Religion, Sexuality Politics, and the Transformation of Latin American Electorates*

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Abstract

Right-wing candidates have rallied against same-sex marriage, abortion, and “gender ideology” in several recent Latin American elections, drawing strong support from socially conservative voters. Yet in other parts of the region, these issues are largely irrelevant to voting decisions. Drawing on theories explaining partisan shifts in the United States, we argue that elite debates on sexuality politics create conditions for electoral realignment in Latin America. When politicians take polarized positions on newly salient “culture war” issues, masses shift their voting behavior. Using a conjoint experiment in Brazil, Chile, and Peru and region-wide multilevel analysis of the AmericasBarometer and Latinobarómetro, we demonstrate that the rising salience of sexuality politics creates new electoral cleavages in terms of issue attitudes and religion. Whereas scholarship in the United States posits the centrality of partisanship, our findings indicate that sexuality politics prompts realignments even in weak party systems.

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1 Introduction

In January 2018, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that Costa Rica was obligated to legalize same-sex marriage, immediately transforming the dynamics of the country’s ongoing presidential election campaign. While most candidates equivocated in their response to the Court’s ruling, the two who staked out the clearest positions for and against same-sex marriage, former cabinet minister Carlos Alvarado and opposition deputy Fabricio Alvarado, went from single-digit standings to become the top two finishers in the first-round vote (Zúñiga Ramírez, 2018). Views on sexuality politics emerged as a major electoral cleavage. In a post-electoral survey that inquired about the reasons for one’s presidential vote, the biggest gap between supporters of the two candidates was in the percentage who voted “to defend the traditional values of Costa Rica”: 54% for Fabricio Alvarado and 9% for Carlos Alvarado (Alfaro Redondo et al., 2018).

Religion also played new roles in the election. Nine days after the court ruling, the Catholic Bishops Conference of Costa Rica and the Costa Rican Evangelical Alliance Federation issued a joint statement supporting “the family founded on the marriage between a man and a woman” and calling on citizens to meditate on their presidential votes before God (Arroyo, 2018). Such stances might have pushed both conservative Catholics and evangelicals into the arms of Fabricio Alvarado, an evangelical pastor. However, in the second round campaign, media attention to ostensibly anti-Catholic statements from an evangelical ally of Fabricio Alvarado inhibited an inter-religious alliance (Alfaro Redondo et al., 2018). On election day, religious affiliations and attitudes were among the strongest correlates of vote choice: Catholics comprised 60% of voters for Carlos Alvarado, but only 30% of those supporting Fabricio Alvarado.

The example of Costa Rica’s 2018 election raises an important general question: how and when do new electoral cleavages emerge in developing democracies, and why do we see...
Throughout Latin America, issues such as same-sex marriage, abortion, and the treatment of gender and sexuality in public school curricula are transforming political battles between left and right in a way that seemed unthinkable just a decade ago. Simultaneously, electoral gaps have emerged between religious groups, sometimes between evangelicals and Catholics and sometimes along religious-secular lines. Yet these changes are not uniform across the region, nor have they proceeded gradually over time in a pattern that might be attributable to demographic changes such as the growth of evangelicalism or the religiously unaffiliated. Some countries have largely avoided religious cleavages and battles over sexuality politics, with electoral competition still centering on traditional materialist issues such as redistribution or law and order. In others, like Costa Rica, new electoral cleavages seem to burst onto the scene in a spectacular, discontinuous fashion.

We argue that the emergence of new electoral cleavages around sexuality politics and religion is attributable not to gradual demographic changes like the growth of evangelicalism or human development and post-modernization (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) but rather to the specific actions of political elites, often in alliance with progressive social movements. Sometimes issues of sexuality and the family are thrust onto the political agenda as the result of a prominent judicial decision, such as the Colombian Supreme Court’s legalization of same-sex marriage in 2013 or the IACHR decision bearing on Costa Rica in 2018. In other instances, these issues arise thanks to alliances between social movements and legislators, as with Mexico City’s decriminalization of abortion in 2007 or the attempt to do so in Argentina in 2018 (Daby and Moseley, Forthcoming). Once elites and movements have

1We use the term “cleavage” to refer to societal divides defined by both issue attitudes (Inglehart, 1984, 1990) and sociological categories such as class, race, and religion (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Bartolini and Mair, 1990). Unless preceded by the adjective “latent,” our use of the term implies that cleavages are active, in the sense of influencing political behavior.
placed these issues on the agenda, the public responds, and vote choice becomes tied to attitudes on sexuality politics (e.g., Layton et al., 2020; Renno, 2020). Religion enters the story because it affects vote choice in myriad ways, via issue attitudes as well as discussion within congregations and political messages from the pulpit. Because different sexuality politics issues are salient in different religious communities, voters sometimes realign along a Christian–secular cleavage and, at other times, along an evangelical–Catholic one.

Our analysis draws on multiple data sources and methodologies: a conjoint survey experiment in Brazil, Chile, and Peru; panel data on newspaper coverage of same-sex marriage and abortion across the region; and multi-level analysis of seven waves of the AmericasBarometer and Latinobarómetro surveys between 2004 and 2019. First, we show that when the issue stances of hypothetical candidates are experimentally manipulated, voter-candidate agreement on abortion policy has a comparable or greater effect on vote intention than agreement on crime policy or the role of the state in the economy. Next, we show that as newspaper coverage of abortion or same-sex marriage/civil unions increases, typically in response to a legislative proposal or judicial decision, issue attitudes and religion or religiosity become more predictive of left-right voting decisions.

