

Spanish Connectives and Pragmatic Implicatures

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1. Introduction

An important research question in contemporary discourse pragmatics is this: What kinds of contextual information can lexical items or constructions be sensitive to? Preliminary answers to this question have already been found in the work of Ellen Prince (e.g. 1992) and her associates (e.g. Birner and Ward 1998), who have shown quite convincingly that particular syntactic constructions are heavily constrained by information-structural features of the ongoing discourse. Similarly, the work of Paul Kay (e.g. 1990) on particles like English *even* has demonstrated that individual lexical items provide instructions to access intricate pragmatic information, such as the position of a particular contextually-salient proposition in a pragmatic scalar model. Among researchers working on Spanish, José Portolés (e.g. 1998) has been very active in providing answers to the question mentioned above. In particular he has provided us with evidence showing that there are very subtle differences between nearly-synonymous discourse markers, and that these differences are due in large part to the distinct requirements each marker places on the discourse context.

In this paper, my purpose is to contribute to this line of research in discourse pragmatics, using data from Spanish forms that express “adversative connection”. Building on the insights of Koenig and Benndorf (1998) for the German adversative sentence conjunctions *aber* and *sondern* (both translatable into English as ‘but’), I will show how the lexical semantics of the corresponding Spanish conjunctions *pero* and *sino* (again, both translating English ‘but’) contain information about the types of pragmatic implicature to which each form is sensitive, both positively and negatively. More importantly, however, I will extend the analysis to the contrast between *pero* and *si* (<conditional connective *si*) as dialogic discourse connectives in colloquial conversational Spanish which, I will argue, offers a better example for lexical sensitivity to pragmatic implicature than the sentence conjunctions. As I have demonstrated in previous work (Schwenter 1999a, b), and show in Section 3 below, there is good evidence to consider *si* as the dialogic connective counterpart to the sentence-level conjunction *sino*, and this parallelism also holds with respect to the types of implicatures to which each form is sensitive, both positively and negatively. The main conclusion is that the *pero/si* contrast in dialogic contexts provides excellent evidence to uphold the position that the inherent semantics of lexical items can be sensitive to different types of pragmatic implicatures.

The data to be considered in this study are naturally-occurring examples from a 40-hour corpus of colloquial conversational Spanish, collected by the author in Alicante, Spain (ALC) during 1995-96. Constructed examples will also be used to exemplify certain points; these reflect mainly the judgments of

Peninsular speakers. However, it should be noted that cross-dialectal judgments of these data are rather robust, as there appears to be only one particular difference—a rather insignificant one for the analysis in this paper—separating different varieties of conversational Spanish. I will comment briefly on this difference in Section 3 below.

2. *Pero* and *si* as adversative discourse connectives

Let us first start out with a “minimal pair” that allows one to appreciate the distinction between the discourse connectives *pero* and *si* in dialogic contexts. This distinction is a rather subtle one from the point of view of semantics/pragmatics, but it is also a rather significant one for determining the direction of the ensuing discourse, since the kind of “opposition” expressed by the two connectives differs greatly:¹

(1) [A is trying to convince B to hire Juan for a linguistics position]

A: Juan es inteligente.

‘Juan is intelligent.’

B: (Sí,) **Pero** no sabe nada de lingüística.

‘But he doesn’t know anything about linguistics.’

(2) A: Juan es inteligente.

‘Juan is intelligent.’

B: (*Sí,) **Si** no sabe nada de lingüística.

‘SI he doesn’t know anything about linguistics.’

In example (1) with *pero*, speaker B concedes (perhaps for the sake of argument) that “Juan is intelligent” and asserts that despite Juan’s intelligence “he doesn’t know anything about linguistics”. The concessive value of *pero* in this example is corroborated by its compatibility with an initial marker of affirmation like *sí* ‘yes’, which displays agreement between A’s and B’s evaluations of Juan. The role of *pero* is that of introducing an argument that is stronger than the one put forth by A; more explicitly, then, B’s response can be understood as conveying “while it is true that Juan is intelligent, and that this is an argument in favor of hiring him for the position, it is also true that he doesn’t know anything about linguistics, and this is a decisive argument for NOT hiring him”.

