

whereas Schnabel's performances *show* you his interpretations' (p. 38). It seems to me that there are greater differences between these senses of interpretation than merely that between showing and telling, especially given that for Kivy, 'the analogy to be drawn is between the first reading of a score (that one has never heard) and the first reading of a novel (p. 63). For while in the case of music one may well have a notion of how the work 'goes' and 'what makes it tick' (although I suspect that not in every instance), in the case of reading that seems to be the exception rather than the rule—how can we know how a work goes before we read it? If we are familiar with the writer, we may well have expectations, but otherwise, that seems likely only in a very broad sense (if I know I am reading a novel rather than a poem, say, or a lyric rather than an epic).

Kivy's monograph gives the idea of readings as performances its best exposition and defense thus far. I am inclined to agree with him that the tokens of at least most literary works are their readings, but I would refrain from construing those readings as performances that include interpretation in the senses discussed, and that are done *con espressione*.

*Department of Philosophy*  
*Texas Tech University*  
 2500 Broadway, Box 43092  
 Lubbock, TX 79409–3092  
 USA  
[annachristina.ribeiro@gmail.com](mailto:annachristina.ribeiro@gmail.com)  
 doi:10.1093/mind/fzp004

ANNA CHRISTINA RIBEIRO

*Nietzsche and Morality*, edited by Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. vii + 308. H/b £35.00.

The introduction to this volume claims that Nietzsche deserves a place alongside Aristotle, Kant, Hume, and Mill as one of the giants of moral philosophy. The eleven essays composing the volume can be read as a spirited defense of that claim. They reveal a Nietzsche who is grappling with the central problems of moral philosophy, by developing distinctive, challenging, and highly insightful analyses of matters such as the relationship between values and emotions, the nature of human agency, and the question of how normative claims can be justified. As a result, this book will be illuminating not only for those interested in Nietzsche, but also for anyone with an interest in moral philosophy.

The essays in this volume are generally of a very high quality, and represent some of the best recent work on Nietzsche. Although each essay merits discussion, for reasons of space I will focus on five essays that address a series of related questions concerning Nietzsche's views on value.

It is clear that Nietzsche is holding up some sort of ethical ideal as an alternative to conventional morality. However, Nietzsche's style makes it difficult to determine precisely which ethical claims he endorses. The essays by Thomas Hurka and Bernard Reginster address this question. According to Hurka, Nietzsche embraces an agent-neutral, maximax version of perfectionism: each agent has reason to maximize the perfection of those few individuals who are capable of the highest degrees of perfection, without regard for those who are less perfect. What constitutes perfection? Hurka argues that rather than offering a substantive characterization of perfection (e.g. as well-being or the development of human nature), Nietzsche employs two formal measures of perfection: the extent of the agent's effects on the world, and the unity of the agent's various goals.

Bernard Reginster offers a very different reading of Nietzsche's ethical view. According to Reginster, Nietzsche's ethic is based upon his 'will to power' thesis. Reginster argues that will to power is the desire to engage in the activity of overcoming resistances or obstacles to one's ends. On this view, Nietzsche is claiming that we actively seek resistances, challenges, and obstacles, in order to overcome them. Reginster points out that this interpretation elucidates Nietzsche's emphasis on creativity: he argues that valuing creative activity as an end counts as a paradigmatic instance of valuing the activity of overcoming resistances. Moreover, Reginster uses this analysis to illuminate some of Nietzsche's otherwise puzzling evaluative claims, such as his insistence on the value of suffering, loss, and destruction.

These two essays therefore offer quite different characterizations of Nietzsche's ethical view. How are we to adjudicate between them? One question that any proponent of a Nietzschean ethic must answer is why we should accept the view. Take Hurka's view: why should we care whether our own goals are unified and their effects far-reaching, much less whether some other individual's goals possess these properties? Unfortunately, Hurka's essay does not address these topics. Reginster's essay has the advantage of offering a response to the question: Nietzsche's ethic is grounded in facts about the (purportedly) most fundamental human motive, will to power. (Reginster develops these ideas in more detail in *The Affirmation of Life*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

This brings us to a more general topic: how exactly does Nietzsche justify his own evaluative claims? Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick tackle this question, asking whether Nietzsche can claim objectivity for his own values. They provide an extremely helpful account of the changes that Nietzsche's views on value undergo from his early to late works. They argue that, in his late works, Nietzsche develops a view according to which values possess a certain kind of objectivity, despite the fact that all values are created by human activities. In particular, values count as objective 'to the extent that one's value judgements express commitments that one has taken up when one has seen things from different perspectives' (p. 220). Notice that this is an entirely pro-

cedural conception of objectivity: one's values are objective when they issue from a certain procedure, namely, when the agent has reflected on and scrutinized alternative valuations from a variety of perspectives.

