Appendix

Voting for Democracy: Campaign Effects in Chile's Democratic Transition

Taylor C. Boas

Boston University

November 18, 2011

1 Descriptive Statistics

As discussed on page 14, the research design only allows for inferences regarding the behavior of the treatment group—those with more knowledge of the "Yes" than the "No" campaign advertising. Luckily, this group is similar to other respondents as a whole in terms of basic demographics (Table 1) and does not appear "unusual" in any obvious way.

2 Balance Statistics for Interaction Terms

The main text reports balance statistics for the covariates and squared terms used in matching, but not for the interaction terms; these are reported in Table 2. As noted on page 15, p-values from difference-in-means t-tests and bootstrapped Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests were no lower than .107 for the "No" control group and .091 for the "Both" control group.

3 Derivation for the Non-Response Simulation

As discussed on pages 17–18, I conducted a simulation in which respondents refusing to answer the vote choice question were randomly reassigned to the "Yes" and "No" voting categories based on different assumptions about the relative non-response propensities of true "Yes" and "No" voters. The derivation below shows that the true number of "Yes" and "No" votes for each treatment or control group can be expressed as a function of the reported voting frequencies and the single unknown parameter r that varies in the simulation.

For treatment or control group j, let n_j equal the true number of respondents voting "No," $\hat{n}_j$ the number that reported a "No" vote, y_j the true number of respondents voting "Yes," $\hat{y}_j$ the number that reported a "Yes" vote, $\hat{m}_j$ the number missing due to non-response, p_j the proportion of true "No" voters that did not respond, and rp_j the proportion of true "Yes" voters that did not respond. The ratio of "Yes" to "No" non-response propensities, r, is assumed to be constant across treatment

and control groups. It is also assumed that everyone in the non-response category cast a valid "Yes" or "No" vote, rather than abstaining or voting blank/null.

Because p_j and rp_j are proportions,

$$0 \leq p_j \leq 1 \tag{1}$$

and

$$0 \leq rp_j \leq 1 \tag{2}$$

The relationship among the quantities defined above can be expressed as a system of three equations in four unknowns:

$$y_j + n_j = \hat{y}_j + \hat{n}_j + \hat{m}_j \tag{3}$$

$$n_j = \frac{\hat{n}_j}{1 - p_j} \tag{4}$$

$$y_j = \frac{\hat{y}_j}{1 - rp_j} \tag{5}$$

By solving for n_j and y_j as a function of the single unknown parameter r, and then letting r take on a range of values, we can conduct a simulation in which the appropriate number of voters in the non-response category are randomly reassigned to the "No" and "Yes" vote categories, and treatment effects and standard errors are calculated for each value of r. To proceed, we will first solve for p_j as a function of r, and then substitute into (4) and (5).

Substituting (4) and (5) into (3), and multiplying through by the common denominator:

$$(1-p_j)(1-rp_j)\left(\frac{\hat{n}_j}{1-p_j}+\frac{\hat{y}_j}{1-rp_j}\right)=(\hat{y}_j+\hat{n}_j+\hat{m}_j)(1-p_j)(1-rp_j^2) \tag{6}$$

$$\hat{n}_j(1-rp_j)+\hat{y}_j(1-p_j)=(\hat{y}_j+\hat{n}_j+\hat{m}_j)(1-p_j-rp_j+rp_j^2) \tag{7}$$

$$0=p_j^2[r(\hat{y}_j+\hat{n}_j+\hat{m}_j)]-p_j[\hat{n}_j+(1+r)\hat{m}_j+r\hat{y}_j]+\hat{m}_j \tag{8}$$

Applying the quadratic formula:

$$p_j=\frac{\hat{n}_j+(1+r)\hat{m}_j+r\hat{y}_j\pm\sqrt{\{-[\hat{n}_j+(1+r)\hat{m}_j+r\hat{y}_j]\}^2-4\hat{m}_jr(\hat{y}_j+\hat{n}_j+\hat{m}_j)}}{2r(\hat{y}_j+\hat{n}_j+\hat{m}_j)} \tag{9}$$

$$p_j=\frac{\hat{n}_j+(1+r)\hat{m}_j+r\hat{y}_j\pm\sqrt{(\hat{n}_j+r\hat{y}_j)^2+\hat{m}_j^2(r^2-2r+1)+2\hat{m}_j\hat{n}_j(1-r)+2r\hat{m}_j\hat{y}_j(1-r)}}{2r(\hat{y}_j+\hat{n}_j+\hat{m}_j)} \tag{10}$$

$$p_j=\frac{\hat{n}_j+(1+r)\hat{m}_j+r\hat{y}_j\pm\sqrt{(\hat{n}_j+r\hat{y}_j)^2+[\hat{m}_j(1-r)]^2+2\hat{m}_j(1-r)(\hat{n}_j-r\hat{y}_j)}}{2r(\hat{y}_j+\hat{n}_j+\hat{m}_j)} \tag{11}$$

