

Looks Like Me, Thinks Like Me? Descriptive
Representation and Opinion Congruence in Brazil

Supporting Information

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1 Civil Society Participation by Party

In section 3, we note that PT identifiers rarely attend meetings of civil society organizations or the party itself, and, in a footnote, we claim that figures rarely differ significantly for the PSDB or PMDB. Table 1 reports figures for each party and type of organization. The only significant difference for the percentage who never attend is between the PT and the PMDB for women's groups.

2 Descriptive Statistics for the Brazilian Legislative Surveys

Table 2 compares three waves of the Brazilian Legislative Surveys (BLS) to the Brazilian Congress as a whole. The BLS is an opt-in rather than random sample of legislators, but on a number of metrics, it is representative of the Congress as a whole. None of the major political parties or regions of the country is consistently over- or underrepresented. Surveyed legislators are also similar to their colleagues in terms of age, gender, and race. Evangelicals and those with no college education are somewhat under-sampled in each wave. However, since our purpose is to examine how these groups differ from their colleagues in terms of congruence, we need not worry about the combination of causal heterogeneity and unrepresentativeness on religion or education.

3 Alternative Measures of Partisanship

As discussed in section 4, Latinobarómetro (LB), the AmericasBarometer (AB), and the Brazilian Electoral Panel Study (BEPS) measure partisanship in different ways from one another: LB asks what party the respondent would vote for in a hypothetical election, whereas AB and BEPS ask what party he or she sympathizes with. For ideology and gay marriage, the issue areas that draw substantially from both data sources, we calculated our elite-mass difference-in-distributions measure separately using data from LB and from AB/BEPS. For ideology, we limited the analysis to the 2009 and 2013 waves of the BLS, for which we have corresponding mass survey data from

both sources. Results are presented in Figure 1. Elite-mass differences in distributions are similar regardless of whether we use LB, AB/BEPS, or both. If the values for one or the other data source were substituted into Figure 2 in the main text, our substantive conclusions would not be affected.

4 Survey Question Wordings

The wording of questions used to operationalize issue attitudes for masses and elites is contained in Table 3. Questions drawn from studies by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life and used in the separate analysis of lifelong evangelicals versus converts are listed in Table 4. We present questions from the Churches North and South Project used in analysis of clergy influence and heterogeneity of opinion among churchgoers in Table 5.

5 Mean Issue Attitudes of Masses and Elites

Figure 2 summarizes the difference in the mean left-right positions of masses and elites for each issue area and category of representation that we examine. This quantity has a theoretical range of -1 to 1 ; positive numbers indicate that elites are to the right of masses.

6 Legislator Opinion and Roll-Call Votes

At the end of section 4, we discuss the relationship between personal preferences and legislative behavior as measured via roll-call votes. Many bills in Brazil never reach a floor vote, and many of those that do are approved or rejected via voice rather than roll-call vote. Our analysis focuses on two roll-call votes in the 2011–2014 legislature that can be matched to issue attitudes measured in the BLS: the 2012 Forest Code (Law 12.651/2012), which establishes conservation areas, and a 2014 law for race-based affirmative action in public sector hiring (Law 12.990/2014). In both instances, a “yes” vote would correspond to the more left-wing position. As shown in Figure 3,

we find that supporters of each bill expressed more left-wing attitudes on environmentalism and race-based affirmative action, respectively.

7 Difference in Distributions Using the KS Statistic

In Figure 2 in the main text, we measure elite-mass congruence using the area between the cumulative distribution functions for masses and elites. Figure 4 shows that we obtain similar results using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic, which gives the maximum distance between CDFs.

8 Weights for Differences in Distributions

In Section 5, we calculate the area between the cumulative distribution functions for masses and elites as a measure of congruence for a given policy area and category of representation. Most policy areas draw from only a single wave of the BLS and several years of mass surveys that are matched to that wave. However, for ideology and economic regime preference, our data span several waves of the BLS. Response rates vary over time for particular categories of legislators in the BLS, such as evangelical Christians or members of the PT (see Table 2). The number of mass survey respondents paired to each BLS wave also varies; we have fewer that correspond to the 2005 survey of legislators, since only Latinobarómetro, not AmericasBarometer, was conducting surveys in Brazil during that time. If we simply pooled all our data and calculated mass and elite CDFs for these policy areas, we would underweight mass or elite respondents from certain years and overweight others. This could be especially problematic if opinion is shifting over time, as unequal weighting might lead us to underestimate congruence.

