

Supplementary Materials:  
Religion, Sexuality Politics, and the Transformation of  
Latin American Electorates

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# 1 Sexuality Politics vs. Other Issues in Campaigns

In the main text, we note that leftist and rightist candidates reliably stake out opposing positions on economic redistribution and crime and security, but they have not consistently done so with sexuality politics. Figure 1 summarizes data from the Comparative Manifestos Project on party programs in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico from 1988–2018.<sup>1</sup> While there is a lot of variation in stance on the welfare state, and a moderate amount on law and order, parties in these countries have rarely adopted contrasting positions—or even said much at all—about issues of “traditional morality,” including divorce, abortion, and the separation of church and state. Forty-four percent of programs say nothing about these issues, versus 8% that ignore law and order and only 1% that say nothing about the welfare state.

## 2 Gaps in Key Issue Attitudes, by Religion


Below we present results from a series of multivariate models of four issue attitudes from the AmericasBarometer data. Measurement of these attitudes—support for reducing inequality, getting tough on crime, same-sex marriage, and therapeutic abortion—is discussed in the main text. In addition to controlling for religious affiliation and church attendance, these models also include controls for gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, education, size of place of residence, age, and year (a time-trend, with ‘1’ = the 2012 wave, and ‘4’ = the 2018/19 wave). Models of same-sex marriage and economic views are estimated using OLS, while models of abortion and crime views are estimated using logistic regression.

Table 1 shows the independent effects of church attendance and religious affiliation on each of the four attitudes; however, these models implicitly assume that the role of church

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<sup>1</sup>We omit Mexican party programs prior to 1988, as well as those from Bolivia in 2009 and 2014 and Uruguay in 2014, in order to analyze a similar time period for a common set of countries. No other Latin American countries are covered in the 2019b release of the Manifesto Project Dataset.

Figure 1: Issue Dimensions in Party Programs, 1988–2018



Data are drawn from the Comparative Manifestos Project for all party programs from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, 1988–2018.

attendance is invariant across religious groups. To assess in greater detail how religious groups' attitudes vary across the range of church attendance, Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 show the predicted values of the various dependent variables, based on models in which religious affiliation and church attendance are interacted with each other.<sup>2</sup> Interactive analysis is particularly important because of the very large differences between Catholics and evangelicals in church attendance. Only ten percent of Catholics report attending church more than once a week and another 28 percent weekly, while 41 percent of evangelicals/Protestants report attending church more than weekly, and another 27 percent weekly.

<sup>2</sup>Confidence intervals in the figures are suppressed for the sake of legibility.

On economic redistribution and crime, religious variables are actually associated with somewhat more progressive views in Table 1. Support for state action to reduce inequality is uncorrelated with church attendance, but Protestants and evangelicals hold slightly more progressive views than do Catholics. Turning to crime attitudes, we find larger religious effects. Both church attendance and Protestant (versus Catholic) religious affiliation reduce the likelihood a respondent would say that the state needed to get tougher on crime. As Figure 3 shows, the negative effect of church attendance is found within all three religious groups, and evangelicals are significantly more progressive than Catholics across the range of church attendance.

Considering the two sexuality politics attitudes, by contrast, religious variables are associated with more conservative views. First, Table 1 shows that church attendance substantially depresses both support for same-sex marriage and support for therapeutic abortion. In addition, in the non-interactive results, Protestant and evangelicals are significantly more conservative than Catholics on same-sex marriage. The interactive analysis confirms that, once we take into account more fully the differences in church attendance between Catholics and Protestants, there is a large inter-affiliation gap in same-sex marriage attitudes, and no inter-affiliation gap in abortion attitudes. Across the range of church attendance, the predicted probabilities of Catholics and Protestants supporting therapeutic abortion are virtually identical. By contrast, for same-sex marriage, a Catholic who attends church more than weekly is almost as liberal as a Protestant who never attends.


