringar i hemländer ser ofta internationella remitteringarna som en potentiell resurs som kan utnyttjas och det är vanligt med kritik mot att dessa överföringar inte investeras. Denna kritik är obefogad. För det första är det vanligt att överfö-
ringar till familjen i hemlandet investeras, bland annat i utbildning och bostäder. Kollektiva remitteringar, via organisationer som hemortsföreningar, investeras ofta i lokala faciliteter och infrastruktur, även om uppgifter (främst från Mexiko) visar att det i första hand är mer välbärgade grupper som gynnas av detta. För det andra är remitteringar från individer privata överföringar. Även om beslutsfattare vill öka investeringarna i landet, är det inte självklart varför remitteringsmottagarna ska stå för dessa. Å andra sidan kan bristen på offentliga investeringar i infrastruktur avhålla dessa mottagare från att investera.

Kunskaperna om återflyttningsnivåer och erfarenheter hos internationella migranter som återvänt, frivilligt eller ofrivilligt, är begränsade. Genom små kompletteringar i folkbokföringen skulle man ganska lätt kunna åtgärda mycket av detta. Under tiden visar de analyser som finns att återflyttade migranter ofta startar små affärsverksamheter med hjälp av hopsparade pengar än icke-migranter. De har sannolikt också lättare att få anställning när de kommer tillbaka, till följd av de erfarenheter och den kompetens som de har skaffat sig utomlands, även om man tar i beaktning att de utgjorde en uttalad del av befolkningen redan från början.


Migration från landsbygd till städer är viktig för att underlätta övergången till en industrialiserad ekonomi. Huruvida denna övergång sker på ett effektivt sätt är omtvistat. Uppskruvade lönenivåer i städerna, inom den offentliga sektorn och
inom andra delar av den formella sektorn, lockar migranter att, på vinst eller förlust, söka sig till dessa lukrativa inkomstkällor. Å andra sidan är personer som tillhör utsvatta grupper ofta mindre benägna att flytta till städer. Huruvida detta beror på en motvilja mot de risker det innebär, en förkärlek för lantlivet, bristande information om vilka möjligheter som finns eller oro för att bli utfrysta av stadsborna, är oklart. Oavsett vilka skäl som ligger bakom, försvarar sådana ”hinder” för rörlighet inte bara en effektiv styrning av arbetskraften till de mest produktiva sektorerna. Det leder även till stora inkomstskillnader och till att den extrema fattigdomen koncentreras till landsbygden. Dessa hinder måste undanröjas för att man ska kunna åstadkomma effektiv utveckling och minska fattigdomen. Att förbättra tillgången till skolundervisning på landsbygden och höja dess kvalitet kan vara viktiga faktorer i detta sammanhang, i synnerhet i mer avlägsna områden.


Att söka arbete i en stad är förknippat med risker. Att försöka överleva de skiftande förhållandena på landsbygden är ofta ännu mer riskfyllt. Det finns omfattande belägg för att remitteringar från familjemedlemmar i städerna kan fungera och fungerar som en försäkring för dem som stannat kvar när det blir dåliga tider. Att ha familjemedlemmar som migrerat till en stad (eller till och med utomlands) innebär ofta ett skydd mot extrem fattigdom, om än tillfälligt. Det finns även vissa studier som pekar på att säsongsbunden migration har betydelse för att minska svälten på landsbygden under dåliga år.
Oavsett om migrationen är internationell eller intern, splittrar den ofta familjer. Om det innebär att de mest utsatta grupperna, barn och äldre, blir isolerade, kan priset bli högt. Det gäller även när par skiljs åt.

**Offentligt utvecklingsbistånd: Samband med migration**

Även om fokus här ligger på sambandet mellan offentligt utvecklingsbistånd (Official Development Assistance, eller ODA) och migration, är målet för biståndet långtifrån bara att påverka migrationen och konsekvenserna av den. OECD har definierat vad ODA innebär och anger bland annat att ”målet med det i första hand är att främja ekonomisk utveckling och välfärd i utvecklingsländerna”. ODA har i allt högre grad kommit att användas för att försöka bromsa den internationella migrationen. Detta är inte alltid förenligt med OECD:s definition.

USA har hotat med att minska biståndet på grund av att migrationen inte har hållits tillbaka, men det har inte fått någon som helst effekt. Tidigare utgjorde erbjudanden om ODA en del av paketet i gemensamma utvecklingsprojekt som olika europeiska länder utarbetade. Dessa misslyckades dock med att skapa sammanhängande strategier och har till stor del övergivits. Efter att invandringen till Europa ökat under 2015, inrättade EU en förvaltningsfond för nödåtgärder i Afrika. Den följdes snart av ett partnerskapsramverk för migration som kombinerades med en ambitiös extern investeringsplan. Dessa europeiska initiativ har kritiserats för att flytta över medel från det offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet till insatser som knappast syftar till att ”främja ekonomisk utveckling och välfärd i utvecklingsländerna”. De har även visat sig ha mycket begränsad effekt när det exempelvis gäller att skapa arbetsstillfällen och de har heller inte lyckats öka beredvilligheten i utvecklingsländer att ta emot tillbakaskickade migranter.

Den traditionella uppfattningen bland beslutsfattare har varit att ekonomisk utveckling i utvandrarländerna minskar utvandringen. Andra observatörer pekar istället på det motsatta – att bistånd till utvecklingsländer inte minskar incitamenten för att migrera, utan faktiskt ökar migrationen. Vad säger forskningen?
De källor som det oftast har hänvisats till som belägg för att det finns ett positivt samband mellan bistånd och migration, mer precist, utvandring/emigration, är vid det här laget utdaterade och det kan mycket väl vara så att de dessutom lider av statistiska brister. Vissa studier som gjorts på senare tid betonar bland annat betydelsen av biståndets sammansättning. Andra drar till och med rakt motsatt slutsats: att mer bistånd är förknippat med lägre utvandring. De direkta beläggen går här stick i stäv med varandra.

Vissa av slutsatserna bygger på de belägg som finns för migrationspuckeln. Om bistånd (ODA) höjer BNP-nivåer och utvandring ökar i takt med inkomster i utvecklingsländer, så kommer bistånd att påskynda utvandring. Men bidrar ODA verklig till att öka den ekonomiska tillväxten? Detta har varit och är en omtvistad fråga. Så länge det är oklart om bistånd faktiskt bidrar till ekonomisk tillväxt, är det alltså oklart om ODA bidrar till ökad migration – via en migrationspuckel. Det är bara om det är uppenbart att bistånd höjer inkomstnivåerna och att ökade inkomster i sin tur ökar utvandring, som bistånd kan anses påskynda utvandring. Om de länder som har de lägsta inkomsterna nekas bistånd på grund av att det kan öka utvandring, skjuter man hur som helst bara upp processen. Om det finns en puckel kommer fler och fler länder förhoppningsvis att passera den med tiden, i synnerhet om brytpunkten för inkomster är så låg som vissa uppgifter tyder på.

att leva under instabila förhållanden år 2030. När en konflikt har brutit ut är det i allmänhet näst intill omöjligt att tillhandahålla bistånd, och definitivt försent för ett effektivt bistånd. Det finns emellertid tecken på att förbättringar har skett när det gäller biståndet, och dess effektivitet, till stater som befinner sig i en instabil situation, men där konflikt ännu inte har brutit ut.

Det råder ingen tvekan om att biståndets sammansättning i hög grad påverkar det totala biståndets effekter på migration, både internationellt och internt. Man bör i detta sammanhang dock betänka att bruttobistånd till en viss sektor inte nödvändigtvis betyder en nettoökning av monetära satsningar inom samma område.


ODA till reproduktiv hälsa och hälsovård kan på ett mer generellt plan bidra till att göra det mer attraktivt att stanna kvar. Det har dessutom på senare tid visat sig att ODA till regeringar och till civilsamhället kan bidra till att minska utvandring.

Bistånd till ekonomisk infrastruktur, främst inom transport och energi, är också en relativt viktig del inom det bilaterala biståndet och det uppgick 2017 till cirka 17
procent. Dessa biståndskomponenter kan ha stor inverkan på migration i åtminstone tre avseenden. (1) Bristfällig infrastruktur är ett stort hinder för ekonomisk utveckling i många utvecklingsländer, vilket i slutändan begränsar möjligheterna att skapa arbetstillfällen och göra det attraktivt att stanna kvar. (2) Investerings som görs av migranter eller som sker med hjälp av migranter s remitteringar, måste kompletteras med tillhandahållande av lämplig infrastruktur för att de ska bli lönsamma. (3) Var infrastruktur byggs har sannolikt stor betydelse för interna migration.

Bistånd till jordbruk kan anses ha två huvudmål: att trygga livsmedelsförsörjningen (genom att begränsa livsmedelsimporten och öka den lokala produktionen) och att höja levnadsstandarden på landsbygden där merparten av världens fattiga bor. I den mån man lyckas uppnå det sistnämnda målet, bidrar bistånd sannolikt till att minska migration från landsbygd till städer. Det är oklart om incitament för att människor ska stanna kvar på landsbygden är den bästa strategin på lång sikt, i synnerhet i områden där klimatförändringar gör det allt svårare att leva på jordbruket.

Bistånd till miljöskydd kan förväntas ha mer långsiktiga effekter, genom att det upprätthåller levnadsstandarden och mildrar vissa av klimatförändringarnas konsekvenser för den interna omfördelningen av befolkningen. Beroende på vilka målen för biståndet är, kan det även få positiva spridningseffekter globalt. Detta bistånd är emellertid ganska begränsat och totalt uppgick det till endast omkring tre procent av totalt ODA 2017.

Det globala ramverket förorsåker, ordnad och reguljär migration (Migrationsramverket, eller GCM) innehåller 23 mål, som var och ett har en förteckning över tilltänkta åtgärder för att uppnå dessa mål. ODA har inte någon självklar roll när det gäller samtliga dessa mål och alla tänkbare insatser uppfyller sannerligen inte Lissabondefinitionen av ODA. Denna rapport innehåller likväl några förslag om hur detta bistånd kan användas för att uppnå åtminstone vissa av mål och planerade insatser. Flera av förslagen innefattar ett behov av experthjälp för att närma sig målen för GCM. GCM betonar dock även behovet av att minimera de negativa drivkrafter och strukturella faktorer som tvingar människor att lämna sitt hemland. Fokuset på tvång här visar tydligt att åtgärder bör riktas mot att tillgodose intressen för hemländernas befolkning. Detta innebär att ODA skulle kunna få en viktig roll, vilket också beskrivs i denna kunskapsöversikt. Ett antal andra potentiella roller för ODA konstateras också, både när det gäller att göra migration mer ordnad och när det gäller att främja utveckling på hemmaplan till följd av dessa omflyttningar. Det globala ramverket för flyktingar (Flyktingramverket, eller GCR) är mycket tydligare än GCM i sina krav på internationellt stöd, även om målet i det här sammanhanget är att skapa flera grupper bestående av olika intressenter (stake-holders), vilket i sin tur kräver multinationell samordning.
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1. Introduction

A two-way link exists: economic development affects migration while migration influences development. In today’s world, these links play an important part in shaping the economies of the Low and Middle-Income countries. A few attempts have been made to use Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a bargaining chip in this migration-development nexus. Some attempts are in the form of threats; “Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador were not able to do the job of stopping people from leaving their country and coming illegally to the U.S. We will now begin cutting off, or substantially reducing, the massive foreign aid routinely given to them” (Tweet, Donald Trump, October 22, 2018). In fact, any such threat is quite empty. USAID reports that aid to these three countries totalled 538 million US$ in 2017 (BBC News, 2018); the World Bank estimates that migrant remittances to these three nations was almost 18 billion US$ in that same year. Other attempts to wield aid have been in the guise of promises rather than threats. Thus, aid has been a key ingredient in the co-development strategies of several European countries, aimed both at containing new migration and encouraging return. Gubert (2014) provides an excellent account of the ambiguities in these programs resulting in little policy coherence. In any case, the ability of these home countries to restrain emigration are certainly circumscribed, not to mention that the right of exit was established in 1948 with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In July 2018, a Final Draft of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) was approved by all member nations of the UN except the US. A Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 17th, 2018, with the US and Hungary opposing the resolution, while Eritrea, Liberia and Libya abstained (UNHCR, 2018). The GCM lists 23 objectives with descriptions of intended action to achieve these goals. Although the global amount of ODA is too small to have a major impact on economic development, and has been quite abused in threatening, aiming at and bargaining for altered migra-
tion patterns, aid may nonetheless be able to play a more constructive role in implementing certain of the GCM objectives. Aid is probably quite blunt as an instrument resolving conflict, but it can assume some importance in post-conflict settings, in working with refugees, and in countries in failing situations, thus also playing a useful role in the GCR. This overview seeks to bring out some of these potentialities for aid in pursuing the GCM and GCR, while also summarizing what is and is not known about the links between migration, including refugee flows, and economic development.

Migration within countries is far larger than international movements, and is a key to smooth development as economies transition from predominantly rural to increasingly urban societies. In some parts of the developing regions, notably in much of Latin America, this transition is already fairly complete; in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South Asia rapid urbanization is likely to continue for some time, probably accelerated by climate change. Again, aid may be able to ease this transition.

The consideration of these issues is divided into four main sections in this overview. The first sets the scene by providing some background evidence on the magnitudes and composition of various forms of migration and the associated remittances from these migrants. The second considers some of the key drivers and limits to both internal and international migrations, while the third turns to the consequences of these movements for economic development. Section four then takes up the links between aid and migration, addressing the evidence on the current links between aid and migration and potential roles for aid in moving toward fulfillment of the GCM and GCR. Throughout, the emphasis is on economic development rather than the broader sense of development set out in the Sustainable Development Goals; within the confines of this brief document it is not feasible to address this much broader set of concerns.
2. Magnitudes of Migration and Remittances

What are the magnitudes, directions and composition of international migration, the extent and directions of internal migration within the Low and Middle-Income countries, and of remittances from both types of migrants? The data available to answer each of these questions are limited, an issue taken up in the GCM. Meanwhile, what may be gleaned from the extant data? ³

**International migration**

Over the last quarter century, the stock of international migrants has risen from nearly 153 million in 1990 to about 258 million as of 2017 (United Nations, 2017). To a large extent this increase reflects global population growth and the percentage of world population that are migrants rose only from 2.9 percent in 1990 to 3.4 percent by 2017. Figure 1 illustrates the time pattern of this evolution leading up to 2017. The percentage of the world's population migrating has not changed by much.

**Figure 1. Global Migrant Stock: 1990-2015**

![Chart showing the global migrant stock from 1990 to 2015](chart.png)

Data source: *Trends in the International Migrant Stock: The 2017 Revision.*
*United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017).*
These UN estimates of the global migrant stock exclude temporary migrants, moving for less than one year. Indeed, the data on such temporary migrants are quite incomplete, though data on permits issued to four categories of temporary migrant workers to the OECD countries are available in the annual OECD International Migration Outlook. The first three categories, seasonal workers, working holiday makers and trainees are “mostly on low-skilled jobs” (OECD, 2018, Annex, p.28). In 2016 there were 685 thousand seasonal workers (mostly in Poland from Ukraine), 477 thousand working holiday makers (about half in Australia), and 140 thousand trainees (almost entirely in Japan). The intra-company transfers are generally more highly skilled and numbered 153 thousand in 2016. “These flows far exceed permanent labour migration, which amounted to fewer than 500 000 workers in 2016” (OECD, 2018, p. 10). No systematic data appear to exist on temporary migration into non-OECD countries.

On the other hand, in principle, the UN estimates of migrant stocks do include irregular migrants. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines irregular migration as “Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries”, but goes on to note that “There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration” (IOM, 2019). The issue is not merely the point of entry, but may include over-stayers, unreturned, rejected asylum seekers, and those working without employment permission, for instance. Not surprisingly, no systematic data exist on the numbers of irregular migrants and estimates encompass a wide range. Nonetheless, EUROSTAT estimates that “In 2017, 618 780 non-EU citizens were found to be illegally present in the EU” (Eurostat, 2018). This amounts to only 0.12 percent of the population, but includes only those detected and reported by member states. This total peaked dramatically in 2015 at over 2 million, though by 2017 it had returned to only 6 percent above the level in 2008 (before which data are not comparable). Meanwhile, the number of third nationals refused entry at the external EU borders had trended downwards from 2008 to 2015 with a slight upturn thereafter, though remaining nearly a third lower in 2017 compared to 2008 (Eurostat, 2019). The Pew Research Center estimates 11 million unauthorized migrants in the US in 2015 (about 3.4 percent of the population) (Pew Research Center, 2018). However, the Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions, reported by US Customs and Border Protection has been on a clear downward trend, declining to less than a fifth of the 2000 number by 2017, despite claims of a border crisis.
Irregular migration is certainly not confined to the OECD countries. Over-staying the period of visa coverage is also common in some of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states for example, though no data appear to exist, and xenophobia has recently been aimed at the irregular migrants in South Africa. In the Low-Income countries and some of the Middle-Income countries, where borders are highly porous, perhaps most of the migration goes undocumented and is therefore irregular in nature.