To address this issue, we apply weights when calculating the difference in distributions measure for ideology and economic regime preference. Weights return the elite or mass sample to

proportionality across BLS waves. For masses, weights are calculated as

$$w_{m,r,p,y} = \frac{1/\#Y_r}{P(y_{m,r,p})}$$

where m denotes masses, r indexes the category of representation, p indexes the policy area, y indexes the corresponding year of the BLS (2005, 2009, or 2013), $\#Y_r$ denotes the number of waves of the BLS for which we have data on representation category r (2 for Afro-Brazilians; 3 for all others), and $P(y_{m,r,p})$ is the proportion of the pooled mass sample in representation category r , and for which we have a valid measure of policy attitude p , that corresponds to BLS year y . For example, of evangelical respondents for whom we have a valid measure of economic regime preference, 42% correspond to the 2009 BLS wave. Ideally, one-third would correspond to this wave. Hence, the weight applied to these observations is

$$w_{m,evang,econ,2009} = \frac{1/3}{0.42} = 0.79.$$

For elites, we use a similarly calculated set of weights, but the target proportionality is derived from the presence of different categories of legislators in the Congress. The elite weights are calculated as

$$w_{e,r,p,y} = \frac{P(y_{c,r})}{P(y_{e,r,p})}$$

where e denotes elites; r , p , and y are defined as above; $P(y_{e,r,p})$ is the elite-survey equivalent of the quantity defined above for masses; and $P(y_{c,r})$ is the proportion of all members of the 52nd-54th Legislatures from representation category r (separately counting repeat terms by the same legislator) that would correspond to BLS year y had they been interviewed. For example, there were 73 evangelicals in the 52nd Legislature (BLS year 2005), 34 in the 53rd (BLS year 2009), and 73 in the 54th (BLS year 2013). Thus, the ideal share of evangelicals in our elite sample corresponding to the 2013 BLS would be $73/(73+34+73)$, or 41%. In fact, among evangelical legislators for whom we have a valid measure of economic regime preference, 48% correspond to

the 2013 BLS wave. Hence, the weight applied to these observations is

$$w_{e, \text{evang}, \text{econ}, 2013} = \frac{0.41}{0.48} = 0.85.$$

9 Weights for Dyadic Regressions

For similar reasons to those described above, we apply weights to the regressions with legislator-constituent dyads. The calculation of these weights is more straightforward than for the difference in distributions. They do not vary by representation category because we analyze all categories together in a single regression. We also do not vary weights by policy area. At the mass level we simply adjust for the number of respondents paired to each BLS wave. Mass weights are calculated as

$$w_{m,y} = \frac{1/3}{P(y_m)}$$

where m denotes masses, y indexes the corresponding year of the BLS (2005, 2009, or 2013), and $P(y_m)$ is the proportion of the pooled mass sample that corresponds to BLS year y . At the elite level, we use the BLS variable PWEIGHT, which adjusts for over- or underrepresentation of particular parties within the sample. Mass and elite weights are merged into the dyadic dataset, and the final weight used in the regression is the product of the two.

10 Validating the BLS Measure of Clientelism

In our dyadic regressions, we control for the degree to which legislators think that voters demand clientelism, using the CLIENTS variable in the BLS. This question is as close as the survey comes to measuring reliance on clientelistic linkages, but it is obviously not the same. To validate this measure, we compare mean scores by party on the BLS CLIENTS variable with those for a composite measure of clientelism (variable b15) from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP), in which country experts were asked to score Latin American parties on a vari-

ety of characteristics. Table 6 summarizes these scores (each rescaled from 0 to 1) for the parties covered in both datasets. The rank order of the four least clientelistic parties is the same using either data source, and both place the PT in the middle of the pack (position 6 or 7 of 11). There is somewhat greater divergence in rank ordering among the most clientelistic parties, but overall, the measures are highly correlated ($r = 0.86, p < 0.001$).

