Books
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[3] Philosophy of Devotion: The Longing for Invulnerable Ideals.
Oxford University Press, forthcoming December 2022 Oxford University Press Click here for a draft chapter; email me if you'd like to read the entire manuscript. Abstract
Why do people persist in commitments that threaten their happiness, security, and comfort? Why do some of our most central, identity-defining commitments resist the effects of reasoning and critical reflection? Drawing on real-life examples, empirical psychology, and philosophical reflection, this book argues that these commitments involve an ethical stance called devotion, which plays a pervasive—but often hidden—role in human life. Devotion typically involves sacralizing certain values, goals, or relationships. To sacralize a value is to treat it as inviolable (trade-offs with ordinary values are forbidden), incontestable (even contemplating such trade-offs is prohibited), and dialectically invulnerable (no rational considerations can disrupt the agent’s commitment to the value). Philosophy of Devotion offers a detailed philosophical account and defense of these features. Devotion and the sacralization of values can be reasonable; indeed, a life involving meaningful, sustained commitment depends on these stances. Without devotion, we risk an existential condition called normative dissipation, in which all of our commitments become etiolated. Yet devotion can easily go wrong, deforming into the individual and group fanaticism that have become pervasive features of modern social life. The book provides an alternative to fanaticism, investigating the way in which we can express non-pathological forms of devotion. We can be devoted through affirmation and through the deepening move, which treats the agent’s central commitments as systematically inchoate. Each stance enables a wholehearted form of devotion that nevertheless preserves flexibility and openness, avoiding the dangers of fanaticism on the one hand and normative dissipation on the other. (The linked file contains the introductory chapter. Email me if you'd like a draft of the entire book.)
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[2] The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious
Oxford University Press, 2016 (Paperback edition 2019) Oxford University Press Amazon Abstract
Nietzsche's works are replete with discussions of moral psychology, but to date there has been no systematic analysis of his account. How does Nietzsche understand human motivation, deliberation, agency, and selfhood? How does his account of the unconscious inform these topics? What is Nietzsche's conception of freedom, and how do we become free? Should freedom be a goal for all of us? How does--and how should--the individual relate to his social context? The Nietzschean Self offers a clear, comprehensive analysis of these central topics in Nietzsche's moral psychology. It analyzes his distinction between conscious and unconscious mental events, explains the nature of a type of motivational state that Nietzsche calls the 'drive', and examines the connection between drives, desires, affects, and values. It explores Nietzsche's account of willing unity of the self, freedom, and the relation of the self to its social and historical context. The Nietzschean Self argues that Nietzsche's account enjoys a number of advantages over the currently dominant models of moral psychology--especially those indebted to the work of Aristotle, Hume, and Kant--and considers the ways in which Nietzsche's arguments can reconfigure and improve upon debates in the contemporary literature on moral psychology and philosophy of action. |
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Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism
Oxford University Press, 2013. (Paperback edition 2015) Oxford University Press Amazon Abstract
Constitutivism is the view that we can derive substantive normative conclusions from an account of the nature of action. Agency and the Foundations of Ethics explains the constitutivist strategy and argues that the attractions of this view are considerable: constitutivism promises to resolve longstanding philosophical puzzles about the metaphysics, epistemology, and practical grip of normative claims. Yet constitutivism faces a challenge: it must employ a conception of action that is minimal enough to be independently plausible, but substantial enough to yield robust normative results. The current versions of constitutivism fall short on this score. However, we can generate a successful version by employing a more nuanced theory of action. Drawing on recent empirical work on human motivation as well as a model of agency indebted to the work of Nietzsche, the book argues that every episode of action aims jointly at agential activity and power. An agent manifests agential activity if she approves of her action, and further knowledge of the motives figuring in the etiology of her action would not undermine this approval. An agent aims at power if she aims at encountering and overcoming obstacles or resistances in the course of pursuing other, more determinate ends. These structural features of agency both constitute events as actions and generate standards of assessment for action. Using these results, the book shows that we can extract substantive normative claims from facts about the nature of agency. |
Edited volumes
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The History and Philosophy of Fanaticism