Though there are two roots, only the lesser of the two is valid. First, consider the greater root when $r>1$. Note that $\hat{n}_j+r\hat{y}_j\geq\hat{n}_j-r\hat{y}_j$ because $\hat{y}_j>0$. Hence, by modifying the last term under the radical in the numerator of (11),

$$p_j\geq\frac{\hat{n}_j+(1+r)\hat{m}_j+r\hat{y}_j+\sqrt{(\hat{n}_j+r\hat{y}_j)^2+[\hat{m}_j(1-r)]^2+2\hat{m}_j(1-r)(\hat{n}_j+r\hat{y}_j)}}{2r(\hat{y}_j+\hat{n}_j+\hat{m}_j)} \tag{12}$$

$$p_j \geq \frac{\hat{n}_j + r\hat{y}_j + \hat{m}_j + r\hat{m}_j + \sqrt{(\hat{n}_j + r\hat{y}_j + \hat{m}_j - r\hat{m}_j)^2}}{2r(\hat{y}_j + \hat{n}_j + \hat{m}_j)} \tag{13}$$

$$rp_j \geq \frac{r\hat{y}_j + \hat{n}_j + \hat{m}_j}{\hat{y}_j + \hat{n}_j + \hat{m}_j} \tag{14}$$

Because $r > 1$, the right-hand side of (14) is greater than 1, which violates (2). Next, consider when $r < 1$. By modifying (11) in a slightly different fashion,

$$p_j \geq \frac{\hat{n}_j + (1+r)\hat{m}_j + r\hat{y}_j + \sqrt{(\hat{n}_j + r\hat{y}_j)^2 + [\hat{m}_j(1-r)]^2 - 2\hat{m}_j(1-r)(\hat{n}_j + r\hat{y}_j)}}{2r(\hat{y}_j + \hat{n}_j + \hat{m}_j)} \tag{15}$$

$$p_j \geq \frac{\hat{n}_j + r\hat{y}_j + \hat{m}_j + r\hat{m}_j + \sqrt{(\hat{n}_j + r\hat{y}_j - \hat{m}_j + r\hat{m}_j)^2}}{2r(\hat{y}_j + \hat{n}_j + \hat{m}_j)} \tag{16}$$

$$p_j \geq \frac{r\hat{y}_j + \hat{n}_j + r\hat{m}_j}{r\hat{y}_j + r\hat{n}_j + r\hat{m}_j} \tag{17}$$

Because $r < 1$, the right-hand side of (17) is greater than 1, which violates (1). Finally, consider the case when $r = 1$:

$$p_j = \frac{\hat{n}_j + 2\hat{m}_j + \hat{y}_j + \sqrt{(\hat{n}_j + \hat{y}_j)^2}}{2(\hat{y}_j + \hat{n}_j + \hat{m}_j)} = 1 \tag{18}$$

But in this case, both (4) and (5) are undefined. Thus, only the lesser root is valid:

$$p_j = \frac{\hat{n}_j + (1+r)\hat{m}_j + r\hat{y}_j - \sqrt{(\hat{n}_j + r\hat{y}_j)^2 + [\hat{m}_j(1-r)]^2 + 2\hat{m}_j(1-r)(\hat{n}_j - r\hat{y}_j)}}{2r(\hat{y}_j + \hat{n}_j + \hat{m}_j)} \tag{19}$$

Substituting (19) into (4) and (5) gives the equations for n_j and y_j that are used in the simulation,

where r takes on a vector of values between $\frac{1}{3}$ and 3:

$$\mathbf{r} = \begin{pmatrix} 3^{-1} & 2.9^{-1} & \dots & 1.1^{-1} & 1 & 1.1 & \dots & 2.9 & 3 \end{pmatrix}$$

Results from the simulation are presented in Table 3 at the end of this appendix.

