Boston<=
/st1:City>, June 19, 2004 in The Nation
Those
perched above the clouds in the White House may be in denial, but the
"F" word is heard more and more in Washington these days. Barring a mirac=
ulous
consolidation of power by Prime Minister Iyad <=
span
class=3DSpellE>Allawi and his new Baghdad
government, the present course seems headed into the jaws
of failure. The bold new thinking necessary to avert disaster, as suggested=
by
several contributors to the forum, is unlikely.
There
are a number of reasons to doubt that the new government will enjoy sufficient moral authority to guide Iraq toward UN-supervised elections by yea=
r's
end, not least the demonstrated US
intolerance of Iraqi officials unwilling to toe the line. Lakhdar
Brahimi has become little more than a multilateral stage prop. The transiti=
onal
government led by Allawi will find legitimacy e=
lusive
unless the United States can
be kept at arm's length, which means reducing visible US dividends from invading Iraq. A=
Bush
Administration bent on re-election will not look kindly on a further whittl=
ing
of already much diminished dividends. Ambassador John Negroponte will
"reel in" independent-minded Iraqi officials or subvert their
authority.
US officials have yet to come =
to
terms with the core dilemma in Iraq:
to end the insurgency's momentum, Washington
must pay a heavy toll in prestige and reputation, not to mention a domestic
political penalty for a tacit admission of failure. Instead, the Bush
Administration will cling to the illusion that it can engineer a satisfacto=
ry
outcome in Baghdad=
.
Grand
Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most influential voice for Iraq's =
Shiite
Muslim majority, offered only a
conditional stamp of approval for the new government, which, he emphasizes,=
is
un-elected. He poses key criteria to judge
the government's performance: the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty and the
establishment of comprehensive security. Neither condition is likely to be =
met.
Iraqi sovereignty will mean little in the face of "military
necessity."
The
resistance attacks are unlikely to end or even taper off. Senior US offi=
cers
persistently underestimate and seriously misread the challenge. Gen. John <=
span
class=3DSpellE>Abizaid, for instance, has claimed that the fighters =
are a
force of only 5,000. In Lebanon
the Israeli army faced a resistance force with a full-time cadre of fewer t=
han
500. Other fighters were weekend mujahedeen--mechanics,
optometrists, bakers--who disappeared for a few days on operation and then
returned to work. That force prompted a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from =
Lebanon=
in May
2000. In Iraq, as in Lebanon, a village force of five or ten draws strength
from cousins, friends and co-religionists and grows ac=
cordionlike--5,000
becomes 25,000.
Options
and choices that are now visible in the rearview mirror are gone. It is not=
as
though one missed a turn on the freeway and can double back to choose a new
route. Early on the =
United
States lost the opportunity to win a bro=
ader
legitimacy for its occupation because it was determined to marginalize the =
UN.
The United States has
effectively checkmated itself in Iraq.
A
century and a half ago, Florence Nightingale, the Crimean War nurse who bec=
ame
a leading hospital reformer, offered a wise comment: "It may seem a
strange principle to enunciate as the very first requirement in a Hospital =
that
it should do the sick no harm." In Ira=
q,
the United States
has illustrated the limits of its power, and it has spread disease rather t=
han
cured sickness. The Middle East is a muc=
h more
dangerous region today than it was two years ago.
AUGUSTUS
RICHARD NORTON For all letters see: htt=
p://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=3D20040719&s=3Dletter<=
/span>
F=
or the
original article on =
Iraq:
http=
://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=3D20040524&s=3Dforum