

COURSE SCHEDULE Details of this schedule are subject to change. Registered students can log into the course website at <https://learn.bu.edu/>. You should visit this website frequently to get the latest course schedule, check announcements, obtain class material and verify your personal grading record. Recordings and notes from the lectures will also be posted there.

- ◆ LECTURE and READING are complements rather than substitutes. To do well in this course, you must understand both thoroughly. Readings from the TEXT are given in this schedule. Additional reading will be assigned or suggested from time to time.
- ◆ HOMEWORK problems will be assigned from time to time in relation to the progress of the course. Although they will not be collected and graded, working through practice problems is essential for mastering the course material and preparing for the exams. SOLUTIONS to the exams and some homework problems will be posted on the course website, and we may devote some time in class to solving problems. But you will not benefit from the solutions until you have worked seriously on the problems.
- ◆ EXAM dates are given below. The two exams will test your comprehensive understanding of the course material up to the time of the exam.

DATE	LECTURE	READING
W1/25	Modeling Strategic Interactions Extensive Form Games with Complete and Perfect Information Backward Induction and the problems it raises	Chapter 1 Chapters 5, 6, 7
W2/01	Zermelo's Theorem and the Game of Chess Centipede Game & Chain Store Paradox Rubinstein Bargaining Model and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium	Chapter 16 Section 16.1 (Sec.16.2-4 are of related interest but not part of the course)
W2/08	Strategic (Normal) Form Games with Complete Information Nash Equilibrium and the problems it raises	Chapters 2, 3, 4
W2/15	Cournot & Bertrand Models of Oligopoly Strategic Substitutes vs. Strategic Complements	
W2/22	Iterated Deletion of Dominated Strategies Maximin and Rationalizable Strategies	Chapters 11, 12
W3/01	Mixed Strategy and Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies Existence of Nash Equilibrium	
W3/08	<No Class: Spring Recess>	
W3/15	Strategic (Normal) Form Games with Incomplete Information Decision under Uncertainty and Statistical Inference	Chapter 9
W3/22	Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Correlated Equilibrium	
W3/29	EXAM 1: covers course material through 3/22	

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DATE	LECTURE	READING
W4/05	Extensive Form Games with Imperfect or Incomplete Information Sequential Rationality and Inference about the Past Imperfect Recall Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Signaling and Screening in Labor Markets Reputation in Repeated Interactions & Monetary Policy Cheap Talk, Persuasion & Debate	Chapter 10
W4/12	Repeated Games Inter-temporal Preference and Decision Reward, Punishment and Cooperation Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and Recursive Strategies	Chapters 14, 15
W4/19	<No Class: Substitute Monday Schedule>	
W4/26	Social Norms Mutual Sanction vs Third-Party Sanction Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Payoffs and Strategies	
W5/03	Evolution of Behavior and Belief Population Dynamics and Evolutionary Stability	Chapter 13
W5/10 <6-8pm>	EXAM 2: covers material from the whole course	

*Final exam schedule is subject to confirmation or change by the University Registrar's official announcement later in the semester.