Activist Disconnect:

Social Movements, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Bases Abroad

Appendix

June 26, 2018

1 Interviews

The following interviews (listed chronologically) are cited in the main text:

1. Shin Soo-yun, activist, Seoul, South Korea, June 8, 2016
2. Kim Pan-tei, activist, Gunsan, South Korea, June 15, 2016
3. Bae Jong-jin, former activist, Daegu, South Korea, June 28, 2016
4. Kim Yong-han, former activist, Pyeongtaek, South Korea, July 3, 2016
5. Two anonymous former activists, Dongducheon, South Korea, July 11, 2016
6. Ōkawa Kiyoshi, activist, Iwakuni, Japan, September 30, 2016
7. Nīkura Yasuo, Yokosuka, Japan, October 4, 2016
8. Hatoyama Yukio, former prime minister, Tokyo, Japan, June 19, 2017

2 Survey Representativeness

We used Facebook advertisements targeted to strata of age and sex in each region to approximate a stratified sampling procedure. This approach was fairly successful at obtaining a sample that resembles the population on these variables. Table 1 summarizes the percent male and median age in each region in both the adult population and the sample, as well as combined figures that are obtained by weighting each region equally, following our research design. Percent male is nearly identical to that of the population. While our sample is somewhat younger than the adult population of each region, due to difficulty in recruiting the oldest age groups through Facebook advertisements, it does not deviate drastically in terms of age.

We can also examine the representativeness of our sample on political variables. While we inquired about vote in the last election, this variable is potentially subject to severe social desirability

bias in South Korea, given the scandal and impeachment of President Park Geun-hye just prior to our survey. Hence, we opt to examine ideological self-placement instead, which, while not immune to such biases, should be less affected. We compare the distribution of ideological self-placement in each region between our survey and the 2010 World Values Survey (WVS), which used the same question wording. For the South Korean WVS, we are able to subset on respondents from Daegu and Gyeonggi. In the Japanese data file, only region is identified, not prefecture. Hence, we compare our Okinawa and Kanagawa respondents to WVS respondents from the encompassing regions, Kyushu and Minami Kanto, respectively.

The distribution of ideology in each region is summarized in Figure 1. For Japan, the distributions from our sample and the WVS are quite similar. For South Korea, our online sample leans to the left. We suspect that at least some of this deviation is attributable to a shift in the distribution of ideology in South Korea between 2010 and 2017, likely influenced by the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye and loss of support for her conservative party.

3 Behavioral Outcome

In addition to the attitudinal outcome—self-reported support or opposition to U.S. military bases—our survey and pre-analysis plan included a behavioral outcome. All respondents had the option of entering a raffle for a 1-in-80 chance of winning a cash prize of 50,000 KRW or 5,000 JPY (each about $45); 94% did so in South Korea, and 82% did so in Japan. Those who chose to enter the raffle were asked what portion of their prize (in the event of winning) they wished to donate to a South Korean or Japanese organization opposing U.S. military bases in their country: the National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea, and the Peace Forum in Japan. We provided a brief description of each organization's mission, using language drawn from its website. When asked, pre-treatment, to place each organization on a 1–10 left–right ideological scale, respondents gave similar answers in each country, averaging 3.88 in Korea and 3.75 in Japan ($p = 0.17$ for a two-tailed difference in means t-test). Hence, it appears that respondents perceived

each organization similarly, and accurately, in ideological terms.

The proportion of the prize donated to the organization is used as a behavioral measure of opposition to U.S. military bases. The distribution of this variable is summarized in Figure 2. Respondents who chose not to enter the raffle (a decision made prior to any mention of the opportunity to donate) are dropped from analyses using this outcome measure. In the end, our raffle winners donated a total of 385,000 KRW (340 USD) and 5,500 JPY (49 USD) to the anti-base organization in each country. We anonymously transferred this sum, plus any unclaimed individual prize money, to the bank accounts of each group.

On the whole, Japanese respondents were much less willing to donate to the anti-base organization. In each country, the modal proportion donated was zero, but this option was much more commonly chosen in Japan (72% of respondents) than in Korea (40%). There are two potential explanations for these cross-national differences in willingness to donate to the anti-base organization. First, charitable donations may simple be less common in Japan. When asked about "donating money to a civic group that shares causes I support" (towards the beginning of the survey and prior to any mention of U.S. military bases), 33% of Japanese respondents said that they would never do so, versus 8% of Koreans. Second, as noted above, our Korean sample leaned further to the left than our Japanese sample. Thus, while respondents in both countries were similar in terms of their ideological placement of the anti-base organization, they placed themselves much further from this organization in Japan than in Korea (2.5 versus 1.9 points on the 1–10 scale; $p < 0.001$ for a two-tailed difference in means t-test).

