of knowledge about things in themselves. One could equally well think that his move undermines even the restricted objective validity that Kant safeguards for knowledge about appearances, and makes cognition entirely relative to historically contingent conceptual schemes. Sedgwick seems to assume the contrary—that the proposal she ascribes to Hegel guarantees the possibility of knowledge about things in themselves (pp. 119, 129 f.). Presumably, her reason for this is that if our fundamental concepts are sensitive to experience, they are shaped by the things that we encounter in experience, and hence will represent them as they are in themselves. But this already assumes that experience gives us access to things in themselves. It would be good to hear more about why the denial of strictly nonempirical concepts should bring one into a better position to make this realist assumption.

Finally, there is strong textual evidence against the reading on which Hegel regards fundamental concepts as sensitive to actual experience and historical change, and on which we cannot abstract from our contingently given standpoints. Hegel’s later writings contain several passages in which he ascribes us very far-reaching capacities for abstraction, and claims that such abstraction is a necessary condition for genuine cognition (e.g., Encyclopedia (1830) §23 with Remark). The latter point is particularly important for the Science of Logic. Of course, Hegel believes that an explicit grasp of the conceptual structures exposed in the Science of Logic is possible only as the result of a long historical development. But at the same time, he repeatedly claims that the Logic is free from all presuppositions, that it operates in the sphere of pure thought, and that it unfolds according to its own immanent necessity. As always with Hegel, it can be (and has been) argued that such statements should not be taken at face value. But given that Sedgwick does not discuss these points at all (with the exception of a footnote on Houlgate: pp. 156 f.), her case for her reading remains incomplete.

Quite generally, I found that the strength of this book lies more in the details of its exegetical discussions than in its overall argument. The interpretations of key passages from Hegel’s writings are always presented with great lucidity and care. Sedgwick goes to great effort to trace overt and implicit references to Kant, and to analyze the relevant background in Kant’s texts. In particular, it is a major merit of the book to convincingly argue that Hegel was much more aware of the subtleties of Kant’s views and arguments than is often appreciated.

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This collection opens by stating that its intent is to ‘assess Nietzsche’s normative views and their relation to the naturalistic worldview it has become common to attribute to him’
In reading the nine essays that compose the volume, it shortly becomes clear that although everyone agrees that Nietzsche is committed to some form of naturalism, everyone disagrees about what this means. Some of the papers address the nature of Nietzsche’s naturalism head on, with Schacht, for example, contending that Nietzsche’s sensitivity to the way in which cultural and social factors are constituents of the phenomena under investigation precludes a ‘scientistic’ form of naturalism (p. 237), and Anderson persuasively arguing that commentators have erred by associating Nietzsche’s naturalism with a reductive Humeanism (pp. 211–16). But most of the essays approach the topic of naturalism as an aside in the course of pursuing more specific interpretive issues.

There are central concerns that emerge in most of the papers: whether Nietzsche’s account of agency is compatible with the idea that we are sometimes actuated by reflective appraisals of value; whether the very idea of value, as something more than a subjective preference, makes sense given Nietzsche’s other commitments; and how Nietzsche’s ethical ideals avoid the problems that he raises for traditional morality. In short, the nature of the Nietzschean self and the content and justificatory status of Nietzsche’s evaluative claims are the central topics in this collection. The collection might demonstrate, then, that the best way of getting at the question of what form of naturalism Nietzsche endorses is to set that question aside and pursue more specific concerns. Rather than starting with a conception of naturalism and trying to draw from it conclusions about what Nietzsche’s account of the self, morality, and agency must be, we instead analyze his accounts of selfhood, morality, agency, and learn from this what form of naturalism he accepts. In that respect, the volume is a success: almost every paper in this collection is excellent, a real contribution to the literature. I won’t have space to discuss all nine of the essays here; instead, I’ll focus on four of them, mentioning the other five only briefly.

Peter Railton identifies four potential problems for interpreting Nietzsche’s texts. First, there is ‘the normativity problem’: how can Nietzsche offer action-guiding claims about how to live while attacking traditional accounts of freedom, the will, and autonomy? Second, the value problem: if Nietzsche is a naturalist, how can he speak of value? Third, the morality problem: how can Nietzsche simultaneously reject the possibility of universal or absolute values while offering a new ethical ideal? Fourth, the truth problem: how can Nietzsche claim that truths are essentially linked to perspectives?