edited by Paul Katsafanas Routledge, forthcoming 2023 Table of Contents
The History and Philosophy of Fanaticism Current table of contents (provisional): 1. Introduction: Paul Katsafanas (Boston University) Part I: Fanaticism in Antiquity 2. Fanaticism in Greek Philosophy: Mor Segev (University of South Florida) 3. Fanaticism in Arabic Philosophy: Ahab Bdaiwi (Leiden) 4. Fanaticism in Indian Philosophy: Nathan McGovern (University of Wisconsin) 5. Fanaticism in Chinese Philosophy: Eirik Harris (Colorado State) Part II. Fanaticism in the Early Modern Period 6. Locke: Douglas Casson (St. Olaf) 7. Spinoza and Hume: Justin Steinberg (CUNY) 8. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson: Rachel Zuckert (Northwestern) 9. Germaine de Staël: Kristin Gjesdal (Temple) 10. Montesquieu: Vickie Sullivan (Tufts) Part III. Fanaticism in Late Modern Philosophy 11. Kant: Krista Thomason (Swarthmore) 12. Hegel: Dean Moyar (JHU) 13. Nietzsche, Heidegger, and others: Bernard Reginster (Brown) 14. William James and Nietzsche on scientism and fanaticism: Rachel Cristy (King’s College London) Part IV. Fanaticism in the Twentieth Century 15. Sartre/Scheler/fanaticism/paranoia/mendacity: Nicolas de Warren (Penn State) 16. Jorge Portilla: Carlos Sanchez (SJSU) 17. Frantz Fanon: William Paris (Wesleyan) 18. Simone Weil: Beatrice Han-Pile (Essex) 19. Du Bois/Arendt/Shelby: “Mob Rule and Resistance in the Ghettoes: Du Bois, Arendt, and Shelby”: Elvira Basevich (UMass Lowell) Part V. Fanaticism in the Contemporary World 20. Fanaticism and Social Media: Mark Alfano (Macquarie) 21. Fanaticism and Terrorism Studies: Quassim Cassam (Warwick) 22. Women, Hate Groups, and Fanaticism: Tracy Llanera (Connecticut) 23. Fanaticism and Close-Mindedness: Heather Battaly (Connecticut) 24. Psychological motivations for fanaticism: Sophie-Grace Chappell (Open University) |
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The Nietzschean Mind
edited by Paul Katsafanas Routledge, 2018 (Paperback edition 2020) Table of Contents Routledge Press Amazon Abstract
This edited volume contains 28 original essays on the following topics: Nietzsche's major works; philosophical psychology and agency; the self; value; culture, society, and politics; metaphysics and epistemology; and the affirmation of life. |
Articles in Journals
[31] The Fanatic and the Last Man
(invited article)
Journal of Nietzsche Studies, forthcoming.
(invited article)
Journal of Nietzsche Studies, forthcoming.
Abstract
Suppose we accept Nietzsche’s claim that critical reflection undermines our evaluative commitments. Then it seems that we are left with a pair of unappealing options: either we engage in critical reflection and find our evaluative commitments becoming etiolated; or we somehow immunize certain evaluative commitments from the effects of critical reflection. Nietzsche considers both of these paths, labeling the person who results from the first path “the last man” and the person who results from the second “the fanatic.” I consider Nietzsche’s analysis of these two character types; discuss why he thinks that in modernity these are the options with which we are faced; and ask whether Nietzsche thinks that there is a third way.
[30] Recent Work on Nietzsche's Moral Psychology and Ethics
(invited article)
Nietzsche-Studien 50:1 (September 2021): 361-381.
(invited article)
Nietzsche-Studien 50:1 (September 2021): 361-381.
Abstract
This is a long review article on four recent books on Nietzsche's ethics. I critique the books listed below and draw some general lessons about how to approach Nietzsche's moral psychology and ethics. (1) Mark Alfano, Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology (Cambridge University Press 2019); (2) Brian Leiter, Moral Psychology with Nietzsche (Oxford University Press 2019); (3) Aaron Ridley: The Deed is Everything: Nietzsche on Will and Action (Oxford University Press 2018); and (4) Tom Stern, Nietzsche’s Ethics (Cambridge University Press 2020).
[29] Fanaticism and Sacred Values
Philosophers' Imprint 19:17 (May 2019): 1-20.
Philosophers' Imprint 19:17 (May 2019): 1-20.
Abstract
What, if anything, is fanaticism? Philosophers including Locke, Hume, Shaftesbury, and Kant offered an account of fanaticism, analyzing it as (1) unwavering commitment to an ideal, together with (2) unwillingness to subject the ideal (or its premises) to rational critique and (3) the presumption of a non-rational sanction for the ideal. In the first part of the paper, I explain this account and argue that it does not succeed: among other things, it entails that a paradigmatically peaceful and tolerant individual can be a fanatic. The following sections argue that the fanatic is distinguished by four features: (4) the adoption of sacred values; (5) the need to treat these values as unconditional in order to preserve a particular form of psychic unity; (6) the sense that the status of these values is threatened by lack of widespread acceptance; and (7) the identification with a group, where the group is defined by shared commitment to the sacred values. If the account succeeds, it not only reveals the nature of fanaticism, but also uncovers a distinctive form of ethical critique: we can critique a way of understanding values not on the grounds that it is false, but on the grounds that it promotes a particular form of social pathology.
[28] Nietzsche and Murdoch on the Moral Significance of Perceptual Experience
European Journal of Philosophy 26:1 (March 2018): 525-545.
European Journal of Philosophy 26:1 (March 2018): 525-545.