4 Placebo Test Results

As discussed on pages 18–19, for a placebo test involving an alternative treatment, I examined the effect of watching soap operas (*TVsoaps*) and televised movies/serials (*TVmovie*) on vote choice. The basic procedure is to show that there is a significant bivariate relationship before matching between each covariate and the outcome, and that after matching, the relationship disappears. Because the outcome is a multi-category variable, I tested these bivariate relationships by estimating a multinomial logistic regression of vote choice on each covariate plus an intercept. Coefficients for the alternative treatment variable in each for these four regressions are in Table 4.

5 Results from a Parametric Model

To check whether results change when estimating a parametric model on the matched dataset, I conducted a multinomial logistic regression of vote choice on the covariates and squared terms used in matching along with indicator variables for the two control conditions. I then used this model to calculate predicted probabilities for each individual in the matched dataset and took averages for each treatment and control condition, generating figures can be directly compared to the voting proportions and ATT estimates derived from matching. Results are in Table 5.

Table 1: Treatment Group versus Other Respondents. P-values are for t-tests assuming equal variance. *Urban* is an indicator variable for residing in Santiago, Valparaíso, Viña del Mar, or Concepción.

	Mean, "Yes" message	Mean, other respondents	P-value, difference
Age	40.8	38.1	.058
Education (0-6)	3.19	3.03	.227
Family Income (1-9)	3.15	3.18	.837
Religiosity (0-3)	1.14	1.15	.900
Employed (%)	41.4	42.5	.738
Male (%)	46.8	49.4	.545
Urban (%)	58.9	56.5	.576

Table 2: Balance Statistics for Interaction Terms Before and After Matching. 'Std. mean diff.' is the mean difference of the treated and control observations divided by the standard deviation of the treated observations. P-values are from bootstrapped Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests or mean difference t-tests (two-sample before matching, paired after matching). See main text for variable descriptions.

	"Yes" vs. "No"				"Yes" vs. Both			
	100 × Std. mean diff.		Min. p-val., KS or t-test		100 × Std. mean diff.		Min. p-val., KS or t-test	
Covariate	**Before**	**After**	**Before**	**After**	**Before**	**After**	**Before**	**After**
Education × Family Income	-4.04	5.90	0.57	0.35	24.44	1.43	0.01	0.19
Education × Age	17.53	1.24	0.04	0.71	51.01	2.68	0	0.5
Education × Religiosity	1.19	5.61	0.55	0.38	29.13	-8.13	0	0.29
Education × Male	-4.40	6.65	0.60	0.37	9.29	-3.5	0.19	0.66
Education × Employed	-8.46	-0.74	0.34	0.78	8	-2.6	0.37	0.56
Education × Urban	1.41	-3.33	0.87	0.44	15.54	-5.33	0.03	0.09
Education × TVnews	10.21	5.23	0.24	0.45	41.29	-2.17	0	0.72
Education × TVinfo	21.85	-0.93	0.01	0.81	48.84	-1.87	0	0.48
Education × Opposition Paper	-26.70	3.41	0.01	0.35	-64.99	3.41	0	0.37
Education × Opposition Radio	-11.94	1.00	0.08	0.72	-23.67	4.99	0.01	0.52
Education × UCTV	-22.95	1.11	0.01	0.65	-11.19	4.42	0	0.18
Education × TVN	18.04	-0.31	0.04	0.95	37.3	-6.1	0	0.36
Family Income × Age	14.34	8.15	0.04	0.18	10.25	1.28	0.21	0.6
Family Income × Religiosity	-2.03	-0.34	0.30	0.75	-4.75	1.89	0.24	0.82
Family Income × Male	3.59	-3.64	0.68	0.62	-21.14	-6.83	0.03	0.35
Family Income × Employed	2.92	-0.73	0.62	0.91	-15.11	0.13	0.11	0.97
Family Income × Urban	12.67	-1.84	0.15	0.64	-18.41	-1.13	0.05	0.79
Family Income × TVnews	4.32	0.67	0.62	0.93	-12.6	0.49	0.09	0.63
Family Income × TVinfo	9.63	-5.24	0.08	0.56	19.3	-10.41	0.04	0.33
Family Income × Opposition Paper	-11.46	2.35	0.08	0.53	-76.58	2.35	0	0.37
Family Income × Opposition Radio	-9.42	2.51	0.24	0.48	-50.19	5.75	0	0.55
Family Income × UCTV	-8.01	-1.59	0.03	0.66	-34.78	2.1	0	0.62
Family Income × TVN	3.13	2.75	0.17	0.56	9.19	-11.9	0	0.16
Age × Religiosity	9.22	0.37	0.16	0.65	27.55	-2.64	0	0.71