In example (2) with *si*, speaker B likewise asserts “he doesn’t know anything about linguistics”. But instead of accepting the argument offered by A, B’s *si*-marked reply denies the RELEVANCE (in the Gricean sense) of A’s point of view. In other words, it does not matter to B whether Juan is intelligent or not—this datum is immaterial to the issue at hand. Indeed, the force of *si* is to signal that the proposition it marks is the ONLY one relevant among those under consideration. Unlike (1) with *pero*, the presence of an initial affirmative *sí* in (2) would be highly anomalous. However, this does not mean that speaker B necessarily believes that Juan is not intelligent. Rather, it only indicates the refusal on speaker B’s part to consider the premise “Juan is intelligent” as an

argument in favor of hiring Juan for the linguistics position. As I have noted in previous research (e.g. Schwenter 1998), the pragmatic function of *si* in such examples is best characterized as being one of “refutation”.

The use of *si* as in (2) has not gone completely unnoticed by previous researchers. Indeed, as pointed out as early as Bello (1984[1847]:§1272), there is a clear (diachronic) link between *si*-introduced responses like that in (2) above and full conditional sentences introduced by the same marker, with the meaning “if”. However, synchronically, there is ample evidence to consider such *si*-marked clauses to be a distinct type of declarative sentence (Almela 1985; Montolío 1999; Porroche 1998; Schwenter 1999b, c), not an elliptical conditional. For instance, *si* in conditional sentences makes a crucial contribution to the propositional content of the sentence. In stark contrast, *si* in examples like (2) does not contribute to the expressed proposition at all; indeed, *si* could be eliminated from (2) without changing the propositional content in the least.

Another important difference between *si*-marked clauses like that in (2) and conditionals headed by *si* regards restrictions on verb forms. The possibilities open to verbal mood in conditional sentences (e.g. past subjunctive in counterfactuals) are not permitted in *si*-marked examples like (2), which are constrained to the indicative mood, no matter what the tense of the verb. Thus, speaker B in (2) could not have responded as in (3) in the same situation while conserving the same meaning and pragmatic force (#=pragmatic infelicity):

- (3) #Si no supiera nada de lingüística.
'If he didn't know anything about linguistics.'

In addition, these *si*-marked declaratives allow a full range of verbal tenses. As is well known, the future tense—whether marked inflectionally or periphrastically—is typically not an option in the protasis of a conditional sentence, except when this protasis is “echoic”, i.e. repeating the content of a prior utterance:

- (4) Si llueve/*lloverá/*va a llover mañana, no jugarán el partido.
'If it rains/will rain/is going to rain tomorrow, they won't play the game.'

By contrast, in the *si*-marked declaratives of prime interest in this paper, the future tense is a completely felicitous option, as shown by (5) and (6), where B's *si*-marked responses contravene A's temporal expectations (cf. Montolío 1999):

- (5) A: Voy a llamarlos a ver a qué hora van a venir esta tarde.
'I'm going to call them to see what time they're coming this afternoon.'
B: **Si** no vendrán/van a venir hasta la noche.
'SI they won't come/aren't going to come until tonight.'

- (6) A: El jueves me dirás lo que te pareció la película.
 ‘Thursday you’ll tell me what you thought of the movie.’
 B: ¡Si para entonces no la habré visto!
 ‘SI by then I won’t have seen it!’

In sum, then, we are dealing with a construction that is superficially similar to a conditional protasis, but which has its own distinct properties (for more syntactic evidence, see Schwenter 1999c). It follows from these differences that the *si* which appears in examples (5) and (6) can no longer be assimilated to the conditional conjunction; rather, it must be considered a separate polysemy, specifically an adversative discourse connective. Moreover, this adversative *si* is in paradigmatic contrast with the adversative connective *pero* ‘but’, as implied by the distinct interpretations of (1) and (2) above. Further evidence in support of the contrast between *pero* and *si* is presented in the next section.