Abstract
This paper examines a claim defended by an unlikely pair: Friedrich Nietzsche and Iris Murdoch. The claim is that perceptual experience itself—as distinct from perceptually based judgments and beliefs—can be morally significant. In particular, Nietzsche and Murdoch hold that two agents in the same circumstances attending to the same objects can have experiences with different contents, depending on the concepts that they possess and employ. Moreover, they maintain that this renders perception an object of moral concern. This paper explicates these claims, examines the way in which we might distinguish between better and worse perceptual experiences, and argues that if some version of the Murdochian/Nietzschean claim is accepted, then certain influential approaches to moral epistemology and agency must be rejected.
[27] Nietzsche’s Account of Self-Conscious Agency
Philosophical Explorations (Special Issue on Philosophy of Action from Suarez to Anscombe), 21 (Feb. 2018): 122-137.
Reprinted in: in Philosophy of Action from Suarez to Anscombe, edited by Constantine Sandis. London: Routledge, 2019.
Philosophical Explorations (Special Issue on Philosophy of Action from Suarez to Anscombe), 21 (Feb. 2018): 122-137.
Reprinted in: in Philosophy of Action from Suarez to Anscombe, edited by Constantine Sandis. London: Routledge, 2019.
Abstract
An overview of Nietzsche's philosophy of action.
[26] Fugitive Pleasure and the Meaningful Life: Nietzsche on Nihilism and Higher Values
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1 (Fall 2015): 396-416.
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1 (Fall 2015): 396-416.
Abstract
Nietzsche’s discussions of nihilism are meant to bring into view an intriguing pathology of modern culture: that it is unable to sustain "higher values". This paper attempts to make sense of the nature and import of higher values. Higher values are a subset of final values. They are distinguished by their demandingness, susceptibility toward creating tragic conflicts, recruitment of a characteristic set of powerful emotions, perceived import, exclusionary nature, and their tendency to instantiate a community. The paper considers Nietzsche’s arguments for the claim that we are committed to instituting some set of higher values. The cost of not doing so is vitiating our deepest aim and precluding a central form of happiness.
[25] Nietzsche on the Nature of the Unconscious
Inquiry (Special Issue on Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology), 58 (2015): 327-352.
Inquiry (Special Issue on Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology), 58 (2015): 327-352.
Abstract
This paper argues that Nietzsche develops a novel and compelling account of the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states: he argues that conscious mental states are those with conceptual content, whereas unconscious mental states are those with nonconceptual content. I show that Nietzsche’s puzzling claim that consciousness is “superficial” and “falsifying” can be given a straightforward explanation if we accept this understanding of the conscious/unconscious distinction. I originally defended this view in “Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind” (European Journal of Philosophy, 2005); since then, the view has been critiqued by Brian Leiter, Mattia Riccardi, and others. In this essay, I defend the interpretation in light of these objections. I provide new textual evidence for the interpretation, show that Nietzsche extracted aspects of the view from Schopenhauer’s work on consciousness, consider the possibility that Nietzsche endorses a higher-order thought theory, and respond to Riccardi’s claim that unconscious thought can be conceptual.
[24] Nietzsche and Kant on the Will: Two Models of Reflective Agency
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89 (July 2014): 185-216.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89 (July 2014): 185-216.
Abstract
Kant and Nietzsche are typically thought to have diametrically opposed accounts of willing: put simply, whereas Kant gives signal importance to reflective episodes of choice, Nietzsche seems to deny that reflective choices have any significant role in the etiology of human action. In this essay, I argue that the dispute between Kant and Nietzsche actually takes a far more interesting form. Nietzsche is not merely rejecting the Kantian picture of agency. Rather, Nietzsche is offering a subtle critique of the Kantian theory, denying certain aspects of it while preserving others. On a standard reading, the Kantian theory of willing is committed to three claims: (1) choice causes action, (2) motives do not determine choice, and (3) reflective deliberation suspends the effects of motives. I argue that Nietzsche accepts claims (1) and (2) while denying claim (3). I show that Nietzsche's denial of (3) is premised upon a sophisticated conception of motivation. I contend that Nietzsche's denial of (3) leads him to a new model of reflective agency. This model preserves certain Kantian insights about the nature of self-conscious agency, while embedding these insights in a more complex and arguably more plausible account of motivation. The resultant theory of agency is considerably more sophisticated than has yet been appreciated.
[23] Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6 (2011): 219-254.
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6 (2011): 219-254.
Abstract
Lately, a number of philosophers have argued that agents can be more and less active in the production of their own actions. Some actions—principally reflective, deliberative ones—are said to involve agential activity; other actions—principally unreflective, non-deliberative ones—are said to be brought about in a more passive fashion. In this essay, I critique these claims. I show that philosophers employing the notion of agential activity have relied on one or more of the following claims, which have not been clearly distinguished in the literature: (1) that choice causes action, (2) that motives do not determine choice, and (3) that reflective deliberation suspends the effects of motives. These claims are closely related, and are often conflated in the literature. However, I argue that they are importantly distinct. I explicate and assess each of these claims, arguing that while there are precisifications of the first and second claims that render them true, there are philosophical arguments and results from empirical psychology indicating that the third claim is false. Moreover, I argue that the third claim is the crucial one; its truth is necessary in order to support the idea that reflective agency is paradigmatically active. As a result, the traditional accounts of agential activity must be rejected. I close by suggesting a new model of agential activity.
