Igbo linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits

A thesis presented by

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Abstract

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Igbo and Igbo are township-based, rural lineage federations of southern Nigeria, on opposite margins of the Igbo culture area (Fonde and Jones 1950, Onyejege 1970). They provide windows on Igbo ethnicity, understood as linguistic consciousness.

Ethnicity links explicit knowledge (ideology) with implicit knowledge (grammar). This effect is problematic, if grammar is located in biology or psychology as an “I-language” which maps sound and meaning through a parametric subset of Universal Grammar (Chomsky 1986b). But it is expected, if grammar and ideology share a common cognitive ground. That ground is the lexicon: “the supra-individual external memory” which constitutes “the public world of human culture and knowledge in the objective sense” (Koster 1999).

In southern Nigeria, the creation of standard languages by hubristic missionaries and the colonial/national state has had ethnic effects, illustrating Gouldner’s view that

[I]deology… is the restructuring of an ordinary language… by selective focusing of the ordinary language on certain public projects… by changing the meanings of the ordinary language… by taking certain parts of ordinary language and making them newly problematical [and]… by the invention of new signs. (1976: 81)

One effect of the ideological struggle which accompanied standardization has been the blockage of literacy. Standard Igbo is little used in formal education and the public sphere.

Chapters 1-3 adduce evidence on the unity and diversity of Igbo in relation both to its Benue-Kwa neighbors (especially Yoruba) and to Universal Grammar. The relationship between knowledge of language and encyclopedic/pragmatic knowledge is formulated in terms of aspect, argument selection and the lexicalization of semantic constants. Morpheme-based analyses are developed for tonal prosody; verb serialization, V-V compounding; ditransitivity, antipassive; verb focus, antilogophoricity, tense.

Chapter 4 characterizes Igbo and Igbo as political-economic systems in which lexical representations—functioning as tacit resources and explicit, strategic symbols—affect consciousness.

The blockage of Igbo literacy reflects 150 years’ politicization of the Igbo lexicon by state and missionary projects, and Igbo-speakers’ resistance to these.

The ethnic effect challenges predominant, neo-Kantian assumptions in western sociology and biological reductionism in generative linguistics.

Six oral texts from Igbo, two from Igbo, and one from Yoruba are transcribed/translated and reproduced in an accompanying tape. The dissertation with cassette is available at cost (US$20.00 postpaid by air).

Committee chair: Stanley Jeyara Tambiah, professor of Anthropology.
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Dictated lists

A diviner is fortunate; the chief of the diviners is fortunate, too. (Onye ọ, uch; onye ugbọ mma, ome. A diviner's dance goes on and on.)

Chinua Achebe

Diviner's dances

March 1983

Recorded songs, not transcribed

\[\text{\ldots...}\]

Recorded, transcribed texts

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Ágbọ́, Ìjìgbọ́ and Ìṣẹ́ texts (C-100 cassette tape) ........................................................ inside back cover

[Invocation]

[Kola nut composed of four lobes: peace!
Three-lobed kola nut: a strong right arm!
Ọrọ́ọ́kọ́ Dìké, do you see the kola I brought?
“Prince among historians”
First tiller of this soil,
Come, sir, for your preeminent share]

Ifemọ̀ṣa (1984: 43)
Orthography

Igbo's official orthography followed Nigerian independence by 2 years, delayed by a century of missionary rivalry. Today, the orthography remains incomplete, with barely begun colonial-era spellings in personal and place names, and nearly all literacy in the medium of English. The present work aims to be completely orthographic, providing for "dialect" sounds where relevant, as envisioned by Ôghéghé and Òmùnéò 1975. The orthographic principle does not exempt quotations and names, all of which I have respelled in these pages, with tone marks. This practice is standard in the leading African language departments in Nigeria.

Punctuation is politics. BBC announcers take great pains with Polish surnames, and never miss the diphthong in Bohs, but it took a year of insistence for [Asari] to out [Ezegba] from their scripts. In languages with automatic (i.e. phonemic) orthographies—as opposed to the morphological spelling system of English—a misspelled word is by definition mispronounced. Political confusions are entrenched by the venerable misspelling "fæt" to oust from [Ær]. Thanks to schools and mass media, most place name etymologies are obscure; colonial-era spellings guarantee they will remain so. An example is given by Òmùnéò 1981. The town of "Owerri" grew up around a British post where young men were seized for forced labor, hence Òwerre 'Abductor' with [L LL H] tones. Thanks to schools and mass media, most Igbo speakers, including residents of the town itself, will use the [L LLL] pattern "Owerre", which is semantically opaque. In this way, history is quietly erased. Òmùnéò 1979 lists the pronunciation of settlement names in the present "Anambra" (Ọ-má-sí-mála, 'flat-flood-[the]-plain'), cf. Òmùnéò 1985: 1 and Igbo States.

The References give conventional spellings of personal names in brackets after the orthographic form; names whose pronunciation I don't know appear in brackets. Here too, there are empirical needs for nonroman symbols are used for subphonemic elements. The \[ ] or \[ \] pattern "Ọwerre, 'Death-doesn't-go-to-war' is semantically less plausible than "Ọmùnéò, 'Death-doesn't-use-medicine-[to-kill]' A pronouncing dictionary of prominent Nigerian names has been compiled at the Institute of African Studies, University of Ife.

Unlike other parts of Africa, where nonroman symbols are firmly established, Nigeria since 1960 has opted for orthographies with Roman symbols plus diacritics (Williamson 1985). In the leading African language departments in Nigeria, the orthographic principle does not exempt quotations and names, all of which I have respelled in these pages, with tone marks. This practice is standard in the leading African language departments in Nigeria.

In any case, converts were attracted to English literacy, not to Igbo "scriptures" (Ochó 1972). The second reason reflects linguistic properties of Igbo tone.

Like its Benue-Congo neighbors Ọjọọ [baw, ọ] and Òmùnéò, Igbo exhibits phrase-tone level alternations which makes a given word appear with different pitch patterns in different syntactic contexts, e.g. Òkú, "compound" [LH], Ònọ, "inside the compound" [HH]. Igbo also resembles its fellow Kwa languages Ọjọọ and Ọjọọ in the high "functional" level of tone contrasts on monosyllabic roots, e.g. Ọkú, "to cry" [HH], (be) "to perch". In such a language, phonological (as opposed to morphological) spelling of his [\( \text{bh} \) is needed not just to distinguish plosive \( \text{b} \) from fricative \( \text{f} \), but also to distinguish aspirated \( \text{ch} \) from plain \( \text{c} \). The Adams/Ward solution to the latter problem, duly incorporated in the Catholic orthography of the 1990's, preserved by Green and Igbo 1963 but not 1970, and newly advocated by Òzùmọkhọ 1985d, is to write the plain affricate as \( \text{c} \). However, nonaspirated \( \text{ch} \) has become too well established, and is too strongly reinforced by English \( \text{ch} \), to expect people to revert to plain \( \text{c} \) at this date.

Tonomarking

Outside the technical literature, there is little tonemarked Igbo in print, for two reasons. The first is practical; missionary literacy is not creative. Missionized Igbo speakers were given tools designed to decode received texts which had been ineptly translated from English (Achebe 1976). In any case, converts were attracted to English literacy, not to Igbo "scriptures" (Ochó 1972). The second reason reflects linguistic properties of Igbo tone. In any case, converts were attracted to English literacy, not to Igbo "scriptures" (Ochó 1972). The second reason reflects linguistic properties of Igbo tone. Despite its Benue-Congo neighbors Ọjọọ [baw, ọ] and Òmùnéò, Igbo exhibits phrase-tone level alternations which makes a given word appear with different pitch patterns in different syntactic contexts, e.g. Òkú, "compound" [LH], Ònọ, "inside the compound" [HH]. Igbo also resembles its fellow Kwa languages Ọjọọ and Ọjọọ in the high "functional" level of tone contrasts on monosyllabic roots, e.g. Ọkú, "to cry" [HH], (be) "to perch". In such a language, phonological (as opposed to morphological) spelling of his [\( \text{bh} \) is needed not just to distinguish plosive \( \text{b} \) from fricative \( \text{f} \), but also to distinguish aspirated \( \text{ch} \) from plain \( \text{c} \). The Adams/Ward solution to the latter problem, duly incorporated in the Catholic orthography of the 1990's, preserved by Green and Igbo 1963 but not 1970, and newly advocated by Òzùmọkhọ 1985d, is to write the plain affricate as \( \text{c} \). However, nonaspirated \( \text{ch} \) has become too well established, and is too strongly reinforced by English \( \text{ch} \), to expect people to revert to plain \( \text{c} \) at this date.

For Igbo, most authors adopt a paradigmatic, syllable-by-syllable method. Green and Igbo 1963 mark I syllables individually with a grave accent ('') and leave H unmarked, except that the H which immediately follows a downstep juncture (nonautonomic, cumulative pitch declination) bears a vertical stroke (' '). Williamson and Òmùnéò, who between them have produced most tonemarked publications in the language, and Green and Igbo 1970, replace the stroke (') with a macron ('). Consider the sentences in (1), which have the tone patterns in (2).
and

Eze jere Anọ-ọcha ta

"Eze went to Anọ-ọcha today"

Adịga aghala ahyə.

"Adịga has gone to market (and returned)"

2a. [ H L L L L H H H H H H H H ]

2b. [ L H H H H H H H ]

[\] represents downstep.

In (1b), all syllables save the first bear H, but two downsteps break up the
seven adjacent H syllables into three declining pitch levels, yielding the contour in (3b):

3a. [ \ - - - - - - - ]

3b. [ \ - - - - - - - ]

A junctural representation, with full tone marking as found in phonetics texts, is given in (4):

4a. Ėzè jere ọnjịcha ta

b. ọnjịcha ọghọghọ ahí ọghọghọ

By the Williamson-Ọnjịcha convention, the examples are written as in (5):

5a. Ėzè jere ọnjịcha ta

b. ọnjịcha ọghọghọ ahí ọghọghọ

Ịgbọ texts tonemarked by students reveal a major problem with any non-junctural convention
which uses a special mark for downstep.  Although the macron represents for a phonetic juncture
after the immediately preceding syllable, students generally write it as if its domain is the
syllable on which it stands.  That is, they tend to associate the macron, not with the preceding
downstep juncture, but with the pitch level that follows the juncture.  Accordingly, in the course of
learning the Williamson-Ọnjịcha convention, students very often write (5b) as (6):

6. ọnjịcha ọghọghọ ahí ọghọghọ

In the mind of the writer of (6), the macron has apparently acquired the function of marking a
"mid" tone (which is indeed the misleading term employed by Green and Igbo, as well as by at
least one more recent author).  But once the syntagmatic convention is interpreted as
paradigmatic, there is no way to indicate the second downstep on the last syllable of the sentence,
without introducing some new diacritic (as in fact done by Abraham 1967).  The error is pervasive
enough, I believe, to disqualify this system outright.6

I adopt a modified form of the syntagmatic, syllable-by-syllable convention of Welmers and
Welmers 1968 and Nwachukwu 1983, as found in Nwachukwu (ed.) 1983.  In the Welmers-
Nwachukwu system, both H [\ ] and L [\ ] are marked, but a given mark is restricted to the first of
the maximal sequence of syllables bearing identical tone.  An unmarked syllable has the tonal
value of the nearest mark to its left.3 Accordingly, (1a) is written:

7. Ėzè jere ọnjịcha ta

Pitch sequences undergo several processes related to downstep which do not affect the sound-
meaning correspondence.  An L is downdrifted (automatically lowered) whether an H or an L

6For Nwachukwu, 1983, the comparison of tone-marking systems is a matter of typographic frequency: the
preferred system is the one that requires fewer tonemarks for a statistically significant sample of text.  Certainly,
frequency is related to markedness: the less frequent alternative is more 'marked' in the Pragusan sense.
However, learnability involves more than markedness.  The common learning error in (6) reveals the
unlearnability of the macron for Igbo.

3This convention mimics a well-founded phonetic constraint: the Obligatory Contour Principle (Lehnen 1973), cf.
§1.3.3 below.
In December 1976, the Centre for African Studies, University of Ibadan, gave me a Uher tape recorder. In April 1977, the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, gave me a Nagra. With these machines I have recorded some 80,000 words, of which almost all have been transcribed here.

In 1974-76, I was introduced to philology and historical linguistics by Calvert Watkins, to anthropological linguistics by Ives Goddard and to generative phonology by Nick Clements. In the 1980s, I recorded some two dozen texts, of which eight are transcribed here.

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Grammar and ideology

Both grammar and ideology are forms of knowledge1 which divide people as well as link them to each other and to the wider world. They differ in cognitive status: ideology is explicit or discursively explicable; grammatical knowledge is neither.

That ideology is a type of discourse, and hence explicable, follows from the logos in its name: there is no ideologia without ideologues to receive, embody, promote or enforce it. Though oriented towards totality, as "the intellectual reflex of determinate social processes" (Lichtheim 1965: 185), ideology is not everyone’s discourse. Nor, some say, is it anyone’s. From the elective affinity of Weber’s Protestant ethic, to the “free-floating intellectuals” of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, the critique of ideology in modern Europe has tempered totalizing, Hegelian historicism with the neo-Kantian relativism of the fact/value distinction, leaving ideology as the possession of abstract, “methodological individuals”2. Such relativism, however, poses an obstacle to comparison and analysis (cf. §4.3 below).

By contrast, grammar in the relevant sense is not discourse. It has nothing to do with the prescriptive formulas dispersed by schools and William Safires — authoritarian discourse. Grammar, as speakers’ untaught knowledge of the sound-meaning relation (Chomsky 1986b), can be studied only indirectly, by inference of formal universals from empirically-based language description. Speakers’ intuitions of their own linguistic knowledge, while uniquely heuristic (Sapir 1933), still require an explicit theoretical framework in order to be elucidated.

Yet despite this difference, grammar and ideology interact, as seen in that type of ideology which I call linguistic consciousness — better known as ethnicity.

Ethnicity, race and class

In contemporary North American discourse, ethnicity is, among other things, a euphemism for race (Rosaldo 1990). Notably, the New York City electorate has been categorized in Black, Irish, Italian, Jewish and Latin "ethnic" voting blocs (Glazer and Moynihan 1963). Nor is this

1Here, knowledge stands for all mental representations, without reference to ‘truth value’ in the sense of demonstrable, propositional intension (Tugendhat 1986: 279f.). For example: ‘Consciousness’ distinguishes itself from something to which it relates this something is ‘something for consciousness’. This being of something for a consciousness (for an other) is what we call ‘knowledge’. (Merleau-Ponty 1961/1976: 54)

2Reworking this tradition in an attempt to escape its pessimism, Habermas appeals to ”language” in particular to the “communicative ethics” presupposed by “universal pragmatics” as a bridge between the Hegelian and Kantian standpoints (McCarthy 1978: 110f.). But, as Bourdieu remarks: [Habermas’s] idealization... has the effect of removing in practice from the relations of communication the relation of force which are effectuated therein in transcendental form. This is shown by his sacrificial borrowing of such concepts as dilucidatory force which tend to ascribe to words and not to institutional conditions of their realization the force of words. (1982: 25 fn. 4).
segmentation farfetched. Wolf 1982 observes a close historical relationship between race and ethnicity: the contexts of racial ideology are inclusion in a forced-labor economy, as during the transition from mercantile expansion to extractive industry, and exclusion from a competitive labor market, as with the immobile, post-industrial underclass (Williams 1984, Fields 1983). Thus, ethnicity expresses resource competition in a centralized economy, and segmentary incorporation in a labor market. Wolf describes the historical transition in this way:

The more comprehensive categories [i.e., ethnic identities, as opposed to racial ones] emerged only as particular cohorts of workers gained access to different segments of the labor market and began to treat their access as a resource to be defended… (1982: 360)

Wolf’s analysis predicts that racial categories are commutable into ethnic ones, just in case of expanded access to a central resource. This indeed occurred with the (limited) enfranchisement of Black and Latin voters in the Bronx, Brooklyn and Manhattan since the 1960’s. Other resource sectors, however, saw no such transformation. Despite decades of liberal efforts in the U.S. to ‘ethnicize’ access to capital, education, employment, health care and housing, e.g., by setting affirmative action standards for the relevant institutions, these basic services continue to be rationed by the ‘free’ market on the basis of racial categories.

Nigeria provides another example of the dialectical between race and ethnicity, this time mediated by religion. In its reliance on African forced labor, the Nigerian colonial state was explicitly racist. In administering the Nigerian north, Lugard espoused the racial superiority of the Fulani (Fulfulde-speaking) sultan and emirs — his intermediaries in Indirect Rule — over the ‘pagan’ (Yoruba) peasantry (Dudley 1968: 12-22; Smith 1978; Sharpe 1986: 60 ff. 4). This policy was explicitly based on the indomitable Hamitic Hypothesis (Meinhof 1912, Palmer 1928, cf. Greenberg 1963: 24-30), which accepted and amplified the Muslim Fulani’s claim to an exotic, non-African origin. Thus, in the north, the racist assumptions of Indirect Rule were expressed primarily in religious terms. In the south, by contrast, administrative categories were based on shared first language. (Ellah 1983: 89-98) recounts how Lugard and his successors Macpherson and Robertson drew linguistic subdivisions in the south, but preserved the boundaries of the linguistically heterogeneous northern emirates. This choice established the major regional contrast in Nigerian politics, which has held ever since.

Eventually, the northern expression of “race” in terms of religion took hold in Hausa-speaking migrant communities of the south. Cohen describes how religion overcame ethnicity as the primary factor in Hausa “social exclusiveness” in Ifedika:

With the coming of party politics, Indirect Rule collapsed, and the Chief of Ifedika, Ifedika’s Hausa-speaking quarter lost a great deal of power. It was this vacuum that allowed the Bijinaya [Muslim order] soon filled … by creating a new ritual power structure. … This change in the nature of political organization of Ifedika [was a change from a polity based on the support of the colonial power to a power based on men’s religious loyalties…

(1969: 162, 170)

But in the south, for the most part, “race” gave way to ethnicity during the colonial period. In establishing linguistically segregated labor markets and urban residential quarters, the colonial state fostered ethnic monopolies (Sosi 1978). Southern nationalist politicians inherited and extended this system, though they fought racism, they capitalized on the ethnic “regionalism” of

Ethnicity as an unhappy consciousness

Ethnography’s reliance on the concept of ethnic group has been challenged as objectifying an error of scale. Rejecting the standard assumption that “geographical and social isolation have been the critical factors in sustaining cultural diversity”, Barth 1969 defines ethnic categories as “relational, ascriptive identities” which require active “boundary maintenance” while permitting individual “identity change”. The rise of “ethnic conservatism” in reaction to the threat of massive identity change, presupposes the same dynamism and puts the lie to “primordialist” political science theories. This is clearly expressed by Cohen:

The Hausa in kifinda are “more retribalized” than the Western Igbo, not because of their conservatism, as LeVine suggests, and not because of special elements in their traditional culture, as Rout and others contend, but because their ethnicity articulates a Hausa political organization which is used as a weapon in the struggle to keep the Hausa in control of the kifafa trade.

Unfortunately, the alternatives given by those critics do not differ in substance. Barth’s dynamic concept of ethnic boundaries relies on the prior identification of “value orientations” which, being themselves incommensurable, simply reintroduce problems of relativism and objectivism at a more abstract level. The same objection applies to Cohen’s strategic concept of “ethnic capital”, and to Dudley’s (1973) game-theoretic interpretation of ethnic conflict. All these analyses clarify the active, instrumental role of ethnic categories, but none makes a new proposal as to what these categories consist of, and where they can be found.

It may be that this impasse represents the limit of Weberian (i.e., social-democratic) Marxism, which “introduced a systematic distinction between philosophy and empirical science” (Lichtlehm 1975).

Some nationalists in trade unions e.g. Michael Imoudu and the Nitégpog brothers failed to adopt the ethnic strategy. However, in the 1960’s-70’s, they were purged from national politics through anticomunist tactics planned and financed mainly from abroad (cf. Cohen 1980).

The avoidance of dynamic tradition of indigenous “orientalist” foundation stories, as told by the fjigayikin, are “adaptations of Islamic traditions” (Schapinska 1981: 51). In this respect, some ethnic charters in southern Nigeria resemble the northern type. Aòwàgò used these features in his own ethnic politics.

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Some nationalists in trade unions e.g. Michael Imoudu and the Nitégpog brothers failed to adopt the ethnic strategy. However, in the 1960’s-70’s, they were purged from national politics through anticomunist tactics planned and financed mainly from abroad (cf. Cohen 1980).

The avoidance of dynamic tradition of indigenous “orientalist” foundation stories, as told by the fjigayikin, are “adaptations of Islamic traditions” (Schapinska 1981: 51). In this respect, some ethnic charters in southern Nigeria resemble the northern type. Aòwàgò used these features in his own ethnic politics.

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and, sociolinguists pursued statistical correlations of speech styles...vaunts itself as “the practical class consciousness of the proletariat” (Lukács 1971: 205), Leninism “the false consciousness of the New Class of intellectuals” (Gouldner 1985: 65):

A statist limitation continues, if more covertly, in later versions of the dialectic. When it vaunts itself as “the practical class consciousness of the proletariat” (Lukács 1971: 205), Leninism takes a covert statist line. In turn, therefore, Frankfurt Marxists diagnosed Leninist ideology as “the false consciousness of the New Class of intellectuals” (Gouldner 1985: 65):

The Marxist critique of workers’ false consciousness is also a fact of politics, reflecting the competition between artisans and intellectuals in the “workers’ movement, and legitimating the latter’s claim to special authority in it. (Gouldner 1985: 139)

In other words, Leninism — even in Lukács’ elegant, deductive formulation — is voluntarist:

Lukács’ very success in demonstrating the prevalence of reification, of the structural factors inhibiting the formation of political, proletarian class consciousness, meant that he could only appeal to the proletariat to overcome reification by apostrophes to the unification of theory and practice, or by introducing the party as a doxa ex nucea. (Rose 1981: 29)

For Stalinist technocrats of “socialism in one country”, ethnicity — viewed as the Nationalities Question — was both a political danger and a theoretical embarrassment. The Popular Front strategy of the 1930’s accommodated nationalism, but at a purely tactical level. In 1950, Stalin supplied theoretical justification for a linguistically segmented Soviet empire, criticizing Marr’s doctrine of language-as-superstructure and proclaiming that:

[Language belongs to] the forces of production, or more precisely the tools of production, since language, just like these tools, opposes [regional/bureaucratic] society and especially social classes in equal measure. (Karpowitz 1973: 147)

(Cf. Evl 1970: 102-07.) This was but a sterile reply to the Hegelian formula of The German Ideology: “Language is real, practical consciousness” (Marx and Engels 1847/1965: 491). The Stalinist state (and its carbon copies from China to Ethiopia) has only ever succeeded in bottling up intra-state ethnicity for a few decades.

Ethnicity as linguistic consciousness

Evidently, analysis of ethnic ideology is distorted by a statist frame of reference. On the other hand, ethnicity does not reduce to knowledge of language (possession of a given language by a competent speaker-hearer), as shown by the persistence of ethnic self-identifications among “Anglicized” white 2nd and 3rd generation immigrants in the U.S. between 1940-60:

[S]ome form of ethnic self-identification is frequently still reported by many of those who no longer claim any facility at all in their ethnic mother tongues... (Fishman 1971: 335)

Nevertheless, many examples of ethnicity have a robust linguistic component. Accordingly, sociologists in the 1960’s and 70’s framed the ethnic issue (in their own, distinctively repressive dialect of Newspeak) as the circumstances under which language consciousness, language knowledge and language-related groupness perceptions do or do not enter into reference group behavior in contact situations: (Fishman 1971: 333)

Approaching language as “speech” — sociolinguists pursued statistical correlations of speech styles with social indices, and compiled situational scenarios of code-switching. As behaviorist constructs, however, these correlations and scenarios suffer from some famous inadequacies (cf. Chomsky 1984). For example, sociolinguistic theories of code-switching do not offer a descriptively adequate account of this phenomenon, stating under what conditions it occurs. Instead, with few exceptions, sociolinguists’ anti-generative polemics (e.g. Labor 1971, Bailey 1973) were framed in terms of method, rejecting Chomsky’s delimitation of the “ideal speaker-hearer” as the source of linguistic data.

From a generative standpoint, the question poses itself in mechanistic terms. How is linguistic consciousness possible at all? Ethnicity, as linguistic consciousness, poses a paradox: how can explicit, historical knowledge (ideology) refer to implicit, synchronic knowledge (grammar)? This relational effect can follow, only if grammar and ideology occupy some common cognitive terrain. My proposal is that the terrain in question is the lexicon. The proposal structures the observations in the following chapters. As a cognitive phenomenon, ethnicity is a source of evidence for lexical entries. As a lexical phenomenon, ethnicity is a source of evidence for the relationship of language to other forms of knowledge.

The Hegelian idea that cultural values are a form of knowledge, while heretical in the predominating neo-Kantian framework of Western sociology, is not unprecedented in recent cultural anthropology. Dumont, for example, has proposed that

a “system of values” is...an abstraction taken from a larger system of ideas and values (1980: 238).

Massive support for this view is found, e.g. in the Native American philology of Boas and his students, and in the Indo-European studies of Dumézil, Benveniste and Bataille.

In the present study, I consider a case of linguistic consciousness which has been a thorny practical issue for a century, and remains so today: the interplay of grammar and ideology in Igbo — the dialect area which contains the roots of modern standard Igbo (Benue-Kwa, Niger-Congo). Most of my research occurred in Igboob and Igboobi, communities which stand respectively at Igbo’s western and eastern geographic extremes. It is challenging but inevitable to view the cognitive resources of these localities in relation to their near and distant neighbors.

The first major studies to address the Igbo-speaking area as a whole were official reports, all commissioned in response to the deepening administrative crisis in southeastern Nigeria: Meek 1937, Ward 1941, Forde and Jones 1950. Each of these is preoccupied with the supposed

Ch, for Hymes 1962, “speaking”; both are subsumed in what Chomsky 1986b calls externalized language (E-language), i.e. language which exists independently of the constructs of the mind.

Earlier sociolinguists (e.g. Weinreich 1954) were equally uncomfortable with classical structuralism on this point. Chomsky acknowledges that his terms competence and performance were confusing; Koster 1989b notes other confusions in the recent concept internalized language (I-language, cf. §6.5). Generative studies of code-switching include Woolford 1983, Donatalla et al. 1986, Bakambu 1987.
statelessness, and accompanying cultural fragmentation, of the area. More recent pan-Igbo syntheses have had an antithetical concern, as befits the cultural-nationalist perspective. Szijjártó 1962, Tchérully 1965, Živkov et al. 1972. Igbo 1983 and Živanović 1983 have all sought to elucidate a “common underlying core” (Živanović’s phrase) of language, culture and social organization, for the whole area.10

The shift from power politics to cognition is a natural one: the cognitive domain was closed to colonial scholars, who didn’t speak the language and rarely consulted those who did.11 There remains, however, an assumption which is constant for both schools. Cultural-nationalist refutations of colonial stereotypes of ‘tribal’ fragmentation still tacitly accept from colonial ethnographers and linguists the job of proving the historic unity of linguistic aggregates like the Igbo-speaking area. For both schools, this assumption betrays the statist context of ethnographic and linguistic knowledge. Being the immediate intellectual context of research throughout this century, this assumption merits some detailed scrutiny.

Statism in Igbo studies

In the present international system of nation-states, which mercantile rivalry and colonization brought to Nigerian soil, the object of ethnography has been identified — more or less implicitly — with the institutions created in the course of indigenous state formation. Nigerian colonial ethnographers, aptly titled “political officers”, were concerned to establish the charters of client rulers and to draw administrative boundaries. But the clearer the boundary, the less autonomous its contents. From a critical perspective, the point is not to accept localities and regional aggregates as pre-given units, but to explain how these boundaries arise in conjunction with historical processes on a larger scale and in the longer term (Hopkins et al. 1982: 43f.).

With the mainstream, developmentalist social-science view of autonomous ‘societies’, the gain of operational simplicity has exacted a high price of idealization. This price is paid daily by the ‘marginal’ peoples — that is, populations which do not display notable national elites. In 1988, for example, after nearly a year of isisafa and just when Palestinian statehood began to be recognized by bodies like UNESCO, FAO and the EC, a leading Palestinian intellectual indicted statist assumptions as the conceptual glue with which Western officials have stuck the “terrorist” label on self-determination movements, his own included:

So deeply ingrained is the tendency to funnel society into the mold prepared for it by the nation-state, that we cannot conceive of societies except...as if the ideology of all social entities was the state. ...Terrorism is short must be directly connected to the very processes of identity in modern society, from nationalism, to statism, to cultural and ethnic affirmation, to the whole array of political, rhetorical, educational and governmental devices that go into consolidating one or another identity. ...Thus the triumph of identity by one culture or state is almost always implicated directly or indirectly in the denial, or the suppression of equal identity for other groups, states or cultures.12

In practice, such views actually hastened the decline of indigenous aristocrats, ironically clearing the way for the appointment of the neo-feudal Eastern House of Chiefs as the creature of the regional administration, in the hands of A. State-sponsored war on the African National Congress, characterising it as “black on black” violence among “tribal factions” from different “tribal groups”.13

Nationalism exhausts the processes by offering what appears to be ethnocide as an alternative to clamorous demands for equality, for sovereignty, for national self-definition. (Saïd 1988: 54, 58)12

During the Nigerian civil war, fought mainly in the Igbo-speaking area from 1967-70, the statist tack was a devastating intellectual impendence. At the time, Diamond was one pro-Biafran “Africanist” who criticized the statist view of ethnicity:

Recourse to the explanatory principle of “tribalism” is a Western reification which blocks our view of African reality and deflects our attention from our own responsibility. (1970: 27)13

Speaking on and for the Federal side, Armstrong — who wrote his doctoral thesis on African state formation — adopted a militant statist position, to inflammatory and paternalistic effect:

In my view, we [i.e. the Johnson administration in the U.S.] should sell arms to the Nigerian Government. The present federal structure, with twelve states and a strong but not dictatorial centre, is what two generations of Nigerian nationalists have been fighting for... (1967: 16f.)

This conceptual impendence of statism has roots in colonial administration, which defined the inland region east of the Niger and south of the Benue as stateless. On the contrary, Igbo has shown that the administrative problem was not a lack of precolonial states, but the opposite: a superabundance of bounded political systems which fulfilled various criteria of statehood, but were inconveniently many in number, small in scale, and flexible in structure. The flaw of Indirect Rule in Southeastern Nigeria was not the recognition of chiefs, but “keeping the number of chiefs low, irrespective of the demands of the people for the recognition of more chiefs” (A. Igbo 1981: 318). Lugard’s “pretense of using traditional machinery” (1891:323) destroyed its appointees’ accountability to guilds and lineage councils, sparking the 1929 women’s anti-tax rebellion.

After crushing the rebellion by shooting peasant women in masse, the long-term colonial response to the embarras d’états was a further retreat into unreality. Mock’s official report on the background of events is a model of bland, diffusionist denial:

[T]he most characteristic feature of Igbo society is the almost complete absence of any higher political or social unit than the commune or small group of contiguous villages, who... regard themselves as descendants of a common ancestor. ...Kingship is not and never was a feature of the Igbo constitution. Where it occurs it is clearly of exotic origin. (1937: 3, 185)

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12Cf. also the analysis of statism and terrorism in Chomsky 1986c. The most characteristic feature of Igbo society is the almost complete absence of any higher political or social unit than the commune or small group of contiguous villages, who... regard themselves as descendants of a common ancestor. ...Kingship is not and never was a feature of the Igbo constitution. Where it occurs it is clearly of exotic origin.

13The classification of Chiefs Law (cap. 20) of 1959... was prompted by the need to find suitable persons who should be recognized as chiefs and be eligible to sit in the House of Chiefs. Apart from a few traditional office holders a number of persons were appointed on political consideration as first class chiefs and into the House of Chiefs. One first class chief was appointed to represent each of the ten provinces. To introduce a semblance of democracy into the House of Chiefs, the then Government proceeded to institute an electoral college system of clan heads (second class chiefs).

Under pressure, ex-District Officer G. I. Jones, who was the government’s consultant in drafting the Chiefs Law, granted the first class chieftaincy for Igbo NCB.

Endnotes


11Northcote Thomas was the great exception. Lackner (1973: 135) quotes Colonial Office correspondence by one Flood, dated 19/12/1930, which reports that Thomas was a recognised Nine in many ways. He wore sandals, even in this country [Britain], lived on vegetables and was generally a rum person.

To justify Thomas’ dismissal from colonial government service, Flood goes on to remark (less than grammatically) that it was undesirable to have an object like that going about... partly because he was calculated to bring a certain amount of discredit upon the white man’s prestige.
§26 Note 1. This decision, contradicting Jones’ own knowledge of the precedence relationship between these two monarchs, was clearly desirable for the NCNC leadership.14

After the Nigerian Civil War, the official view of Igbo kingship was redefined by the federal administrator for the defeated Biafran territory — himself a very utilitarian brand of political scientist — who revived Meek’s diffusionist views:

Consequent on the migration and movement of people into and from the town. *Ehia* land became a commodity in exchange and a system of corporate offices developed, modeled on institutions borrowed from the Benin Kingdom.15

*Igbo* land. *Nkpo* and *Ehia* were three communities which to our knowledge, possessed a centralized office of kingship in Igbo land. Elsewhere in *Ehia* land there were varying title holders of various types but they did not as far as the present evidence go amount to a centralized authority.

From 1963 to 1988, Nigeria went from three regions to 21 states on the assumption that political and economic rights can be secured only through control of a redistributive bureaucracy. §13 (Elkah) 1983 shows that, in the Second Republic (1979-83), this assumption may not have been unreasonable, but it was disastrous for the south, especially for the Igbo-speaking area, which had the least bureaucratic control proportionate to population.

Statism pervades Igbo studies in subtler ways as well. In each of Ottenberg’s four books on “an African Society…Afikpo,” the title combines two specious idealizations: an equivocal social-science category and a particularly egregious colonial misspelling of *African Society…Afikpo*, the title combines two specious idealizations: an equivocal social-science category and a particularly egregious colonial misspelling of *African Society…Afikpo*. The inaccuracy of *Afikpo* cannot have escaped Ottenberg’s notice, so its use represents a conscious choice to distance himself from the vocabulary of everyday life, and stick to official (originally colonial) nomenclature. The subtitled phrase an African society makes his studies of this peripheral Igbo-speaking community seem less particularistic (and hence more marketable), but it adds little (beyond geographical titillation). Both usages reflect intellectual commodification and weaken the link between hypothesis and evidence. In particular, the adoption of “a society” as the unit of analysis permits Ottenberg to elide from 24 months in Igbo to the supposed nature of the Igbo ethnic group as a whole. On this basis, he has maintained his famous thesis of “Igbo receptivity to change” (1989), unchanged for thirty years, most recently (1989) describing Igbo as an “entrepreneurial society”.16

The present work

This century’s uncertain debates on Igbo statehood point up the need for a non-circular criterion of ethnic constituency. This problem is no less real in other regions of Nigeria, where statehood was less controversial. The issue is the same: top-down versus bottom-up definition.

Igbo linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits

“epidemiology of representations”). No less than the development of ethnic movements, the foundation and reformation of states is predicated on knowledge, shared and controlled. This book assembles elements of a knowledge-based account of politics in the Igbo-speaking area. By hypothesis, the first such element is grammar itself.

The first two sections of chapter 1 introduce linguistic consciousness in the research setting, through an example of dialect relexification in an Igbo text. *Ehen* *Mk* *E* *Ehen* Did It? is the name of the initiation play (*Ehen* *Mk* *E* *Ehen*) of an age grade which was formed around 1920. This seems to have been the age grade which did most of the forced labor as long distance “carriers” in the early colonial era.

As I-language (cf. footnote 7 above), the text of *Ehen* *Mk* *E* *Ehen* raises the issue of multiple reference. It uses mythological material to comment on the experience of migrant laborers in the new colonial order. The fragmentary recorded performance of 1977 incorporates references to recent village life, including my role as a penniless patron of the arts. As I-language (cf. footnote 8 above), the text evidences dialect relexification, in its irregular position with respect to some isoglosses of phonetic and morphological innovation. Addressing the latter question, §1.3 provides a classification of dialects based on phonetic innovations. One of the relevant isoglosses is tonal, and the analysis proceeds to a formal, metrical analysis of tone in the Bena-Kwa family of Niger-Congo. Following Kaye, Lowenstamm and Vergnaud’s cognitive approach to phonology, which minimizes the stipulation of phonological rules, I suggest that the primary locus of variation in Igbo sound systems is in the licensing of syllabic and metrical structure, rather than in the inventory of segments or tonal autosegments per se. This suggestion is corroborated by external evidence from the poetics of *Ehen* *Mk* *E* *Ehen* no observed relexification alters metrical constituency, and substitutions with metrical consequences, otherwise possible, are not observed.

Chapters 2-3 bring a cognitive perspective to some parametric issues in Igbo grammar, clarifying the role of lexical entries. Proposing a shift from “deriving” to “generating” “representational concepts”, Koster (1986, 1989b) argues that knowledge of language is located in the lexicon (an information retrieval system) and not in individual psychology (I-language). The claim that all syntactic parameters are lexical directs attention to two sorts of evidence: thematic domains and affixation (function composition in morphology and syntax). As to thematic domains, the M.I.T. lexicon project (e.g. Gaerstel et al. 1985) has shown that a wide range of transitivity alternations respect a small set of constraints stated over lexical conceptual structures. Igbo resembles its close neighbors *Gbe* and *Yoruba* in the relative insignificance of the lexical categories *P* and *A*, as compared to *V* and *N*. It differs from them in at least two general ways: the lexicalization of affectedness, and the headedness of verbal predicators (cf. *Igbo* 1989, Déchaine 1990). Affixation, i.e. function composition in morphology and syntax, reduces to head movement as argued by Travis 1984, Koopman 1984, Baker 1985 and Roberts 1985. The affixes which trigger head movement in *Igbo* account for case and aspectual phenomena, some of which are restricted to particular dialects. Together, these chapters go some way towards specifying the contents of the set “knowledge of Igbo”.