3. Two kinds of ‘but’ in Spanish: Beyond sentence conjunctions

The Spanish sentence conjunctions *pero* and *sino* represent two types of adversative expression which are found to be lexicalized in some languages (e.g. German, Hebrew) but not in others (e.g. English and French). From a strictly syntactic point of view, the most obvious difference between the two conjunctions is that *sino*, but not *pero*, requires overt negation of the first conjunct, as shown in the contrast between (7) and the negated (8):

- (7) Mario es bajo **pero** (*sino) fuerte.
 ‘Mario is short but strong.’
 (8) Julia no es alta **sino** (*pero) baja.
 ‘Julia is not tall but short.’

Beyond the syntactic differences, these examples also show how the meanings of the two conjunctions differ. As it does in (7), *pero* provides a restriction on the meaning and/or the implicatures arising from the first conjunct: Mario’s shortness might be taken to imply that he is not strong but, contrary to this expectation, he actually is strong. By contrast, *sino* as in (8) offers a correction or substitution of the negated first conjunct: the correct word to describe Julia is not *alta* but rather *baja*. Furthermore, the non-negated version of the first conjunct, i.e. *Julia es alta* ‘Julia is tall’, is understood as making reference to a viewpoint that is not that of the speaker (cf. Anscombe and Ducrot 1977).

The semantic differentiation of the two adversative conjunctions is not due (only) to the obligatory syntactic negation in the first conjunct of *sino* sentences, for although negation CAN appear in the first conjunct of *pero* sentences, the overall restrictive meaning of this conjunction differs from the corrective or substitutive meaning of its counterpart *sino*. This is especially clear in examples that contain scalar predicates like the quantifiers *algunos* and *todos* (cf. Kovacci 1986):

- (9) No vinieron todos, **pero** vinieron algunos.
'Not everybody came, but some people came.'
- (10) No vinieron todos, **sino** algunos.
'Not everybody but rather some came.'
- (11) *No vinieron algunos, **pero** vinieron todos.
'Some didn't come, but all came.'
- (12) No vinieron algunos, **sino** todos.
'Not some but rather all came.'

Though both (9) with *pero* and (10) with *sino* are possible, their meanings are quite different. First, (9) concedes that "not everybody came" and asserts that "some came", and furthermore presents the latter proposition as a pragmatic argument in favor of a conclusion opposed to the conclusion implicated by "not everybody came". By contrast, (10) is strictly a correction of the quantifier *todos* by a weaker quantifier on the same scale (*algunos*). But, whereas *no ... sino* can be used for any kind of "substitution", independent of the scalar relationship between the predicates involved, *pero* cannot be used in a sentence like (11), since the conjunction forces the negation to be interpreted as applying to the propositional content (see Horn 1989). That is, the only possible reading of (11) is that which assigns a truth value of F to the proposition "some came", but a value of T to the proposition "all came". However, since the proposition "all came" unilaterally entails "some came", the end result is contradictory. Indeed, the only way a negative sentence with these two conjuncts can be interpreted is as a (metalinguistic) denial of the upper bound implicated by *algunos* 'some', i.e. "no more than some", followed by a "correction" (*todos*) introduced by *sino* which cancels this implicated upper bound, as in (12).

Now, in previous research (Schwenter 1999a, b), I have argued that the semantic/pragmatic distinction between the (mainly dialogic) discourse connectives *pero* and *si* is in many ways parallel to the well-known distinction between the adversative sentence conjunctions *pero* and *sino*. Of course, the parallelism between the semantic value of *pero* at the sentential level and *pero* at the discourse level is obvious, and has already been noted by a number of researchers (e.g. Acín 1993; Porroche 1996; Portolés 1995). In general, what this prior research has concluded is that *pero* expresses a concessive restriction at both levels of use.

On the other hand, the semantic/pragmatic parallelism between the adversative sentence conjunction *sino* and the (mainly) dialogic discourse connective *si* is much less transparent. Nevertheless, there are several points of commonality which are indicative of such parallelism. First of all, from a purely formal perspective, both words contain the erstwhile conditional conjunction *si* 'if' ($sino < si + no$), though the paths taken from the strictly conditional meaning to the adversative meaning they express today appear to be quite convoluted (cf. Alarcos 1980; Montolío 1999). I will not go into the details

about possible diachronic developments here, but will instead point out that this formal similarity would lead one to expect at least some similarity in meaning/function.

