# JEONGMEEN SUH

131 Bay State Road
#3F
Boston MA 02215 USA
Cell: (608) 345-7999
Fax: (617) 353-4449
Email: megameen@bu.edu
Web site: http://people.bu.edu/megameen/


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## EDUCATION

DOCTORAL STUDIES

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2009 (expected)
Dissertation Title: *Three Essays on Dynamic Competition*
Main advisor: Barton L. Lipman
Dissertation Committee: Barton L. Lipman, Ching-to Albert Ma, Dilip Mookherjee, and Andrew F. Newman

PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES

M.A., Economics, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea, 2003
B.A., Sociology, Korea University, Seoul, Korea, 2001

## FIELDS OF INTEREST

Applied Microeconomic Theory, Public Economics, Industrial Organization

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant, Intermediate Microeconomics, Boston University, Fall 2006-Spring 2007
Teaching Assistant, Information Economics (Master's level), Boston University, Spring 2007
Teaching Fellow, Principle of Microeconomics, Boston University, Fall 2007
Teaching Fellow, Principle of Macroeconomics, Boston University, Spring 2008
Head Teaching Fellow, Boston University, Fall 2008 – present

## WORK EXPERIENCE

NON-ACADEMIC

Military Service, 501st Military Intelligence Brigade, Korea, 1996-1998

ACADEMIC

Research Assistant, Korea Development Institute (KDI), Korea, 2002
"Privatization of Korea Telecom (KT) and Regulatory Policy"

## FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Scholarship for Graduate Study Abroad, ILJU Scholarship Foundation, Fall 2003 – Spring 2008
Travel Grant, Institute for Economic Development (IED), Boston University, Spring 2008
Teaching Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2007 – Fall 2008

## WORKING PAPERS

"A Theory of Optimal Quality Reports with Inertia" October 2008
"Evaluation Inertia and Market Segmentation" October 2008

## WORK IN PROGRESS

"An Economic Approach to General Public License" (joint with Murat Yilmaz)
"Envy, Ex Ante or Ex Post" (joint with Michael Luca)

## CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

Winter Conference of the Korea International Economic Association, Seoul National University, December 2002
Micro Theory Workshop, Boston University, October 2005
Conference on Tournaments, Contests, and Relative Performance Evaluations, North Carolina State University, March 2008
Micro Theory Workshop, Boston University, April 2008
Micro Theory Workshop, Boston University, October 2008

## LANGUAGES

Korean (native), English (fluent), Japanese (intermediate)

**COMPUTER SKILLS:** STATA, MATLAB, R, Scientific WorkPlace, Microsoft Office

**CITIZENSHIP/VISA:** REPUBLIC OF KOREA/F1

## REFERENCES

**Professor Barton L. Lipman**
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 496-1740
Email: blipman@bu.edu

**Professor Ching-to Albert Ma**
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 353-4010
Email: ma@bu.edu

**Professor Dilip Mookherjee**
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 353-4392
Email: dilipm@bu.edu

**Professor Andrew F. Newman**
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 358-4354
Email: afnewman@bu.edu

October 2008

## JEONGMEEN SUH

**A Theory of Optimal Quality Reports with Inertia** (*Job Market Paper*)

This article considers how to design quality reporting systems (QRS) which imperfectly provide quality rating information to consumers. QRS attempt to correct the moral hazard problem from opportunistic firms when consumers cannot observe quality. Consumer Reports is one example of QRS that plays a major role in purchaser behavior and firm incentives. In a two-period repeated contest model, two firms try to get the relatively better rating since the better rating leads to a bigger market share. I investigate the optimal rating accumulation rule which provides incentives for firms to choose the highest expected overall quality level in the market across periods. In a quality report, a firm's rating is determined by the expected quality of the firm's goods and a carried-over advantage from the firm's past rating. The size of advantage score is the system designer's control variable and the choice of its size captures how cumulative rating the reporting system uses. The results show that the optimal system allows greater rating accumulation in a market with a larger degree of uncertainty in quality evaluation or production. I also study the case in which the early winner may have an advantage in market share as the incumbent due to consumers' switching costs.

**Evaluation Inertia and Market Segmentation**

This paper shows that how inertia in consumer's perception on product quality can cause market segmentation with ex ante identical firms. In a dynamic contest model with moral hazard, a trusted third party imperfectly evaluates the quality of products and provides information to consumers. A consumer wants to choose the product which provides the largest gap between its expected quality and its price. However, there is some inertia in consumer perceptions in the sense that the consumer chooses the brand which was best in the preceding period unless its current evaluation is lower than that of the currently best brand by a certain amount. I show that once a firm is perceived as a higher reputation brand, consumer inertia creates an incentive for the firm to provide high quality at a high price in subsequent periods and vice versa for a lower reputation brand though the firms are ex-ante symmetric.

**An Economic Approach to General Public License** *(with Murat Yilmaz)*

We analyze open innovation projects and their effects on incentives for innovation. We model basic features of the GPL, one of the most popular open source licenses and study how opportunistic users would behave under the license. By altering the timing of incentives, open innovation under GPL provides a new tool for innovation policy which has a trade-off between stimulating innovation and promoting disclosure. By using open knowledge, a firm can increase its technology level and therefore its probability of innovation success and of achieving a monopoly in that period. Under GPL, however, any innovative findings using open knowledge should be also open knowledge in subsequent periods. This obligation decreases the expected future revenue of the firm.