11 Regression Results for Legislator-Constituent Dyads

In Table 7, we present weighted least squares regression results corresponding to Figure 3 in the main text. Table 8 presents coefficients from these regressions estimated without elite- or mass-level control variables; Figure 5 plots the difference in coefficient estimates (parallel to Figure 3 in the main text) for this alternative set of results, which are essentially identical to those analyzed in the main text.

12 Lifelong Evangelicals versus Evangelical Converts

In Section 5.3 of the paper, we discuss results related to lifelong evangelicals and evangelical converts from the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life surveys in Brazil. Figure 6 shows levels of elite-mass congruence separately for lifelong evangelicals and converts. Differences between the two groups are small, and we find no consistent patterns; on some issues converts are more congruent, and on other issues they are less so.

13 Churches North and South Project

In Section 5.3 of the paper, we analyze results from the 2014 Churches North and South Project. The primary location of the project was the Brazilian city of Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais, a medium-sized city in the Southeast region, with a religious composition essentially identical to that of the

country as a whole in the 2010 census.¹ This research was supported by a Fulbright Award and a Small Research Grant from the American Political Science Association and was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the PI's home institution, by the Federal University of Juiz de Fora, and by the local Brazilian public health ministry.

For the clergy survey, ninety-seven evangelical and Catholic clergy were interviewed in Juiz de Fora. To verify the extent to which they differed from clergy in other locations, an additional 102 evangelical and Catholic clergy were interviewed in Rio de Janeiro, and 227 interviews were conducted with evangelical clergy attending a professional development conference in the city of Fortaleza, in the Northeast region.²

To contact Catholic priests, Juiz de Fora and Rio de Janeiro were stratified into regions based on geography and socioeconomic status. To contact evangelical clergy, interviewers relied on member lists from clergy associations and clergy contacted at association meetings. For comparison with the congregation-level study, this paper only uses data on clergy from Juiz de Fora, but results do not differ significantly for those from other regions. Despite the similarity of attitudes across clergy from various locations, it is unclear how representative they are of the broader national population of clergy, and there is no national-level sampling frame. Nonetheless, to the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to examine the political attitudes and behavior of Brazilian clergy.

The congregation-level study was conducted solely in Juiz de Fora. Though a study of a single city is obviously not representative at the national level, it allows for an in-depth examination of how congregational context shapes mass attitudes, while holding constant the broader municipal context. Eight churches across the metropolitan area were selected to represent conservative and more populist religious traditions within both Catholicism and evangelicalism, as well as neighborhoods of different socioeconomic levels. The sample includes three traditional Catholic churches—one each in upper-class, working-class and poor neighborhoods—and a Charismatic

¹In 2010, 65% of both the city and national population reported they were Catholic, and 22% reported they were evangelical. In Juiz de Fora, 5% identify as spiritist, and 5% as having no religion. The respective groups register 2% and 8% across the country as a whole.

²The conference, organized by the Apostolic Discipleship Movement (Movimento do Discipulado Apostólico, MDA, <http://www.visaomda.com>), was a professional development seminar on a church growth strategy involving methods of discipleship and ministry in cell groups.

Catholic church catering to the working class. In addition, it includes two traditional (i.e., "Main-line" or "historical") evangelical churches and two Pentecostal evangelical churches of upper middle-class and working-class profiles. Where possible, Catholic and evangelical churches were selected in the same neighborhoods, though several churches were large and centrally-located, drawing participants from across the city. Quantitative exit interviews were conducted with approximately fifty attendees at worship services in each church. Interviewers used gender quotas and were told to approach every second person exiting the church. To assess the extent to which socialization in churches imposes constraint beyond that found in the broader population, interviews were also conducted in five neighborhood sites near the churches: four health clinics and, to capture upper-income citizens who use private health providers, a shopping mall catering to the upper-middle class.

14 Variance Function Regression Results

We draw on the congregation-level survey of the Churches North and South Project to conduct a variance function regression (Western and Bloome 2009). In Tables 10 and 11, we present full results from the first and second stage models, both estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The second stage coefficients and 95% confidence intervals are reported in Figure 5 of the main text. As explained in Section 5.3, the first stage entailed regressing public opinion measures, all rescaled to run from 0 to 1, on indicators for the separate church and community sites.³ In the first stage regression results presented in Table 10, we find that there are many differences across sites in mean attitudes, especially on gay marriage and abortion. The second stage models regress the squared residuals from the first stage regression on indicators for Catholic church and non-religious community site, with evangelical church as the excluded category. When mean squared residuals are larger in magnitude, it indicates greater site-level heterogeneity in opinion among respondents from that type of site.