Chapter 4 analyzes the cognitive component of social relations in the Igbo area in terms of the social component of lexical entries. If ideological representations are stored diffusely in the lexicon, where they are sorted morpheme-by-morpheme, there is no need to posit monolithic social
structures, underpinned by an equally paradoxical category: collective consciousness. This step avoids Durkheim’s pitfall of “hypostatizing ‘society’ into an entity superior to its members” (Lichtheim 1965: 179). At the same time, it clarifies the outstanding issue in Igbo ethnohistory, clearly posed by Œ̒nìyààn’s (1976) study of Sr Kingdom: the co-occurrence of hierarchical and egalitarian politics in a single social formation.17

Hierarchies of gender, age, birth order, doctrant group, initiation level and affine alliance, authorise a series of sumptuary privileges, mainly: production usufructs, corvée labor, tax and tribute rights.18 Accumulation of individual property outside of this conceptual system both supports and undermines it in practice. The È xe Œ̒r — a ‘sacred’ (and not ‘divine’) king comparable to the monarchs of the Ògù and Ògù kingdoms in the 19th century (Mortor-Williams 1967; Nàìjàñì 1981; Bradbury 1989) — was hemmed in by ritual sanctions which left titled elders and propertied ‘big men’ greater room for action. Meïlassoux aptly 1986 dub these sacred kings duex corps ‘gods under siege’.19 But the same title system which encircled these kings also relied on them for regulation, in the form of ritual. The picture was further complicated by the strategic relationship between indigenous titles and the state, both colonial and nationalist.

Colonial administrators ignored the constitutional nature of southern Nigerian monarchies, and undermined their religious checks and balances. With reverses (and police support) coming from ‘above’, sacred kings acquired absolutist status in the colonial polity. Àkàhù íkùnte identified this contradiction continued in his account of the 1974-75 È xe Ògù market crisis. The payment of stipend to the Ògù Urban Council as its President, without his performing any positive function, might have inflamed him to feel that he was obliged to te(i) the official (È xe) line… a classic example of the dilemma of our Paramount Chiefs. (1976b: 6)

From 1971-79, a similar palace siege was played out in È xe Ògù, with tragic consequences. The lexical perspective also clarifies the centrality, in the oral civilizations of southern Nigeria, of the Feuerian system (Yòrùbá Ògù È xe Ògù). As analyzed by Àhù iìwèdà 1976 and Ønìyààn 1981, these encyclopedic databases have historically supported large scale systems of communication and control, and preserved cognitive achievements (cf. §4.2.1 infra).

Multilingual literacy adds a dimension of conflict to the lexicon: some strategic words have been contentiously redefined through missionary mistranslations, both mindless and meddlesome (cf. Òwògù 1985, À Ògù 1989).20 Ideological and grammatical knowledge connect in the blockage of Igbo literacy (cf. Ògù 1972). In mass literacy in English, Igbo speakers surpass the rest of Nigeria, but mother tongue literacy in the Igboid area reached an impasse early in this century, from which it has never recovered. As Ønìyààn (1974: 10) put it, “…the period from 1929 to 1961 was a blank period in Igbo literary history.” Àkùnì 1972 shows that this situation was the fruit of missionary rivalry, which created a number of functional polarities. The language of pseudo-literacy (“Union” È gbo), taught by Anglicans, cf. Àkùnì 1976) was opposed to that of secular, practical literacy (English, taught by Catholics), and both of these were distinct from the language of oral commerce (“Waterside” Ønìyàà employed by Catholics and clerks). Beginning with Ward 1941, policymakers rephrased this north-south dialect split as a dichotomy between ‘central’ and ‘peripheral’ forms of the language. Àkùnì 1985 accepts Ward’s ahistorical view that “the Ògù, Òwògù and È xe dialects are closer to Ògù than to Ønìyàà.” (1985: 344). Ward’s dichotomy has become a factor in ethnic fragmentation. Ønìyàà comments:

People speak vaguely of the Central Dialect as if it is a Dialect chosen from the centre of È xe Ògù land or to use the BBC Nigerian Civil War cliché, È xe heartland. (1974: 11)

By the end of the war, Williamson’s Rivers State Readers Project had made common cause with apocalyptic Pentecostal missionaries21 in promoting linguistic separatism in peripheral Igboid communities. The new boundaries were legitimized, in turn, by Williamson’s (1975a) Lower-Niger hypothesis, which divided the Igboid periphery into a half-dozen “languages”, based on lexicostatistics — a discredited, shortcut method of classification which computes lexical coherence from rough translations of an English wordlist. The classification in §1.3, based on common phonetic innovations, contains a north-south division as the deepest of three embedded levels of relationship; it reveals no basis for Ward’s or Williamson’s center-periphery split, which is a social phenomenon, based on relatively recent cultural borrowing and on even more recent administrative policy (cf. Manfredi 1982). The similarities across the periphery, noted by Ward and corroborated by Àkùnì, reflect shared archaisms, not common innovation, and hence reveal little about internal history.

Why is linguistic fragmentation so important in the politics of this region? It is often, commonsensically suggested that that the historic absence of a single predominant state explains a high level of linguistic diversity in the Igbo area (e.g. Meek 1937: 1). But when has state power ever successfully blocked linguistic change? A more plausible assumption is that the founders of written È xe Ògù had no prestige dialect comparable to Standard Yorùbá which is based on the dialect of imperial Ògù (cf. Àkùnì 1983). This was the same if the more striking because as stated by Àkàhù íkùnte who both established Standard Yorùbá and led the early Anglican missions up the Niger to Àlàgbà and Ønìyàà. Rather, the È gbo case shows that the emergence of a prestige dialect does not follow automatically from the establishment of state power. The Ògù kingdom controlled long distance trade and tribute over a wide area for centuries, but it was never linguistically centripetal. Quite the opposite was true: far from imposing their dialect on others, the titled elders of the Ògù kingdom employed a secret vocabulary and stylistic pattern called èlu ‘voice’, to encode their messages outside of the holy city (cf. §4.2.2 infra). Furthermore, the more absence of an standard language of state does not explain the new pattern of linguistic fragmentation in the missionary era. The lexical hypothesis contrasts with some classic and recent accounts of linguistic consciousness. Boas’ (1911) distinction between “primary”, unconscious and “secondary”, reflexive beliefs excludes in principle any interaction between grammatical and social knowledge. Ethnicity also is unrelated to the Sápi-W'hörh hypothesis. Sápi and W'hörh address a different problem: the existence in linguistic categories of a synthetic a priori. Recent work suggests that this Kantian effect may exist (Hale 1983; Bach 1986) but is not specific to linguistic concepts (Jackendoff 1983) and hence has nothing to do with ethnicity.22

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18At È xe soldiers ‘were sold but not kept’ (Ønìyàà 1976: 6). In other settlements, slave labor was central to horticultural production and symbolic accumulation (Thomas-Ønìyàà 1984, 1985).


20The first (1972) edition of Williamson’s È gbo-English Dictionary evoked protests because the nontechnical portions of the lexical entries were drafted by a pair of blithe young evangelists.

Bourdieu’s notions of habitus and symbolic capital are closer to the lexical hypothesis, but his 1981 study of “the economy of linguistic exchanges” preserves a sociolinguistic focus on speech styles — or behavior as opposed to knowledge. If linguistic knowledge does not differ in kind from “encyclopedic” knowledge, then Sperber’s (1975, 1980, 1982) negative view on the relationship between symbolism and linguistic semantics is unwarranted. A similar clarification can be offered to Saussure. In the 1907 manuscript sources of the Cours de linguistique générale (Godel 1969: 145), the systematic side of language (langue) is described as individual, the accidental side (parole) as social. This dichotomy, Chomskian avant de la lettre, was reversed in 1908 under the influence of Durkheim 1898 (Doroszewski 1933, Hiersche 1972), so that Saussurian langue came to pose the same problem as Durkheimian collective consciousness: where is it? If the answer is the lexicon, the metaphysical problem dissolves.

The ethnicity effect also sheds light on what Chomsky 1986b calls Plato’s and Orwell’s Problems. What enables speakers to possess knowledge of a natural language, given their limited exposure to linguistic data during language acquisition? What ensures “subservience to the doctrinal system” in the absence of direct coercion, and in the face of “obvious facts” about “the principles of the state religion”? Chomsky doubts that “misuse or control of language is a central feature of [Orwell’s] problem”, dismissing it as “intellectually [much less] exciting” than the problem of I-language. This study suggests one factor that prevents social actors from formulating autonomous and generalized perspectives comparable to grammatical parameters. The “supra-individual memory”, being lexical, is sorted morpheme-by-morpheme, producing the relative opacity of social vs. linguistic knowledge.

Gouldner, in his Dialectic of Ideology and Technology, clearly states the strategic role of linguistic knowledge, in the sense suggested above:

Ideology, then, is that part of consciousness which is focused linguistically on public projects. ... [It] is the restructuring of an ordinary language ... by selectively focusing the ordinary language on certain public projects, ... by changing the meanings of the ordinary language, ... by taking certain parts of ordinary language and making them newly problematical, [and] ... by the invention of new signs.

(1976: 81)”

\[\text{[\text{Igbo\ formula to begin a story}]}

1Elsewhere called Orunmila, Orunmili, Olorunmil, etc., cf. data (18a) below.

2See §4.2.2 below.
See also Aiyéka 1979. Ethnic names (in parentheses), colonial spellings in UPPER CASE. Reference locations (A - H) and (Z) have their main linguistic affiliations in angle brackets.

1. Agha (Ak; & AGROR
2. Igbanke
3. Ugbua
4. Ilu ILLAH
5. Aga (Okpala, Oru) AROH
6. Igbezu (Ezumai) IBUSA, IBUZA
7. Ochichi (Odm, Oru) ONITSHA
8. Ochichi (Ochichi)
9. Nsukwiri (Akwa, Oba
10. Och
11. Ochiri (Ogbam, Oru) OSSOMARI
12. Och
13. Ogwuta / Owuntu (Ogwa, Oru) OGUTA
14. Egbem
15. Aguleri
16. Ada (Or; Owun)
17. Ns NSHI
18. Ona AKWA
19. Agustka (Agbaegu, Egbata)
20. Nsukwa
21. Ibichu (Ochichu)
22. Och (Okpala) AWGU
23. Uch (Okpala)
24. Agba (Ogwata)
25. Oniokwu (Obia
26. Nsukwa (Okpala)
27. Ikem (Ok; Ok; Ok)
28. Amanwa (Och; Onw, iri) ABRABARKI, EZI
A. Egb (Ok; Ok; IDAH
B. Agba (Southern Igbo)
C. Ikem (Igb; Igb; Igb)
D. Och (Igb; Igb; Igb)
E. (Igb; Igb; Igb)
29. Ehugba AFIKPO
30. Ighe (Eh; AKA, ADA, EDDA
31. Ohimya OHAFIA
32. Bende (Eh) ITEM
33. Ag ARO CHUKU
34. Ighe (Igb; ABRIBA
35. Aka (Nwaaka)
36. Olugari (Ogbolo) OKIGWE
37. Igbe (Igb; ETTI
38. Mba
39. Ogb (Ogb)
40. Mbo
41. Owere (Og; Owerr; OWERRIE, ORATTA
42. Mba
43. Omahya UMBABA
44. Oh
45. Mfoghi (Me; MBAWSI
46. Aji (AGBATA, OGBA
47. Akwakwo
48. Ochichi (Ochichi)
49. Okobre (EGB; ETCHE
50. Ochikoro (Ogb; Ikwere) IKWERRI
51. Umahya (Southern Ikwere)
52. Ilele (Northern Ikwere)
53. Ilele (Northern Ikwere)
54. Omokpo (Ogba) OKUBA, OGBA
55. Ogbasa (Ogba) AHOADA, EKBAPFA
56. Ochichi (Egb; AHOADA, EKBAPFA
F. Ochichi (Ogh; Egb; Egb
G. Okonma (Igb; Igb; Igb)
H. PORT HARCOURT
I. Igbe (Igb; Igb; Ikb; Ikb
X. Igbe (Igb; Igb; Igb

Fig. 1 55 major Igboid settlements referred to in the text

or (Og; Ogb; Ogb S. Ikwere)
Wacka (1982: 99) gives data from the neighboring community of Akwa-Pa
In ORLU L. C. A., but linguistically closer to Oya (Arama) (Armstrong 1967) than to Og;
Including Ohogbo, the base of Green and Ifere 1963.
Moe 1986 also describes Omoge (Omo; (Arama) OMOR, Ada (Ogbo; ADAN;
Kpaga (Egb; Egb; NPLOG, Oku (Oghi) ORUKO-AGOR, Ak ond Ogbha.
A Yoruboid enclave totally within the Igboid area, described by Thomas 1914.
Summary of phonetic innovations (described in §1.3.1 below)
Cover symbols: C = consonant, V = vowel, T = stop, K = [k, g], U = [u, ŋ], I = [i, j]

Southern
- sh-h ‘market’, ‘thing’, ‘people’, ‘theft’

Northern
- n>l / C_ ‘name’, ‘thing’, ‘people’, ‘theft’
- n>l / C_ ‘market’, ‘come’

Lowland
- g>sh(h) ‘give’
- ‘pass.by’, ‘bathe’ (but ʃhʌɡɜ[ɬ] keeps *-wɔ’ bathe’).
- ‘open’ (ʃwʊɔsɔ ‘-wâc’ ‘open’ shows regular hw>wh)

Scarpland
- b>n ‘house’, ‘return’

Delta
- d>z / V [back] ‘husband’, ‘walk’
- k>n / Kwn ‘fire’, ‘leopard’
- d>z / V [back] ‘husband’, ‘walk’

Plains
- t>s / V [ATR] ‘throw’, ‘back [suff.]’, ‘lengthen’
- d>s / V [ATR] ‘throw’, ‘back [suff.]’, ‘lengthen’
- 1 = ʃk̡asɛn ‘all items’
- 2 = ʃk̡asɛn ‘all items’
- 3 = ʃk̡asɛn ‘all items’, 1988: 130

Central
- thV / thVn ‘awake’, ‘fall’
- ‘llocative verb’
- ‘locative verb’
- cf. ʃk̡asɛn ‘all items’

Savannah
- l>l ‘market’, ‘cow’

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*Plains is overlapped by Central and split by some ʃmɔmɔ dialects.

Fig. 2  A “maximal” subgrouping, by sound change, of 25 Igboid settlements

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As a consequence of this expansion, 16th-17th century Akgbó sent tribute to Ijú (cf. Agbáráwa 1934) and acquired many Igbo words and things in return.4 Ìlàwọ́wọ́ (ms.) recounts, some time after Akgbó had come firmly within Ijú’s orbit, òwó Òṣẹ́ (Prince) Kiíjẹ́ fled to the east, having failed to attain the Akgbó throne. With some of his maternal relatives from Òjídún, Kiíjẹ́ founded a string of monarchies including Òjídún Môrì (Fig. 1, location 7), also known as Akgbó (Askó), where he is remembered today as Èrè Chínà. Òjéchà oral historians, cited by Òṣè osin (1962: 16/7) concur with Ìlàwọ́wọ́’s sources in placing these events in the 17th century, although they identify the source of the migration not as Akgbó, but as Èrè itself (see §4.2.4 below).

Ìlàwọ́wọ́ also tells how, after the British sack of Èrè in 1897, Akgbójáwáiwóhin the heir to exiled Òjídún Môrì Nípárii took shelter in Akgbó. There, the British eventually made him District Head, until Akgbó people drove him out in 1901 (Agbáráwa 1934: 61). In 1901, too, the British established Akgbó as the Administrative headquarters for the three divisions between Benin and the Niger: Òjídún (Asaba), Òṣòjùwá (Kwale) and Èsùn (Ishàn).

That Akgbó did not remain a center of colonial officialdom was largely due to the people’s own resistance, especially as directed against the colonists’ recruitment of forced labor and the presence of Benin chiefs under British aegis.5 In 1906, British and Western Nigerian troops repulsed a large-scale insurrection at the cost of between ten and sixteen Akgbó dead (cf. fn. 25 below).6 Ìlàwọ́wọ́ notes that, after a 1908 visit, the Governor Sir Walter Egerton remarked on Akgbó people’s open “hostility” to British rule. In 1918, after a fire at Akgbó’s colonial government station, the District was merged into Òjídún (“Asaba”) Division under Lugard’s 1914 amalgamation of Northern and Southern Provincial administrations (Ìlàwọ́wọ́ ms., Òṣòjùwá 1977).

Èbí Òjídún (Fig. 1, location 29) occupies a cluster of hills and beaches on the right bank of Èbí Òjídún (the Cross River) at the eastern Igboid boundary, some 250 km. to Akgbó’s east. The settlement of Èbí Òjídún dates back millennia to the neolithic transition (Hartle 1966). Today, Èbí Òjídún people practice fishing and horticulture side by side. Rich alluvial soil aside, however, much of the

5Among them: the word ìdìgbà in the meaning ‘gun’ (Melzian 1937: 149), probably along with the object itself: the Benin Kingdom had a near monopoly on firearms imports. The general Igbo word for ‘gun’ is agbó. Throughout Igboid, including Akgbó, èdìgbà means ‘tree’ or ‘stick’; Melzian plausibly speculates that this was the ultimate source for Igbo èdìgbà meaning ‘gun’. Here as so frequently on the Igboid-Edoid border, borrowing went in both directions: Akgbó re-borrowed the word with its ìdìgbà meaning, while preserving its èdìgbà one.

6Agbáráwa assumed the Èbí Òjídún throne in 1914 as Ègbã Òjídún. Agbáráwa is today a prominent family name in Ègbã Òjídún, a village with close ties to the Èbí Òjídún palace. Sir Ralph Moor’s arrangement to “store” Ègbáráwa’s paramountcy at Èbí Òjídún was presumably meant to curb immediate demands for the restoration of the Èbí Òjídún monarchy while Ègbáráwa languished under house arrest in Calabar. With Ègbáráwa’s eventual death in exile and Lugard’s amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Provinces (both events taking place in 1914), Ègbáráwa’s house was slowly rehabilitated as Ègbáráwa’s heir, in keeping with Lugard’s policy of indirect rule and tacitly admitting the failure of direct rule in Benin City in the 14 years since 1897 (Burns 1926: 217, cited by Bradbury 1968/1973: 97). That the British did in Nigeria was a “greater state” is suggested by Bradbury’s locution that Ègbáráwa was kept “waiting in the wings” (1968/1973: 96).

8A nice contrast in this respect is afforded by the town of Ègbari, the capital of the present Èsùn State. As noted in the Orthography section, p. 9 above, Ègbari derived its official prominence, and its name, from its colonial function as the collection point for African corvée labor.

10In the historic raiding economy, approximately 50% of the adult male population was mobilized in times of conflict (cf. Agbáráwa 1934: 25). Hinterland raiding, often to the south and west, sometimes for the purposes of violent acculturation (see §5.4.1 below).
I therefore spent long hours mumbling over my transcriptions. Small speech processes add a layer of hypercorrection to the speech of aspiring literates. The newest wave of ongoing cultural meanings of certain words, by taboo or tendentious mistranslation. This process adds a layer of hypercorrection to the speech of aspiring literates. The newest wave of missionaries inundates the periphery of the Igbo area, as throughout the marginal or ethnic “minority” areas of Nigeria. Before and indeed during the Nigerian Civil War, S.I.L. and allied agents of linguistic saturation worked extensively in both the Savannah and Delta Igbo areas (cf. Meir et al. 1967, 1975; D. J. Clark 1969, 1971; Williamson 1970a, 1973a). By 1984, however, they had not reached either Igbo or Igbo. To my knowledge.

Igbo and Igbo represent Igbo’s typological extremes with respect to both phonology and syntax. In comparing Figs. 1-2, it can be seen that, within Southern Igbo, Igbo is the northwesternmost settlement, and Igbo is the northeasternmost. Perhaps by their spatial proximity to Northern Igbo settlements, Igbo and Igbo have the protolanguage which are not preserved elsewhere in Southern Igbo. Since 1976, with the generous help of many citizens of these two places, I have learned to converse, albeit haltingly, in their mother tongue, though they sometimes wondered aloud what it was good for: in missionized communities of African religion life, feasts of the earth and the ancestors, more freely than was possible in heavily missionized, core Igbo areas. Marginality to foreign religion was also an advantage for a foreign language-learner. In the most thoroughly missionized areas, there is an ongoing purge of the historic meanings of certain words, by taboo or tendentious mistranslation. This process adds a layer of hypercorrection to the speech of aspiring literates. The newest wave of missionaries inundates the periphery of the Igbo area, as throughout the marginal or ethnic “minority” areas of Nigeria. Before and indeed during the Nigerian Civil War, S.I.L. and allied agents of linguistic saturation worked extensively in both the Savannah and Delta Igbo areas (cf. Meir et al. 1967, 1975; D. J. Clark 1969, 1971; Williamson 1970a, 1973a). By 1984, however, they had not reached either Igbo or Igbo. To my knowledge.

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1a. ‘are you the chameleon, who when it sees a black person changes into black, and who when it sees a white person changes into white?’

1b. 'Are you the fat housefly, who goes empty-handed to market?’

1c. ‘Are you the toad, that one does not eat you?’

1d. ‘Are you the pelican, who said that when his mother died, he’d bury her in iron rock?’ My Igbo friends explained me with the nickname ‘the-person-who-their-country-chased-out’. Eventually, with a steady income as a federal civil servant, I earned a more flattering title in Igbo. ‘i someone.who.provides.when.s.he.has[something],

Linguistic description requires talk about talking. To do this through a second language which is unequally possessed by all participants is inevitably to end up talking to oneself much of the time. Although English is Nigeria’s lingua franca, there is small precedent for literal translation into English, and the task of morpheme-by-morpheme analysis is wholly unfamiliar even to highly schooled literates.

I therefore spent long hours mumbling over my transcriptions. Small speech processes add a layer of hypercorrection to the speech of aspiring literates. The newest wave of missionaries inundates the periphery of the Igbo area, as throughout the marginal or ethnic “minority” areas of Nigeria. Before and indeed during the Nigerian Civil War, S.I.L. and allied agents of linguistic saturation worked extensively in both the Savannah and Delta Igbo areas (cf. Meir et al. 1967, 1975; D. J. Clark 1969, 1971; Williamson 1970a, 1973a). By 1984, however, they had not reached either Igbo or Igbo. To my knowledge.

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similarity between the versions in the appendix, and those collected by Ottenberg. Why such
stability? Possession of these lists is intellectual capital: in oral form it accompanies—indeed is a
prerequisite of—the achievement of substantial political stature outside the minor lineage.

The third list was partly situational, consisting of the names of 40 household heads of ìgbò-
ùkwọ; patrilineages, ìghẹ̀-àyé, which I wrote down as they contributed pots of ìgí-
ìṣẹ̀-iṣẹ̀lẹ̀ (fish and melon seed stew) and ìgbẹ̀-ìwọ̀ (rolled portions of pounded yam) to the ìbíṣí-
ìwọ́ on ̀ìkị́pọ̀/Friday 4 March 1977. Although in principle every household contributes to the feast, many
adults are not resident at that time of year, so this list is not comprehensive.

All three lists have some internal structure derived from a degree of cross-classification among
bipartite entries. The handful of identical names in the randomly ordered ìbíṣí-
ìwọ́ list reflects the practice of naming a first son after his paternal grandfather, which by recursion forms a closed
loop in alternate generations, broken only by the failure of a first son to survive until he produces
his own son. By contrast, the lists of settlements and matrilineages possess inherent partial
ordering, based either on the hierarchy of spatial inclusion (a settlement’s constituent motilies or
quarters are grouped together) or more abstractly on common origins as reflected in shared
components of the names. The settlement list I was given in 1976 differs from Ottensberg’s (1968)
published version (collected in the 1950’s) in two respects, neither of which is likely to reflect any
diachronic process. Probably basing himself on the administrative map of the district, Ottensberg
omits a number of smaller settlements, and takes ìgí-ìwọ́ to be a subunit of ìbíṣí-ìwọ́, whereas in terms of
the ritual market calendar it is a coordinate entity.

In ìgbò-ùkwọ, I was given three lists to write down. One of these, repeated often, is an indispensable
road map: the nine component communities of ìgbí-ìtùmọ̀nì, one of the oldest ìgbí-ùkwọ.
settlements. The other two are expert knowledge: the names of local species (or phenotypic varieties) of yams and
mushrooms. The settlement list was topical at the time of my visit: several parts of ìgbí-
ìtùmọ̀nì became the ìgbàììì ọ̀rìṣàlá ìmọ̀yí, the ìgbí-ìtùmọ̀nì royal festival, based on the chieftaincy titles of their respective
heads. In this way, individual titles and their holders virtually ‘translate’ the individual
settlements: ìgbí-ìtùmọ̀nì is the settlement headed by ìgbíkọ́kọ́mì, etc. This kind of translation is
also present in the other two lists. Some of the species names are descriptive phrases (like the
ùgbáììì ìgbí-ùkwọ ‘farm message’ yam); others while untranslatable have a single salient characteristic
that functions as an inevitable, virtual gloss (the one thing you need to know about the
mushroom apart from its physical identity is that it is poisonous). If a species has a general
English label, this becomes the virtual translation of the ìgbí-ùkwọ term: for example the ìgbẹ̀-
ìwọ́ yam belongs to a type widely called water-yam on account of its soft consistency, although no word
‘water’ forms part of the ìgbí-ùkwọ name. All six lists are reproduced in the Appendix.

One kind of list often collected by ethnographers in Nigeria is the ‘king list’ (cf. Bradbury
1959/1973). In a tantalizing anecdote (which I was unaware of during my stay), Beier describes
a phenomenon in the ìgbí-ùkwọ king list which would amount to an information buffer:

ìgbí-ùkwọ is an old settlement, but its real age is difficult to determine, because the people have a
curious custom of keeping their official king list down to the number fifteen. Every time a new
òkọ̀rùrù meets the throne, the name of the earliest ìgbí is struck off the list. It is no longer recited at
the annual festivals and no more sacrifices are brought to his tomb. (1963: 184)

ìgbí-ùkwọ linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits

While in ìgbí-ùkwọ I did not hear of such a practice, but it is consistent with the fact, unavailable to
Beier, that the king list compiled by ìgbí-ùkwọ (ms.) contains just fifteen names in the third dynasty.
The last of the fifteen was ìgbí-ùkwọ, who was on the throne at the time of Beier’s visit. The
reported limitation to fifteen, if correct, may reflect the intersection of two concepts. First, as
reported by ìgbí-ùkwọ (1980), the spirits of past ìgbí kings are viewed as forming a lineage in
their own right, called ìgbí-ìtùmọ̀nì-ìgbí-ùkwọ, subordinate in status to the component lineages of the
community. This special form of the conical clan accounts for the requirement that, after the ìgbí-
ìwọ́ coronation, the king is undergone funeral rites:

The ìgbí-ìwọ́ was buried in a shallow grave. His wives began to perform the real mortuary rites,
which lasted for twenty-one days. He ‘rose’ from the ‘dead’ clothed with white cloth and
decorated with white chalk on his head. He had become a spirit (ìgbí-ìwọ́) and a living ìgbí-ìwọ́. He
announced his new name and the people greeted him as ìgbí-ìwọ́, the sky, the most high. He had
become ìgbí-ìwọ́. (1980: 88)

The ìgbí-ùkwọ monarchy—unlike that of ìgbí—is hereditary, in fact primogeniture. There is no
other corresponding need to construct a special lineage for kings it already exists. However, there is a
second, widespread belief in the area between ìgbí and ìgbí-ùkwọ (which I am unable to document for
ìgbí-ùkwọ specifically) that the maximum number of reincarnations of an individual is sixteen. This
number is also central to the ìgbí-ìwọ́ divination system (ìgbí-ìwọ́ ìgbí-ìwọ́, ìgbí-ìwọ́ ìgbí-ìwọ́, cf. §2.1.2 below), which
regulates communication with the ancestors.

To summarize. Insofar as every ìgbí-ùkwọ king bears the same title, ìgbí-ìwọ́, the assumption of the
kingship can be viewed—may, more precisely, be viewed by the participants—as a ritual
reincarnation of the same individual. Supporting this interpretation is the prohibition that no
person with a scar or other physical deformity may become king (ìgbí-ìwọ́ ms.); it is said that a
person transmits his/her scars to the next incarnation, so to allow a deformed king would be to
admit that prior kings had been deformed. Taken together with this interpretation, the two
concepts would directly explain the limit reported by Beier: only 16 ontologically distinct kings
actually exist, hence the list contains 15 names plus the present one.

Dictation played a large role in my introduction to ìgbí-ùkwọ. On the instructions of ìgbí-
ìwọ́ the ìgbí, I was conducted to the nine villages of ìgbí-ìtùmọ̀nì over the first two weeks of my stay.
In each village, I was generously received by the elders and regaled with stories. Since I needed to
write down anything I wanted to comprehend, long texts were ruled out in this situation; some very
patient elders gave me texts running into hundreds of words. Looking back over these early
transcriptions, I am struck by all the mistakes I made.

Following Northcote Thomas’ 1911 example in ìgbí-ìwọ́ ẹ̀nìyì and ìgbí-ìwọ́, I made a request for ìgbí-
‘proverbs’, which are of manageable length for a rank beginner to write down, and are easy to
‘ready-made surface structures’—Kiparsky’s (1975) term for Homeric formulæ—proverbs give rhetorical
advantage to the speaker who knows them. Quotational authority lets the speaker omit m ention
17Thus the categories of proverb, welleverism and folktale (ìgbí-ìwọ́) are continuous, cf. ìgbí-ìwọ́ 1982c.
of the features of the immediate context to which the proverb refers, an omission whose effect can range from merely tactful to canny or downright wily.

In other words, I think that the dictation of proverbs was popular in my first days in ọgbọ, not just because they were viewed as appropriate for storage in written form, but especially because they allowed the act of dictation to refer to my presence and condition in a politically acceptable if not entertaining way. I had the strong impression, at least, that people enjoyed telling the proverbs to me because there were some important but sensitive subjects connected with me, on which they had something to say. Here are some examples from my notes of September 1976.

Through proverbs, I was told: generosity should be acknowledged (2a); even unequal relationships give mutual benefit (2b); what seems useless to one person is not to another (2c); people should not be judged by their material state (2d).

- **2a. Ọmụya kọ iken we mè nì? ** ("A person who mentions what they did for him/her, [in so doing] tells them to do more")
- **2b. Ọmụya ọmụya iken we mè nì? ** ("The king has something commoners are good for; commoners have something the king is good for")
- **2c. Nwụ eghu læ jikwu eghu n'okwu. ** ("A witch's child never goes to waste: while it's alive, she sends it on errands; when it's dead, she eats its flesh")
- **2d. Ọsọ i-eje oyi, ọi e n'a. ** ("Poverty is not disease, it is not madness")

In keeping with the imminent, royal ọgụ ọgbọ festival, and my arrival in the village with a royal instruction to stay out of trouble,4 many proverbs told on my first day in ọghọma, ọghọma were apparently chosen to bring the king's authority to my and others' attention:

- **3a. Ẹgbẹ n'ịtị a ọbụ ọmụya nị? ** ("The farm basket bears not, because it is on the middle of the head that they carry it")
- **3b. Ọsọ i-ji, i-ji ọrụ a ọma. ** ("If trees come to an end in the forest, there no more fronds")
- **3c. Ọsọ i-ji, i-ji ọrụ a ọma. ** ("When they finish dancing, the buttocks are the last place to [stop moving]")
- **3d. Ọgbọma we dihì e, ọgbọma ọghọma. ** ("If they don't see a herbalist, they won't cut up a puff adder")

As I tended to miss the point, the assembled people (a dozen or so) concentrated their exergical energy on constructing instances of appropriate usage for each proverb. However, though I had ample help with pragmatics of these texts, the preoccupation with literal translation was mine alone. There were other difficulties. As material for phonological analysis (my main interest at the time), dictated texts raise special problems such as self-correction and tempo changes.

10 Cf. the ọghọma proverb cited by Thomas (1913 vol. 2: 382), which I conjecturally retranscribe as follows:

- **1. Cọma a ọghọma i-ji i-ji ọrụ a ọma. ** ("Vulture said to his wife:
  "'The child is in danger of death."
  "If she delivers [and it dies], they eat the good child.
  "If she delivers [and it lives], they carry the child along.'
"

11 My arrival in ọghọma on 11 September 1976, as the guest of Jacob ọghọma ọghọma, took place on the instructions of ọghọma ọghọma. Two days before, my mentor M. A. Onwu-ọghọma had brought me to the home of the ọghọma ọghọma, the ọghọma historian ọghọma. A ọghọma ọghọma.

12 For example, nasality and the length of words in different dialects is a subject of impressionistic comment by the participant-observer, and without evidence, I will review some definitions and terms. Historical linguistics distinguishes two mechanisms of change: borrowing (describable by August Schmidt's 'wave model') and common

Variation between speakers and styles was leveled out on my paper, greatly obscuring the phenomena of local interest: tone and syllable structure.

Tape recordings, began some weeks later, confirmed these inklings by foregrounding a wide range of linguistic variation.20 On playback, speakers explained some of the variants in terms of arachnial and stylistic register, but these explanations had a stereotypic form (ọgụ ọghọma ọghọma 'the speech of the elders', ọghọma ọghọma ọghọma 'the language of the ancients'). By contrast, speakers showed precise knowledge of variation keyed to locality (geographical dialect). Without making explicit reference to speech sounds, speakers could identify the local origin of a given word.21 It was therefore notable to find items from different localities in a single text by a single speaker.

Some texts are multilingual in a limited sense: a stylistically distinct passage may use a different language from the rest of the text. For example, the 'choreos' of some ọgbọma stories (e.g. Nwụ ọghọma ọghọma ọghọma My-sun-the-little-doctor, in the Appendix) exist in alternative ọghọma and ọghọma versions.22 Other texts show inter-local variation at a smaller scale: in individual lexical items. One example of the latter type lifted the historical curtain on linguistic consciousness in the ọgbọma region. In retrospsect, this example offers evidence that the ethnic effect is located in the lexicon.

1.2 Reflexication

In a series of June 1977 recording dates, ọghọma ọghọma, an ọghọma ọghọma of M. A. Onwu-ọghọma led surviving members of his age grade in reconstructing ọghọma ọghọma ọghọma ọghọma-did-it—a 1920-vintage initiation play.24 The songs of this play, as recreated by him, were set to the music of the ọghọma (antelope horn trumpet, of which he was a master player) and two iron gongs (ones of them double).

The text of ọghọma ọghọma ọghọma is strongly marked by dialect reflexication. Before presenting the evidence, I will review some definitions and terms. Historical linguistics distinguishes two mechanisms of change: borrowing (describable by August Schmidt's 'wave model') and common

20 Cf. content, too, sound recording is heuristic, recalling Jean Rouch's film ọghọma. In Moore's 1988 terminology, documentary events are "diagnostic": the linking of audiences in time and space evokes latent contradictions.

21 For example, nasality and the length of words in different dialects is a subject of impressionistic comment by the participant-observer, and without evidence, I will review some definitions and terms. Historical linguistics distinguishes two mechanisms of change: borrowing (describable by August Schmidt's 'wave model') and common

22 For example, nasality and the length of words in different dialects is a subject of impressionistic comment by the participant-observer, and without evidence, I will review some definitions and terms. Historical linguistics distinguishes two mechanisms of change: borrowing (describable by August Schmidt's 'wave model') and common
innovation (which defines family trees in the neogrammarian mode). As observed by Meillet 1908, the difference between these diminishes, the more local the change in question. Each borrowing is a potential common innovation; most don’t make it (Weinreich, Herzog and Labov 1968). The upper limit of borrowing is wholesale relexification, as in the formation of so-called “creoles”. The classic relexification study in a generative framework is Muysken 1981, which observes that relexification occurs when language acquisition takes place in a multilingual context under circumstances of extreme social dislocation—such as experienced by migrant workers. Although the social conditions are similar, what occurs in Choko Me 4 is a bit different: relexification apparently restricted to (or at any rate focused in) a single text. Eko’s age grade was initiated to adulthood after their enforced journey as head-load “carriers” to Gokva in Kwalale, and Akp, some fifty or more miles away in the Niger delta. Others were sent further still: to Spele and Warri, and, during World War I, to Cameroon and East Africa. From such punishing hardship, young men of that era developed great physical endurance; in 1976, I saw how as elders they voluntarily maintained a discipline of limited food and water even during vigorous farmwork.

Choko’s generation was the first to mature under British rule. A famous event of their youth, recalled by one and all, is recounted in summary by Egbagba in 1934 and in detail by Ogbo Me 4. Accusing the town of Gokva of withholding unpaid labor, Akp District Commissioner O. S. Crewe-Read (who, in the oral tradition as Bebd, led his police force in 1906 to seize an old man as hostage. Events soon spun out of control and, shot the old man’s son dead when he tried to intervene. Outraged people chased Bebd to Gokva and finally killed him when his ammunition ran out. In retaliation, the British attacked Gokva, captured Gk Me 4 and 15 chiefs and killed all of them. Eventually, other towns including Gbobo counterattacked, killing 7 Britons.

One chorus of Choko Me 4, which given the foregoing can only be understood as ironic, goes:

4. Eko, your sons are better, your daughter is a princess. [Eko] go tell him the era of the whites is better. Insofar as the dialects differ, the sentence in (4) is in Choko. In other sentences of the Choko Me 4 text, however, uniquely Gokva and Gbobo morphemes occur in close proximity. As part of its...
They said "OK, as you are doing this thing, stay and we'll teach you dancing"

They taught him the dance for a long time.

When he reached home, he finished teaching it to them. They started using it to tease each other: "You, you, you, wayfarer! Traveling doesn't kill me is the child of Big-one!

She-the-uses-leg-to-find-a-mate is located at' 'wayfarer' is [copula] crisis in the Western House.

Possibly borrowed from the (6) and (11), apart from the substitutions in (12a-c) and (12e) respectively, are grammatical Agh language.

Notice that, in the pairs in (12a-d), all the Agh forms are metrically longer than their English counterparts, as measured in the number of surface syllables or in some other prosodic category such as tone. The prefix of 'Agh' is elided after a vowel, unlike consonant-initial /m/, /n/, etc.