Our findings contrast with and help explain prior work on this topic, which has generally found that positions on sexuality politics weakly predict voting behavior in Latin America (Carlin, Singer and Zechmeister, 2015a; Zechmeister and Corral, 2013) and that religion’s correlation with vote choice varies from one election to another (Boas and Smith, 2015). We show that Latin American voters’ stances on sexuality politics do sometimes have a large effect on their voting behavior, but only under certain conditions: when candidates stake out opposing positions and when heightened media coverage makes these issues salient. Similarly, religious citizens become religious conservatives at the ballot box when sexuality politics issues arrive on the agenda. Thus, sexuality politics debates at the elite level catalyze the growth of the new religious right.
Our arguments also speak to a large literature explaining political polarization in the United States. Scholars show that American polarization on culture war issues began among political, religious, and social movement elites before subsequently spreading to the masses. We argue that the process by which Latin American electorates sort themselves according to sexuality politics attitudes and religion resembles patterns found in the US. However, there is a key difference in culture war polarization between the two regions. In the US, strong partisanship in the context of the two-party system is a glue that helps bind together attitudes on sexuality politics and religion. In Latin America, by contrast, sorting of the electorate has occurred despite multiparty systems and low levels of mass partisanship. Thus, our research suggests that the rise of sexuality politics issues on the policy agenda can lead to electoral realignments even in the absence of strong partisan social identities.

2 Theory

What explains the growing importance of sexuality politics issues and religion in some Latin American elections? One prominent hypothesis is that the explosive growth of evangelicalism and Pentecostalism is driving these changes (Corrales, 2017, 2020; Costa, Marcantonio Junior and Castro, 2018). Superficially, the hypothesis is plausible. First, the timing seems right: the percentage of Latin Americans adhering to evangelicalism and Pentecostalism has grown five-fold since 1970 (Pew Research Center, 2014), coinciding with the rise of sexuality politics issues on political agendas. Second, like their counterparts around the world, Latin America’s evangelicals and Pentecostals adopt conservative theological stances, adhering to strict doctrinal interpretations that would seem to dovetail with conservative politics (Robbins, 2004). Third, the obvious but often implicit analogy to evangelicalism and Pentecostalism in the United States primes many observers to expect a natural linkage between these religious traditions and culture war politics. Likewise, there is evidence of a similar relationship in
Sub-Saharan Africa, where the growth of Pentecostalism and charismatic Christianity has boosted the salience of LGTBQ policy issues in many countries (Grossman 2015).

On further scrutiny, though, the hypothesis starts to look less plausible. Prior to the 2000s, the growth of evangelicalism and Pentecostalism did not automatically translate into right-wing voting or produce a broader societal cleavage over sexuality politics. Evangelicals and Pentecostals have played a prominent role in the electoral politics of some Latin American countries since the 1980s (Freston 2008), yet a review found little evidence of a consistent linkage between evangelicalism and the ideology of vote choice as recently as 2012 (Boas and Smith 2015). Social forces in evangelical churches may tend to induce cohesion in vote choice, in both Latin America and the United States (Smith 2019; Wald, Owen and Hill 1990), but those choices have not been uniformly rightist in Latin America. The same is true of issue attitudes. Latin American evangelicals and Pentecostals have tended to take substantially more liberal positions than their American counterparts on many policy issues, ranging from social welfare to the environment (McAdams and Lance 2013; Smith and Veldman 2020). Those relatively progressive political stances may, in part, find their roots in the historically lower- and working-class constituency of evangelicalism and Pentecostalism in Latin America (Martin 1990; Smilde 2007). The broader comparative literature also suggests that analogies to the United States may be misleading; U.S. evangelicals are substantially more politically conservative even than their counterparts in other wealthy English-speaking democracies (Bean 2014; Malloy 2017).

A second hypothesis relates to human development and modernization. While classic modernization theory believed that economic and social development would bring about a “death of religion” (Norris and Inglehart 2011, p.3), more recent “post-modernization” arguments envision growing culture war conflict, as a secular push for progressive policies on sexuality and the family prompts a backlash from the remaining social and religious conservatives (Gaskins, Golder and Siegel 2013; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). As a consequence,
scholars predict that human development will widen cleavages between religious conservatives and secular voters and intensify battles over sexuality politics issues. The human development perspective would argue that the growth of evangelicalism does not automatically produce cultural conflict; rather, it does so only when it coincides with rising human development and a growing push for policy liberalization.

The human development perspective does offer an important insight: there can be no conflict over issues that are not yet on the political agenda, and liberalizing efforts on sexuality politics issues have gone furthest in the wealthier countries of Latin America. The fact that we see major conflict on abortion and LGBTQ rights in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica, but not in Guatemala, Paraguay, and Venezuela, is largely consistent with the general predictions of these arguments.