³The omitted site is "Evangelical Church 1."

Western and Bloome (2009) recommend using iterated gamma regression in the second stage of the variance function regression. For ease of interpretation, we present OLS results in the main text. In Tables 12 and 13 below, we present results from iterated gamma regression analysis. Results are similar to those obtained using OLS.

Table 1: Civil Society Participation by Party Sympathy

Organization Type	Meeting Attendance Frequency			
	Once a week	1–2 times a month	1–2 times a year	Never
Community Association				
PMDB	1.6	7.2	7.6	83.7
PSDB	1.7	7.5	10.3	80.5
PT	2.2	7.1	10.1	80.5
Professional Association				
PMDB	1.6	5.2	5.2	88.0
PSDB	0.0	2.9	7.5	89.7
PT	1.7	3.0	7.1	88.2
Labor Union				
PMDB	0.0	2.7	9.5	87.8
PSDB	2.7	4.1	11.0	82.2
PT	1.2	4.3	7.7	86.7
Women’s Group				
PMDB	0.0	2.9	2.0	95.1
PSDB	3.4	1.7	5.2	89.7
PT	3.4	4.3	5.2	87.0
Political Party				
PMDB	1.6	2.4	8.0	88.0
PSDB	1.1	4.0	9.8	85.1
PT	1.0	2.5	9.6	86.9

NOTE: Entries are row percentages based on the combined AmericasBarometer Brazil surveys from 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2012, except for labor unions (not asked in 2010-2012) and women’s groups (not asked in 2007).

Table 2: BLS Surveys vs. Corresponding Legislature

	BLS 2005	52nd Leg.	BLS 2009	53rd Leg.	BLS 2013	54th Leg.
<i>N</i>	124	594	139	594	148	594
Demographics						
Evangelical	0.07	0.12	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.12
Female	0.09	0.09	0.1	0.1	0.12	0.1
Afro-Brazilian			0.14	0.12	0.21	0.19
No College	0.08	0.15	0.09	0.12	0.12	0.13
Average Age	54	54	55	55	57	55
Region						
South	0.18	0.14	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.14
Southeast	0.31	0.32	0.37	0.32	0.3	0.32
Northeast	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.09
North	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.14
Center-West	0.28	0.3	0.29	0.3	0.3	0.3
Party						
PT	0.21	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.13	0.17
PMDB	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.16
PSDB	0.16	0.14	0.18	0.13	0.1	0.11
DEM	0.13	0.17	0.14	0.14	0.07	0.09

NOTE: Entries are proportions, except for average age and *N*. Age is measured as of the year of each BLS survey. Party is measured at the time of election. Data on legislatures are from the Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE) and correspond to election winners; they do not account for leaves of absence or replacements (*suplicantes*).

Figure 1: Opinion Congruence: Differences in Distributions Using Alternative Measures of Partisanship




Table 3: Survey Questions Used to Measure Congruence

BLS question	Mass survey questions
BLS 2013: Homosexual couples should have the right to marry (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree).	LB 2010: Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements I am going to read?: Homosexual marriage. BEPS 2010, AB 2012: How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry?
BLS 2013: Abortion should be prohibited in any circumstances (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree).	BEPS 2010: Which of these statements best expresses your opinion? (1) Abortion should not be permitted by law in any circumstances; (2) abortion should be permitted by law in some exceptional circumstances; (3) abortion should be permitted by law, for any reason, in the early stages of pregnancy; or (4) abortion should be permitted by law, without restrictions.
BLS 2013: It is fair for public universities to reserve slots for people of African descent (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree).	BEPS 2010: Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: It is fair for public universities to reserve slots for people of African descent (Black or mixed-race people).
BLS 2013: It is fair for public universities to reserve slots for people from low-income families (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree).	BEPS 2010: Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: It is fair for public universities to reserve slots for people from low-income families.
BLS 2013: Which of these is closer to your point of view? (1) Defending the environment should be a priority, even if it causes slower economic development and fewer jobs, or (2) Economic development and job creation should be priorities even if the environment suffers some damage.	LB 2011: With which of the following statements do you most agree? (1) Priority should be given to the development of the economy even if it means harming the environment, or (2) Priority should be given to the protection of the environment even if it means that economic growth is slower.
BLS 2005, 2009, 2013: Now let's imagine that on this line the number 1 corresponds to "left," the number 5 to "center," and the number 10 to "right." As you can see, a person who was very left-wing would be at number 1, and one who was very right-wing would be at 10. Where would you place yourself?	LB (all): In politics, we normally talk about "left" and "right." In a scale where 0 is "left" and 10 is "right," where would you place yourself? AB (all): On this card there is a 1–10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.