**International migration between the developing and high-income countries**

As of 2017, just over three out of five international migrants are in the High-Income countries (see Table 1). However, more than a fifth of those in the High-Income countries are in the GCC. Moreover, the non-GCC High-Income countries are themselves a source of a fifth of the world’s migrants and about three-quarters of them are in other non-GCC High-Income countries. Indeed, more than 70 percent of the migrant stock in the non-GCC High-Income countries are from the Upper-Middle-Income and other High-Income countries. In stark contrast, 95 percent of the migrants in the GCC are from Low and Lower-Middle-Income countries.

**Table 1. Migrant Stocks in Millions: A Bilateral View in 2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host</th>
<th>Low income</th>
<th>Lower middle</th>
<th>Upper middle</th>
<th>Other “South”</th>
<th>High income</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower middle</td>
<td>8.45</td>
<td>15.28</td>
<td>9.23</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>22.06</td>
<td>14.60</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>7.03</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC states</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>25.31</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other high income</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>29.41</td>
<td>54.99</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>36.96</td>
<td>129.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25.57</td>
<td>95.28</td>
<td>79.32</td>
<td>7.02</td>
<td>49.73</td>
<td>256.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important to note that, apart from movements to the GCC states, relatively few migrants from the Low and Lower-Middle Income countries make it to the High-Income regions.

In fact, in 2017, all six GCC member countries are among the seven countries with the highest ratio of migrants to population, topped by the United Arab Emirates at over 88 percent (United Nations, 2017). The traditional destinations of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and US are all in the top 25, in that order. But Europe has more recently become a destination too; in Switzerland 30 percent of the population are migrants, which is higher even than Australia. Austria and Sweden are the next highest in Europe. Singapore is the other High-Income country that stands out with a large migrant population relative to its size, actually exceeding the ratios in two of the GCC states (Oman and Saudi Arabia).

Nearly 40 percent of the world’s international migrants are estimated to be in the developing countries, with almost exactly half of these in the Low and Lower-Middle Income states. On a per capita basis, Jordan and Lebanon, both with extremely high refugee populations, have the highest fractions of migrants among the developing countries. Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, two of the highest income countries in SSA (but still in the Middle-Income range) are also among the relatively high recipients of migrants relative to their populations. The only Low-Income country reported to have a migrant stock at about ten percent of its population in 2017 is Gambia.5

Migration to neighboring countries is common, resulting in extensive movements within regions. Figure 2 presents a picture of the extent of this intra-regional migration in various parts of the globe. From SSA, about 70 percent of the migrants are in other countries of SSA. Two out of three migrants from Europe are in other European countries and half of the migrants in Europe are Europeans.6 Distance matters in migration patterns; a theme to which this overview returns.

The skill profile of international migrants

Skill-biased technical progress, enhancing the relative importance of the highly-skilled in production of goods and services, has been pervasive over recent decades. Some analysts see this shift as a major driving force in rising, global wage
inequality. Others view the demands for the highly-skilled as temporary, driven by the need for skills during rapid change, such as the mass infusion of computers during the 1990s and the green revolution in a much earlier era. Whether temporary or not, there has been a rise in the international competition for highly skilled migrants (Kapur and McHale, 2005).

The available data on the skill composition of migrant stocks are quite limited. Using data from 1990 and 2000, the most recent global data available, Artuc et al. (2015, p.6) report that “Non-OECD destinations account for one-third of skilled-migration, while OECD destinations are declining in relative importance.” In contrast, however, OECD (2014, p. 1) notes that, after 2000, “The share of highly educated immigrants is rising sharply in OECD countries; over the past decade it rose 70%, in part because of immigration from Asia.”

The OECD DIOC_E 2010 database reports the education levels of migrants from 236 countries and territories, but only those living in 91 countries. Given the limited scope of destination countries, a complete picture of emigration propensities by education class cannot be drawn. Nonetheless a general perspective may be obtained.

**Figure 2. Education Composition of Bilateral Migrations**

![Bar chart showing education composition of bilateral migrations](http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm)
Thus, Figure 2 shows the educational composition of migrant stocks, on a bilateral basis, derived from these OECD data for 2010. Countries of origin are grouped into three: Low-Income, Lower-Middle Income and Upper-Middle Income. Within each group, “Home” shows the breakdown of the adult population remaining in the country by “Basic” education (none, primary and lower-secondary), “Upper” (upper-secondary and post-secondary), and “Tertiary”. The four country-groups of destination then include the High-Income countries.\textsuperscript{10}

As we have seen, the majority of migrants from the Low-Income countries are in other Low and Lower-Middle Income countries and the education of these migrants is almost entirely confined to a basic level, in-line with the home population. In contrast, among the relatively few that migrate from a Low-Income origin to a High-Income host, roughly a third have an upper level education and another third have a tertiary education. Of those from the Lower-Middle Income countries in the High-Income hosts, an even larger fraction possesses a tertiary education, which is well out of line with the home population.

Not only are the chances, on average, of moving to the High-Income countries low from the Low-Income countries, but the less-well educated from the Low-Income countries stand almost no chance.

The US is clearly the chief destination of tertiary-educated migrants from the Low and Middle-Income countries combined; in 2010, 36 percent of all such migrants were in the US. Half of these skilled migrants in the US, from the developing regions, are from the Upper-Middle-Income countries, with almost a third each from Latin America and the Caribbean and from the Asia-Pacific region. Only some five percent are from SSA and another five percent from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The EU countries are the second largest destination and these countries play host to more than 40 percent of the tertiary-educated migrants from all Low-Income countries. Commensurate with this, the tertiary-educated migrants from SSA and from the MENA region play a much more substantive role among EU immigrants than in the US.
The break-up of the USSR resulted in sudden designation as international migrants of those who were already residing in a state of the USSR other than the state of their birth. Largely as a result, nearly a third of all tertiary-educated migrants originate from Europe and Central Asia (following the World Bank regional definition). Some 37 percent of these are in Russia alone, where they amount to 99 percent of the total tertiary-educated population in Russia from developing regions.

**Return migration**

As the OECD International Migration Outlook 2008 (p. 164) states, “There is little in the way of internationally comparable statistical information available on return migration. Attempts to measure the phenomenon, in effect, face two difficulties: the definition of return migration, and data availability.” The difficulties in definition include the issue of duration of residence, both in the host country and upon return home. Nonetheless this issue of the International Migration Outlook incorporates a special report on the rate of return from the OECD member countries, noting *inter alia* that:

“20% to 50% of immigrants leave within five years after their arrival … the return rate is higher at the extremities of the education spectrum… Return rates to OECD countries are on average twice as high as those to developing countries… programmes for assisting voluntary return have only a limited impact.” (OECD, 2008, p. 163)

Wahba (2014, pp. 327-328) cites a number of other studies on departure from the OECD countries supporting this range of return rates. However, both in these additional studies and in the OECD 2008 report, return generally refers to departure and is unable to distinguish between return to the home country and onward movement to a third country.

In contrast, OECD Development Centre (2017) uses data collected in ten developing countries to estimate the actual return rate to the home country. The measure is specified as the percent of return migrants among those still abroad plus the returned. The return rates range from 9 percent in the Dominican Republic to 55
percent in Costa Rica and 48 percent in Burkina Faso (the latter partly attributable to the civil war in Cote d’Ivoire). Moreover, “the 2010 Mexican Census documents that the return migration was 31 per cent for the 994 869 Mexicans who moved to the USA during 2005 to 2010” (Wahba, 2014, p.328).

These findings on Mexico suggest quite a short interval of turnaround, in accord with OECD (2008). The OECD Development Centre (2017, p.248) finds an even shorter turnaround; “On average, most return migrants came back after less than a year abroad” though Morocco appears to be an exception to this.

Return migration to the developing countries is substantial and occurs after a relatively short stay, though there are major differences across countries.

**Internal migration**

The most commonly cited figure on internal migration is that there were three-quarters of a billion internal migrants as of 2005 (Bell and Charles-Edwards, 2013). However, this estimate is extremely sensitive to the definition of an internal migrant. Among other issues is the definition of the administrative boundary that needs to be crossed in order to be counted as a migrant: should this be leaving the village, the district or the region? Given variations in definitions of these concepts across nations, a global aggregate proves elusive.

Much of the focus on internal migration in the developing countries falls upon the process of rural-urban flows. However, rural-rural moves are actually more common than rural-urban migration where the proportion of population residing in rural areas is large, particularly in Africa and much of Asia. Urban-urban migration comes to dominate where urbanization rates are high in Latin America. Even urban-rural movements are not negligible in some contexts (Lucas, 2018).

The traditional theories of rural-urban migration all cast the process as a permanent decision to move into town with a peak flow occurring around age 20 (Lewis, 1954; Sjaastad, 1962; Harris & Todaro, 1970). More recent evidence is pointing to the importance of temporary moves, even among those changing residence for more than
2. Magnitudes of Migration and Remittances

a year; substantial portions of these “long term” moves are reversed within five years (Lucas, 2018). Seasonal migration, normally defined as lasting less than a year, is also common, though poorly documented; nor does systematic evidence exist on how many of these seasonal moves are into urban areas, as opposed to being rural-rural. In the majority of contexts, such seasonal moves involve a single adult alone, rather than a joint movement of the entire family (Lucas, 2018).

Stepwise migration, from village to small town and on to a big city is commonly thought to be prevalent though the data do not support this supposition; the majority of moves from a village to the big city are direct, not through a small town. (Lucas, 2018).

Remittances

Remittances are private transfers, commonly assumed to be sent to family members but this is not always the case; some of these transfers are for repayment of debts, donations to various causes, or to honor other social obligations (Osili, 2007).

Two main channels are distinguished in the transmission of remittances across borders: Formal remittances, through such agencies as Western Union, post offices and banks; informal money transfers, through channels with various names in different parts of the world, such as the Hundi in India, the Hawala in the Middle East and the Mercado Negro del Peso in Latin America. Most of the posted data refer only to formal remittances, though some countries attempt to estimate the flows through informal channels too.

Reported remittances to the developing regions have grown extremely rapidly since the turn of the Millennium (see Figure 3). By 2017, this total had reached nearly 436 billion US$, nearly a six-fold increase since 2000 and more than 2.5 times the amount of ODA. In 2000, remittance inflows amounted to 3.2 percent of GDP in both the Low and Lower-Middle Income countries. Those to the Lower-Middle Income areas peaked, relative to GDP, in 2015 at nearly 4.4 percent, and those to the Low-Income states peaked a year later at nearly 6.5 percent, though both slacked off slightly in 2017.
This impressive picture of expansion in remittances is marred, however, by the reality that not all of the increase is likely to be real. The Financial Action Task Force actively seeks to divert transfers out of the informal channels into the formal, in part motivated by security concerns. Meanwhile the digital currencies appear to have taken over as the chief route for terrorist money transfers. It seems likely that an unknown portion of the increment to reported remittances simply reflects this redirection of flows from the informal alternatives. In addition, however, the formal market has become a little more competitive in terms of transfer costs as more competitors have moved into the market and greater information has been made available about costs and options. A further factor in the reported expansion may well have derived from change in balance of payments recording practices in some contexts. Thus China’s reported remittance inflows rose from 758 million US$ in 2000 to over 44 billion in 2015. This is nearly a six thousand percent increase although the migrant stock from China is estimated to have increased by only 61 percent between 2000 and 2013 (United Nations 2013).

These recent figures show China to be the second largest recipient of international remittances, after India, followed by the Philippines and Mexico. Relative to GDP,
Nepal is top, with remittances equal to over 31 percent of GDP, followed by Haiti. Both of the latter two states have suffered recent, massive natural disasters, and the large inflows of remittances may partially be responses to these tragedies. Remittances also play an important role in some of the conflict and post-conflict countries, the difficulties of effecting transfers notwithstanding. Thus, Harris et al. (2013, p.1) note “Private remittances are of central importance for restoring stability and enhancing human security in post-conflict countries.”

The data on international remittances clearly have their limitations; national totals on remittances from internal migrants hardly exist. Measuring the latter is particularly difficult: virtually all such transfers are through informal channels; often the migrant will bring his or her savings with them rather than trust to a courier; and a larger portion of internal remittances tend to be in-kind.
3. The Drivers and Limits to Migration and Remitting

Why do some people migrate and not others? Why do some migrants return while others settle more permanently? Which factors enter the decisions whether and how much to remit?

The drivers of migration

The reasons for migrating are clearly manifold, but four factors stand out as among the main drivers of migration: the gap in incomes and the lack of jobs at home, the need to escape violence, family reunion and formation, and the desire to study. Each of these factors plays a part to some extent in both internal and international migration.

The role of incomes

An extensive literature exists establishing a positive correlation between the rural-urban gap in living standards or earnings and the probability of quitting the home village to move into town. The returns to education, in terms of higher pay, tend to be greater in urban than rural areas, resulting in a greater propensity to move into town from rural areas among individuals with more education. A much smaller portion of this literature indicates that the probability of actually finding a job in town also plays a part in attracting migrants and not just the level of pay if employed (Lucas, 1985).

The literature estimating the influence of income gaps on international migration has been limited by the data available. Examinations of individuals’ decisions to emigrate are rare; very few surveys collect information about departed emigrants.
An exception is the analysis by Aguayo-Téllez and Martínez-Navarro (2013) who combine Mexican and US census micro data to examine internal and international migration by Mexicans. They find “For the US, wage differentials are not statistically related to migration probabilities, so it does not provide support to the literature that considers wage differentials as one of the main determinants of migration to the US.” In the absence of micro data, most analyses turn, instead, to look at the gap in average wages or GDP per capita between origin and destination, typically controlling at least for distance in between. Whether such averages at destination adequately depict what the typical person at origin could expect to receive upon migrating may be questioned.

Nonetheless, the correlation between average income gaps and extent of migration is of some import; to what extent do potential international migrants actually manage to move to countries with higher incomes or wages than at home? In contrast to the results from Téllez and Martínez-Navarro, most studies find a positive association. For example, in perhaps the first paper to examine this, Lucas (1975) finds that applications for labor permits in the US increase with the average wage that can be expected in the US, projected on occupation structure in the country of origin, while decreasing with net national product in the country of origin. Similarly, Hatton and Williamson (1994) find a positive correlation of the extent of migration and the gap in mean earnings between the US and various European countries during the 19th and early 20th century. Much of the subsequent literature has followed suit, examining movement to the OECD countries, in part because of a lack of more global data. There are, however, exceptions. Looking at the stocks of migrants, from the 55 countries of Africa, in 220 states and territories worldwide, from 1960 to 2000, Lucas (2015) finds a positive correlation in the extent of that bilateral migration and the gap in GDP per capita between the pair of countries. This association is substantially lower from the countries of SSA than from North Africa and lower still among refugees than among non-refugee migrants. Indeed, as of 2000, nearly a quarter of migrants from SSA and a third of African refugees had actually moved to a country with a lower income level than their home country.
3. The Drivers and Limits to Migration and Remitting

A migration transition

The notion of a mobility transition (also known as a migration hump) in the association between the level of GDP per capita and the rate of emigration is pervasive. The idea is that the emigration rate is supposed to rise with the level of income, up to some level, then decline with higher incomes thereafter. A number of plausible explanations have been put forward for such a pattern, including the relaxation on financial constraints that limit expensive international moves among the poor, and that rising education levels facilitate international migration as economic development proceeds. The concept of a migration transition has given rise to serious scepticism with respect to development assistance; if aid helps to raise incomes of the Low-Income countries, the belief is that this will be accompanied by rising migration.

“A commonly presented ‘smart solution’ to curb immigration is to address the perceived root causes of migration through increasing aid or liberalizing trade with origin countries … besides the limited scope and credibility of such policies, empirical and theoretical evidence strongly suggests that economic and human development increases people’s capabilities and aspirations and therefore tends to coincide with an increase rather than a decrease in emigration.” (de Haas, 2007, p. 819)

What does the evidence actually show? Most, though certainly not all, authors conclude that a migration hump exists, though the data are extremely circumscribed to examine any such migration transition. Much depends upon how the question is posed. Some studies focus purely upon migration to individual OECD countries. Rotte and Volger (2000) examine the flow of migrants into Germany from 86 countries of Asia and Africa, for instance, while Faini and Venturini (2010) look at the migrant stocks in four countries of Southern Europe; both find a statistically significant migration hump. Berthélemy et al (2009) analyze global data instead, looking at the emigrant stocks from all countries and territories as of 2000. Clemens (2014) extends this to look at these stocks every ten years, from 1960 to 2010, and the implied flows in between. Both Berthélemy et al and Clemens find a cross-country pattern in which the middle-income countries have the highest emigration rates.
Indeed, the turning point in these patterns is found to be high; “there is no hint of a negative relationship between income and emigrant stock between PPP income per capita of roughly $600 (that of today’s Niger or Ethiopia) and about $7500 (today’s Albania or Colombia)” Clemens (2014, p.155). As Clemens (2014, p. 157) goes on to note, however, “These data do not necessarily demonstrate a transition path that any given country must take.” In the end, cross-country evidence may tell us little about the time-path of emigration as development proceeds; those countries currently in the middle-income range may simply differ in fundamental ways from what their poorer counterparts are evolving into.