Treatment effects on money donated to the anti-base organization are summarized in Figure 3. In what may come as a shock to the many such organizations that rely on donations, none of our hypotheses is sustained; there is no evidence that any of the tactics commonly employed by the anti-base movement increases material support for the organizations themselves. As with our attitudinal measure, we find some suggestive evidence of a backlash effect for ideological framing; exposure to language about U.S. hegemony, militarism, and imperialism seems to prompt respondents to donate less money to organizations opposing U.S. military bases. The negative

average treatment effect is statistically significant at the 0.9 level for a two-sided test in two out of four specifications, though our pre-registered hypothesis was for a one-sided test in the opposite direction.

4 Results in Tabular Form

In the main text we present results in graphical form. Results in tabular form, with coefficients, standard errors, and valid N's for each regression, can be found in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5.

5 Results Conditional on Screener Passage

We implemented a screener question to identify respondents who were paying particularly close attention to the survey. Our question asked respondents to choose (from a drop-down menu) the most serious problem facing the country. Buried in the instructions was a sentence telling them to ignore the question and select a blank answer choice at the bottom of the list, which respondents would be unlikely to choose if they were answering randomly or naively. In Japan, 46% of respondents answered this question correctly; in Korea, 22% did so.

Results for the subset of respondents who passed the screener are summarized in Figures 4 and 5 (due to small sample size, the Base Reduction treatment effect could not be estimated when controlling for covariates). As expected, point estimates are somewhat larger for respondents who are paying very closer attention to the survey, though the reduced statistical power means that many of these estimates are insignificant. Overall, the pattern of results is similar to what we obtain for the full sample, so restricting the analysis to respondents who passed the screener would not change our conclusions.

6 Framing Effects Conditional on Ideology

In the main text, we discuss the possibility that nationalistic and/or ideological framing boosts opposition to U.S. bases among left-wing respondents, even if these strategies are ineffective or counterproductive among the public at large. Table 6 reports results from regressions that include a linear interaction between the framing treatment and ideological self-placement on a 1–10 scale. Figures 6 and 7 plot the estimated conditional effect of the treatment across the full range of the ideology variable for each of these eight models. In seven of eight models, the coefficient on the interaction term is smaller than or similar in size to its standard error. For the effect of ideological framing versus the regular control with covariates, the interaction with respondent ideology is nearly significant at the 0.05 level, in the expected direction. However, as shown in Figure 7, conditional average treatment effects as estimated in this model are significant only for right-of-center respondents, for whom the ideological framing generates a backlash effect, reducing opposition to U.S. bases. In no model does nationalistic or ideological framing significantly boost opposition to U.S. bases among left-of-center respondents.

Table 1: Online Sample versus Census

	South Korea		Japan		
	Daegu	Gyeonggi	Kanagawa	Okinawa	Combined
N					
Population	2,073,090	10,409,399	7,652,110	1,119,548	21,254,147
Sample	576	582	600	598	2,356
Percent Male					
Population	49	50	50	49	49
Sample	49	50	50	47	49
Median Age					
Population	47	45	49	49	47
Sample	39	42	48	42	42

Census figures are based on the 18-and-older population in each country's 2015 Census. Combined statistics weight each region equally.

Figure 1: Ideology: Online Sample versus 2010 World Values Survey



Figure 2: Proportion of Raffle Prize Donated to an Anti-Base Organization



Table 2: Average Treatment Effects on Attitudinal Outcome Versus Pure Control

	Treatment							Differences	
	Military Crimes	Base Expansion	Base Reduction	Pragmatic Framing	Ideological Framing	Nationalistic Framing	Local Leaders	Pragmatic–Ideological	Pragmatic–Nationalistic
Covariates: No									
Intercept	2.86	2.83	2.81	2.83	2.82	2.83	2.82	2.66	2.85
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Treatment	0.16	0.24	0.08	0.21	-0.16	0.03	0.13	0.37	0.18
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.21)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.1)
Covariates: Yes									
Intercept	2.9	2.87	2.97	2.88	2.82	2.88	2.88	2.7	2.85
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Treatment	0.1	0.21	-0.21	0.14	-0.13	-0.07	0.03	0.29	0.2
	(0.09)	(0.1)	(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
N	569	405	160	565	584	560	572	609	585

NOTE: Dependent variable is a 1–5 Likert scale measuring opposition to U.S. military bases in the respondents region. Estimated standard errors in parentheses. Regional fixed effects not shown.

Table 3: Average Treatment Effects on Attitudinal Outcome Versus Regular Control

	Treatment							Differences	
	Military Crimes	Base Expansion	Base Reduction	Pragmatic Framing	Ideological Framing	Nationalistic Framing	Local Leaders	Pragmatic–Ideological	Pragmatic–Nationalistic
Covariates: No									
Intercept	2.9	2.89	2.79	2.87	2.87	2.87	2.86	2.66	2.85
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Treatment	0.1	0.16	0.11	0.16	-0.21	-0.02	0.08	0.37	0.18
	(0.1)	(0.12)	(0.21)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.09)	(0.1)
Covariates: Yes									
Intercept	2.88	2.89	2.87	2.87	2.82	2.87	2.86	2.7	2.85
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Treatment	0.14	0.19	-0.07	0.19	-0.12	-0.02	0.1	0.29	0.2
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.2)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
N	590	443	143	586	605	581	593	609	585

NOTE: Dependent variable is a 1–5 Likert scale measuring opposition to U.S. military bases in the respondents region. Estimated standard errors in parentheses. Regional fixed effects not shown.