[22] Deriving Ethics from Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (November 2011): 620-660.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (November 2011): 620-660.
Abstract
This paper has two goals. First, I offer an interpretation of Nietzsche’s puzzling claims about will to power. I argue that the will to power thesis is a version of constitutivism. Constitutivism is the view that we can derive substantive normative conclusions from an account of the nature of agency; in particular, constitutivism rests on the idea that all actions are motivated by a common, higher-order aim, whose presence generates a standard of assessment for actions. Nietzsche’s version of constitutivism is based on a series of subtle claims about the psychology of willing and the nature of satisfaction, which imply that all actions aim at encountering and overcoming resistance (this is what Nietzsche means by “will to power”). Second, I argue that Nietzsche’s theory, thus interpreted, generates a new, a posteriori version of constitutivism that is not vulnerable to certain familiar objections. If this is right, then we can deploy Nietzschean ideas in order to make a substantive contribution to issues that are currently at the forefront of ethics and action theory.
[21] The Concept of Unified Agency in Nietzsche, Plato, and Schiller.
Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (January 2011): 87-113.*
* Selected by Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best papers published in 2011.
Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (January 2011): 87-113.*
* Selected by Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best papers published in 2011.
Abstract
This paper examines Nietzsche’s concept of unified agency. A widespread consensus has emerged in the secondary literature on three points: (1) Nietzsche’s notion of unity is meant to be an analysis of freedom; (2) unity refers to a relation between the agent’s drives or motivational states; and (3) unity obtains when one drive predominates and imposes order on the other drives. I argue that these claims are philosophically and textually indefensible. In contrast, I argue that (1*) Nietzschean unity is an account of the distinction between genuine actions and mere behaviors, rather than between free and unfree actions; (2*) unity refers to a relation between drives and conscious thought; and (3*) unity obtains when the agent’s attitude toward her own action is stable under the revelation of further information about the action’s etiology. I show that Nietzsche develops this notion of unity by drawing on Plato’s and Schiller’s accounts of unified agency.
[20] Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind: Consciousness and Conceptualization
European Journal of Philosophy 13 (April 2005): 1-31.
European Journal of Philosophy 13 (April 2005): 1-31.
Abstract
I show that Nietzsche's puzzling and seemingly inconsistent claims about consciousness constitute a coherent and philosophically fruitful theory. Drawing on some ideas from Schopenhauer and F.A. Lange, Nietzsche argues that conscious mental states are mental states with conceptually articulated content, whereas unconscious mental states are mental states with non-conceptually articulated content. Nietzsche's views on concepts imply that conceptually articulated mental states will be superficial and in some cases distorting analogues of non-conceptually articulated mental states. Thus, the claim that conscious states have a conceptual articulation renders comprehensible Nietzsche's claim that consciousness is "superficial" and "falsifying."
Papers in Edited Volumes and Conference Proceedings
[19] Group Fanaticism and Narratives of Ressentiment
The Philosophy of Fanaticism: Epistemic, Affective, and Political Dimensions, ed. Leo Townsend, Hans Bernard Schmid, Michael Staudigl, and Ruth Tietjen, Routledge University Press, forthcoming.
The Philosophy of Fanaticism: Epistemic, Affective, and Political Dimensions, ed. Leo Townsend, Hans Bernard Schmid, Michael Staudigl, and Ruth Tietjen, Routledge University Press, forthcoming.
Abstract
The current political climate is awash with groups that we might be tempted to label irrational, extremist, and hyper-partisan; it is full of echo-chambers, radicalization, and epistemic bubbles. Philosophers have profitably analyzed some of these phenomena. But philosophers have largely overlooked another crucial aspect of our time: the way in which certain groups are fanatical. I distinguish fanatical groups from other types of problematic groups, such as extremist and cultish groups. I argue that a group qualifies as fanatical only if it has features that promote individual fanaticism. But how might a group promote individual fanaticism? I argue that a typical feature of fanatical groups is their tendency to encourage an emotion that philosophers sometimes call “ressentiment,” which differs from ordinary resentment. I explain what ressentiment is, how it can be fostered, and how it can lead to fanaticism. I contend that this account helps us to identify a disturbing and increasingly widespread feature of contemporary social and political groups.
[18] What Makes the Affirmation of Life Difficult?
Cambridge Critical Guide to Nietzsche's 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra', ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson and Paul Loeb, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022.
Cambridge Critical Guide to Nietzsche's 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra', ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson and Paul Loeb, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022.