In the 1962 Agh Frontier crisis in the Western House, Oke was crossed the carpet to the NCNC, which sought the creation of a new Midwestern Region (extending from the (Agh Kingdom to the Niger). This new region was reasonably expected to come under NCNC control. With the Western House dissolved, the Midwestern Region was made minister without portfolio in the new AG regional government. The entrenchment of regional interests, to which the peace dividend was sacrificed in 1965, led quickly to the breakdown of civilian rule.

When the war finished, it showed that someone who harasses a king is wasting his time.

In the first regional elections (1953), the Agh vote split between Agagu's NCNC which controlled the Eastern and the NCNC controlled the Western House of Assembly, and Oke's NCNC which controlled the East and the NCNC controlled the Western House. The NCNC won a majority in the West; in retaliation, local AG committees took over local government councils. The 1953 elections were won by the AG with only 5 out of 14 regional seats from the district, but with 22 of 42 seats in the NCNC local government council. In recognition of this margin of victory, Oke was made minister without portfolio in the new AG regional government.
policy was vindicated by the appointment, as postwar governor of Bendel State, of Brigadier S. O. Ogbemudia, who hailed from the Igbo-speaking town of Igboho (Fig. 1, location 2). Thus, through seven tumultuous decades of colonialism, nationalism and rival regionalism (including secession and civil war), Igboho's ancient ties to the rest of the Igbo area were stretched ever thinner, and Igboho's ethnicity cut free of its ancient moorings.

It is often observed that ethnic categories, in both social-science and political discourses, are circularly defined (Lockwood 1970). Although clearly derivative of political and economic forces, they are invoked as immediate causes of social action when seen from a "top-down" and ex-post-facto perspective, e.g.: [The preoccupation with property relations obscured ethnic ones ... but it is property that begins to seem derivative, and ethnicity that seems to become a more fundamental source of stratification.]

Glauser and Moynihan (1976: 16d.)

The mediation of linguistic consciousness, evidenced in Òkàkótó MCÉ, breaks this vicious circularity.

The Igbo ethnic ideology was emergent, in tandem with the creation of the standard language, during the incorporation of the Igbo area into the colonial and national political economy. As a byproduct of regional politics since the turn of the century, the Igboh ideology came to be "stranded" from the rest of Igbo, as just sketched. Correspondingly, Igboh fell outside the ambit of a second historical process: the standardization of Òkàkótó.

Sometimes, linguistic standardization and political regionalization work hand in hand. The standardization of Òriyá was overtly political, when, from the 1840's - '70's, Bishop Òṣíṣelúyì Crowther established as the basis for standardization the dialect of his own ancestral town, the precolonial capital of Òṣíṣelú (cf. Òṣíṣelú 1960). In the 1950's, Òmọ̀wọ̀dáyì laid an explicitly linguistic foundation for his dominant party of the Western Region, the AG, in the cultural union foundation for his dominant party of the Western Region, the AG, in the cultural union .

The comparative method cannot strictly apply to a dialect cluster like Igboh, because of mutual influence throughout its history. In a situation of perpetual contact, waves of innovation prevent the emergence of distinct subfamily branches. Each correspondence among dialects in principle defines an independent innovation in a network of isolosses which crosscuts the interdialectal area. Internal reconstruction 'undoes' innovations whose reflexes are not fully regular. This lack of regularity has two sources relative chronology (different innovations reach different dialects in different orderings), and relative subgrouping (innovations are partial in extent: usually nonintersecting or overlapping, only accidentally coterminous or complementary).

Both kinds of irregularity are explained by the chronology of innovations in each dialect, insofar as these can be reconstructed by hypothesis. Watkins 1962 shows that a historical linguistic study has two logical stages: proto-language reconstruction via the comparative method, and "forward reconstruction" of innovations leading to the attested daughter forms via intermediate common languages. Both relative chronology and relative subgrouping are elucidated by 'forward internal reconstruction', the chronology of innovations in each dialect.

Forward internal reconstruction can be aided what Kiparsky 1973 terms external evidence. For phonological representations, external evidence comes from language history, language acquisition, verbal art and psycholinguistics. For dialectology, demographic and sociological sources are crucial. Demography suggests how groups of speakers have assembled and intersected in the recent past, and sociology describes how linguistic forms carry prestige or authority in various networks. Both types of evidence lessen the indeterminacy of relative chronology in subgrouping. Even the paradigm case of comparative reconstruction, Proto-Indo European, gives rise to the relative chronology problem with respect to its most archaic innovations. Meillet 1908, following
Evidence of the
is said by Ladefoged et al. 1976 to have the richest system of stops in the world.

There is an additional problem: before assuming that peripheral dialects had
and linked by a large number of
documented in the rest of this section.

Accordingly, I propose that a uniform chronology for some innovations can be derived by
imposing, to the maximum degree possible, two conditions on the nodes of the hypothetical tree.

13. **tree condition**

- Only those innovations which define complementary (non-overlapping)
  nodes are included in the tree, as diagnostic for subgrouping.

- **branch condition**
  
  No discontinuous nodes.

These conditions select a subset of observable innovations for tree construction. The tree condition
captures the notion of geographical separation as a condition for subgrouping. It excludes situations
in which one half of a binary separation is defined only negatively ("privatively"), as a remnant
group preserving the status quo ante, while only the other half innovates. As opposed to a network
of waves, a tree implies a positive ("equivollent") identity for each branch.35 Evidence of the
geographic dispersal of one half of a binary split produced by migration would obviate this
condition, designating that half as a 'remnant' or residual node rather than a branch.

The tree condition also excludes a situation in which members of separate branches subsequently
undergo a common innovation. But this should not exclude the common situation in which a locality
at the edge of one subgroup undergoes an innovation of the adjacent subgroup. The branch condition
recognizes that when two branches overlap, one "splitting up" the other, this may be
demographically recoverable and the discontinuous subgroup reconstructed.

The 19 innovations listed in Fig. 2 define the "maximal" subgrouping of Igboid, in that they
extract, from the total wave picture, the information most relevant to a cross-sectional
subclassification. The maximal Igboid which results is a tree with 4 hierarchical levels. The root
node, Proto-Igboid, certainly does not correspond to a homogeneous protolanguage. Proto-Igboid was
woven by numerous waves of innovation, none of which led to its uniquely innovating subgroup.
Then, each of the ten non-root nodes of the tree (plus one node, *ljemb*, which at the present state
of analysis has the status of a remnant) are defined either positively or negatively by the innovations
listed in Fig. 2 above, and those in Figs. 3-4 below. Sample data supporting these diagnostic
innovations, as well as other innovations which are excluded by the tree and branch conditions, are
documented in the rest of this section.

The picture of Igboid in Fig. 2 is based on changes in grammar36, in contrast with Williamson’s (1973) lexicostatistic classification (summarized in Fig. 5). The conclusion which I
draw from this contract is that lexicostatistics does not measure (in Mary Haas’ phrase) “the
prehistory of languages”. This is self-evidently true, as lexicostatistics counts shared retentions
equally with shared innovations (Williamson, p.c.). Applied to dialect clusters, lexicostatistic

The alternative structure in (15b) has the possible advantage of accounting for the ambiguous
behavior of the /y/ as sometimes vocalized (cf. *Ememog*1971, Williamson 1984b, Kamany ms.).

*n* was segmental, as shown both by its pre-Igboid origin in "CVnV sequences (Williamson 1973c)
and by the nasal plosion and aspiration outcomes in Southern Igboid. The order C(n)y
is reconstructed in preference to C(y)n because one outcome is Chy. But, since y is also included in the
category C, both *yn* and *ny* are both predicted by (15a), with distinct outcomes: *yn* simplified to n
and was subsequently lost in many Northern dialects (e.g. *Iye* vs. *nye* ‘kanye ‘thing’), while in the
same dialects *ny wasn’t (e.g. *nye* ‘give’). *ny simplified to n in Lowland, and to n or y in *njyem

35 The concept ‘basic vocabulary’, intended to sidestep this, lacks independent validity (Bennett 1983).

36 Querci is said by Laderoghe et al. 1976 to have the richest system of stops in the world.

37 The concept 'basic vocabulary', intended to sidestep this, lacks independent validity (Bennett 1983).

38 Querci is said by Laderoghe et al. 1976 to have the richest system of stops in the world.
50 *yny sequences would have degeminated by the OCP once the n was either deleted or autosegmentalized.

Shared innovations in Igboid include consonant and tone shifts as part of wider-scale changes in syllabic and metrical structure which worked their way across the Benue-Kwa group of Niger-Congo over millennia. A major syllabic change bisects Igboid into Northern and Southern dialect areas (§1.3.1). *Agbo is the northernmost member of Southern Igboid, while *typgo is among the southernmost Northern Igboid settlements. A multitude of more local consonant shifts were triggered by the basic innovation. The vowel changes discussed in §1.3.2 divide between those which affect the majority of dialects, and hence precede Late Common Igboid; and those which affect only isolated dialects, and hence postdate the innovations of the “maximal” subgrouping. A process of tone shift, reflecting large scale changes in metrical structure, runs from west to east (§1.3.3); it is implemented least in *Agbo, and most in *typgo.

1.3.1 Consonant innovations

Palatalizations and rhotacism One possible outcome of a *Cy sequence is palatalized. Different treatments of *fV and *fyV are seen in respectively in (16a) and (16b):

Proto-Igboid 16a. soup *soup
*name *name

Fig. 3 (below) proposes a fine-grained chronology of innovations in these labial palatal clusters.

Velars (17a-b) palatalized in several branches, and hence in the period before Late Common Igboid. There is a historical clue that velar palatalization is relatively recent in *Agbo. In the 1877 treaty between *Agbo and Great Britain, witnessed by Crowther and reproduced by (1976b: 52f.), the chieftaincy title now pronounced *Agbo is given as "Agei", i.e. unpalatalized.

Alveolar and labial (17c-f) palatalizations are mostly restricted to *Agbo. A few cases (17d, e) attest an original CVC cluster; others (17a-e) are simple CV contexts, not all of which have obvious front vowels, e.g. 'white', 'throw away'. 'Old' probably has a CVV root.

17a. tomorrow

white *white

old *old

b. yam *yam

snail *snail

c. ear *ear

throw-away *throw-away

bound -rV *bound -rV

In most of the rhotacism cases where a nasal is reconstructed (but not all, cf. 'reach'), the expected *sh is glottalized to *l, cf. (19b). But nonrhotacized *l didn't glottalize in *Agbo. In *Agbo, however, glottalization is found. The reflexes of 'house' indicate a complex syllable, parallel to '[2nd weekday]'.

19. return home

return home

to house

[2nd weekday] *house

b. earth *earth

c. ten *ten

food *food

reach *reach

what? *what?

Spirantization This change is regular in *typgo, sporadic elsewhere. Cf. also 'ear' and '[locative V]' in (17) above. This distribution suggests a wave in the Common Igboid period.

*histoic w-*t is attested in *Agbo 'belly', *typgo 'fly', *typgo 'hurt/swell/bite', et cetera. **Williamson's reconstructed *v is glottalized to *l, cf. (19b). But nonrhotacized *l didn't glottalize in *typgo. In *typgo, however, glottalization is found. The reflexes of 'house' indicate a complex syllable, parallel to '[2nd weekday]'.

18a. body

people

slave

die

R. Niger

choose

18b. white

sand

house

20. toneless suffix occurring in the verbs 'know' and 'wait for'.

41 The *sh form is invariable in all verbs, except for the 'is' and 'is' of the verb 'is' in (27) above. The distribution suggests a wave in the Common Igboid period.

42 It is not clear if the *sh form is invariable in all verbs, except for the 'is' and 'is' of the verb 'is' in (27) above. The distribution suggests a wave in the Common Igboid period.

43 Williamson 1972 reports the verb n- for older * Agbo speakers.


20a. difference  işe  işe  işe  işe (Agbó) cf. ‘white’ in (17a) above
day  işe  işe  işe  işe (Agbó)
darkness  işe  işe  işe  işe (Agbó)
sand  işe  işe  işe (Agbó)
go/walk  işe  işe  işe (Agbó)
cf. ‘spirit child’ (Ọchọgà), ‘chief’
also cf. ọzọ [title], ‘step on/trample’

cf. ‘spirit child’ (Ọchọgà), ‘chief’
also cf. ọzọ [title], ‘step on/trample’

b. headpad  işe  işe  işe  işe (Agbó)
c. husband  işe  işe  işe (Agbó)

Labializations

CwV reflexes have several sources. KPnV simplifies to KwnV (cf. below). Some CwV reflexes before nonround vowels may come from bisyllabic structures:

< (21) or CwV < CuV (22). The ọ: w correspondence in (21) is also seen in (27).


1985 reports a series of labialized coronal stops, which are glottalized in and correspond to affricates elsewhere. She reconstructs *tIO and *dIO clusters, but several of the forms in (22) strongly suggest *tUO and *dUO, whose affrication and palatalization recalls the regular treatment of words like tutor and duty in Received British English.

22a. be.sweet  grow/be.long
b. rain (v.)?

The major source of CwV is *KU. In Delta, labialization crosses a segmental *K in *Kọ́ (23d, h).

22a. be.sweet  grow/be.long

Labiovelar simplification

Ladefoged et al. 1976 show that KPnV is unstable, delabializing before round vowels, deverbalizing elsewhere (sporadically) in Central:

Agbó  ọzọ  ọzọ (Kwà)

Williamson observes that nasalized ọ: (as ‘leopard mask, handsome person’).

46 Cf. ọzọ [title], ‘step on/trample’. On the interaction of these changes, cf. §4.2.6 below.

46 Cf. ọzọ [title], ‘step on/trample’. On the interaction of these changes, cf. §4.2.6 below.
54

and

other

26. blood ọgbẹ́i ọmọ́ ọmọ́ [ọhọbara] mee (AkaÁže)
time ọgbẹ́ ọmọha/ômọ ọgbẹ́ (Ọgbẹ́)
wélèlélka ọmọ́ ọmọ́ [ọhọbara]

*we devalibalized to gh, y or h (27a-b). This was fed by simplification of *nw or m (27c-d).

Ọgbẹ́ Ọmọha Ọmọ́ Ọgbẹ́ (Ọgbẹ́)
26. blood ọgbẹ́i ọmọ́ ọmọ́ [ọhọbara] mee (AkaÁže)
time ọgbẹ́ ọmọha/ômọ ọgbẹ́ (Ọgbẹ́)
wélèlélka ọmọ́ ọmọ́ [ọhọbara]

*we devalibalized to gh, y or h (27a-b). This was fed by simplification of *nw or m (27c-d).

Ọgbẹ́ Ọmọha Ọmọ́ Ọgbẹ́ (Ọgbẹ́)
26. blood ọgbẹ́i ọmọ́ ọmọ́ [ọhọbara] mee (AkaÁže)
time ọgbẹ́ ọmọha/ômọ ọgbẹ́ (Ọgbẹ́)
wélèlélka ọmọ́ ọmọ́ [ọhọbara]

*we devalibalized to gh, y or h (27a-b). This was fed by simplification of *nw or m (27c-d).

Ọgbẹ́ Ọmọha Ọmọ́ Ọgbẹ́ (Ọgbẹ́)

Goat

27a. goat ọgbẹ́i ọmọ́ ọmọ́ [ọhọbara]

pluck ọgbẹ́i ọmọ́ ọmọ́ [ọhọbara]
bathe ọgbẹ́i ọmọ́ ọmọ́ [ọhọbara]

pass.by ọgbẹ́i ọmọ́ ọmọ́ [ọhọbara]

b. war

27b. war ọgbẹ́i ọmọ́ ọmọ́ [ọhọbara]

fry/be.cooked ọgbẹ́i ọmọ́ ọmọ́ [ọhọbara]

enmity ọgbẹ́i ọmọ́ ọmọ́ [ọhọbara]

cf. 'enemy' ọgbẹ́i ọmọ́ ọmọ́ [ọhọbara]

d. [inceptive Asp]

27c. navel ọgbẹ́i ọmọ́ ọmọ́ [ọhọbara]

Glottalization Ọgwurụ 1982 observes that in the Ọghụrụ-Ọghụrụ area, t is glottalised in [-ATR] syllables (Ọghụrụ has a glottal stop in some items.) He reports the following minimal triplets:

28. t’ [parasite?’] t’ [distance?’] t’ [bird’]
t’ [weevil’] t’ [obstinacy’] t’ [contribution’]
t” [smallness’] t” [left side’] t” [junior mate’]

29a. throw t’ [mas] t’ [fios] t’ [lugga] t’ [at]

gowbe-long t’ [lugga] t’ [lugga] t’ [lugga] t’ [lugga]

a.little [suff.] t” [no cognate] t” [no cognate] t” [no cognate]

b. back/towards [suff.]

29b. vagina t” [lugga] t” [lugga] t” [fios] t” [at]

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b. back/towards [suff.]

29b. vagina t” [lugga] t” [lugga] t” [fios] t” [at]

Aspiration Ọgbẹ́can 1948 observes the complementarity of nasalized spirants and aspirated stops in Ọghụrụ. Williamson (1973b: 6) derives both outcomes from *CNV, noting that Armstrong 1967 finds nasality with aspiration in Ọghụrụ. As recorded by Elugbe 1969, the *CNV proto-sequence is preserved as stop plus nasal plosion in Ọghụrụ; Williamson reports the same in Ọgbẹ́can.


48This is my knowledge means ‘anus’ or more generally ‘ass’, as in the expression t’i n ọghụrụ ‘cupulate’.

50This the form reported in Áṣọ [Asa] by Thomas (1913 vol. 5: 120); the forms given by Armstrong 1967 and Williamson 1968 are either anatomically distinct from the vagina or periphrastic. The avoidance is presumably due to politeness, and the regularly expected form would be t’i.
Fig. 3: Development of Pre-proto Igboid *'theft', *'name', *'soup', *'market', *'thing'  
N.b.: below, ny denotes a sequence of segments in the orthography, ny is the digraph for [ŋ].

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<tr>
<th>a.</th>
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Fig. 4: Development of Pre-proto Igboid *'belly', *'fly (v.)', *'swell/hurt'  
N.b.: fricative lenition (g) in Fig. 4 corresponds to (g) in Fig. 3; onset simplification (b) in Fig. 4 corresponds to (h) in Fig. 3.

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1. Clark reports *'soup' in [\_h\_w\_n\_\_y\_f] as in *'soup', but w\=\=f is attested in *'belly', w\=\=f 'fly (v.)', w\=\=f 'swell/hurt'

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\[\text{Fig. 3: Development of Pre-proto Igboid} \]

\[\text{Fig. 4: Development of Pre-proto Igboid} \]

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1. Applies after line (4c)

2. Prefix vowel and root tone not copied from source.
Fig. 5. My schematization of Williamson’s (1973a, b) “Lower Niger” classification, to be contrasted with my Fig. 2 above.

The parenthesized ethnic names are used by Williamson, who recognizes four degrees of lexicostatistic relationship, defined as follows:

Level 4 — “indisputable” separation — all connecting percentages below 70
Level 3 — “not particularly close” — all connecting percentages below 85
Level 2 — “fairly close” separation — some percentages below 85 and some above it
Level 1 — “indisputable” parts of the same language — all connecting percentages above 85
33a. dry up
 deflectate
 clear [forest]
c. day
 b. arrow
 c. mind / heart

Vowel merger
Williamson 1984 shows how an underlying ten vowel system is reduced in various Benue-Kwa languages through merger. Unlike lowering, merger is not constrained by vowel harmony. Cf. also (29b).

34a. time
 orange
c. thing

: a and : e correspondences can be seen between ágbò and ówèrè, while ágbò and ọ́nṣe have e for the first set (34a). In (34c), ágbò, ọ́nṣe and ágúówá ẹ̀ṣa come from e which follows a nasalized continuant. (ágbò has generalized the environment of this rule to any continuant.)

Williamson posits *e > e in noun prefixes, to explain non-harmonizing forms like 'palate' (ọ́nṣe). Examples of prefix *e > e abound, e.g. (35a). Examples of root lowering, as in (35b), are isolated. The prefix raising in ógbẹ̀kọ̀́jẹ́ 'earth' is an innovation, according to Williamson.

Spreading and downstep
Since its origin in two studies of ágbò, autosegmental phonology has endured a conceptual tension between automatic and rule-governed spreading. Williams' (1971) Tone Mapping rule ensures that toneless morphemes receive tonal specifications, but skips over tonal morphemes and melody-final floating tones. Goldsmith's (1976) Well Formedness Condition associates all tones automatically, left-to-right and one-to-one, spreading the melody-final tone onto toneless positions, or linking extra tones onto the final tone-bearing position. Hallé and Vergnaud 1982 remark that the WFC does not exclude rules of tone spreading, so that the tone mapping framework, being thoroughly rule-governed, is mechanically simpler.

Arguments against rule-governed spreading have, by comparison, been few. There are different views of what is at stake in giving up the WFC. Depending on the content attributed to association lines, their manipulation by phonological rules is a more or less significant departure from the original goals of the theory. If association lines simply encode “synchronization” (Hallé and Vergnaud), crucial reference to linking is a straightforward way of stating phonotactic constraints (thus Hayes 1986). But if association lines denote constituency relations, i.e. predictable locality domains, it is inconceivable that they are formally autonomous of the features or elements which they connect.

The status of association lines also has consequences for the Obligatory Contour Principle (Leben 1973). Odén 1986 restricts the OCP to underlying representations, so as not to force identical tones to “collapse into a single tone” across morpheme boundaries. Clark 1989, continuing her 1978 account of tones as “pitch change markers”, eliminates the OCP even in the lexicon, so that the relative pitch of sequential H tones is encoded in the number of underlying identical autosegments. On the other hand, if the OCP holds both in the lexicon and in phrasal phonology,
then association lines reflect independently determined constituency relations. Kaye, Lowenstamm and Vergnaud (1985, 1987) theorize government among syllable constituents (rimes and onsets) and within the segment (heads and operators). In their framework, rules of spreading are not storable; the distribution of surface floating and default elements is constrained by structure preservation, minimality and proper government (Charette 1988, Nikiema 1988, Kaye 1989).

The next section ("Tone and locality") critiques rule-based tone typology. While every logical combination of (H, L) tones spreads automatically in some Benue-Kwa language, tone spreading is nonparametrically parameterized. H-spread excludes total downstep but does not conflict with partial downstep. L-spread excludes partial downstep but is a prerequisite of total downstep. A language with two types of L tone, spreading and non-spread, has both types of downstep. The spreading of both H and L tones contradicts downstep altogether. These implications are understandable if both spreading and downstep are represented in terms of prosodic government by tonal elements, following Bamba’s (1984) claim that downstep is the effect of metrical constituency on the pitch realization of tone elements.

The subsequent section ("Prosodic government") establishes prosodic government domains in two languages which have been analyzed in terms of rule-governed spreading. Prosodic government predicts the tonal effects of syntactic structure, effects which are handled in extant analyses by diacritic tones and association lines. These cases, together with the typology, constitute arguments against rule-governed spreading. A concluding comment ("Typology and the prosodic residue") suggests that M is a default tone which arises after spreading applies, but this says nothing about *T* 1964 western forms of H tone association and falling tone simplification. And the ITAR plus WFC can’t handle *γ* ekoyó, a language in which L tones divide into two classes, respectively spreading and non-spread.

To account for *γ* ekoyó, Clements and Ford 1979 propose another kind of parametrized association, which they dub accestral. Dispensing with a L-spread rule like (39a), they treat the formation of word-final LH contours as a WFC effect, by positing a pre-cyclic tone shift or initial tone association rule (ITAR). In (39b), the first tone links to the star ["] diacritic, and the other linkings follow from the WFC:

\[
\begin{align*}
39a. & \quad \text{H} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{H} \\
39b. & \quad \text{L} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{H} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{L} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{H}
\end{align*}
\]

Maintaining the essence of (39b), Clements’ (1984) account of *γ* ekoyó tone assignment still requires several stipulations, including a highly marked inventory of lexical tone melodies, as well as rules of leftward H tone association and falling tone simplification. And the ITAR plus WFC can’t handle *γ* ekoyó, languages with contour tones which are non-final in a monomorphic association domain.

If spreading-induced contours are not tone association effects, two possibilities remain: they result from language-specific rules, or else they attest inherent properties of those elements which spread, as these properties are licensed by the phonological context. In comparing the alternatives, the relation between spreading and downstep is relevant. John Stewart has provided many rich ideas in this connection.

For Stewart (1965, 1971, 1983) "downstep" describes the lowered phonetic register of a high tone preceded by a low tone. Lowering is cumulative and persists throughout the tone phrase, but is reversed at syntactic pauses. The triggering L need not surface; if it doesn’t, the downstep is "non-automatic." If there is no synchronic evidence for a L tone, downstep is triggered diacritically. L-delinking, which yields non-automatic downstep (marked by a macron), can be expressed by one of the rules in (40). What varies is the direction of assimilation, and the survival vs. elision of the original L-bearing unit:

\[
\begin{align*}
40a. & \quad \text{H} \quad \text{L} \quad \text{H} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{H} \quad \text{L} \quad \text{F} \\
40b. & \quad \text{L} \quad \text{H} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{H} \quad \text{L} \quad \text{F} \\
40c. & \quad \text{H} \quad \text{L} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{H} \quad \text{L} \quad \text{F}
\end{align*}
\]
All the rules in (40) involve two assumptions: a tone automatically delinks from a timing unit which is affected by spreading or elision, and floating tones do not automatically reassociate. In Akan (Schachter and Fromkin 1968), L is delinked either by rightward or by leftward H-spreading (40a, 40b), or by TBU elision (40c). In “central” Igbo, elision is not found, and H-spreading is leftward (3b). Yoruba, Ḟẹọ and western Igbo attest elision (40c) and—in other contexts—non-delinking, rightward H-spreading (41a). Ìgbẹyọ observes that H-spreading is blunted by elision: H does not spread across a floating L tone (41b).

41a. $\begin{array}{c} H \downarrow L \uparrow \rightarrow \ H \downarrow \uparrow \downarrow \end{array}$
b. $\begin{array}{c} H \downarrow L \uparrow \rightarrow \ H \downarrow \uparrow \downarrow \end{array}$

Other combinations of spreading and delinking are more problematic. (41a) flatly contradicts (40a). L-delinking (40a-c) blends L-spreading (39a), but there is a conceivable feeding relationship by which spreading feeds delinking so as to mimic the effect of (40a) and (40c).54 In (42), the “early” application of the L-spreading rule functions as a diacritic for subsequent delinking, i.e. for non-automatic downstep.

42a. $\begin{array}{c} \ H \downarrow L \uparrow \rightarrow \ H \downarrow \uparrow \downarrow \end{array}$
b. $\begin{array}{c} \ H \downarrow L \uparrow \rightarrow \ H \downarrow \uparrow \downarrow \end{array}$

One can exclude the derivations in (42) by stipulating that L-spreading and L-delinking cannot occur in one grammar. However, this is falsified by Yoruba/Yamba and Yoruba, but in an interesting way. In Yoruba, the downstep which results from L-delinking (known in the literature as “the assimilated low tone”) is limited in domain to one syllable: subsequent syllables with the same tonal value as the downstepped tone can exceed its pitch level.55 In Yoruba/Yamba, automatic downstep is perseverative but is not triggered by all surface L tones, and some non-automatic downsteps are total.

The phenomenon of total downstep, found in Yoruba and Yoruba/Yamba, challenges Stewart’s claim that the downstep trigger is always a floating L tone. Total downstep lowers a H tone all the way to the level of a L tone in the same position. A following L tone is lower still. Thus the tonal sequence in (43), where total downstep is marked by a double macron, would have the phonetic interpretation shown.

43. $\begin{array}{c} [H, L, L] \end{array}$

54Rightward L-spreading cannot trigger downstep of the type in (44b).
55Lawiran 1991 provides instrumental descriptions of several highly marked pitch phenomena in the Yoruba terraced-tone system, as compared to systems of the Igbo type.

If an abstract L tone was responsible for total downstep, it would possess properties distinct from both kinds of concrete L tones which are found in Yoruba/Yamba: one kind spreads on a following H without downdrifting it, as in (44a), while the other kind downdrifts a following H tone (by the interval of a partial downstep), but without spreading onto it, as in (44b).56

44a. $\begin{array}{c} [H, L, H] \rightarrow \ [H, L, L] \end{array}$
b. $\begin{array}{c} [H, L, H] \rightarrow \ [H, L, L] \end{array}$

Type (44a), and not (44b), is found in Yoruba; the total downstep trigger in that language is distinct from both. Accordingly, Clements and Ford propose that the trigger for Yoruba total downstep is not floating L but floating “super-L,” a non-surfacing type of low tone. But they do not explain why total downstep is restricted to phrase-level phonology, although partial downstep (in other languages) can occur morpheme-internally. This distributional asymmetry suggests that the triggers of the two downstep types are not formally comparable.

In two instances, Stewart 1965 recognized the arbitrariness of floating L tone as the trigger of partial downstep: lexical downsteps where no alternation occurs, and syntactic downsteps for which no low tonal morpheme is motivated (see also Fromkin 1976). Among generative Bantuists (Voorhoeve et al. 1969; Voorhoeve 1971; Williamson 1970, 1986; Hyman 1972, 1976), the main justification for nonmorphemic floating tones (many of which are diacritic downstep triggers) is historical reconstruction. Notwithstanding Kiparsky’s (1974) caveats, some autosegmentalists imported this abstract notation wholesale. Pulleyblank 1983 treats Hyman and Tadadjeu’s (1976) floating tones like observational data.

To summarize, downsteps of several kinds arise in several distinct tonal and syntactic configurations. It is impossible to account for downstep alone, or the relation between spreading and downstep, across the languages in (38) by means of rules, without using tones or rules diacritically. The remaining possibility is that every instance of spreading and downstep reflects inherent, parametric properties of tone elements, subject to universal prosodic constraints. This alternative premise correctly predicts the co-occurrence of downstep, total and partial, with the full set of possible spreading phenomena, both intra- and cross-linguistically, for the languages in (38).

Spreading and downstep differ with respect to locality. In most languages, the lowering effect of a downstep (whether partial or total) persists over a potentially unbounded phonetic span. The downstep found in Yoruba is local (non-perseverative). Spreading, by definition, is constrained by adjacency on the relevant tier. Stewart 1961 observes that partial downstep is in complementary distribution with the spreading of a low tone onto the domain of a following high tone. This is borne out for the five types in (38), as shown by the fuller typology in (45).

45. Yoruba

| Language | “Central” Igbo | Yoruba/Yamba | Yoruba/Yamba
<table>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>partial downstep</td>
<td>partial downstep</td>
<td>total downstep</td>
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<tr>
<td>H spreads onto L</td>
<td>H spreads onto L</td>
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Some languages that exhibit partial downstep also exhibit total downstep. This is borne out for the five types in (38), as shown by the fuller typology in (45).

56Tadadjeu (1974: 284) et al. reports that L-spread is optional and restricted to utterance final position.
46. Total downstep contradicts H-spreading and requires L-spreading.

47. Perseverative downstep contradicts the joint presence of H-spreading and L-spreading.

48. Perseverative downstep contradicts the joint presence of H-spreading and L-spreading.

To express these in terms of tone rules minimally requires a distinction between tonal and register tiers of tonal autosegments (Manfredi 1979, Huang 1980, Clements 1981, Inkeles et al. 1987):

But the register tone hypothesis only restates the problem at the level of feature geometry: it attributes two nonintersecting sets of properties to identically-named autosegments, depending on which tier they occupy. If (49) represents partial downstep, what prevents the spreading of tonal-L between “tonal feet” (i.e. between register domains)? And how could a representation like (49) account for the two types of tonal-L (spreading and non-spreading) which occur in Yoruba-Yambo?

Alternatively, suppose that tones have a single set of properties, all local and invariant, while long distance, relational phenomena like downstep reflect the interaction of tone and metrical structure (Bamba 1984, 1988). In a kindred vein, Clements and Ford argue that, if the accentual character of ÿkoyò “tone shift” is accepted at face value,

...we would immediately want to take the further step of attributing underlying (or rule-inserted) accent to all lexical tone languages. This is because it would make no sense to argue that Ikoyò had fixed initial accent simply on the basis of the hindgirt afforded by tone shift, while denying fixed accent to such typologically similar tone systems as those of Ewe, Igbò or Akan.

Clements and Ford’s minimality condition: to rule out all L-spreading into a metrical constituent, as in (20a) below.

This government asymmetry between L and H, essential in all downstep systems, is most vivid with total downstep. Total downstep lowers a H tone to the pitch of a L tone. In (51b), this is represented as [H₂: H₂] a [w] melodic position directly dominating H₂. For pitch interpretation, the timing unit bearing H₂ is equivalent to one bearing L. That is, the tonal content of a weak position is metrically “invisible”.  

53.

Compare the process of vowel reduction in “stress” languages (i.e. languages in which metrical structure is a projection of syllable weight): a vowel in weak metrical position gets the phonetic interpretation of a schwa. In contrast, a preceding vowel in strong metrical position projects as a syllable nucleus.  

54.

\begin{align*}
\text{Igbò linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits} & \\
50a. & \\
50b. & \\
50c. & \\
50d. & \\
51a. & \\
51b. & \\
51c. & \\
51d. & \\
52. & \\
53. & \\
\end{align*}
(53) shows that a total downstep is immediately preceded by \([s]\); an empty \([s]\) position. If the \([s]\) position before a total downstep was occupied by a H tone, such as H1 as in (54), a partial downstep (on H2) could immediately follow a total downstep (on H2):

\[
\text{(54)}
\]

But (54) is ill-formed. The interpretation of (54) would require a greater pitch drop between metrical feet than occurs in (51a-b) and (53), making tones function as covert accents. To put the matter more simply: downstep, whether total or partial, is by definition a relationship between adjacent feet, so the relation between H1 and H2 in (54) cannot be downstep of any kind.

In 'pekóyó, all downsteps are total. Clements and Ford (1978, 1979) observe that the surface tone preceding downstep is always H. Their downstep displacement rule (55a) is represented in (55b):

\[
\text{(55a)} \quad [H^1LQ] \circ [H^2L] \\
\text{(55b)} \quad (X_Q = \text{the maximal sequence of } X \text{ elements})
\]

The prosodic change in (55b) is driven by considerations of well-formedness. The left side of (55b), which arises in phrasal contexts, is phonetically uninterpretable. Unless there was a systematic possibility for a “super-low” L in this position (which is not the case), the \([s-L]\) in the second foot would require a zero pitch drop between \(q_1\) and \(q_2\)—otherwise the pitch change between adjacent feet would be diacritically determined by the tones, robbing the metrical hypothesis of content.

(53) suggests that what permits total downstep is a parametric loosening of the bijective mapping between tones and metrical positions found in “pure” partial downstep languages (where H directly projects [s] and \([s]\) is optional). If either H or L can be immediately dominated by either [s] or [w], two new possibilities arise: \([w-L\ldots H\ldots]\) and \([\ldots L\ldots w]\). This would allow two different tone elements to share one (branching) metrical position. The four logical options are given in (56):

\[
\text{(56a)} \quad \text{LH} \\
\text{(56b)} \quad \text{LH} \\
\text{(56c)} \quad \text{LH} \\
\text{(56d)} \quad \text{H L}
\]

\[\text{[s]} \circ \text{[\_]} \] an empty strong position is a marked type of constituent which occurs in a very restricted set of prosodic contexts, cf. below. By contrast, weak positions are optional except phrase-finally, where the notation \([w]\) indicates a weak position which is both obligatory and empty, cf. (57a):

\[
\text{(57a)} \quad \text{LH} \\
\text{(57b)} \quad \text{LH} \\
\text{(57c)} \quad \text{LH} \\
\text{(57d)} \quad \text{H L}
\]

Most of these are independently ruled out. If only [s] can tonally branch, (56c-d) are excluded, which is quite natural given that \([\_]H\) is phonetically identical to L, so that both \([\_]LH\) and \([\_]HL\) would be level in pitch. Two possibilities remain: \([\_]LH\) (=56a) and \([\_]HL\) (=56b). The fact that only (56a) ever occurs is another clue about the relationship of tonal and metrical government.

In 'Yamba, Tadadjeu 1974 and Hyman 1985 observe a contrast between two types of L tone: a phonetically raised L which spreads onto the following H (but doesn’t downshift it), and a non-raised L which induces partial downshift on the following H (but never spreads onto it). Two types of L also contrast in the context “L _ #8#”: one maintains steady pitch while the other drops off. Suppose that in both contexts, the former type of L tone is the left member of a branching [s] as in (57), and the latter is immediately dominated by [w] as in (58).

\[
\text{(58a)} \quad \text{LH} \\
\text{(58b)} \quad \text{LH}
\]

A raised, potentially spreading L tone (= a tonal governor) is immediately dominated by [s], but an [s] position must also contain a H tone, since H is the metrical governor. Because the LH sequence shares the same foot, there is no downshift between them, cf. (57a). A sentence-final L can be directly dominated by [s] if and only if the following weak metrical position is empty, cf. (57b): although H metrically governs \([\_]L_1\ L_2[\_]L_2[\_]L_2\) is nevertheless well-formed because L is metrically stronger than \([s]\). This theorem gives a principled basis to the frequent observation that the \([H-L]\) contrast is neutralized sentence-finally. In the same way, the fact that L-spreading is restricted to utterance-final position in 'Yamba (cf. fn 55 above) seems to depend on the fact that there is no following constituent to be metrically governed by the H tone onto which L spreads. In 'pekóyó, too, LH tone contours are apparently restricted to phrase-final position. The parallel restrictions in the two languages follow from (52).

\[\text{Contra Hyman (1985: 79 fn. 20), I describe the phonetic lowering of an LH sequence in configurations like (64c) as downshift (i.e., automatic downstep), so as to preserve a uniform cross-linguistic representation of phonetically and phonologically identical phenomena. The fact that downshift does not occur after all surface L tones in all languages does not warrant its dismissal as an “old concept”.}\]

\[\text{Voorhoeve’s idea (adopted by Hyman) is that L-dropoff is blocked by a word-final, floating H tone. My analysis in (57b) is not completely different. Condition (60a) below licenses nonbranching [L, ] just in final position, since an L tone is metrically stronger than zero, but a non-final [L, ] must be part of a branching [L, L] constituent. There is, however, an important difference between the two approaches. Voorhoeve’s floating H is totally abstract: it never surfaces.}\]

\[\text{(59)}\]

\[\text{LH} \text{ and } \text{LH} \text{ linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits}\]
There is no evidence, however, that a non-branching [s] can dominate a nonfinal L, as in (59a). There is also no phonetic distinction between two types of HL sequences, corresponding to the prosodically distinct LH sequences in (57-58). Such a distinction would require some HL sequences, but not others, to exhibit spreading. In fact, no H-spreading occurs in Yoruba or Ekofoye, so [s,HL] is excluded, cf. (59b).