In a very recent study, Gamso and Yuldashev (2018) manage to address this, examining the typical, within-country evolution of emigration from 101 developing countries to the OECD member states, (using fixed-effects to represent each country). They find a small and statistically weak, negative association of income levels at origin and the emigration rates, with no sign at all of a migration hump. Perhaps the only more global glimpse into this that can be obtained with existing data is with the net migration flows generated by the UN Population Division (UNdata, 2017). A simple analysis of these measures, from 1955 through 2015, with fixed effects picking up the difference in inherent nature of the countries encompassed, indeed indicates a statistically significant turning point in net migration, but at a far lower income level than suggested in the cross-country data; an income level exhibited by Cambodia as of 2015. Thereafter, net out-migration is projected to decline and to do so statistically, significantly beyond incomes somewhere between that of India and Sudan in 2015.

To the implications for aid of this literature on the migration transition, the last section of this overview returns. Meanwhile, it is of interest to note that Dao et al. (2018, p.96) offer some evidence on the roles of financial constraints versus improved education underlying a transition:

“Overall, this means that financial constraints, while relevant for the very poorest countries, only have a limited effect on the upward segment of the mobility transition curve... a rise in income induces only small effects on low-skilled and average emigration rates. In the long-run, a rise
in income increases ... the number of more mobile high-skilled workers and affects... the share of college graduates among emigrants as well as the average emigration rate”.

To the extent that the OECD countries are concerned to attract better-educated migrants, and indeed compete amongst themselves to do so, this last result suggests that any concerns with respect to a migration transition are really misplaced.

The availability of social benefits

A component of incomes that has garnered particular attention is the access to social benefits in the OECD host countries. By underwriting the risks in relocating and, depending upon the nature of conditionality, offering support in the absence of work, such benefits can act to encourage migration. OECD (2013) estimates that, on average, migrants are actually fiscal neutral, contributing to tax revenues approximately, equally to their calls upon public spending. Migrants contribute less on average to tax revenues though they also depend less on social spending than do natives. In part this is attributable to the age profile of migrants who tend to be of prime working age, though the report does note that in countries where humanitarian migration is more significant the fiscal balance effect is less favourable. A very recent study by d’Albis et al. (2019), explores the dynamics of this age effect and concludes that immigration to the OECD countries indeed improves the fiscal balance.

In individual Scandinavian country studies, contrasting effects on the fiscal balance have been detected. Ruist (2014) notes that at the time of the 2004 EU expansion, Sweden was the only prior member state not to restrict welfare access of migrants from the ten new members; the net effect on the fiscal balance of Sweden was zero or even slightly positive. Hansen et al. (2017, p.925), on the other hand, conclude that in Denmark from 2014 onwards, “immigrants from Western countries have a positive fiscal impact, while immigrants from non-Western countries have a large negative one, which is also the case when considering only non-refugee immigrants. The negative effect is caused by both a weak labour market performance and early retirement in combination with the universal Danish welfare schemes.” Direct comparisons are not readily available, but US provisions for refugees appear less generous.
“The State Department’s reception and placement program provides refugees with a loan to travel to the U.S., which they are required to start repaying after they arrive. The program then supplies resettlement agencies a one-time sum per refugee to finance their first 30-90 days in the U.S... After three months, the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement then works through the states and other nongovernmental organizations to provide refugees with limited cash and medical assistance.” (Cepla 2019)\textsuperscript{19}

The earlier literature on the extent to which social benefits attract migrants tended to focus on the attraction to various states within the US. For a survey see Brueckner (2000), who finds that US states, with an eye to (largely internal) migrant movements, have looked to neighboring states in designing their benefit structures. In consequence, Brueckner favors matching Federal Grants, to lower the cost of welfare payments by individual states, in order to avert a “race to the bottom” in offering the lowest benefits.\textsuperscript{20}

More recently most of the attention in the literature has switched to the role of social benefits as a magnet in attracting international migrants within the EU. There seems widespread agreement that countries with higher benefits attract more migrants. Beenstock et al. (2015), for example, estimate that raising social benefit levels within individual EU countries raises their rate of immigration.

Razin and Wahba (2015) investigate an important variant on this. This paper distinguishes between migration from countries within the EU, which is largely without controls (as among the states of the US), and migration from other countries (distinguishing other High-Income versus developing countries). They find that welfare levels are indeed a magnet attracting migration by low-skill workers where movement is essentially free within the EU, though high-skill workers from within the EU are deterred from moving to such states. The opposite is uncovered where migration controls exist. Voter pressure is hypothesized to discourage low-skill migration for fear of encountering a fiscal-burden, leaning toward high-skill migrants instead, a hypothesis supported in their results.
Before leaving this topic it is worth emphasizing that almost this entire scope of literature focuses upon social benefits as a magnet in individual countries. This is predominantly about choice of location. Whether social benefits in the High-Income countries increase total migration, by highly-skilled or less-skilled workers, from developing countries is not really addressed.21

**Employment opportunities**

Income opportunities play a major role in shaping both international and internal migration. For the poor, who possess few if any assets, the dominant source of income is their labor earnings. Accordingly, the GCM appropriately draws out the importance of lack of employment at home as a major element on the list of “adverse drivers” of international migration. Both internal and international migrations tend to peak in early adulthood and, consequently, youth employment has attracted a special amount of attention.22

Job creation, for youths or more generally, is a perennial issue for many developing countries. Solutions are not simple and typically require a coordinated effort featuring training and education, trade and exchange rate policies, consideration of the role of labor market policies, private versus state-owned initiatives and so on.

**Climate change**

Despite denials in some quarters, the evidence clearly shows a pattern of global warming. This may impact migration in two main ways: directly through the onset of more frequent hydrometeorological disasters; and indirectly through changing livelihoods. Lucas (2015) shows, for instance, that emigration increases following droughts in the countries of SSA that have significant arable farming sectors (see also, Lucas, 1987, and Munshi, 2003). Nonetheless there seems some agreement that migration responses to climate change are largely internal moves, rather than international (IOM, 2018). A recent World Bank volume anticipates that much of this internal migration will be from rural to urban areas, accelerating the process of urbanization, and the report emphasizes the need for advanced planning for
these changes. Looking at the longer term projections of climate change, this same report projects that “By 2050—in just three regions—climate change could force more than 143 million people to move within their countries,” 86 million in SSA, 40 million in South Asia and 17 million in Latin America (Rigaud et al., 2018, pp.xiv-xv).

Following natural disasters some return migration does occur, though the effects of the disasters can persist over long periods. Looking at droughts in Brazil, for example, Mueller and Osgood (2009) find that it takes more than five years for wages to return to their pre-drought level; Kondylis and Mueller (2014) surmise that the effects of the 2011 floods in Pakistan may even be felt into future generations, through the loss in education that they observe.

**Escaping conflict and violence**

Conflict and violence at home are clearly major adverse-drivers of migration, with swelling global numbers of both refugees and those internally displaced.

The number of newly displaced per year more than tripled from 2007 to 2017. For 2017, UNHCR (2017) reports “By the end of the year, 68.5 million individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, or generalized violence.” Of these 68.5 million forcibly displaced, 58 percent were Internally Displaced People (IDP), 37 percent were refugees and the remaining 5 percent were asylum seekers. The number of refugees and asylum seekers combined amounted to just over 10 percent of the global stock of migrants in 2017.

The 2015 influx of asylum seekers into the EU and the inability to return rejected asylum seekers, given an absence of understandings with the countries of origin, has become a focal point of discord in the EU (Dustmann et al, 2017; Hatton, 2017). More recently, the caravan of asylum seekers approaching the US has been deployed as a political tool. Yet UNHCR (2017) estimates that 85 percent of the world’s refugees, and almost all of the IDP, are actually in the developing countries with a disproportionate concentration in the Low-Income countries (see Table 2).
Table 2. Refugees per Million Population in 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level</th>
<th>Refugees per Million Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>7.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower middle</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle</td>
<td>3.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Derived from World Development Indicators data.

Certainly, some of the international migration flows are mixed in character. “Those travelling to Libya include refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, unaccompanied minors, persons displaced as a result of climate change, victims of trafficking and stranded migrants among others. These people travel along the same routes and resort to the services of the same smugglers to help them cross Libya” (Altai Consulting and IMPACT Initiatives, 2017, p.11). Since conflict breeds poverty, escaping violence and poverty often go hand-in-hand. Nonetheless, the patterns of movement of refugees are quite different from those of other international migrants, at least in Africa. Thus Lucas (2015, section 3.1.2.2.) finds a number of distinctions. For example: (1) Refugees are much less responsive to the gap in incomes between home and potential destinations than are other migrants. (2) Although political violence at home significantly increases non-refugee outmigration, the impact in generating more refugees is far larger. Incidents of violence in the countries of destination within Africa, on the other hand, are found to do nothing to diminish the volume of refugees entering from other African states. (3) If the index of political violence at home is divided into international versus civil and ethnic conflicts (as defined in the Uppsala Conflict Data), the latter generate significantly larger numbers of refugees, though there is no difference in their effects on non-refugee migrants, while the cumulative effect of continued wars at home add even greater pressures on refugees.

A burgeoning, though contentious, literature exists on the economic roots of conflict. To attempt a summary of this literature is beyond the scope of the present overview, though the issue of support for countries in fragile situations is taken
up in the closing section of this research overview. Certainly, military aid and arms shipments to the combatants may well prove counter-productive. Nonetheless a couple of tangential connections with internal migration might be mentioned. First, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that more widely dispersed populations are positively associated with the onset of violence. Wide dispersion is a reflection of a lack of urban-bound migration. Second, Stewart (2009) links conflict to horizontal inequality, (disparities across ethnic groups). The evidence on internal migration points to various ethnic minorities being disadvantaged in access to rural-urban migration, even given distance to town and education levels (Lucas, 2018). This lack of access in turn exacerbates inequalities across communities and hence may spark conflicts.25

The traditional view of forced migration is that it is utterly involuntary; that those who flee simply have no alternative. Yet not all depart the area of aggression. Ibáñez (2014) summarizes the state of evidence on the determinants of migration during episodes of violence or anticipated violence. It is clear that the threat of violence is dominant, but other factors enter too, though the role of other factors diminishes with the scale of violence; at low levels of aggression, economic factors still play a significant role. Whether wealthier households are more or less likely to flee depends upon the nature of their assets; those whose wealth is in the form of land are less likely to flee, hoping to protect their property, whereas those whose assets are more mobile (in livestock or household assets) have a higher probability of fleeing. Networks at home play an ambiguous role. On the one hand having a network of friends at home may serve to offer limited support; on the other hand these friends may offer protection to one’s property having fled. At least at lower levels of violence, selection into departure is also shaped by labor market opportunities at home versus at destination, as in the traditional models of internal migration. However, Ibáñez correctly emphasizes the difficulties in identifying these factors. The onset of violence clearly alters the labor market situation, for instance. Moreover, Ibáñez cites evidence that the perpetrators select specific target households and communities, to seize property, to make their point, and to disrupt the economy.26
Although both are at an all-time high, the reported number of IDP has risen relative to asylum seekers and refugees (see Figure 4). There appears to be relatively little evidence, however, on the determinants of the mix between these two forms of flight. Who chooses, or manages, to cross an international border and who remains in their country of origin? Certainly in some contexts the outcome is mixed. At the end of 2016, of the population of concern counted by UNHCR originating from Syria, 5.7 million were refugees and asylum seekers, while 6.9 million were IDP (including 600,000 returned IDP). Moore and Shellman (2006) offer a rare insight into the mix between these two forms of flight. Using cross-country data from 1976 to 1995 these authors find that relative to the numbers of IDP “refugee flows are greater in the face of state (sponsored) genocide/politicide than they are in response to other state coercion, dissident campaigns of violence, or civil wars... countries surrounded by poor, authoritarian regimes will produce fewer refugees (relative to IDPs) than those surrounded by wealthy, democratic neighbors” (Moore and Shellman, 2006, p. 599). Much remains to be investigated on this topic, though lack of availability of appropriate data poses a serious constraint.
Of the 25.3 million refugees at the end of 2017, only 102 800 had been resettled in third countries as “the number of resettlement opportunities available to refugees has decreased” (UNHCR, 2017). Hard data on the profiles of refugees, beyond gender and age, are not readily available. Nonetheless, given the bribes required and risks involved in reaching the high-income countries to claim asylum, and given the criteria imposed for resettlement of refugees, the select few who make it to the high-income regions are most probably far wealthier, better educated and more enterprising than the average refugee.

During 2017, 4.2 million IDP and 667 400 refugees were returned to their areas or countries of origin. Little is known about the fate of these returned refugees, IDP and rejected asylum seekers and UNHCR (2017) expresses concern:

“However, the countries to which these people returned reported only that these refugees had returned and not the circumstances of their return. This is important as there is no way to differentiate between those who returned through voluntary repatriation or those who returned spontaneously or in conditions which did not meet those considered necessary for lasting solutions. Refugee returns from Cameroon to Nigeria are an important example of this. As many as 150 000 of these returns took place in 2017 with UNHCR having expressed concerns over the sustainability and voluntariness of them.”

In a rare exception, Kondylis (2008) examines the context of refugees returned to Rwanda. She notes that there are a number of reasons to anticipate that the labor productivity in agriculture of those who have returned might be less than those who never left. These include “a result of the trauma of displacement, the lack of relevant work experience while in camps, through loss of locally specific knowledge upon return to a new environment, and from fractionalization of households diminishing intergenerational transfer of learning” (Lucas, 2015, p. 1480). In practice, Kondylis finds the labor productivity of those returned is actually greater than those who remained, in large part as a result of having been assigned better quality land upon return. In fact, the productivity of those returnees who were not surrounded by other returned refugees proved greatest, perhaps because of their ability to learn from stayers.
A report, prepared for IOM, also addresses the issue of the community of return in assisted voluntary return and reintegration programs. The report concludes that the keys to success include “a sufficient number of migrants with an adequate profile returning to the same community” (in seeming contrast to Kondylis’s evidence), “the interest of residents and the motivation of migrants; the existence of basic infrastructure in the region; stability, security and a minimum of economic opportunities in the region; and strong civil society activism” (Altai Consulting, 2017, p. 102).

**Family formation and reunion**

In both international and internal migration family reasons for moving are an important driving element.

Among first residence permits issued in 2017 to non-EU citizens by the EU28 countries, just over a quarter were for family reasons (Eurostat 2017). In the US in the same year, just over one in ten of I-94 admissions (excluding temporary visitors for pleasure and business, transit aliens and commuter students) were admitted as spouses, children or other dependents (DHS 2017). Comparable data on movements between the developing countries are not available to discern the extent that families move together.

In much of Latin America, South and East Asia, women are more likely than men to undertake rural-urban migration, though in India this appears to be a recent phenomenon. In the MENA and SSA regions the opposite holds. In many of the lower income countries there is a stigma associated with autonomous moves of any kind for women, though this may be breaking down. However, internal migration at the time of marriage is extremely common, though whether the husband or wife is the one to move varies with patrilocal and matrilocal traditions. In the context of India, the National Sample Survey Office (2010, H-ii) notes, “The most prominent reason for female migration in both the rural and urban areas was marriage: for 91 per cent of rural female migrants and 61 per cent of the urban female migrants the reason was marriage.” These findings are based on self-reported reasons for moving. In his work on Nepal, Fafchamps (2012, 461) qualifies such reported reasons; “The migration of young women for marriage purposes is usually treated separately from...
labor migration. Once we recognize that these women join a self-provision unit where their labor is valued, their migration should be seen as an equally important labor allocation process.” Among married couples it is common for the husband to move first from village into town, joined by the wife later, sometimes with considerable lags (Lucas, 2018). Given the lower costs of living in rural areas, there is some evidence from Kenya that larger families tend to remain split, with the mother remaining in the village with her children (Agesa and Kim, 2001).

Separation of couples can have impacts on several elements, including fertility levels and the transmission of sexual diseases. Three effects of migration upon fertility may be distinguished: disruption (separation of couples), selection (of more or less fertile migrants) and adaptation (changes in migrants’ behavior). It is not clear that separation lowers total fertility as opposed to postponing having children. Selection, of course, does nothing to actually lower the birth rate, only to move the location of births. However, the evidence leans toward adaptation being the most important of these, suggesting that rural-urban migration can actually lower overall fertility rates (Lucas, 2015). Docquier et al. (2014) demonstrate that, at least in the context of international migration in SSA, the main impact of migration upon the incidence of HIV-AIDS falls on the place of origin; the disease is already common among prostitutes at destination and the migrants bring the illness home with them.

