Product Fit Uncertainty and Information Provision in a Distribution Channel

Monic Sun, Boston University Rajeev Tyagi, UC Irvine



Search

ikebana

Departments

Buddhism

Books

Flower Arranging

Crafts & Hobbies

Japanese Garden

Japanese Biographies

+ See more...

Kindle Store

Flower Arranging Interior Design Decorating Asian Art History

Home & Kitchen

Plant Vases Decorative Vases Artificial Flora

+ See All 24 Departments

International Shipping (What's this?)

AmazonGlobal Eligible

Shipping Option (What's this?)

Free Super Saver Shipping

Book Format

Hardcover

Kindle Edition

Paperback

Book Language

English

Furniture & Décor Style

Casual

"ikebana"

Related Searches: ikebana supplies, ikebana vase, ikebana vases.

Showing 1 - 16 of 2,455 Results



Ikebana: The Art of Arranging Flowers by Shozo Sato and Kasen Yoshimura (May

\$49.95 **\$32.97** Hardcover

Order in the next 44 hours and get it by Tuesday, Feb 19.

Only 9 left in stock - order soon.

More Buying Choices - Hardcover

\$22.09 new (31 offers)

\$22.09 used (30 offers)

******* **№** (7)

Eligible for FREE Super Saver Ship

Sell this back for an Amazon.com (

Books: See all 918 items



Ikebana: Japanese Flower Arranging for Today's Interiors by Michelle Cornell

\$40.00 \$26.40 Hardcover

Order in the next 47 hours and get it by Tuesday, Feb 19.

Only 5 left in stock - order soon.

More Buying Choices - Hardcover

\$26.40 new (8 offers)

\$17.29 used (25 offers)

***** **№** (10)

Eligible for FREE Super Saver Ship

Sell this back for an Amazon.com (

Books: See all 918 items



the Art

Only 5 left in stock - order soon.

Zen in the Art of Flower Arrangement: The Classic Account of the Meaning

Herrigel, R. F. C. Hull and Daisetz T. Suzuki (Aug 1, 1999)

\$11.95 **\$9.42** Paperback

Order in the next 46 hours and get it by Tuesday, Feb 19.

More Buying Choices - Paperback

\$6.30 new (38 offers)

\$3.39 used (31 offers)



Eligible for FREE Super Saver Ship

Books: See all 918 items

SEPHORA

3-DAY SHIPPING FREE over \$50 >

E BATH / BODY HAIR TOOLS / ACCESSORIES MEN GIFTS SOLUTIONS IT LISTS TRENDS ADVICE TV BRAND

samples

Select 3 free samples, then add to the basket



NUDE Skincare ProGenius™ Treatment Oil -0.05 oz



Face Soap and Clarity 3-In-1 Daily-Detox Vitamin C Facial Wash - 0.17 oz



Clean Fresh Laundry - 0.03 oz Eau de Parfum Spray




Paco Rabanne 1 Million Eau de Toilette - 0.03 oz
















http://www.fisher-price.com Catch your favorite Fisher-Price® toys in



WATCHED Fisher-Price Stroll-to-Ride™ Trike by fisherpricebrand 1,490 views





Little People® Disney® Princess Songs Palace - Demo by fisherpricebrand 4,581 views

Play is the way children grow, and Fisher-Price® toys make the most of play. To help us create toys that encourage a child's growth and development, we take our inspiration from kids. Hear our employees' perspectives in some of the videos on this ...

action! Cool demo videos let you check out some of the fun features our toys

have to offer—over and over again!



Rev 'n Go Stunt Garage - Demo by fisherpricebrand 1,539 views

more

10 playlists by Fisher-Price® View all videos




Laugh & Learn™ Apptivity™ Monkey - Demo by fisherpricebrand 1,581 views


10.430.989 views Subscribe

Featured Playlists

1,930



Little People® Wheelies™ Loops 'n Swoops Amusement Park™ - Demo by fisherpricebrand 1,580 views



Little People® Wheelies™ Connect 'n Play Railway - Demo

Research Questions

- When does a manufacturer disclose product match information?
 - How does quality reputation of the product matter?
 - Does it matter whether she is selling direct or through a retailer?
 - What happens to disclosure when there is downstream competition and when the competition gets more intense?
- Do the retailers like the manufacturer's disclosure strategy?
- How would online WOM or mandatory disclosure affect the manufacturer and the retailers?

Product & Store Differentiation

Consumer utility:

$$u = v - p - td_{x} - d_{y}$$

- $-d_y$ is the consumer's mismatch with the product in the taste space, d_x is his transportation cost to shop with the seller
- Consumers are uniformly distributed in the unit square
 - Two stores located at x = 0 and x = 1
 - Two product types y = 0 and y = 1

Benchmark. A manufacturer selling directly to consumers chooses to provide product-fit information iff $v < v^D(t)$, where $v^D(t) = (i) \ 2 + \frac{t}{4} - \sqrt{2-t}$ for $0 \le t < \frac{2}{9}$, and (ii) $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{t}{4} + \frac{\sqrt{2t}}{4}$ for $\frac{2}{9} \le t \le 1$.

Proposition 1. A manufacturer selling through a monopolistic retailer is less likely to enable the disclosure of product fit information than a manufacturer selling directly to consumers.

The intuition is as follows. When the manufacturer sells through a monopolistic retailer, double marginalization leads to a positive markup for the retailer, which reduces the total channel profit and shifts some of the channel profit to the retailer. The manufacturer can then limit its loses using nondisclosure strategy that increases homogeneity in consumer willingness to pay, making the demand more elastic, and thus reducing retailer markup.

Proposition 2. If a manufacturer sells through a monopolistic retailer, then the retailer benefits from the disclosure of product fit information (i) for products of all quality if $t \in (0,0.0408)$, and (ii) if $t \in [0.0408,1]$, then for products of either sufficiently low or sufficiently high quality, and not for products of intermediate quality.

 Intuition: when product quality is sufficiently low or sufficiently high, nondisclosure hurts the retailer since it leads to a small demand increase and a large margin decrease. When product quality is intermediate, nondisclosure benefits the retailer since it leads to a large demand increase and a small margin decrease.

Figure 5 Product Fit Disclosure in a Channel with a Monopolistic Retailer [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary. com]




Figure 6 Product Fit Disclosure in a Channel with Competing Retailers [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]




Figure 7 Channel Disclosure with a Monopolistic Retailer when Manufacturer Commits to a Wholesale Price Before Disclosure Decisions [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary. com]





Figure 8 Channel Disclosure with Competing Retailers when Manufacturer Commits to Wholesale Prices Before Disclosure Decisions [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary. com]



Conclusions

- M discloses product match info. when quality is low
- Adding a retailer reduces M's disclosure
- R discloses product match wen quality is very high or very low
- If M can commit to a wholesale price before disclosure decisions, R does not disclose product match when quality is high
- Total disclosure increases (decreases) with retail competition if wholesale price is set after (before) disclosure decisions

Thank you!