Yet there are reasons to believe that the effect of abortion and same-sex marriage attitudes on voting behavior should not simply follow a time trend or correlate with levels of economic development across countries. First, even if the sexuality politics cleavage writ large becomes increasingly salient with economic development, particular policy issues within this broader cluster come and go from the political agenda. In Peru, a series of same-sex civil unions bills were introduced in Congress between 2013–2016, but none was successful. More recently, conflict between progressives and social conservatives has centered on the treatment of gender in school curricula. In Argentina, attention to same-sex marriage spiked in 2010 as legislators were debating its legalization, but the salience of this issue declined significantly after the policy passed. The more recent sexuality politics battleground was the effort to legalize first trimester abortion in 2018, an issue that had been seen as politically untouchable before feminist groups mobilized in favor of the reform (Daby and Moseley, Forthcoming). As abortion, same-sex marriage, and related issues rise and fall on the political agenda, the degree to which they influence voting behavior should fluctuate as well, rather than increasing steadily with economic development.
Beyond the timing of policy battles, issue attitudes are more likely to influence voting behavior when candidates differentiate themselves on those issues. If an issue has become salient due to media coverage or social movement pressure, but major candidates strategically ignore it or adopt similar positions to one another, public attitudes on this issue are unlikely to affect voting behavior. In Latin America, leftist and rightist candidates reliably stake out opposing positions on economic redistribution and crime and security, but they have not consistently done so with sexuality politics. In the Supplemental Information, we analyze data from the Comparative Manifestos Project to show that Latin American party programs often vary little on “traditional morality” issues such as divorce, abortion, and the separation of church and state, and they often ignore these issues entirely. The lack of differentiation on sexuality politics may be partly due to left-wing parties’ ambivalence on these issues (Friedman 2009), born out of a desire to prioritize redistribution and a pragmatic recognition of the socially conservative attitudes held by many voters of lower socioeconomic status.

In emphasizing issue salience and candidate position-taking, we shift the theoretical focus from gradual demographic change to the specific actors who place sexuality politics on the agenda—including political and judicial elites and the social movements that seek to influence them. In the United States, ideological polarization and electoral realignment around culture war issues began with political, religious, and social movement elites, followed by a similar transformation at the mass level in the 1990s and 2000s (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998, 2008, Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2005, Hetherington 2001, Hunter, 1992, Layman and Carsey 2002, Layman and Green 2006, Levendusky 2009a,b). In recent decades, elites have been leading a similar process of realignment in Latin America by placing issues on the agenda that activate new cleavages. Though Latin American political elites have generally hewed to the right on economic matters and questions of democracy (Stevens, Bishin and Barr 2006), they hold more progressive attitudes than the general public on same-sex marriage, abortion, and related issues (Boas and Smith 2019, Corral González 2013). Progressive
policy initiatives have most often responded to the efforts of organized feminist and LGBTQ
movements (Daby and Moseley, Forthcoming; Diez, 2015; Encarnación, 2016; Htun, 2003)
rather than widespread public demand for policy change, and they have often been met
with lukewarm support or even outright opposition among the broader public (Corredor
2019). When wedge issues transform the political agenda in such a fashion, candidates are
more likely to stake out opposing positions, and those that remain neutral may risk electoral
decline (Chhibber, 1999), as in Costa Rica’s 2018 election.

When sexuality politics rises in salience and candidates stake out opposing positions on
these issues, religious communities intensify individual-level realignments. As in the United
States (Putnam and Campbell, 2012), abortion and same-sex marriage are the two major
issues that most strongly cleave the Latin American electorate along religious lines. In the
Supplemental Information, we show that religious attendance strongly depresses support for
same-sex marriage and abortion in Latin America. By contrast, religious attendance and
Protestant (versus Catholic) affiliation are associated with progressive—not conservative—
positions on economic redistribution and crime. Hence, when sexuality politics remains a
latent cleavage, religious affiliation and church attendance may actually push Latin Ameri-
cans to the left in their vote choices. However, when sexuality politics becomes salient, we
expect that religious citizens will crystallize as a conservative electoral base.

We also argue that different issues should produce different religious cleavages. Recent
work on Brazil finds that views on homosexuality and gender uniquely differentiate evangel-
icals from Catholics, while both religiously devout Catholics and evangelicals adopt conserva-
tive positions on abortion (Smith, 2019). In the Supplemental Information, we show that
a Catholic–evangelical gap in abortion attitudes is entirely explained by differences in church
attendance, yet a similar gap in views on same-sex marriage persists, even after accounting

2Other, related issues that cleave the electorate by religion include school-based sexual education and
anti-LGBTQ bullying campaigns, as well as policies on churches’ rights and responsibilities.
for religiosity. As a result, policy debates over abortion should produce an electoral cleavage on the basis of religiosity (i.e., church attendance), while debates on same-sex marriage will trigger realignments between Catholics and evangelicals.

If religion influenced voting behavior simply via its effect on sexuality politics attitudes, it might be a relatively unimportant part of the story, located far back in the “funnel of causality” from demographics to vote choice (Campbell et al., 1964). However, we expect that when sexuality politics issues increase in salience, religion will influence voters’ decisions in multiple ways, beyond the effect that is mediated by issue attitudes. First, religious groups constitute communities where social pressure often leads to high levels of political cohesion, as churches orient vote choice through social and identity-based processes (Djupe and Gilbert, 2009; Smith, 2019; Wald, Owen and Hill, 1988, 1990). Even church members who are personally unconvinced on the issues may end up voting with their fellow congregants. Second, religious leaders may deliberately work to strengthen the linkage between policy attitudes and vote choice through active campaigning or more subtle, less overtly partisan messages during sermons or in the course of other interactions with church members.

Based on the discussion above, we formulate and test the following hypotheses:

- **H1a.** When sexuality politics issues are more salient, views on these issues will be more strongly linked to vote choice.
- **H1b.** When candidates stake out opposing positions on sexuality politics issues, views on these issues will be more strongly linked to vote choice.
- **H2a.** When sexuality politics issues are more salient, both religiosity and evangelical religious affiliation will be more strongly linked to vote choice.