Table 4: Average Treatment Effects on Behavioral Outcome Versus Pure Control

	Treatment							Differences	
	Military Crimes	Base Expansion	Base Reduction	Pragmatic Framing	Ideological Framing	Nationalistic Framing	Local Leaders	Pragmatic–Ideological	Pragmatic–Nationalistic
Covariates: No									
Intercept	0.21	0.19	0.28	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.15	0.18
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Treatment	-0.03	-0.02	-0.06	-0.01	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04	0.04	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Covariates: Yes									
Intercept	0.21	0.19	0.26	0.21	0.2	0.21	0.22	0.15	0.18
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Treatment	-0.02	-0.03	-0.06	0	-0.05	-0.03	-0.05	0.05	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
N	503	353	154	493	518	491	509	531	504

NOTE: Dependent variable is the proportion of prize money that the respondent agreed to donate to a Korean or Japanese anti-base organization in the event of winning the raffle. Estimated standard errors in parentheses. Regional fixed effects not shown.

Table 5: Average Treatment Effects on Behavioral Outcome Versus Regular Control

	Treatment							Differences	
	Military Crimes	Base Expansion	Base Reduction	Pragmatic Framing	Ideological Framing	Nationalistic Framing	Local Leaders	Pragmatic–Ideological	Pragmatic–Nationalistic
Covariates: No									
Intercept	0.18	0.19	0.15	0.18	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.15	0.18
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Treatment	0	-0.03	0.07	0.01	-0.02	0	-0.01	0.04	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Covariates: Yes									
Intercept	0.18	0.19	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.18
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Treatment	0	-0.03	0.05	0.02	-0.02	0	-0.02	0.05	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
N	516	386	134	506	531	504	522	531	504

NOTE: Dependent variable is the proportion of prize money that the respondent agreed to donate to a Korean or Japanese anti-base organization in the event of winning the raffle. Estimated standard errors in parentheses. Regional fixed effects not shown.

Figure 3: Treatment Effects on Money Donated to an Anti-Base Organization



Note: Dependent variable is the proportion of prize money that the respondent agreed to donate to a Korean or Japanese anti-base organization in the event of winning the raffle. Icons give point estimates and lines give two-sided 90 percent confidence intervals.

Figure 4: Treatment Effects on Opposition to U.S. Bases (Respondents who Passed Screener)



Note: Dependent variable is a 1–5 Likert scale measuring opposition to U.S. military bases in the respondent's region. Icons give point estimates and lines give two-sided 90 percent confidence intervals.

Figure 5: Treatment Effects on Money Donated to an Anti-Base Organization (Respondents who Passed Screener)



Note: Dependent variable is the proportion of prize money that the respondent agreed to donate to a Korean or Japanese anti-base organization in the event of winning the raffle. Icons give point estimates and lines give two-sided 90 percent confidence intervals.

Table 6: Average Treatment Effects on Attitudinal Outcome, Conditional on Ideology

	Treatment vs. Pure Control		**Treatment vs. Regular Control**	
	Ideological Framing	Nationalistic Framing	Ideological Framing	Nationalistic Framing
Covariates: No				
Intercept	2.8	2.84	2.86	2.9
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Treatment	-0.1	0.02	-0.16	-0.03
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.09)	(0.1)
Ideology	-0.22	-0.23	-0.22	-0.22
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Treatment ×	0.02	-0.03	0.03	-0.04
Ideology	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Covariates: Yes				
Intercept	2.82	2.88	2.82	2.87
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Treatment	-0.13	-0.07	-0.12	-0.02
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Ideology	-0.15	-0.15	-0.09	-0.09
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Treatment ×	-0.03	0.01	-0.09	-0.05
Ideology	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
N	584	560	605	581

NOTE: Dependent variable is a 1–5 Likert scale measuring opposition to U.S. military bases in the respondent's region. Estimated standard errors in parentheses. Regional fixed effects not shown. Ideology is demeaned, so the constitutive term of the interaction represents the effect for respondents of average ideology.

Figure 6: Conditional Average Treatment Effects on Attitudinal Outcome (No Covariates)



Note: Dependent variable is a 1–5 Likert scale measuring opposition to U.S. military bases in the respondent's region. Dotted lines give 95% confidence intervals. Plot based on the estimates reported in Table 6.

Figure 7: Conditional Average Treatment Effects on Attitudinal Outcome (With Covariates)



Note: Dependent variable is a 1–5 Likert scale measuring opposition to U.S. military bases in the respondent's region. Dotted lines give 95% confidence intervals. Plot based on the estimates reported in Table 6.