Indeed, it is at the level of semantic/pragmatic meaning where we find more convincing evidence for parallelism between *sino* and *si*. Note first that both words are used to introduce a “correction” of some sort. In the case of *sino*, as in (8) above, the correction is of the explicitly denied (via negation) element in the first conjunct of a *no ... sino* sentence. As regards *si*, the correction is often much more indirect: for instance, in (6) above, the correction made by speaker B is of an underlying assumption that is inferable from what speaker A says, namely that speaker B will have seen the movie in question by Thursday.

Related to the pragmatic function of expressing a “correction”, both forms also have a close relationship with the concept, if not the form, of negation. One of the main pragmatic purposes for negation is to express denials of (some aspect of) the viewpoints of others. As already noted above, *sino* requires an explicit negation of the first conjunct, and this negation always conveys a denial of another viewpoint, often that of another interlocutor present in the discourse situation. As the examples of *si* above have shown, this connective also signals denials, typically a denial of the relevance of a preceding proposition (which is often implicated) or some other aspect of a preceding utterance.

Finally, the parallelism in meaning between *sino* and *si* can actually be demonstrated explicitly using a fairly simple correspondence test. This test involves converting dialogues in which adversative *si* is found into monologues (i.e. one-sentence examples), or vice-versa. What this test shows quite clearly is that many uses of *si* in dialogues can be directly paraphrased by *sino* (but not by *pero*) in monologues. Consider first the (naturally-occurring) example in (13a):

- (13a) [H and M are talking about their son, whose math teacher has just sent home a note about his poor performance in the class.]
H: Pues, parece que va a suspender matemáticas.
‘Well, it looks like he’s going to fail math.’
M: **Si (#Pero)** va a suspenderlas todas.
‘SI he’s going to fail all of them.’
- (ALC)

In this example, M’s response is not to the explicit content of H’s prior utterance, but rather to a potential implicature arising from it. Upon stating that it looks like their son will fail math, what H implicates is that their son will fail math and only math. M’s response in (13a) is specifically targeting this implicature. Now, when we attempt to convert the dialogue in (13a) into a monologue, the choice of *sino* over *pero* to connect the two conjuncts is clear:

- (13b) No va a suspender matemáticas **sino** (***pero**) todas (sus asignaturas).
‘He’s not (only) going to fail math but rather all (of his classes).’

Two more examples illustrating the “substitutability” of *si* and *sino* across dialogues and monologues are given in (14) and (15). Note in each case how *si*

in the dialogue examples cannot correspond to adversative sentence conjunction *pero*, which is ungrammatical or pragmatically bizarre in the monologue examples:

- (14a) H: Su tío Pablo ya está muerto.
'Her uncle Pablo is already dead.'
M: **Si (#Pero)** está vivo.
'SI he's alive.'
- (ALC)

- (14b) Su tío Pablo no está muerto **sino** (***pero está**) vivo.
'Her uncle Pablo isn't dead but rather alive.'

- (15a) R: No encuentro mi medicina [medeθina].
'I can't find my medicine ["incorrectly" pronounced].'
L: **Si (#Pero)** es medicina [mediθina].
'SI it's medicine ["correctly" pronounced].'
- (ALC)

- (15b) No es [medeθina] **sino** (??**pero es**) [mediθina].
'It's not [medeθina] but rather [mediθina].'

In (14a), M's *si*-prefaced response logically contradicts H's statement that the person in question is alive. As shown in (14b), when the dialogic (14a) is turned into a monologue, one must use *sino*, not *pero*. Meanwhile, in (15a) L's reply objects to R's mispronunciation of the word *medicina*, not to any aspect of the meaning of R's utterance; L could not have introduced her reply using *pero*. When converted into a monologue, as in (15b), *sino* is the conjunction counterpart to *si* in (15b). Notice that, while *pero* in (15b) is not strictly ungrammatical, it does force a completely different interpretation in which the two pronunciations of the word *medicina* must be understood as referring to different things in the world. In other words, the interpretation of the dialogic example (15a) cannot be replicated in the monologic (15b) using *pero*.