Table 1: Determinants of Issue Attitudes, AmericasBarometer

	Reduce Inequality	“Mano Dura” Support	Support for SSM	Abortion Support
Church Attendance	0.001 (0.006)	-0.477* (0.050)	-0.163* (0.009)	-0.471* (0.053)
Protestant/Evangelical	0.011* (0.005)	-0.160* (0.039)	-0.114* (0.006)	-0.031 (0.039)
No Religion	0.022* (0.008)	-0.362* (0.060)	0.034* (0.012)	0.204* (0.062)
Other Religion	0.011 (0.011)	-0.404* (0.082)	-0.046* (0.014)	0.154 (0.086)
Female	-0.007* (0.004)	0.112* (0.028)	0.084* (0.005)	0.029 (0.031)
Mestizo	0.016* (0.005)	-0.042 (0.038)	-0.043* (0.007)	0.036 (0.042)
Indigenous	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.518* (0.064)	-0.026* (0.011)	0.224* (0.065)
Black	0.026* (0.009)	0.109 (0.077)	0.011 (0.014)	0.130 (0.078)
Mulatto	0.043* (0.009)	0.121 (0.077)	0.050* (0.015)	0.278* (0.078)
Other	0.013 (0.011)	-0.155 (0.086)	-0.035* (0.014)	0.096 (0.087)
Household Wealth	0.001 (0.010)	-0.400* (0.083)	0.143* (0.014)	0.583* (0.085)
Education Level	0.050* (0.008)	-0.700* (0.068)	0.024* (0.012)	0.665* (0.070)
Size of Locality	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.104* (0.051)	-0.055* (0.008)	-0.064 (0.049)
26-35 Years Old	0.005 (0.006)	-0.152* (0.047)	-0.066* (0.009)	0.087 (0.051)
36-45 Years Old	0.001 (0.006)	-0.191* (0.048)	-0.097* (0.009)	0.207* (0.051)
46-55 Years Old	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.302* (0.053)	-0.112* (0.010)	0.140* (0.056)
55-65 Years Old	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.347* (0.058)	-0.142* (0.010)	0.071 (0.062)
66+ Years Old	-0.017* (0.008)	-0.430* (0.064)	-0.165* (0.011)	-0.022 (0.066)
Year	-0.020* (0.001)	0.143* (0.006)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.026* (0.006)
Constant	40.414* (1.611)	-287.149* (12.878)	1.410 (2.158)	-51.670* (12.734)
Observations	24308	22090	18948	18956

Standard errors in parentheses


\*  $p < .05$

Figure 2: Support for Economic Redistribution, by Religious Affiliation and Attendance




Source: Americasbarometer 2012–2018/19. Estimates based on full multivariate model.

Figure 3: Support for “Mano Dura” Approach to Crime, by Religious Affiliation and Attendance




Source: Americasbarometer 2012–2018/19. Estimates based on full multivariate model.

Figure 4: Support for Same Sex Marriage, by Religious Affiliation and Attendance



Source: Americasbarometer 2012–2018/19. Estimates based on full multivariate model.

Figure 5: Support for Therapeutic Abortion, by Religious Affiliation and Attendance



Source: Americasbarometer 2012–2018/19. Estimates based on full multivariate model.

### 3 Online Survey Details

The conjoint survey experiments were administered to online convenience samples in each country, recruited via Facebook advertisements. The use of convenience samples for experimental research in political science has become increasingly common (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2012; Boas, Christenson and Glick, 2020; Krupnikov, Nam and Style, 2021), and Facebook advertisements are a popular recruitment method for studies in comparative politics, given the network’s massive global user base and the limited reach of other alternatives such as Mechanical Turk (Ananda and Bol, 2021; Avenburg, 2019; Bentancur, Rodríguez and Rosenblatt, 2019; Bicalho, Platas and Rosenzweig, 2021; Boas, 2014, 2016; Boas, Hidalgo and Toral, 2021; Elçi, 2022; Finkel, Neundorf and Rascón Ramírez, Forthcoming; Jäger, 2017; Kim and Boas, 2020; Neundorf and Öztürk, 2021; Nichter and Nunnari, 2022; Rosenzweig and Zhou, 2021; Samuels and Zucco, 2014; Williamson and Malik, 2021; Zucco, Luna and Baykal, 2020). Online convenience samples in the Global South are typically more highly educated than nationally representative samples, and they may also differ in terms of partisanship, ideology, and other political variables (Boas, Christenson and Glick, 2020). These differences can limit the external validity of experiments conducted on convenience samples, though the experimental method offers significant gains in internal validity as a trade-off.

The Facebook advertisements offered a 1-in-100 chance of winning a cash prize (100 Brazilian reais, 100 Peruvian nuevos soles, or 20,000 Chilean pesos, each worth \$25–30 at the time) in exchange for completing a short survey. Advertisements were targeted to Facebook users in distinct strata of age, sex, and region in each country. Tables 2 and 3 show how these samples compare to those from the nationally representative AmericasBarometer surveys that were also fielded in each country in 2019. As expected, respondents in the Facebook-recruited samples are much more highly educated than those from nationally representative samples. They are also more likely to be white, especially in Brazil. They are broadly similar

in most other respects, including ideology; across countries, the surveys did not consistently over- or underrepresent the left, center, or right. Hence, limited external validity should be less of a concern than with more politically unrepresentative samples of convenience (Boas, Christenson and Glick, 2020).