With an eye toward answering the first three questions, Railton offers a perspicuous account of the characteristic features of normative and evaluative concepts, respectively. He suggests that Nietzsche’s ethical critiques are mainly concerned with ‘normative concepts proper’, which are concepts such as ‘rule, norm, standard, law, right, wrong, correct, incorrect . . .’ (p. 25). We can distinguish these from evaluative concepts such as ‘good, bad, noble, base, fine . . .’, which Nietzsche regards as less objectionable (p. 25).

Why might Nietzsche be more skeptical of normative concepts than evaluative ones? Railton argues that normative concepts proper—at least in their strongest forms—concern the voluntary, whereas evaluative concepts are ‘characteristically associated with non-voluntary states, attitudes, or motivations as well as acts’ (p. 26). For this reason, evaluative assessments do not presuppose ‘that the actions were under control of a faculty of reason or an autonomous self, in the sense that excludes empirical determinism’ (p. 30). Thus, Nietzsche’s critiques of morality can have ‘genuine authority’ even if ‘what it concerns is not voluntary’ (p. 310). For ‘normative guidance can operate via evaluative notions and attitudes without presupposing the sorts of freedom or agency Nietzsche attacked’ (p. 46). Railton uses appreciation of aesthetic value as a model for the kind of normative guidance that would be immune to Nietzsche’s critiques.
While Railton’s discussions are extremely illuminating, he spends little time analyzing the four potential problems that motivate the article. For example, the idea that Nietzsche would reject normative concepts concerning the voluntary presupposes that Nietzsche objects to all accounts of the voluntary; Railton writes, ‘Nietzsche’s critique of autonomous agency and voluntariness has rendered [normative concepts proper] deeply problematic’ (p. 26). But a more careful reading of the texts—of the sort undertaken in the essays by Christopher Janaway and Lanier Anderson, to which I turn in a moment—casts doubt on the idea that Nietzsche is engaged in a flatfooted denial of the voluntary/involuntary and autonomous/heteronomous distinctions. Rather, Nietzsche is pointing to problems with traditional accounts of those distinctions and developing improved versions of his own. Thus, while Railton’s account of normative guidance as operating without movements of a reflective will seems exactly right, his initial framing of the interpretive concerns seems to me off target.

Peter Poellner investigates Nietzsche’s grounds for critiquing traditional moral values. Poellner begins by noting that Nietzsche often critiques values in terms of their relation to will to power. However, Poellner argues that this cannot be the whole story, for will to power provides only very minimal constraints on permissible values; some types of ascetic Christianity, for example, would seem to be exemplary expressions of will to power, but are still critiqued by Nietzsche. So we need to say more about the basis of Nietzsche’s critiques.

Poellner argues that if we attend to Nietzsche’s evaluative claims, we see that ‘the ground level of evaluative justification is invariably located in judgments expressing a “taste” ’ (p. 56): Nietzsche will claim that a person or phenomenon is abhorrent, distasteful, repellant, disgusting, and so on. If taste were just a matter of arational sensation, this would make little sense; Nietzsche would have no reason to place uncritical faith in the sensations that happen to be elicited by circumstances. But Poellner suggests that taste is more complex for Nietzsche. In particular, he argues that Nietzsche’s judgments about taste concern the affective experiences of agents. So we can make progress by understanding the nature of affective experiences.

Poellner’s argument is rather intricate, but I think it can be fairly summarized as follows: Nietzsche’s judgments of taste are directed at affective experiences; affective experiences have success conditions, so it makes sense for Nietzsche to evaluate negatively those affective experiences that fail to meet their own internal success conditions (for example, to evaluate negatively an experience that presents something harmful to the agent as alluring); the success conditions are specified in terms of whether the affective experience accurately represents the relation between a phenomenon and the agent’s life or health. As he puts it, ‘fear, for example, is appropriate if it correctly identifies some phenomenon as threatening to something that we independently, and justifiably, value, such as our life or health’ (p. 65).