**Migration for education**

Providing quality tertiary education in the developing regions is costly and difficult to establish. Study abroad has accordingly expanded. UNESCO reports nearly 4.5 million tertiary level students studying abroad in 2017.
Figure 5. Tertiary Students Studying Abroad 2017

Data source: UNESCO http://data.uis.unesco.org/

Figure 5 shows the composition of these tertiary-level students by region of origin in 2017. Only seven percent are from the Low-Income countries, though this amounts to 5.7 percent of tertiary enrolment at home, as compared to less than two percent in the Middle-Income states. Study abroad is particularly common among smaller countries where limited enrolments prohibit extensive offerings (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. Tertiary Students Abroad Against Population

Data source: UNESCO http://data.uis.unesco.org/
The host countries for study abroad differ substantially by place of origin; Africans are significantly more likely to study abroad from the relatively better-off African nations and most are studying in Europe, especially in France (Lucas, 2015). Traditionally, the US has been a dominant destination for overseas students, playing a significant part in the brain-drain to the US. This, however, may be in the process of change; the number of foreign students coming to the US has fallen off sharply in the last year or so, raising the question as to whether less students are heading abroad or whether they are shifting destinations.\textsuperscript{29}

Very little is known about the return rate of these students upon completion of their programs. An OECD study estimated stay rates ranging from 15 to 30 percent in 14 OECD countries in 2008-9.\textsuperscript{30} The US is not included in this OECD report and no breakdown by whether students are from developing countries is available. A US study tracks foreign students graduating from US universities with a doctorate in science or engineering. The results from the latest of these series of studies, using 2013 data, are presented in Table 3.\textsuperscript{31} The stay rates among this specific set of graduates is certainly very high indeed, though it does vary by country of origin.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region of Citizenship</th>
<th>Doctorate Recipients</th>
<th>Stay-rate Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China (including Hong Kong)</td>
<td>7 500</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2 400</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>2 400</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Asia</td>
<td>2 500</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>3 800</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North and South America</td>
<td>3 100</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other</td>
<td>4 800</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, all countries/regions</td>
<td>26 400</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Internal migration for education is probably common too in the developing countries, though rarely documented. Some of the early Demographic and Health Surveys ask where respondents spent most of their time before the age of 12. These respondents display a significantly greater urban-rural migration rate than do surveys asking place of birth. A possible interpretation is that rural-born individuals move into town to access better quality and more readily available education, spend their childhood in town, then return to their rural roots (Lucas, 2018). More specifically, Glewwe (2002, 443) writes, “About 19 percent of secondary students in rural Peru live away from their families ... and the same holds for 27 percent of middle-school students in Ghana.”

**Other drivers of international migration**

The report of the Global Migration Group (2010) mentions a number of other drivers of international migration, including poor governance, corruption, social and political freedoms, though unfortunately the report does not offer or cite evidence on the importance of these factors. There is evidence that poor governance and corruption tend to slow growth, though whether they impact international migration more directly, other than through their influence on income levels, remains uncertain. Indeed, in the context of migration from the states of Africa, Lucas (2015) shows that, given income levels and other controls, emigration rates are significantly greater from countries that are more democratic, exhibiting higher polity scores.

**Drivers of return migration**

Three main explanations prevail with respect to drivers of voluntary return migration: (1) that it reflects selection on those who “failed” at their destination; (2) that migrants are target-savers who planned from the beginning to return after saving sufficient funds; (3) that conditions have changed, either in destination or at home, warranting unanticipated return. Almost no evidence exists distinguishing among these three in the context of internal migration.
Wahba (2014) surveys three main categories of empirical evidence on return international migration: the duration of stay abroad; the probability of return; and the selection on who returns. Some of the factors considered are the income and education levels of the migrants, labor market conditions at destination and at home including both earnings levels and unemployment, as well as various attitudinal indicators. There seems some agreement that labor market shocks at destination play a significant role in the decision to return, though otherwise the results appear to be quite sensitive to the context of the study. An OECD Development Centre (2017, p.246) study emphasizes some of the home country sectoral policies, noting that:

- “Return migrants’ lack of access to government employment agencies may mean that self-employment is the only option.
- Public policies aiming to relieve households’ financial constraints, such as agricultural subsidies, can represent incentives for return migrants.
- Social protection increases the likelihood of migrants returning home permanently”.

Whether it is wise to recommend agricultural subsidies in order to encourage return migration should, however, be weighed seriously. In the immediate future they can certainly diminish rural poverty. However, such subsidies can readily lead to serious distortions in the economy and prove difficult to remove once in place, potentially postponing a transition of rural poor communities out of dependence on agriculture. This may prove especially problematic in situations of environmental degradation through long-term climate change.

With respect to the massive migrations to the GCC states, essentially all of the movements are temporary; only a very few, highly-skilled migrants remain for very long periods. Some of the return is a result of temporary visa expirations; some reflects target saving; and some reflects disillusionment with the wages actually delivered as opposed to those promised, or with respect to work and living conditions.
The limits to moving

Income inequality has increased, both within and between countries. Indeed, given the gaps in income, the surprise is not that migration has expanded by so much, but why more people do not move. Both in internal and international migration there are clearly limits to taking up the chance of relocating to a much better living standard.

Limits to internal migration

A fundamental division has emerged among economists investigating the limits to rural-urban migration in the developing countries. There is agreement that a very substantial gap in incomes between the rural and urban sectors remains. However, one position adopted is that, given skill levels, there are no barriers to moving; the urban-rural income gap is entirely attributable to differences in education and other skill factors. There is certainly some evidence to support this view. Thus Hicks et al. (2017) present evidence from Indonesia and western Kenya that those who move into town gain nothing in either earnings or living standards, suggesting that there are no barriers to moving, though the authors do not examine the potential gain to those who do not move (see also Young, 2013).

Other analysts point to various limitations in moving into town. Bryan et al. (2014) find a small loan sufficient to persuade Bangladeshi men to undertake seasonal migration into town and attribute the prior reluctance to migrate to the risk involved in moving. The implied risk aversion, however, seems far too large to be the only limiting factor and a subsequent attempt to replicate the study over a wider part of Bangladesh failed to support the initial experiment. Kone et al. (2017) find a significant lack of workers crossing state boundaries to find work in India, and suggest this reflects a reluctance to hire out-of-state workers in public-sector jobs. Bryan and Morten (2017) estimate large productivity gains in simulating a reduction in internal migration cost in Indonesia. Lagakos et al. (2018) depict the barrier as a strong preference to remain in the rural area. Lucas (2018) estimates large costs to moving in 44 developing countries and shows that these costs are correlated with distance to town, having lower levels of education, and being a member of an
ethnic minority group, or having a strong network at origin. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) explore a particular aspect of the last of these associations and find mutual insurance networks induce remaining at home in the villages of semi-arid regions of India.

The differences between these two positions remain contested; whether the chief barrier to closing the wide gap in incomes between rural and urban areas reflects differences in acquired and inherent skills or effective barriers against the ability for some to move.

**Limits to international migration**

Many of the same factors enter into the determinants of international migration: levels of education, concerns for risk, preferences to remain at home with family and in familiar surroundings. But the role of crossing state boundaries assumes a far more important role than in internal migration.

The financial costs of border crossings can be very high, even for documented migrants.

“For-profit recruiters match workers with jobs across borders in all migration systems, but ... High recruitment costs, which sometimes exceed $2,000 for a worker who will earn $200 a month over three years abroad, can encourage workers to overstay their visas in order to achieve savings targets or take on extra jobs and become irregular.” (Martin, 2013, p.1)

Reducing these recruitment costs is listed as a target in the SDG, and the ILO Instruments on Forced Labour 2014 lists “ensure that recruitment fees or costs are not charged directly or indirectly to workers” (ILO, 2017, p.7). However Martin (2013, p.1) counters, “Consider realistic and easily enforceable maximum recruitment fees rather than asserting that foreign employers should pay all recruitment costs and risk driving worker-paid fees underground”. This is an area where more research is called for and the KNOMAD-ILO surveys on recruitment costs should help in this.35

Between many of the Low-Income countries, particularly in SSA, borders are highly porous; the distinctions between internal and international migration are not
3. The Drivers and Limits to Migration and Remitting

sharply delineated (Lucas, 2015). Undocumented entry into the High-Income countries, on the other hand, typically involves hiring a smuggler.

“The smuggling of migrants is a significant and worldwide phenomenon ... Seen by some as ruthless criminals who prey on the vulnerability of irregular migrants, others see migrant smugglers as Samaritans who act to aid refugees and those fleeing war, discrimination, and poverty. For refugees and other migrants lacking regular avenues of migration, smugglers frequently offer the only way to reach safety and pursue the hope of a better life abroad.” (KNOMAD, 2017, p.14)

Smugglers’ fees and the personal risk of crossing the Mexico-US border and entering Europe, either across the Mediterranean or over land, are considerable. Kelly (2017) claims Coyote (smugglers) fees on the US-Mexico border have recently reached 8 000 US$ for a single crossing. Bazzi et al. (2018) examine the effects of the Consequence Delivery System, introduced by the US Border Patrol during 2008-12, which increased the fraction of apprehended border crossers subject to administrative or criminal sanctions. This study finds that “Exposure to (milder) administrative penalties reduces the 3-month and 18-month re-apprehension rates for male Mexican nationals by 6.6 and 4.6 percentage points, off of baseline rates of 22.6% and 24.2%; exposure to the full set of penalties reduces these re-apprehension rates by 8.1 and 6.1 percentage points” (Bazzi et al., 2018, p.1). Quite how these various border restrictions affect the stock of undocumented migrants is less clear. In the past, driving up the cost (and risk) of crossing the US-Mexico border has led to migrants bringing their families with them, rather than risking a visit home, and has served to expand the stock of undocumented migrants in the US (Redburn, Reuter and Majmundar, 2011). Vaupel and Martin (1987) argue that so long as employers are able and willing to hire undocumented workers, sealing borders is likely to prove relatively ineffective. The OECD International Migration Outlook (2018) itemizes some of the efforts made by member countries in this regard and recommends three major thrusts: (1) Working towards firms and workers recognizing the benefits of formalization; (2) Reducing the costs of formality for employers and the self-employed; (3) Scaling up detection and enforcement measures.
Distance and networks

That distance from origin to destination is a major deterrent to the occurrence of internal migrations has long been recognized, but remoteness is also a deterrent to international migration. Quite why this is observed in both settings is not so apparent; explanations range from the cost of moving, to lack of familiarity in more remote locations, to lack of information about opportunities (Lucas, 2001). Whatever the root-cause, distance acts as more of a deterrent to movement among the less-well-educated than for the highly-skilled. Most of the low-skilled migrants in the high-income countries are from neighboring countries – from the Maghreb in southern Europe, from Mexico and Central America in the US. Migration to the GCC states is a clear exception, where large numbers of low-skill migrants arrive from South and Southeast Asia.

Networks of kith and kin at destination can offset some of the deterrent effect of distance. Such networks can lower the cost of moving by offering accommodation upon arrival; can provide a more familiar environment among friendly faces; and can offer information about job opportunities. Whether networks should be seen as a separate driver of migration remains uncertain, however; do migrants move because fellow-villagers have moved or do both movements occur because the specific village is undesirable? (Munshi, 2003).

The decision to remit

“In their survey, Rapoport and Docquier (2006) distinguished six potential motives for remitting that have been hypothesized by various authors: altruism; exchange, including trading for care of assets or family at home, often in the context of intended return; strategic behavior to influence the pool of migrants in the context of asymmetric information about worker’s abilities and statistical discrimination; mutual insurance arrangements, particularly to protect families in risky agricultural settings and urban migrants during an initial job hunt; repayment of loans, such as the private costs of education; and aspirations to inherit family assets” (Lucas, 2015, p.1514). Rapoport and Docquier go on to note that it is virtually impossible
to distinguish amongst these hypotheses from any empirical evidence; the several hypotheses overlap substantially in their predictions of remittance outcomes with respect to observable information, rendering distinctions infeasible.

Nonetheless, at least some patterns in these transfers are discernible. For example, the amounts of money remitted by migrants are typically, significantly related to the level of their incomes. As a result, international migrants in the high-income countries tend to remit more than internal migrants located within the developing countries; highly educated migrants tend to remit more than the less-highly skilled (Adams, 2011; Bollard et al., 2011). There is also some evidence that those migrants intending to return home remit more (Collier et al., 2018) though the popular notion that remittances decline with duration of absence has mixed support in the literature.38

The chief limitation in remitting is clearly the cost involved, which is particularly an issue in the formal remittance market for international transfers. Gibson et al. (2006) explore remittances from New Zealand to Tonga and find the amounts sent are quite highly sensitive to the level of these costs. In 2009, the G8 committed to cutting the average costs of transferring remittances from 10 percent to 5 percent in 5 years, a goal accepted by the G20 a year later. A system of public information on costs of various corridors has been established39 and by 2018 the World Bank reports that the average costs stands at 6.94 percent, though with considerable variation across transfer corridors. This is an issue taken up in the GCM and to which the final section of this overview returns.
4. Economic Consequences of Migration for Developing Countries

International migration is not a substitute for economic development at home but both internal and international migrations can have major implications for the speed and nature of economic development. Not all of these consequences are necessarily positive; some aspects of migration may prove harmful to the home country. Much depends upon the setting; upon the state of policies in place and their implications for the structure of the economy. This speaks to the importance of integrating migration into the planning framework. The roles of internal and international migration are, however, rather separate in this regard and are consequently addressed separately here.

Internal migration: Efficiency and poverty

The work that has been done on the economic outcomes from internal migration can be broadly divided into two: the part that addresses how efficiently population movements occur with respect to such aspects as labor market performance and infrastructure location; and the portion that has been more concerned with respect to inequality and poverty implications.

Efficiency

In virtually every context, as the level of development rises a structural transformation occurs from agriculture to non-agricultural employment. This involves population movement from rural to urban areas. At low levels of urbanization, the fraction of rural folk relocating in towns is generally low, though the absolute numbers mov-
ing can be very large. Indeed, rural-urban migration is often “blamed” for the rapid increase in urbanization levels among countries where urbanization levels remain low. However, this is not obviously the case. A significant portion of the expansion in urbanization is a reflection of natural population growth resulting in villages becoming towns and in encroachment of cities, swallowing neighboring rural areas. At the very high levels of urbanization seen in Latin America the propensity to quit the remaining countryside for town is high, though here the numbers migrating are generally small.

The state and dynamics of urbanization have important implications for efficient infrastructure placement. Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010), for example, contend that lack of infrastructure, especially electricity generation and transmission, is the dominant constraint on economic growth in Africa. Their report goes on to note that the low levels of urbanization in SSA and the resulting wide population dispersal obfuscate installation of such key elements of infrastructure. Rational decisions must be founded not only on today’s population location but on projections over decades to come. To some extent, the spread of population is, in turn, shaped by the availability of infrastructure. There is ample evidence on the role of employment and earnings opportunities in shaping internal migration decisions; these opportunities in turn are affected by the infrastructure available. There is far less evidence on the direct effects of amenity availability, at origin and destination, upon migration decisions; evidence that may prove critical in planning for future infrastructure placement.

Rural-urban migration is a key element in facilitating the transition to an industrialized economy. More generally, as sectoral shifts continue to occur, from one industry to another, the willingness and ability of people to relocate remains a critical factor in exploiting emerging comparative advantage in new spheres. Internal migration greases the engine of growth. But how efficiently does the labor market in fact relocate workers?

The early development literature emphasized the concept of surplus labor in the rural areas and, hence, that too little migration occurs from rural to urban areas (Lewis, 1954). Harris and Todaro (1970) turned this around, arguing that artificially
high wages in the urban formal sector induce migrants to gamble on moving into
town to search for these remunerative jobs, resulting in underemployment of urban
workers.

More recently the emphasis has shifted to the role of skills in affecting migration
outcomes. It has long been recognized that the better-educated rural inhab-
itants are more likely to move into town. There is also some evidence that the
less-well-educated give up in town and move into the villages (Young, 2013). One
line of argument is that agriculture is a low-skill activity while urban industries de-
mand higher skill levels (Lagakos and Waugh, 2013). If lack of education and skills
is the only barrier to moving, then migration between the rural and urban areas may
simply reflect an efficient sorting of workers into sectors where they have a compar-
ative advantage (Young, 2013).

But does migration between the rural and urban sectors actually result in a sorting
of workers with higher and lesser skills? Although rural inhabitants are more likely
to move into town if they have a better education, those rural inhabitants with little
education far out-number those receiving a higher-education in most developing
countries. The typical result is that rural-urban migration actually lowers skill-levels
in town in most countries. Not all jobs in towns are in industry requiring higher skill
levels; the informal sector is an important urban employer too. In addition, those
quitting towns for the countryside are, on average, better educated than the native
rural population. In rural areas, incomes derived from non-agricultural activities are
an important contributor to livelihoods. In this sense, there is selection without
sorting by education (Lucas, 2018).

Moreover there is substantial evidence that such factors as distance to town, mem-
bership in a minority ethnic group, having a support network at home, or concerns
about risk, may impose substantive barriers to mobility. Such barriers not only
prevent efficient sorting of labor into the most productive activities, but also result
in wide disparities in incomes; extreme poverty is concentrated in the rural areas.
Both on account of efficiency and poverty alleviation these barriers require redress.
Poverty

Economic growth is fundamental to poverty alleviation; rarely is growth accompanied by such sharp increases in inequality that poverty actually rises. Thus any effects of internal and international migration upon growth also impact poverty. But migration may also play a role in shaping the distribution of incomes directly, alleviating or exacerbating poverty at given levels of GDP.