Up till now, no mention has been made of the fact that, for many speakers/dialects of Spanish, the utterances introduced by *si* in the examples above could also be introduced by the COMBINATION of the two connectives in question, i.e. by *pero si*. Indeed, in some dialects this would be the favored way of prefacing these kinds of responses. This does not cause a problem for the analysis presented here. As noted by Montolío (1999), this combination is virtually fossilized as a single lexical item, and indeed, with respect to the substitution test illustrated above, it acts exactly like *si* does alone. What the addition of *pero* in this combination does is reinforce speaker opposition towards what their interlocutor has said or implied. In short, the *pero si* combination should be taken as a variant of *si* which is also in paradigmatic contrast with *pero*.

To conclude this section, what I have shown is that the classic distinction between two types of adversative sentence conjunction in Spanish (*pero* vs. *sino*) is paralleled by the distinction between two types of adversative discourse connectives (*pero* vs. *si*). This information is summarized in Table 1 below. While space restrictions prevent me from providing the details here, it should be pointed out that further support for the distinction between two types of adversative discourse connectives can also be found in other languages. For example, in Japanese there is a nearly identical contrast between the discourse connectives *demo* ('pero') and *datte* ('si') (Schwenter 1999b).

Table 1: Spanish 'but' expressions, by discourse type

DISCOURSE TYPE	EXPRESSION	EXPRESSION
Monologic	<i>pero</i>	<i>sino</i>
Dialogic	<i>pero</i>	<i>si</i>

4. Sensitivity to Pragmatic Implicature

In a recent paper, Koenig and Benndorf (1998) use evidence from the German adversative sentence conjunctions *aber* and *sondern* to argue that (neo-) Gricean pragmatic principles may actually be encoded by the semantics of individual lexical items. The authors follow Horn's (1984, 1989) reductionist classification of Grice's original maxims (1975), in which Grice's several maxims are reduced to two general pragmatic principles, labeled Q and R (Horn 1989:194).² The characteristics of the principles are as follows:

The Q principle	The R principle
Make your contribution SUFFICIENT:	Make your contribution NECESSARY:
Say as much as you can (given both QUALITY and R).	Say no more than you must (given Q).
LOWER-BOUNDING principle, inducing UPPER-BOUNDING implicata	UPPER-BOUNDING principle, inducing LOWER-BOUNDING implicata
Collects Grice's QUANTITY ₁ maxim and MANNER _{1,2}	Collects Grice's RELATION maxim, QUANTITY ₂ , and MANNER _{3,4}

Typical examples of Q-implicatures are those arising from scalar contrasts between lexical items, for example that which holds between the English quantifiers *all* and *some*. These implicatures impose an upper bound on interpretation, LIMITING this strictly to "what is said". Thus, if I tell you that *I saw some of your friends at the party*, I will typically implicate, and you will infer, that I didn't see all of your friends at the party. Strictly speaking, however, this utterance is consistent with seeing all of your friends at the party, since it is not contradictory to say *I saw some, in fact all, of your friends at the*

party. In other words, the “not all” meaning normally expressed by *some* is cancelable, and therefore a conversational implicature (Grice 1975).

On the other hand, typical R-implicatures are those that derive from our stereotypical expectations about “how the world works”. Unlike the limiting nature of Q-implicatures, R-implicatures actually ENRICH interpretation beyond “what is said”. To take a rather well-known example, if I tell you that our friend John *took out the key and opened the door*, I will typically implicate, and you will infer, that John used the key to open the door (instead of, e.g., kicking the door in), despite the fact that nowhere in my utterance is this information made explicit. Again, note that this utterance is compatible with other interpretations, since it is perfectly felicitous for me to say *John took out the key and opened the door by kicking it in*. Thus, the “stereotypical” interpretation is cancelable, and therefore also a conversational implicature.

Koenig and Benndorf go on to show in particular that the semantics of the German adversative sentence conjunctions *aber* and *sondern* are differentially sensitive to the Q and R Principles. Not surprisingly, their Spanish counterparts, the conjunctions *pero* and *sino*, show exactly the same distribution with regard to these implicature types. Consider the contrasts in (16) and (17):

(16) Juan no es alto **sino** (***pero**) altísimo.
'Juan isn't tall but (rather) very tall.'