Age × Male	5.05	3.20	0.56	0.70	3.85	-8.03	0.43	0.33
Age × Employed	1.44	1.49	0.87	0.50	3.47	4.66	0.45	0.24
Age × Urban	12.31	-1.77	0.14	0.65	13.44	-2.01	0.06	0.39
Age × TVnews	19.88	5.76	0.02	0.36	37.77	0.64	0	0.45
Age × TVinfo	25.38	-4.32	0.00	0.41	46.82	-2.38	0	0.8
Age × Opposition Paper	-26.93	0.26	0.01	0.89	-75.25	-1.63	0	0.31
Age × Opposition Radio	-12.89	1.74	0.16	0.61	-25.85	5.59	0.01	0.6
Age × UCTV	-15.63	0.26	0.07	0.83	-17.15	-1.05	0.06	0.65
Age × TVN	19.68	-1.85	0.02	0.71	35.14	-5.4	0	0.44
Religiosity × Male	-12.99	-0.92	0.16	0.93	-15.25	-14.09	0.11	0.13
Religiosity × Employed	-1.67	-2.57	0.79	0.78	1.72	2.05	0.85	0.75
Religiosity × Urban	3.15	-2.81	0.72	0.60	1.78	-1.74	0.84	0.73
Religiosity × TVnews	2.80	8.03	0.75	0.31	14.29	1.89	0.11	0.82
Religiosity × TVinfo	13.58	-8.41	0.09	0.35	30.18	-5.06	0	0.6
Religiosity × Opposition Paper	-38.17	0.00	0.00	0.97	-87.2	4	0	0.6
Religiosity × Opposition Radio	-21.94	5.08	0.02	0.39	-33.73	4.88	0	0.63
Religiosity × UCTV	-26.40	-1.72	0.00	0.65	-24.91	2.01	0	0.75
Religiosity × TVN	15.36	5.81	0.03	0.39	22.36	-14.94	0	0.12
Male × Employed	-5.76	-8.39	0.52	0.30	-4.8	6.99	0.61	0.22
Male × Urban	-2.21	-5.80	0.80	0.39	-13.73	-5.8	0.14	0.35
Male × TVnews	1.81	-0.47	0.59	0.78	-4.92	-4.73	0.4	0.54
Male × TVinfo	12.64	5.59	0.15	0.54	15.37	-8.39	0.09	0.4
Male × Opposition Paper	-13.41	2.88	0.15	0.56	-66.92	0	0	1
Male × Opposition Radio	-12.80	2.59	0.17	0.71	-46.18	2.59	0	0.8
Male × UCTV	-14.66	-10.43	0.11	0.11	-29.31	5.96	0	0.25
Male × TVN	10.14	7.03	0.25	0.35	16.83	-12.3	0.06	0.14
Employed × Urban	3.71	2.93	0.68	0.62	-9.78	-2.93	0.3	0.16
Employed × TVnews	-1.46	0.00	0.87	0.88	-1.54	-2.5	0.87	0.57
Employed × TVinfo	8.07	2.90	0.36	0.74	20.66	1.45	0.02	0.86
Employed × Opposition Paper	-19.40	3.60	0.05	0.56	-64.92	0	0	1
Employed × Opposition Radio	-5.58	5.18	0.54	0.48	-36.39	-2.59	0	0.8
Employed × UCTV	-14.31	-7.94	0.12	0.16	-24.42	0	0.01	1
Employed × TVN	10.39	6.91	0.23	0.37	18.28	0	0.04	1