## 4 Alternative Conjoint Experiment Results

In the online surveys, respondents were allowed to choose among three positions on abortion—legalization, the status quo, or a full abortion ban—but in the conjoint experiment, candidate positions were only randomized between the latter two options. Hence, in the analysis presented in the main text, those who favor legalized abortion are treated as agreeing with candidates who support the status quo. When we analyze the conjoint experiment only for the subset of respondents who could perfectly match candidate positions—that is, those who favor the status quo or a full abortion ban—we obtain slightly smaller coefficient estimates for abortion, as shown in Figure 6.

In the main text, our analysis of the conjoint experiment follows a modified approach whereby we examine the average effect of respondents agreeing with a candidate on a policy issue and disagreeing with their opponent, who adopts the opposite stance on that issue. This approach flows from our hypothesis that voters’ opinions on sexuality politics issues should affect voting behavior in a context where candidate stances differ. When we take a more conventional approach, using the full sample to estimate the effect of respondent–candidate policy agreement on the probability of voting for that candidate over a randomly chosen opponent, including opponents that adopt the same policy position, we obtain an identical pattern of coefficient estimates that are half the size of those reported in the main text and support similar conclusions (Figure 7). This makes sense, as the causal effect of

Table 2: Online Surveys vs. AmericasBarometer (1)

	<b>Brazil</b>		<b>Chile</b>		<b>Peru</b>	
	Online Survey	Americas Barometer	Online Survey	Americas Barometer	Online Survey	Americas Barometer
<b>Age</b>						
18–29	33.7	29.0	27.9	26.5	35.8	33.2
30–44	35.7	35.6	28.9	30.8	32.7	33.5
45+	30.5	35.4	43.2	42.7	31.5	33.3
<b>Education</b>						
Primary or Less	11.0	50.9	5.5	32.9	7.5	21.9
Secondary	55.0	40.0	53.8	53.1	46.6	57.1
Higher	34.0	9.1	40.6	14.0	45.9	21.0
<b>Religion</b>						
Catholic	34.9	50.4	40.1	46.8	66.7	70.1
Evangelical	25.8	30.3	9.1	20.3	9.0	13.0
None	24.7	11.7	47.0	30.0	20.5	7.8
Other	14.6	7.6	3.8	3.0	3.7	9.1
<b>Church</b>						
1+ Times/Week	18.1	22.7	4.8	7.9	7.9	8.8
1 Time/Week	21.9	24.8	8.0	8.5	20.3	24.3
1 Time/Month	14.5	20.7	8.9	11.2	21.2	25.8
1–2 Times/Year	17.4	13.4	21.4	17.4	26.5	22.5
Never/Almost Never	28.1	18.4	56.9	55.0	24.0	18.7
<b>Ideology</b>						
Leftist (1–4)	34.7	29.9	39.9	34.4	18.9	31.1
Centrist (5–6)	29.2	27.7	32.9	43.1	47.1	38.6
Rightist (7–10)	36.1	42.4	27.2	22.5	34.0	30.3
<b>Other</b>						
Male	47.2	50.2	45.8	49.7	53.0	49.9
Partisan	31.5	23.6	23.2	10.7	12.1	10.8
<i>N</i>	1817.0	1405.0	3732.0	1638.0	3698.0	1521.0


NOTE: Figures are percentages, except for *N*. AmericasBarometer figures are from 2019 and weight each individual equally. Education is the highest level completed.

Table 3: Online Surveys versus AmericasBarometer (2)

	Online Survey	Americas Barometer
<b>Race: Brazil</b>		
White	48.5	28.4
Brown	37.8	43.9
Black	10.6	19.4
Other	3.1	8.3
<b>Race: Chile</b>		
Indigenous	8.9	11.7
<b>Race: Peru</b>		
White	12.5	9.4
Mestizo	74.8	61.4
Indigenous	5.5	20.0
Other	7.2	9.2
<b>Region: Brazil</b>		
Center-West	6.3	14.6
North	6.2	14.3
Northeast	23.8	22.8
South	15.5	16.7
Southeast	48.2	31.7
<b>Zone: Chile</b>		
North	11.6	12.3
Central	33.8	34.7
South	12.9	13.7
Metropolitan	41.8	39.3
<b>Region: Peru</b>		
Coast	20.4	19.7
Highlands	28.6	34.8
Jungle	7.3	9.0
Capital	43.7	36.4

NOTE: Figures are percentages.  
AmericasBarometer figures are from 2019  
and weight each individual equally.

