

CURRICULUM VITAE

Zvika Neeman

September, 2004

Personal

Born in Petach-Tikva, Israel, 1966. Married +1.

Academic Degrees

B.Sc. Mathematics, Magna Cum Laude, Tel Aviv University, 1990.

M.A. Economics, Summa Cum Laude, Tel Aviv University, 1991.

Ph.D. Managerial Economics & Decision Science, Northwestern University, 1995.

Academic Appointments

2003 – present. Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Boston University.

2000 – present. Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.

1995 – 2003. Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Boston University.

1995. Lecturer, J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.

Teaching Interests & Experience

Environmental Economics, Game Theory, Information Economics, Intermediate Microeconomics, Microeconomic Theory, Public Economics.

Journal Articles

Published

1. “On Determining the Importance of Attributes with a Stopping Problem,” *Mathematical Social Sciences* 29 (1995), 195-212.
2. “Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p -Beliefs,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 12 (1996), 162-164.
3. “Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 16 (1996), 77-96.
4. “Herding and the winner’s curse in markets with sequential bids,” with Gerhard Orosel, *Journal of Economic Theory* 85 (1999), 91-121.
5. “The Freedom to Contract and the Free Rider Problem,” *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 15 (1999), 685-703.
6. “Termination and Coordination in Partnerships,” with Deborah Minehart, *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy* 8 (1999), 191-221.

7. "Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information," *Review of Economic Studies* 66 (1999), 679-691.
8. "Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition," with Enriqueta Aragones, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 12 (2000), 183-204.
9. "The Scope of Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information," with Ehud Lehrer, *Review of Economic Studies* 67 (2000), 309-326.
10. "Optimal Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities," with Deborah Minehart, *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 43 (2002), 303-324.
11. "Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis," with Gerhard Orosel, *Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy* 1 (2002), Vol. 1: No. 1, Article 6, <http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol1/iss1/art6>.
12. "A Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization," with Leonard Wantchekon, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 14 (2002), 439-464.
13. "Asymptotic Strategyproofness of Majority and Borda rules," with Eyal Baharad, *Review of Economic Design* 7 (2002), 331-340.
14. "The Effectiveness of English Auctions," *Games and Economic Behavior* 43 (2003), 214-238.
15. "Incentive Structures for Class Action Lawyers," with Alon Klement, *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 20 (2004), 102-124.
16. "Contestable Licensing," with Gerhard Orosel, *Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy* 3 (2004), Vol. 3: No. 1, Article 1, <http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol3/iss1/art1>.
17. "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design," *Journal of Economic Theory* 117 (2004), 55-77.
18. "Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach," with Alon Klement, *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 21 (2005), in press.

Submitted/Under Revision

19. "Markets Versus Negotiations: an Experimental Analysis," with Tamar Kugler and Nir Vulkan, revised and resubmitted, *Games and Economic Behavior*.
20. "The Robustness of Scoring Rules Against Inefficient Manipulation," with Eyal Baharad.
21. "Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance," with Gerhard Orosel.

22. “Markets Versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets,” with Nir Vulkan.
23. “On the Impossibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design,” with Aviad Heifetz.

Work in Progress

24. “The Quality of Information and Incentives for Effort,” with Omer Moav.
25. “Inspection in Markets for Experience Goods,” with Omer Moav.
26. “A Political Economy Model of Corporate Governance,” with Lucian Bebchuk.
27. “Corruption and Openness,” with Daniele Paserman and Avi Simhon.

Presentations in the Last Four Years

2000 – 2001: NBER Decentralization conference at IBM Research Laboratories; Tel-Aviv University; Center for Rationality at the Hebrew University; Haifa University; Hebrew University (twice); Cornell; University of Helsinki; University of Vienna; University of Copenhagen.

2001 – 2002: Ben-Gurion University; Bar-Ilan University; Hebrew University; CLEO conference on “Mechanism Design and the Law” at USC; Harvard (Law and Economics); Boston University.

2002 – 2003: Tel-Aviv University (twice); Stanford; UCLA; LSE; UCL; HEC; Haifa University; Technion; European University; Ecole Polytechnique.

2003 – 2004: NBER Decentralization conference at Duke; “Robust Mechanism Design” conference at Yale; Chicago; Washington University; Rutgers; Boston University; Harvard/MIT.

Research Grants

NSF Grant No. SBR-9806832; proposal title: “Mechanism Design, Reconsidered.” Amount and Duration: \$115,944, 1998-2000.