Abstract
Nietzsche suggests that even individuals who take themselves to bear an affirmative attitude toward life would be horrified by the thought of eternal recurrence (roughly, the idea that our lives will repeat endlessly in exactly the same fashion). But why? Why is it supposed to be more difficult to affirm recurring lives than to affirm a non-recurring, singular life? I argue that standard interpretations of eternal recurrence are unable to answer this question. I offer a new interpretation of eternal recurrence, which attributes its difficulty to the conditional nature of ordinary affirmation. Affirmation is conditional when it depends on the possibility of excising objectionable elements from the object of affirmation. What Nietzsche means to reveal, with eternal recurrence, is that even the most apparently affirmative individuals often manifest only a conditional affirmation of life, a form of affirmation that conceals a tacit negation. Eternal recurrence brings this hidden negation to light, thereby encouraging us to move toward an unconditionally affirmative stance. I conclude by reflecting on why Nietzsche takes the distinction between conditional and unconditional affirmation to be such an important philosophical idea. I argue that those who devote themselves to challenging, long-term goals will face psychological pressures that tend to deform unconditional affirmation into conditional affirmation.
[17] Moral Critique and Philosophical Psychology
Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Special Invited Section on "Nietzsche Studies Now", Vol 49:2 (Autumn 2018), pp. 245-253.
Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Special Invited Section on "Nietzsche Studies Now", Vol 49:2 (Autumn 2018), pp. 245-253.
Abstract
This is a contribution to a special invited section in the Journal of Nietzsche Studies. Invitees were asked to identify the two most pressing areas for future work in Nietzsche studies. I identify some questions that fall under two broad headings: how should we understand Nietzsche's moral critiques and his commitments in philosophical psychology?
[16] Nietzsche's Moral Methodology
Nietzsche's Metaphilosophy: The Nature, Methods, and Aims of Philosophy, ed. Matthew Meyer and Paul Loeb, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
Nietzsche's Metaphilosophy: The Nature, Methods, and Aims of Philosophy, ed. Matthew Meyer and Paul Loeb, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
Abstract
Nietzsche is widely reputed to have a novel approach to moral philosophy. Does he? And if so, what is this approach? I argue that while Nietzsche rejects the aspiration of finding some theory-independent premise from which to derive ethical claims, he does articulate several rationally defensible constraints on acceptable normative claims. An acceptable set of normative claims must not presuppose false claims about human agency; it must not issue prescriptions that ultimately undermine human flourishing; it must secure some set of higher values; and it must avoid promoting certain forms of pathology. Nietzsche uses these constraints to assess moralities (or, more generally, sets of normative claims).
[15] The Antichrist as a Guide to Nietzsche's Mature Ethical Theory
The Nietzschean Mind, edited by Paul Katsafanas, pp. 83-101. New York: Routledge 2018.
The Nietzschean Mind, edited by Paul Katsafanas, pp. 83-101. New York: Routledge 2018.
Abstract
I argue that the rarely discussed Antichrist can serve as perhaps the best guide to Nietzsche’s mature ethical theory. Commentators often argue or assume that while Nietzsche makes many critical points about traditional morality, he cannot be offering a positive ethical theory of his own. This, I argue, is a mistake. The Antichrist offers a substantive ethical theory. It explicitly articulates Nietzsche’s positive ethical principles, shows why these principles are justified, and uses them to condemn traditional Christian morality. The chapter reviews and explains Nietzsche’s ethical theory. It also considers why commentators so often assume that Nietzsche cannot have an ethical theory: I argue that commentators tend to be driven by the assumption that all ethical theories embrace seven commitments. These commitments are, I suggest, definitive of Enlightenment ethical theory, but not of ethical theory as such; Nietzsche’s rejection of them in no way precludes his having a positive ethical theory of his own.
[14] Nietzschean Approaches to Hermeneutics
The Cambridge Companion to Hermeneutics, edited by Kristin Gjesdal and Michael Forster, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
The Cambridge Companion to Hermeneutics, edited by Kristin Gjesdal and Michael Forster, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
Abstract
This essay charts several key points of contact between Nietzsche and the hermeneutical tradition. It begins by arguing that the familiar claim that Nietzsche offers a hermeneutics of suspicion is potentially misleading. Seeking a more accurate representation of Nietzsche’s views, the essay argues that Nietzsche’s interpretive stance has several key features: he rejects immediate givens, endorses holism and perspectivism, and sees conscious experience as structured by concepts and language. Methodologically, Nietzsche inaugurates a genealogical approach to studying objects of philosophical concern, and offers a series of thoughts and arguments on perspectives and the ways in which they might be assessed. After explaining these points, the essay reviews the way in which Nietzsche takes religious, moral, and philosophical systems as aspiring to provide an interpretation of existence that renders it meaningful. The closing section briefly discusses the Nietzschean approach to interpretation that is adopted by Foucault.
[13] Constitutivism
Cambridge History of Philosophy: 1945 to 2010, edited by Kelly Becker and Iain Thomson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
Cambridge History of Philosophy: 1945 to 2010, edited by Kelly Becker and Iain Thomson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
Abstract
An explanation and overview of constitutivism.
[12] The Emergence of the Drive Concept and the Collapse of the Animal/Human Divide
Animals: A History, edited by Peter Adamson and G. Fay Edwards, pp. 239-268. Oxford University Press, 2018.