Figure 6: Effects of Strict Policy Agreement on Vote Choice When Candidates Differ: Conjoint Experiment




Dependent variable is an indicator for voting for the candidate; independent variables are indicators for policy agreement on each issue. Icons give point estimates and lines give two-sided 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered on the respondent. The sample is limited to choice tasks where candidates differ in their policy stances, such that only one candidate agrees with the respondent, and to respondents who support the status quo on abortion or a full abortion ban, both of which were positions that candidate profiles could take on.

policy agreement in the choice tasks we exclude from the main analysis should be zero. When both candidates adopt the same position, the respondent agrees or disagrees with both, votes for one, and votes against the other, so on average, agreement should have a zero effect.

## 5 Newspaper Coverage of Sexuality Politics Issues

As discussed in the main text, our measure of the salience of abortion and same-sex marriage in different countries and years is based on mentions of these policies issues in major newspapers. Using the Factiva database, we identified the major newspaper with the most complete full-text coverage for each Latin American country; these are summarized in Table 4. We

Figure 7: Effects of Policy Agreement on Vote Choice: Conjoint Experiment (Full Sample)



Dependent variable is an indicator for voting for the candidate; independent variable is an indicator for policy agreement on each issue. Icons give point estimates and lines give two-sided 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered on the respondent.

then ran searches on terms for abortion and same-sex marriage or civil unions. We used the search term “aborto” for abortion, and the following terms for same-sex partnerships:

- Spanish: “matrimonio gay” OR “matrimonio igualitario” OR “matrimonio homo\*” OR “matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo” OR “union\* civil\*”
- Portuguese: “casamento gay” OR “casamento igualitario” OR “casamento homo\*” OR “casamento entre pessoas do mesmo sexo” OR “uniao civil” OR “unioes civis”

Since public debate on same-sex partnership in some countries and years concerns civil unions rather than marriage, we included terms measuring this concept as well.

For the Dominican Republic, which was not covered in Factiva, we were able to use the search function on Diario Libre’s website to obtain annual counts of coverage of abortion and politics. The site’s search engine did not accept Boolean search terms, so we were unable to obtain counts for same-sex marriage. Due to limited full-text newspaper coverage, we have

Table 4: Newspapers Consulted in Each Country


Country	Newspaper
Argentina	La Nación
Bolivia	La Razón
Brazil	Folha de São Paulo
Chile	El Mercurio
Colombia	El Tiempo
Costa Rica	La Nación
Dominican Republic	Diario Libre
Ecuador	El Comercio
El Salvador	None
Guatemala	Prensa Libre
Honduras	None
Mexico	Reforma
Nicaragua	None
Panama	La Estrella
Paraguay	ABC
Peru	El Comercio
Uruguay	El País
Venezuela	El Nacional

no measures for El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

## 6 Distribution of Transformed Contextual Variables

Figure 8 shows the distribution of the two contextual variables used in the AmericasBarometer analysis. As described in the main text, we averaged the news coverage ratios from the year of the election in question and the previous year. We then rescaled the proportions to run from 0 to 1 and transformed them by taking their square roots. The square root transformation accounts for the skew of the raw ratio, readily observable in the form of dramatic peaks in certain countries and years. A logarithmic transformation works less well for dealing with the skewed distribution because it creates extreme variation among values close to zero. The final resulting contextual variables run from 0 to 1, with means relatively close to the scale midpoints.

Figure 8: Distribution of the Transformed Contextual Variables



Note: The figure is limited to country-years included in the AmericasBarometer analysis.

## 7 Coding Ideology of Presidential Candidates

Carlin, Singer and Zechmeister (2015*b*) rely on 0–20 expert-coded ideology measures from Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009), with slight updating for a few candidates and parties. They use PELA-derived measures like ours as a robustness check, noting a high correlation between the two sets of scores. Given the extensive changes in many Latin American party systems since the Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) analysis, we opt to use the PELA surveys, which offer more contemporaneous measures.