Urban × TVnews	4.18	-1.91	0.64	0.75	-4.75	-3.82	0.55	0.36
Urban × TVinfo	8.00	-4.05	0.37	0.56	17.84	-12.15	0.05	0.15
Urban × Opposition Paper	-9.76	0.00	0.29	1.00	-64.69	0	0	1
Urban × Opposition Radio	-6.73	0.00	0.46	1.00	-35.7	5.69	0	0.53
Urban × UCTV	-6.07	-1.38	0.50	0.56	-25.2	0	0.01	1
Urban × TVN	10.12	3.26	0.25	0.48	15.36	-9.78	0.09	0.18
TVnews × TVinfo	20.02	-0.46	0.02	0.96	37.23	-3.22	0	0.62
TVnews × Opposition Paper	-18.54	3.87	0.05	0.49	-71.35	3.87	0	0.1
TVnews × Opposition Radio	-20.12	-0.79	0.03	0.89	-42.39	0	0	0.97
TVnews × UCTV	-16.76	-3.80	0.02	0.41	-24.94	4.27	0.01	0.29
TVnews × TVN	16.80	4.49	0.05	0.38	26.68	-10.98	0	0.12
TVinfo × Opposition Paper	-2.97	0.00	0.74	1.00	-10.45	10.81	0.29	0.18
TVinfo × Opposition Radio	2.95	-5.18	0.74	0.56	4.55	12.96	0.61	0.2
TVinfo × UCTV	4.50	1.40	0.61	0.82	11.05	4.19	0.22	0.6
TVinfo × TVN	11.50	-5.85	0.19	0.37	23.39	-14.63	0.01	0.13
Opposition Paper × Opposition Radio	-25.78	0.00	0.01	1.00	-87.2	-14.42	0	0.1
Opposition Paper × UCTV	-36.19	3.30	0.00	0.32	-110.58	0	0	1
Opposition Radio × UCTV	-34.87	2.48	0.00	0.32	-73.2	-17.35	0	0.11

Table 3: Non-Response Simulation Results

	"No" Vote						"Yes" Vote					
r	$ATT_{yes/no}$	p-value	$ATT_{yes/both}$	p-value	Difference	p-value	$ATT_{yes/no}$	p-value	$ATT_{yes/both}$	p-value	Difference	p-value
3.0^{-1}	-0.037	0.519	-0.035	0.544	-0.002	0.974	0.125	0.012	0.054	0.311	0.072	0.261
2.9^{-1}	-0.043	0.454	-0.041	0.470	-0.001	0.984	0.131	0.009	0.060	0.256	0.071	0.268
2.8^{-1}	-0.043	0.455	-0.041	0.472	-0.002	0.980	0.131	0.009	0.060	0.257	0.071	0.265
2.7^{-1}	-0.043	0.454	-0.041	0.475	-0.002	0.979	0.131	0.009	0.060	0.260	0.071	0.266
2.6^{-1}	-0.043	0.453	-0.041	0.470	-0.002	0.981	0.132	0.009	0.060	0.257	0.071	0.266
2.5^{-1}	-0.042	0.464	-0.047	0.412	0.005	0.942	0.130	0.010	0.066	0.217	0.064	0.318
2.4^{-1}	-0.043	0.456	-0.047	0.409	0.005	0.946	0.131	0.009	0.066	0.214	0.065	0.314
2.3^{-1}	-0.042	0.464	-0.048	0.405	0.006	0.934	0.130	0.009	0.067	0.212	0.064	0.323
2.2^{-1}	-0.049	0.394	-0.053	0.355	0.004	0.951	0.137	0.007	0.072	0.179	0.065	0.313
2.1^{-1}	-0.049	0.395	-0.054	0.349	0.005	0.943	0.137	0.007	0.073	0.175	0.064	0.320
2.0^{-1}	-0.049	0.395	-0.054	0.350	0.005	0.943	0.137	0.007	0.073	0.176	0.064	0.319
1.9^{-1}	-0.055	0.340	-0.052	0.369	-0.002	0.972	0.143	0.005	0.071	0.191	0.072	0.269
1.8^{-1}	-0.048	0.401	-0.052	0.365	0.004	0.951	0.137	0.007	0.071	0.188	0.065	0.317
1.7^{-1}	-0.054	0.347	-0.059	0.311	0.005	0.941	0.142	0.005	0.078	0.153	0.064	0.326
1.6^{-1}	-0.060	0.291	-0.065	0.266	0.005	0.950	0.149	0.003	0.084	0.126	0.065	0.322
1.5^{-1}	-0.061	0.288	-0.065	0.268	0.004	0.955	0.149	0.003	0.084	0.127	0.066	0.319
1.4^{-1}	-0.059	0.297	-0.071	0.224	0.012	0.870	0.148	0.004	0.090	0.102	0.058	0.381
1.3^{-1}	-0.066	0.246	-0.069	0.238	0.003	0.967	0.155	0.003	0.088	0.112	0.067	0.317
1.2^{-1}	-0.072	0.205	-0.076	0.198	0.004	0.959	0.161	0.002	0.095	0.089	0.066	0.323
1.1^{-1}	-0.071	0.210	-0.082	0.167	0.010	0.885	0.160	0.002	0.101	0.072	0.059	0.376
1.0	-0.084	0.138	-0.095	0.111	0.010	0.888	0.173	0.001	0.114	0.045	0.059	0.377
1.1	-0.084	0.141	-0.093	0.119	0.010	0.896	0.172	0.001	0.112	0.049	0.060	0.374
1.2	-0.084	0.142	-0.099	0.099	0.016	0.829	0.172	0.001	0.118	0.039	0.054	0.428
1.3	-0.088	0.122	-0.099	0.101	0.011	0.885	0.177	0.001	0.118	0.041	0.059	0.387
1.4	-0.089	0.118	-0.105	0.082	0.016	0.822	0.177	0.001	0.124	0.032	0.053	0.438
1.5	-0.094	0.098	-0.110	0.069	0.016	0.823	0.183	0.000	0.129	0.026	0.053	0.438
1.6	-0.093	0.099	-0.109	0.073	0.016	0.832	0.182	0.001	0.128	0.029	0.054	0.433
1.7	-0.100	0.076	-0.116	0.057	0.016	0.830	0.189	0.000	0.135	0.022	0.054	0.435
1.8	-0.100	0.078	-0.122	0.046	0.022	0.759	0.188	0.000	0.141	0.017	0.047	0.496
1.9	-0.100	0.077	-0.122	0.046	0.022	0.765	0.188	0.000	0.141	0.017	0.048	0.491
2.0	-0.099	0.078	-0.121	0.049	0.021	0.769	0.188	0.000	0.140	0.019	0.048	0.489
2.1	-0.106	0.061	-0.127	0.039	0.021	0.775	0.194	0.000	0.146	0.014	0.049	0.485
2.2	-0.098	0.082	-0.127	0.039	0.029	0.692	0.186	0.000	0.146	0.014	0.041	0.561
2.3	-0.104	0.063	-0.133	0.031	0.029	0.693	0.193	0.000	0.152	0.011	0.041	0.558
2.4	-0.104	0.064	-0.133	0.031	0.029	0.694	0.192	0.000	0.152	0.011	0.041	0.559
2.5	-0.104	0.064	-0.131	0.034	0.028	0.707	0.192	0.000	0.150	0.012	0.042	0.549
2.6	-0.104	0.064	-0.131	0.034	0.027	0.709	0.192	0.000	0.150	0.012	0.042	0.547
2.7	-0.104	0.063	-0.131	0.034	0.027	0.711	0.193	0.000	0.150	0.012	0.043	0.545
2.8	-0.103	0.065	-0.138	0.026	0.034	0.639	0.192	0.000	0.157	0.009	0.035	0.616
2.9	-0.103	0.064	-0.138	0.025	0.035	0.633	0.192	0.000	0.157	0.009	0.035	0.621
3.0	-0.103	0.066	-0.130	0.036	0.027	0.712	0.191	0.000	0.149	0.014	0.043	0.547