(17) Ana barrió el patio y limpió la cocina, **pero** (***sino**) no en ese orden.
'Ana swept the patio and cleaned the kitchen, but not in that order.'

In (16), where *sino* but not *pero* is possible, arising from the underlying non-negative assertion *Juan es alto* ‘Juan is tall’ there is a potential Q-implicature that the speaker does not believe (or does not have sufficient evidence to assert) that Juan is more than just “tall”. The function of *no* in (16) is to deny the “assertability” (Horn 1985) of *alto*; note that it does not deny the TRUTH of this adjective, rather, it objects to the lower bound that it implicates via Q-implicature (“tall and no more than tall”). The function of *sino* is that of introducing a correction (*altísimo*) that contravenes the upper bound set by the use of the scalar adjective *alto*. As the example shows, the use of *pero* here would be impossible.

As regards (17), where *pero* but not *sino* is possible, a fairly uncontroversial R-implicature arising from this utterance is that Ana performed the actions in the same order as they were mentioned in the utterance. Such an interpretation involves enrichment of the conjunction *y* ‘and’ to a more informative reading along the lines of “and then”. The function of *pero* here is to introduce new information that cancels the potential R-implicature (“not in that order”).

A problem with the analysis of (17), however, is that *sino* could be seen as an ungrammatical option not only because the implicature being canceled is an R-implicature instead of a Q-implicature, but also, and perhaps primarily, because there is no explicit negation of the first conjunct. Therefore, it is unclear which factor determines the ungrammaticality of *sino* in (17). To test the

behavior of *sino* with R-implicatures, then, it is necessary to consider an example in which the first conjunct is negated, as in (18):

- (18) María no es alta **pero** (#**sino que**) sabe jugar muy bien.
 ‘Maria isn’t tall, but she knows how to play well.’

In the context of choosing players for a basketball team, the utterance in (18) would be used to argue in favor of choosing Maria, despite her lack of height. A potential R-implicature from the first conjunct of (18) is that Maria doesn’t know how to play basketball (well): indeed, a stereotypical expectation about short people is that they don’t play basketball at all. While *pero* is perfectly acceptable introducing information to contravene this implicature, *sino* is not. Indeed, to the extent that it is possible, felicitous use of *sino* in (18) would force a very different interpretation, namely a denial and correction of *María es alta* ‘Maria is tall’. Thus, we now have clear evidence showing that the latter conjunction is not compatible with R-implicatures.

Given the foregoing evidence, one might argue that *pero* and *sino* are accessing R-implicatures and Q-implicatures directly, and that this information forms part of their inherent lexical semantics. However, there is a crucial problem for Koenig and Benndorf’s analysis—a problem which they recognize in their paper—when it is applied to the conjunctions *pero* and *sino*, as well as to the German forms they studied. While *pero* (= *aber*) accesses R-implicatures directly, it is not the lexical semantics of *sino* (= *sondern*) alone that is sensitive to Q-implicatures. Rather, it is the whole *no ... sino* construction (German *nicht ... sondern*), since explicit negation of the first conjunct with *no* is obligatory in order for *sino* to be grammatical (with the intended adversative meaning).

However, the contrast between the discourse connectives *pero* and *si* in dialogic contexts DOES seem to be regulated by the distinction between Q- and R-implicatures, as the data presented below illustrate. Obviously, *si* in this use does not require a prior negation like *sino* does, and thus it seems plausible to say that it encodes a sensitivity to Q-implicatures as part of its lexical semantics. Consider the examples in (19) and (20), where R+> means “R-implicates” and Q+> means “Q-implicates”:

- (19) L: Ana barrió el patio y limpió la cocina. (R+> “in that order”)
 ‘Ana swept the patio and cleaned the kitchen.’
 A: **Pero** (#**Si**) limpió la cocina primero.
 ‘But she cleaned the kitchen first.’
 (ALC)
- (20) M: Creo que te han tintado MAL el pelo. (Q+> “no worse than mal”)
 ‘I think they dyed your hair POORLY.’
 B: ¡**Si** (#**Pero**) me lo han tintado FATAL!
 ‘SI they dyed it HORRIBLY!’
 (ALC)