BLS 2005, 2009, 2013. In your opinion, what type of economic system is most appropriate for Brazil? (1) A predominantly market economy with the least possible participation of the State. (2) An economic system in which there is an equal distribution of responsibilities between state-owned firms and private firms. (3) An economy in which state-owned firms and the State constitute the main sector, but without eliminating the market economy. (4) An economy in which private capital is totally banished from the main sectors of the economy, with large firms becoming state-controlled.

LB: Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements I am going to read?
–The less that government intervenes in the economy, the better it is for the country (2002)
–The market economy is the best for the country (2002, 2007, 2009)
–Private enterprise is indispensable for the development of the country (2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011)
–The market economy is the only system with which Brazil can become a developed country (2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013)
–The privatization of state companies has been beneficial to the country (2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013)

LB 2006: Who do you think has to create wealth in our society, the state or private enterprises? On the same scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means that “the state has to produce wealth” and 10 that “private enterprises have to produce wealth,” where would you put your opinion?

AB 2007: Now I am going to read you a series of statements, and I would like you to tell me if you strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree. The less the government interferes in the economy, the better for the country.

BLS 2005: Authoritarian regimes are better able to stimulate economic growth than are democratic regimes. Do you agree or disagree?

BLS 2005: In Latin America, it has been harder for democratic governments to maintain order than it has for authoritarian governments. Do you agree or disagree?

LB 2002–05: Which of the following statements do you agree with most? (1) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government (2) In certain situations, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one (3) To people like me, it doesn’t matter whether we have a democratic government or a non-democratic government.

LB 2002–2005: Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements? Democracy may have problems but it is still the best form of government.

Table 4: Survey Questions Used for Analysis of Lifelong Evangelicals versus Converts

Issue area	Mass survey questions
Political Regime	<p>Pew 2006: Some people say to solve our country’s problems we should have a government that allows greater political participation by ordinary people and limits the power of individual political leaders. Others say to solve our country’s problems we should have a leader with a strong hand even if there is little participation by ordinary people. Which comes closer to your opinion?</p> <p>Pew 2014: Some feel that we should rely on a democratic form of government to solve our country’s problems. Others feel that we should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country’s problems. Which comes closer to your opinion?</p>
Economic Regime	<p>Pew 2006, 2014: Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following statements. Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor.</p>
Ideology	<p>Pew 2006: Some people talk about politics in terms of left, center and right. On a ten-point scale, with 1 indicating extreme left and 10 indicating extreme right, where would you place yourself?</p> <p>Pew 2014: <i>A Brazil-specific ideology question is included in the dataset, but the wording is not listed in the topline questionnaire.</i></p>
Abortion	<p>Pew 2006: Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following statements. The government should not interfere with a woman’s ability to have an abortion.</p> <p>Pew 2014: Do you think having an abortion should be legal in all cases, legal in most cases, illegal in most cases, or illegal in all cases?</p>
Gay Marriage	<p>Pew 2014: Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally?</p>

Table 5: Survey Questions Used for Analysis of Churches (Churches North and South Project)

Clergy survey questions: <i>How frequently are the following topics discussed in your church?</i> <i>(1 = Very rarely, 5 = Very frequently)</i>	Church and community site survey questions: <i>To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following proposals for laws?</i> <i>(1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree)</i>
The sin of homosexuality	Implementing legal gay marriage
The sin of abortion	Legalizing abortion
The need to take care of the environment	Implementing strong policies to protect the environment
The fight against racism and discrimination	Strengthen policies to combat racism and discrimination

Figure 2: Opinion Congruence: Mean Differences in Elite and Mass Positions





Figure 3: Legislative Opinion and Behavior: Roll-Call Votes and Corresponding Issue Attitudes.