Our theoretical discussion also implies that when candidates adopt different positions on sexuality politics, both religiosity and evangelical religious affiliation will be more strongly linked to vote choice (H2b), though we do not test this particular hypothesis, due to our lack of a comprehensive measure of candidates’ campaign platforms and the impossibility of
experimentally manipulating religion or religiosity.

3 Empirical Analysis

To test our hypotheses, we combine two distinct research designs: a candidate-choice conjoint experiment conducted via an online survey in Brazil, Chile, and Peru, and multilevel analysis of voting behavior in multiple waves of the AmericasBarometer and Latinobarómetro surveys, conditioning on coverage of same-sex marriage and abortion in major newspapers during the period surrounding the election. These two research designs complement one another. The conjoint experiment, which we use to test H1b, allows for a causal interpretation of the effect of candidate issue stance on vote intention in a hypothetical election in three countries. The multilevel analysis, which we use to test H1a and H2a, shifts to a real-world context and expands the scope of our analysis to multiple years of elections in 15 countries.

3.1 Conjoint Experiment

3.1.1 Research Design

The candidate-choice conjoint experiment was embedded in online surveys that were fielded in Brazil, Chile, and Peru from May 7–22, 2019. Respondents were recruited via Facebook advertisements, a common approach to convenience sampling for online surveys in comparative politics (Boas, Christenson and Glick, 2020). To ensure a diverse sample, advertisements were targeted to Facebook users in distinct strata of age, sex, and region in each country. The valid N for each survey was 1817 respondents in Brazil, 3732 in Chile, and 3698 in Peru.

3 These three countries are the focus of a separate book project for which the conjoint experiment was designed. Despite having substantial evangelical populations, Brazil, Chile, and Peru differ in terms of evangelicals’ descriptive representation, the outcome that the book project seeks to explain.

4 Samples were larger in Chile and Peru because the surveys sought to recruit enough evangelical Christians to allow for subgroup analysis in each country, and evangelicals were a larger share of the sample in Brazil.
The conjoint experiment presented subjects with a choice between two hypothetical candidates for Congress and asked which one they would vote for. Subjects read the following introductory text (the name of the office varied across countries) and then were presented with a table of candidate attributes, with the value of each attribute for each candidate randomly chosen from among the two options. As is standard in conjoint experiments, each profile was randomized independently of the other, so while the two profiles could differ in every attribute, as shown below, they almost always involved some common traits.

Imagine that the legislative elections were this coming Sunday and that you were deciding between two candidates for federal deputy / deputy / congressperson with the following characteristics. Which candidate would you vote for?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Candidate A</strong></th>
<th><strong>Candidate B</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex:</strong> Male</td>
<td><strong>Sex:</strong> Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age:</strong> 39 years</td>
<td><strong>Age:</strong> 56 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education:</strong> Completed college</td>
<td><strong>Education:</strong> Completed high school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation:</strong> Businessman/woman</td>
<td><strong>Occupation:</strong> Merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Experience:</strong> Has been mayor</td>
<td><strong>Political Experience:</strong> No prior office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion:</strong> Evangelical</td>
<td><strong>Religion:</strong> Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abortion policy:</strong> Maintain current laws</td>
<td><strong>Abortion policy:</strong> Complete ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic policy:</strong> Stimulate private enterprise</td>
<td><strong>Economic policy:</strong> Increase state participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crime policy:</strong> More prisons and tougher penalties</td>
<td><strong>Crime policy:</strong> Social development to prevent crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To prevent anchoring biases while still allowing for a logical presentation of items, the three policy positions were randomly shown either first or last, and within the policy and non-policy block, the order of items was fully randomized. To increase statistical power, the conjoint experiment was repeated three times for each respondent, with a new random draw of candidate characteristics each time.

Since the main purpose of the conjoint experiment was to examine voting behavior for Catholic versus evangelical candidates, the policy positions were constrained to those that an evangelical representative might reasonably take. On economic and crime policy, evangelical issue positions span the ideological spectrum, so progressive and conservative stances are both plausible. By contrast, few evangelical politicians publicly advocate for liberalizing abortion laws, so the leftmost plausible position on this issue is to maintain the status quo, which is roughly similar across countries. All three allow therapeutic abortion; Chile and Brazil permit abortion in cases of rape or fetal inviability (in Brazil, only due to anencephaly); and Chile also allows it in cases of incest ([Marcus-Delgado, 2019](#)). Since laws on same-sex partnerships differ more dramatically across countries—Brazil allows same-sex marriage, Chile allows civil unions, and Peru permits neither—this issue was not included in the conjoint experiment.

Prior to the conjoint experiment, and separated from it by a block of questions about party identification and vote in previous elections, respondents were asked for their own issue positions on abortion, economic, and crime policy. The text of the questions read: “Which of the following options best represents your position on abortion / the economy / crime?” Choices included the same two positions that the candidates could adopt; for abortion, respondents were also offered the option of legalization, in order to span the full range of policy positions.
3.1.2 Specification and Results

The analysis of the conjoint experiment examines the effect of candidates taking the same position as respondents on abortion, crime, and the economy. For abortion, where candidate issue positions were restricted, respondents who favor full legalization are treated as agreeing with candidates who want to maintain current laws. Since candidate positions are fully randomized, agreement or disagreement on each issue is independent of all other characteristics of the candidate as well as the respondent. Hence, a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of vote choice on indicators for policy agreement provides unbiased estimates of the causal effect for each issue. Specifically, for respondent $i$, candidate profile $j$ (1 or 2), and choice task $k$ (1, 2, or 3), we estimate the following regression:

$$ Vote_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{AgreeAbortion}_{ijk} + \beta_2 \text{AgreeEconomy}_{ijk} + \beta_3 \text{AgreeCrime}_{ijk} + \epsilon_{ijk} $$