The poor generally migrate internally while international migration tends to be the prerogative of the relatively wealthy. Remittances from migrants abroad are higher, per migrant, than from internal migrants, thus tending to exacerbate inequality at home (Adams et al. 2008). The substantial evidence on whether the net effect of migration and remittances exacerbates or narrows income inequality remains contentious, apparently depending upon the context, the mix of internal and international migration, and whether both the effects of migration and remittances are incorporated or remittances alone are examined (Stark et al., 1986; Barham & Boucher, 1998; Docquier et al., 2006; Agwu et al., 2018; Koczan & Loyola, 2018).

Distance deters migration and migration from remote villages into the towns and cities is typically rare. As a result no network in the urban sector is established of prior inhabitants from these remote locations. The effect consequently becomes cumulative; families in remote locations are increasingly left behind. Trickle-down development does not reach these remote locations and the result is chronic, persistent poverty (Molho, 1995). Any policy solution to this effect is unclear. One possibility is improved transport, connecting remote villages to towns. However, the net effect of such a strategy is uncertain; opening trade routes permits imports from towns into villages and may reduce the incidence of non-agricultural jobs (Lucas, 1997). Thus, a recent study of road improvements into Brasilia found that it expanded trade along the route but had only a small impact on migration (Morten and Oliveira, 2018).

Transitory poverty may be further subdivided. There are incidents of poverty that may affect an entire village or region, such as when local rains fail. On the other hand, individual families within the community may hit particularly hard times, such as when a major earner in the family falls ill.
Families that are on the border of starvation suffer severe consequences if they are unable to sustain consumption levels during bad times when incomes fall, either for the individual family or for the neighborhood. There is evidence from several contexts that families are able to smooth their consumption to some extent over temporary dips in their income, provided that the entire community is not suffering at the same time. It seems the community provides mutual insurance understandings among their group, tending to members who have hit hard times (Townsend, 1995). Much of this literature assumes the relevant community is the village, though this is not always obvious; there is some evidence that the community may be smaller (a caste within the village) or wider, an entire tribe or caste (Grimard, 1997; Munshi, 2016).

Migration offers a potential mechanism to insure against starvation in bad times when the entire community is harmed or cannot otherwise be relied upon. Khandker, Khalily and Samad (2012) demonstrate the importance of seasonal migration in consumption smoothing across agricultural seasons, alleviating the incidence of starvation in Bangladesh. Longer-term migrations may also insure against temporary drops in incomes. Placing family members in locations where incomes are unlikely to decline at the same time as at home spreads the family’s risks. Such locations may be in a rural area with different weather patterns, in a town, or even abroad. Each involves migration. An agreement may then be struck between the migrant and those at home, involving mutual insurance; settlements are in the form of remittances. Such agreements are inherently intertemporal. The greatest risks to rural-urban migrants, for example, are upon initial arrival in town; those to the rural family are continuing. Altruism within the family may suffice to enforce such agreements, but there is also evidence that the threat of disinheritance may matter (Lucas and Stark, 1985). There is now substantial evidence that domestic remittances, in particular, react in accord with an insurance understanding. There is less direct evidence that migration is planned in advance to provide such insurance.

Some families move together; other families are spatially split through departure of a subset of members. Whether those left behind gain or are left in poverty is then an important question. The outcome may be divided into two main parts: the ef-
effect of departure upon income-generation of those left behind; and the amounts of remittances returned by the absent members. The departure effect in turn depends upon whether the remaining members are able and willing to take up the role of the migrants; is someone at home able to undertake, or hire-in someone to undertake, ploughing, if the only able-bodied adult leaves, for example? If those remaining comprise only small children and the elderly this is unlikely. One aspect of this that has attracted particular attention is whether departure of men results in higher poverty levels among female-headed households left-behind. A distinction must be made between two-types of female-headed households in discussing poverty; de jure female-headed households (widows, divorcees, single mothers) versus de facto female-headed households (with an absent, migrant, male spouse). There is no clear evidence that female-headed households with absent migrant male partners suffer higher levels of poverty; any loss in income-generation at home is apparently offset by the inflow of remittances. The net effect on the family at home is, however, difficult to detect. Are family members left-behind in poverty because of the migrant’s departure, or did the migrant leave because the home-situation was poor? Conversely, are families with absent migrants better off because the migrant left and remitted or does more migration take place from better-off families who can afford the costs of migrating? In fact, almost all of the extant studies look either at the departure effect or at remittance inflows, not both. The only contribution of which I am aware that attempts to account for both is Rozelle, Taylor and de Brauw (1999) which finds that out-migration is associated with lower farm yields, but remittances enhance those yields.

Aid can, of course, be addressed to tackle poverty directly, though it may be difficult to target the incidence of temporary, idiosyncratic poverty impacting individual families. In aiding to enhance educational systems, particularly in remote rural areas, a key barrier to internal mobility may be lowered, providing easier access to the rewards of internal migration. In providing expertise to help with the process of incorporating migration into development planning, more rational schemes for the location of infrastructure should emerge, potentially providing the amenities essential to livelihood improvements, and indeed aid may be sufficient to help in the actual installation of such infrastructure elements as power and roads.
International migration

Discussion of the effects of international migration upon the economies of developing countries may be divided into three categories: (1) the effects of labor departure, usually subdivided into departure of the highly-skilled and of those with lower skill levels; (2) the impacts of migrant inflows into the developing countries; (3) the effects of remittance inflows.

Departure of the highly-skilled

A much discussed issue is the effect of emigration of the highly-skilled on prospects for development at home. The traditional presumption is that this represents a “brain-drain” and is inherently harmful. In reality, much depends upon five issues: (1) how effectively the highly-skilled would be deployed at home if they were to remain; (2) the method of financing higher education at home; (3) where the training actually takes place; (4) the stimulus to the home economy from having a well-educated diaspora; (5) and the likelihood of return.

Emigration of doctors and nurses from SSA has been widely criticized. But would stemming this outflow actually result in improved healthcare? The evidence points to trained nurses not working as nurses at home, and doctors who remain in the major cities, offering little or no healthcare to the rural masses. The contribution of an additional doctor in a major urban hospital to health outcomes in the country as a whole may be fairly small (Clemens, 2007).

In most of the developing countries, higher education is heavily subsidized and often free of charge. This is typically a regressive policy, since the majority of those attending universities are drawn from well-off families. As a result, this can be a source of resentment when the graduates then emigrate. Very few countries from the developing regions are yet seriously considering a shift to student loans for higher education, a move that has been made in a number of the higher-income countries.

On the other hand, by no means all of the tertiary education takes place in the country of origin. As we have seen, study abroad is common at the tertiary level, though little is known about the return rate after such experiences. Thus, Özden...
and Phillips (2015, p.1) “find that almost half of African-born doctors were trained outside their birth country... around 15 percent of all doctors trained in Africa were actually born outside the continent.”

Several recent contributions have turned the focus from brain-drain to brain-gain, emphasizing at least four routes through which a highly-skilled diaspora can actually benefit their home country.

(1) It is largely the highly-educated who manage to migrate to the high-income countries. This can encourage the next generation to continue their studies, aspiring to emigrate. Not all will manage to leave, and the home-country may potentially wind up with a larger stock of highly educated workers. Such a phenomenon has supporting evidence (Beine et al., 2001).

(2) The diaspora generally serves to stimulate trade with the home country through three mechanisms: a preference for consumption of goods from the old country, a taste that can be passed along to the indigenous population in the new country; provision of information about trading opportunities and mechanisms, particularly where language and other differences separate the two countries; an ability to enforce contracts at home through social pressures, when written contracts are not the norm. Lucas (2014) shows that such links are important; bilateral trade between pairs of countries is greater where migration has also occurred between the two countries. This study finds this to be the case even among refugees, though particularly among educated migrants. However, the stimulus is to both imports and exports, with no clear improvement in the balance of trade for the home country.

(3) Educated migrants tend to remit larger amounts per capita, though not necessarily a larger fraction of their incomes (Bollard et al., 2011).

(4) Less well documented is the role of technology transfer to the home country through contacts with the highly-educated diaspora. The impact of such transfers may, however, depend upon the sophistication level of this knowledge and the preparedness of the home country to absorb frontier information.
Departure of the less-skilled.

Migration of less-skilled workers from developing countries is largely confined to movements to other developing countries, with two exceptions: (1) migration of low-skill workers from countries neighboring on high-income regions is more common; (2) migration of low-skill workers, both male and female, to the GCC states continues on a fairly massive scale.

Within international migration, return migration of low-skilled workers probably has the largest impact in terms of direct poverty reduction. The departure of such workers tightens the labor market for remaining low-skill workers, diminishing unemployment and tending to raise wages (Lucas, 1987; Mishra, 2014). Remittances from these workers go to low-income families at home, and remitting is highest when the migrant intends to return home (Adams, 2011).

Migration to the Gulf countries is entirely temporary and dominated by low-skill workers; it has had a profound effect on poverty alleviation in the developing countries of origin (Lucas, 2005).

Effects of remittance inflows.

Whether remittances actually raise the family income of recipients may depend upon the extent to which the family members elect to reduce their labor-efforts as a result. The work of Azam and Gubert (2005) in the Kase area of Mali suggests that this substitution may be substantial. Nonetheless, remittance inflows are frequently portrayed as a clear economic gain for the country as a whole. Yet it is not apparent what the counter-factual should be in this claim. Remittance inflows do not occur without migrant outflows. If the pattern of emigration proves harmful then this requires weighing against the gains from remittances.

Any form of financial inflows can result in a real appreciation of the exchange rate, resulting in a Dutch disease effect, lowering real earnings as the price of non-traded goods rises, potentially resulting in higher unemployment. (Neary and van Wijnbergen, 1986). Remittance inflows are no exception to this, nor are inflows of ODA (Bourdet & Falck, 2006; Rajan & Subramanian, 2011). Indeed, in the context of
remittances there is at least some evidence of a significant real appreciation and hence a potential Dutch disease effect (Aosta et al., 2009; Larney et al., 2012).

A common complaint against the inflow of international remittances is that they are mostly spent on consumption, not on investment. There are two main lines of counter-argument. First, the factual basis of this complaint may be doubted. Significant portions of any additions to family incomes as a result of remittance receipts are spent on education of children and on housing, both of which are forms of investment (Adams, 2011). Second, even if policy-makers wish to raise the commitment to investment, it is not obvious why remittance-recipients should be expected to bear the load. Remittances are private transfers, not public funds to be invested at will.

Whether remittances will, in fact, result in greater investments depends very much upon the context, and here aid may play an important part. Bourdet and Falck (2006, p. 281) explain:

“Remittances and aid have to complement each other in order for the supply effect to take place. For example, the productive impact of remittances invested in an economy characterized by a lack of human capital and deficient technical and social infrastructure will be limited. Foreign aid can increase the efficiency of investments out of remittances by removing these bottlenecks, e.g. through improving roads, education, and health. Similarly, remittances can increase the marginal productivity of aid through contributing the private financial capital necessary for reaping the benefit of infrastructural improvements. It is worth adding that remittances themselves can contribute to the development of infrastructure and human capital and eventually to growth.”

Philanthropic organizations, known as home-town associations, also provide a conduit through which the diaspora may transfer funds; commonly called collective remittances. Orozco and Lapointe (2004) report at least 2000 such Mexican associations across the US and similar associations link communities in several African nations with their emigrants in Europe. Such activities can, however, challenge the position of the elite at home, resulting in tensions between the association members and local leaders (Mazzucato and Kabki, 2009).
Much of the analysis of the consequence of the collective remittances generated has focused on the Mexican context, where the various levels of government have contributed to match three times the amount sent by migrant associations, financing local public projects. Deploying community-level, panel data from 2000-2005, Kijima and Gonzalez-Ramirez (2012, p. 291) demonstrate that “investment in roads, water supply, and non-agricultural productive projects by the 3X1 program improved community welfare ... however ... neither the marginalization level nor the migration level determined the access to the program.” Aparicio and Meseguer (2012, p. 206) go further, finding “that poorer municipalities are less likely to participate than those with medium poverty levels. We also find that the Program rewards PAN strongholds rather than competitive municipalities.” Replicating the Mexican experience, with or without the inherent biases, is, in any case, not trivial. Burgess (2012, p. 119) undertakes a comparison of the Mexican context with that in El Salvador, concluding that the public-private collaboration “has been more sustained, multifaceted, and negotiated in Mexico than in El Salvador. These outcomes are linked to four factors: the density and type of migrant organizations, the territorial distribution of state authority and resources, the extent and nature of diaspora outreach, and legacies of state-society relations.”

Levitt (1998, p. 926) coined the term “social remittances ... a local-level, migration-driven form of cultural diffusion,” a concept developed further in Levitt (2001) which features the transnational migrants between Boca Canasta village in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica Plain neighborhood in Boston. As Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2010) write, “It’s not just about the economy, stupid ... Migrants from the developing world bring with them social remittances — defined as ideas, know-how, practices, and skills — that shape their encounters with and integration into their host societies. They also send back social remittances that promote and impede development in their countries of origin.” To a significant extent this links up with the transmission of know-how that is part of the brain-gain literature, though social remittances are not confined to the highly-skilled. Moreover, as Levitt and Lamba-Nieves note, some of these effects may actually harm development at home.

A number of aspects of how international migration can shape attitudes and affect the home country have been examined empirically: political norms, attitudes to
fertility and family planning, gender norms, engagement in civil society and pro-social behavior, and the impact on corruption, have all been examined. Much of this work was initiated by the seminal paper of Spilimbergo (1990), illustrating that education abroad can help to promote democracy at home, but only if that education is acquired in a democratic setting. Spilimbergo does not distinguish whether the overseas students return home or not; as we have seen, data on this are extremely sparse. Certainly none of these studies focuses explicitly on transnational migrants oscillating between countries; the original context of social-remittance studies. Tuccio et al. (2019, p.6) do, however, note instead that “Overall, the existing evidence points at a correlation between the values and opinions of host countries and those of the left-behind families of migrants abroad.” These authors also point to a major weakness in most of this literature; the problem of selection; “selection into emigration, selection into return migration, and, more important, selection into destination” (Tuccio et al., 2019, p.3). Are migrants’ choices of destination shaped by the inherent ideas at home prior to departing, resulting in reverse causality? After controlling for this triple selection problem Tuccio et al. reach a conclusion reminiscent of that in Spilimbergo; families in Morocco with either return or current migrants are likely to have increased their demand for political and social change, if the migration was to a more democratic state in Western Europe, but have lowered these demands if migration was to a ‘non-West’ state.

**Return migration**

Wahba (2014) notes that returning migrants represent an inflow of resources into the country of origin, both in the form of financial capital from accumulated savings and as human capital from skills, knowledge and experience acquired while abroad. On the other hand, any social capital possessed by emigrants may have depreciated while away. Wahba surveys two main outcomes of these resource flows: the effect on business startups and on the role of returnees in the wage labor market. In both contexts, the paper emphasizes the difficulty in evaluating the impact of these inflows, given that emigrants are a select group in the first place and those who return are a select group among emigrants. Earlier studies established that migrants returned from abroad are indeed likely to set up a small business though not always employing much labor beyond their own efforts. The more recent work
has generally shown that returned migrants are also more likely to establish a start-up than are comparable non-migrants. Marchetta (2012) also demonstrates that returned migrant startups are also more likely to survive.

Examination of wage gains upon return, sometimes dubbed the returns to returning, ideally requires dealing with three levels of selection; not only the selections into emigration and into return but also into wage labor upon return. The only study of which I am aware tackling all three is by Wahba (2015), which finds that returned migrants in Egypt on average earn 16 percent more than non-migrants.

OECD Development Centre (2017, Table 10.3) lists a number of policy recommendations to the countries of origin, to make the most out of return migration. These suggestions may be divided into two main targets: to increase the extent of return and to improve the reintegration of returned migrants. The two are clearly linked. Recommendations with respect to reintegration involve help locating a job, related training programs and information about qualification recognition, offering information about financial and investment opportunities, and ensuring social protection. Among the suggestions aimed at enhancing the return rate are setting up a web information portal, organizing diaspora fairs and offering duty exemptions on personal items and subsidized salaries. With respect to some of these recommendations aid agencies could presumably play a role. However, it might be noted that any such efforts may encounter two problems: first creating resentment among those who did not emigrate; second possibly exacerbating the incentive to emigrate if the privileges of returning are set sufficiently high (Lucas, 2005).

**Migrant inflows to developing countries**

The economic consequences of immigration into the High-Income countries have been the subject of a plethora of contributions. It is not the place of this overview to attempt to summarize where this stands. Meanwhile, the economic consequences of immigration into the Low and Middle-Income countries has been almost entirely neglected, though there are a couple of exceptions.