NOTE: Issue attitudes are regarding environmentalism for the Forest Code vote and race-based quotas for the affirmative action vote. See main text for details on each bill.

Figure 4: Opinion Congruence: Differences in Distributions using KS Statistics




Table 6: Measures of Clientelism: Brazilian Legislative Surveys vs. Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project

Party	BLS		DALP	
	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
PR/PL	0.732	1	0.778	5
PTB	0.708	2	0.830	3
PDT	0.662	3	0.667	6
DEM/PFL	0.659	4	0.847	2
PMDB	0.652	5	0.880	1
PT	0.632	6	0.593	7
PP	0.613	7	0.819	4
PSDB	0.572	8	0.520	8
PSB	0.534	9	0.492	9
PPS	0.404	10	0.452	10
PC do B	0.292	11	0.311	11

NOTE: Entries are party-level averages. Measures of clientelism are the variable CLIENTS from the Brazilian Legislative Surveys (BLS) and the variable b15 from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP). Both are rescaled from 0 (theoretical minimum) to 1 (theoretical maximum).

Table 7: Congruence: WLS Regression Results

	Econ. Reg. '07-'13	Econ. Reg. '02-'13	Ideology '07-'13	Ideology '02-'13	Political Regime	Race Quotas	Class Quotas	Abortion	Gay Marriage	Environ- ment
Descriptive Rep.										
Evangelical	-0.039 (0.035)	-0.055* (0.026)	-0.02 (0.017)	-0.032† (0.016)	0.028 (0.048)	0.108* (0.053)	0.12 (0.076)	-0.065 (0.061)	-0.111** (0.039)	-0.029 (0.061)
Female	-0.002 (0.031)	0.04 (0.034)	0.03 (0.023)	0.062* (0.028)	-0.024 (0.016)	-0.071** (0.023)	-0.062† (0.034)	0.104† (0.062)	0.027 (0.017)	-0.159** (0.061)
No College	-0.013 (0.022)	0.015 (0.021)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.015)	0 (0.021)	0.033 (0.047)	-0.072* (0.028)	0.006 (0.049)	-0.013 (0.022)	-0.066 (0.069)
Afro-Brazilian	0.005 (0.021)		0.006 (0.013)			-0.022 (0.033)	-0.037 (0.032)	0.01 (0.046)	0.033† (0.02)	0.016 (0.048)
Traditional Rep.										
Same Party	0.001 (0.015)	0.01 (0.011)	0.061*** (0.011)	0.047*** (0.009)	-0.019** (0.007)	-0.087*** (0.015)	-0.079*** (0.018)	0.1** (0.033)	0.062*** (0.013)	-0.04 (0.034)
Same State	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.011 (0.008)	0.011 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.013 (0.01)	0.005 (0.011)	0.027† (0.015)	-0.006 (0.008)	0.011 (0.025)
Mass Controls										
Age	0 (0)	0 (0)	0.001*** (0)	0.001*** (0)	-0.001** (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0.001† (0)	0 (0)
News	0 (0.001)	0.002† (0.001)	0 (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.007** (0.002)	0.006 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.003* (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)
Log Muni. Pop.	0 (0)	0 (0)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0 (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0 (0.001)
Elite Controls										
Experience	0 (0.001)	0 (0.001)	0 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.004† (0.003)	0 (0.001)	-0.008* (0.003)
Corp. Donations	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.005 (0.003)	0.007 (0.009)	0.016† (0.009)	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.027 (0.018)
Clientelism	0.009 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.021)	-0.029 (0.021)	-0.021 (0.015)	0.011 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.037)	-0.032 (0.046)	0.004 (0.05)	-0.018 (0.02)	0.098 (0.068)
Sample Size										
<i>N</i>	906,153	1,460,625	1,064,878	1,484,510	421,022	325,897	167,904	144,576	677,198	151,385
<i>N</i> elites	245	330	191	265	119	143	144	144	142	137
<i>N</i> masses	6,741	11,428	10,255	14,688	3,538	2,279	1,166	1,004	4,769	1,105


NOTE: Dependent variable is the absolute value of the difference in opinion for elite-mass dyads. Entries in parentheses are estimated standard errors, clustered on elite respondent and mass respondent. Intercept and fixed effects for each mass survey estimated but not reported. Observations weighted to correct for disproportionality in legislators' parties and the number of dyads per BLS wave. † $p < .1$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 8: Congruence: WLS Regression Results (Without Controls)