Example (19), a naturally-occurring example, illustrates what has already been said for *pero* in its use as an adversative conjunction at the sentential level: it is perfectly compatible with R-implicatures. The contrast in (20) shows however that it is *si*, not *pero*, that is most felicitous when the objection proffered is to a Q-implicature. M's utterance Q-implicates that *mal* is the strongest word applicable to describing the dye job on B's hair, but B herself contravenes the implicated upper bound and provides a stronger negative characterization: *fatal* entails *mal* in (20), but not vice-versa.³

More naturally-occurring examples from the Alicante corpus confirm the correlation between *pero* and R-implicature, on the one hand, and *si* and Q-implicature, on the other. Once again, it is important to notice how each connective is infelicitous when paired with the other's implicature-type. In other words, each connective appears to be specified not only for its positive sensitivity to one type of implicature, but also for its negative sensitivity to the other type of implicature.

- (21) U: Tu madre comió la pizza. (R+> “she ate all of it”)
 ‘Your mother ate the pizza.’
 L: **Pero** (#Si) no se la comió toda.
 ‘But she didn’t eat it all.’
 (ALC)

- (22) A: Su hermano tiene como cinco perros. (Q+> “no more than five”)
 ‘Her brother has like five dogs.’
 L: **Si** (#Pero) tiene por lo menos ocho.
 ‘SI he has at least eight.’
 (ALC)

In (21), L concedes that her mother did indeed eat some of the pizza, but objects to the R-implicature that she ate all of the pizza. While her *pero*-prefaced response is perfectly felicitous given the context, a response prefaced by *si* would have been decidedly odd. In contrast, the response introduced by *si* in (22)—objecting to the upper bound Q-implicated by *cinco* ‘five’—is impeccable, but a use of *pero* here would have resulted in infelicity.

At both the sentence and discourse levels, then, there are strong links between linguistic forms and types of pragmatic implicature. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the relationship between implicature-type and individual utterances is not as fixed as one might surmise from the examples presented above. Indeed, depending on the particular discourse context, as well as other factors such as intonational cues, a given utterance could give rise to either a Q- or an R-implicature. Nevertheless, the two connectives’ patterns of acceptability remain the same:

- (23a) A: Roberto está escribiendo la tesina. (Q+> “not his dissertation”)
 ‘Roberto is writing his bachelor’s thesis.’
 B: **Si** (#Pero) es su tesis doctoral.
 ‘SI it’s his doctoral dissertation.’

- (23b) A: Roberto está escribiendo la tesina. (R+> “he’s smart”)
 ‘Roberto is writing his bachelor’s thesis.’
 B: **Pero (#Si)** no es muy inteligente.
 ‘But he’s not very smart.’

A’s utterance in (23) could give rise to a Q-implicature like that seen in (23a), or to an R-implicature like the one in (23b). As the judgments show, the felicitous use of *pero* or *si* is once again dependent on the type of implicature being objected to.

In the oral presentation of this paper, it was pointed out to me that the use of *si* instead of *pero* could be made felicitous in an example like (23b) if the negation were not present. Indeed, an alternative dialogue like (24) is also a possibility:

- (24) A: Roberto está escribiendo la tesina.
 ‘Roberto is writing his bachelor’s thesis.’
 B: **Si (#Pero)** es muy inteligente.
 ‘SI he’s very smart.’

Though this is a constructed example, it is most plausibly situated in a discourse context in which A’s intention is to convey some degree of surprise about Roberto’s writing the thesis—this information runs counter to A’s expectations. B’s response targets this aspect of A’s utterance, and provides a correction that removes the potential for surprise about Roberto’s actions. In more general terms, what this example illustrates is that *pero* and *si*, while clearly sensitive to implicature-type, are not restricted to appearing ONLY when R- and Q-implicatures, respectively, are at issue. There are clearly other kinds of implicit information (e.g. pragmatic presuppositions) conveyed in discourse, and speakers often respond to these too. Therefore, speakers will employ a given connective depending on their communicative intentions (e.g. concession vs. refutation) at that moment in the discourse. In (24), where the most accessible interpretation is one in which speaker B is attempting to refute (some aspect of) speaker A’s assumptions about Roberto, *si* (or *pero si*) is much more felicitous than *pero*, as predicted from the analysis in Section 3 above.