Table 4: Alternative Treatment Placebo Test. Each line reports coefficients and standard errors from a bivariate multinomial logistic regression of vote choice on the covariate plus an intercept (not shown). Reference category is "Yes" vote. ** $p < .01$.

		Plebiscite Vote:		
		"No"	Blank/none	No response
Pre-matching (N = 1242)	1. TVsoaps	-0.15**	0.039	-0.052
		(0.061)	(0.094)	(0.073)
	2. TVmovie	-0.21**	-0.15	-0.071
		(0.083)	(0.13)	(0.099)
Post-matching (N = 474)	3. TVsoaps	-0.095	0.11	-1.1
		(0.089)	(0.13)	(0.81)
	4. TVmovie	-0.089	0.13	-0.041
		(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.15)

Table 5: Message Reception and Plebiscite Vote: Results from a Multinomial Logistic Model. In the top panel, entries represent the mean predicted voting probabilities for individuals in each treatment or control group in the matched dataset. N = 158 for each group.

		Plebiscite Vote:			
		"No"	"Yes"	Blank/none	No response
Message Reception:	"Yes" (treatment)	0.391	0.324	0.059	0.225
	"No" (control)	0.485	0.211	0.142	0.162
	Both (control)	0.528	0.286	0.077	0.109
Treatment Effect:	$ATT_{yes/no}$	-0.094	0.113	-0.083	0.063
	$ATT_{yes/both}$	-0.137	0.039	-0.017	0.116
	$ATT_{yes/no}$ - $ATT_{yes/both}$	0.043	0.075	-0.066	-0.052