Animals: A History, edited by Peter Adamson and G. Fay Edwards, pp. 239-268. Oxford University Press, 2018.
Abstract
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, philosophers including Kant and Hegel draw a sharp distinction between the human and the animal. The human is self-conscious, the animal is not; the human has moral worth, the animal does not. By the mid to late nineteenth century, these claims are widely rejected. As scientific and philosophical work on the cognitive and motivational capacities of animals increases in sophistication, many philosophers become suspicious of the idea that there is any divide between human beings and other animals. This paper traces the transitions in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thought about animals. My focal point is the notion of drive or instinct (Trieb, Instinkt). Although in sporadic usage during earlier times, the drive concept explodes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It begins playing central roles in three distinct areas: embryology, ethology, and metaphysics. In embryology, drive describes a force, inaccessible in itself but whose results are visible and susceptible to scientific and philosophical study, governing organic development. In ethology, drives are the sources of seemingly deliberate, highly articulated, yet non-conscious activities, which are directed at ends of which the animal is ignorant. In metaphysics, drive describes the human essence. I focus on the way in which the emergence of the drive concept in each of these three domains undermines the idea that there is any sharp distinction between the human and the animal. I conclude by considering how, in light the collapse of the human/animal divide, ethical theories are reshaped.
[11] Autonomy, Character, and Self-Understanding
Questions of Character, edited by Iskra Fileva, pp. 132-146. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Questions of Character, edited by Iskra Fileva, pp. 132-146. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Abstract
Autonomy, traditionally conceived, is the capacity to direct one’s actions in light of self-given principles or values. Character, traditionally conceived, is the set of unchosen, relatively rigid traits and proclivities that influence, constrain, or determine one’s actions. It’s natural to think that autonomy and character will be in tension with one another. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: while character influences and constrains choice, this poses no problem for autonomy. However, in particular cases character can affect autonomy by generating a particular kind of influence upon choice. As a first approximation, character limits autonomy when it influences the agent’s choice in a way that were she aware of it, (1) she would disavow the influence, and (2) the influence could no longer operate in the same way. Put a bit differently, I argue that character undermines autonomy when it generates reflectively unstable perceptions of warrant.
[10] The Problem of Normative Authority in Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche
Nietzsche’s Engagements with Kant, Volume II: Nietzsche and Kantian Ethics, edited by Tom Bailey and João Constâncio, pp. 19-50. London: Bloomsbury, 2017.
Nietzsche’s Engagements with Kant, Volume II: Nietzsche and Kantian Ethics, edited by Tom Bailey and João Constâncio, pp. 19-50. London: Bloomsbury, 2017.
Abstract
Kant and Hegel agree that normative claims are justified only if they are manifestations of freedom. Yet they develop this idea in strikingly different ways: Kant attempts to derive substantive content from a formal notion of autonomy, whereas Hegel argues that this approach fails. I argue that Nietzsche develops a theory of normativity that incorporates aspects from both Kant and Hegel. Like Hegel, Nietzsche denies that Kant can derive any content from the notion of autonomy. However,Nietzsche departs from Hegel in arguing that one norm can be extracted from the bare idea of freedom, independently of any facts about the particular system of values, practices, and institutions that the individual inhabits. This norm is will to power. Its connection to freedom and its independence from extant social norms gives it a position outside of our current system of ethical norms, making possible a radical critique of these norms. Developing these points, I show that Nietzsche develops a theory of normative authority that proceeds, in part, by reconciling the most compelling aspects of the Kantian and Hegelian accounts—aspects that have seemed, to many interpreters, to be incompatible. This results in a novel account of normative authority.
[9] Constitutivism and Practical Reason
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 367-391. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 367-391. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Abstract
This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature – a constitutive aim, principle, or standard – that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to derive normative claims. In short, the authority of certain normative claims arises from the bare fact that we are agents. This essay explains the constitutivst strategy, surveys the extant attempts to generate constitutivist theories, and considers the problems and prospects for the theory.
[8] Naturalism, Minimalism, and the Scope of Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology
Debates in Nineteenth-Century European Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses, edited by Kristin Gjesdal, 326-338. New York: Routledge Press, 2016.
Debates in Nineteenth-Century European Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses, edited by Kristin Gjesdal, 326-338. New York: Routledge Press, 2016.
Abstract
Bernard Williams’ “Nietzsche’s Minimalist Moral Psychology”, replete with provocative and insightful claims, has been extremely influential in Nietzsche scholarship. In the two decades since its publication, much of the most interesting and philosophically sophisticated work on Nietzsche has focused on exactly the topics that Williams addresses: Nietzsche’s moral psychology, his account of action, his naturalistic commitments, and the way in which these topics interact with his critique of traditional morality. While Williams’ pronouncements on these topics are brief and at times oracular, and although many important details are not addressed, he manages to identify some of the richest veins in Nietzsche’s texts. In this response, I focus on the four central claims in Williams’ article. Sections One and Two address the claim that Nietzsche is a naturalist and an advocate of “minimalist moral psychology,” respectively. Sections Three and Four examine Williams’ interpretations of Nietzsche on the will and agency. Finally, Section Five critiques Williams’ claim that Nietzsche cannot be a source of philosophical theories.