Across different types of connective expressions (sentence conjunctions and discourse connectives), then, we see that the classification of forms given in Table 1 above also corresponds to sensitivity to implicature type. Table 2 summarizes this relationship between linguistic forms and implicatures. The adversative sentence conjunction *sino*, as noted above, is not on its own accessing Q-implicatures, but rather does so as part of the *no ... sino* construction. Nonetheless, I have included it in parentheses in Table 2 to further highlight its semantic/pragmatic similarity to discourse connective *si*. The symbols + and – should be understood as standing for “positively sensitive to” and “negatively sensitive to”, respectively.

Table 2: Spanish ‘but’ expressions, by sensitivity to implicature-type

	Q -IMPLICATURES	R -IMPLICATURES
<i>pero</i>	–	+
<i>(sino)/si</i>	+	–

The parallelism between the adversative sentence conjunctions and the adversative connectives argued for in Section 3 is once again corroborated by the data in this section, and show that the distinction between the Spanish forms is not independent of the distinction between Q- and R-implicatures. Going beyond these correspondences, the data presented in this section actually provide BETTER exemplars of what Koenig and Benndorf sought to illustrate in their discussion of the German adversative sentence conjunctions. As noted above, one of these authors’ main purposes was to show that the encoded meaning of lexical items can be sensitive to pragmatic implicatures, and specifically that this meaning “can make reference to and distinguish between R-based and Q-based implicatures” (Koenig and Benndorf 1998:366). However, in their study this goal was ultimately met in only partial fashion, as it was here when considering the contrast between *pero* and *sino* at the sentence level. What I have shown is that the meaning of *si* is DIRECTLY accessing Q-implicatures and rejecting R-implicatures, in paradigmatic contrast to its connective counterpart *pero*, whose lexical semantics is the mirror image of *si* with respect to these implicature-types.

5. Conclusion

The parallelism between the adversative sentence conjunction *sino* (as part of the *no ... sino* construction), and the dialogic discourse connective *si* which I have noted in prior research, has been corroborated in this paper by their similar sensitivity to Q-implicatures. Both of the latter connectives are incompatible with R-implicatures, which are the domain of *pero* both in its use as conjunction and discourse connective. The present study therefore provides strong corroboration for Koenig and Benndorf’s observation that “lexical semantics can be sensitive to distinctions hitherto believed to only be relevant to the contextual interpretation of utterances” (1998:384). Indeed, in the contrast between *pero* and *si* as dialogic discourse connectives, this study actually provides a better example than the German conjunctions studied by Koenig and Benndorf (1998).

From a broader perspective, the results of this research have important implications for pragmatic theorizing. A popular position held currently by researchers in Relevance theory (e.g. Carston 1998) is that competing pragmatic principles like Horn’s Q and R can be subsumed by an overarching Principle of Relevance. However, the data and analysis presented above demonstrate that this single principle cannot provide the theoretical detail necessary to explain the contrasting lexical sensitivities of the Spanish connective forms. The findings here thus accord well with recent work in diachronic semantic change (e.g. Traugott 1999), which has shown that multiple principles are needed in order to

make accurate predictions about where change is and is not possible. In short, then, a theory of pragmatics that allows for multiple principles is not only preferable but necessary.

Notes

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1. Throughout the paper, I have chosen to translate *pero* by ‘but’, and to leave *si* untranslated. While the most likely English translation would also be ‘but’, this potentially obscures the differences between the Spanish forms.

2. Horn does not include Gricean Quality (“be truthful”) in his reduction of the maxims, since he considers it to be “primary and essentially unreducible” (Horn 1989:194).

3. The fact that in these examples we are dealing with (in)felicity as opposed to (un)grammaticality is mainly a function of the discourse contexts in which they appear: in dialogues like (19) and (20) it is not accurate to say that a given reply is strictly ungrammatical, since in another context the reply would be perfectly acceptable. It should also be noted that some speakers’ intuitions on dialogic examples are gradient, in the sense that they find some examples much less acceptable than others. Nonetheless, the overall patterns of preference regarding the choice of *pero* or *si* are very robust across all the examples presented in this section.

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