Clark and Dudrick are certainly right to emphasize the importance that Nietzsche places on scrutinizing and assessing one's values. However, I think Clark and Dudrick err in presenting this as a *sufficient* condition for objectivity: I would argue that Nietzsche regards it merely as a *necessary* condition. Suppose I read all of Nietzsche's works, study history and literature for new perspectives on values, and decide that I will adopt Judeo-Christian values, merely because I prefer them. Here, by investigating values from a variety of different perspectives, I have fulfilled Clark and Dudrick's condition; however, I have embraced values that Nietzsche himself regards as misguided. Moreover, I have adopted these values for a trivial reason: personal preference.

This example points to a deeper question: what are we supposed to be *looking for* when we scrutinize our values? Nietzsche delights in showing us how values are interrelated, what effects values have on our psychic health, what roles values have played in society, how values emerged, and so forth. But which of these considerations count as good reasons for adopting or rejecting values? This is the central question concerning Nietzsche's ethical view. While Clark and Dudrick provide an illuminating account of the procedure by means of which we assess values, they do not explain the *content* of these assessments, and therefore do not provide an answer to the central question.

Let's turn now to a still more general topic, addressed in this volume by Nadeem Hussain and Peter Poellner: what is a value? Hussain agrees with Clark and Dudrick that values are created. Yet, according to Hussain, 'Nietzsche claims that nothing has value in itself' (p. 159). Consequently, Hussain reads Nietzsche as endorsing a fictionalist account of value: Nietzsche recommends that we 'engage in a simulacrum of valuing by regarding things as valuable in themselves while knowing that they are not' (p. 178).

Unfortunately, Hussain's interpretation seems to be in tension with some of the central themes in Nietzsche's work. In particular, I would argue that the fictionalist interpretation can account neither for the necessity of scrutinizing one's values, nor for the urgency and importance that Nietzsche attributes to reevaluation. As Clark and Dudrick note, Nietzsche demands that we investigate the history and effects of values. But if values are mere illusions, they should be entirely unconstrained by these facts; we should be free to generate whatever illusion we happen to fancy, without regard for the value's history. Nor should it matter which values we ultimately embrace. If there are no facts about what is valuable—if valuing is an entirely unconstrained process of generating illusions—then Nietzsche's insistence that we abandon Judeo-Christian values in favour of some alternative set of values seems indefensible. (Notice that it would not help to appeal to Nietzsche's claim that Judeo-Christian values undermine health, flourishing, or strength: if all values are

fictional, then there is no reason to value health above sickness, flourishing above decay, or strength above weakness.)

Even if we set those problems aside, the textual evidence for the fictionalist interpretation seems decidedly thin. Hussain places a great deal of weight on Nietzsche's claim that nothing has 'value in itself' (cf. p. 159). However, when Nietzsche writes that nothing has value in itself, he goes on to suggest that all values arise from human activities: 'whatever now has value in our world does not have value in itself, according to its nature—nature is always valueless—but has been given value at some time, as a present—and it was *we* who gave and bestowed it' (*Gay Science*, §301). Here, Nietzsche is not denying that there are values; rather, he is explaining how values arise.

Peter Poellner's essay is relevant here. Poellner provides a nuanced investigation of the connection between affects and values. He argues that Nietzschean values are constituted by affective responses to the world. As he puts it, 'value existentially depends on the existence of affective experiences' (p. 252). We can bring this point to bear on Hussain's article. If there were no creatures that had affective experiences, then there would be no values; but there are such creatures, so there are values. Accordingly, Nietzsche's claim that nothing has value in itself is more plausibly read as the claim that values arise from valuing.

I will end with a word on the rich and worthwhile essays that I lack the space to address. The contributions by Mathias Risse, Brian Leiter, and Joshua Knobe provide instructive analyses of the way in which Nietzschean claims about agency and moral psychology can be used to critique Kantian and Aristotelian ethical theories. Jay Wallace and Christopher Janaway shed light on Nietzsche's moral psychology by way of their acute and insightful readings of the *Genealogy*. Neil Sinhababu considers a general question raised by Nietzsche's work: how can the history of an evaluative judgement bear on the justificatory status of that judgement? Simon Blackburn offers some reflections on the Nietzschean notion of 'perspective', and mounts a brief argument against fictionalist interpretations of Nietzsche.

This volume constitutes a significant advance in the Nietzsche literature. It is among a handful of volumes that anyone with a serious interest in Nietzsche simply must read. It will also be rewarding for anyone who is interested in the way in which moral psychology and action theory bear on ethics.

*Department of Philosophy*  
*University of New Mexico*  
*Albuquerque, NM 87131*  
 USA  
 doi:10.1093/mind/fzp005

PAUL KATSAFANAS