	1	3	5	7	9	11	13	15	17	19
Descriptive Rep.										
Evangelical	-0.046 (0.036)	-0.056* (0.026)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.021 (0.014)	0.036 (0.047)	0.103† (0.054)	0.11 (0.079)	-0.071 (0.064)	-0.109** (0.038)	-0.016 (0.072)
Female	-0.004 (0.03)	0.039 (0.034)	0.031 (0.024)	0.06† (0.031)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.073** (0.023)	-0.055 (0.035)	0.097 (0.061)	0.032† (0.018)	-0.168** (0.065)
No College	-0.011 (0.023)	0.015 (0.021)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.013 (0.015)	0.001 (0.02)	0.03 (0.047)	-0.073* (0.03)	0.008 (0.051)	-0.009 (0.022)	-0.09 (0.071)
Afro-Brazilian	-0.004 (0.022)		0.013 (0.013)			-0.021 (0.033)	-0.033 (0.033)	0.003 (0.045)	0.032 (0.02)	0.016 (0.049)
Traditional Rep.										
Same Party	-0.002 (0.015)	0.012 (0.011)	0.061*** (0.011)	0.052*** (0.008)	-0.018* (0.007)	-0.089*** (0.015)	-0.079*** (0.018)	0.103** (0.033)	0.067*** (0.013)	-0.057 (0.037)
Same State	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.011 (0.008)	0.014 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.013 (0.01)	0.004 (0.011)	0.028† (0.015)	-0.006 (0.008)	0.007 (0.028)
Sample Size										
<i>N</i>	930,714	1,497,844	1,088,838	1,517,766	428,280	327,899	168,048	144,720	685,150	155,680
<i>N</i> elites	248	333	193	267	120	143	144	144	142	140
<i>N</i> masses	6,827	11,578	10,378	14,868	3,569	2,293	1,167	1,005	4,825	1,112

NOTE: Dependent variable is the absolute value of the difference in opinion for elite-mass dyads. Entries in parentheses are estimated standard errors, clustered on elite respondent and mass respondent. Intercept and fixed effects for each mass survey estimated but not reported. Observations weighted to correct for disproportionality in legislators' parties and the number of dyads per BLS wave. † $p < .1$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Figure 5: Opinion Congruence: Effect Comparisons (No Controls)



Difference in $\hat{\beta}$ (point estimates and 95% confidence intervals)

Negative values mean that the first group is more congruent than the second.

Table 9: Issue Opinion: Lifelong Evangelicals versus Converts

	2006			2014		
	Lifelong	Convert	P-value	Lifelong	Convert	P-value
Political Regime	0.33	0.24	0.09	0.39	0.45	0.26
Economic Regime	0.73	0.68	0.18	0.75	0.73	0.54
Ideology	0.51	0.49	0.44	0.54	0.58	0.36
Abortion	0.56	0.57	0.94	0.77	0.80	0.25
Gay Marriage				0.66	0.71	0.09

NOTE: All variables scaled 0 (left) to 1 (right). P-values are from two-sided difference-in-means t-tests assuming equal variances. Data are from surveys by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life: “Spirit and Power: A 10-Country Survey of Pentecostals” (2006) and “Religion in Latin America” (2014).

Figure 6: Opinion Congruence: Lifelong Evangelicals versus Converts. Data sources listed in the main text.