A joint study by OECD and ILO (2018) examines the impact of immigration upon labor markets, GDP levels and productivity, and on the fiscal balance in ten devel-
The economic impact of refugees upon host countries may well differ from that of non-refugee migrants (Cortes, 2004). Given that the vast majority of refugees are in developing countries, the question arises as to the effect this has on the host citizens. Fallah et al. (2018) examine the context of Jordan and find a similar situation in the labor market to that noted in the OECD/ILO report. Any impact on Jordanian workers is minimal, largely because the refugees are in the informal sector and Jordanians have more formal employment. The refugees do, however, compete with other immigrants and the earnings of the latter decline in consequence. A study of refugee inflows from Rwanda and Burundi into the Kagera region of Tanzania paints a more nuanced picture; indigenous agricultural laborers suffer from lower wages as a result of increased competition for jobs; skilled workers gain from increased demand for their services, as do employers (Maystadt and Verwimp, 2009). More generally, there is case-study evidence that massive inflows of refugees can put excessive pressure on water and firewood supplies as well as on infrastructure, such as schools and health facilities; food prices may also be driven up by the demands of the refugees, though aid-supplied food helps to counter this.\(^{52}\) Moreover, Lucas (2015) finds a significant negative impact of refugee inflows on growth in GDP per capita among 51 African countries during 1970-2007.\(^{53}\) International agencies offset some of the costs of supporting the refugees, but apparently by no means all of the costs and this is an obvious lacuna that aid could certainly help to fill.
5. Official Development Assistance: The Migration Links

This final section of the research overview comprises two parts. The first part summarizes some of the evidence related to ways in which existing patterns of Official Development Assistance tend to shape international and internal migration patterns. The second part then turns to the specific objectives outlined in the GCM and GCR and how ODA may potentially play a role in pursuing some of these goals.

At the outset of this section it needs to be emphasized that, although the focus here is upon links with migration, by no means the only goal of aid is to shape migration and its outcomes. The OECD defines ODA, *inter alia*, as “administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective.” Although the definition of ODA changed in 2018, this remains a key phrase in the definition. As we shall see in the first portion of this section, it is dubious that all recent uses of ‘ODA’ meet this requirement.

**Current patterns of ODA and links to migration**

The cumulative evidence relating ODA and the extent of migration may be broken down into five groups: (1) studies of the direct effect of aid upon the extent of international migration; (2) contributions that break this link into two steps, the effect of aid on growth and the effect of growth on international migration; (3) aid in the context of fragile states; (4) the implicit effects of the sectoral composition of aid on international and internal migration.

The issue of how aid may improve the manner in which migration affects economic development in the developing countries is better addressed within the objectives of the GCM in the following section.
Evidence on the direct influence of ODA on the extent of international migration

A small set of papers directly approach examining the association between the amount of ODA received by a country and the extent of emigration. Parsons and Winters (2014) provide an excellent summary of that evidence. One of the earliest of these analyses is Neumayer (2005) who looks at the applications for asylum in 17 West European countries from 127 developing countries, using annual data from 1982-1999. Neumayer finds no significant association between the total applications to these West European countries and total aid to the specific country of origin.

This early work by Neumayer is fairly aggregated and focuses upon seeking asylum in Europe, while, as noted in earlier sections, 85 percent of the world’s refugees are in developing countries. In a much more recent paper, Dreher et al. (2018), looks at net refugee flows from each of 141 countries, not only to the group of DAC donors but also to the world in general, during 1976-2013. The results indicate that the level of aid to the average country over time is negatively correlated with the number of refugees fleeing in the following year. Using techniques to attempt to see if this association is causal (instrumental variables), no significant association is found in the effect of aid upon refugee flows either to the DAC countries or to the world in general.

Another early paper by Berthélemy et al. (2009) examines the more general migrant stock by 2000, rather than focusing upon refugees or asylum applicants. The data for this study encompass 22 OECD host countries and 187 countries of origin. In doing so, this paper takes two important steps: first, looking at the pairwise connections between specific host and origin countries; second, recognizing a potential link in which aid affects migration and migration affects aid. The latter link is hypothesized to stem from lobbying activities of migrants on behalf of their home country. The main result, for our purpose, is that the stocks of migrants are positively related to both the bilateral ODA, from host to origin country, and to total aid received by the country of origin. Disaggregating the analysis by skilled (secondary and tertiary-educated) and less-skilled migrants, this study finds the less-skilled are more responsive to total aid and less responsive to bilateral aid than the skilled migrants. This has become the chief source of evidence in support of
the argument that aid is not a substitute for migration but will actually exacerbate these movements, with bilateral aid stimulating migration of less-skilled workers in particular. These results are, however, subject to certain limitations. The two-way link between migration and aid is addressed using a statistical technique (three-stage least squares) that is particularly sensitive to small changes in specification of the control variables included. Indeed, the approach can only be applied if some controls are assumed to affect aid but not migration, and vice versa. The reasons for the particular exclusions adopted in Berthélemy et al. are not always apparent, and none seem to be subjected to standard tests. A further “potential problem that Berthélemy et al. recognize ... is that their dependent variable is the migration stock ... which is determined over many years, whereas their aid variables refer to averages over five or ten years” (Parsons and Winters, 2014, p.102).

Two papers that have appeared within the last year question the generality of the results in Berthélemy et al. Gamso and Yuldashev (2018) again look at emigrant stocks in the OECD countries from the aid-recipient countries, but with five-yearly, panel data extending from 1985 through 2010 rather than looking at 2000 alone. This study does not address the issue of a potential two-way link between aid and migration but has the distinct advantage of being able to address the fact that each country is different in unmeasured ways (that is using country fixed-effects). A key feature of this analysis is a bifurcation of aid into two types, following OECD definitions: “governance aid” (supporting government, civil society and NGO) versus “economic and social aid” (the remainder). The results indicate that aid to improve governance significantly reduces the emigrant stock whereas economic and social aid has no significant effect in either direction.

Lanati and Thiele (2018) take up the point recognized by Berthélemy et al, looking at migrant flows rather than the accumulated stocks, while also using more extensive data covering 1995-2014. This paper indeed finds that the association with aid is highly sensitive to the estimation approach, but adopting similar techniques to those deployed in Berthélemy et al. the results in the latter are completely reversed; there is a significant negative association with aid. Lanati and Thiele (2018, p. 59) suggest that the effect of aid in reducing migration may stem from the fact that the “positive
welfare effects of foreign aid tend to manifest themselves in improved public services for the poor rather than higher incomes, which is in line with the reorientation of foreign aid towards social sectors under the Millennium Development Goals.”

The debate continues. Examining the direct links from aid to migration has generated mixed results. It is interesting to note, though, that with exception of part of the work by Dreher et al. (2018), the entire focus of these analyses is upon the effect of aid on migration to the OECD countries. The intent, whether stated explicitly or not, is to ask whether the DAC countries can use aid to reduce migration to themselves. As we have seen in earlier sections, in fact much of the migration from developing countries, particularly of the less-well-educated and certainly of refugees, is to other developing countries; the role of aid in shaping this remains almost entirely neglected.

**Aid, growth and international migration**

A very substantial literature exists on the effects of aid upon economic growth; in turn the effect of economic growth upon international migration has been subjected to investigation, offering an indirect route through which ODA may shape international population movements.

The former set of contributions, connecting aid with growth, has a long and very contentious history. Perhaps the earliest contribution is attributable to Griffin and Enos (1970) who report a zero or negative correlation between aid receipts and growth across 27 countries. Of course, such a simple approach does not suffice; aid may be greater precisely because growth is slow. Since 1970 the results have become increasingly sophisticated but with extremely mixed outcomes, seemingly depending upon a number of factors: addressing the reverse causality problem just noted, the role of out-lying observations, the lags between aid receipt and subsequent growth, the time period and country coverage of the data, and the precise way in which the link between aid and growth (or investment in some studies) is modelled.

Some contributions nonetheless support the initial position of Griffin and Enos, that aid does nothing to accelerate growth. Boone (1996, p.289), for instance, finds
“that aid does not significantly increase investment, nor benefit the poor ... but it does increase the size of government.” This position is subsequently supported in the work of Rajan and Subramanian (2008, p.643) who “find little robust evidence of a positive (or negative) relationship between aid inflows into a country and its economic growth... Our findings suggest that for aid to be effective in the future, the aid apparatus will have to be rethought.”

Burnside and Dollar (2000, p.847) adopt a more nuanced position; “We find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies.” Yet even this qualified position has been questioned. Extending the time period and country coverage of the data, but applying similar approaches to that in Burnside and Dollar, Easterly et al. (2004, pp.779-780) “raises new doubts about the effectiveness of aid and suggests that economists and policy makers should be less sanguine about concluding that foreign aid will boost growth in countries with good policies.”

Still other studies fall in the camp of positive effects of aid on growth. Clemens et al. (2011, p. 590) state this in qualified form, “aid causes some degree of growth in recipient countries, although the magnitude of this relationship is modest, varies greatly across recipients and diminishes at high levels of aid.” Others are less equivocal. “It is shown that aid in all likelihood increases the growth rate, and this result is not conditional on ‘good’ policy” (Hansen & Tarp, 2001, p.547); “a positive, statistically significant, and economically sizable effect of aid on growth is found” (Galiani et al., 2017, p.1; See also Mekasha & Tarp, 2013).

Again, the debate continues. If the sign of the effect of aid upon economic growth remains unclear, whether or not a migration hump exists is moot. Only if aid clearly raises income levels and raising incomes in turn witnesses rising emigration will aid accelerate emigration. In any case, to deny aid to the lowest income countries because this may enhance migration pressures is only to postpone the process; if a hump exists, hopefully more and more countries will transit that hump in time (Lucas, 2005). Indeed there is even some evidence that “that aid given to poor developing countries enhances growth and reduces emigration” (Ziesermer, 2011, p.4865).
Aid in the context of fragile states

The countries and territories listed, by the World Bank, to be in conflict or in a fragile state are the origins of two-thirds of the world’s refugees and sixty percent of the internally displaced, as of 2017. ODA to these states has risen from about 12 percent of total ODA at the turn of the millennium to over a quarter by 2017. By 2017 these countries and territories in a fragile state received nearly ten times as much ODA relative to their gross national income (GNI) compared to receipts of all developing countries, a ratio that has risen from about half that level in 2002 (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. ODA to Fragile Situations

Data source: World Development Indicators at databank.worldbank.org/data/.

In 2017, Humanitarian Aid amounted to 13 percent of the ODA total. “Humanitarian aid represents about one fourth of total ODA to all fragile contexts but half of all ODA in extremely fragile contexts ... an alternative that is gaining traction is the idea of ‘development wherever possible, humanitarian only when necessary’” (OECD, 2018, p.257). Along these lines, “World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim today said that the world’s powers need to pay far greater attention to boosting developing economies and creating jobs in the most fragile countries in order to give more opportunity to people in those nations and to prevent future refugee crises.”56
Containing the flow of refugees ought not to be the chief criterion in directing aid towards failing situations; other concerns are paramount in these states and often underlie the conflict that results in refugee out-pouring. For instance, OECD (2018, p.254) writes “If no action is taken, more than 80% of the world’s poor could be living in fragile contexts by 2030.”

Effectively delivering aid during times of conflict is generally not viable. As noted earlier in this section, at least some of the evidence questions the effectiveness of aid in promoting growth more generally in the presence of weak governance, which characterizes many of the states in a failing situation. As we have seen, the general-ity of those claims has been disputed. Moreover, there are signs of improvement in aid delivery to states in a fragile situation; “in the late 1990s and early 2000s ... the World Bank reported that the share of its projects in fragile states receiving unsatisfactory evaluations was double the share in stable countries. But when projects over the subsequent decade were evaluated, that difference vanished. The recent portfolio performance of the U.K. Department for International Development and the Global Fund in fragile states has been similarly favorable” (Chandy et al., 2016, p.3).57

Debates resound over the effects of the aggregate level of aid in promoting economic growth, both in states of failure and more generally, and ultimately any effects this has in shaping international migration. But what of the sectoral composition of aid; how does this link with migration outcomes?

The sectoral composition of bilateral ODA and mig-ration

No doubt the composition of aid has an important role in shaping any effects of total aid upon migration, both internationally and internally, though any direct evidence on this is sorely lacking. It should also be borne in mind that aid can prove fungible; gross contribution levels to a specific sector are not necessarily equal to net incremental spending on this aspect. What may be surmised?
The ‘Other’ segment in Figure 8 is quite substantial largely due to about seventeen percent of the sector of ODA being unspecified. Nonetheless it is clear that contributions to the five main segments of Social Infrastructure, (Education, Health, Population Policy & Reproductive Health, Water Supply & Sanitation, and Government & Civil Society) play a substantial part, amounting to about a third of total ODA.

How contributions to education shape migration may well depend very much on the nature of this spending, including the level of education and location within the country. Nearly a fifth of educational spending is reported as ‘Level Unspecified.’ Of the remainder, over half contributed to ‘Post-Secondary Education’, nearly a third to ‘Basic Education’ and the rest to ‘Secondary Education’. As we have seen in earlier portions of this overview, possessing a tertiary education is associated with higher levels of emigration and emigration to the High-Income countries in particular. Whether this results in a loss (brain-drain) or brain-gain to the home country, on balance, remains debatable. On the other hand, expanding the basic and second-
ary levels of education typically enhances the employability of young people at home, tending to diminish departure.

There is good evidence that providing primary schools in rural areas can have a significant effect on school completion and on earnings.\textsuperscript{58} Since those with a little better education are also more likely to migrate into urban areas, this can also facilitate the process of transition out of dependence on agriculture. Moreover, there is evidence on the deterrent effect of distance to school impacting attendance (Lucas, 2018). Provision of at least primary schools closer to remote areas may well then help to diminish the cumulative isolation of those at the periphery from economic progress at the core, discussed in earlier sections. Data on the location of ODA spending within countries does not appear to be readily available however.

Contributions to health and reproductive health can certainly improve the attraction of remaining at home. Moreover, as noted above, there is at least some very recent evidence that ODA to Government and Civil Society may be significant in diminishing emigration pressures (Gamso and Yuldashev, 2018).

Contributions to Economic Infrastructure, predominantly in Transport and Energy, are also quite key in bilateral ODA, amounting to some 17 percent in 2017. These components can play an important role in shaping migration in at least three ways. (1) Lack of infrastructure is a significant constraint on overall economic development in many of the developing countries, ultimately limiting the potential for job creation and the attractiveness of remaining at home (Straub, 2008; Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, 2010). (2) Investments by the diaspora and out of migrants’ remittances need to be complemented by the provision of appropriate infrastructure to render them viable. (3) Again, the location of any additions to infrastructure probably has an important role in shaping internal migration, and projections of future migration ought, in turn, to impact optimal choices of locations, though there is not a large body of reliable evidence investigating this.

ODA to agriculture presumably has two main goals: improving food security (to the extent that food imports are limited and food must be grown locally); and improving living standards in rural areas where most of the world’s poor reside. To the extent
that it is successful with respect to the latter, such aid probably serves to diminish the extent of rural-urban migration. Whether providing incentives to remain in the rural zones is the best strategy in the long-run is unclear, particularly in contexts where climate change is having an increasing effect on rendering dependence upon agriculture less and less viable (Rigaud et al., 2018).

Contributions to Environment Protection are presumably productive in the longer-run, sustaining living standards and mitigating some of the consequences of climate change on population redistribution internally. Depending upon the targets of this assistance, it may also have global, spill-over benefits. This segment is, however, quite small, totalling only about three percent of bilateral ODA in 2017.

In 2017, 90 percent of the Humanitarian Aid (12 percent of total bilateral ODA) contributed to Emergency Responses. This is clearly an important role for the donor countries. However, the contributions to Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation and to Disaster Prevention & Preparedness both amounted to less than one percent of total ODA. The former is likely to play an important role in return of both migrants and refugees; the latter is also likely to prove vital, going forward, in limiting the need for Emergency Response funding and in diminishing the adverse drivers of both international and internal migration. The emphasis here seems to be rather short-sighted.

A European perspective

As of 2017, the EU member countries contributed just over half of the world’s ODA, or 56 percent including the EFTA countries. Of the 15 countries contributing the highest fraction of their gross national income as ODA, 13 are in the EU or EFTA; the US is 25th. But where is this ODA going?

Following the surge in asylum seekers and of undocumented migrants in Europe in 2015, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) was established at the Valletta Summit on Migration in November 2015, “to address the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration and to contribute to better migration management ... The bulk of its resources are dedicated to the creation of jobs and
Economic Development, especially for young people and women in local communities, with a focus on vocational training and the creation of micro and small enterprises” (European Commission 2018). The EUTF is focused on three regions within Africa: The Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and North Africa. As of February 2019, 4.2 billion Euros have been allocated to the EUTF, largely from the European Development Fund though, in addition, “EU Member States and other donors (Switzerland and Norway) have contributed EUR 492 million” (European Commission 2019a). To date, about 30 percent of the amount approved has actually been paid out. Among the targets of the EUTF, it is asserted that 167 760 jobs have been created, 5.4 million people have received basic social services, 103 183 migrants in transit and forcibly displaced people have been protected or assisted, and 163 141 people are participating in conflict prevention and peace building activities by early 2019 (European Commission 2019b). While recognizing that the target areas within the Sahel, Horn of Africa and North Africa presumably do not encompass entire countries, to create 168 000 jobs in regions with populations exceeding 500 million does not seem very significant.

