A Model of Smart Technologies

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Impact of Smart Tech

- Number 1 tech trend predicted by Forbes to dominate 2017
- A big driver of Internet of Things
 - IDC forecasts that the worldwide market for IoT solutions will grow from \$1.9 trillion in 2013 to \$7.1 trillion in 2020.
- Smart <u>home market</u> predicted to be worth 121 billion by 2022

What is a Smart Technology?

- Situated: recognition and processing of situational and community contexts
- Personalized: tailoring to buyer's and consumer's needs and affects
- Adaptive: change according to buyer's and consumer's responses and tasks
- Pro-active: attempt to anticipate buyer's and consumer's plans and intentions
- Business aware, location aware, network capable



Research Questions

- Is "smartness" always good?
 - How could smart technologies change consumers' behavior?
 - What are the implications of this change on firm profit and pricing?

Model: Timeline of Events



Consumer learns the occasion and his search cost prior to accepting the price.



Smart Technology: Definition

- Predicts the next consumption occasion <u>after initial usage</u>
 - .5≤r≤1: probability the firm correctly guesses second occasion
- Reduces search cost for the best option <u>if the consumer has</u> <u>used the service under the same occasion before</u>
 - 0≤k ≤1: reduction multiplier of search cost for the better alternative
- Conventional product: r=0.5 and k=1.

Second Period: Information Structure

- Firm observes whether the consumer has used the service before and if so, under which occasion; second period price depends on previous usage and firm's guess of next occasion.
- Five relevant prices: p_h^L , p_l^L , p_h^H , p_l^H , p_l^N , p_l^N .



Second Period: Pricing

- If first occasion is H and firm guesses H for next occasion
 - With prob r, consumer gets H-kc- p_h^H , otherwise, he gets L-c- p_h^H .

$$p_h^H = \begin{cases} H - kc, & \text{if } r(H - kc) \ge L - c; \\ L - c, & \text{if } r(H - kc) < L - c. \end{cases}$$

- When r is higher and k is lower, firm is more likely to bet on H.
- Calculations for other prices are similar. Smarter technologies lead to higher second-period prices.



Impact of Smartness on First Period Pricing

- Suppose the first occasion is H and product is very smart.
 - If use in period 1, consumer expects (1-r)(H-L)/2 from period 2.
 - He gets a positive utility if occasion is H and firm guesses L
 - If no use in period 1, consumer expects (H-L)/2 from period 2
 - Assume H-c<2(L-c) so firm charges L-c in second period</p>
- Consumer expects a loss in period 2 when using the service in period 1 → firm lowers price for initial usage
 - Firm extracts all surplus when making the correct guess
 - Reduction of first period price is greater as r increases

What About Not-So-Smart Technologies?

- Suppose the first occasion is H and product is not very smart.
 - No prior usage gives consumer (H-L)/2 in period 2
 - Prior usage gives consumer (1-r)(H-L)/2 + r(H-kc-L+c)/2
 - When the firm guesses H, it charges L-c to be safe
 - The two terms: firm guesses L incorrectly; it guesses H correctly
 - Consumer benefits from initial usage and benefit increases with r
 Firm is less aggressive in pricing and consumer saves search cost
- Firm enjoys a surplus in period 1 from being not very smart!

As Technology Becomes Smarter

- At first, the firm always plays safe by charging a low price and consumers benefit from initial usage. Firm charges a higher first period price as r increases
- At a certain point, the firm starts charge more when guessing H. Consumer expects a loss in the second period and firm lowers the first period price.
- Eventually, the firm's gain in second period outweighs its loss in the first period.



An Example



- As r increases, profit first increases, then jumps to a level lower than conventional tech, and then increases again
- Reduced matching cost always benefits the firm





Concluding Remarks

- When technology becomes smarter, future prices are higher.
- When smartness reaches a certain threshold, firm profit drops below non-smart.
- Being super smart helps, but fairness concerns and mismatch costs may again dampen the reward.

Thank you! Comments: monic@bu.edu