The unit of analysis is the candidate profile, six of which were evaluated by each respondent (three choices among two profiles). Hence, the valid N for each regression is six times the number of respondents: 10,902 for Brazil, 22,392 for Chile, and 22,188 for Peru. $Vote$ takes on the value of 1 if the candidate’s profile was chosen, and 0 if it was not. Since $\epsilon_{ijk}$ will be correlated within choice tasks (if one candidate is chosen, the opponent is not) as well as respondents, standard errors are clustered on the respondent $i$, following Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014).

Results from the conjoint experiment offer strong support for H1b: when we experimentally induce variation in the issue positions of hypothetical candidates, voter-candidate agreement on abortion has large effects on voting behavior (Figure 1). Averaging across all other candidate characteristics and issue positions, agreeing on abortion raises the probability of supporting the candidate by 21 percentage points in Brazil, 25 percentage points in Chile, and 16 percentage points in Peru. These effects are of similar magnitude to voter-
Figure 1: Effects of Policy Agreement on Vote Choice: Conjoint Experiment

Dependent variable is an indicator for voting for the candidate; independent variables are indicators for policy agreement on each issue. Icons give point estimates and lines give two-sided 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered on the respondent.

candidate agreement on the economy or crime. As shown in the Supplemental Information, we obtain slightly smaller coefficient estimates (though they support similar conclusions) when we limit the sample to respondents who favor current laws or a full abortion ban. Thus, part of what drives our results is that proponents of full legalization prefer the lesser of two evils, a candidate who favors the status quo. We expect we would obtain even larger effects for agreement on abortion if these voters could choose a candidate who matched their issue position.

The conjoint experiment has the advantage of allowing for a causal interpretation of the effect of voter-candidate agreement on each policy issue. Moreover, presenting candidate profiles with a variety of different characteristics and randomizing the order in which the issue stances appear makes the choice task more realistic, disguises the purpose of the experiment, and enhances external validity when compared to vignette experiments that manipulate only a single characteristic of the politician.
However, conjoint experiments still present a fictionalized scenario in which voters are asked to choose candidates absent all other influences on voting behavior, including partisanship, clientelism, campaigns, and—importantly for our study—church-based social influence. In such contexts, effects of the experimental stimuli on voting behavior are often unrealistically large and unreplicable in the real world (Boas, Hidalgo and Melo, 2019). Hence, to gauge whether sexuality politics issue positions correlate with voting behavior in actual elections, and to assess the role of religion, we turn to an observational analysis of survey data.

3.2 Multilevel Analysis

3.2.1 Contextual Measures

For our public opinion analysis, we develop real-world contextual measures of the salience of abortion and same-sex marriage in the news in a given election year. Our contextual measures reflect the frequency with which abortion and same-sex marriage are mentioned in news coverage in each country-year, following Grossman (2015). Using the Factiva database, we identified the major newspaper with the most complete full-text coverage for each Latin American country; in almost all cases this is plausibly the “newspaper of record.” To measure coverage of each issue, we ran full-text searches on “aborto” within each country and on the following terms for same-sex marriage:

- Spanish: “matrimonio gay” OR “matrimonio igualitario” OR “matrimonio homo*” OR “matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo” OR “union* civil*”

- Portuguese: “casamento gay” OR “casamento igualitario” OR “casamento homo*” OR “casamento entre pessoas do mesmo sexo” OR “união civil” OR “unioes civis”

Since the legislative debate on same-sex partnership in some countries concerns civil unions rather than marriage, we included terms measuring this concept as well. Newspapers vary
in the amount of coverage they devote to any given topic, and the Factiva database also has more complete coverage of some publications in recent years, so we standardize coverage of abortion and same-sex marriage by the number of stories about politics, measured via a full-text search on the term “politica.”

For the Dominican Republic, which is not covered in Factiva, we were able to use the search function on Diario Libre’s website to obtain annual counts of coverage of abortion and politics. The site’s search engine did not accept Boolean search terms, so we were unable to obtain counts for same-sex marriage. For El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, Factiva has no full-text newspaper coverage, and we were unable to obtain data elsewhere.

The resulting raw measures, ranging from 0 to 0.173 for abortion and 0 to 0.116 for same-sex marriage, represent the ratio of the number of stories on each issue to the total number of stories about politics. Figure 2 summarizes these measures for each of the 15 countries for which we have data. The major spikes in coverage are readily identifiable as corresponding to periods of high salience for abortion or same-sex marriage, typically because of a proposed or actual policy change, as summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Identifying Peaks in Coverage of Sexuality Politics Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Abortion Peak</th>
<th>Same-Sex Marriage Peak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2018 legalization bill</td>
<td>2010 legalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>2011 legalization bill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2010 election</td>
<td>2013 legalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2017 liberalization</td>
<td>2017 legalization bill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2013 legalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2018 IAHCR ruling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2019 legalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2007 decriminalization (Mexico City)</td>
<td>2010 legalization (Mexico City), 2016 legalization proposal (national)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2013–16 civil unions bills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2012 legalization</td>
<td>2013 legalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Countries with no identifiable peaks for these issues during the period of coverage also serve to validate the measure. For abortion, all countries with low and steady levels of
Figure 2: Abortion and Same-Sex Marriage as a Share of Political Coverage in Main Newspaper, 2002–2019
coverage experienced no legislative change or proposed change during the period of coverage, and in most of them, abortion is either totally prohibited or allowed only to save the life of the mother (Marcus-Delgado, 2019). Likewise, the three countries with consistently low levels of same-sex marriage coverage, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Venezuela, have seen little progress on LGBTQ rights. In these countries, abortion or same-sex marriage are largely off the political agenda, a fact that is reflected in the absence of newspaper coverage.