The ill-formed representations in (59) have in common a L tone as the rightmost daughter of a [s] node, i.e. nonfinal L immediately preceding a weak position. Such a restriction is reminiscent of the exclusion of “super-heavy” CVVC syllables, in which both rime and nucleus branch (Kaye, Lowenstamm and Vergnaud 1987, Charette 1988). In both cases, a metrical governor is lacking adjacent to a weak position.

Since tonal elements are potentially both tonal and metrical governors, there is an asymmetry in the constraints which hold at the respective levels. While metrical structure is never fully autonomous of submetrical domains, be those projections of tone or syllable weight (or both, for a language like Kishambaa), the correspondence of tonal and metrical domains can be more or less close. The proposal that metrical domains extend the properties of tonal elements as governors and governee resembles the idea that syntactic government domains can be hierarchically extended, providing a unified account of local and long-distance dependencies (Kayne, Lowenstamm and Vergnaud 1987, Charette 1988). In both cases, a metrical governor is lacking adjacent to a weak position.

(61) tone visibility constraint

Tonal government is not possible from a [w] position.

(62) prosodic domain parameter

A [s] position uniquely dominates a tonal governor: [yes, [no]].

In pure partial downstep systems like Igbo and Yoruba, the value for (62) is [yes]. In these systems, there are three formal possibilities for an initial L tone. The first, adjunction under a strong position as in (63a), is ruled out by (62). Instead, as proposed by Bamba (1988), an initial L can adjunction under a weak position, as in (63b). Alternatively, an initial L could belong to a unique foot projected by an initial [s, L] constituent, as in (63c). Initial L tone is phonetically raised in [s, L].

60a. metrical projection theorem

A [s] position immediately dominates a metrical governor.

61. tone visibility constraint

Tonal government is not possible from a [w] position.

62. prosodic domain parameter

A [s] position uniquely dominates a tonal governor: [yes, [no]].

In total downstep systems, tonal and metrical domains are fully distinct: the metrical governor is H and the tonal governor is L. H does not project a strong metrical position: some H tones occur in weak positions, and some L tones occur in strong positions (both initially and non-initially). But total downstep systems still satisfy (60): a nonfinal [s] dominating a L tone must branch to [s, W]. Nonbranching [s] nodes need only contain H just in case the corresponding [w] position is weaker than L, cf. (57b), where [s, L] governs an obligatorily empty, sentence final [w] position. (61) is also respected in total downstep systems: no spreading is possible from a weak metrical position.

The typological array in (45) attests the independently varying parameters in (64), subject to the constraints in (52), (60) and (61).

64a. metrical government parameter

The metrical governor is [H, [L, [L]]].

64b. tonal government parameter

The set of tonal governors is [H, [L], [H, [L]]].

64c. prosodic domain parameter (revised)

Tones freely occupy metrical positions: [yes, [no]].

(64a) determines the basic type of tonal licensing for metrical government domains. The value [H] yields downstep, [L] yields upstep and [Ø] yields neither. (64b) accounts for the fact that local spreading varies cross-linguistically among four logical possibilities. Closely related

65As noted in fn. 63 above, the possibility of both [HL] as metrical strong is probably instantiated in the three-tone system of Verhè (1977), Igbo and Yoruba, but not in Kishambaa (Odden 1986: 364 fn. 11). This systematic difference might correspond to the representational distinction between (63b) and (63c), both of which are well-formed in principle.
languages/dialects differ with respect to (64b), and the learner can determine the setting from the simple, positive evidence of intra-morphemic contour tones.

A “mixed” system such as Y\textsuperscript{mama}\textsuperscript{2}-Yamba, in which only some L tones exhibit spreading, is evidence for the independence of the tonal and metrical parameters. The tonal governor is \(\{L\}\), but tonal government from a weak metrical position is ruled out by (61). Further, as attested by both Y\textsuperscript{mama}\textsuperscript{2}-Yamba and Yokoyo, (52) prevents spreading in a nominal \(\{L\} H\) constituent, so the actual cases of L-tone spreading are a subset of a subset of the total number of L tones: \([\{L\} H\] \(\{w\}^0\]]\).

Stating this in the form of a spreading rule obscures the generalizations which hold for each of the sub-relations on which it is jointly based, and which have independent, highly valued empirical consequences in other contexts.

(64c) restates (62) in a more general fashion, with the markedness value reversed. A yes value for (64c) has three major consequences: H may be dominated by \(\{w\}\), L may be dominated by \([s]\), and \(\{s\}\) may branch. The distinguishing phonetic alternation of a total downstep system, H \(\{s\} L\), in weak positions can also be observed from simple positive evidence. Total downstep intrudes marginally in many partial downstep systems: downstepped \(H\) in final position is phonetically low in \(\{kan\}\)N\textsuperscript{1} \(\{kan\}\) (\(\{kan\}\)N\textsuperscript{1} \(\{kan\}\) (\(\{kan\}\)N\textsuperscript{1} \(\{kan\}\) (Meir et al. 1975)) and \(\{h\}\) (\(\{h\}\) (Manfredi 1979)). The possibility of branching \([s]\) can be induced from the contrast between two kinds of L tone \(\{\{w\} L\}\) which downdrifts but does not spread, and \([\{s\} L\]\) which spreads but does not downdrift. This contrast, supported by two concomitant phonetic cues, is also easily learnable.

A yes value for (64c) licenses total downstep. The fact that an \(\{s\}\) position may branch to \(LH\) implies the separation of tonal and metrical domains. Once the domains are separate, (52) requires the learner to identify a governor for each \(H\). must remain the metrical governor, because all weak positions are phonetically nonhigh. This makes \(L\) the only candidate for tonal governor in a total downstep language.

A no value for (64c) makes a metrical foot a pure projection of \(H\), as in (50a); every \(H\) is linked to \(\{s\}\), and every \(L\) to \(\{w\}\). Nothing requires every \(\{w\}\) to link to a \(L\) tone however, so partial downstep is possible with either yes or no values of (64c), but no excludes total downstep. No is the unmarked value since positive evidence for this setting is less straightforward.

The next section compares prosodic government domains in the associative constructions of a “Semi-Bantu” language and \(\{\text{gho}\}\).

Prosodic government in Y\textsuperscript{mama}\textsuperscript{2}-Yamba and \(\{\text{gho}\}\)

Y\textsuperscript{mama}\textsuperscript{2}-Yamba (“Dschang-Bamiléké”) is discussed by Tadadjeu 1974, Hyman and Tadadjeu 1976, Pulleyblank 1983, Hyman 1985. Their principal data are drawn from the “associative” construction, a complex nominal resembling the Semitic construct state. Although the associative construction is sometimes translated by an English DP like the feather of the/an eagle, restrictions in phrasal expansion and definiteness make it semantically closer to an English nominal compound like angle feather. One difference from a compound is the presence of a morpheme between the two nouns. But unlike a possessive morpheme or other determiner, the associative morpheme does not imply definiteness. In other words, as in the construct state, the dependent noun in an associative construction is not independently referential.

\footnote{This nonreferentiality contrasts with N incorporation as analyzed by Baker 1985, eg. in examples of the general form \(\{l\} \text{book}\_\text{give}\_\text{John that now}\_\text{it}\).}

The associative morpheme is an agreement prefix on the dependent noun, coined with the head. Welmers 1963 reconstructs the associative morphemes of proto Niger-Congo as \(\{\text{gho}\}\_\text{and} \{\text{gge}\}\_\text{gho}\_\text{linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits}\)

The best-understood licensing relation is thematic, as defined in X-bar theory (Chomsky 1981), but it is not obvious that this is the appropriate one. For Boron 1983, the Hebrew construct state is a thematic, phrasal projection (but note that Boron 1987, 1989 cites it as an example of word formation in the syntax). Another possibility is that the licensing projection is not thematic but “functional”.

Responding to some recent proposals by Fassi-Fehri (see 1987), Ritter 1988 analyzes the construct state as a projection of the determiner, essentially as in (65).\footnote{On the categorial identity of possessive morphemes as determiners, cf. Fukui 1986, Abeys 1987.}
assume that an affix governs its subcategorized complement. In this structure, unlike the noun incorporation structures discussed by Baker 1985, the referential index of 'eagle' cannot percolate.

Hyman states that, depending on the agreement class of the head noun, the associative clitic is lexicalized in Yoruba as /L/ or /H/ or /LH/. A propos the underlying form of these morphemes, he astonishingly remarks that “the segmental information is, as far as I have been able to determine, totally irrelevant for the study of tone” (1985: 78, fn. 3). But, just as in Hyman’s (1980) description of the Igbo dialect of Yoruba, this assertion obscures syllable-based generalizations about tone association domains (cf. Manfredi 1983a). Two important observations relate to the segmental form of these morphemes: /L/ always acquires the quality of the preceding vowel (whether or not a consonant intervenes), while the syllabic features of /H/ almost never surface (Hyman 1985: 78, fn. 4, 7). In keeping with the second observation, the two clitics can be represented as in (67).

The floating L in (67) is a morpheme, and as such is leamable, given appropriate alternations. The same cannot be said of the nonmorphemic floating tones posited by Voorhoeve and Hyman (and carried over without argument by Pulleyblank); to these I now turn.

As remarked above, Yoruba shows four distinct surface tone patterns on bisyllabic nouns. (Tadadjeu and Hyman cite them on the segmental base [ληςτι].) The first tone in each pattern is L. Three of the four contrasts are manifested exclusively on the second syllable, in one word, the initial L is predictably raised. Tadadjeu distinguishes the four by postling one morpheme-final, lexical floating tone, justified by appeal to historical reconstructions.

The first observation about this tone quadruplet is that it is only near-minimal, because it is composed of two lexical nouns and two infinitives. The latter are unquestionably bimorphemic, presumably formed by syntactic affixation as in (68).

The lexical nouns may be analyzeable as prefix + root, since there are no high tone-initial nouns.

Applying the metrical representations in (57-58), phonetically motivated as discussed above, it becomes clear that the syntactic and lexical /L/ prefixes differ prosodically:

69a. 'feather'

b. 'navel'

70a. 'to call'

b. 'to reimburse'

The two lexical nouns begin with a metricaly strong position, but the infinitive prefix is weak. The generalization in (71) cannot be translated into a floating tone notation.

71. clitic prosody hypothesis Syntactic affixes are metricaly weak.

Concerning the verb root 'call', Hyman does not indicate underlying tone consistently. At the end of his discussion, he cites the verb with lexical H tone (1985: 64, data 28a), disregarding his initial hypothesis of a final, floating L tone (1985: 48, data 1c). The floating L seems to be needed just to trigger his rules of "L-metathesis" and "H-lowering". In a footnote (1985: 78, fn. 8), he justifies the floating L on morphological grounds, as an independent suffix which is present on a "nominal" infinitive [iLγi]. This form contrasts with a "verbal" infinitive, otherwise identical, that lacks the suffix. The two infinitives select different concord for their complements: Class I Genitive concord is [iL], while the corresponding Accusative concord is [i]. Disregarding the nominalizing suffix, the phrases are as in (72).

72a. 'to call me (Acc.)'

b. 'to call me (Gen.)'

The phonetic output in (72a) is evidently straightforward, with rounding harmony spreading from the verb to its complement. In the output of (72b), the total downstep between L tones, and the spread of L onto the final syllable, must be accounted for. But an associative construction 'bird horn' lacks the L-spread:

73. 'bird horn'

The phonetic discrepancy between (72b) and (73) raises a descriptive problem for Hyman. He posits a final floating L tone equally on both [iLγi] and [iLγi] in the latter case presumably not on morphological grounds. But the two floating L tones do not have consistent phonetic consequences: both cause the preceding H tone to be downstepped (in his account), yet only the former triggers a rising tone on a class I complement. Moreover, he cites no syntactic or semantic difference for the twin types of infinitives.
In the framework developed in the preceding section, the difference between (72b) and (73) is not tonal but prosodic: a spreading L tone must occupy a 4 position. Given the generalization in (71), there is no way to preserve Hyman’s “nominal infinitive” hypothesis. Rather, the phonetic difference reflects a property of the complement. There are a number of possible stories; for the present discussion, nothing much hinges on the choice, once it is clear that the “nominal infinitive” hypothesis does not justify a phonological floating tone suffix on a noun like ‘horn’. The contrast between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ pronouns is widespread in the Benua-Kwa family (cf. Manfredi 1987), and the prosody of the object pronoun in (72b) makes it plausibly a strong metrical constituent. For concreteness, I represent the strong pronoun as a Kase Phrase, headed by an X⁰ category (n.b. not a syntactic affix) which is metrically strong:

74a.  

74b.  

The representations in (74) yield the correct phonetic outputs with two additional assumptions. At the accentual level, the OCP merges [L L H] → [L LH], because the output is a well-formed configuration in this language, and the input is not, cf. (57a, 64c) above. At the timing level, the tonal prefix of the dependent category flops onto the final timing unit of its governing category, causing the already associated H tone to delink, creating total downstep (i.e., [L L]ₜ), cf. (75).

75.  

I claim that the apparent leftward tone flop in (75) is the consequence of bringing the governor into the prosodic domain of its governing category. I portray this process informally as in (76a). Other data exemplify the reassociation in (76b). The two domain changes are not contradictory.

76.  

a. domain allocation  
An unassociated element acquires as its association domain the adjacent timing unit of its governing category.

b. domain expansion  
The association domain of the governing category expands to include one timing unit of the governor.

In the rest of this section, I show that (76) explains the phonetic alternations in the associative construction. The problem is to account for all possible tonal/metrical permutations of the structure in (66), where each noun ranges over the four patterns in (32-33), and the clitic is either of the elements in (67). Of the (4 x 4 x 2 =) 32 possibilities, ‘bird horn’ in (71) is one; I will consider four more. The example ‘rooster song’ combines a bisyllabic head noun of the prosodic shape [L L] with a bisyllabic [L L] dependent noun, linked by the class 7 (ₜ) prefix. Prosodic cliticization (76b) occurs in both cycles; in the outer cycle (40c), the reality of this process is attested not just by tone but by the forced spread of vowel features.

77.  

a.  

b.  

c.  

(77) shows three changes from UR: one on each level of representation, except on the tonal level: there are exactly zero tone rules involved, if ‘tone rule’ means a stipulation that affects the tonal tier. On the metrical level, (77a) shows that the H tone prefix occupies a weak position, in accordance with (71). On the timing level, (77b) and (77c) show the cyclic effects of prosodic cliticization (76b). The claim that this process is prosodically driven is supported by the fact that it is mirrored on the segmental level, by vowel assimilation. This parallelism of tonal and segmental reassociation under syntactic government is not accidental, as would be claimed by separate tone and vowel harmony rules. All other aspects of the representation, notably the tones, remain stable, subject only to the OCP. Phonetic interpretation requires that the three domains in
(78a) are metrically connected. This yields the superstructure in (78b), which is equivalent to the pitch interpretation notated by Hyman as in (78c):

\[ \text{[azsɔbɔ mɔŋj kʊɔʔ]} \]

In (78a), well-formedness (cf. 60b) requires the projection of empty strong positions. Since a \( \{w, L\} \) position directly precedes \( \{w, H\}, \{l, s\} \) position is interpolated between them as in (53), yielding a total downstep in (78b). Empty metrical positions cannot occur in lexical items; their appearance in phrasal contexts is forced by the conjunction of (60) and (61).

The rest of the Tatadjeu-Hyman data follow in the same way. The derivations in (81-83) are evidence for Bamba’s (1984) proposal that the OCP respects prosodic structure. This can be formulated as in (79a), which can be viewed as a special case of (79b):

\[ \text{[ndзаi məsɔŋ, ] ‘thieves’ axe’} \]

(82a) The OCP requires both categorial identity and strict locality (metrical adjacency).

b. Structure-preservation: metrical governors are conserved.

In (81c), two L tones separated by a \( \{w, L\} \) do not trigger the OCP. Identical tones in successive \( \{s\} \) positions are not metrically adjacent, but identical tones in adjacent branches of different feet are: \( \{w, L\}, \{l, s\} \in (81d) \) and \( \{w, H\}, \{l, H\} \in (83d) \). In (82c), \( \{w, H\}, \{w, H\} \) \( \{l, H\} \). (79) wrongly predicts the merger of \( \{w, L\}, \{l, L\} \) in the first cycle of (81). This merger does in fact occur, but only after the docking of \( \{w, L\} \) in (81c). My proposal is (80):

\[ \text{[ala?i mɔmɔb hʊ́] ‘dog, country’} \]

With these assumptions, the remaining derivations yield Hyman’s cited phonetic outputs.
Over the past three decades, most analyses of Igbo attributing some kind of autonomy to tonal representation (Welmers 1963; 1970; Voorhoeve et al. 1968; Williams 1971; Hyman 1975; Goldsmith 1976; Ėbemeje 1978; Clark 1982, 1989; Williamson 1986; J. Shopen 1988) hold that the associative morpheme is a H tone. Two problems remain. First, there has never yet been a non-arbitrary account of the observed tonal effects of this morpheme. This is a matter of predicting a tonal change on either noun, both or neither, depending on their inherent tonality and morphological structure. Second, as is glaringly apparent in a licensing framework like government-binding theory, there is the fundamental question of how the H tone gets there in the first place.

Take the latter problem first. As with the associative construction in Yoruba Yoruba, it is not that the associative morpheme needs to be licensed; rather, this morpheme licenses the dependent noun. The open question is the syntactic category of the associative morpheme. The proposal given in (66) for Igbo Yoruba cannot be maintained for Igbo, because Igbo nounclass morphology is purely vestigial, and the Igbo associative morpheme does not display any agreement alternations—unlike the Yoruba Yoruba associative morpheme, cf. (67). An alternative proposal is given in (84a): the Igbo associative morpheme is a K^0 (Case) element which governs its complement, the dependent noun in a KP (Kase Phrase), cf. Fukui 1986. Recall from (64c) that every H tone in Igbo projects a strong metrical position, so that the syntactic representation of the K^0 morpheme is [_{0}]. The automatic nature of the relationship between H tone and [_{0}] position means that, in a language for which the setting of the parameter in (64c) is [_{0}], there is no informational loss if a morpheme composed of a single H tone element has no metrical structure in the lexicon.

The KP hypothesis is contentful to the extent that it has consequences for the rest of the grammar. In fact, it captures an important syntactic generalization. As pointed out in different ways by Voorhoeve et al. 1968, Williams 1971, and Clark 1981, the noun complement of a perfective verb is also licensed by a H tone morpheme. If Igbo perfective verbs are intransitive (as argued in Chapters 2 and 3 below), then every instance of the H tone morpheme spells out inherent (i.e.}
"genitive) case. Although Williams (1971: 481) explicitly discounts the idea of unifying the two morphemes, this conclusion is forced by Lieber's constraint that homophonous, distinct lexical entries, are possible in a morpheme-based framework just if they share only phonological representation... [and] have neither category, nor semantic representation, nor any argument structure or diacritics in common. (1981: 1799)

The two H tone morphemes share the categorial property of selecting a noun complement, and are both right-branching: this forces the learner to assign them to an identical lexical entry.70

Thematically, there is no difference between the associative constructions of ɪgbọ and ɪgbọ́-ɪgbọ́-Yamba—or, for that matter, with the Semitic construct state (Borer 1987, 1989). The dependent noun has no independent referential value, and the semantic range of the construction accordingly includes idiosyncratic (i.e. lexical) compounds. I propose that the ɪgbọ, inherently nonreferential, inherits the referential index of its governor, so that the "autonomous" ɪ ]-morpheme of Nj by Nj, is mediated by K0.

(84b) in turn differs from (84a) in the referential value of the dependent noun. The most straightforward way to represent this, following Abney 1987, is to say that the complement of K0 is a noun, so that its complement is expected on the right.

Beginning with the associative construction, the tone alternations exhibit phenomena which are closely parallel to those seen in ɪgbọ-ɪgbọ́-Yamba, in particular the effects of prosodic cliticization as in (76). The effects of one or further constraint are notable in the data:

85. metrical projection constraint A metrical constituent must be linked to (a) or (b): a. a timing unit (i.e. via a nonzero tone); b. a zero tone (if the language allows zero tones).

In a partial downstep language like ɪgbọ́, since zero tones are not licensed, cf. (64c), the relevant case is (85a). (85a) is vacuously satisfied by the representation of a purely tonal morpheme in the lexicon, since metrical structure is redundant for such a morpheme and no constituent can be said to exist. In a language such as ɪgbọ́-ɪgbọ́-Yamba, in which tones are freely distributed in metrical positions (subject to independent constraints), (85) also rules out the presence in the lexicon of metrical structure on tonal morphemes composed of a single tone element. It is thus interesting to observe a generalization such as (71), which permits the metrical structure of these elements to be determined post-lexically on a morphological basis in such a language.

Postlexically, (85) affects the association domain of the K0 morpheme. Contrast two examples. In (86), both nouns bear L tone throughout. KP is governed by Nj, and K0 is not governed by Nj, so (76) predicts that the [L H ] morpheme citizes to its left; this in fact occurs, cf. the outer cycle (86c). No tone association is required on the inner cycle (86b): the associative morpheme satisfies (85a) by linking through its [w] position to the already associated initial L tone of Nj.

Now consider an example in which both nouns bear H tone throughout. In (87), cliticization occurs only with

86a. b. c. d.

Note how cliticization is not possible on the initial noun: (87b). In (87c), the Nj tone is covertly realized as a plus tone in the Nj encoding of the initial noun. In (87d), the Nj tone is fully visible in the Nj encoding of the initial noun, but it is marked as a plus tone, since the noun is plural.

In (87d), both nouns bear the same H tone, so the [L H ] morpheme of Nj is governed by Nj, and K0 is governed by Nj. The cross-linguistic difference in assimilation is doubtless related to the difference in syllable structure; there are essentially zero closed syllables in ɪgbọ́.
The absence of downstep between $N_2$ and KP is due to an independent fact about Igbo (and other pure partial downstep languages, which doesn't hold, for example, in Kishambaa, cf. Odden 1982): consecutive words respectively ending and beginning with H tone are not separated by a maximal projection (XP), but which doesn't hold, for example, in Kishambaa, cf. Odden 1982). The alternations in (86-87) are the tonal effects of the associative morpheme, but a number of independent phenomena also occur in associative constructions. Notable among these is a process which Clark 1980 calls “smoothing”. The initial L tone of an LH nominal complement delinks, creating a HH contour, after H, cf. (89). The forms in (90) show that this change is unrelated to the associative morpheme. (90a) shows that no associative morpheme follows an infinitive, or else we would find a downstep before the second syllable of ‘kola’; yet LH smoothing occurs in that context, cf. (90b):

\[
\begin{align*}
89a. & \quad \text{'oil-bean dish'} & \quad \text{éxwú'úgbá} \\
& \quad \text{dish} & \quad \text{K} \\
& \quad \text{of/for oil-bean} & \quad \text{úgbá} \\
89b. & \quad \text{'bag of/for oil-bean'} & \quad \text{úgbá} \\
& \quad \text{bag} & \quad \text{K} \\
& \quad \text{of/for oil-bean} & \quad \text{úgbá}
\end{align*}
\]

Finally, as Williamson succinctly observes, “(the tones of the Specitic construction operate identically with the Associative if an initial H of $N_2$ is replaced by L)” (1986: 188). This replacement follows directly from the representation in (84b) with [wL] occupying the D position, given (85a). To satisfy metrical well-formedness, the L tone must take over the association domain of the initial tone of the dependent noun. (If the dependent noun is L-initial, the effect is vacuous, and the specific form is identical to the associative.)

The “third” monosyllabic tone class in Igbo

A number of dialects attest a third underlying tone class of monosyllabic verbs, in addition to the two tone classes (H and L) found in other dialects and in standard Igbo. Williamson 1981a shows that the lexical membership of the three classes is consistent across Igbo in all those dialects which have them; and in dialects with just two classes, all potential members of the third class belong to the H class. Although three classes can be derived mechanically with floating tones, this would imply at least four logical possibilities, but only three are ever attested. The metrical analysis developed above suggests a more constrained analysis. This replacement follows directly from the representation in (84b) with [wL] occupying the D position, given (85a). To satisfy metrical well-formedness, the L tone must take over the association domain of the initial tone of the dependent noun. (If the dependent noun is L-initial, the effect is vacuous, and the specific form is identical to the associative.)

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The analysis now proceeds. First consider the fact that, in sentence-final position in Млі́шна, a
downstepped H tone is pronounced L. In metrical formalism, such a H tone would be represented as
weak [w H]. Weakened H, while not generally possible in a partial downstep system, is strictly
speaking not ruled out by the parameters in (64). Rather, it is possible only in final contexts;
nominally, it leads to ill-formedness as shown in (54). Nevertheless, the weakening of H in final
position is not found in all partial downstep systems; it can be expressed as a domain condition:

\[ \text{HH} \rightarrow \text{Hw} \]

The first set of forms (91a) shows a two-way split in tonal behavior. In the imperative, formed
with a H tone suffix, the root is pronounced low in both the ‘fall’ and ‘walk’ classes, but high in
the ‘eat’ class. In the indicative, formed with the toneless -\( \text{V} \) suffix, the same split is found.76
Sentence-finally, where the downstepped H in the indicative of the ‘eat’ class is subject to phonetic
lowering, the three classes are pronounced the same.

The second set of forms (91b) shows a different two-way split. Except for the 3sg indicative
negative, the ‘fall’ class has L tone on the root, while in both the ‘walk’ class and the ‘eat’
class the root has H. In the 3sg indicative negative, the expected prefix H tone is displaced onto the
root, and the expected root tone (L for ‘fall’, H for ‘walk’ and ‘eat’) is displaced onto the negative
suffix. As in (91a), a sentence-final downstepped H is phonetically lowered, superficially merging
the three classes in that context.

In the gerund (91c), formed by reduplicating the stem consonant plus a high vowel, the three
classes are phonetically distinct. The tone of the gerund can be described as follows: the root in
(91c) bears the same tone that the root has in (91b), while the high vowel infix of (91c) bears
the same tone that the root has in (91a).77

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position is not found in all partial downstep systems; it can be expressed as a domain condition:

\[ \text{HH} \rightarrow \text{Hw} \]

The above discussion of (92-93) shows that [\( \text{w H} \)] is possible in Млі́шна, in at least one (fairly
restricted) context: [\( \text{w L} \)] and [\( \text{w H} \)], by contrast, are freely available in any partial
downstep system, apart from the parametric occurrence of minor restrictions like (92). The fourth logical
possibility, [\( \text{L L} \)], is ruled out absolutely for all partial downstep systems, including all dialects of
\[ \text{b} \], by the metrical government parameter (64a). Since [\( \text{w H} \)], while marked, is not ruled out in
principle in Млі́шна, one can ask if it arises anywhere else, other than in sentence-final position
after H. Another potential instance of [\( \text{w H} \)] in Млі́шна is the third lexical tone class. The
metrical analysis of the three lexical tone classes follows:
and its use has, however, acquired the force of tradition in Igbo grammar, possibly because the form often translates English -ing.

The literature describes another verbal derivative which is not a free form: the bound verb complement (BVC). This terminology does not challenge the prosodic generalization just stated, however, since the BVC is homophonous with the participle, i.e. the BVC prefix also exhibits tone polarity. Indeed, as remarked in the previous footnote, Nwachukwu 1976a describes the Igbo ‘participle’ as a bound verb. One reason that the participle and the BVC may have received different names in the literature is that they can co-occur in a single predicate, but in a syntactic framework which allows for head movement, the BVC can be thought of as a resumptive lexicalization of the verb trace, cf. §3.1.2.
Accordingly, the tone polarity of the participle prefix can be understood as follows. It has been observed that the so-called participle always complements a finite auxiliary. And in Igbo, a finite auxiliary always appears in the factive form; this fact is important because, in Igbo, an auxiliary verb can have no tonal suffix.\(^99\) And if, by hypothesis, the participle prefix is toneless, this means the root tone of the Aux is always adjacent to the root tone of the participle. Now the Aux syntactically governs its complement, the participle. It would seem reasonable, in this circumstance, to require that the Aux should prosodically govern the root of the participle. It remains to consider how such a requirement might be met, for the three verb classes, to explain why the participle prefix must bear the tone opposite to that of the root.

If the verb root of the participle is \([w L]\), the prefix is \(H\). If the prefix were \(L\), then the OCP would merge the prefix and the root into the domain of a single tone. But this would prevent the Aux from prosodically governing the verb root of the participle, since the participle prefix now shares the prosodic constituent of the root. The only remaining possibility, which guarantees that the participle root has its own prosodic constituent, is that the participle prefix must bear \(H\) tone.

If the verb root of the participle is \([w H]\), the prefix is \(L\). If the prefix were \(H\), it might be \([w H]\) or \([L H]\). If the prefix were \([w H]\), the OCP would merge its tone with that of the root, blocking prosodic government by the Aux as in the preceding paragraph. And if the prefix were \([L H]\), this itself would prosodically govern the root, forming a minimality barrier to government by the Aux. The only remaining possibility, which guarantees that the participle root has its own prosodic constituent, is that the participle prefix must bear \(L\) tone.

If the verb root of the participle is \([H H]\), the prefix is \(L\). If the prefix were \(H\), it might be \([w H]\) or \([L H]\). If the prefix were \([w H]\), the OCP would merge its tone with that of the root, blocking prosodic government by the Aux as before. If the prefix were \([L H]\), the OCP would also merge its tone with that of the root, blocking prosodic government by the Aux. The only remaining possibility, which guarantees that the participle root has its own prosodic constituent, is that the participle prefix must bear \(L\) tone.

The above reasoning is frankly speculative. If it is conceptually flawed, there is a phonological approach available in a system like Clark’s (1989), which employs the mechanism of minimal base parameter. For the remaining forms in (91b), the \(H\) prefix directly licenses the lexical tone of the root, as in these infinitive forms, all of which satisfy (92) without further comment:

\[\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\text{H} & \text{I\textbar} & \text{B} \\
\text{w} & \text{i} & \text{b} \\
\text{b} & \text{d} & \text{b} \\
\text{r} & \text{i} & \text{i} \\
\end{array}\]

Any lexical complement must precede the bound verb complement (BVC) if any. The same restriction holds in \(\text{Shis\textbar}\), and indeed throughout Igbo except in \(\text{Gab}\), where there is no BVC. On the syntax of the BVC, cf. Fodor & Szabolcsi 1975a, 1975b; Watanabe 1983, 1985c; Watanabe 1988a and §3.1.2 below.
The \([s, H]\) can project a higher \([s]\) position, satisfying (100). The well formed lexical bases of the three tone classes are given in (101).

101. bases

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
  & k & e & e \\
  (101) & z & i & i \\
  & r & i & r \\
\end{array}
\]

Prosodic typology

A natural question is how the prosodic typology of Benue-Kwa, as sketched above, relates to other languages. Before Bamba proposed that tone was sensitive to metrical structure, metrical formalism was restricted to the analysis of stress languages. In autosegmental theory, pitch accent languages like Japanese and some Benue-Congo languages were represented by means of accentual diacritics on tone melodies (cf. Haraguchi 1975, Clements and Goldsmith (eds.) 1983).

There is a typological generalization about metrical structure which strongly suggests that Bamba is correct. Informally, “tone languages” seem to have one of two typological properties: either their basic syllable structure is CV (as in the Kwa languages), or their basic word structure is monosyllabic (as in Chinese). In a functional sense, this means that tone languages do not “need” metrical structure to attach to syllabic constituents, either because all syllables have nonbranching rimes (i.e. are monomoraic) as in Kwa, or because all words are prosodically nonbranching (as in Chinese). In all these languages, metrical structure is “available” to attach to tones.

“Stress” languages, on the other hand, have both of the opposite properties: a wide variety of surface syllable types (e.g. CV, CVC, CVV, and possibly others) and polysyllabic words. In all these languages, that is, metrical structure is unavailable to attach to tones. But, as argued by Jhrlt 1984, there is no reason to suppose that “stressed” languages lack tone features. It would be a strange world indeed if some human languages possessed phonological features which were unknown in other human languages. It is more reasonable to suppose that “stress” languages have tone features, but since these features cannot attach to metrical structures, the result is what has been called intonation, i.e. “semantic” control of pitch. Conversely, it would be strange to think that “tone” languages were simply deprived of metrical structure. What would it mean to say that a speaker of a tone language did not “possess” metrical structure as part of her knowledge of language? How about those people who are bilingual in a “tone” language and a “stress” language? Do they keep different sets of phonological features in different parts of their brains?

The alternative to this conceptual nightmare is the position adopted by Kaye, Lowenstamm and Vergnaud (1985, 1987), among others, namely that there is a universal inventory of phonological elements, among which are numbered tones, and a universal “syntax” of these elements, including the principles underlying syllable structure and metrical structure. What differs from one language to another is not the inventory of these elements and principles, but the parameters which govern their interrelationship. Accordingly, I propose the following parameter

\[\gamma\]
and constituent boundary. Since tone projects metrical structure, it is the metrical structure which adjusts. In both phenomena, it is necessary to state a direct relationship between syntax and metrical structure. Something would be lost in attributing prosodic effects like (76) and (88) to the mediation of a special prosodic constituent structure.

In postulating the simultaneous presence of different subtypes of the government relation (phrasal, metrical, tonal, syllabic...), phonology becomes an important source of syntactic information, just as syntax can be seen to motivate phonological processes. This conclusion leads to considerations of lexical domains, just as I was led to study Igbo syntax by my pursuit of an understanding of Igbo tone. Or, as Chief Igbo said of Ichem Odu, Igbo, put it one day in 1977, with the following proverb:

103. "Ijụ asị, o acharụ ọzọ. O aasị ihe o asị na. Kọ ọghọ ọgụ kọọọ, kọ ọghọ ihe!
   "If you see an animal, you take off in hot pursuit. You don't know [in advance] which [animal] you can kill. Whether it is wounded in the leg, you don't know!"

Throughout the 1960's and 70's, the research program of generative grammar was driven by the concept of rule systems. While far from novel (cf. Kiparsky 1979 on Panini), this concept did depart from the classical European idea of grammar as construction and rectio, as well as from the commonsense notion that to know a language is to know its words. But over the past decade, in both syntax and phonology, the generative framework has turned away from rule-based formalism to recover essentials of the classical and commonsense viewpoints.

In the resulting picture of knowledge of language, lexical entries are central in two respects. Argument structure—the array of thematic relations which license underlying phrase structure (d-structure)—is not an autonomous representation. Rather, it reduces to the selectional and predicational content of lexical categories (V, P, A, N). Syntactic type ('basic word order') is further determined at the surface (s-structure) by functional categories (I, C, K, D).

Chapter 3 is concerned with the interaction of lexical and functional categories. This chapter considers the contribution of lexical categories to d-structure type.

From transformations and constraints to principles and parameters

For Chomsky 1965, the "syntactic base" or phrase structure component of a grammar consisted of rules establishing language-particular relationships of selection, constituency and ordering among a universal set of categories (1) and lexical features (2).

1. (Sentence, Noun Phrase, Auxiliary, Predicate Phrase, Verb Phrase, Prepositional Phrase, Noun, Verb, Preposition, Modal, Determiner, Adverbial, Adjective...)

2a. N(noun)  →  {±Common, Abstract, Animate, Human, Count, Definite...}

2b. V(verb)  →  {±Progressive, Transitive, Abstract Subject, Animate Object...}

The output of the base in a given language—its set of deep structures—is an autonomous representation. Rather, it reduces to the selectional and predicational content of lexical categories (V, P, A, N). Syntactic type ('basic word order') is further determined at the surface (s-structure) by functional categories (I, C, K, D).

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Note as before in two articles a and b, the whole construction of the Latins was contained; so their whole rectio is by prepositions nearhand declared.

Ben Jonson, English Grammar 1636

2Lexical domains

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French has grammatical examples equivalent to (5b), e.g. (from Kayne 1975: 335, 112):

(3) anachronistically frames observations by Ross 1967 in the X-bar schema of Abney 1987.

Unlike [\[\], the Left Branch Condition. On the DP analysis, assuming a directional version of bounding theory structural description of a rule, and achieve the same effect by appealing to independent principles change. The modular framework aims to eliminate construction-specific information from the environment (s-structure).

6. You saw [\[\] who see-Asp car 3sg time people state seize-Asp 3sg BE-rel car] forms the left branch of the right-branching phrase [\[\]]. From this structure, which Ross calls a syntactic "island", constituent extraction is evidently blocked.

There are two indications that a locality constraint is behind the ungrammaticality of (5), rather than some inherent problem with forming s-questions from non-PPs. Grammatical (4b) minimally differs from ungrammatical (5b) in the "pied-piping" of car along with whose. Stressed, in situ s-questions exist for for either [\[\], car], or [\[\], car], with no perceptible difference in grammaticality:

\[\[\] who see-Asp car 3sg time people state seize-Asp 3sg BE-rel car\]

Ross 1967 dubbed the restriction in (5) the Left Branch Condition. The possessive determiner [\[\]] forms the left branch of the right-branching phrase [\[\]]. From this structure, which Ross calls a syntactic "island", constituent extraction is evidently blocked.

Transformational rules are formulated in two parts: structural description and structural change. The modular framework aims to eliminate construction-specific information from the structural description of a rule, and achieve the same effect by appealing to independent principles of wellformedness. Thus, one can abstract away from the structural description in constraints like the Left Branch Condition. On the DP analysis, assuming a directional version of bounding theory such as Kayne’s (1985) connectedness condition or Koster’s (1986a) global harmony condition, the phenomena in (5) are accounted for as Subjacency violations.