[7] Kant and Nietzsche on Self-Knowledge
Nietzsche and the Problem of Subjectivity, edited by João Constâncio, Maria João Mayer Branco, and Bartholomew Ryan, 110-130. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter Press, 2015.
Nietzsche and the Problem of Subjectivity, edited by João Constâncio, Maria João Mayer Branco, and Bartholomew Ryan, 110-130. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter Press, 2015.
Abstract
Kant recognizes two distinct forms of self-knowledge: introspection, which gives us knowledge of our sensations, and apperception, which is knowledge of our own activities. Both modes of self-knowledge can go astray, and are particularly prone to being distorted be selfish motives; thus, neither is guaranteed to provide us with comprehensive self-knowledge. Nietzsche departs from Kant in arguing that these two modes of self-knowledge (1) are not distinct and (2) are far more limited than Kant acknowledges. In addition, Nietzsche departs from Kant in arguing that we can acquire self-knowledge by looking away from ourselves. I provide a brief sketch of the ways in which this is so. In particular, Nietzsche argues that genealogy enables a form of self-knowledge: it helps us to identify some of the subtle factors shaping our actions as well as the influence of our current conceptual repertoires on our perceptions and understandings of our actions.
[6] Ethics
The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century, edited by Michael Forster and Kristin Gjesdal, 473-495. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century, edited by Michael Forster and Kristin Gjesdal, 473-495. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Abstract
At the close of the eighteenth century, Kant attempts to anchor morality in freedom. A series of nineteenth-century thinkers, though impressed with the claim that there is an essential connection between morality and freedom, argue that Kant has misunderstood the nature of the self, agency, freedom, the individual, the social, the natural sciences, and philosophical psychology. I trace the way in which a series of central figures rethink the connection between morality and freedom by complicating the analyses of the aforementioned notions. In particular, I discuss Schiller's demand for a unified self; Hegel's attention to the socially and historically situated agent; Feuerbach's and Büchner's turn to natural science; Marx's materialism; Schopenhauer's philosophical psychology; and Nietzsche's attempt to anchor normative demands in will to power.
[5] Value, Affect, Drive
Nietzsche on Mind and Nature, edited by Peter Kail and Manuel Dries, 163-188. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Nietzsche on Mind and Nature, edited by Peter Kail and Manuel Dries, 163-188. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Abstract
Nietzsche associates values with affects and drives: he not only claims that values are explained by drives and affects, but sometimes appears to identify values with drives and affects. This is decidedly odd: the agent's reflectively endorsed ends, principles, commitments--what we would think of as the agent's values--seem not only distinct from, but often in conflict with, the agent's drives. Consequently, it is unclear how we should understand Nietzsche's concept of value. This essay attempts to dispel these puzzles by reconstructing Nietzsche's account of value. According to the view that I defend, an agent values X iff (i) the agent has a drive-induced affective orientation toward X and (ii) the agent does not disapprove of this affective orientation. Additionally, I argue that drives generate thoughts about justification, thereby inclining the agent to regard pursuit of the drive's aim as valuable. I contend that this interpretation makes sense of Nietzsche’s remarks about value and overcomes the difficulties inherent in competing interpretations. I conclude by investigating the recalcitrance of drive-induced affective orientations.
[4] Philosophical Psychology as a Basis for Ethics
Journal of Nietzsche Studies 44 (Summer 2013): 297-314.
(Note: this is a special issue containing the proceedings of the North American Nietzsche Society)
Journal of Nietzsche Studies 44 (Summer 2013): 297-314.
(Note: this is a special issue containing the proceedings of the North American Nietzsche Society)
Abstract
Near the beginning of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes that “psychology is once again the path to the fundamental problems” (BGE 23). This raises a number of questions. What are these “fundamental problems” that psychology helps us to answer? How exactly does psychology bear on philosophy? In this conference paper, I provide a partial answer to these questions by focusing upon the way in which psychology informs Nietzsche’s account of value. I argue that Nietzsche’s ethical theory is based upon the idea that power has a privileged normative status: power is the one value in terms of which all others values are to be assessed. If this is the correct interpretation of Nietzsche’s ethical theory, though, it raises a question: how could power have a privileged status, given that Nietzsche denies that there are any objective facts about what is valuable? I argue that Nietzsche’s account of psychology provides the answer: he grounds power’s privileged status in facts about the nature of human motivation. In particular, Nietzsche’s account of drives entails that human beings are ineluctably committed to valuing power. So Nietzsche’s ethical theory follows from his philosophical psychology.