Perhaps not surprisingly the ETFA has been substantially criticized.

“The EUTF makes predominant use (90 percent) of Official Development Assistance (ODA), mostly from the European Development Fund (EDF), and as such, its implementation should be guided by the key principles of development effectiveness ... There is an increasing concern that the EUTF is being used as a political tool focusing on quick-fix projects with the aim to stem migratory flows to Europe, which is not the purpose of ODA according to the EU’s own Lisbon Treaty. There is also a concern that some funding from the EUTF contributes unintentionally to inhumane treatment of migrants and refugees, as in the case of Libya. In addition, the EU strategy of “quick-fixes” is very likely to fail since addressing the drivers of forced migration requires a long term, coherent and sustainable approach, respecting the basic principles of development aid.” (European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development, 2018, p.6)

Following the Valletta Summit, the EU also introduced a Migration Partnership Framework (MPF) in June 2016, integrating migration into the EU’s foreign poli-
“The objective is saving lives and breaking the business model of smugglers, preventing illegal migration and enhance cooperation on returns and readmission of irregular migrants, as well as stepping up investments in partner countries” (European Commission 2016). The plan further diverts ODA funds to this end with the aim of forming compacts with individual countries of origin, transit, or hosting large refugee populations. These compacts would “combine different policy elements like development aid, trade, mobility, energy, security, digital policy” (European Commission, 2016). In practice, this statement lists two main prongs to this strategy. (1) Expanding the EU presence and personnel in the partner countries, as migration liaison officers, on Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations, and as strengthened European Border and Coast Guard, and EUROPOL involvement. (2) Offering financial incentives, such as making the ETFA and Syria Trust Fund more flexible, combined with an ambitious External Investment Plan.

To a significant extent this appears to echo the rather discredited, much earlier, co-development schemes and in turn has generated its own critics. Castillejo (2017), for example, “finds that there is significant disagreement both among EU member states and within EU institutions over the MPF’s approach and priorities,” noting “the political and ethical controversies that the MPF has generated, including regarding its ambition to subordinate other areas of external action to migration goals; its use of incentives; and its undermining of EU development and human rights principles.” Castillejo (2017, p.2) continues, “the MPF has so far not managed to incentivise the type of cooperation that the EU was seeking. This is particularly striking in the area of returns, where there has been almost no progress in the five priority countries and where European expectations that modest financial incentives would purchase cooperation appears to have been misplaced … the strongest results have been seen in Niger, where … the sensitive issue of returns is not a factor.”

Where does this leave the role of aid in relation to migration? Both of the global compacts, on migration and on refugees, offer some possibilities that may prove more helpful and less controversial.
ODA and the objectives of the GCM and GCR

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration sets out 23 objectives, each with a list of intended actions to achieve these goals. The first portion of this section addresses some potential roles for ODA in addressing these intended actions. Certainly not all possible interventions meet the Lisbon definition of ODA. The Global Compact on Refugees is far more explicit in its calls for international assistance and the nature of these calls is summarized in the second portion of this section, closing with a note on the neglect of internally displaced persons in both compacts.

Some potential roles for official development assistance in moving toward fulfilment of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

Not all of the objectives laid out in the GCM lend themselves to an obvious role for ODA. In this outline, only those objectives that touch upon areas where ODA might indeed play a significant part are listed. In each case, the specific objective is then quoted, followed by quoting selected intended actions where it is surmised that ODA may potentially play a constructive part. Some thoughts on this influence that ODA may possess are then addressed within each topic. Although the GCM does not explicitly mention internal migration, this summary nonetheless addresses some potential roles for ODA in smoothing internal population movements, which help shape the economic setting from which international migration occurs.
“OBJECTIVE 1: Collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies.”

It is in the context of evidence-based policies and the need to integrate migration into national planning (see Objective 19) that compilation and analysis of such data assumes importance in the “economic development and welfare of developing countries” as required in defining ODA.

Select intended actions:

“Elaborate and implement a comprehensive strategy for improving migration data.”

   Expert assistance, perhaps provided as part of ODA, will prove essential in many of the developing countries if they are to move towards such data generating capacity.

“Establish and strengthen regional centers for research and training on migration origination observatories, such as the African Observatory for Migration and Development.”

   Such centers, and perhaps the African Observatory in particular, will also need assistance in their establishment.

“Conduct household, labour force and other surveys to collect information on the social and economic integration of migrants ... Develop research, studies and surveys on the interrelationship between migration and the three dimensions of sustainable development.”

   Such surveys can be quite expensive and could be off-set by assistance. Moreover, technical assistance in the design of these surveys and conduct of research will be required in many contexts.
“OBJECTIVE 2: Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin.”

Note that the emphasis here is upon drivers that are adverse to the situation in the developing countries of origin. Principal among these are the poverty of livelihoods, the lack of employment, and the threats of violence. Indeed, it may be argued that in the absence of these adverse drivers, most people would prefer to remain at home with kith and kin and in familiar surroundings, both in their home country and within those countries.

Select intended actions:

“Invest in sustainable development ... allowing all people to improve their lives ... by fostering sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, including through private and foreign direct investment and trade preferences.”

This speaks to a couple of aspects of ODA.

First, it draws out the importance of policy coherence on behalf of donor countries. Coordination of trade policies, direct investment incentives and regulation, need to be in line with the intent of assistance efforts.

Second, the reference to inclusive growth brings attention to the role of poverty as a driver of migration. Here an important link exists with internal migration; the worst levels of poverty are usually focused in rural areas, especially the more remote rural areas. ODA focused upon growth alone would not address these issues; populations in remote locations are isolated from any trickledown benefits of growth. Assistance providing better education in rural areas can help linking the poor into the gains from overall economic progress.

Third, is the broader question as to whether ODA actually accelerates growth and, in turn, whether it diminishes emigration pressures. As discussed above, both connections remain highly contentious. In any event, to deny ODA to very low-income countries, on grounds that it might
increase emigration, surely misses a prime objective of ODA, which is poverty eradication. Moreover, any rise in emigration rates across the poorer countries is more certainly associated with rising education levels, enabling easier entry to host countries. The industrialized countries today actively compete to attract better-educated workers, so rising education levels of migrants ought to be a plus.

“Strengthen joint analysis and sharing of information to better map, understand, predict and address migration movements, such as those that may result from sudden-onset and slow-onset natural disasters.”

In this context, foreign assistance could play at least three potential roles. (1) In providing the expertise to improve prediction of such disasters. (2) Working with local authorities to develop capacity for emergency response in the event of sudden-onset. (3) Helping in the design and financing of the necessary urban infrastructure to anticipate the induced rural-urban migration likely to occur. The last of these assumes a particular importance in the context of on-going climate change.

“Invest in human capital development by promoting entrepreneurship, education, vocational training and skills development programmes and partnerships, productive employment creation, in line with labour market needs, as well as in cooperation with the private sector and trade unions, with a view to reducing youth unemployment, avoiding brain drain and optimizing brain gain in countries of origin.”

International assistance in designing, building and financing vocational training and skills development programs could certainly prove constructive in diminishing an important adverse driver compelling migration; the lack of jobs. Any effect of additional vocational training in opening avenues to further international migration is likely to prove small though evidence on this seems lacking. In addition, working with the ministries of education to develop and disseminate information packages about the links between schooling choices and labor market prospects could also
alter decisions to attend and remain in school and, hence, to become more employable at home while enhancing overall skill levels in the economy.59

This same point of intended action also mentions brain drain and gain. The extent to which brain drain (emigration of the highly skilled) proves harmful to the country of origin remains disputed. Much depends upon four issues: (1) how effectively the highly-skilled would be deployed at home if they were to remain; (2) the method of financing higher education at home; (3) where the training actually takes place; (4) and the stimulus to the home economy from having a well-educated diaspora. This last point is what has come to be known as brain gain, of which there are also four aspects: (1) emigration of the tertiary-educated can encourage the next generation to continue their studies; (2) a highly-skilled diaspora often serves to stimulate trade with the home country; (3) educated migrants tend to remit larger amounts; (4) contacts with the highly-educated diaspora may play a role in the transfer of technology to the home country.

Some thoughts on potential roles for ODA in “avoiding brain drain and optimizing brain gain” are touched upon under OBJECTIVE 5.
Although this is clearly in the interest of the migrants themselves it is less apparent that such enhancement helps to promote “the economic development and welfare of developing countries.” Consequently, appropriate roles for ODA in pursuing this objective may be limited. An exception arises in the context of one intended action listed under this objective.

A select intended action:

“Expand available options for academic mobility, including through bilateral and multilateral agreements that facilitate academic exchanges, such as scholarships for students and academic professionals, visiting professorships, joint training programmes, and international research opportunities, in cooperation with academic institutions and other relevant stakeholders.”

This statement of intended action embodies two, rather distinct aspects: scholarships for students and international research opportunities.

To the extent that stipends for study abroad are paid by the host country or the universities attended are subsidized by the host state, this is essentially a form of aid. The individuals who participate in overseas studies are certainly major beneficiaries on average. Whether their countries of origin gain economically is a matter of some contention; evidence on the return rate from study abroad is scant and study abroad may actually be a major conduit to promoting brain-drain. Alternatively, many universities are developing distance learning programs, as is the World Bank. Subsidizing country-specific program development and enabling access to these online programs may offer a form of aid that might result in greater retention of the highly-skilled at home.

On the other hand, financing the exchange of scholars and other international research opportunities, including appropriate conferences, could potentially promote faster technical progress, and more generally the spread of new ideas, in the developing countries, both of which are aspects of what are sometimes dubbed “social remittances.”
“OBJECTIVE 6: Facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work.”

Return migration of low-skill workers to the GCC states has probably done more to diminish poverty in the origin countries than any other form of international population mobility. That it is entirely return migration increases the amounts remitted; that most are less-skilled workers means these remittances are going to poorer families; and departure of lower-skilled workers is both less disruptive of production while tightening the labor market at home for other low-income workers. The conditions under which these migrations occur has nonetheless been widely criticized and objective 6 deals, in part, with these migrant workers in particular.

A select intended action:

“Develop and improve national policies and programmes relating to international labour mobility.”

Efforts have been made to manage the drivers of the migration streams in a number of labor-supplying countries, including providing more complete information, training, and vetting of recruiters. To some extent the Philippines has been a leader in these efforts and other countries have followed, including Indonesia, Nepal and Sri Lanka. However, as Asis and Agunias (2012) maintain, much remains to be done in setting up and fine-tuning such programs. This is an area where foreign assistance can be of help, both in providing resources to the relevant authorities establishing these labor-management programs and in offering expert assistance, including opportunities to meet and compare experiences.

A part of the efforts to improve migrant-worker programs includes setting up centers to assist migrants in the receiving countries. Such centers could also play a role towards achieving the next two objectives.
“OBJECTIVE 7: Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration.”

A select intended action:

“Develop gender-responsive migration policies to address the particular needs and vulnerabilities of migrant women, girls and boys.”

Centers, set up in migrant-receiving and transit countries could act as a focal point for more vulnerable migrants.

“OBJECTIVE 8: Save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants.”

A select intended action:

“Enable migrants to communicate with their families without delay ... and designate contact points for families looking for missing migrants.”

The centers mentioned under objectives 6 and 7 could also potentially play a part in acting as communication facilities for missing migrants.

ODA could help in setting up these centers, which are certainly in the interests of citizens of developing countries. Whether such centers would be welcomed by the host countries is less clear and some of these, particularly the transit states, are themselves developing countries. Note also that some of the IOM Transit Centers, such as that in Agadez, already provide facilities along these lines.

“OBJECTIVE 9: Strengthen the transnational response to smuggling of migrants.”

A select intended action:

“Use transnational, regional and bilateral mechanisms to share relevant information and intelligence on smuggling routes, modus operandi and financial
transactions of smuggling networks, vulnerabilities faced by smuggled migrants, and other data to dismantle the smuggling networks and enhance joint responses.”

Collecting such information will not be easy and would require information from the origin, destination and, most particularly, the transit countries. Offers of aid to these countries in collecting and providing this information might, in principle, help. Whether such offers are in the interests of the “the economic development and welfare” of the transit, or even origin, developing countries is, however, highly disputable. Any such “aid” may not qualify as ODA.

“OBJECTIVE 18: Invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences.”

A select intended action:

“Use technology and digitalization to evaluate and mutually recognize skills more comprehensively based on formal credentials as well as non-formally acquired competences and professional experience at all skills levels.”

The establishment of such a system will require expert assistance which could come in the form of foreign aid, linking with representatives from the private sector as noted in the GCM. Such a system could act in the interests of the truly qualified individuals from developing countries. Whether it would serve to improve the “the economic development and welfare” of the more general population remaining at home depends very much upon the balance between brain drain and brain gain effects.

The broader issue of skills development is actually addressed, and discussed, in the context of Objective 2; not here.
“OBJECTIVE 19: Create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries.”

Select intended actions.

“Develop targeted support programmes and financial products that facilitate migrant and diaspora investments.”

A few countries have quite successfully introduced diaspora bonds, a mechanism offering tax incentives to encourage capital inflows from the diaspora. To render such initiatives more widely successful “may require support for institutional capacity building and credit enhancement from multilateral or bilateral agencies” (Ketkar and Ratha, 2010: p.251).

“Integrate migration into development planning and sectoral policies ... to strengthen policy coherence and effectiveness of development cooperation.”

Both internal and international migration have been marginalized in development planning in most developing countries (Lucas, 2009). Integrating international migration into development planning has, only recently, begun to receive some attention. Integrating internal migration into such plans remains rudimentary. Developing country policy plans with respect to education, trade and exchange rates, infrastructure location, industrial and labor market regulation, and many other areas, are affected by migration outcomes and, in turn, affect migration. Partial decision making, by national planners and by aid agencies, in the absence of integrating these many elements may readily prove detrimental. Bringing migration into such a meta-framework, moving toward policy coherence at all levels, will be challenging (Global Migration Group, 2010). Not only do the aid agencies need to think about their own strategies in this light, but help in the form of expertise will surely be required in many of the developing countries to move in this direction.
“**OBJECTIVE 20:** Promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants.”

Select intended actions.

“Develop innovative technological solutions for remittance transfer, such as mobile payments, digital tools or e-banking.”

Mobile banking has already become the norm in some parts of the developing regions, but where it has not ODA could play a part in establishing and promoting such possibilities, in conjunction with the private sector.

“Enable migrant women to access financial literacy training.”

The GCM is not explicit about the stages at which this is intended to take place. Financial literacy training for women prior to recruitment as migrant workers is one clear possibility and already exists in some contexts. Post-migration training is the other main possibility, though perhaps more difficult to target. ODA could certainly play a part in the former, helping to finance pre-departure training. Whether post-migration training is in the interests of “the economic development and welfare of developing countries” is a little less apparent if the migration is permanent, though in principle it could be targeted at nationals from the developing countries.

“Develop programmes and instruments to promote investments from remittance senders in local development and entrepreneurship in countries of origin ... to enhance the transformative potential of remittances beyond the individual households of migrant workers.”

In this context it may be important to maintain a distinction between developing incentives, or even requirements, that transfers be invested, versus removing barriers that discourage such investments. The common complaint that recipients choose to invest too little of their remittances is misplaced; these are private transfers. If too little investment is taking place in the home-country, the onus should not fall upon remittance-re-
cipients to pick up the slack. On the other hand, removing disincentives to invest one’s remittances could be a win-win scenario. In this latter context, the interaction between publicly provided infrastructure and private investments has attracted some particular attention. The use of ODA to enhance infrastructure in the developing countries could then prove critical in lowering a barrier to effective investments out of remittances.

“Build partnerships between local authorities, local communities, the private sector, diasporas, hometown associations and migrant organizations.”

There is some evidence indicating that communal remittances through such organizations as hometown associations has, indeed, resulted in higher levels of local investments. To this extent, assistance in setting up and supporting such associations may prove productive.

“OBJECTIVE 21: Cooperate in facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable reintegration.”

Any role for ODA in this would presumably focus upon the issue of reintegration, rather than the actual process of return, and the GCM mentions several intended actions with respect to this reintegration process.

Select intended actions.

“Establish or strengthen national monitoring mechanisms on return”.

This will not prove easy; tracking returned migrants is notoriously difficult though perhaps some explorations into mechanisms for doing so will yield results. The aid agencies may wish to consider funding such an exploration.

“That returning migrants are assisted in their reintegration process through effective partnerships … Facilitate the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants into community life by providing them equal access to social protection
and services, justice, psycho-social assistance, vocational training, employment opportunities and decent work, recognition of skills acquired abroad, and financial services.”

ODA could certainly play a role in vocational training and in support of the establishment and running of small business start-ups among returned migrants. Three difficulties with this may, however, be mentioned: (1) locating returned migrants and verifying their status can prove problematic; (2) the incentive to emigrate could be exacerbated if the perceived privileges of returning are set sufficiently high; (3) resentment among those who did not emigrate may create a backlash. The last of these leads into a further intended action listed.