5French has grammatical examples equivalent to (5b), e.g. (from Kayne 1975: 335, 132):

i. De qui as-tu fait disparaitre la voiture?
   - "Whose car did you make disappear?"
ii. Voilà la fille dont je connaissais le père.
   - "There’s the girl whose father I know"

The [\[\]] equivalent of (5c), with a reflexive pronoun at the extraction site, is grammatical:

\[\[\] who Comp 2sg see-Aug car 3sg time people state seize-Aug BE-rel car\]

Literally: "Who did you see his/her car, when government people seized it, the car?"

Unlike [\[\]] and [\[\]], English has in situ s-questions only with special constituent focus as in echo questions. This is probably related to the fact that English signals focus by extra word-stress.

\[\[\] who see-Asp car 3sg time people state seize-Asp 3sg BE-rel car\]

Another parametric, s-structure phenomenon is binding: the licensing of referential dependencies (Reinhart 1983, 1986; Bouchard 1984; Koster 1986a). Although it interacts with agreement and Case (and ultimately with informational constraints of discourse, cf. Kuno 1987), binding also depends on thematic information, since what is anaphoric about arguments is their interpreted thematic content (Williams 1988, Bouchard 1988). One way to understand this is to reduce binding parameters to differences in the inventory of nonreferential lexical items (pronouns, reflexives...), whether these have the form of phrases (XPs), or of clitics (X′ affixes), cf. Vikner 1985, Evers 1986, Pica 1987, Yang 1988.

Cross-linguistic differences also affect underlying phrase structure. In licensing null argument positions, Chinese is systematically more permissive than Romance, Germanic and Semitic (cf. Huang 1982, Whitman 1987). The universal status of some phrase structure constituents (and consequent "subject-object asymmetries") has been called into question by “free word order” languages like Warlpiri, Japanese and Navajo (cf. Hale 1983, Saito 1985, Fukui 1986, Speas 1989). Neither phenomenon can be accounted for by s-structure parameters. And since, by hypothesis, d-structure is a “direct representation of GF-φ” (Chomsky 1981: 43), there are conceptual problems with parametrized phrase structure. To achieve a “typology of the base” that accommodates the range of configurational differences in natural language, Hale (1980, 1983) has argued that phrase structure parameters originate in the lexicon.

Other kinds of parameters have been proposed. As already noted, the derivational approach postulates multiple levels in the grammar, each with a cluster of specific properties, and linked in a general "architecture" by specific blocs of rules. In addition to d-structure and s-structure, a number of levels have theoretical currency. These include Logical Form (May 1977, Huang 1981, Pesetsky 1982), NP-structure (Riemsdijk and Williams 1985, Williams 1986) and Phonetic Form (the "surface structure" of Marantz 1986). While multilevel architecture has enjoyed the status of the null hypothesis, Koster 1986a argues that one need not appeal to multiple levels (and their
parameters) since their properties (quantifier scope, reconstruction, rebracketing) are all available at s-structure. As I will show in the rest of this chapter, the standard account of predicate argument structure is subject to the same criticism.

Origins of thematic structure

Lexical conceptual structure is “a representation of those aspects of the meaning of a lexical item which characterize a native speaker’s knowledge of its argument structure and determine the syntactic expression of its arguments” (Levin 1985: 4). It treats the meanings of individual words as the interface between linguistic knowledge and cognition in the broadest sense.8

In orthodox theory of the past three decades, lexical semantics has led a submerged—even underground—existence (cf. Newmeyer 1980, Goldsmith ms.). Most recently, in keeping with the derivational heritage, lexical semantics has been viewed, not as a deep source of explanation for syntax, but as yet another autonomous level of representation: predicate argument structure (Stowell 1983, Williams 1981, Marantz 1984,Carrier 1985, Zubizarreta 1987, Grimshaw 1989). The constituent elements of this structure are thematic grids (θ-grids) of argument roles drawn from an ordered list (“thematic hierarchy”). A derivational concept of argument structure is shared by unorthodox generative theories, including Relational Grammar (Perlmutter 1978) and Lexical-functional Grammar (Bresnan ed. 1982). Jackendoff 1983 takes a modified representational approach for lexical entries. This section argues for a fully representational (and non-psychological) approach.

θ-roles account for syntactic relationships between two sorts of categories: θ-assigners i.e. predicates (probably all the lexical categories V, P, A, N), and arguments (typically nouns and clauses). A given θ-assigner may license several alternative θ-grids. For example, English give may license two object-like NP arguments (7a), or else one direct object plus one prepositional (“indirect”) object (7b). Either object may appear as the subject of the passive verb be given (8a-b). But the other possible constituent orders are ill-formed, cf. (9).

7a. Anne gave [a book] [to Lucienne].
   b. Anne gave [a book] [to Lucienne].
8a. [A book] was given [to Lucienne].
   b. [To] Lucienne was given [a book].
9a. *Anne gave [a book] [Lucienne].
   b. *[A book] was given [Lucienne].

To account for these facts, it is conceivable to derive one θ-grid from another, but this raises the problem of learnability. To the extent that rule systems are arbitrary, they must be learned, but language acquisition is not explicable in terms of rules (Wexler and Culicover 1983, Roemer and Williams eds. 1987). Alternatively, if θ-roles derive from lexical conceptual structure, then it might suffice to learn the meaning of words to know the θ-grids in which they can enter. English give seems to have two θ-grids. Instead of deriving one from the other, both might derive from a ‘common origin’ in the conceptual structure) of give. This hypothesis resolves some difficulties in argument structure accounts of double object constructions.

9As is well known but little understood, (9b) is grammatical for many British and Canadian speakers, some of whom also accept (9a) if both objects are pronounal: Anne give it her.

It has been observed that present and donate differ from give in failing to license a double object construction (10), although like give, they both license a prepositional dative, cf. (11).

10a. *Casey presented [to the Contras] [drug money].
   b. *Reagan donated [to the homeless] [his jellybeans].
11a. *Casey presented [to drug money] [to the Contras].
   b. Reagan donated [to his jellybeans] [to the homeless].

Further, present differs from both donate and give in licensing a with-construction:

12a. Casey presented [to the Contras] [to drug money].
   b. *Reagan donated [to the homeless] [to with jellybeans].
   c. *Anne gave [to Lucienne] [to with a book].

The argument structure approach assumes that, in a polyadic predicate, the verb θ-marks both “direct” and “indirect” arguments—the latter by means of a preposition which comes in for Case reasons. But it is not easy to see how this analysis could capture the thematic similarity between the two instances of triadic presént in (11a) and (12a), while explaining the syntactic difference between prepositional donate in (11b) and double-object donate in (12b). To claim that with is a semantically empty Case-assigner when it appears in construction with present, but that the same possibility is not available for donate, is to use θ-roles diacritically. Since some instances of with are unarguably thematic, the only alternative is to suppose that, in both (11) and (12), the prepositions are autonomous θ-assigners. I purport this idea.

The with-construction in (12) is reminiscent of one variant of the “locative alternation” for verbs like spray and load (Fillmore 1968, Carter 1984, Rappaport and Levin 1985):

13a. Anne sprayed [to the wall] [with paint].
   b. Anne loaded [onto the truck] [with hay].

The observation is that the with variants in (13a) imply a ‘totally affected’ object (every part of the wall was painted, the wagon was full), but that the locative variants in (13b) do not. Following Verkuyl 1972, Tenny 1987 shows that total affectedness is not primarily a property of arguments (the wall, the wagon) but rather a property of events (of paint-spraying, hay-loading). An event is “delimited” if the direct object is totally affected.

If delimitedness is also relevant for predicates like present—i.e. if (12a) but not (11a) entails that all the Contras were paid off—then the failure of donate to license a with variant (12b) might follow from the meaning of donate. This supposition is plausible, if one compares the entries of the three verbs in the Oxford English Dictionary. In (14), I reproduce the first OED definition (slightly abridged) for each. Donate in (14a) has just one internal argument, the thing given, while presént in (14b) has two, the thing given and the recipient. Both verbs contrast with give in (14c), which the OED interprets as inherently delimited (or “totally affecting”, in Tenny’s definition).

14a. present “to bring [something/someone] into the presence of [someone]”
   b. donate “to make a donation or gift of [something]”
   c. give “to make [someone] the recipient of [something]”

The second OED entry for donate cites an equivalent example from 1862:

i. Soldiers returning from the Mexican wars were donated with warrants for land.
Assuming (14), the only way for *donate* to take an indirect object as in (11b) is combined with a preposition. The requirement of semantic compatibility between the verb and the preposition does not reduce the preposition to a mere extension of the verb, as claimed by Stowell 1981. The definition of *donate* in (14b) makes no mention of a recipient, yet there is a recipient in (11b). This recipient is therefore uniquely projected by the preposition *to*. To is an autonomous θ-assigner.

(14) has other consequences. Unlike *present* and *give*, the meaning of *donate* does not include a locative directional component, so we expect *donate* to be compatible with a wider range of Goal-taking prepositions than either *present* or *give*. This is confirmed by the ability of *donate*, but not *present* or *give*, to combine directly with a benefactive preposition such as *for*:

15a. Reagan donated [to his jellybeans] [to the homeless].
15b. *Casey presented [to drug money] [to the Contras].
15c. Casey gave [to drug money] [to the Contras].

The empirical claim in (15) concerns semantic composition. (15b-c) are marginal insofar as the 

\( θ \)-assigners example

\begin{align*}
\text{present} & \quad + & \text{with} & \quad (12a) \\
\text{donate} & \quad + & \text{to} & \quad (11a)
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{give} & \quad + & \text{to, for} & \quad (11b, 15a) \\
\text{with} & \quad + & \text{to} & \quad (7a)
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{for} & \quad + & \text{to} & \quad (7b)
\end{align*}

In (18), verbs are annotated for compatible θ-assigners, while prepositions are not. Since the annotations stand for inherent semantic properties, this amounts to the plausible idea that verbs are semantically richer than prepositions. A given verb is θ-compatible with a relatively small number of prepositions, compared to the number of verbs with which a given preposition is θ-compatible. In other words, verbs semantically select prepositions.

Now observe that the choice of internal argument for each verb in (18) follows from the choice of semantically compatible preposition. If a verb is annotated for either *to* or *for*, it licenses a Theme; if *with*, it licenses a Goal. Therefore, (18) can be restated more simply:

19. internal argument compatible θ-assigners

\begin{align*}
\text{present} & \quad + & \text{to, with} & \quad \text{Goal} \\
\text{donate} & \quad + & \text{to, for} & \quad \text{Goal} \\
\text{give} & \quad + & \text{with} & \quad \text{Theme} \\
\text{for} & \quad + & \text{to} & \quad \text{Goal} \\
\text{with} & \quad + & \text{to} & \quad \text{Goal}
\end{align*}

Marantz 1984 suggests that at least some specific θ-role names be dispensed with, given appropriate semantic information about the θ-assigner. Suppose that prepositions lexically distinguish Theme and Goal arguments by semantic selection, so that there is no need to label the internal argument position of these categories. Then, unpredictable information about argument structure reduces to the presence or absence of a lexically unsaturated (i.e. open) internal argument position, in the meaning of a word. Since all the words in (19) are transitive, they all have a lexically open internal argument. This reduces (19) to (20):

20. open internal argument compatible θ-assigners

\begin{align*}
\text{present} & \quad + & \text{to, with} & \quad \text{Goal} \\
\text{donate} & \quad + & \text{to, for} & \quad \text{Goal} \\
\text{give} & \quad + & \text{with} & \quad \text{Goal} \\
\text{for} & \quad + & \text{to} & \quad \text{Goal} \\
\text{with} & \quad + & \text{to} & \quad \text{Goal}
\end{align*}

(20) claims that the properties which distinguish the syntactic behavior of the three verbs reduce to semantic selection. Argument structure—in the sense of θ-role labels—adds nothing to this account, so long as prepositions are treated as autonomous θ-assigners.
Following Fischer 1971, Hale and Keyser 1986 propose that syntactically inert "lexical constants" may fill argument positions. In all the examples they consider, a lexical constant has the effect of reducing syntactic valency: e.g. intransitive *eat* derives from transitive *eat* by the presence of the lexical constant FOOD. The definitions in (14) suggest that the conceptual representations of *present* and *donate* contain, as lexical constants, the derivationally related nominals DONATION and PRESENCE. These constants differ in autonomy with respect to their related verbs. Both *present* and *presence* derive from the verb (be) *present*. *Donate* has one internal argument, and does not inherit a second. Since *give* like *present* exhibits a transitivity alternation, it plausibly also has two internal arguments. But *give* also resembles *donate*, in being ineligible for inheritance (in this case because *give*, being uninflected, has no lexical constant).

Finally, all three definitions in (14) share the approximate semantic property of causation. I represent lexical causation with an embedding predicate *effect*, rather than with the semantic operator CAUSE. An abstract CAUSE element figures in lexical decomposition analyses, e.g. McCawley (1968), Jackendoff (1983). Hale and Keyser (1986, 1987) argue that the affixation of CAUSE, a lexical head that selects a proposition (= a predicate plus its external argument), unifies an abstract CAUSE element. An abstract CAUSE element figures in lexical decomposition analyses, e.g. represent lexical causation with an embedding predicate *effect*. Following Fischer 1971, Hale and Keyser 1986 propose that syntactically inert "lexical constants" may fill argument positions. In all the examples they consider, a lexical constant has the effect of reducing syntactic valency: e.g. intransitive *eat* derives from transitive *eat* by the presence of the lexical constant FOOD. The definitions in (14) suggest that the conceptual representations of *present* and *donate* contain, as lexical constants, the derivationally related nominals DONATION and PRESENCE. These constants differ in autonomy with respect to their related verbs. Both *present* and *presence* derive from the verb (be) *present*. *Donate* has one internal argument, and does not inherit a second. Since *give* like *present* exhibits a transitivity alternation, it plausibly also has two internal arguments. But *give* also resembles *donate*, in being ineligible for inheritance (in this case because *give*, being uninflected, has no lexical constant).

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If prepositions have predicational structure as in (22), then selectional annotations between verbs and prepositions can be eliminated. In the proverbial “best” theory, all predicates (including prepositions as well as verbs) combine freely, and syntactically open positions in predicates combine freely with arguments, unless blocked by semantic selection.

Finally, reconsider the transitivity alternations in (7-16). Both give and present (but not donate) license either of two linear orders, which are expressed in terms of θ-rules as ThemeGoal and GoalTheme. Since it should not be an accident that just these verbs, but not donate, contain two internal argument positions, as represented by the variables in (21).

Tenny argues that the surface order of polyadic predicates has an aspectual basis. The delimiting (totally affected) argument is projected as the complement of the verb. The remaining internal argument is licensed either directly (for give with the order GoalTheme) or by a semantically compatible preposition (for give with the order ThemeGoal, and for present with either order). Thus, transitivity reduces to selection plus aspectual properties.

If, as the above suggests, there are no language-particular rules of grammatical relation changing, then comparable differences of transitivity among individual predicates will be found both intra-linguistically and cross-linguistically. An approach grounded in lexical conceptual structure must explain both in a unified way. In fact, such a result is both desirable and possible, as both intra-linguistically and cross-linguistically. An approach grounded in lexical conceptual properties either order). Thus, transitivity reduces to selection plus aspectual properties.

Like English present and donate, Yoruba ñin and bẹ̀m (usually glossed as ‘give’ and ‘present’, respectively), fail to license a double object (23a). Like all three English verbs in (21), neither ñin nor bẹ̀m forms an anticausative or a middle (23b).

Like English complex expression present with (cf. 12), ñin and bẹ̀m both license a Goal argument directly, and a Theme argument indirectly, as the complement of ni:13

Because a serializing language, Yoruba is evidently freer than English to combine multiple θ-assigners in a single, complex predicate. ñin and bẹ̀m can appear either as the initial verb in a kind of “anti-dative” (24), or as the second verb in an instrumental dative (25).

As a serializing language, Yoruba is evidently freer than English to combine multiple θ-assigners in a single, complex predicate. ñin and bẹ̀m can appear either as the initial verb in a kind of “anti-dative” (24), or as the second verb in an instrumental dative (25).

Next, consider a few ìgbò predicates. Ìgbò, the closest ìgbò equivalent to English give, is syntactically the mirror image of English donate: it licenses a double object construction (26a), but not a dative construction (26b) (regardless of what material intervenes between Theme and Goal). Also like donate, ìgbò can occur dyadically, as in (26c-d).

13Obýí àgbé (1989a, 1990) analyzes ni in (24) as a marker of “antifocus”, and not as the verb ‘have’. I regard ni here as a lite verb ‘have’ whose internal argument is “transferred” (in the terminology of Grimshaw and Moort 1988) to the governing verb, cf. §2.1.4 below.
I propose the following lexical representations:

\begin{align*}
\text{\textit{Affect x (x = ADDRESSEE) [come to HEAR y]}} \\
\text{\textit{Give x (x = POSSESSUM) money}} \\
\text{\textit{Give x (x = MONEY) to y}} \\
\text{\textit{Give x (x = MONEY) to y [in return]}} \\
\text{\textit{Give x (x = MONEY) with y}} \\
\end{align*}

17 Similar cross-linguistic puzzles of "lexicalization" are discussed by Talmy (1985).
domain-independent relation which underlies the dependencies of binding (c-command), bounding (subjacency) and predication (Williams’ “c-subjacency”). By Koster’s (1986a) Thesis of Radical Autonomy, all language-particular factors which extend or restrict these syntactic domains are accidental properties of lexical categories, at the root of such syntactic effects as connectedness, opacity, L-marking. Koster rejects Chomsky’s assumption that syntactic knowledge resides in the biology or psychology of individuals, in the form of a parametrized Universal Grammar (UG):

> [T]here are no human minds disjunct from the public record. [Specifically, …] there is no reason to assume that the structures of the initial state are preinterpreted for language. Language only results from the application of the structures in question to meaningful elements of the public record. (1986a: 3, 6)

One putative UG parameter is the direction of a word’s government. A language is said to be either “head-final” or “head-initial”, i.e. (lexical) categories govern either to the right or left, cf. Kayne (1984), Koopman (1984), Travis (1984) (following Greenberg’s universals). Koster denies this: A language does not have a canonical government configuration. In some languages, like Japanese, the direction of government of the various lexical heads is uniform, while in other languages, like Dutch, some lexical heads govern in one direction and others govern in the opposite direction. (1986a: 173)

If this critique goes through, then—abstracting from the domain-independent configurational matrix—there is nothing for UG parameters to account for. Grammar reduces to domain-specific information in the public record, i.e. to the lexicon. But the lexicon stores more than grammar.

The boundaries of linguistic knowledge in lexical entries

The union of lexical semantics and morpheme-based syntactic typology constitutes “knowledge of language” in the sense of Chomsky (1986b). But such knowledge does not exhaust the content of lexical entries. As Koster (1986b) observes, any lexical compilation, as a sample of “non-personal, supra-individual external memory”, necessarily includes much cultural (encyclopedic) knowledge. If the syntax of a word may be largely determined by the content of its lexical entry, one can still ask: what portion of the entry is syntactically relevant, what else is there in the entry, and do these two-sub-entries interact? Or, how distinct is the acquisition of linguistic knowledge from the learning of other cultural information?

For functional categories (word classes without thematic content), the syntactically relevant portion of the lexical entry is exhaustive. The cultural storehouses are the thematic word classes V and N. Two examples. U. S. citizens in the late 20th century command an ever expanding repertoire of predicates which paraphrase “kill” (stritch, blow away, bump off, chill, collaterally damage, duel, hit, ice, liquidate, off, send to Kingdom Come, smoke, snuff, take out, terminate, waste, whack…). An upwardly mobile subclass of this same citizenry is defined, and define themselves, by possession of more esoteric knowledge, comprising of commodity names with desirable status connotations (e.g. Szwatch™ is a desired type of Swiss watch, Cuisinart™ is a desired type of French blender, Corona™ is a type of Mexican beer, Infiniti™ is a desired type of Japanese car…).

In short, the heart of the “language and culture” problem is the relationship between thematic and encyclopedic knowledge. The strongest claim, which essentially restates the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, is that the two are identical. For a grammarian who posits predicate argument structure, this has the daunting consequence that the list of θ-roles is limited by context. There is some support for this view: the major systematic attempt to set an upper limit on the list of semantic roles (Otterby 1979) stopped counting after 48. On the other hand, individuals differ in the possession of some encyclopedic knowledge. Does knowledge of physics or fishing affect a person’s grammar? Probably not. Perhaps then, as argued by Hale (1986), there is a universal distinction between “philosophy” and lexico-syntactic. But even so, if the two interact, there may be systematic consequences for either one, or for both.

Chapter 4 presents some cultural content of the Igbo lexicon, much of which was politicized over the past century by missionaries and governments, during the introduction of literacy, the “standardization” of Igbo, and the promotion of linguistic separation on the Igboid periphery. In other words, language policy was an effective vehicle for cultural aggression and social control. These impacts, which underlie the ethnic facts itself, can be explained if linguistic resources like lexical-semantic representations are analyzed as a subset of cultural knowledge.


2.1 Polyadicity and incorporation in Benue-Kwa

The Benue-Kwa linguistic continuum extends across southern, eastern and central Africa (the Benue-Congo portion), through southern Nigeria to south-central Côte d’Ivoire (the Kwa portion). Until the classification of Greenberg (1963: 8) is superseded, the Kru languages form part of this continuum, extending its western edge into Liberia. Since Christaller (1875: 69-73), no phenomenon of the Kwa languages has been more studied than serial constructions. Serial constructions provide evidence for the role of lexical representations in syntax.

A parametric typology of Benue-Kwa serial constructions reveals some mistaken assumptions in the literature. Intensive studies of individual languages often take accidental correlates of the construction type as fundamental properties. Large-scale surveys have tended to underanalyze verb morphology, relying on loose translations for structural hints.

Many analyses assume that “true” serial constructions must refer to a single event. Restating this in terms of morphology, they claim that only one verb per serial construction can bear inflection. Yet, Yoruba counterexamples the first point, and Igbo the second, as described below in §2.1.4 and §2.1.5. It is also widely assumed that, in a given language, a particular semantic relation can be expressed either by a serial construction, or by a V-V compound, but not by both (cf. Lord 1977). Again, counterexamples are found in Yoruba: the “splitting verbs” which are lexical compounds but which have the surface form of serial constructions.

Such contradictions tell against the claim that there is a monolithic serialization parameter, as made (most recently) by Baker (1988c, 1989a). Rather, the language-particular range of serial constructions reflects the interaction of independent properties, including thematic and categorical patterns in the lexicon, and the inventory of inflectional morphemes. Because any construction must satisfy the full range of licensing conditions, it is actually surprising if a particular subset correlates consistently across languages.  

10For formal semantics like Montague and his followers, the standard approach is to append “philosophy” (i.e. logico-semiotic interpretive models à la Frege, Tarski and Quine) to syntactic categories. This locates conceptual structure “after” syntax; for a critique, cf. Bach 1986.
My general claim is closely modeled on that of Awaýałe’s 1988 serial constructions are freely-formed V-bar adjunctions, constrained by lexical-semantic properties of the individual verbs, and by morphological requirements of surface syntax. In addition, the compositionality of phrase structure requires that lexical properties satisfy a more general constraint if an event is referred to, then the category denoting that event is the head of the adjunction structure as a whole. It follows that, depending on the choice of predicates, both subject-sharing and object-sharing effects are possible in serial constructions, as alternatives or as compatible effects. Contra Baker 1989, object sharing is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for verb serialization.

A useful spin-off of the above claim is a highly constrained, modular analysis of V-V compounds in Ĭgbọ. Specifically, V-V compounding alters the surface shape of otherwise well-formed serial constructions according to the general principle of head-movement: the ECP. If the first verb of a V-V compound denotes the event, this implies (in Awaýałe’s phrase structure) that it governs the underlying position of the second verb. V-V compounding in Yorùbá and N-V compounding in both languages, has a different type of licensing; they are possible just if the second element of the compound spells out a lexical constant in conceptual structure.

On the general hypothesis of this chapter, the locus of parametric variation between Ĭgbọ and Yorùbá with respect to serialization and compounding cannot be phrase structure. Rather, two sources of variation are open in principle: the content of lexical categories, and the inventory of functional categories. In fact, both are at play. As a practical matter, this chapter is mainly concerned with lexical categories; however, some discussion of functional categories is inevitable at various points, anticipating (and duplicating) fuller discussions in Chapter 3.

### 2.1.1 The tension between thematic structure and Case

If adjacent languages vary the configuration of polyadic predicates, two modules of grammar are potential sources for this: θ-theory (or conceptual structure) and Case-theory. In many ways, Ĭgbọ occupies the typological center of Benue-Kwa, and the explanatory tension between these two modules is key to its analysis. Both V-V compounding (31) and verb serialization (32) are productive in Ĭgbọ. The phenomena co-occur in (32b).

1. **Verb serialization**
   - "Adha beat Eze to death" OR: "Beat Eze severely"
   - "Adha fueled the car (with petrol)"
2. **V-V compounding**
   - "Adha peeled yams with (i.e. while holding) a kitchen knife"
   - "Adha cut down the tree with (i.e. while holding) a machete"

### 2.1.2 Case theory

In many languages, incorporated lexical heads are affixes, while in Ĭgbọ they may be either affixes or full verbs (Lord 1985). By Baker’s hypothesis, incorporation entails lexical properties satisfy a more general constraint if an event is referred to, then the category denoting that event is the head of the adjunction structure as a whole. It follows that, depending on the choice of predicates, both subject-sharing and object-sharing effects are possible in serial constructions, as alternatives or as compatible effects. Contra Baker 1989, object sharing is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for verb serialization.
This restriction fails in Yerubá (35a) is grammatical, even though je 'eat' cannot anticausativize:

38. *Yeľő ye jem
   hand eat pounded yam

Baker 1989b stipulates this difference by stating that structural Case assignment is obligatory
in V-V, optional in Yerubá. The failure of the V-V verb hš 'kill' in (37a) to license a single-event serial
construction is then explained by the fact that, unlike so 'hit', hš cannot be anticausative (i.e. cannot
'retract' its structural Case in accordance with Burzio's generalization), cf. (37b) vs. (36b). And it is
semantically plausible that a verb that means 'kill' is inherently causative, so its
hypothetical anticausative version would be nonsense. But the same consideration does not apply
to a verb meaning 'hit'. The object of 'kill' is necessarily affected, but the object of 'hit' is not.

Baker's Case parameter can be extended to یگبو. If every transitive یگبو verb assigns both
an obligatory structural Case and an optional inherent Case (Nwokocha 1987c), then two transitive
verbs can form a syntactic compound under two scenarios:23

39. Two یگبو verbs form a (syntactic) V-V compound if either (a) or (b):
   a. The 'direct argument' of both verbs is the same (as in 31a).
   b. i. The underlying 'direct argument' of V₁ gets Inherent Case from V₂, as in 31b, and
      ii. the V₂ can undergo "ergative Case retraction".

Concerning (39b-i), the ability of the ergative verb ی 'fill/be full' to optionally assign
inherent Case is independently shown by (40b):

40a. Ṁeše-uru (نم یی)
    'The car (i.e. the tank) is full (of fuel)'
   car fill-0Asp Prep petrol

b. Ṁeše-uru (نم مذبح)
    'The car (i.e. the seating) is full (of passengers)'
   car fill-0Asp Prep human being.

Now consider the two verbs in an example of یگبو serialization, (32a) above. The second verb
does not undergo the ergative alternation:

41. یکت ایا (بی فلا )
    yam peel-0Asp Prep knife kitchen-Gen

Therefore the formation of a compound verb یکت ایا is ruled out.

The equivalence of (39a) and (39b) as sufficient conditions for V-V compounding suggests that,
while structural Case assignment in یگبو is obligatory, inherent Case assignment is optional. So
یگبو fits into Baker's typological array as in (42):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Case</th>
<th>Inherent Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>optional</td>
<td>obligatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obligatory</td>
<td>optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obligatory</td>
<td>obligatory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42. Yerubá
   Yeľó obligatory
   یگبو obligatory optional
   Sesedo obligatory obligatory

23Land 1975 and Nwokocha (1975a, 1975b) observe that many یگبو V-V compounds are lexicalized; but lexical
compounds have the same structure as those formed by affixation in the syntax. Either the second member is a
bound form, or two free forms combine idiomatically, as in this example (contrast with (32a) above):

4i. یکت ایا (بی فلا )
    'A dba cheated Ean'
    eat-kill-Asp

یگبو has a few unanalyzable bisyllabic verbs, but it has zero V-V compounds whose first member is bound
second member free. The first member of any compound is its syntactic head.

یگبو linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits

There are several conceptual problems with (42) as a parametrization of serial constructions.
First, it relies on Baker's (1989a) argument-sharing account of the thematic licensing of serial
constructions as complex predicates, which requires a phrase-structure parameter (i.e. a language-
particular template defined at d-structure). This kind of parameter is implausible if, as Baker
assumes, d-structure is a 'pure' projection of thematic structure.

Second, to account for the linear order of verbs in his argument sharing template, Baker is forced
to invoke the Tematic Hierarchy, a construct which is problematic because it enforces non-localistic

A third reason to question (42) concerns the status of Case features in the lexicon. If Case is a
licensing principle of s-structure, then the annotation of lexical entries with Case features is
diachronic. If θ-assigners can be freely marked with Case features, empirical generalizations
which link thematic and Case properties (e.g. Burzio 1986) are rendered circular.

For these reasons, I pursue a thematic account of the language types in (42). §2.1.2 reviews some
lexical parameters of Kwa as a whole. §2.1.3 proposes constraints on the format of lexical
conceptual structures, which dispense with a thematic hierarcy. §2.1.4-2.1.5 eliminate
polyadicity from the lexical entries of Yerubá and یگبو.

2.1.2 How to be a Kwa lexicon22

Since Knolle 1954 and Westermann 1927, the Kwa languages (including Kru) have been recognized
as a typological subgroup of Niger-Congo. There is a list of syntactic properties, both positive and
negative, which, while individually not unique to Kwa, consistently pattern together there. (43)
describes some properties of lexical (V, P, A, N) categories in Kwa. The rightmost column captures Kwa
lexical categories by feature redundancy, assuming the standard syntactic features.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>positive traits</th>
<th>negative traits</th>
<th>feature analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>verb serialization</td>
<td>few prepositions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. many static verbs</td>
<td>few adjectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. classifier phrase anaphors</td>
<td>no lexical NP-movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. cognate object</td>
<td>no syntactic NP-movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43a. یگبو serialization  few prepositions [- N, O V ]
   b. many static verbs  few adjectives [ P N, V ]
   c. classifier phrase anaphors  no lexical NP-movement [ + N, V ]
   d. cognate object  no syntactic NP-movement [ + N, V ]

In Kwa, unlike English, neither prepositions nor adjectives form large, open classes
syntactically distinct from verbs.23 The features in (43a-b) define two overlapping
archi-categories—call them P/V and V/A. By transitivity, these form a single category P/V/A
which covers a wide range of eventive and stative predicates.24

22Apologies to Williamson 1984, who applied this self-help metaphor in a diachronic context.
23Nyulme 1975 shows that Adjective is not a major category of یگبو; یگبو verbs translate English adjectives
and prepositions, cf. Nwokocha 1975. Haitian, apart from adverbs (pro 'nearby', ci 'approximately') and
bare nouns (anielu 'vicinity', ینغ underscore, ینغ 'side'), has just a handful of prepositions: al 'with', pa 'by',
pas 'for', en 'without, sans 'on'. The item son 'in/at' may well be a verb meaning 'be in/be at'.
24The ideophone is a P/V/A predicate of sound-symbolism, see Awóyági 1980 and Nwokocha 1984.
In languages satisfying both (43a) and (43b), i.e. languages where prepositions and adjectives are minor, closed classes, the lexical opposition of P/V/A vs N might be represented with a single feature [±N]. If the major-class lexical features reflect the distribution ofbasic semantic properties such as substantive and predicative (Chomsky 1974; 1985: 48) or argument and functor (Reuland 1986: 47), then the difference between a lexicon with two such features (the familiar [±N, ±V] lexicon) and a “one-feature lexicon” is a matter of redundancy. In a one-feature lexicon which satisfies the biconditional relation [+V] = [±N], there is an implication that all predicates are nonsubstantives, and vice-versa.25

The category N in Kwa is subject to a restriction of its own; it is never A-bound. That is, there are no lexical or syntactic analogues, i.e. no elements, covert or overt, with the features [+V, -N, -anaphoric]. There are just phrasal anaphors, of the form X’s body (see §3.2 below). Following Bouchard 1984, we expect overt and covert anaphors to pattern together, i.e. the absence of a class of X0 reflexives predicts the absence of passive and raising. Also in line with the absence of NP-internal negative: the claims by Awekćeićī 1972 and Ėmīnàmọ́p 1984 that all verbs are underlyingly transitive, in Yorùbá and Igbo (respectively). Thus, the two basic typological traits of Kwa lexical categories, expressed in standard features, are [+V][±N] and [+V, -anaphoric]. These may be related at a deeper level, currently obscure. 2.1.3 Selection vs. argument sharing

Larson 1988 points out that a serial construction like (35a) translates in English by secondary predication: Aje ate pounded yam = [with his hand] – by hand – manually]. Given the freedom of occurrence of multiple PPs and APs in languages like English, a plausible consequence of the lexical P/V/A category in Kwa is free serialization. As with other cases of free syntactic concatenation, the problem is how to rule out ill-formed combinations. The optimal claim is that the constraints on serialization in a given language are based solely on the morphological and semantic selectional properties of the lexical items concerned.

Apart from inherent syntactic category, morphological selectional constraints concern the status of a lexical item as a bound or free form, and the direction of affixation (prefixes or suffixes). Closely related languages may differ in the status of an item as bound or free. For example, Ėmīnàmọ́p 1981 observes that some aspectual morphemes which are verbal suffixes in Southern Igbo (e.g. Òwọ́rẹ) are auxiliaries in northern Igbo (e.g. Òkọ́bù), with Òsẹwọ́ in an intermediate position. The respective Yorùbá morphemes, however, are all auxiliaries (Čygal 1990b).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Igbo</th>
<th>Yorùbá</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Òwọ́rẹ</td>
<td>Òsẹwọ́</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Òkọ́bù</td>
<td>Òkọ́bù</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. anticipated</th>
<th>(Standard)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>habitual</td>
<td>gā,  yā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>progressive</td>
<td>nā,  nā,  nā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prior</td>
<td>nā-a,  nā-bọ-ụ,  ụ26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perfective</td>
<td>ọ-ku,  ọ-ku,  ọ-ku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative</td>
<td>ọ-aniu,  ọ-aniu,  ọ-aniu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25Hale (1988, 1989) reports that Yorùbá nouns systematically translate English adjectives and prepositions, hence its redundancy is the inverse of that found in Igbo. 26The ‘prior’ auxiliary ụ in Igbo/Ọgwa may be related to the Yorùbá verb ọtù ‘be early’.

Igbo linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits

In (44), suffixes are preceded by a hyphen. Independent of morphology ([category]-selection), lexical items can differ in semantic selectional properties. There are at least two kinds of semantic restriction which one word can impose on another. On the one hand: restrictions of predication, for example the requirement of an agentive subject for predicates which inherently involve intentional action. Just such a restriction distinguishes the verbs swim and float. Consider the following:

45a. #The book swam.
   b. The book floated.
   c. #The rock floated.
   d. While fishing, I dropped my book in the river and watched it “swim” downstream.
   e. On the movie set, a styrofoam “rock” floated in the Martian canal.

Because books aren’t animate, (45a) violates a predication restriction of animativity. By comparison, (45b) is well-formed, since float does not impose this restriction. Indeed, it has been argued that, at a deeper level, the external argument of float is no external argument at all, but an internal argument (cf. Burzio 1986). That float imposes some semantic restriction on its internal argument, is shown by (45c). Both phenomena are based in knowledge about the world: (the activity of swimming cannot be predicated of books, nor the state of floating of rocks); but there is still an asymmetry in the two kinds of violations, as shown by the “saved” versions in (45d-e). To save the predication violation in (45a), the verb swim is altered, cf. (45d), whereas to save the semantic restriction in (45c), the noun “rock” is altered, cf. (45e).

Metaphysical considerations affect pragmatic restrictions, since knowledge about the world is mediated by “philosophy”. Hale 1973 (cited in Hale 1986: 234) reports that some Navajo speakers limit subject-object inversion to [human] subjects, on the grounds that humans “are the possessors of language, and therefore of the power to control events.” The restriction in (45a) I will call (predicate)-selection, as distinct from (semantic)-selection, the selection of an internal argument which is violated in (45c). P-selection holds between lexical categories of the form XP (or X[object]), e.g. NP (subject) and VP (predicate). S-selection, on the other hand, holds between an X[head] and its complement.27

46. (Semantic)-selection of the complement of a lexical head. (Predicate)-selection of the external argument of a lexical projection.

Now consider some examples where s-selection and p-selection interact. (46a) predicts that a predicate can be ambiguous as to whether it violates s-selection or p-selection. For example, the phrase [ate the book] is interpretable in two ways. S-selection may be satisfied literally, at the cost of pragmatic plausibility, as in (47a). These pragmatics are ameliorated in (47b). Or else, eat can metaphorically acquire a wider s-selection, as in (47c).

47a. #John [ate the book].
   b. Ollie’s shredder “ate” the president’s compromising letter.
   c. John ordered 1,000 copies of Nixon’s book. When it didn’t sell, the head buyer made him “eat” the book (= the loss was deducted from his pay.)

27Chomsky (1986: 13) groups p-selection and s-selection together as Lexical-marking. Baker 1986 adds a third, intermediate type, which is both indirect (selecting sister of VP) and VP-internal, cf. (17b). I will show that Baker’s ‘indirect’ marking which blurs the distinction in (46) is unnecessary.
Eat in (47b) means "consume/absoorb (e.g. a financial loss)." This metaphorical extension is systematic in many languages (including Igbo and Yoruba) the verb which translates English eat also means "consume, enjoy, embrace". This effect is different from what obtains with savim in (45), which is circumscribed by stylistic intent and idiosyncratic context.