The straightforward decision rules summarized in the main text sufficed for assigning an ideology score to the majority of presidential candidates. In some cases, scores did not exist for candidates who had changed parties or run as independents, so we used their most recent party or coalition for which we had a score, as summarized below:

- Sergio Masa (Argentina 2015, United for a New Alternative): assigned the score of the Justicialist Party, which he left in 2013
- Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil 2018, Social Liberal Party): assigned the score of the Social Christian Party, which he left in 2018
- Marco Enríquez-Ominami (Chile 2009, Independent): assigned the score of the Socialist Party, which he left in 2009
- José Antonio Kast (Chile 2017, Independent): assigned the score of the Independent Democratic Union, which he left in 2016
- Juan Diego Castro Fernández (Costa Rica 2018, National Integration Party): assigned the score of the National Liberation Party, which he left in 2014
- Verónica Mendoza (Peru 2016, Broad Front): assigned the score of Peru Wins, the coalition with which she was elected to Congress in 2011
- Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (Peru 2016, Peruvians for Change): assigned the score of Alliance for the Great Change, the coalition with which he ran for president in 2011

The only major candidate (with greater than 5% vote share according to the Americas-Barometer surveys) that could not be scored via this approach was Beatriz Sánchez of the Broad Front in Chile’s 2017 election. None of the coalition’s small component parties had ever been scored, and Sánchez had no history as a politician and hence no former party. We assigned her the mean ideological self-placement of those who voted for her and have the highest level of interest in politics. This results in a score of 2.9, placing her to the left of every candidate in that election except the Communist candidate, which seems plausible.

## 8 AmericasBarometer Analysis

This section discusses our analysis of the AmericasBarometer data. Table 5 summarizes the countries, elections, and survey waves for which we have valid measures of news coverage, as well as the share of respondents from each wave voting for candidates or parties for whom we lack a valid measure of ideology.

In the main text, we examine the relationship between sexuality politics views or religion and the ideology of vote choice, conditional on news coverage of abortion and same-sex marriage. However, as a first step in the analysis, one can examine the unconditional relationship. This analysis mirrors similar analyses for prior periods (Boas and Smith, 2015; Carlin, Singer and Zechmeister, 2015*a*; Zechmeister and Corral, 2013). We include controls for tough-on-crime attitudes and church attendance in separate models, given the reduced numbers of survey country-years incorporating these variables.<sup>3</sup>

The results of this unconditional analysis are shown in Table 6. Since all variables are standardized to run from 0 to 1, coefficients are directly comparable. On average across the region, views on same-sex marriage predict voting behavior in recent elections when controlling for ideological self-identification—a contrast with earlier findings (Carlin, Singer and Zechmeister, 2015*a*, p.364). In comparative terms, the impact of same-sex marriage attitudes across the range of the variable is slightly less than a quarter of the effect of identifying as a leftist rather than a rightist. The coefficient for same-sex marriage attitudes is similar in magnitude to those for other issues. Consistent with earlier analyses (Boas and Smith, 2015; Carlin, Singer and Zechmeister, 2015*a*), on average across the region we find no impact of attitudes toward therapeutic abortion and little evidence of a Catholic-evangelical cleavage in vote choice. However, the non-religious do vote substantially to the left of both Catholics and evangelicals, and church attendance pushes vote choice slightly to the right.

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<sup>3</sup>For reasons of space, we do not show the coefficients for indicator variables for age bracket; age is broadly statistically insignificant in the analysis.

Table 5: Elections, AmericasBarometer Waves, and Reported Vote for Missing Candidates