While Poellner’s discussions of affective experiences are insightful, we can raise two questions. First, while it’s plausible that certain affects such as fear and disgust represent relations between their objects and the agent’s life or health, Poellner gives us little reason for thinking this point generalizes to all affects. Are vengefulness, indignation, grief, kindness, magnanimity, and joy plausibly regarded as specifying relations between their objects and the agent’s life or health? At the very least, we would need to see the arguments.

Second, it’s unclear how Poellner’s account helps us to answer his initial concern that will to power cannot provide enough substantive content to rule out certain ways of life. Poellner’s solution is to appeal to affective experiences that are successful when they
correctly identify relations between various phenomena and the agent’s health or life. But this makes our appraisals dependent, at the most basic level, on judgments about health or life. Health and life seem at least as indeterminate and capacious as will to power. Not only that—I would argue that Nietzsche defines health and life in terms of power (consider a few examples: ‘the essence of life’ is ‘its will to power’ (Genealogy of Morality II.12); ‘life simply is will to power’ (Beyond Good and Evil 259); ‘life itself’ is a striving for ‘power’ (The Antichrist 6)). If this is right, we return to our original problem.

Two especially interesting contributions, by Christopher Janaway and Lanier Anderson, focus on Nietzsche’s concept of the self, and I’ll devote the remainder of the review to them.

Janaway is interested in the relation between two of Nietzsche’s ideals: self-affirmation and psychic unity. Start with the first ideal. Nietzsche valorizes a certain attitude toward oneself, which is characterized as ‘amor fati’, saying Yes to one’s life, or affirming oneself. This, Janaway notes, seems to be an ideal with normative content: people have reason to be in it, or to strive to get into it (p. 184). Or at least, some people do, as Nietzsche often restricts pursuit of this ideal to a few great individuals (p. 185). Notably, Nietzsche does not think it is the specific content of one’s life that makes one capable of affirming it. As Janaway helpfully puts it, ‘Given the amount of suffering, lack, boredom, and triviality in a life, how well-disposed can you be to it? . . . life has not fulfilled all my desires, it is not perfect, I cannot change that, but can I still love it?’ (p. 185). What’s wanted here is ‘a second-order attitude of acceptance, affirmation, or positive evaluation’ towards one’s experiences, regardless of whether they are negative or positive (p. 186). So the ideal is not to see everything in one’s life as good, but to affirm one’s life in spite of its badness.

Consider, now, the second ideal: some form of psychic unity. We need to ask three questions about Nietzschean unity: what are the things that are being unified, what relationship between these things constitutes unity, and how is this unity attained?

On the first question, Janaway interprets the requisite unity as a unity between drives: he writes that ‘this internal multiplicity of strong drives must be unified, united’ (p. 188). But what is a drive? Janaway accepts my own account (Katsafanas 2013) of a Nietzschean drive as, in his words, ‘a disposition that manifests itself by informing the agent’s perception of objects, generating an evaluative orientation toward them, and thereby bringing it about that the agent’s action, conscious reflection, and thought takes place in the service of a goal of which the agent is ignorant’ (p. 187). Janaway raises some objections to my account. For example, he argues that the agent is typically, but not necessarily, ignorant of the drive’s goal. Incidentally, I agree, though the phrasing of my paper may have made this unclear. Janaway further objects that my claim that drives ‘cannot be eliminated’ by the agent is too strong: drives are ‘relatively enduring’, in the sense that they cannot be eliminated at will, but they can come into existence and dissipate over time (p. 190). His argument seems to me persuasive on this point.

This brings us to the second question: what relation between the parts constitutes unity? Janaway sees the ideal as a state of attained, conflictual unity: the agent would have strong, conflicting drives that have been coordinated (p. 191). (Regrettably, Janaway does not specify what kind of coordination constitutes unity—are the drives supposed to tend toward a common aim? A set of related aims?) Here I would register an objection: I’ve argued elsewhere that the type of unity that concerns Nietzsche is not a unity among drives, but a unity between drives and the agent’s reflective thought (Katsafanas 2011). More precisely, a disunified agent is not an agent who has drives pushing him in contrary directions; a disunified agent is one who is moved by his drives in such a way that, were he to be aware of it, he would reject it. (Janaway considers something like this
interpretation on p. 194, when he asks whether ‘an attitude of self-affirmation might be what constitutes the unified functioning of conflicting strong drives’.