“Identify and address the needs of the communities to which migrants return.”

This, once again, emphasizes the need to integrate migration, including return migration, into development planning, at the community level as well as from a national perspective. The potential role for ODA in achieving this has already been noted.

Very little is known about the fate of returned migrants but this objective focuses upon improving both the process and outcome of returning. In doing so this would also encourage higher rates of voluntary return. Both voluntary and involuntary returnees are encompassed within the realm of this objective, as are both migrants and refugees; the latter provide a bridge to the Global Compact on Refugees.

The calls for resources embodied in the Global Compact on Refugees.

The Global Compact on Migration does not really address the onset of conflict as a major adverse driver of migration. This is the realm of the Global Compact on Refugees, which is far more explicit in its calls for international assistance; “the mobilization of timely, predictable, adequate and sustainable public and private funding nonetheless is key to the successful implementation of the global compact.”
The stated, main objectives of the GCR are to:

“(i) ease pressures on host countries;
(ii) enhance refugee self-reliance;
(iii) expand access to third country solutions;
(iv) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.”

Although acceptance of refugees for resettlement might be considered a form of aid in its own right, it is in the context of the three remaining objectives that ODA is particularly called for.

**Pressures on host countries.**

In the foregoing sections, it is noted that, as of 2017, developing countries host 85 percent of the world’s refugees and evidence is cited of the pressure placed on the resources and the state of the economy in these host states. The GCR recognizes these pressures: “Countries that receive and host refugees, often for extended periods, make an immense contribution from their own limited resources to the collective good, and indeed to the cause of humanity. It is imperative that these countries obtain tangible support of the international community as a whole in leading the response.” To do so, the GCR proposes establishment of Support Platforms, grouping stakeholders, upon which host countries can call in the event of a mass refugee inflow. “This will involve additional development resources, over and above regular development assistance, provided as grants or with a high degree of concessionality through both bilateral and multilateral channels.”

**Self-reliance.**

The GCM and GCR share some elements in common: both aim to “reduce vulnerabilities in migration.” Some thoughts on potential roles for aid in this have already been mentioned in the context of objectives 7 and 8 of the GCM.

The GCM and GCR both also remark on the importance to “invest in skills de-
development” emphasizing vocational training in particular. The targets of assistance are, however, quite different in the two Compacts. In the GCM, the potential roles for ODA in this regard stem largely from addressing skill development in the countries of origin, as a means of reducing a key adverse driver; the lack of jobs. In the GCR the focus is upon skill development among the refugees, listing education, jobs and livelihoods as among the “indicative areas relying on contributions from others.” A difficulty in achieving this is the common experience of mixed flows of refugees alongside other migrants. Targeting training to the refugees specifically may prove problematic, at least at the initial arrival stages.

Return in safety and dignity.

Again, this is an objective shared by the GCM and GCR. “Voluntary repatriation in conditions of safety and dignity remains the preferred solution in the majority of refugee situations … the international community as a whole will contribute resources and expertise to support countries of origin, upon their request, to address root causes, to remove obstacles to return, and to enable conditions favourable to voluntary repatriation.”

Some of the potential roles for ODA in the process of reintegration of returning migrants and in support of their communities have already been noted in discussing objective 21 of the GCM. Much of this applies equally to the reintegration of refugees also, though the context of achieving reintegration of refugees presents special difficulties.

(1) In post-conflict settings, substantial destruction of infrastructure can be common and rebuilding becomes critical to establishing viable livelihoods.

(2) Refugee flows are selective. Some whole families flee together; others are split when only some members manage to escape. Very little is known on any systematic basis about the fate of those family members who are left behind; better information on the poverty induced by this would help
in targeting aid toward those particularly deprived in post-conflict settings. Indeed, aid agencies may be able to play a significant role in reuniting such families through establishment of information portals.

(3) Refugees are also selective in another dimension, typically drawing from specific ethnicities or communities and their welcome and hence reintegration upon return is far from assured. This will require close monitoring by the stakeholders involved in the Support Platforms.

A note on Internally Displaced Persons.

The GCR barely addresses the internally displaced. As noted in the discussion on patterns of migration, this set of migrants has become far larger than the numbers of refugees crossing state borders. Almost nothing is known about the selection that occurs into those who manage to flee the country versus those remaining internally-displaced. This is an area where the international community needs to focus some attention, including the possibilities of ODA actually reaching such groups. This clearly will not be simple; little cooperation from the country that generated the IDP can be anticipated, at least in the immediate future.
6. Some pointers on future analysis

1. Given the likely increased return of migrants and rejected asylum seekers, by far the most important gap in our information is the trajectories for these returnees. Improved knowledge on this should help to understand what can be done to ease reintegration but also to make returning a more attractive option.

The major hurdle is lack of data. Non-random sampling of returned migrants can be extremely misleading. We lack sampling frames, identifying returnees to permit random sampling.

Three possible suggestions to address this:

- Work with the UN Population Division on inserting a couple of questions into the detailed sub-sample for the 2020 round of censuses at least for some of the developing countries.
  - “Have you ever lived abroad for a year or more?”
  - “In which country did you live the last time you were abroad for more than a year?”
  - “In which year did you return from this last stay abroad?”

- Failing this, work with a couple of countries to add a couple of similar questions into their next Labor Force Survey. (Only covers adults but still very useful).

- Design a specialized (nationally representative) survey. Presumably less cost-effective than insertions into the census or labor-force survey.

Better data are generally called for in the GCM and these issues are certainly in the interest of the countries of origin, justifying any ODA.
2. IDP vastly out-number refugees though very little is known about those internally displaced. Again the major limitation is lack of data. It may be possible, in a post-conflict setting, to implement a specialized survey identifying those IDP and returned refugees. Collecting information on non-returned refugees is an important, though separate component, and might best be achieved through data collected in camps in the main host countries.

Retrospective information on these populations, compared to their current situation, will offer important insights into integration, the role of the community, and what distinguishes those displaced across borders versus being internally displaced.

3. The GCM and this report call for integrating migration into national planning. But what, more precisely, does this mean? Working with a cross-ministry group in a well-chosen country could offer an important example for others: involving the ministry of education in links to brain-drain, the location of schools within the country and implications for trickle-down development, vocational training and employability of youths, the potential for distance learning as an alternative to study-abroad; infrastructure planning in light of future population locations, its impacts on these locations and on inducing productive investments out of remittances; the ministry of labor on how employment creation and active labor market policies shape emigration, immigration and internal movements; the ministry of finance on integrating remittances and such ideas as diaspora bonds into financial planning.

4. Climate change calls for urgent action for advance planning for rapid urbanization resulting from induced migration, particularly in Africa and parts of Asia. A critical review of the best practices in such planning could be valuable as a model for states likely to be impacted.

5. Closely related to the prior point, the GCM calls for improvements in disaster prediction, though this includes not only long term and short term climate change disasters but also the emergence of failed states and displacement resulting from the onset of violence. How can these predictions be improved? Progress in this sphere really requires two sets of expertise: one in hydro-meteorological events, the other
6. Some pointers on future analysis

in burgeoning state collapse and conflict, though the two may not be entirely separate.

6. The African Union is in the process of establishing the African Observatory for Migration and Development in Rabat, Morocco. Expert assistance will surely be helpful in setting up analysis at this facility.

7. According to their own reported successes, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa has singularly failed in terms of the number of jobs created. A case study of how this is being measured and why the numbers are so small could prove most valuable in redirecting future efforts.

8. A couple of studies have shown how important seasonal migration from very low-income, rural areas can prove in reducing lean-season poverty and malnutrition. Yet surprisingly little is known about the extent, nature and limits to seasonal migration. A well designed survey is needed to redress this lacuna.

9. A handful of private-sector space companies are in the process of establishing a global net of satellites, in part to provide global, high-speed internet coverage. Simultaneously, most major universities and some private sector companies are substantially expanding the range of on-line learning available. The intersection of these may well impact migration in several ways. By providing more complete information about job opportunities, without the need to migrate to search for jobs, the extent of risk involved in moving can be diminished. By improving education levels in remote rural areas, the young folk in these settings should become better linked to the opportunities that economic development at the core offers, reshaping their aspirations to migrate. With access to on-line degrees the need for expensive study-abroad should be obviated, potentially lowering the extent of brain-drain, particularly from smaller, low-income nations. Setting up tracking of these changes before they become available and as they spread would be most valuable.

10. An important aspect of return migration where almost no information exists is the propensity of students to return from study abroad. If the suggestions in topic (1) can be expanded just a little to include a question, such as, “What was your main
activity while abroad: Working, studying, or some other activity?” this would offer the first serious insights into student return. It could also potentially offer deeper insights into the transmission of acquired knowledge into the home economy.

11. The GCM lists, among its specific, intended actions, “Develop and improve national policies and programmes relating to international labour mobility.” The World Bank has published a pilot study on migration costs of low-skilled labor migrants but as the present overview notes “much remains to be done in setting up and fine-tuning such programs.” Studies of the experiences and outcomes from attempts to improve conditions in specific countries are needed. Work to date has rather focused on the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia, but other contexts warrant closer analysis, including Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka.

12. The latest data available on global, bilateral migrant stocks by education level are for 2000. Estimates based on the 2010 round of censuses are available only for a subset of countries. Rather than attempting to complete the 2010 estimates it is probably worth beginning advance planning for a complete update based on the 2020 censuses. The earlier estimates for 1990 and 2000 have proved valuable but are now sadly dated.
References


References


1 Parsons and Winters (2014: 66) also conclude “Prima facie, it has not been a success.” Comparisons have also been made with the migration clauses in the US-Mexico NAFTA agreement (Cornelius, 2002).

2 The GCM is not legally binding but was adopted by a meeting of leading representatives from 164 governments at the Intergovernmental Conference on the Global Compact for Migration, Marrakesh, in December 2018, though “The United States did not endorse the Compact, and more than a dozen other countries either chose not to sign the accord or are still undecided” (UN News, 2018).

3 See also World Bank (2018) on the patterns of international migration.

4 In a few instances, the origin of the migrants is unknown. However, the UN Population Division distinguishes between those from “Other North” and “Other South”. In Table 2, Other North is amalgamated with High-Income origins. The overall total in Table 1 remains slightly below 258 million, where this distinction could not be made.

5 Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine also report migrants being more than ten percent of the population; however, a large part of this resulted from designation as migrants of long-term residents from other states of the former Soviet Union, after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1990.

6 There are exceptions. Very few migrants from North Africa are in North Africa, nor are they in SSA; rather the migrant stock from North Africa is predominantly in Europe and the Middle East, the former being a slightly larger set. The relevant catchment region for North African migrants is really the Mediterranean Basin and its neighboring Arab states.

7 Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998) and Card and DiNardo (2002) argue these shifts in technology cannot explain the evolution of gender and race gaps in the US, however.


9 The latter include 32 of the 34 OECD countries (Japan and Korea are missing) and 58 other countries, though none of the GCC states is incorporated. See Database on Immigrants in OECD and non-OECD Countries: DIOC, 2019, available at http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm.

10 To the extent that the destination countries represented within each of the four income classes are randomly drawn, the pattern perceived would not be biased. There are, however, some notable omissions; none of the GCC states is included among the High-Income countries, for example. Almost certainly the education profile of migrants to these GCC states is lower than to the OECD countries actually included.

11 See also Chappell et al. (2010).


13 For a survey of the earlier literature on this topic, see Lucas (1997). Lucas (2018) contains more recent evidence from 44 developing countries.

14 Águayo-Téllez and Martínez-Navarro (2013, p.1659), adding (p.1647) “After controlling for wage differences, the results suggest that single adult men with low schooling levels tend to migrate to the US while married women and men with higher levels of schooling tend to migrate within Mexico.” See also Bazzi (2017) who examines the income elasticity of emigration using micro data on Indonesia.
15 Zelinsky (1971) appears to be among the founders of this discussion, laying out a set of “laws” of mobility but presenting only cursory evidence with respect to internal migration.


17 See also, Lucas (2015 p. 1493) who finds “the volume of migration from North Africa diminishes with higher incomes at home over the entire range of actual distances; for SSA this is not true. For the average country in SSA, the extent of migration decreases the greater is GDP per capita at home up to a distance of about 7500 kilometers, beyond which the elasticity of migration with respect to home income becomes slightly positive... For the non-African Low-Income countries a similar pattern is observed, though with the transition to a positive association occurring at a much greater distance of nearly 13,000 kilometers... More generally, a U-shaped pattern, not an inverse U-shape, is observed from this specification applied to the global data.”

18 See also, Ziesemer (2011) who explores the dynamic outcomes working, inter alia, through education.

19 See also the US State Department’s own statement at https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/reception-placement/index.htm.

20 There are interesting parallels here in the potential for matching grants, particularly in the context of bearing any costs of refugee inflows.

21 Angelucci (2015) does, however, provide evidence of an effect from the country of origin, demonstrating that receipt of cash under the Oportunidades program induces additional migration to the US of low-skilled workers from low-income families in Mexico. This is interpreted as a relaxation of the financial constraint on moving.

22 See also, Cortes (2004) and Boustan (2007).

23 Note, however, that the United Nations and World Bank (2018) report on preventing violent conflict only once mentions the word migration.

24 See also Libois (2016) on the Maoist targeting of higher castes during the Nepal civil war.


26 See also Hirvonen and Lilleør (2015), who favor the failure scenario, with failed job aspirations for men and failed marriages for women in the Kagera region of Tanzania.

27 On the case of Malaysia, see Lucas and Verry (1999).
35 For information about the migration and recruitment cost surveys visit: https://www.knomad.org/data/recruitment-costs

36 See also Arcand and Mbaye (2011) on the costs of boat crossings to Europe from Africa versus the costs of bribing an embassy official.

37 Looking at the decade from 2000-2010, Beenstock et al. (2015, p.491) note, however, “No evidence is found that the threat of apprehension at the destination deters migrants from the European Neighborhood and other countries.”

38 See, for example, the blog by Zahid Hussain on the case of Bangladesh at https://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/long-absence-does-not-necessarily-kill-love.


41 For an early contribution see Byerlee (1974). More recently, Lucas (2018) reaffirms this pattern in seventy developing countries, though noting a significant and interesting exception in Iran.

42 For an early survey see Reardon et al. (1998).

43 See the summary of evidence in the section on limits to internal migration.


45 Fan, Sun and Zheng (2011) estimate that among married migrants who have children, 47 percent have their entire nuclear family with them in Beijing; 16 percent are alone.

46 See the survey by Mendola (2012).

47 See Lipton and Ravallion (1995) and UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2010).

48 See, however, Maskus (2004), Ivus and Naghavi (2014).

49 For references, see the introduction to Tuccio et al. (2019).

50 See, for example, Ilahi (1999) on Pakistan.


53 For a detailed discussion of the controls included in this finding see Lucas (2015) pp. 1547-1549. It should be emphasized that no such parallel impacts on GDP of refugee inflows into the High-Income countries exists.

54 See definition under ODA flows: ii (a) at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm

55 For instance, whether the host and origin countries have a former colonial link is assumed generally to affect both migration and aid, while possessing a common language is presumed to affect migration but not aid. Similarly, colonial links with Portugal and the UK are singled out as affecting migration, versus colonial links with Spain that affect aid.

This report goes on to maintain that not all bilateral donors have performed equally well and actually recommends these donors direct their resources elsewhere. References are also cited in which the aid programs may even have led to conflict.

See the seminal paper by Duflo (2001), for example, though even these results may be questioned as to whether school placement depends upon likelihood of attendance, hence over-stating the observed causal effect of new schools upon education received.

Pekkala Kerr et al. (2015) show, with a randomized control trial, that providing young people with information about the links between schooling choices and labor market prospects can substantially affect their decisions with respect to educational paths.
List of previous publications


Kunskapsöversikt 2016:1, *Alla tiders migration!*, av Dick Harrison.


Kunskapsöversikt 2017:1, *De invandringskritiska partiernas politiska inflytande i Europa*, av Maria Tyrberg och Carl Dahlström.


List of previous publications


Policy Brief 2019:1, ”Bridging the Gaps”, Martin Ruhs, Kristof Tamas och Joakim Palme.


The number of international migrants is estimated to have expanded by approximately 90 million from 1990 to 2015; nearly a 60 percent increase over this interval. The 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants emphasizes the need for a global approach to addressing the orderly and safe movement of these migrants and refugees.

Simulations suggest that such movements may have massive consequences for improvements in world productivity, largely through moving workers from low-income, low-productivity settings to higher-productivity countries. In this research overview Prof. Robert E.B. Lucas, Boston University, synthesizes existing research on the two-way links between international migration and economic development in the lower-income countries, in which development affects migration while migration simultaneously impacts development. The review outlines the magnitudes, composition and types of both international migration and of the accompanying remittance flows. It furthermore addresses the effects of migration upon economic development, and expounds on what is known about the role of development assistance, or foreign aid, within this framework.

The Migration Studies Delegation is an independent committee that initiates studies and supplies research results as a basis for future migration policy decisions and to contribute to public debate.