Country	Election	Wave	Missing	Country	Election	Wave	Missing
Argentina	2011	2012	0.0%	Ecuador	2009	2012	2.0%
Argentina	2011	2014	0.0%	Ecuador	2013	2014	0.4%
Argentina	2015	2017	1.8%	Ecuador	2013	2016	0.0%
Argentina	2015	2019	3.3%	Ecuador	2017	2019	0.4%
Bolivia	2009	2012	0.6%	Guatemala	2015	2017	2.8%
Bolivia	2009	2014	0.3%	Guatemala	2015	2019	3.4%
Bolivia	2014	2017	0.6%	Mexico	2006	2012	0.4%
Bolivia	2014	2019	0.1%	Mexico	2012	2014	1.0%
Brazil	2010	2012	0.4%	Mexico	2012	2017	0.8%
Brazil	2010	2014	0.1%	Mexico	2018	2019	2.2%
Brazil	2014	2017	0.0%	Panama	2009	2012	0.0%
Brazil	2018	2019	3.7%	Panama	2009	2014	0.0%
Chile	2009	2012	0.0%	Panama	2014	2017	0.0%
Chile	2013	2014	7.8%	Panama	2014	2018	0.0%
Chile	2013	2017	8.3%	Paraguay	2013	2014	2.3%
Chile	2017	2019	0.3%	Paraguay	2013	2016	1.5%
Colombia	2010	2012	0.0%	Paraguay	2018	2019	0.3%
Colombia	2010	2014	0.0%	Peru	2011	2012	0.0%
Colombia	2014	2016	0.0%	Peru	2011	2014	0.0%
Colombia	2018	2018	0.0%	Peru	2016	2017	4.2%
Costa Rica	2010	2012	0.0%	Peru	2016	2019	1.7%
Costa Rica	2014	2014	0.0%	Uruguay	2009	2012	0.0%
Costa Rica	2014	2016	0.0%	Uruguay	2009	2014	0.0%
Costa Rica	2018	2018	2.0%	Uruguay	2014	2017	0.2%
Dom. Rep.	2012	2014	2.5%	Uruguay	2014	2019	0.4%
Dom. Rep.	2016	2016	1.1%	Venezuela	2006	2012	0.0%
Dom. Rep.	2016	2019	0.9%	Venezuela	2013	2014	0.9%
				Venezuela	2013	2016	0.4%

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Elections listed are those for which we have valid measures of news coverage; there are none for El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The “Missing” column gives the total reported vote share from each AmericasBarometer wave for those candidates for whom we lack estimates of ideological position.

It is interesting to note that all demographic variables (not only religion, but even social class) are weaker predictors of the ideology of vote choice than are attitudinal variables. The strongest demographic predictors of voting behavior are social class and identification as indigenous (versus white), but taken as a whole, religious variables come in a close second. A person who self-identifies as non-religious and never attends church is predicted to choose a candidate about 0.26 notches to the left of a Catholic or evangelical who attends church more than weekly. By comparison, a person at the bottom of our wealth scale is predicted to choose a candidate 0.33–0.35 notches to the left of a person at the top of that scale.

Tables 7 and 8 show the interactive, contextual results presented in the figures in the main text. The three models presented in Table 7 correspond to those in the left panes of the two key figures, while those presented in Table 8 correspond to those presented in the right panes. All control variables from the previous analysis are incorporated in the analysis but are not shown.

Does salient coverage of sexuality politics issues reduce the impact of redistribution views on vote choice? Table 9 presents results equivalent to those found in the first model of Table 7 and the first model of Table 8. However, in this analysis, the contextual measures of news coverage have been interacted with the individual-level attitudinal variable measuring support for reducing inequality. The models also include the other standard attitudinal variables shown above in Table 6. The first two columns of the table do not include a control for tough-on-crime attitudes, whereas its third and fourth columns do include that control (reducing the number of observations). Two of the three analyses indicate that when sexuality politics issues are more salient, the correlation between views on economic issues and vote choice becomes weaker. In other words, in contexts in which sexuality politics views become more predictive of the vote, economic views become less so.

Table 6: Determinants of Ideology of Presidential Vote Choice: Non-Contextual Analysis, 2012–2019

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Support for Therapeutic Abortion	0.008 (0.018)	0.014 (0.021)	0.007 (0.021)
Support for SS Marriage	-0.249* (0.026)	-0.193* (0.030)	-0.201* (0.029)
Protestant/Evangelical	-0.031 (0.022)	-0.059* (0.026)	-0.043 (0.026)
No Religion	-0.230* (0.030)	-0.229* (0.037)	-0.181* (0.037)
Other Religion	-0.053 (0.052)	-0.055 (0.057)	-0.073 (0.056)
Reduce Inequality	-0.498* (0.031)	-0.502* (0.035)	-0.411* (0.035)
Leftist	-0.519* (0.021)	-0.475* (0.025)	-0.432* (0.024)
Rightist	0.587* (0.021)	0.568* (0.024)	0.458* (0.024)
Female	0.060* (0.017)	0.082* (0.020)	0.060* (0.020)
Mestizo	-0.109* (0.023)	-0.106* (0.027)	-0.112* (0.026)
Indigenous	-0.328* (0.039)	-0.339* (0.044)	-0.358* (0.045)
Black	-0.139* (0.042)	-0.122* (0.050)	-0.132* (0.048)
Mulatto	-0.092* (0.042)	-0.034 (0.050)	-0.111* (0.047)
Other	0.007 (0.053)	0.030 (0.060)	0.029 (0.055)
Household Wealth	0.337* (0.050)	0.338* (0.057)	0.324* (0.058)
Education Level	0.072 (0.040)	0.064 (0.047)	0.075 (0.047)
Size of Locality	0.119* (0.026)	0.108* (0.030)	0.051 (0.029)
Fight Crime by Increasing Punishment		0.108* (0.022)	
Church Attendance			0.104* (0.033)
Observations	46041	34337	30937

Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < .05$ . Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP. Results from hierarchical models controlling for age and year.