Finally, what brings about the unity that Nietzsche is interested in? Nietzsche seems to have two pictures: unity can be brought about consciously, or it can come about by chance (pp. 193–94). Janaway argues that both can be true.

With this groundwork in place, we can return to the initial question: what is the relation between Nietzsche’s ideals of self-affirmation and unity? The attitude of self-affirmation, Janaway suggests, sometimes ‘cause[s] alterations to our drives and their relations to one another in such a way as to move them nearer to a state’ of unity (p. 195). But the opposite can also be true: unity can cause self-affirmation. In particular, Janaway offers a subtle discussion of the way in which the agent’s adoption of certain moral values might both influence and be influenced by the agent’s drives. In particular, he brings out the way in which the agent’s adoption of traditional moral values might imperil unity. Shedding these moral values and adopting alternative ones that do not fragment the drives can make the agent better disposed toward himself, more self-affirmative (p. 200).

So self-affirmation could be both a result of, and a means toward, unity.

Lanier Anderson suggests that Nietzsche is interested in developing a value theory that is ‘at once fundamentally anti-Kantian but also built on a core of broadly Kantian ideas’ (p. 204). In particular, Anderson notes that Kant’s ethical theory rests on the idea of an autonomous self, a self which has the capacity to step back from its inclinations ‘and decide independently whether the inclination is to be endorsed by the self or not’ (p. 204). There is controversy over whether Nietzsche would countenance a self capable of standing back from its attitudes. Interpreters with naturalist sympathies, including Brian Leiter, argue that Nietzsche rejects this conception of the self: the self ‘is nothing but the strongest or dominant drive itself’ (p. 205). By contrast, readers with transcendentalist sympathies, including Sebastian Gardner, argue that Nietzsche is committed to a self capable of standing back from its attitudes (pp. 206–8). There is textual support for each view, so we face a dilemma. Anderson endeavors to find a third way, a ‘viable competitor to the naturalist and transcendentalist conceptions of selfhood’ (p. 208).

He begins by attacking the naturalist readings. Anderson points out that although Nietzsche is often interpreted as endorsing a Humean model of the self, the texts make it clear that Nietzsche cannot have Hume’s reductionist ambitions. Whereas Humeans attempt to account for the richness of human psychology solely in terms of beliefs and desires, Nietzsche distinguishes between a vast array of psychological states that he never endeavors to reduce to one another (p. 209–10). He has no aspiration to collapse drives and affects to desires, for example. This point seems to me both extremely important and completely persuasive.

Anderson bolsters his argument by showing that BGE 12, which is frequently cited in support of a reductionist/Humean reading of the Nietzschean self, actually undermines reductionist readings. For example, Anderson points out that Nietzsche’s rejection of what he calls ‘soul atomism’ cannot be interpreted as the claim that the soul does not exist—for Nietzsche also rejects ‘drive atomism’ (pp. 211–13). Hence, if ‘X is not an atom’ entailed ‘X does not exist’, we would be forced to conclude that Nietzschean drives don’t exist!

More generally, Anderson argues that BGE 12 demonstrates that the Nietzschean self is something beyond its parts. But how, exactly, should we characterize the self? Anderson addresses this point by analyzing the nature of the drives and affects that constitute the self. He accepts my account of drives (Katsafanas 2013) as psychological states that admit an aim/object distinction: the aim of the drive is a distinctive pattern of activity, whereas the object is adventitious, a chance occasion for expression. For example, the aim of the
sex drive is sexual activity; the object might be a particular person. Extending this model, Anderson argues that affects also have a two-place complement: a stimulus object, which standardly activates the affect, and a default behavioral response, toward which the affect standardly disposes or primes the agent (p. 218). For example ‘the affect of resentment is standardly activated by ... another agent, or agent like object, who does injury or standards athwart the agent’s will ... and it issues in a default tendency to respond by seeking revenge’ (p. 219). Anderson shows that if we accept this account, drives and affects are tailor made to work together. The drive recruits an affect which ‘will add nuance to both the manner of the drive’s aim expression and its value-laden perception of the object’ (p. 221). Likewise, affects can recruit drives ‘to lend focus and firmer telic shape to the action’ toward which the affects dispose us (p. 221).