To recognize both s-selection and p-selection, predicts that subjects of unaccusative verbs (external arguments which originate as the (internal) sister of V0) are selectively licensed in both ways. This prediction is borne out in examples like (48). (48a) can be interpreted either pragmatically, by understanding Bill as Bill's body, cf. (48b), or else metaphorically, by understanding rotted as malingered or dissipated, cf. (48c):

48a. #Bill rotted.
   b. "Bill" (i.e. Bill's corpse) rotted for years after his death.
   c. Bill "rotted" (away) in graduate school.

The claim that s-selection is limited to internal arguments, predicts that unergative verbs (e.g. laugh) will not be ambiguous in this way. (49a), to my intuition, is a pure pragmatic violation. (49b), which is metaphorically licensed, actually supports the prediction, since laugh in that example means something more like emit a chuckling or chattering noise—in either words, the verb has become unaccusative, like grow, cf. (49c).

49a. #The chair laughed.
   b. The chair "laughed" (as it skidded along the polished wooden floor).
   c. The chair "groaned" (when the elephant sat on it).

A selectional story about Romance causatives

Chomsky (1986: 121f) discusses an interesting example of s-selection. In Spanish, animate objects must be introduced by a, cf. (50a). Italian does not have this restriction, cf. (51a). Both languages have a so-called 'causative': a complex predicate in which the embedded subject is marked by the morpheme a. In the a causative, the embedded subject (or "Causee", cf. Marantz 1984) is always animate.

The two languages differ with respect to the embedded object. In Spanish, the embedded object of an a causative cannot be animate (50b vs. 50c), but either animate or inanimate embedded objects are fine in corresponding examples in Italian (51b,c).

50a. Juan acusó Pedro. *(Juan accused Pedro)*
   b. Juan hizo arreglar el carro a Maria.
   c. Juan hizo denunciar a Pedro a Maria. *(Juan accused Pedro)*

51a. Giovanni accusò Piero. *(Giovanni accused Piero)*
   b. Giovanni ha fatto riparare la macchina a Maria. *(Giovanni had Maria fix the car)*
   c. Giovanni ha fatto accusare Piero a Maria. *(Giovanni had Maria accuse Piero)*

Evidently, Spanish verbs s-select [-animate]. From this, together with the grammaticality of (50a) in which a appears before Pedro, it follows that this a is a real preposition, rather than a "dummy case marker" (as has been claimed in many analyses). A mere case marker, which by definition can impose no semantic restriction on its complement, must therefore fail to save a s-selectional violation between verb and object. Of course, someone wishing to maintain that a is a mere Case marker could reconcile the statement of the restriction as follows: Spanish verbs do not permit complements which are both [+direct] and [-animate]. But this disjunctive statement, like the "curly brackets" of generative phonology, simply restates the problem diacritically.

igba linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits

On the other hand, by the Predicate Opacity Condition of Williams (1980, 1988), if a is a "real" preposition, one expects it to prevent an animate object from violating the [-animate] s-selection requirement of the verb. Which in fact it does, since (50a) is grammatical.

The next question is why (50c), with two occurrences of a, is ungrammatical. Consider two possibilities. If the same thematic structure underlies both (50c) and (51c), the only difference is Case assignment. In Spanish, the [-animate] constraint forces the complex verb hacer-denunciar to assign inherent Case to the embedded object Pedro, so (50c) is out because the verb cannot assign inherent Case a second time to the embedded subject Maria.

The Case solution runs into trouble in Italian. From a Case viewpoint, there is nothing wrong with (51c), but in the a causative, Buzzo observes that "animate embedded objects are allowed only with a handful of verbs" (1986: 309). With most verbs, the a causative with animate embedded object is nearly as ill-formed in Italian as in Spanish, cf. (52a), while the nearly synonymous da causative is well-formed, cf. (52b).

52a. Giovanni ha fatto aiutare Piero a Maria.
   b. Giovanni ha fatto aiutare Piero da Maria.
   c. Giovanni ha fatto denunciare Pedro a Maria.
   d. Giovanni ha fatto denunciare Pedro da Maria.

To maintain the Case analysis, one would have to claim that faire-accuser (51c) assigns both structural and inherent Case, while faire-aiuter (52a) and faire-matraquer (53a) assign just structural Case. But this is completely arbitrary, since what differs is the structural Case assigner (accuser vs. aiuter/matraquer), while the presumed inherent Case assigner (fare/aiuter) stays the same.

More doubt is cast on the Case analysis, as opposed to s-selection, by other examples cited by Buzzo 1986: French (54a)—originally noticed by Ruwet and Wehrli—and Italian (54b):

54a. Jean fait téléphoner à Paul à Marie.
   b. Fa stringere la mano al direttore a Maria! *(Make Maria shake the director's hand)*
   c. Make Maria shake the director's hand! It was a general problem with double assignment of inherent Case, neither of these sentences should be grammatical. But Buzzo observes that double datives "are not always ungrammatical, and ... to the extent that they are not, they are unambiguous" (1986: 243). In other words, the constraint violated by (50c) and (52a) is not structural, but thematic.

Abandoning the assumption that prepositions simply transmit Case from the verb, leaves the premise that there is a thematic difference between (50c) and (51c). This means that causative a is an autonomous -assigner, roughly like English to in (22). In fact, a selectional relation must be assumed to exist between lucre/ faire and a, in the derivation of the a causative. On the other hand, (50a) shows that not all tokens of a are selected (licensed) in the same way. In particular, the preposition in (50a) is not selected by the verb alone; rather, it appears to be "co-selected" by the animate object and the verb which rejects animate objects, as a kind of predicate opacity effect. Although it is not clear why the licensing of a works this way in Spanish nevertheless, by hypothesis, it is not a Case phenomenon. It remains to pursue the consequences of this hypothesis.

Suppose that (50c) is ill-formed because the complex predicate contains two tokens of the same θ-assigner (a), licensed (selected) in different ways. This situation, which violates something like the converse of Chomsky’s Uniformity Condition (1986b: 97f.), does not exist in (54a-b), because the same kind of selection occurs in both a-phrases. In (54a), the first a is selected by téléphoner and the second by faire. In (54b), the first a is selected by stringere le mano and the second by faire. In both cases, the verb selects the preposition, so no thematic constraint is violated.\footnote{The linear order of the verbs and their arguments in these causatives is not at issue here; both the Case and the thematic hypotheses have to account for the fact that hier/Here/hiere is not adjacent to the embedded subject, in contrast to the English version here Mary phone John.}

This leaves the contrast between grammatical (51c), marginal (52a) and ungrammatical (53a). Here, it will not do to appeal to a uniformity constraint on the thematic selection (s-selection) of prepositions, since there is only one preposition in each sentence. Rather, by Burzio’s testimony quoted above, the weight of explanation rests on the “handful” of verbs which permit animate embedded objects as in (51c). According to Burzio, the majority of Italian data, together with Kayne’s French examples, resemble the Spanish situation (50c) quite closely. Both Italian and French a causatives respect the same constraint which all transitive verbs respect in Spanish: they select [-animate]. Why the constraint is more general in Spanish than in the other languages is an open question; for now, it is enough to observe that a selectional constraint is at bottom of things. One can speculate that causatives like faire-acquérir permit an animate object, just because it is somehow “dehumanized” by the meaning of the verb. To test this idea would require the complete list of such verbs, but the parallelism of the animacy constraint in Italian (52) and French (53) makes the selectional account the null hypothesis, so the effort of looking would be repaid.

The rest of this chapter explores the hypothesis that distributional restrictions on predicates in serial constructions reflect the distinction between s-selection and p-selection, as expressed in a version of Lexical Conceptual Structure which maximizes the formal difference between these two.

Baker does not need this distinction, because he claims that the typology of serial constructions is determined mainly by Case. In their different ways, both Baker and Larson hold thematic constant and varies the thematic content of lexical entries. The study of complex predicates in Yoruba and Igbo shows that selectional properties of lexical entries underly generalizations which cannot be stated in a Case-based approach.

\section*{Linearization}

For Baker 1988c, the possibility of verb serialization is given by a d-structure parameter:

\begin{enumerate}
\item The structure \( [\ldots V \ldots] \) is allowed.\footnote{In Baker 1989a, (55) is subsumed in a more general option, cf. (132) below.}
\end{enumerate}

(55) enables two or more verbs to co-project an asymmetrically multiple-headed VP, within which they “share” internal arguments.

In languages which lack (55), Baker allows lexical heads to differ individually in the Case-assignment property, cf. (56a). In languages which have (55), Baker constrains its scope by a global condition on Case assignment, cf. (56b).

\section*{Igbo linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits}

56a. Kinyarwanda -\text{AP} [applicative] has structural Case features…

Chichewa [dialect A]\footnote{Baker’s, “Chichewa dialect A” refers the central Malawi’s form of the language described in Mchombo 1978, Bresnan and Mchombo 1987, Bresnan and Kanerva 1989.} -\text{AP} [applicative] has no structural Case features.

b. Verbs with a Case to assign must assign it in \( \text{Che} \) and \( \text{Haitian} \) but not in \( \text{Yoruba} \) and \( \text{Sranan} \).\footnote{In the argument structure literature, universal semantic predicates are written in all upper case. I use upper case notation only for lexical constants, which have their own independent entries, as above.}

(Baker 1989d)

The distribution of verbs in the phrase-structure in (55) is governed by the Uniformity of Theta-Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH, Baker 1985), and the thematic hierarchy:

57. Goals compose with the verb before patients (Larson 1988).

Instruments compose with the verb after patients (Marantz 1984).

(Baker 1989d)

(57) leads to a universal argument structure representation for GIVE:36

\begin{array}{c}
\text{GIVE} \quad [\text{Agent} [\text{Theme} [\text{Goal}]]]
\end{array}

Oddly enough, no instance of give conforms fully to (58). In the English and Igbo double object constructions (7a) and (28a), the Goal precedes the Theme. \( \text{Yoruba} \) lacks a double object construction.) In the English prepositional dative (7b) and the \( \text{Yoruba} \) serial dative (24), the order of \( \text{themes} \) is as in (58) but there are two lexical heads. \( \text{Igbo} \) lacks a prepositional dative. In the \( \text{Yoruba} \) antidative (23), the order is Theme\( \text{Goal} \) and there are arguably two lexical heads. (English and Igbo lack an antidative.) For those who assume universal (58), therefore, the problem is how to linearize it. Larson and Baker face this problem somewhat differently, although they both appeal to Case theory.

Larson 1988a derives the English double object and prepositional dative constructions from (58) by the following steps. He first assumes that give originates next to the Goal argument, in the “innermost” constituent. Then, by the Single Complement Hypothesis (1988a: 380-81), he postulates an empty lexical head, projected above a triadic give, to which the verb raises, bringing both internal arguments within the verb’s government domain. Larson relates the prepositional dative (59a) to the double object (59b) by NP-movement within the lower VP, so that a single lexical entry gives rise to both Theme\( \text{Goal} \) and Goal\( \text{Theme} \) surface orders:

\begin{enumerate}
\item The \( \text{Igbo} \) linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits
\item The \( \text{Yoruba} \) linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits
\item The \( \text{Yoruba} \) linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits
\item The \( \text{Yoruba} \) linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits
\end{enumerate}
V-to-Infl superfluous (Pollock 1988, Lema 1988). Why doesn’t rule R lower Infl “all the way”, instead of the two processes converging on the empty lexical head?

To derive the different linearizations of give from Case theory, Larson posits both a structured, polyadic predicate and an empty lexical head. But, if Case is realized at structure (and even assuming a more involved scenario of Case checking at various representational levels—at least somewhere in the syntax), one may question the diacritic marking of Case properties in the lexicon. In fact, Larson’s Case analysis is covertly thematic, since it relies on the distinction between inherent (“semantic”) and structural Case. After V-to-empty-V raising, the trace of give in the prepositional dative construction (59a=60a) transmits inherent Case via to, while in the double object construction (59b=60b) the trace of give directly marks book with inherent Case:

\[
\text{60a. } [\text{VP ... give, VP John a book }] \quad \text{ structural Case + prepositional transmission of inherent Case}
\]

Although Larson’s V-to-empty-V approach makes crucial use of the triadic property of a single lexical head give, as expressed in the argument structure formula in (58), this thematic representation is not sufficient. The dative-double object relation also hinges on the relationship between two contentful heads: a verb and a preposition. Larson ascribes the lack of a double object construction for verbs like donate to the non-redundancy of the prepositional \(\theta\)-role, cf. (61a). This contrasts with the situation for give, where the verb assigns its own Goal role (61b) and the thematic contribution of to is redundant, so that “its grammatical contribution effectively ‘reduces’ to Case marking” (1988a: 370). 

\[
\text{61a. donate Theme, Beneficiary Goal} \\
\text{61b. give Theme, (Beneficiary), Goal redundancy} \\
\text{61c. spare Theme, Beneficiary, *Goal mismatch}
\]

Although the idea of thematic licensing in (61) is plausible, the \(\theta\)-grid format fits it badly. Larson makes the Beneficiary role optional for give, recognizing that it is compositionally determined. In (62), give (b) denotes a simple transfer of location, cf. (63):

\[
\text{62a. John gave his Mastercard to the cashier.} \\
\text{62b. John handed the cashier his Mastercard.} \\
\text{63a. John handed his Mastercard to the cashier.} \\
\text{63b. John handed the cashier his Mastercard.}
\]

But the facts are less symmetrical. The possibility the Beneficiary role arises just in the prepositional dative (64a = Larson 1988: 340 ex. 9b). If the Beneficiary role forms part of the argument structure of give, what blocks it in the double object construction (64b)?

64a. Beethoven gave his Fifth Symphony to the world.
64b. ??Beethoven gave the world his Fifth Symphony.

The failure of (64b) suggests that the Beneficiary is projected by the preposition, not the verb. Larson offers explicit thematic grids for donate and give, but not for spare (61c). I have used the notational device “*Goal” to represent his observation of “semantic incompatibility” between verb and dative preposition. But this device, like the “optionality” of the Beneficiary role of give, just reveals the formal arbitrariness of \(\theta\)-role labels.

(61) shows that, over and above the empty head generated by the Single Complement Hypothesis for purposes of verb raising, double objects are licensed by two thematic relations. Baker (1988c) provides a syntactic treatment of this idea. The Benue-Congo construction corresponding to the English double object involves two overt lexical heads: a free form (verb) and an applicative suffix. Baker 1988a analyses this suffix as an incorporated preposition:

\[
\text{65a. } [\text{VP ... give, VP John a letter/book }] \quad \text{structural Case + abstract incorporation}
\]

Building on Marantz’s (1984) analysis of applicatives, Baker reformulates inherent Case as abstract noun incorporation, similar to Larson’s “\(V\)-reanalysis”: the verb plus its structural (applied) object form a constituent with the capacity to Case-mark a second complement. This makes double object constructions “zero applicative” verbs (1988a: 285)—structurally parallel to applicatives, except that the incorporated preposition is morphologically zero. Baker thereby derives the triadic nature of English double-object give in essentially the same way as the complex Benue-Congo verb write-appl:

\[
\text{66a. } [\text{VP ... write-appl, VP John a letter/book }] \quad \text{structural Case + abstract incorporation}
\]

67. Chichewa: write-appl

Chichewa: give-appl

English: give...to

The analysis of give as an applicative verb creates semantic problems. The thematic range of non-zero applicatives is wider than that of double object constructions (zero applicatives); in Baker’s analysis this is a mystery. In write John a letter, even if the letter is not sent, there is an
and the intransitive verb inherits the structural Case of the affix. In such languages, for a verb that is impossible to translate as applicatives in Chichewa (Baker 1988), for which there are two possible explanations. They may, like Marantz’ Generalization, be based on a Thematic Hierarchy, in which case every head must form part of a single complex predicate to which the Hierarchy applies. This idea underlies Baker’s (1988d) argument-sharing proposal for Yoruba serial constructions, which parallels Larson’s θ-role matching analysis of English. But Awóyá’s igbo linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits shows that ordering regularities of constituents in Yoruba serial constructions extend beyond what can be expressed in terms of co-argumenthood, and hence beyond the scope of a Thematic Hierarchy. To escape this conclusion, Baker excludes from the rubric of serial constructions, and from his d-structure parameter (54), any combination of verbs which refers to more than one event. On the other hand, if single-event serial constructions follow from semantically-based principles without the need to posit a d-structure parameter, nothing prevents these principles from generalizing to multi-event serial constructions. The next section pursues this alternative.

2.1.4 Are there triadic verbs in Yoruba?

To explain “Why serialization?”, some have appealed to the restricted nature of prepositions in serializing languages (e.g. Sebbag 1987, Awóyá 1987, Larson 1988a). Déchaine 1988b takes the opposite tack, asking “Why not serialization in English?”, and seeks the answer in terms of the nature of prepositions in languages which lack serial verb constructions. Both views, highly modular, are orthogonal to Baker’s parametric analysis of serialization.

Loosening the Projection Principle by a d-structure parameter, Baker claims that multiple verbs which refer to a single event (his “serial constructions proper”) are licensed by the possibility of argument sharing within a recursive \( \overline{V} \). A finer-grained version of (55) is (68).

68. \[ VP - [\varphi V_1 - [\varphi V_2 - ...]] \] (cf. Baker 1988c, 1989a)

(A Deg 2) is not an adjunction structure, because neither \( \overline{V} \) segment counts as the head of the whole. Baker’s analysis of (69) is sketched in (70).

69. \( \overline{V} \overline{ } \overline{ } \) 'My father bought me a garment'

\( = \) Baker 1988c from (CyselKen 1982)

70. father\( \overline{V} - [\varphi V_1 - [\varphi V_2 - ...]] \) Theme\( \overline{ } \) Theme\( \overline{ } \) Goal\( \overline{ } \) of V1 of V2 of V2

The projection of (70) requires three types of \( \varphi \)-marking, listed in (71).

71a. VP extremepredicational external argument of VP

father = Agent(\( \overline{V} \)\( A_2 \))

b. \( \overline{V} \) indirect,predicational sister of lower \( \overline{V} \) garment = Theme2

c. \( \overline{V} \) direct,predicational complement of V1 garment = Theme1

complement of V2 1sg = Goal2

Each verb in (70) directly \( \varphi \)-marks its complement (in Yoruba, to the right). \( V_1 \) directly \( \varphi \)-marks the NP garment, and \( V_2 \) directly \( \varphi \)-marks the NP 1sg. Garment, which stands between the two verbs, is shared by them because it is also indirectly \( \varphi \)-marked (to the left) by the lower \( \overline{V} \). Baker characterizes indirect \( \varphi \)-marking as predicational, although it is distinct from another type of predicational \( \varphi \)-marking: the assignment of a \( \varphi \)-role to the external argument. The single VP, shared by both verbs, is predicated of a single external argument, and therefore (under conventional assumptions) both verbs mark this external argument with a subject \( \varphi \)-role—in the example, Agent.

Of the three relations in (71), the crucial one for Baker is indirect \( \varphi \)-marking, because this allows \( V_2 \) to share the middle argument with \( V_1 \), so that they are interpreted as a single event. The sharing of an external argument follows from internal argument sharing.
In (69) \( V_1 \) must be dyadic and \( V_2 \) triadic. The resulting \([V_P \ldots V_1 \ldots V_2 \ldots]\) is triadic, with one shared internal argument and one shared external argument. In effect, Baker treats the two verbs \( buy \ldots present \) as the discontinuous lexicalization of a single, polyadic predicate with the applicative meaning \( buy-for \) as a process. (68) is thus a syntactic template which permits polyadicity with multiple heads of the same lexical category. It is a permissive rather than a restrictive parameter: its presence in a grammar adds a class of formal possibilities without subtracting any other class. (68) is therefore not strictly a serialization parameter, because it does not preclude alternative polyadic structures, e.g., \([V_\ldots V_P \ldots V_P \ldots]\) or \([V_\ldots V_{\text{affix}} \ldots]\), which are generally less available in serializing languages.

Nor does (68) accurately predict the class of possible serial verb constructions. It requires that a multiple-event serial construction do not exhibit internal argument sharing, and that serial constructions which do not exhibit internal argument sharing will never denote single events. Both consequences are factually incorrect. (72) restates (68) in two-dimensional form. Baker's list of thematic well-formedness conditions for (68/72) is paraphrased in (73), with sample glosses:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
V_1 & V_2 & \text{glosses} \\
\hline
\text{unergative} & \text{unergative} & \text{\textit{zejjez walk} \text{"walk happily\}}} \\
\text{unergative} & \text{unaccusative} & \text{\textit{* (by 75d)}} \\
\text{unaccusative} & \text{unaccusative} & \text{\textit{open \text{"open to the point of rotting\}}}} \\
\text{unaccusative} & \text{transitive} & \text{\textit{* (by 75d)}} \\
\text{transitive} & \text{unergative} & \text{\textit{* (by 75e)}} \\
\text{transitive} & \text{unaccusative} & \text{\textit{hit NP_1 \text{"hit NP_1 down\}}}} \\
\text{transitive} & \text{transitive} & \text{\textit{hit NP_1 \text{"strike NP_1 dead\}}}} \\
\text{trialic} & \text{unergative} & \text{\textit{* (by definition, 75e)}} \\
\text{trialic} & \text{unaccusative} & \text{\textit{* (by definition)}} \\
\text{trialic} & \text{transitive} & \text{\textit{* (by definition, 75e)}} \\
\end{array}
\]

(74) gives the full set of possibilities generated, and ruled out, by (73), with sample glosses:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
V_1 & V_2 & \text{glosses} \\
\hline
\text{unergative} & \text{unergative} & \text{\textit{\{\text{hit} \text{NP_1} \text{hit NP_2}\} \text{"hit NP_1 to NP_2\}}}} \\
\text{unergative} & \text{unaccusative} & \text{\textit{\{\text{take} \text{NP_1 cut NP_2}\} \text{"cut NP_2 with NP_1\}}}} \\
\text{unaccusative} & \text{transitive} & \text{\textit{\{\text{take} \text{NP_1 give NP_2}\} \text{"give NP_1 to NP_2\}}}} \\
\end{array}
\]

I will now show that (74) is both too permissive and too restrictive.

**Object gapping.**

(74) overgenerates because it allows argument sharing between two transitive verbs, where the second verb is not anticausative. Baker (1989b) cites the following example:

75. Amba naki Kofi kiri. 'Amba struck Kofi dead'

But Baker himself observes that Sranan kiri can occur intransitively as a passive, so Kofí is the external argument of kiri and there is no internal argument sharing. Passives are not found in Kwa, and Yorùbá has no single-event example like (75), although Baker predicts that it does.

Kwa languages translate (75) in one of two ways, neither of which fits the argument sharing template: multi-event serial constructions (in Yorùbá), or single-event V-V compounds (in Yorùbá, Igbo). But (76) is impossible in Kwa, so Baker's template is too permissive.

In Yorùbá, two or more transitive verbs which share a direct object, with a gap after the noninitial verb(s), are obligatorily interpreted as a sequence of events:

77a. *Ọjọyọ siẹrẹ təmá\[\text{\textit{\{\text{bowl} \text{\text{"bowl\}}\}}}}

But (78) is impossible in Kwa, as Baker's template is too permissive.

In fact, neither Sranan nor Yorùbá conforms to Baker's model of serialization (68). The existence of passive in Sranan makes "indirect \( \theta \)-marking" unnecessary. Argument sharing is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for serialization in Yorùbá. Sranan does fit Baker's model of covariant coordination (70): a coordinate event interpretation is triggered for a dyadic (nonergative) \( V_2 \) only if its object is lexicalized, either as an NP or as a pronoun:

79. Amba naki Kofi kiri en. 'Amba struck Kofi and killed him'

Baker comments: "Sebba is careful to show ... that kiri ‘kill’ is an obligatorily agentive verb." Accordingly, he analyzes (75) as an instance of his one-event serialization template:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Agent of } V_1 & \quad \{ \text{\textit{\{\text{hit} \text{\text{"hit\}}\}}} \} \\
\text{of } V_1 & \quad \{ \text{\textit{\{\text{kill} \text{\text{"kill\}}\}}} \}
\end{align*}
\]

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79. Amba naki Kofi kiri en. 'Amba struck Kofi and killed him'

But (77) shows that this requirement for coordinate events does not exist in Yorùbá. And Baker's conclusion that the two templates (68, 78) generalize in one parameter ("serializing languages allow double-headed VPs") 1989a: 549, cf. 519 ex. 10), fails to explain why Yorùbá lacks single-event serial constructions with a gap after a non-initial transitive verb.

The other way in which Kwa languages translate (75) is with V-V compounds, which—like these Igbo examples—are potentially idiomatic:

33NP_1 can also be the Instrument of both verbs, but an Instrument in a \{\text{take} \text{\ldots cut} \text{\ldots}\} construction has certain Theme-like properties.

34Including the "trialic ergatives" of Gag (Lefebvre 1988a) and Haitian (Massam 1987).
The facts in (84) are consistent with two possibilities. Either ñâ is dyadic (inchoative) or it is dyadic/triadic (inchoative/causative) alternating. Now consider the potentially triadic cases. ñâ occurs in serial constructions with an Agent subject plus an apparent Instrumental NP argument in (85a): or else the NP may be more like a Theme (in the Cruber/Jadzoff sense of the passive participant in motion along a path), as (85b).

85a. ñâ fi ñâ bâ mî " use hand hit 1sg "Aje slapped me" (i.e. hit me with his hand)

85b. ñâ ta ñâ bâ mî "shoot arrow hit 1sg"

But the contrast between these two predicates in the ñî construction, given in (86), belies the apparent triadicity of ñâ in (85).

86a. ñî bâ mî ñî "hit 1sg but I log have hand"

b. *ñî bâ mî ñî ñî "hit 1sg have arrow"

Pending an account of the ñî construction in terms of affectedness and possession (presented later in this section), (86) suggests that what is triadic in the examples in (85) is not ñâ itself but rather the serial predicates as a whole. In particular, it seems that, unlike ñî "hand", ñî "arrow" is not licensed by ñâ in all in (85), but rather by ñâ "shoot". The conclusion is that ñâ is dyadic, at least in (85b), and therefore the serial constructions in (85b) is not licensed by Baker’s template, showing that the template is too restrictive.47

Similar considerations obtain in ñâ (a member of ñâ, cf. Capo 1985), where Lefebvre 1986a also assumes that instrumental serial constructions involve a triadic V2. But she observes that, if V1 is either ñâ or ñâ (both of which she glosses as ‘take’), and V2 is dyadic, a single-event

Obligatory dyadic V2

Baker’s template also undergenerates. In a single-event serial construction with two internal arguments i.e. [V1 NP1 V2 NP2], the template requires that V2 ‘be triadic. What counts as evidence of triadicity? For Baker, a verb translating ‘hit’ which occurs as V2 of a serial construction is necessarily triadic, whether the argument structure is [Agent [Theme [Goal]]] or [Agent [Instrument [Theme]]]. But Youkhû happens to have a lexical gap for triadic ‘hit’, fi, which Abraham 1958 translates ‘impinge on’, occurs dyadically with a Theme subject (84a) but not an Agent subject (84b). Pending an account of the ñî construction in terms of affectedness and possession (presented later in this section), (86) suggests that what is triadic in the examples in (85) is not ñâ itself but rather the serial predicates as a whole. In particular, it seems that, unlike ñî "hand", ñî "arrow" is not licensed by ñâ in all in (85), but rather by ñâ "shoot". The conclusion is that ñâ is dyadic, at least in (85b), and therefore the serial constructions in (85b) is not licensed by Baker’s template, showing that the template is too restrictive.

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interpretation will be available iff V2 independently undergoes the anticausative alternation (Burlio 1986). (Examples (56-57) are repeated from above.)

36a. Kòkò bò jwèyi lok. wàn yòu Afrikà.  "Kòkò hit Afriké with a stick"‘take’ stick hit
b. Kòkò jwèyi lok. wàn yòu Afrikà.  ‘A/the stick hit Afriké’stick hit
37a. Kòkò jwèyi jëfò lok. wàn yòu Afrikà.  ‘Kòkò took a stick and killed Afriké’‘take’ stick kill
b. ‘Kòkò hit Afriké with a stick’stick kill

Instead of Baker’s phrase structure parameter, Lefebvre proposes that one-event serial constructions are derived in the lexicon by matching or overlapping parts of the conceptual structures of the two verbs. The idea is very similar to argument sharing, but it pushes the licensing conditions “one step back” back in the derivation, from d-structure to the lexicon.

For Lefebvre, then, the success of a one-event serialization “take...hit,” and the corresponding failure of “take...kill,” follows from the fact that, while take is a verb of change of location, kill denotes a change of state. To maintain this story for ‘teach’ and ‘show’, she must say that these predicates are metaphorical motion verbs, as opposed to metaphorical verbs of change of state. A priori, this seems to be exactly backwards; however she has no other choice, given her claim.

87a. Kòkò jwèyi jëfò lok. wàn yòu Afrikà.  ‘Kòkò taught French to Afriké’French teach
b. Fòfò lok. wàn yòu Afrikà.  ‘French becomes known to Afriké’French teach
88a. Kòkò jwèyi jëfò lok. wàn yòu Afrikà.  ‘Kòkò explained French to Afriké’French show
b. Fòfò lok. wàn yòu Afrikà.  ‘French becomes clear to Afriké’French show

Even less plausibly, in extending this analysis to Haitian, Lefebvre 1988b must claim that koupe ‘cut’ involves a change of state in ungrammatical (89a), but a change of location in grammatical (89b), whereas pran ‘take’ does not. A more accurate generalization is that the ability of a verb like koupe/filanje to undergo the ergative/anticausative alternation is determined by the unintentional status of the event. In other words, the grammaticals “ergatives” in (89b-c) are actually “inanimate agents”, i.e. actions whose Agent is [-animate]. The flavor of this interpretation is preserved in the examples in (91):

91.  The axe cut the carpet (when it fell off the table).

Lefebvre may have been originally misled to ascribe a motion component to the meaning of jwèyi and Haitian pran because these verbs may serialize with verbs of motion, e.g.: 92a. Kòkò jwèyi jëfò lok. wàn yòu Afrikà.  ‘Kòkò took [the] crab to market’take crab go market
b. Emí pran jwèyi jëfò lok. wàn yòu Afrikà.  ‘Emí brought chickens to the market’take chicken go Loc market Det

But there is no need to posit a motion component in the meaning of jwèyi and pran, if the assumption of LCS matching is given up. In examples where jwèyi and pran collocate with a motion verb, it is sufficient to derive the motion component from the motion verb (e.g. goat), without repeating it in the lexical entry of jwèyi and pran. In the translations take something to market / porter qqch. au marché, we suppose that the idea of motion comes from the verb and not the preposition, but this is a fact about the lexicalization of motion in English/French (as suggested by Talmy 1985), and it need not be carried over to the analysis of Haitian and Fòfò.

Lefebvre observes that “jwèyi cannot select an abstract complement like Fòfò”, so that a sentence such as (93) is ungrammatical.
In this way, Lefebvre posits a selectional difference between \( g2 \) and \( z \) (although she glosses them the same). But her specific proposal, that \( g2 \) requires a nonabstract complement, creates another problem, because \( g2 \) successfully \( \theta \)-marks \( filanje \) in serial constructions with 'teach' and 'show' (cf. 87a, 88a above). At that point, Lefebvre opts to stipulate that, in such examples, \( filanje \) "has to be selected by 'teach'/'show' and not by the 'take' verb", effectively reducing the so-called 'take' verb to a more causative operator. Why isn't any other verb equally possible in this function? If the thematic-selectional properties of the 'take' verb are not relevant in a serial construction, then why resort to lexical-semantic derivation? The only reason to adopt lexical conceptual structures is to derive the selectional properties of a morpheme from its meaning. Notice that this is impossible, if \( g2, z \) and \( pran \) are all glossed as 'take' and represented as denoting "change of location".

Hounkpai Capo (p.c.) translates \( z \) more accurately not as 'take' but as 'take hold of', roughly synonymous to \( yorùbá \) \( mọ \). In other words, \( z \) by itself has nothing to do with a change of location; rather, it \( s \)-selects something which can acquire a possessor. Thus, instead of Lefebvre's proposed LCS, given in (94), a truer representation of is given in (95):

94. '\( z \)' [ x CAUSE [ y undergo a change of location ] ]

(Lefebvre 1988b)

95. '\( z \)' [ TAKE HOLD OF x ]

Along the same lines, the other verbs glossed by Lefebvre as 'take' (\( g2, pran \)) are more accurately represented as in (96a); \( z \), another serializing verb in \( \text{f\'rançais} \), is represented in (96b):

96a. \( \text{f\'rançais} \) \( z \) [ HOLD x ]

b. \( \text{f\'rançais} \) \( z \) [ USE x ]

The Haitian situation evidently differs. Haitian \( koupe \) and \( filanje \), unlike \( \text{f\'rançais} \) \( pran \), does nothing to do with the selectional properties of \( g2 \) and \( pran \). As Lefebvre observes, the \( g2 \) verb \( pran \) does not undergo anticausative shift, i.e. it is obligatorily affecting, cf. (97a). The verb \( x \) on the other hand, has no such restriction, as in (97b):

97a. \( pran \) [ affect x [ come to be in the state y, y = DEAD ] ]

b. \( pran \) [ come SHARPLY INTO CONTACT WITH x ]

The Haitian situation evidently differs. Haitian \( koupe \) and \( filanje \), unlike \( \text{f\'rançais} \) \( pran \), permit an inanimate subject, but only under a special pragmatic interpretation—which is fully paralleled in English. \( koupe \) and \( filanje \), like English cut and slice/score, are affecting, and therefore allow inanimate subjects just if the subject can be interpreted as autonomous. As in (91), instruments like knives and axes can appear to act autonomously under certain circumstances, such as the influence of gravity. (\( \text{f\'rançais} \) \( koupe \) wa e! \( \text{Aje!} \))

\( 93. {'yòòkè \ 'fàìtànà} \ \text{'take'} \ \text{French} \)

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\( 98. \ \text{The glass broke} \)

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b. \( \text{f\'rançais} \ \ \text{fr} \ [ \ \text{take hold of x} ] \)

Maintaining that serial constructions are licensed by matching lexical-semantic material, Lefebvre 1988a suggests that the ungrammaticality of (100a) reflects a clash between a change-of-state component in \( g2 \) and a change-of-location component in \( z \). But \( g2 \) has no such component. Nor is Baker's (1989b) Case-based explanation available: \( gbè \) successfully anticausativizes. cf. (100b).

There are parallel facts in \( yorùbá \), cf. (101a), although the idea that \( fi \) entails a semantic "change of location" is wholly implausible (and is rejected by speakers):

101a. '\( ìlábá \ \text{z} \ \text{gà} \ \text{gbà} \ \text{take'} \ \text{glass break} \)

b. '\( ìlé \ \text{gbà} \)

The glass broke

There is no inherent problem with a causative interpretation of \( yá \) is shown by (102):

102. '\( ìjẹ \ \text{yá} \ \text{nàà} \ \text{a} \)

'Aje tore that cloth (e.g. by ripping it with his hands)'

\( \text{bear cloth} \)

In fact, (101a) can be fully salvaged by introducing an implicit, intervening cause:

103. '\( ìjẹ \ \text{yá} \ \text{nàà} \ \text{yá} \)

'Aje [indirectly] brought about the tearing of that cloth'

\( \text{bear.hold.of cloth Det tear} \)

\( \text{bear Det cloth} \)

\( \text{bear cloth} \)

Parallel to (103) is (104), where \( ìjẹ \) is only an indirect agent, and \( ìjẹ \) is an involuntary agent:

104. '\( ìjẹ \ \text{bá \ ò} \ \text{sa} \ \text{sope} \)

'Aje made Olu offend Sope

\( \text{bear.hold.of offend} \)

\( \text{bear.hold.of offend} \)

\( 38 \text{"Inchoative stativization" (Guerssel 1986), e.g.} \)
These acceptable examples show that the problem with both (100a) and (101a) is essentially pragmatic. (100a) is ruled out because it is physically impossible for a bottle to be the instrument of its own breaking, just as (100b) is ruled out because it is impossible to use a piece of cloth to tear itself. In both cases, some additional instrument must be supposed.

Significant generalizations are therefore missed in both variabilities and cases, as both Baker and Lefèvre hold (in slightly different ways), the second verb in a so-called instrumental serial construction is necessarily triadic, and expresses its selectivity through the intermediate representation of argument structure labels. It remains to consider alternative proposals for how the semantic licensing of serial constructions accounts for word order.

The order of heads

In Baker’s argument-sharing template, the order of verbs depends on the thematic roles of their complements. Since Goals are stipulated to be “lower” than Themes in his Thematic Hierarchy, and since the d-structure template is right-branching, Theme8 Goal order is possible, but Goal8 Theme order is not. In fact, while Theme8 Goal order occurs in dative/benefactive examples like (69), Goal8 Theme order is also possible, as in “antidative” serial constructions like (105):

105a. òñf bi m ọ ọwọ. [ŋi ọwọ → njọwọ] ‘Olu presented me with money’

Baker 1988d from Oyejokan [1982]

b. òñf ‘Olu has money/is rich’

The analysis in (105b) is impossible in Baker’s template: the Theme lexicizes the Thematic Hierarchy, and njọwọ is not triadic. Yet (105a) is well-formed, so Baker must give it a different structure—for example, a double object, with bi m ọ ọwọ triadic and njọwọ a “dummy” Case-assigner.

However, njọwọ occurs independently as the verb ‘have’, cf. (106), so to claim that njọwọ is a verb in (106) but not in (105) is at best a dialectic solution.

106. òñf ‘Olu has money/is rich’

Certain instrumental serial constructions also violate the triadic V2 requirement, e.g.:

107a. ọjẹ m ọ ọwọ yẹ yàn. ‘Aje ate pound yam by hand/with his hand’

For argument sharing to license (107), m ọ ọwọ ‘eat’ must be “optionally triadic”. But this optionality weakens the predictive content of argument structure representations, and loses the apparent generalization in (107) that V2 acquires its Instrument in composition with V1.

Another class of counterexamples to a triadic V2 requirement is causative serial constructions:

108. Aje ọjẹ m ọ ọwọ sọ. ‘Aje made me buy [some] fish’

Of course, (108) is no counterexample to Baker’s template if, instead of the serial structure in (109a), it has a non-serial structure such as object control, cf. (109b).