Table 7: Determinants of Ideology of Presidential Vote Choice: Sexuality Politics Attitudes Contingent on Abortion Coverage

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	ideol	ideol	ideol
Support for Therapeutic Abortion	0.172*	0.023	0.023
	(0.044)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Abortion Coverage	-0.279	-0.458	-0.571
	(0.575)	(0.732)	(0.733)
Support for Therapeutic Abortion $\times$ Abortion Coverage	-0.295*		
	(0.073)		
Support for SS Marriage	-0.243*	-0.207*	-0.204*
	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Protestant/Evangelical	-0.042	-0.283*	-0.065*
	(0.024)	(0.066)	(0.027)
No Religion	-0.273*		-0.205*
	(0.030)		(0.036)
Other Religion	-0.106*		-0.139*
	(0.053)		(0.056)
Reduce Inequality	-0.468*	-0.391*	-0.386*
	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Protestant/Evangelical $\times$ Abortion Coverage		0.413*	
		(0.102)	
Church Attendance		0.151*	-0.193*
		(0.033)	(0.079)
Church Attendance $\times$ Abortion Coverage			0.519*
			(0.123)
Observations	37647	25629	25629

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < .05$

Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < .05$ . Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP; see text for discussion of estimates of news coverage. All demographic and attitudinal controls from full models included in analysis (except crime attitudes).

Table 8: Determinants of Ideology of Presidential Vote Choice: Sexuality Politics Attitudes Contingent on Same-Sex Marriage Coverage

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	ideol	ideol	ideol
Support for SS Marriage	-0.038 (0.060)	-0.222* (0.031)	-0.218* (0.031)
SSM Coverage	0.454 (0.747)	0.400 (0.942)	0.441 (1.063)
Support for SS Marriage × SSM Coverage	-0.545* (0.130)		
Support for Therapeutic Abortion	0.015 (0.020)	0.024 (0.023)	0.026 (0.023)
Protestant/Evangelical	-0.050 (0.026)	-0.445* (0.065)	-0.070* (0.029)
No Religion	-0.300* (0.032)		-0.235* (0.039)
Other Religion	-0.111 (0.057)		-0.143* (0.060)
Reduce Inequality	-0.500* (0.034)	-0.424* (0.038)	-0.415* (0.038)
Protestant/Evangelical × SSM Coverage		0.915* (0.135)	
Church Attendance		0.173* (0.035)	-0.010 (0.079)
Church Attendance × SSM Coverage			0.298 (0.161)
Observations	34866	23904	23904

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < .05$

Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < .05$ . Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP; see text for discussion of estimates of news coverage. All demographic and attitudinal controls from full models included in analysis (except crime attitudes).

Table 9: Determinants of Ideology of Presidential Vote Choice: Redistribution Attitudes Contingent on News Coverage

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	ideol	ideol	ideol	ideol
Reduce Inequality	-0.639*	-0.502*	-0.660*	-0.690*
	(0.077)	(0.071)	(0.087)	(0.077)
SSM Coverage	-0.016		0.223	
	(0.784)		(0.794)	
Reduce Inequality $\times$ SSM Coverage	0.356*		0.452*	
	(0.177)		(0.204)	
Support for SS Marriage	-0.261*	-0.246*	-0.182*	-0.171*
	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.030)
Support for Therapeutic Abortion	0.013	0.011	0.021	0.018
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Protestant/Evangelical	-0.049	-0.040	-0.097*	-0.083*
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.028)
No Religion	-0.303*	-0.275*	-0.338*	-0.302*
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.037)
Other Religion	-0.112*	-0.107*	-0.133*	-0.125*
	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.058)
Abortion Coverage		-0.505		-0.809
		(0.589)		(0.571)
Reduce Inequality $\times$ Abortion Coverage		0.059		0.456*
		(0.118)		(0.133)
Fight Crime by Increasing Punishment			0.078*	0.076*
			(0.024)	(0.023)
Observations	34866	37647	24703	26576

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < .05$

Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < .05$ . Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP; see text for discussion of estimates of news coverage. All demographic and attitudinal controls from full models included in analysis.