With this philosophical psychology in place, we get an account of a ‘minimal self’ (p. 223). The minimal self is a repository of drives and affects; this repository persists despite changes in its constituent drives and affects, and is hence something emergent from and distinct from them. It is a ‘functional grouping of drives and affects that permits ... mutual recruitability’ (p. 226). This minimal self can take up attitudes toward its constituent drives and affects (p. 228), and hence counts as a genuine self.

This account seems to me extremely promising, but I want to raise a quibble. Anderson’s term ‘repository self’ might suggest that affects are simply lying around, waiting to be recruited by drives. That is, the term suggests that drives select from a repository of independently existing affects. But this doesn’t seem true to Nietzsche’s intent. Rather, Nietzsche’s idea seems to be that some—perhaps all—affects are generated by drives. For example, the sex drive generates affects such as lust, attraction, love, and so forth; it is because we have a sex drive that we experience these affects. But perhaps we can accommodate this by saying that once a particular causes an affect, this affect can then be recruited by other drives. So, the sex drive creates affects such as lust, attraction, and so on, which can then be coupled with other drives.

Though the remaining five essays deserve substantial discussion, I close merely by mentioning their topics. Simon Robertson focuses on the ‘scope problem’: Nietzsche rejects morality in one sense and accepts it in another. Thus, we need to find a set of features that distinguish the target of Nietzsche’s critiques from his positive ideal. Robertson surveys and forcefully critiques extant attempts to do so. Nadeem Hussain argues, against Clark and Dudrick, that it is a mistake to interpret Nietzsche as a non-cognitivist. Alan Thomas attacks Nadeem Hussain’s claim (defended elsewhere) that Nietzsche is best interpreted as a moral fictionalist; instead, Thomas suggests that Nietzsche defends a new form of subjective realism. Bernard Reginster provides a careful and precise analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of Schopenhauer’s morality of compassion. He articulates some flaws in Schopenhauer’s discussion of the egoism/altruism distinction, and seeks to understand why Nietzsche thinks that Schopenhauerian compassion leads to a form of selflessness. Richard Schacht concludes the volume with an attempt to distinguish Nietzsche’s naturalism from ‘scientism’.

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This is a work in ethics that, in both its form and its content, challenges and reveals the limitations of the way in which that subject is typically pursued in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. The overall aim or approach of the book is to pursue and significantly extend some interrelated themes that are familiar from the work of Bernard Williams. For instance, throughout the book there is an attack on a ‘Kantian approach’ (though not necessarily to be identified with Kant himself, p. 36) that is held to be, not just an influential position in philosophy, but a revealing cultural stereotype in its own right. That stereotype comprises (a) a commitment to the rational supremacy of moral considerations, including the priority of moral considerations to considerations having directly to do with the meaningfulness of one’s life; and (b) a conception of rational agency such that rational agents can formulate, recognise and, through an effort of will, comply with moral considerations derived from a formal procedure and which, by virtue of the formal rationality of each, they can all agree upon.

There is also an attack on the widespread use of schematic thought-experiments in ethics as opposed to sensitive reporting of the phenomenology of engagement in actual moral situations; and a related emphasis on the need for moral reasoning to be grounded in substantive rather than formal considerations. There is an argument against the anti-realism or projectivism that is assumed by the Kantian constructivist approach. Connected with this is an emphasis on the role of the emotions in moral reasoning, and an argument that the role of emotions in intelligent action can help us to overcome a ‘divided self’ that we are saddled with by Kantian morality. There is an argument for a fundamental distinction between two types of awareness of facts about the world: merely declarative awareness, which is awareness that a fact obtains, and expressive awareness, such that one experiences the fact as resonating in one’s life and calling for some response. This is connected with an argument that aims to explain how a certain kind of immediate response to human suffering is possible—a response that is a judgement of some sort rather than a mere ‘gut reaction’, but which delivers an immediate awareness of the suffering as something that needs to be ended and healed.

Finally, and perhaps most intriguingly, evidence against the Kantian view is derived from a study of the phenomenon of our confidence in the world. Confidence in the world, for Corbi, is not a rational attitude, justified on the basis of evidence, but rather an aspect of our pre-reflective awareness or practical attitude to the world. Corbi argues (a) this brute confidence in the world is very hard to shake; (b) there is, however, plenty of evidence that the world is not such that we should have confidence in it; (c) that our