109a. ọjẹ V1 send [Theme 2 Agent 1 1sg buy fish ]

b. ọjẹ V1 send [Theme 2 Agent 1 1sg buy fish ]

But against this control analysis, and in favor of a structural parallel between serial causatives (108) and instrumental causatives (107), Yoruba has a construction semantically intermediate between the two types: the “dehumanized” causatives in (104). Another example is in (110):

110a. ọjẹ m ọ ọwọ sọ. ‘Aje made me buy [some] fish’

In (110b) the θ-criterion does not permit one argument to bear two θ-roles, so the lower Agent is “demoted” to Instrument. The small clause structure in (109b) has no such implication. And, as it is generally recognized that the so-called “Agent θ-role” is a bundle of semantic properties, there is no need to derive the subtle difference between (109) and (110) both structurally and compositionally. That serial constructions are licensed, not by a d-structure template (or its lexical equivalent), but by selectional properties alone, makes it possible—indeed necessary—to eliminate diacritic homophony from the lexicon.

Against diacritic homophony: ọjẹ

Certain serial verb constructions correspond directly to verb-preposition constructions in non-serializing languages. Conceivably, every item which functions sometimes as a verb and sometimes as a ‘preposition’ might be said to possess two homophonous lexical entries. This is the tack taken by Abraham 1958. In Yoruba, one such item is ọjẹ.

Consider the difference between (111) and (112). In (111), in construction with the transitive verb m ọ ọwọ ‘take hold of’, ọjẹ means ‘give’. It has roughly the same meaning in construction with m ọ ọwọ ‘have’, with the reverse word order in (111b).

111a. ọjẹ m ọ ọwọ yẹ yàn. ‘Aje gave Olú a book’

b. ọjẹ m ọ ọwọ yẹ yàn. ‘Aje gave Olú a book’

But in (112), with the intransitive verb ‘rejoice’, ọjẹ is interpreted as ‘on behalf of’—corresponding to the preposition for in the English translation:

112. ọjẹ yẹ ọjẹ. ‘Aje made Olú happy’

In (112a), the θ-criterion is relaxed and the Agent is “reassigned” as Instrument of the preposition for in the English translation. (112a) is not an example of an argument structure with a triadic θ-role, but rather a transitive construction with only two θ-roles. In (112b), the Agent is “promoted” to Theme of the preposition for, with a “dummy” Case-assigner.

41 A similar construction occurs in ọjọ with ya ‘use’ as V1:

   Dẹ ọjọ yọ, nọtun ọjọ. ‘I used the work’

†Edinson put me to work’
The capitalized noun A/Y'G[oy]' in (112) is a syntactically inert, i.e. an overt lexical constant. (112) has no counterpart ni construction corresponding to (111b).43

If \( f_{\text{G}} \) is ambiguous between verb and preposition, then its two lexical entries might resemble (113a) anadromous in the \( \text{y} \) dictionary in Abraham’s dictionary:

**113a.** \( f_{\text{G}} \) | GIVE
- [Agent [Theme [Goal]]] e.g. (111)
- [Beneficiary] e.g. (112)

To posit both (113a) and (113b), makes the \( \text{y} \) lexicon look like the surface structure of English, and thereby leaves an unrelated serialization property of \( \text{y} \). The alternative, which unites the two phenomena, is that \( f_{\text{G}} \) has just one lexical entry.

Suppose \( f_{\text{G}} \) is always dyadic. Beneficiaries are equatable with Goals (Jackendoff 1983), so the reduction of the two \( \theta \)-arrays in (113) to a single, dyadic grid has just two possible outcomes:

**114a.** [Theme [Goal]]
- b. [Agent [Goal]]

(114a) is at least partly equivalent to triadic (113a), since predication ensures that an Agent is projected if neither internal argument is externalized.44 However, (114a) has no possible relationship to the construction in (112), which lacks a Theme. This defeats the attempt to unify the two entries of \( f_{\text{G}} \). The remaining possibility is to represent \( f_{\text{G}} \) as in (114b).

On standard assumptions about argument structure, (114b) looks bizarre. In its most widely adopted version (Marantz 1984, Baker 1985, Larson 1988, Speas 1989), the Thematic Hierarchy maintains that there is no localistic relationship between Agent and Goal. However, this objection holds only insofar as the Thematic Hierarchy is irreducible. And, as already suggested, there is reason to believe that \( \theta \)-role labels are not semantic atoms.

It is generally recognized that Agent-hood is a derived, complex notion. The label of Agent denotes an animate Causer. Its surface licensing by predication (p-selection) is held to depend on the presence of an internal Theme (Perlmutter 1978, Buzzo 1981). Conversely, the failure of a Agent to project externally correlates with the externalization of a Theme. Gaesser (1986: 75f.) has expressed this idea in terms of a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic change of state, stating this in the framework of Lexical Conceptual Structure (LCS) as follows:

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43Abraham (1958: 677) gives the verb as \( \text{y} \). A/Y', which would mean “overfiled [with] joy.” The underlying form is conjectural because the vowel of the verb root is phonetically elided.

44Abraham (1986: 56) observes that a \( \text{y} \) construction like (111b) is not ruled out for all intransitives; it can be formed with unaccusative verbs like \( \text{y} \), which are small:

- i. \( \text{Y'G} \) have - \( \text{Y'G} \) have man
  - Aje is small for a male
- ii. \( \text{Y'G} \) have - \( \text{Y'G} \) have man
  - Aje is small for a male
- iii. \( \text{Y'G} \) have - \( \text{Y'G} \) have man
  - Aje is small for a male

The generalization in the \( \text{y} \) construction may be that the preceding verb needs a syntactically active direct object. If \( \text{y} \) is small, then there is a syntactic direct object, \( \text{Y'G} \), which externalizes to the subject position. But the lexical constant of \( \text{y} \) in (112) is unavailable for this purpose, as shown by the meaning difference between (112) and the \( \text{y} \) construction in (iii). Without the constant, \( \text{Y'G} \) is not strictly intransitive; without benefactive \( f_{\text{G}} \), there is an adverbial reading of a direct, syntactic object, cf. (iii).

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45Déchoine (1987, 1988) proposes approximately (114a) for the Haitian morpheme \( \text{y} \), which in many ways recalls the ambiguity of \( \text{y} \).
The optionality of a by-phrase Agent is related to valency retraction in the passive verb, as expressed by morphology. I. Roberts 1985 accounts for this directly with the suggestion that English passive morphology (is-en) is argumental in itself—like an incorporated object, as proposed in recent refinement of Roberts’ proposal (Baker et al. 1989). Morphological retraction/incorporation is lacking for the underlying semantic role of property sharing. As Koster (1986: 41) points out, the sharing of thematic content among syntactic positions violates one half of the bijective criterion (Chomsky 1981), but this half must be dispensed with for independent reasons (e.g., to allow the binding of NP-trace).

However, there is a difference: the Agent of a passive predicate in English is “implicit” (presupposed but optional), while the transferred affect is an integral part of the sentence.

In (121), the internal argument of n’i ‘have’ is identified with the unprojected affect in the conceptual structure of its governor n’i. For the mechanism of this effect, I borrow the term “argument transfer” from Grimshaw and Mester’s (1988) analysis of light verbs. More abstractly, the discontinuous projection of thematic material within an extended lexical government domain is an example of “property sharing”. As Koster (1986a: 41) points out, the sharing of thematic content among syntactic positions violates one half of the bijective criterion—like an incorporated object, as proposed in recent refinement of Roberts’ proposal (Baker et al. 1989). Morphological retraction/incorporation is lacking for the underlying semantic role of property sharing. I. Roberts 1985 accounts for this directly with the suggestion that English passive morphology (is-en) is argumental in itself—like an incorporated object, as proposed in recent refinement of Roberts’ proposal (Baker et al. 1989). Morphological retraction/incorporation is lacking for the underlying semantic role of property sharing.

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Alabama. 'The boss sent Olu to Alabama' = (134a) master dispatch?

b. Ògà ràn Olu ní Alabama. master dispatch?

c. 'Olu Alabama. Ògà ràn Olu i. Comp master dispatch

d. Ògà ràn Olu ní-Ìjì. The boss sent Olu for kola nuts

Ní in (134b) might be the locative preposition glossed as ‘on/at’ in (123) and (128) above. But Ògàkàn 1990 shows that, unlike the PPs in (134d) and (132b), ní-Ìjì in (134b) cannot be focused by sel-movement. In neither (134b) nor (154d) does ní select a location per se. In (134d), its complement is the Goal of the erand, while in (134b) it is the point of arrival (Goal).

This leaves the possibility that ní in (134c) and (134e) is the verb ‘have’. If so, then its complement, if s-selected, must be either a possessor or, in the context of argument transfer, an affectum. Alabama in (134c) cannot be an affectum, since locations are canonically non-affected (e.g., ‘send Tokyo a letter’, cf. Tenny 1987). Affectum is implausible on other grounds as well: it is Ògà who is affected, as the causee in the act of sending. The remaining possibility is possession; otherwise there is no s-selection, ní is a mere case-marker, and Ògà is triadic, thus weakening the overall argument against polyadicity and argument sharing.

Metaphoric possession is plausibly involved in (134e), since Ògà ní specifically means ‘send someone to obtain something’. The case for possession in (134c) is weaker, although perhaps it does get through on the premise that to be "at P" means to “possess the location P”.

The above observations support the general claim that ní ‘have’ s-selects its complement, either directly as a possessor, cf. (113b), (129b), (128b), (127b), (133b), or indirectly as an affectum in an argument transfer construction (i.e. a lexically-induced causativization, cf. (128b), (132b), (123b). Among the numerous examples cited by Ògàkàn 1990 in support of the claim that ní is a mere case marker, there are two in which the thematic contribution of ní is difficult to pin down. In the abstract manner phrase of (129b) and the goal phrase of (134c), the semantic structure of ní is unclear as between location and possession. The solution of these problems depends on the semantic content of morphemes like ní and Ògà. The alternative, that ní has no semantic content in these constructions, will be hard-pressed to account for the failure of examples like (96b) and (133b).

Benefactive Ògà and lexical constant effects

The last instance of Ògà to be accounted for by the unitary lexical representation in (116) is the alleged benefactive preposition in (112) = (135a). (Below, lexical constants are capitalized.)

135a. Ògà yọ (Àyọ) yọ ní Ògà. ‘Aje was happy for Olu’ [i.e. rejected on Olu’s behalf]

b. Ògà yọ *yọ (Àyọ) [Ìjì ní Ògà] ní Ògà. be-in-the-state x, x = Ògà extrinsically-come-to-be-in-the-possession-of x

The lexical constant Ãyọ, optionally overt here, is not an available subject for Ògà ní. So what does Ògà p-select? Since p-selection ranges over maximal projections, it is possible that Ògà p-selects the entire Ògà projecting by yọ. Since yọ is coindexed with the subject, by transitivity Ògà is coindexed with SPEC,1. Semantically this is the right result. The transfer denoted by Ògà in

129a. Ògà ní Ògà ní Ògà. = (129a) master dispatch

b. Ògà ní Ògà ní Ògà. = (130a) master dispatch

c. Ògà ní Ògà ní Ògà. = (131a) master dispatch

130a. Ògà ní Ògà ní Ògà. ‘Aje cut [a] yam with [a] knife’

b. *Aje Ògà ní Ògà ní Ògà. = (132a) master dispatch

c. *Aje Ògà ní Ògà ní Ògà. = (131a) master dispatch

By argument-sharing, both Ògà ‘to’ and Ògà ‘cut’ are triadic with [Agent [Instrument [Theme]]], and in the (a) examples. By my alternative, Ògà ‘knife’ is s-selected by Ògà ‘use’ in the (a) sentences, whereas in the (b) sentences it is indirectly licensed by argument transfer. Since argument transfer depends on lexically-induced causativization by the prefix affect x, as in (120), the failure of (131b) is a matter of affectedness. A knife is affected in the process of stabbing, being ‘stuck’ or immersed in the stabe; in cutting, it is unaffected. On Baker’s hypothesis, the failure of (131b) is unexpected. (A similarly unexpected phenomenon was observed in (86b) above.)

To take a more minimal contrast, (131) differs from (132) in the relevant way.

132a. Aje Ògà ní Ògà ní Ògà. = (132a) master dispatch

b. Aje Ògà ní Ògà ní Ògà. = (132a) master dispatch

c. *Aje Ògà ní Ògà ní Ògà. = (132a) master dispatch

Again, the argument sharing hypothesis expects no grammaticality difference between (131) and (132), whereas the hypothesis of argument transfer predicts the grammaticality of (131) on the basis of the semantic fact that a knife is affected by the action of slapping a yam.

In the remaining class of examples cited by Ògàkàn, ní introduces a location argument, potentially counterexemplifying the hypothesis that ní ‘have’ s-selects its complement. However, s-selection is arguably present in these cases as well. In (133b), the complement of ní is not a bare NP but a gerund, which additionally specifies Miami as Ògà’s point of origin (Source). This gerund, as the complement of ní ‘have’, therefore denotes a property which Ògà possesses as he arrives: an (abstract) possessum.

133a. Ògà ní Ògà ní Ògà. ‘Olu arrived from Miami’

b. Ògà ní Ògà ní Ògà. ‘Olu arrived, having started from Miami’

Other examples show ní in construction with the verb Ògà. Ògà is usually glossed as ‘send’, apparently triadic, but a better translation might be ‘dispatch x as a message/messenger’. Likewise with Ògà and Ògà

134c. Ní in (134e) is difficult to pin down. In the abstract manner phrase of (129b) and the goal phrase of (134c), the semantic structure of ní is unclear as between location and possession. The solution of these problems depends on the semantic content of morphemes like Ògà and Ògà. The alternative, that ní has no semantic content in these constructions, will be hard-pressed to account for the failure of examples like (96b) and (133b).

Benefactive Ògà and lexical constant effects

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b. Ògà yọ Ògà (Àyọ) [Ìjì ní Ògà] ní Ògà. be-in-the-state x, x = Ògà extrinsically-come-to-be-in-the-possession-of x

The lexical constant Ìjì, optionally overt here, is not an available subject for Ògà ní. So what does Ògà p-select? Since p-selection ranges over maximal projections, it is possible that Ògà p-selects the entire Ògà projecting by yọ. Since yọ is coindexed with the subject, by transitivity Ògà is coindexed with SPEC,1. Semantically this is the right result. The transfer denoted by Ògà in
...is not a transfer of joy; Olú’s own happiness is not entailed. Rather, what is transferred is agenthood, with reference to the act of rejoicing, from Olú to Aje.

Subject control of benefactive αμ in (135) derives from the non-argument status of όν lexical constant. This element is not abstract; it is syntactically active in (136).

136. Aje όν Aje αμ: Aje was deliriously happy  

Elimelech 1981 and Oyelaran ms. discuss three ways that lexical constants are overtly morphologized. First, it may be a cognate noun, as in όν όν (‘laugh’ differs only in that the constant is obligatorily overt, but it is inseparable from the verb root, cf. (135)).

137a. Aje αμ αβλ καρανν  

‘Aje laughed’

b. Aje αμ αβλ καρανν  

‘Aje laughed for Olú’ [i.e. to cheer him up]

c. ‘Aje αμ αβλ  

laugh have laughter

d. Aje αμ αβλ  

‘Aje derided Olú’  

use laugh laughter

Second, an overt constant may be a bound element which is independently a full verb, e.g. αμ όν ‘straighten upright’ ↔ ‘straighten out’ ↔ ‘stand’. In some dialects, the causative alternant is a splitting verb (138); non-splitting causative αμ αβλ assigns Case roles to the constant (138).

138a. Aje αμ αβλ  

‘Aje stood straight up’

straighten upright

b. Aje αμ αβλ υν όν όν.  

‘Aje stood that book up (on its end)’

take book that straighten upright

c. Aje αμ αβλ  

‘Aje stood it up’

take 3sg.ACC straighten upright

d. ‘Aje αμ αβλ  

‘Aje stood that book up’

straighten upright book that

e. Aje αμ αβλ  

‘Aje stood it up’

straighten upright 3sg.GEN

f. Aje αμ  

[ = nonstandard version of (138d) ]

‘Aje stood that book up’


Third, an overt constant may be a noncognate nominal. This may be bound, e.g. όν εξοπλω ‘sit down’, or free, e.g. όν όν ‘put on [female] clothing’ ↔ ‘stand up’ ↔ ‘dress’.

139a. Bọọse αμ  

‘dress got dressed’

stand cloth

b. Bọọse αμ αμ όν όν.  

‘Bọọse wore an outfit for Aina’ [i.e. to please her]

stand cloth ‘give’

c. Bọọse αμ αμ όν.  

‘Bọọse dressed Aina’ [i.e. ‘Bọọse wore an outfit for Aina’]

stand have cloth

d. Bọọse αμ αμ όν  

‘Bọọse dressed Aina’

use cloth stand

Nearly synonymous όν όν ‘get dressed’ has no idiosyncratic gender feature. In construction with όν εξοπλω όν όν is ambiguously benefactive-intransitive or causative (140b); όν όν is not (139b). With όν (139c) and όν (139d, 140d), both verbs are unambiguously causative.

140a. Aje όν όν και αμ:  

‘Aje got dressed’

b. Aje όν όν και αμ:  

‘Aje wore an outfit for Olú’

enter cloth ‘give’

OR ‘Aje dressed Olú’

enter have cloth

c. Aje όν όν και αμ:  

‘Aje dressed Olú’ [i.e. ‘Aje wore an outfit for Olú’]

d. Aje αμ εξοπλω όν.  

‘Aje dressed Olú’

use cloth enter

The interpretive contrast between (139b) and (140b) follows if the first entry is unambiguously όν όν while the second one is ambiguously όν εξοπλω όν όν. The semantic opacity of όν όν results from the transitivity effect of the overt constant, cf. (141b).

141a. ergative όν εξοπλω  

‘come to be in state x, x = UPRIGHT’

b. intransitive όν εξοπλω:  

[ = affect x, x = CLOTH [come to be in-situation, y = UPRIGHT]]

(141b) with two lexical constants is both causative and idiomatic; if όν εξοπλω was syntactically active, όν εξοπλω would mean ‘cause cloth to stand up’. By contrast, the ambiguity of όν εξοπλω plus όν in (140b) as affecting or unergative benefactive follows from its competing analyses as a transitive with an open variable (142a), or intransitive with two lexical constants (142b).

142a. transitive όν εξοπλω  

‘come to be in location x, x = INSIDE y’

b. intransitive όν εξοπλω:  

‘come to be in state x, x = INSIDE y, y = CLOTH’

‘dress’

The concatenation of (142b) with όν, yielding a benefactive interpretation, works as in (135); the concatenation of (142a) with όν, yielding a causative interpretation, works as follows:  

143. ‘Aje όν όν και αμ:  

αμ: affect x [come-to-be-in-location y, y = INSIDE z] — extrinsically—come-to-be-in-pos’n-of-x

The causativizing effect of a lexical constant is also seen with όν ‘flow’ ↔ όν ‘tears’ in (144a). This effect fails to occur with detransitivized verbs as in (144b–c).

144a. [ι]ι [ι]ι όν και αμ:  

‘cry’

flow

TEARS

c. [ι]ι [ι]ι:  

‘eat [intransitive] as in ‘eat a (canonical) meal’

out

THING

c. [ι]ι [ι]ι:  

‘settle one’s debt’

pay

MONEY

For όν ‘eat’ (144b) and όν ‘pay out’ (144c), a lexical constant detransitivizes the verb, just as in English (Hale and Keyser 1986). With inchoativem ‘flow’ in (144a), the lexical valency is fully saturated by the constant TEARS. Because a constant cannot externalize (as a subject), the only possible predicate extends the valency of ‘flow’ in the familiar aspectual way:

145a. inchoative όν όν  

‘move by means of FLOWING’

b. intransitive όν όν:  

[ = affect x, x = TEARS [move by means of FLOWING]]
The mechanism of argument transfer, seen in the lexical causatives in (143) and (145), permits a unitary lexical entry for fàm as in (116), as opposed to an analysis which treats some instances of fàn as in (112) as clitic prepositions. The preposition analysis is ruled out in any case by sub-extraction evidence which groups fàn with verbs, e.g. *cf. îgù ‘love/want’, as against the genuine preposition à ‘on/at’. Both fàn and îgù are proper governors which strand:

146a. Abà Yi fàn Ogú. ‘Abà was happy for Ogú’
   b. [i à ¥ n à ò] ‘Who was Abà happy for?’


148a. Ìgbà ìt ìt start from n ìt ‘Who does ìt love?’
   b. [i ìt ìt ìt È ò] ‘Where is it that Ìgbà found (the) book?’

Consequences for projection

If argument sharing is rejected as the special licensing mechanism of serial constructions, what remains to do the same job is selection. With allegedly triadic verbs such as English give, present and donate, and Ìgbà fàn and îgù, the diacritic use of ò-role labels and the Thematic Hierarchy can be replaced by localistic appeal to selectional relations. In (149), argument variables—whether open or filled by constants—encode selectional properties.

149. Verbs of state and intrinsic process

a. static (including locative)
   gù ‘be stupid’
   ìt ‘be small’
   ìà ‘be somewhere’
   ìù (Ìgbà ìt) ‘rejoice’

b. unergative
   ìð ‘roar’
   ìò ‘boil’
   ìt ‘breathe’
   ìm ‘breath’

ì, ‘walk’

[intrinsically emit and intake x, x = AIR]
[intrinsically emit and intake x, x = BUBBLES]
[intrinsically emit x, x = ROAR]
[intrinsically emit x, x = LEGS]
[intrinsically move by means of x, x = FEET]
[intrinsically emit x, x = AIR]
[intrinsically come to be in state x, x = DEAD]
[intrinsically come to be in state x, x = VISIBLE]
[intrinsically come to be in state x, x = DEAD]
[intrinsically come to be in state x, x = EXISTENCE (SOMEWHERE)]
[intrinsically come to be in state x, x = SMALLNESS]
[intrinsically come to be in state x, x = UNOBSTRUCTED]
[intrinsically emit x, x = AIR]
[intrinsically come to be in location x]
[intrinsically emit x, x = AIR]
[intrinsically emit x, x = AIR]
[intrinsically come to be in state x, x = UNOBSTRUCTED]
[intrinsically come to be in state x, x = UNOBSTRUCTED]
[intrinsically emit x, x = AIR]
[intrinsically come to be in state x, x = VISIBLE]
[intrinsically come to be in state x, x = UNOBSTRUCTED]
[intrinsically emit x, x = AIR]
[intrinsically come to be in state x, x = EXISTENCE (SOMEWHERE)]
The absence of ditransitive verbs is not just a negative property: (149-51) show that it correlates with a high frequency of lexical constants. Some constants are audible, as in (135-45). A serializing language is one in which s-selectional constraints are lexicalized (as constraints) to a high degree.

This approach contrasts with Baker's serialization parameter. Baker 1989c adopts a semirecursive definition of "serial constructions proper" as just those structures which satisfy the argument-sharing template (68/72/152a). Baker 1989a adds a structure (152b) to accommodate multi-event serial constructions, but all single-event serial constructions conform to (152a).


152b. Baker 1989a

I have reviewed some Yorùbá counterexamples to (152). (84), (104), (107) and (108) are single-event serial constructions which lack the argument-sharing property and hence are not licensed by (152a). Further, Yorùbá lacks single-event serial constructions comparable to Sranan (75), which satisfies (152a), and multi-event serial constructions comparable to Sranan (79), licensed by (152b).

Baker elides over these differences, and he has no choice but to do so, inasmuch as his parameter forces Sranan and Yorùbá into the same syntactic type.

In both the permissive and restrictive sets of counterexamples to (152a), the culprit is Baker's innovative relation of "indirect, internal θ-marking"—which permits the direct, internal argument of V２ to be an internal argument of V₃. This kind of argument sharing (as opposed to the sharing of an argument external to both verbs) is possible only in a configuration with a ternary-branching V₃ constituent. Strict binary-branching, by contrast, allows just the kinds of thematic relations which are attested in Kwa serial constructions.

The only way that (152a) translates into binary-branching is as an adjunction structure. The two possibilities for adjunction, respectively leftward and rightward, are given in (153a) and (153b).

Baker's template corresponds to a right adjunction, since the highest V₃ is directly projected by V₁. On semantic grounds, however, Awoyále 1988 has proposed that both directions of V₃ adjunction are found in single-event serial constructions in Yorùbá, as follows:

153a. modality-event

153b. event-state

153c. modality-event-state

These structures permit just two types of θ-marking: those I have called p-selection (predication of an XP by an XP) and s-selection (selection of an XP complement by an XP head). Baker's "indirect, internal θ-marking" is ruled out in (153) because there is no NP₂ (complement of V₃) which is "connected" (in the sense of Kayne 1983) to a V₃. (153) requires that the semantic composition between V₃ and NP₂ is mediated by V₂. In (153b), V₂ *max p-selects, not NP₁, but V₁ as in (135).

V₂ cannot p-select NP₁ in (153a) because NP₁ is not external to V₃ *max (the highest instance of V₂). In (35a)/(107a), "hand" cannot be the external argument of 'eat'; to maintain argument sharing, Baker must analyze 'eat' with an optionally instrumental role, but this requires that NP₁ be an internal argument of V₂. Adjunction requires a distinction of headlessness: one verb must be the head of the polyvalent verbal projection, leaving the adjunct(s) in the status of modifier(s).

Awoyále's semantic claim is that, in a single-event construction, the head of the projection denotes the event. For a non-head (an adjunct), he recognizes two possible types of non-event signification: modality (e.g. instrument) and state (e.g. result). (153a), headed by V₂, has the interpretation of modality plus event, as in an instrumental serial construction, while (153b), headed by V₁, instantiates the semantic relation between an event and a state, as in a resultative serial construction. If both modality and state are signified, they adjoin to a central event as in (135c), with the event compositionally closer to the modality term than to the state term. In this way, a semantic template (modality-event-state) correlates with the permutations of a syntactic configuration (Adjunction), through the headeness relation.

Awoyále implies that multiple-event serial constructions have the configuration of coordinate V₃. This follows from two properties. Object-gapping requires that a gapped NP be c-commanded by its NP₂ antecedent, as obtains in the event-state structure.63 "Same-subject" requires that V₂ *max p-selects the external argument, as in the modality-event structure. Neither adjunction structure meets the two requirements simultaneously, hence a coordinate structure is forced.

As opposed to argument-sharing, the structures in (153) embody Awoyále's view that an account of verb serialization...must look beyond the argument structure of individual verbs to some principle or principles which relate these argument structures to each other. ... The 'lexical' approach seems to imply that verb serialization is required just in order to license a complex argument structure. The approach we take to these issues is different: it is the verbs themselves that are licensed in the formation of complex predicates.

I conclude this section with further evidence for the dual adjunction types.

Eventhood and extraction

Baker's argument-sharing template provides just one configuration for all single-event serial constructions: (152a). But there is evidence of a configurational difference between semantic subtypes. One form of in-extraction in Yorùbá, verb focus (misnamed 'predicate cleft'), is sensitive to the semantic difference between dative and instrumental serialization. (See §3.2 below.) Awoyále's dual configurations in (153b,c) predict the observed extraction difference. (154b,c) show dislocation of a focused object or subject NP to the left of the element n. In §3.2.3, the position of this focused element is argued to be SPEC, CP. As described for Kru languages by Koopman 1983, subject trace is lexicalized with a resumptive clitic, cf. (154c).

Awoyále (p.c.) reports similar phenomena with the verb 'see'.

63Kaplan 1989, 1990 regards object gapping as a discourse phenomenon; with the verb 'use' it is particularly free. In (ii) below, the antecedent is not even syntactically active:

i. M ate f ( )

ii. She ate the (food)
V-adjunction will
/'buying' appears in [SPEC, CP]. Or else, the
155a. 'It is continuous book-buying that Aje does/did'

Verbo final involves the wh-extraction of a nominalized, reduplicated gerund, which is distinct from the verb itself, since the latter does not gap. Manfredi and Üppler 1988 propose that the morphological base for reduplication is a Bound Verb Complement (BVC). The BVC can be thought of as the "spreading" of the lexical content of the verb onto a clitic position which may be aspectual in nature (cf. Tenny 1987, 210 ex. 25b), spelling out the "Davidsonian" event position in the argument structure. 'Sopé Üppler points out to me that the nominalized BVC is visible in situ, in certain intransitive, echoic constructions:

155a. 'Aje went on a side trip, he didn't go [just] one going' go-going turning Neg go going one
b. 'Death'n'disease [were] haunting his house' death'n'disease PROG reach house-of 3sg going

In ordinary examples, the BVC is invisible in situ, perhaps to permit structural Case assignment to a lexical complement (cf. Roeper and Keyser 1988, §2.1.5 and §3.1.2 below). It is visible in situ just if the event acquires argumental status, in a context like (155); otherwise, it is wh-extractable.

In (156a), the BVC fuxas version of (154a), tira 'buying' appears in [SPEC, CP]. Or else, the nominalized VP tira jizis 'book-buying' as a whole may be focused, if a copy of the object is in situ, (156b). Üppler 1989b observes that an aspectual Aux may be included in the VP gerund,

156a. 'It's yam that Aje used a knife to cut' use knife cut yam
b. 'It's a book that Aje [is buying, bought] a book' Nom-buy paper Comp buy

In a serial construction, wh-extraction is possible for any subject or object NP, or the BVC of the first verb. But the serial subtypes distinguished as in (153) differ with respect to the wh-extraction of the nominalized BVC of a non-initial verb (e.g. V2). This is possible in an instrumental serial construction like (158) – (153a), but not in dative serial constructions like (159) – (153b).

158a. 'Aje used a/the knife to cut a/the yam' use knife cut yam
b. 'It's yam that Aje used a knife to cut' use knife cut yam
159a. Aje gave a/the box to me'

It is often said that (159c-d) fail because here fum is really a preposition. (A similar claim is made for Haitian bap, cf. Piou (1982: 146f.), Déchaine (1988a: 41-46). Such a view entails the absurd consequence that âje is a preposition in (160c), but not in (160d).

160a. Aje gave a/the box to me'

A government-based explanation for the BVC-extraction asymmetry is available in the Barriers framework (Chomsky 1990a). The idea is that the extraction difference for BVC2 between dative and instrumental serial constructions follows from the different directions of V-adjunction in (153), a difference which Awójúwọyé浸ents semantically.

First, consider a difference in the direction of Vadjunction will not affect. No matter the direction, the BVC of the first verb will always be extractable, because (as argued by Roberts 1985 and Déchaine 1990b, extending Koopman 1984) this verb is always visible to Infl (which in yori contains subject Agp), but not tense. –cf. Manfredi 1988 and §3.1.2 below. V-visibility is satisfied by head movement of V1 to Agp, voiding the barrier.

By contrast, (159c) and (160c) show that the BVC2 is nonextractable just if a double of NP2 comes as the path between landing site and extraction site. Perhaps complement doubling is exceptionally possible with âje because its complement selection is exceptionally strong. Compared to âje, arrive (a near equivalent) is only marginally transitive: John arrived home, but *'Arrived Boston. 50The paradigms of fum and âje differ: in (160) but not (159). BVC2 is extractable just if a double of NP2 comes along, cf. (160b). In general, doubling (or reassertive) strategies save island violations by 'shunting' the path between landing site and extraction site. Perhaps complement doubling is exceptionally possible with âje because its complement selection is exceptionally strong. Compared to âje, arrive (a near equivalent) is only marginally transitive: John arrived home, but *'Arrived Boston.
2.1.5 Are there intransitive verbs in Igbo?

I now turn from the freely serializing, sporadically compounding syntax of Yoruba to the corresponding Igbo phenomena: partial serialization plus the free formation of V-V compounds.

The goal is to represent this correlated difference so as to account for the contrasting pattern of transitivity in the two languages: Yoruba’s lack of double object structures, and Igbo’s lack of surface intransitives. The claim is that this typology stems from the thematic patterning of lexical entries (e.g. inflectional) elements. Relevant properties are listed in (162). Both Igbo and Yoruba serialize modality-event constructions (162a). For event-state constructions, Yoruba serialization and Igbo V-V compounding (162b) are near-complementary options: Yoruba does have some non-splitting, instrumental V-V compounds (162c). V-N compounds occur in both languages (162d), but with a surface difference. In Igbo, the N (which Nwachukwu 1985 dubs an inherent complement) has its own phrasal projection, separated from the verb by any other internal argument. That is, the Igbo inherent complement is a ‘splitting noun’, recalling the splitting verb in Yoruba. Double object and applicative structures occur in Igbo, but not in Yoruba (162e).

162. (a) modality-event serialization  (b) event-state serialization  (c) V-V compounding  (d) V-N compounding objects  (e) double objects

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<th>Igbo</th>
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<td>V-incorporation</td>
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<td>morphologically affectedness</td>
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The differences in (162) boil down to two fundamental properties of Igbo: ‘partial serialization’ and ditransitivity. The next subsections review the empirical basis of (162) and show how these

Igbo linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits twin properties reflect the presence of two options in Igbo grammar: V-incorporation (driven by the requirement of visibility to a dummy Infl) and the morphological spellout of affectedness. The consequences of lexical aspect for surface transitivity and Casemarking can be understood in terms of Tenny’s (1987) general hypothesis that aspect is the interface of lexical and syntactic properties. §3.2.2 below shows how the tonal morphology of Case supports the present analysis.

Partial serialization and V-incorporation

Like Yoruba, Igbo serializes instrumental constructions, and constructions of manner and accompaniment, as in these examples from Òwálááíka 1982 and Òjiànú 1988:

163a. Abígbá [m-] ìmá ̀òhíwú báa m. ‘Adha peeled yams with (i.e. hold-ASP knife kitchen-Gen peel-0VS yam-Gen while holding) a kitchen knife’

163b. Ọ̀ jì tẹ̀rẹ̀ báa ̀ẹ́ mì. Ṣ’he answered forcefully/ ści hold-ASP strength answer-0VS (covert)\(^{61}\)

163c. Igbo wá ipoló dá-à. ‘The kite [predatory bird] swooped down with a chicken’

kite carry hen fall-0VS

But resultative, dative and benefactive constructions, which serialize in Yoruba, have the surface form of V-V compounds in Igbo:

164a. Abígbá gbá-ta mìí ‘Adha hailed [the] car (with petrol/pour-fill-up-0ASP car petrol

164b. Ọ̀ jì tọ̀pọ̀ gbá-à. Ṣ’he lent Adha [a piece of] cloth

164c. Ọ̀ jì tọ̀pọ̀ gbá-à ọ̀ báa ̀ẹ̀ mì. ści borrow-give-0ASP cloth

164d. Ọ̀ jì tọ̀pọ̀ gbá-à ọ̀ báa ̀ẹ̀ mì. ‘S/he [is dancing/usually danced] for us’

\(^{61}\)Nwachukwu 1979a and Òjiànú 1978 discuss the non-occurrence of the OVS with some verb roots.

To represent this difference, Igbo V-V compounding can be viewed as covert serialization, whose resemblance to Yoruba serial resultatives, datives and benefactives is obscured by the effects of V-incorporation (à la Baker 1985).

Déchaine 1996b accounts for the presence of syntactic V-incorporation in Igbo, and its absence in Yoruba, by appealing to V-visibility: the requirement that a verb must be governed by (visible to) Infl in order to assign structural Case (Roberts 1985a,b,c) or, perhaps equivalently, to receive a resultative, dative and benefactive construction.

In Igbo, V₁ is always visible because it is syntactically affixed to Infl as a result of V-to-1 movement (cf. Koopman 1984). Any other verb is governed by Infl, hence visible, only if it occupies the X₀ head of V\(^{n}\). A non-head, non-initial verb is not visible to Infl in situ, so it must affix to the head verb.

This picture is complicated by the absence of overt tense or agreement morphology in Igbo. As discussed in §3.1.2, tense interpretation arises indirectly, mediated by aspectual categories. In the absence of an aspect morpheme or a base-generated Infl element (an Aux), the initial verb bears a default reduplication of -\(ǐ\), e.g. to indicate tense or mood (in some dialects, \(-l-\)). As a result, -\(ǔ\)V is glossed by me as ’\(ǔ\)Asp’.

A noninitial verb in a serial construction (including multi-event ones, unhelpfully dubbed ‘consecutive’ in some of the 1970’s literature) bears a high-toned, ’open vowel’ suffix (Green and Tenny 1976a and 1976b).
This suffix marks events as delimited: it follows from (153) that any non-initial verb in a serial construction includes the verb which denotes the event. Because syntactic Aspect, unlike Tense, is sensitive to lexical properties (Verkuyl 1972, 1988), not every initial verb bears \( V_1 \), and not every non-initial verb bears the other suffix; the selection of examples in (163) illustrates this point. In most southern Igbo dialects, the OVS forms part of the perfective suffix (cf. §3.2 below).

At some stage, the OVS was probably an object pronoun.

With these morphological provisions, the visibility-based account suggests that \( V \)-incorporation succeeds in resultative/dative/benefactive constructions (which have Aboyade’s right-adjoining, event-state structure of (153b)) but not in constructions of instrument/manner/accompanyment (with the left-adjoining, modality-event structure of (153a)). Evidently, \( V \)-incorporation fails in the latter class of constructions because \( V_1 \) does not govern \( V_2 \), violating Travis’ (1984) Head Movement Constraint.52

Ken Hale (p.c.) points out that the pattern of government I am assuming in (165) may not be consistent with Chomsky’s definition of government in adjunction structures: “a is dominated by b only if it is dominated by every segment of b. . . . a excludes b if no segment of a dominates b.” (1986a: 7, 9). Chomsky is considering two kinds of adjuncts: XP and XP, neither of which is in question in (165). On reflection, however, it seems to me that the relation of exclusion actually does obtain in (165c) between \( V_2 \) and either \( V_1 \) or \( V_3 \), since neither one is dominated by any segment of \( V_2 \). Even by Chomsky’s definition, therefore, \( V_2 \) governs the other two verbs in (165c). Exclusion arises only if government between \( V \)-bars is in question, but that kind of government doesn’t seem to have consequences for the present analysis. However this definition works out, the verb of a right adjunct incorporates into a head verb (165b), but a head verb fails to incorporate into the verb of a left adjunct (165a). If \( V_1 \) governs \( V_2 \) in the former but not the latter, incorporation is predicted.