For a contextual measure of salience to use in our regressions, we averaged the news coverage ratios from the year of the election in question and the previous year in order to develop a smoothed estimate of the salience of these topics in the lead-up to each political contest. Since the AmericasBarometer asks about vote in prior elections, these contextual measures are lagged to the time of the election. We then rescaled the proportions to run from 0 to 1 and transformed them by taking their square roots. The final resulting contextual variables run from 0 to 1, with means relatively close to the scale midpoints; histograms of the transformed contextual variables are included in the Supplemental Information.

3.2.2 AmericasBarometer Data

Our multilevel analysis integrates these contextual measures with public opinion data in order to examine the extent to which context modifies the relationship between a series of individual level variables and voting behavior. Our primary source of public opinion data are the 2012, 2014, 2016–17, and 2018–19 waves of the AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), all of which inquired about respondents’ support for therapeutic abortion as well as same-sex marriage. The former is measured via a yes/no question: “Do you believe that the interruption of pregnancy, or an abortion, is justified when the life of the mother is in danger?” The latter is measured via the question “How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry,” with responses on a 10-point Likert scale from strongly disapprove (1) to strongly approve.
We recode abortion views as a dichotomous measure indicating support for the right to a therapeutic abortion, and same-sex marriage views on a 0 to 1 scale. For both recoded variables, higher numbers indicate the more liberal policy position.

To test the conditional impact of religious affiliation, we use two measures. The first is self-identified religious affiliation, recoded as Catholic, evangelical/Pentecostal, no religion, and other religion. The second is church attendance, which we recode to run from 0 ("never or almost never") to 1 ("more than once a week"). Since this latter item was not asked in the 2014 AmericasBarometer, the religion analysis incorporates only 2012, 2016–17, and 2018–19. In the remainder of the analysis, we control for religious affiliation but not religious attendance, to maximize the number of waves we can include.

To account for potentially confounded ideological and policy views, as well as to get a sense of the relative magnitude of various attitudes in shaping vote choice, we included a number of other attitudinal measures. We control for economic views using the only relevant question that is present in all four survey waves: support for "strong government efforts" to "reduce inequality," originally measured on a 7-point scale. In some models, we also include a dichotomous indicator of support for tough-on-crime policies ("fighting crime by increasing punishment"). All of these variables are recoded to run from 0 to 1. To measure ideology, we include indicator variables for those placing themselves on the left end (positions 1–4) or right end (positions 7–10) of the 1–10 ideological scale. Given high and non-random rates of non-reporting of ideology (Ames and Smith 2010; Zechmeister and Corral 2013), we include respondents with missing values on these questions, coding them as 0 on our "leftist" and "rightist" dummy variables. Finally, we incorporate relevant demographic variables potentially confounded with religion and policy attitudes, including

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5The Colombia survey included this measure in 2014, but omitted it in 2018.
6This variable is missing in six countries in the 2018/19 round, and from Argentina and Uruguay in 2016/17.
gender, household wealth, education, age, ethnic identification, and size of place of residence.

Our dependent variable is the ideological direction of vote choice. The underlying measure involves a question about respondents’ vote in the last presidential election (the first round in the case of majority runoff systems). Across all countries and waves, 57% of respondents name a candidate or party in response to this question. To generate a dependent variable that can be compared across countries, we follow Carlin, Singer and Zechmeister (2015b) in transforming vote for specific candidates/parties into a 1–10 measure of the ideology of vote choice. Prior analysis of both elite surveys and expert coding concludes that elite ideology in Latin America can largely be reduced to a unidimensional left-right scale (Saiegh, 2015; Wiesehomeier and Benoit, 2009). We merge in left-right estimates for each candidate/party from the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) surveys from each country, in which respondents (who are themselves legislators) are asked to place major politicians and parties on a 1–10 left–right scale. Our values are drawn from the PELA wave most proximate to the specific election mentioned in the AmericasBarometer survey question. We use the mean ideological rating of the politician, if available; otherwise we use party ratings. Details about a few difficult-to-score cases are discussed in the Supplemental Information. As the dependent variable runs from 1 to 10 and is approximately normally distributed, with a mean of 5.7, all our analysis uses standard multilevel linear models, which facilitates interpretation of effects directly from regression results.

Table 2 summarizes the countries, elections, and survey waves for which we have valid measures of news coverage, as well as the share of respondents from each wave voting for

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7 Carlin, Singer and Zechmeister (2015b) rely on 0–20 expert-coded ideology measures from Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009), with slight updating for a few candidates and parties. They use PELA-derived measures like ours as a robustness check, noting a high correlation between the two sets of scores. Given the extensive changes in many Latin American party systems since the Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) analysis, we opt to use the PELA surveys, which offer more contemporaneous measures.