## 9 Latinobarómetro Analysis

This section discusses our analysis of the Latinobarómetro data. We use the 2004, 2007, and 2015 waves of the Latinobarómetro, all of which included the abortion item of interest. Our coding of the dependent variable and contextual variable are discussed in the main text. To score the ideology of vote choice for Brazil, we derive party estimates from the Brazilian Legislative Surveys (BLS) rather than Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA), since the BLS asks legislators about a larger number of parties. Due to the limited coverage of the Factiva database, our measure of news coverage is somewhat sparser in earlier years, affecting the scope of the analysis. For Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, we are able to use all three Latinobarómetro waves. However, in analysis of Mexico 2004, we use contextual measures only for the year of the hypothetical election, since our news coverage data for that country start in 2004. For Brazil, we omit 2004, due to an apparent coding error with the vote choice variable.<sup>4</sup> For Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Panama, and Paraguay, we use only the 2015 wave. As with the AmericasBarometer analysis, we have no contextual data at all for El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras. In Table 10, we summarize the survey waves used for each country and the percentage of observations for which we lack measures of the ideology of vote choice.

To the extent possible, our Latinobarómetro analysis includes identical control variables to the AmericasBarometer analysis. However, the Latinobarómetro did not include a measure of church attendance, and we also omit most issue attitudes (including crime, the economy, and same-sex marriage, which was measured only in 2015). We included indicator variables for those placing themselves on the left or the right ends of the 0–10 ideological scale.

Table 11 presents the full multilevel results corresponding to the figure presented in the

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<sup>4</sup>In the 2004 Latinobarómetro for Brazil, the PT and PMDB, two popular parties, are never mentioned in response to the vote question, whereas the PDT, which never gets more than 2% of responses in other years, receives 15.7%.

Table 10: Latinobarómetro Waves and Reported Vote for Missing Parties

Country	Wave	Missing	Country	Wave	Missing
Argentina	2004	3.1%	Guatemala	2015	0.0%
Argentina	2007	1.4%	Mexico	2004	0.0%
Argentina	2015	2.6%	Mexico	2007	0.4%
Bolivia	2015	4.8%	Mexico	2015	0.0%
Brazil	2007	0.0%	Panama	2015	0.0%
Brazil	2015	0.2%	Paraguay	2015	0.3%
Chile	2004	0.2%	Peru	2004	1.8%
Chile	2007	0.4%	Peru	2007	0.0%
Chile	2015	2.3%	Peru	2015	0.0%
Colombia	2015	0.5%	Uruguay	2004	0.0%
Costa Rica	2004	0.0%	Uruguay	2007	0.0%
Costa Rica	2007	1.0%	Uruguay	2015	0.0%
Costa Rica	2015	0.0%	Venezuela	2004	0.2%
Dom. Rep.	2015	0.1%	Venezuela	2007	3.0%
Ecuador	2004	1.1%	Venezuela	2015	0.6%
Ecuador	2007	0.2%			
Ecuador	2015	0.2%			

Latinobarómetro waves listed are those for which we have valid measures of news coverage; there are none for El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The “Missing” column gives the total reported vote share from each Latinobarómetro wave for those parties for which we lack estimates of ideological position.

main text. The strong interactive relationship between abortion attitudes and abortion news coverage is evident in the data. In addition, the analysis depicts a strong effect of ideological identification as leftist or rightist. The non-religious are predicted to vote in a slightly more leftist direction, while women, the highly educated, and those of higher socioeconomic status are predicted to lean toward the right.

Table 11: Abortion Attitudes and News Coverage as Determinants of Ideology of Presidential Vote Choice, Latinobarómetro

	(1)
Support for Abortion	0.039 (0.123)
Abortion Coverage	0.151 (0.671)
Support for Abortion $\times$ Abortion Coverage	-0.591* (0.226)
Leftist	-1.025* (0.037)
Rightist	0.714* (0.035)
Protestant/Evangelical	-0.048 (0.042)
No Religion	-0.274* (0.050)
Other Religion	-0.065 (0.101)
Female	0.107* (0.029)
Education Level	0.101 (0.063)
Household Wealth	0.412* (0.079)
Observations	14863

Standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < .05$ . Source: Latinobarómetro 2004, 2007, and 2015; see text for discussion of estimates of news coverage.

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