Table 10: Variance Function Regression (Ordinary Least Squares): First Stage Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Environment	Gay Marriage	Abortion	Racism
Catholic Church 1	0.034 (0.036)	0.430 (0.066)	0.130 (0.055)	0.124 (0.042)
Catholic Church 2	0.035 (0.052)	0.200 (0.098)	0.008 (0.082)	0.151 (0.062)
Catholic Church 3	0.002 (0.042)	0.085 (0.076)	-0.067 (0.063)	0.103 (0.048)
Evangelical Church 2	0.023 (0.034)	0.075 (0.063)	-0.031 (0.052)	0.041 (0.040)
Evangelical Church 3	-0.028 (0.043)	-0.010 (0.081)	0.124 (0.067)	0.079 (0.051)
Evangelical Church 4	-0.001 (0.039)	0.080 (0.073)	-0.057 (0.061)	0.114 (0.046)
Catholic Church 4	-0.021 (0.039)	0.275 (0.073)	-0.066 (0.061)	0.119 (0.046)
Community Site 1	0.034 (0.034)	0.376 (0.063)	0.092 (0.053)	0.131 (0.040)
Community Site 2	0.033 (0.034)	0.437 (0.062)	0.139 (0.052)	0.147 (0.039)
Community Site 3	0.009 (0.034)	0.515 (0.063)	0.058 (0.053)	0.149 (0.040)
Community Site 4	0.019 (0.038)	0.416 (0.071)	0.028 (0.060)	0.135 (0.045)
Community Site 5	0.059 (0.039)	0.689 (0.073)	0.260 (0.061)	0.174 (0.046)
Constant	0.926 (0.028)	0.010 (0.052)	0.097 (0.043)	0.796 (0.033)
Observations	826	833	832	832

Coefficients represent results from models regressing policy attitudes on a categorical variable for site. Evangelical Church 1 is the excluded category. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 11: Variance Function Regression (Ordinary Least Squares): Second Stage Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Environment	Gay Marriage	Abortion	Racism
Catholic	0.002 (0.015)	0.100 (0.013)	0.019 (0.016)	-0.019 (0.016)
Non-Church Site	-0.015 (0.012)	0.139 (0.011)	0.064 (0.014)	-0.041 (0.013)
Constant	0.044 (0.010)	0.038 (0.009)	0.054 (0.011)	0.076 (0.011)
Observations	826	833	832	832

Coefficients represent results from models regressing squared residuals from first stage on a categorical variable for type of site. Evangelical church is the excluded category. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 12: Variance Function Regression (Iterated Maximum Likelihood): First Stage Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Environment	Gay Marriage	Abortion	Racism
Catholic Church 1	0.034 (0.040)	0.430 (0.051)	0.130 (0.046)	0.124 (0.049)
Catholic Church 2	0.035 (0.058)	0.200 (0.090)	0.008 (0.071)	0.151 (0.068)
Catholic Church 3	0.002 (0.047)	0.085 (0.064)	-0.067 (0.054)	0.103 (0.055)
Evangelical Church 2	0.023 (0.037)	0.075 (0.034)	-0.031 (0.041)	0.041 (0.049)
Evangelical Church 3	-0.028 (0.047)	-0.010 (0.044)	0.124 (0.052)	0.079 (0.062)
Evangelical Church 4	-0.001 (0.043)	0.080 (0.039)	-0.057 (0.047)	0.114 (0.056)
Catholic Church 4	-0.021 (0.043)	0.275 (0.060)	-0.066 (0.051)	0.119 (0.052)
Community Site 1	0.034 (0.035)	0.376 (0.051)	0.092 (0.048)	0.131 (0.044)
Community Site 2	0.033 (0.035)	0.437 (0.049)	0.139 (0.047)	0.147 (0.044)
Community Site 3	0.009 (0.035)	0.515 (0.051)	0.058 (0.048)	0.149 (0.044)
Community Site 4	0.019 (0.039)	0.416 (0.064)	0.028 (0.058)	0.135 (0.047)
Community Site 5	0.059 (0.039)	0.689 (0.067)	0.260 (0.060)	0.174 (0.048)
Constant	0.926 (0.031)	0.010 (0.028)	0.097 (0.033)	0.796 (0.040)
Observations	826	833	832	832

Coefficients represent results from models regressing policy attitudes on a categorical variable for site. Evangelical Church 1 is the excluded category. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 13: Variance Function Regression (Iterated Maximum Likelihood): Second Stage Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Environment	Gay Marriage	Abortion	Racism
Catholic	0.041 (0.402)	1.295 (0.202)	0.305 (0.209)	-0.287 (0.337)
Non-Church Site	-0.430 (0.333)	1.543 (0.169)	0.778 (0.174)	-0.771 (0.281)
Constant	-3.128 (0.266)	-3.277 (0.134)	-2.919 (0.139)	-2.571 (0.224)
Observations	826	833	832	832

Coefficients represent results from models regressing squared residuals from first stage on a categorical variable for type of site. Evangelical is the excluded category. Standard errors in parentheses.