8 In instances where both are available, personal and party ratings are correlated at 0.94.
candidates or parties for whom we lack a valid measure of ideology. For most countries listed, we are able to use all four AmericasBarometer waves. For the Dominican Republic and Paraguay, we drop the 2012 wave; for Guatemala, we also omit 2014. On average, candidates for whom we lack ideology measures garnered only 1.0% of the vote. The only case where this figure rises above 5% is Chile’s 2013 election, which featured an unusual number of outsider or small-party candidates.

3.2.3 AmericasBarometer Results

As a first step in the analysis, we examine the unconditional relationship between sexuality politics views or religion, on the one hand, and the ideology of vote choice, on the other. A full table of results is reported in the Supplemental Information. This analysis mirrors similar analyses for prior periods (Boas and Smith 2015; Carlin, Singer and Zechmeister 2015; Zechmeister and Corral 2013). On average across the region, views on same-sex marriage predict voting behavior in recent elections when controlling for ideological self-identification—a contrast with earlier findings (Carlin, Singer and Zechmeister 2015, p.364). In comparative terms, the impact of same-sex marriage attitudes across the range of the variable is slightly less than a quarter of the effect of identifying as a leftist rather than a rightist. The coefficient for same-sex marriage attitudes is similar in magnitude to those for other issues; it is smaller than that of economic attitudes, but larger than that of crime-related attitudes. Consistent with earlier analyses (Boas and Smith 2015; Carlin, Singer and Zechmeister 2015), on average across the region we find no impact of attitudes toward therapeutic abortion and no Catholic-evangelical cleavage in vote choice. However, the non-religious do vote substantially to the left of both Catholics and evangelicals, and church attendance pushes vote choice slightly to the right.

Our hypotheses relate to how context modifies the role of sexuality politics attitudes and religion in shaping vote choice. Figures 3 and 4 show our key results, based on full, multivari-
Figure 3: Vote Choice as a Function of Issue Attitudes and News Coverage

Figure plots the marginal effect of each issue attitude on the ideology of vote choice (higher values = rightist voting). 95% confidence intervals shown; estimates based on full multivariate model shown in SI. Multilevel models; tables corresponding to the figures are included in the Supplemental Information.

Figure 3 supports H1a: the impact of sexuality politics attitudes is strongly contingent on news coverage. In the right panel, we find that the effect of same-sex marriage attitudes on the ideology of vote choice varies with news coverage of the issue. In times and places in which same-sex marriage is highly salient, same-sex marriage attitudes are predicted to matter more than economic views, and nearly as much as ideological identification. The left panel shows that news coverage of abortion likewise moderates the effect of abortion attitudes on vote choice. However, we also find a counterintuitive result: in times and places where abortion is not widely discussed, people who support therapeutic abortion tend to vote for rightist candidates. We discuss this finding in the following section.

Figure 4 examines the interaction between news coverage of each issue and two different
Figure 4: Vote Choice as a Function of Religion and News Coverage

The top panes plot the gap in ideology of vote choice between evangelicals and Catholics; the bottom panes plot the marginal effect of church attendance (higher values = rightist voting). 95% confidence intervals shown; estimates based on full multivariate model shown in SI.
measures of religion: evangelical versus Catholic identification and church attendance. The figures show that when abortion and same-sex marriage are in the news a great deal, religious cleavages emerge. As expected, abortion coverage more strongly shapes the cleavage between religious and secular citizens (as measured by church attendance), while same-sex marriage coverage affects the cleavage between evangelicals and Catholics but only weakly moderates the effect of church attendance on ideology of vote choice.

### 3.2.4 Further Analysis of Abortion Attitudes

In Figure 3, we unexpectedly found that in times and places in which there is little news coverage of abortion, people who supported a woman’s right to a therapeutic abortion (i.e., when the mother’s health is in danger) have tended to vote for right-leaning candidates. One potential explanation for this counterintuitive result concerns the nature of the abortion question in the AmericasBarometer. Therapeutic abortion is a relatively limited right, and it is legal in most countries in Latin America (Marcus-Delgado, 2019). Perhaps when potential legal changes are not on the agenda, those who support the status quo tend to vote for candidates on the center-right for other reasons.

To examine whether the limited nature of the AmericasBarometer abortion question affects our results, we turn to the 2004, 2007, and 2015 waves of the Latinobarómetro, which included a broader and more sensitive measure of abortion attitudes, on the same 1–10 Likert scale as the AmericasBarometer question about same-sex marriage. The question reads: “Please use this card to tell me whether you think abortion can always be justified, never be justified, or somewhere in between.” Higher values indicate stronger agreement with abortion. Once again, this variable is recoded to run from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating the more liberal position. In this analysis, our dependent variable is based on a question that is prospective, hypothetical, and party- rather than candidate-focused: “If there were elections this Sunday, what party would you vote for?” Given the contemporaneous nature
of the question, we code the outcome variable using party-based ideology estimates from the PELA wave closest to the survey year. Similarly, our contextual measures are tied to the survey year. Lacking a measure of church attendance, we are not able to assess the role of religion. In the Supplemental Information, we provide further detail on variable coding as well as the countries, elections, and survey waves included in the Latinobarómetro analysis.

As Figure 5 shows, the effect of abortion attitudes is substantially stronger in the Latinobarómetro analysis than in the AmericasBarometer, perhaps because the former study’s measure of abortion attitudes is finer-grained and better covers the range of possible views. In this figure, the impact of abortion attitudes rivals the gap between rightists and centrists. Moreover, at the low end of the scale of abortion coverage, people who support abortion rights are predicted to be neither more nor less likely to vote for rightist candidates.