[3] Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology
The Oxford Handbook on Nietzsche, edited by John Richardson and Ken Gemes, 727-755. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
The Oxford Handbook on Nietzsche, edited by John Richardson and Ken Gemes, 727-755. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Abstract
Freud claimed that the concept of drive is "at once the most important and the most obscure element of psychological research." It is hard to think of a better proof of Freud's claim than the work of Nietzsche, which provides ample support for the idea that the drive concept is both tremendously important and terribly obscure. Although Nietzsche's accounts of agency and value everywhere appeal to drives, the concept has not been adequately explicated. I remedy this situation by providing an account of drives. I argue that Nietzschean drives are dispositions that generate evaluative orientations, in part by affecting perceptual saliences. In addition, I show that drive psychology has important implications for contemporary accounts of reflective agency. Contemporary philosophers often endorse a claim that has its origins in Locke and Kant: self-conscious agents are capable of reflecting on and thereby achieving a distance from their motives; therefore, these motives do not determine what the agent will do. Nietzsche's drive psychology shows that the inference in the preceding sentence is illegitimate. The drive psychology articulates a way in which motives can determine the agent's action by influencing the course of the agent's reflective deliberations. An agent who reflects on a motive and decides whether to act on it may, all the while, be surreptitiously guided by the very motive upon which he is reflecting. I show how this point complicates traditional models of the role of reflection in agency.
[2] Nietzsche on Agency and Self-Ignorance
Journal of Nietzsche Studies 43 (April 2012): 5-17.
(Note: this is a special issue containing the proceedings of the North American Nietzsche Society)
Journal of Nietzsche Studies 43 (April 2012): 5-17.
(Note: this is a special issue containing the proceedings of the North American Nietzsche Society)
Abstract
Nietzsche frequently claims that agents are in some sense ignorant of their own actions. But what exactly does Nietzsche mean by this claim, and how would the truth of this claim affect philosophical models of agency? I argue that Nietzsche intends to draw attention to the fact that there are influences upon reflective episodes of choice that have three features. First, these influences are pervasive, occurring in every episode of choice. Second, these influences are normatively significant, in that their presence typically affects the outcome of deliberation. Third, these influences are difficult to detect, in that one needs to acquire a great deal of self-knowledge in order to begin to counteract their effects. I briefly sketch the way in which these claims follow from Nietzsche's philosophical psychology.
[1] The Relevance of History for Moral Philosophy: A Study of Nietzsche’s Genealogy
Nietzsche’s ‘On the Genealogy of Morality’: A Critical Guide, edited by Simon May, 170-192. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Nietzsche’s ‘On the Genealogy of Morality’: A Critical Guide, edited by Simon May, 170-192. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Abstract
The Genealogy takes a historical form. But does the history play an essential role in Nietzsche's critique of modern morality? In this essay, I argue that the answer is yes. The Genealogy employs history in order to show that acceptance of modern morality was causally responsible for producing a dramatic change in our affects, drives, and perceptions. This change led agents to perceive actual increases in power as reductions in power, and actual decreases in power as increases in power. Moreover, it led agents to experience negative emotions when engaging in activities that constitute greater manifestations of power, and positive emotions when engaging in activities that reduce power. For these reasons, modern morality strongly disposes agents to reduce their own power. Given Nietzsche’s argument that power has a privileged normative status, these facts entail that we have a reason to reject modern morality.
Book Reviews
[8] Review of John Richardson, Nietzsche's Values
The Monist (special issue on Richardson's book), 15:3 (2021).
review (penultimate draft)
The Monist (special issue on Richardson's book), 15:3 (2021).
review (penultimate draft)
[7] Review of Agnes Callard, Aspiration
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102:2 (March 2021), 464-469.
review (penultimate draft)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102:2 (March 2021), 464-469.
review (penultimate draft)
[6] Review of Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Ethics and Politics
Philosophical Review 125:4 (October 2016): 592-597.
review (penultimate draft)
Philosophical Review 125:4 (October 2016): 592-597.
review (penultimate draft)
[5] "On Humuncular Drives and the Structure of the Nietzschean Self" (contribution to a review symposium on Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick, The Soul of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil (Cambridge, 2012).
Journal of Nietzsche Studies 45 (Spring 2014), 1-11.
review (penultimate draft)
Journal of Nietzsche Studies 45 (Spring 2014), 1-11.
review (penultimate draft)
[4] Review of Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson (eds.), Nietzsche, Naturalism, Normativity (Oxford, 2013).
European Journal of Philosophy 21: Reviews Supplement 4 (December 2013), 9-14.
review
European Journal of Philosophy 21: Reviews Supplement 4 (December 2013), 9-14.
review
[3] Review of Christopher Janaway, Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy (Oxford, 2007)
Mind 122 (April 2013), 553-560.
review review (penultimate draft)
Mind 122 (April 2013), 553-560.
review review (penultimate draft)
[2] Review of Craig Dove, Nietzsche's Ethical Theory (Continuum, 2008)
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, May 2009
review
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, May 2009
review
[1] Review of Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu (eds.), Nietzsche and Morality (Oxford, 2007)
Mind 118 (January 2009), 191-4
review
Mind 118 (January 2009), 191-4
review