Figure plots the marginal effect of support for abortion on the ideology of vote choice (higher values = rightist voting). 95% confidence intervals shown; estimates based on full multivariate model shown in SI.
4 Discussion and Conclusion

Over the past several decades, a number of Latin American countries have witnessed dramatic and often unexpected changes to their policies regarding abortion, LGBTQ rights, and other issues related to gender and sexuality (Díez, 2015; Encarnación, 2016; Marcus-Delgado, 2019). On same-sex partnerships, some Latin American countries have been regional or even global leaders: Argentina was the tenth country in the world and the second in the Americas (after Canada) to legalize same-sex marriage when it did so in 2010. Changes to abortion legislation have been more limited and more hesitant, but there has also been a wave of reform since 2007, when Mexico City first decriminalized the procedure. Some of these changes or attempted reforms have come through legislation, while others have resulted from judicial decisions. Especially in the latter case, policy change has often taken place before there is widespread public support. Brazil’s high court legalized same-sex marriage in 2013, approximately three years before a majority of the public approved of the change; the equivalent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2015 happened three years after public opinion shifted in favor of same-sex marriage.

Latin America’s wave of sexuality politics reforms has had clear effects on mass politics throughout the region. While recent advances in rights have stimulated the rise of social movements opposing “gender ideology” (Corredor, 2019), there is also evidence that progressive policy change can shift public opinion as a whole towards support for those policies. As Maia, Chiu and Desposato (2020) demonstrate in a new paper, highly educated voters responded to a variety of LGBTQ rights reforms in the 1990s and 2000s by becoming more supportive of same-sex marriage and LGBTQ candidates running for office. They further argue that such policy changes did not drive attitudinal polarization, measured as citizens’ distance from mean public opinion in their countries.

Yet even if policy changes reduce attitudinal polarization and boost support for progres-
sive reforms, they can also paradoxically increase electoral polarization around these issues by activating cleavages that were previously latent. Prior to the 2010s, differing attitudes on abortion or same-sex marriage had little repercussion in terms of voting behavior because these issues were largely absent from the political agenda and because candidates did not stake out opposing positions. As policy changes on gender and sexuality have been proposed or implemented, these issues have increased in salience, and they have started to become major topics of debate among rightist social movements and during electoral campaigns. Even if public opinion is becoming more supportive and less polarized in the aggregate, the differences that do remain now matter more for voters’ decisions at the polls.

We argue that the increasing media salience and electoral contestation around sexuality politics in some countries of Latin America is prompting electoral realignments. In a region where materialist issues such as economic redistribution and crime control used to be the major drivers of voting behavior, opinions on gender and sexuality are emerging as a new cleavage that influences decisions on election day. These changes are also shifting the implications of religion for voting behavior in the region. In an era in which materialist issues dominated the agenda, Latin America’s evangelical Christians tended to vote to the left, perhaps thanks to their lower-class social origins. But at times and in places where sexuality politics has risen in prominence, this religious minority has shifted to join a rightist bloc. Where abortion is on the agenda, evangelicals are joined by their Catholic brethren, with both traditions voting more conservatively than the non-religious. Hence, the rise of sexuality politics is prompting the consolidation of a new Christian right—a support base for candidates such as Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (Layton et al., 2020)—even as it may be shifting public opinion toward support for more liberal policies, on average.

Our argument about the emergence of new issue cleavages in Latin America has implications for the literature on ideological polarization and electoral realignment in the United States in recent decades. In the U.S. context, partisan sorting or realignment by issue atti-
tudes has been a central driver of polarization. Sometimes citizens changed their attitudes to match their partisanship, while other times they switched parties to match their attitudes on high profile issues highlighted in the media, such as abortion (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Carsey and Layman 2006; Dancey and Goren 2010). As the Republican Party became publicly identified with conservative religiosity, partisan sorting also skyrocketed along religious lines, and partisanship and religious affiliation became mutually endogenous (Campbell et al., 2018; Margolis, 2018; Putnam and Campbell, 2012). The growing overlap among social identities as well as social influence within increasingly homogeneous groups (among them religious communities) intensified partisan and ideological polarization (Klar, 2014; Levendusky, Druckman and McLain, 2016; Mason, 2018; Mason and Wronski, 2018). Between 1992 and 2012, sexuality politics attitudes, partisanship, and religion became tightly correlated in a mutually reinforcing package, with issue positions simultaneously shaped by and responding to religious and partisan identities (Goren and Chapp, 2017).

Though there are clear parallels between the processes of sorting in Latin America and the United States, partisanship constitutes a key difference between the two regions. In the U.S. realignment process, party identification serves as the glue that binds together issue attitudes, religion, and vote choice. By contrast, in the Latin American context, the binding power of partisanship may be closer to that of Scotch tape. Party systems vary greatly across Latin America, but they are universally younger and more fragmented than in the US (Levitsky et al., 2016; Mainwaring, 2018). Levels of party identification are substantially lower, parties have weaker brands, and partisanship is more fickle (Lupu, 2016; Samuels and Zucco, 2018). Yet even in this seemingly adverse context, we find that elite priming of sexuality politics issues can trigger electoral realignments. In countries like Brazil, social conservatives may flit from one party label to the next, while their emerging tendency to support right-wing candidates remains constant.
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Elections listed are those for which we have valid measures of news coverage; there are none for El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The “Missing” column gives the total reported vote share from each AmericasBarometer wave for those candidates for whom we lack estimates of ideological position.
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