In Igbo as in Yoruba, both configurations can cooccur in a single complex predicate, with a modality-event-state interpretation (165c). Some Igbo examples are given in (166).

52Which Baker 1985 reduces to the ECP; Lema and Rivero 1990 dispense with Travis’ locality condition. Rightward incorporation of \( V_1 \) by \( V_2 \) is ruled out in (165a) by global harmony.
An affecting intransitive like i dAṣò 'get dressed [in female clothing]' (139), literally 'cause cloth to stand', projects as in (169).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V (Appl-NP)</th>
<th>Abbreviations:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>applied affix+object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO DO IC</td>
<td>(BVC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO IC</td>
<td>direct object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO IC</td>
<td>INHERENT COMPLEMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO DO IC</td>
<td>BVC bound verb complement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The restriction in (170) is arbitrary if the inherent complement is not a syntactic argument; but it is predicted if the inherent complement is just the syntactic direct object. Apparent counterexamples, to which Nwachukwu gives the analysis of VDOIC (notionally conforming to their English glosses), are readily reanalyzed as VIOC, cf. (171-72) immediately below. Let us therefore pursue the hypothesis of syntactic licensing for all ICs.

Inherent complements differ from other direct objects only in the strength of their s-selection by the verb. Verb roots which take an inherent complement are semantically ‘lite’, effectively reversing the selectional relationship between verb and complement. In a kind of recoverability effect, an inherent complement—as a lexical constant (invariant argument) which supplies thematic content to the verb—must project in the syntax. This can be seen with the two most productive lite verb roots cited by Nwachukwu (out of an open list of eight such roots) i Ngbo and gbọ.

With abstract inherent complements such as NC 'fear' or Ngbe 'silence' as in (171), the thematic relationship to the respective verb roots is admittedly not obvious:

\[ \text{V (Appl-NP)} \]

As the right-hand element of the compounds in (168) and (169), Aṣò absorbs the structural Case assigned by the verb root in the manner of an object clitic, cf. Kayne 1984. Thematically, it is licensed as a lexical constant, i.e. a fixed member of the lexical entry.

Nwachukwu 1985 shows that the N of a V-N compound in Igbo heads its own phrase. Such nouns, which Nwachukwu calls inherent complements, are the analogues of Yoruba ‘splitting’ verbs: lexically integral but syntactically independent. There is also a semantic parallel: as with Yoruba splitting verbs, Igbo inherent complements involve a ‘lite’, affecting verb root. I will show that the inherent complements of these roots are arguments—specifically, overt lexical constants licensed by argument transfer.

Nwachukwu states that an inherent complement "does not qualify for either a [C]ase or a theta role" (1987c: 78) and again, "[Inherent] Complements are not arguments" (1987c: 134). From this claim he exempt those "ICs which are also patients or themes... In all such instances, the meaning of the verb root and the IC is compositional" (1987c: 78). This loophole was explicitly included to accommodate my earlier observation (1987b, quoted by Nwachukwu 1987c: 73) that at least some ICs are obviously direct objects. What remains to be seriously investigated is the possibility that all ICs are direct objects. If a lexical decomposition analysis exists for them all, then Nwachukwu’s claim of IC nonargumenthood is untenable, because it has no phenomena to analyze.

Otherwise, if noncompositional, nonargument ICs do exist, then one is left with inherent complements. As the right-hand element of the compounds in (168) and (169), Aṣò absorbs the structural Case assigned by the verb root in the manner of an object clitic, cf. Kayne 1984. Thematically, it is licensed as a lexical constant, i.e. a fixed member of the lexical entry.

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The representations in (173) capture this difference, while preserving the other similarities which have been previously noted.

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The aspectual projections in (173), with the affectum (here, the IC) licensed by argument transfer, superficially resemble abstract incorporation (Baker 1985). Baker claims that, like a noun overtly incorporated in a verb (as in Iroquoian languages), an abstractly incorporated nominal composes semantically with a governing verb as its direct internal argument, licensed by inherent Case. In turn, the entire, discontinuous ‘syntactic word’ [V+IC] compositionally assigns its own internal θ-role, a semantic Goal, to the structural Case-marked argument adjacent to the verb.

As in §2.1.4, my approach differs from Baker’s in avoiding appealing to Case theory to license thematic relations. Following Tenny 1987, I replace thematic roles and the Thematic Hierarchy with an aspectual account of the projection of conceptual structure into syntax. The representations in (173) are identical to those proposed for the τερνήδε μ’construction, except that there is no overt counterpart to μ’have’. This difference potentially indicates a degree of arbitrariness in (173), since there are two selectional relations but just one overt θ-assigning category. However, just as I argued that τερνήδε μ’imposes s-selection on its complement, there is at hand a selectional basis for the Igbo inherent complement: the thematic ‘liteness’ of the verb root. The empirical scope of the licensing of (173) is narrower than the scope of abstract incorporation, since it is restricted to 11e verb roots. This implies that every [V+IC] combination constitutes a separate lexical item, without giving up the claim that the IC is aspectually licensed as an affectum (affected object).

The claim that both τέρηδε and ἡβίδε are affective verbs receives direct support from the existence of anticausative variants of these roots:

174a. ὐῡτ(τ)τέρηδε ἡβίδε ἀνθίβα. ‘Adha felt cold’ (literally: ‘Cold struck Adha’)
174b. ὐῡτ(τ)τέρηδε ἀνθίβα. ‘Adha felt sleepy’ (literally: ‘Sleep struck Adha’)

175a. ὀὖν γῆ-βα-α. ‘Day dawned’ (literally: ‘Daylight moved into view’)
175b. ὀὖν γῆ-βα-α. ‘Water is running/runs’

Here a syntactic difference emerges: anticausative τέρηδε is dyadic (174), while anticausative γῆ-βα is monadic (175). (174) has a psychological interpretation and displays the ‘psych-verb’ type of subject/object inversion (e.g. Sincerity frightened John). Similarly, (171a) has an antipassive variant (176a), which itself has a ‘psych-type anticausative (176b), fully parallel to (174).

176a. ἀνθίβα τερήδε ὁ τοῦ ὑγιεῖν ἴπτωσίν. ‘Adha was afraid of Ugwu’
176b. ἀνθίβα τερήδε ὁ τοῦ ὑγιεῖν ἴπτωσίν. ‘Fear of Ugwu struck Adha as frightening’

The alternants of τέρηδε in (171a) and (176a-b) follow from the triadic representation in (177a). This recalls Belletti and Rizzi’s (1986: 3) analysis of Italian psych-verbs of the piacere/preoccupare class in (177b), save for the compositional order of the internal arguments.

177a. [Vmax τέρηδε Τί Τί ὁ ὑγιεῖν ἴπτωσίν. ‘Adha felt cold’ (literally: ‘Cold stuck Adha’)
177b. [Vmax τέρηδε Τί Τί ὁ ὑγιεῖν ἴπτωσίν. ‘Adha felt sleepy’ (literally: ‘Sleep stuck Adha’)

Note that (177a) is the only example of its type, out of a dozen or so examples of τέρηδε. In his transformational analysis, it is a sole exception to his rule of Inherent Complement Movement, easily handled by a rule feature. But in the representational framework adopted here, τέρηδε is a genuine problem, since (177b) is a possible projection of the constituent morphemes.

There is, however, a fact about τέρηδε which has not been utilized thusfar: that its inherent complement is inalienably possessed (a body part). As in binding theory (e.g. GedDateFormat), inalienable possession entails referential nondistinctness encoded in thematic structure. This directly rules out the presuppositional structure of (178b), assuming that a causer and a (nonreflexive) affectum must be referentially distinct. An interesting minimal pair arises in this connection, comparing τέρηδε ἀνθίβα in (178b) and τέρηδε ἀνθίβα in (179).

178a. ὁ τερήδε ἀνθίβα ΑΝΘΙΒΑ ὑγιεῖν ἴπτωσίν. ‘Eze expected Ugwu’
178b. ὁ τερήδε ἀνθίβα ΑΝΘΙΒΑ ὑγιεῖν ἴπτωσίν. ‘Eze surprised Ugwu’

179. ὁ τερήδε ἀνθίβα ἴπτωσίν. ‘Eze expected Ugwu’
179. ὁ τερήδε ἀνθίβα ἴπτωσίν. ‘Eze surprised Ugwu’

In (178), ἀνθίβα in a separate predicate, headed by the locative preposition. As in (178), ἀνθίβα is inalienably possessed in (179); what differs is the possessor. On the standard assumption that the possessor, as a binder, must c-command its possessee/bindee, the observed data follow: Χόδε is the possessor of ἀνθίβα in (178), ὑγιεῖν is the possessor of ἀνθίβα in (179). Apart from τέρηδε ἀνθίβα, there are other examples of anticausative τέρηδε and ἡβίδε in which the subject is not the inherent complement, and which are not psych-verbs, but which involve inherent possession, as in (180). The crucial property in these examples which allows them to be analyzed as anticausative is the thematic identity of subject and object.

By happy accident, the label [Inherent Complement] stands mnemonically for inherent Case.

56Compare τερήδε μ’ στίχων μ’ α μ’ ‘I feel cold’ (literally ‘Cold is striking me’) and the collocate in Nigerian Pidgin English: Cold is hot run.

57The gloss of (176b) includes an implicit, deictic locatum, also seen in (176b) and (182), (183d-e).
180a. &ha:‘Adha became pregnant’
strike-Asp.caus
[literally: ‘Adha’s inside [was] struck (i.e. by semen)’]
b. &ha:‘Adha bled’
move-∅ Asp.caus
[literally: ‘Adha’s blood moved (out of her body/into view)’]

In (180a), the logical subject is perhaps the implicit argument, semen. In (180b), the logical subject is blood. In both, the surface subject is &ha, the possessor of the IC affectum.

There is class of dyadic predicates with &ha, exemplified in (181), where the inherent complement is clearly not the affectum. Noting that these examples (more fully listed in (184) below) all involve intentional activity, and extending the analysis of inherent possession in (178-80), one can treat predicates like those in (181) as triadic, with the implicit affectum ‘body’.

181. &ha:‘Adha escaped /ran away /ran fast (as if pursued)’
move-∅ Asp.caus
‘Adha hurried’

In other words, &ha in these examples is not so much anticausative as reflexively affecting, as in (182a), which has the exact flavor of Jackendoff’s famous English example in (182b):

182a. &ha moved [herself, i.e. intentionally] in a hurry on the run.

b. John rolled [himself, i.e. intentionally] down the hill.

In the skeletal lexical entries in (183-84), no&ha's examples with &ı̠ and &he are analyzed compositionally in terms of the aspectual predicate affect x plus independently attested lexical properties. (A much longer list of examples is given in Thomas 1913, vol. 2.)

183. &ı̠

a. triadic

&ı̠ (handcuffs/stocks) ‘imprison’
[ffect x = HANDCUFFS [come firmly into contact with y] ]
&ı̠ (palmfrond) ‘summon’ (by means of ritual palmfrond)
[ffect x = PALMFROND [come firmly into contact with y] ]
&ı̠ (criticism) ‘gossip about (someone), i.e. direct criticism at them’
[ffect x = CRITICISM [come firmly into contact with y] ]

b. affectum = body part
&ı̠ (‘expect’, i.e. turn one’s vision toward (takes Genuitive object)
[ffect x, x = EYESIGHT] [come firmly into contact with y] ]
e. eye

prepositional IC locatum = body part
&ı̠ ‘be surprising’
[come firmly into contact with EYES (of y) ]
&ı̠ ‘baffle, cause to gape’
in mouth
[come firmly into contact with MOUTH of y] ]

The anticausative variant of the English verb strike requires an instrument subject, while the instrument of the &ha verb &ı̠ is implicit. A better paraphrase might be ‘Semen struck Adha’s inside’ or ‘Semen struck Adha on her inside’.

This literal gloss is rendered awkward by the fact that the anticausative variant of the English verb strike ‘be surprising’ baffle, cause to gape’ requires an instrument subject, while the instrument of the &ha verb &ı̠ is implicit. A better paraphrase might be ‘Semen struck Adha’s inside’ or ‘Semen struck Adha on her inside’.

The agitative noun &ı̠ ‘wanderer, lost child, founding’ (Thomas 1913 vol 2: 345). In iv ‘1888 observes that the sentence in (176a) can also mean, idiomatically, ‘Adha is a refugee’.

196. &he:‘be pregnant’

‘become impregnated/be pregnant’
[ffect x, x = SEMEN [come firmly into contact with y, y = WOMB] ]

61The agentive noun &ı̠ ‘wanderer, lost child, founding’ (Thomas 1913 vol 2: 345). In iv ‘1888 observes that the sentence in (176a) can also mean, idiomatically, ‘Adha is a refugee’.

b. &he:‘be quiet/ignore (someone) i.e. by directing silence towards them’.

b. ‘be quiet/ignore (someone) i.e. by directing silence towards them’.

‘become impregnated/be pregnant’
[ffect x, x = SEMEN [come firmly into contact with y, y = WOMB] ]

62In (182a), &ha is a nominalization of &ı̠ ‘be bad’, so one expects it to mean ‘badness/bad result’, parallel to abstract nouns such as &ı̠ ‘brightness’ and &ı̠ ‘departure’ [for home], or to result nouns such as &ı̠ ‘wealth resulting from exchange’ [as opposed to &ı̠ ‘wealth resulting from exchange’]. &ı̠ ‘tribute, contribution’, &ı̠ ‘beauty’, &ı̠ ‘be impending’.

64I suspect these verbs simply mean ‘trade in livestock/slaves’, reducing to the type in (184c).
and 1988 makes it clear that this verb means to ride 'involuntarily ooze [mucus] from the nose'

66Cf. the Nigerian Pidgin English expression, from Gà À (a kà) Ìgà: ‘Lecture.
65although this inchoative predicate has an alternative, stative interpretation, it is underlyingly eventive: in 'to mention something' in their absence' (Green and
63above.
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60) ‘infectious’ case in rich case languages like Icelandic.) She derives (185a) from (185b), treating the animate experiencer Eze as an underlying object, but nothing in her analysis stops both alternants from being base-generated. Òwâlâà’s other examples are listed in (187a).
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64Possible roots for this reduplicated nominal: ‘unhook [e.g. a coconut]’ (Green and Green 1963: 228).
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excluding states and processes (e.g. *k'wu NKA 'grow old'), for which intentionality is irrelevant. A few of her examples ('cut oneself', 'break one's arm') involve events which qualify as unintentional just because they are reflexive; in the context of intentional action, the same predicates *k'wu MMD ('cut with a knife', *k'wu 'break by snapping') are nonreflexive (absent an overt anaphoric expression such as *de-ve-3 ya).

If the anticausative alternation externalizes the undergoer of a change of state, which is lexically an internal argument, then (185b) and (186b) are anticausative ('or ergative') and all the predicates in (187) similarly undergo the anticausative alternation, contra Nwachukwu (1987c: 113 ff.). As unintended (involuntary or spontaneous) events, these predicates do not p-select an external 'causer' argument, even if the 'undergoer' remains internal. This restriction is not, however, a fact about human language; rather it reflects facts of nature: the unintentional nature of coughing, raining, etc. In the familiar aspectual representation, all the predicates in (187) qualify as ergative, since they allow the externalization of an IC affectum. Nwachukwu's requirement that an ergative predicate should involve the deletion of an external causer obscures the more basic role of the affectum, and loses the idea that the semantic role of Causer (animate Instigator) is derived rather than underlying.

Nwachukwu (1987c: 118 ff., 112 ff.) restricts the term ergative (i.e. anticausative) in Igbo to simple predicates like *k'wu (which he glosses as 'cook') and complex predicates like *k'wu-wa 'split open by knocking'. These verbs display the following alternations:

188a. *šéři ọ-ni ọ-ghị 'Meat is cooking' (transitive or ergative)

b. *šéři ọ-ń ọ-ghị 'Meat is cooking' ('Meat is cooked', intransitive)

189a. *šéři k'wu-wa 'Meat split open [by knocking it]' (split open by knocking)

b. *šéři k'wu-wa gourd knock-split-2ASP gourd

Thus the gourd is split open as a result of knocking it.'

Nwachukwu (1976b: 125) observes that the anticausative alternant in (188b) has the tense interpretation of a stative verb: nonpast.

Wellmers 1968, Emene 1973, Ezieszekwu 1979 and Ọwalaaka 1982, the tense interpretation of a stative verb plus the -iV suffix (a dummy InfL, formed by partial reduplication of the verb and marking zero overt Aspect) as nonpast is predictable. Since inchoatives, as processes, are excluded from the class of 'unintentional events' ergatives in (185-87), the failure of inchoative statization and its nonpast tense effect for these verbs is predicted, without denying their ergative syntax.

Nwachukwu describes *wa which he glosses 'break', as 'strictly speaking an unergative verb, since it never governs an object'. He thereby claims that *wa is not the object of *wa in the V-V compound in (189a). This introduces a problem: how does *k'wu-wa come to mean 'split open by knocking' (or, less accurately, 'break by hitting')? Nwachukwu posits a lexical rule:

190. Causative Root + Unergative Root = Ergative (Nwachukwu 1987c: 99)

However, even if the stipulation in (190) were responsible for (190b), it is descriptively false. If (190) was correct, and *wa is intransitive (unergative), they why can't an indisputably unergative verb such as *wa 'split' combine with an indisputably 'causative' verb such as *wa 'shoot'? This particular compound is impossible in Igbo (191a), although a minimally different compound with *k'wu and the affecting transitive *k'wu 'cut/kill' is fine (191b).51


b. *Ezex k'wa-wa ọwụ. ọwụ.

In fact, (190) is unnecessary because the premise that *wa is inherently intransitive is false. Contrary to Nwachukwu's assertion quoted above, a transitive variant of *wa is commonplace, as in expressions like *wa *gị 'split up a kola nut [by separating its lobes]' and *wa *gị 'split apart a tuber of yam [as in the harvest ritual]'. Why then is it not possible to say *wa *n sọ 'as if to mean 'split the gourd'?' Evidently, gourds (unlike kola nuts and yams) don't split unless they are first knocked (k'wa), struck (t) or stepped on (ọwụ). A linguistic coding of real world pragmatics—rather than grammar—seems to be responsible for the pattern of data. On this point, cf. now van Voorst 1991."

Rejecting (190), the remaining hypothesis, in fact the null hypothesis for (189) is that *wa 'split' alternates between affecting and inchoative (anticausative), while *k'wu 'knock' is transitive. Projected together in an underlying serial construction, these yield both the interpretation and the surface form of (189a) compositionally, by V-incorporation:

[Come-forcefully-into-contact-with x] [Come-to-be-in-state y; f-SPLIT]


51The approximate equivalent of Igbo *k'wu-wa, is grammatical, cf. (191b) above.
The transitivity of V-V compounds

Igbo V-V compounds, as described by Igbo and Green 1970, Lord 1975, Ensminger 1984 and Nwachukuwa 1987c, fall into three logically possible classes, depending on whether the first or second member is a bound element, or neither (i.e. both are free).

The type with bound V1 is marginal if it exists at all. The closest candidates I can find are certain examples headed by a lu V that shows that; V1 combines with any intransitive verb. Of the many are transitive, affecting verbs with fully compositional semantics (193a). Other examples (possibly a majority) are weakly idiomatic, e.g. (193b), having both compositional and extended, non-compositional interpretations. The compounds in (193c) evidently involve the intransitive (and therefore nonaffecting) version of a, meaning not 'make' but 'act' or 'behave'.

In all the transitive readings, m is an aspectual operator affect, projecting as in (194). Syntactic head movement is predicted, since V1 governs V2 (the semantic relation between V1 and V2 is event-state), yielding the surface compound.

Although they differ in grammatical structure, the Ibo syntactic V-V compound kw-na is semantically parallel to the Yoruba lexical V-V compound na-RO 'stand upright' in (167), repeated below. Both express the event-state relation.
In (201), since a lexical constant which is not an inherent complement need not project, in general. How (203) differs from (201) is in the apparent causativization of V 2, the inchoative

203. *he shot Eze dead* (Lord 1975: 31)

204. *This pot will spring a leak* (Lord 1975: 31)

V 2 in (203b) arises directly by V-incorporation, since the individual verbs are respectively inchoative and unergative. The problem concerns (203c), which is affecting although the head verb *shoot* by itself does not independently have this potential, at least in the standard

Burzio 1981 assumes that the sole argument of an inchoative verb originates as its lexical causativization of *a* 'fall' as V 1:

**A second example from Marantz 1984 involves lexical causativization of *a* 'fall' as V 1:**

**Burzio 1981** assumes that the sole argument of an inchoative verb originates as its lexical causativization of *a* 'fall' as V 1:

203a. *da* *da* *fall* 'leak' *(cause to) spring a leak*  
  a. *lepi* *lepi* *da* *da* *da* *da* *da* *da*  
  pot Det Pros ing-fall-leak
  b. *lepi* *lepi* *da* *da* *da* *da* *da* *da*  
  pot Det Pros ing-fall-leak
  c. *lepi* *lepi* *da* *da* *da* *da* *da* *da*  
  Pros fall-leak. pot Det

203b. *da* *da* *eat* *(consume)* *(consume)* *(consume)* *(consume)* *(consume)*  
  *Kinfolk impoverish one*

NP 1 is p-selected by V 2 (as external argument). But (202) seems to violate the Projection Principle: the affectum of V 2 (probably *a* 'wealth') is suppressed. Here, as for inherent possession, I appeal to thematic nondistinctness: the external argument of V 2 is the (alienable) possessor of the affected (consumed) wealth. After V-incorporation, V 2 'inherits' the affectum of V 1. The lexical causativization of *a* 'fall' is "affix-mediated" (Marantz 1984) by V 1's aspectual operator *a*.

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  pot Det Pros ing-fall-leak
  c. *lepi* *lepi* *da* *da* *da* *da* *da* *da*  
  Pros fall-leak. pot Det

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  pot Det Pros ing-fall-leak
  c. *lepi* *lepi* *da* *da* *da* *da* *da* *da*  
  Pros fall-leak. pot Det

203b. *da* *da* *eat* *(consume)* *(consume)* *(consume)* *(consume)* *(consume)*  
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that one posits an underlying internal argument: NP1 in (205d). Since *Adhā *'fall' by itself is an intrinsic change of state, its sole argument necessarily externalizes. In a compound like (202), however, aspectual effects are observed. If, in (203) as in (202), V₂ can “inherit” the internal argument of V₁ as a result of V-incorporation, then NP₁ forms part of a derived lexical domain. The interpretation of NP₁ as an affected argument therefore arises, not from lexical affectedness, but compositionally in the syntax, yielding the ‘causativization’ in (203c).

Example (204) is of nearly the same type, except that there is no anticausative variant. This difference is expected, since V₂ is underlingly transitive, cf. (204c):

204a. ṭi-s-e-gbụ ‘fall’-‘cut/kill’ ‘suffocate’ (= kill by felling, or perhaps by falling on)
204b. Ọ gá ṭi-s-e-gbụ ọmaa‘Adhā will suffocate someone’
204c. ṭi-s-e-gbụ V-max

A final example from Ęmaanụ 1984 is given in (205):

205a. ọ-é rụ ‘take’-‘reach’
205b. ụ-é rụ yá ála ‘Eze watched carefully’
205c. ụ-é rụ V-max

\[ \text{[come-to-be-in-state } y, y=\text{DOWN} ] \quad \text{[affect } x, \text{[come-to-be-in-state } y, y=\text{DEAD} ] \]

We rụ in (205) resembles gbụ gbụ in (200) insofar as each verb has its own internal argument; it differs in that neither one is suppressible. The question is how to license both surface NPs.

For NP₂, V-incorporation poses no problem: it is an affectum both before and after the head-movement of V₂. And, as for NP₂, there is also no problem since—by contrast with what happens in (200)—it is not an affectum. The problem concerns the Case of ála which, not being an affectum is ineligible for Inherent Case by my previous assumptions.

My suggestion is that ála, as a locatum, is licensed much like the corresponding Yoruba examples in §2.1.4 above, e.g. (134b). The difference is that there is no preposition in (205b). However, it is relevant that ála ‘ground’ and its counterpart álu ‘sky/visible sphere’ are frequently used like the English adverbs down and up, with the apparent syntax of adjuncts (e.g. no Kasemarking: *Eze set his hunting snare on high [i.e. in a tree]. Adhā set hers on the ground’).

In the present example, the Projection Principle requires that *rụ ‘reach’ express an internal argument, so I am left with the proposal that, in (205), ála is thematically licensed as an argument, but Case-licensed as an adjunct.

From aspect to Case (an excursion on the lexical content of functional heads)

Unlike the Case-based parametrization in Baker 1989, I have shown that configurational differences between Ịgbọ and Yoruba are derivative of thematic structure and morphology if aspect is represented explicitly. Such a deduction is desirable, since it permits a general analysis of certain ill-understood Case-phenomena in Ịgbọ, in particular the antipassive perfective.

As with the V-V compound resultatives in standard Yoruba, the perfective verbform assigns Genitive case (in all Igbo dialects). It is therefore not surprising to observe that, in southern Igbo, the perfective is built on the Open Vowel Suffix, an element with nominal properties which appears as a kind of default object in the absence of a lexical complement. The perfective affix, which assigns Genitive case, contains so-called open vowel suffix, a kind of aspectual object. In consequence, the perfective is detransitivizing, specifically antipassive.

Conversely, Ęmaanụ 1984 claims that every verb which bears the -s suffix must have some complement, whether an object NP (direct or prepositional) or a Bound Verb Complement. If there is no lexical object, the BVC is obligatory (207b); if both occur, the predicate is emphatic (207c).

207a. ála-be-gụri ọjọ ụgbụ ọmaa ‘Adhā ate yam’
207b. ála-be-gụri ị ọjọ ụgbụ ọmaa BVC ‘Adhā ate [something, as expected]’
207c. ála-be-gụri ọjọ ụgbụ BVC (ẹọ) ‘Adhā (really) ate yam’

But with a perfective verb, i.e. a verb lacking an lexical -V suffix, the BVC is optional and functions as an emphazizer, whether or not a direct object is present:

208a. ála-be-gụri ọjọ ụgbụ BVC (ẹọ) ‘Adhā has eaten (of) yam’
208b. ála-be-gụri ọjọ ụgbụ BVC ẹọ ‘Adhā has eaten (something)’
208c. ála-be-gụri ọjọ ụgbụ BVC Gen ‘Adhā has really eaten (of) yam’

Čwalałaka 1982 shows that the OVS on the second verb in single or multi-event serial constructions is not a ‘consecutive marker’, cf. (209)–(210).

209a. álu yá ọmaa ụgbụ BVC (ẹọ) ‘Adhā peeled yams with a knife’
209b. álu yá ọmaa ụgbụ BVC ẹọ ‘Adhā went to market and bought clothes’
210. ḍẖa' gḥa-궈 ra ґo. bık.  ’Adha came running/on the run’

211. ḍẖa' gḥa-ۈɾ'a ґo. bık.  ’Adha ran and came’

Then, Borer’s observation implies that the first verb of the depictive serial (210) is morphologically stative, while the first verb of the consecutive (211) is not. The meaning of (210) is therefore something like ‘Adha was running (in a running state) when she came’.

Some Igbo grammarians (Green and Igwe 1963, Winston 1973, Nwokocha 1976b) distinguish two more or accidentally homophonous suffixes of phonetic shape -rV, based on their apparent occurrence in examples like (212b). It is possible, however, to simplify this picture. Gaenssel 1986 shows that Berber statives are systematically related to inchoatives; in Igbo, inchoatives like (213) can be derived affixationally from statives like (213a):

212a. ū nwe-e ęgu.  ’S/he was rich’ (Standard Igbo)

212b. ū nwe-e ęgu.  ’S/he was getting rich’ (Igbako dialect)

In (215a), the reason for the -rV suffixes, realized as a double vowel (by the syllabic application of the OCP, as exemplified in data (31a) of Chapter 1), but that this is not the case for consecutives like (211).
For the other class, comprising achievements, no such restriction is to be seen, and the basic complement of the →V form is a bound element derived from the root directly in the syntax (be afraid, starve). It is striking that ordinary transitive verbs fall in the latter class, just in case their lexical object should be suppressed (e.g., eat something expected).

Although Igbo and Italian differ syntactically in many respects, including the selectional properties of clitics and auxiliaries, it is striking (and, in general, confirms Burzio’s analysis) that they should show a comparable lexical-semantic difference. In Igbo, with its rich variety of intransitive verb complements, the difference between the intransitive classes is related to the direct object position much more clearly and directly than it is in Italian or English.

Confining the matter to lexical projections, this gives the following, revised picture for the two classes, where co-indexing marks a lexical dependency among morphemes, and disjoint indexing marks its absence:

![Diagram](image)

One idea which is latent—if not exactly leading—in Chomsky’s discussions of the Projection Principle (1981) and Principle of Full Interpretation (1986b) can be called WYSIWYG morphology. This is the simple, presumably null, hypothesis that the structure of a string directly equals the total configurational (i.e. projected) properties of the morphemes present therein. The WYSIWYG idea has been variously implemented by Braine 1980, Borer 1984, and Manzini and Wexler 1987, among others. WYSIWYG explicitly informs Chapters 1 and 2; in this chapter, it is the guiding thread through a range of constructions in Igbo and its Kru and Benue-Kwa neighbors. The same question recurs throughout: what does surface morphology contribute to interpretation?

Chapter 1 implicitly appealed to the WYSIWYG principle, so as to constrain the analysis of tonal morphemes. The effect was to rule out floating tones—elements without morphological category—and the tone rules which they serve to trigger diacritically, from the analysis of word- and phrase-level pitch alternations. Chapter 2 applied a WYSIWYG perspective to complex predicates. Serial and double-object constructions, and V-V/V-N compounds were all represented as extended thematic domains, compositionally derived through the concatenation of lexical categories. In all the above analyses, three constraints on representations proved to be central:

- Marantz’ 1984 restriction of (semantic)-selection to internal arguments, and a related restriction of (predicate)-selection to external arguments;
- Lieber’s (1981) constraint against homophonous elements sharing the same syntactic category; and
- Tenny’s (1986) aspectual constraint on the projection of lexical properties (here formalized in terms of Hale’s Lexical Conceptual Structure).

While it is hard to imagine a morpheme-based account of projection which does not hold some version of these constraints, it is also easy to find counterexamples. On closer examination, however, these are not as devastating as they first appear. For the most part they simply beg the question, by confronting the constrained analysis with the relatively stipulative and probably unexamined account which is implicit in the counterexample.

The three [tʃ]’s of English are often cited as knock-down counterevidence to Lieber’s proposal on homophony. However, as they do not share syntactic category, they are not excluded. Without Lieber’s constraint, the two [pɹɪə]’s? If pair is a noun just like pear, then they are a counterexample; but if pair is a classifier—a referentially deficient noun—then the facts may be consistent with the constraint. At least, it is worth checking whether other problem cases have similar special characteristics. Less trivial are potential homophones involving ‘functional’ categories: for (preposition/complementizer), to (preposition/infinitive prefix), multiple -ing. Without Leiber’s constraint,
these issues aren’t even posed. To evaluate the WYSIWYG framework, therefore, the consequences of the non-WYSIWYG alternative—especially the loss of generalization—must be recognized.

To exclude diacritic homophony, the hallmark of underanalysis, some kind of WYSIWYG principle is indispensable. In the Benue–Kwa languages, where many inflectional and derivational morphemes are composed of just a single vowel, of a tone, or of a toneless syllable reduplication, a hypothesis such as Lieber’s is indispensable fuel for analysis.

This chapter considers three examples of how functional categories (respectively: aspect, Comp, person/number) work in the grammar of Igbo and its neighbors. First, some general remarks.

The function of functional categories

In direct consequence of the theory of head movement/incorporation—starting with Emmons 1970 and unpublished work by MCA’Nulty, and continuing with Koopman 1983, Travis 1984, Baker 1985 and Chomsky 1980—it seems inevitable that syntactic analyses in the 1990’s will represent an ever larger set of grammatical morphemes (tense, person, number, case, negation, modality, aspect, degree…) as syntactic heads projecting their own phrase-level structures. The ‘arrival’ of this perspective in the Barriers framework (Chomsky 1986a) gave a central role to the IP and CP projections. Not long thereafter, however, it was noticed (e.g. by Weerman 1988) that the phrasal projections of functional heads—as compared with the more familiar lexical phrases—raise a conceptual problem of licensing. Why is head-to-head movement of a lexical category into one or more functional categories obligatory, across a wide variety of instances, to a much greater extent than the corresponding type of movement to a lexical category (e.g. N-incorporation into V)?

I believe the answer, at base, to be that lexical and functional categories inherently differ in optionality, and thus do the licensing relationships into which they enter. Considered individually, lexical categories are optional elements in the sense that each is drawn from a large, open morpheme-class (the set of animate nouns of stative verbs etc.). As a practical matter, functional categories (e.g. complementizers, tense and agreement elements, casemarkers and determiners) present the reverse picture. As closed-class elements, they have a quasi-obligatory status—at least in a given construction. Certainly there are some limited choices to be made among functional elements (e.g. past vs. nonpast tense, definite vs. indefinite determiner), but even these are partly constrained by constructional factors (e.g. tense harmony in embedded clauses, the ‘definiteness effect’ in predication). As the limiting case, at least some functional elements (especially Comp, Agr and morphological case)—whether null or overt in a given language—are virtually invariant and obligatory across construction types.

There is a second, possibly contradictory observation: lexical and functional categories also differ with respect to cross-linguistic variation. The four major lexical categories (V, P, A, N) are relatively universal: there are no languages without V and N. Although P and A are marginal, closed categories in Kwa, they aren’t totally absent from Kwa lexicons. By contrast, Fukui (1986, 1987) claims that Japanese completely lacks Infl, Comp and Det elements, and that the restricted applicability of ‘inl-movement’ in that language follows from the parametric absence of these morpheme categories. A second instance: closely related Romance languages differ in the featural content of the functional element of agreement (cf. Jäggi 1988, Roberge 1986, Roberge and Vinet 1990). To date, by far the most sweeping program of typological explanation in terms of the interaction of functional elements is sketched by Fassi-Fehri (1991a, b).

Igbo linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits

Why should obligatory elements be so variable, and optional elements so stable, from one language to another? This paradox of distribution and function between the two types of categories—a paradox undoubtedly related to the difference in optionality among individual morphemes of the respective types—poses a potential dilemma for parametric research. Cross-linguistic differences in functional categories are as readily expressed in terms of the presence/absence of an element, as they are in terms of variation in an element’s form and/or function. For example, there probably exists no direct evidence which could decide between an analysis involving a null Determiner with default content (to be specified), and one where the D-projection is simply absent. Larson’s (1988) postulation of null lexical heads triggering head movement in the double object construction has been criticized as diacritic (cf. §2.1.1 above); the same criticism cannot be made for functional heads, if they are truly universal (cf. Whitman et al. 1990).

In the generative grammatical tradition, the postulation of a universal set of categories—a set which is maximally inclusive in principle, though necessarily based on an incomplete cross-linguistic survey at any given stage of research—is a familiar and time honored epistemological stratagem. To avoid the potential circularity of this move, however, requires some claims as to the ‘functions’ of the various functional categories. Such claims would motivate null functional elements and simultaneously explain the obligatoriness of head movement into them.

Hale (1988, 1989) makes a specific proposal in this direction. Extending proposals by Braine, Fukui and Abney among others, he defines a set of four functional heads (C, I, K, D) as representing the semantic functions of ‘reference’ and ‘relationality’, respectively for verbal and nominal projection systems. Marrying this account to the locality-based grammar of Kayne 1984 and Koster 1986, the licensing relations among heads at the three levels can be viewed as the formation of ‘dynasties’—Koster’s term for extended government domains—along paths projected by the lexical features [–N, –V] in Hale’s functional domains. The resulting picture is given in (1).
Another potential instance of Hale’s licensing framework for functional categories is the oft-observed correlation between focus and other wh-dependencies, both of which are localized in the specifier position of CP. If, by hypothesis, Comp has a relational function, then its specifier is the postulation of zero morphemes in particular languages or constructions which lack overt elements in than clear what counts as a determiner, and what kind of nominal inflections count as Kase.

Consider then the Kru/Kwa inventory of functional elements and their correlated grammatical properties (to be compared with the corresponding chart for lexical categories in [§2.1.2].)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>positive traits</th>
<th>negative traits</th>
<th>feature analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. ‘factative’ constructions or temporal ambiguity</td>
<td>no Tense affixes</td>
<td>[- N, + V]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. optional WH-movement</td>
<td>no/for-Complementizer, no ECM</td>
<td>[- N, - V]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. embedded subject/object clitics contrast with N0 pronomins</td>
<td>no-θ-Agreement</td>
<td>[+ N, + V] [- F]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. ‘associative’ constructions</td>
<td>no obligatory Determiner, no obligatory Possessive marker</td>
<td>[+ N, - V]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

that \( \lambda_n \) lacks an \( \text{Infl} \) node, so that Verb-second occurs in \( \text{Asp} \). When no overt \( \text{Asp} \) morpheme is projected, an evanescent verb is ambiguous between past and perfective (i.e. present perfect). This is close to the evanescent ambiguity found in \( \lambda_r \) except that the relevant feature is not \( \text{[past]} \) but whatever underlies perfectivity, perhaps a feature like [defaulted] (cf. Tenney 1985). All these Kwa languages have exceptionless verb-second order in main clauses.

Finally: like \( \lambda_g \), Kru languages such as \( \lambda_n \) project \( \text{Infl} \) with no obligatory constituents; the factative morpheme in most dialects is simply a low tone (recalling the low tone plus \( -t^\text{en} \) in \( \lambda_g \)). Koopman 1984 argues that V-to-I movement in Kru is blocked by the presence of an Aux. But Marchese (1979: 127) observes that negative imperfective morphemes are never Auxes in the required sense, i.e. that negative imperfective \( \text{Asp} \) always fails to block V-to-I movement. Why should this be? In other words, what drives V-to-I movement?

### Aspect and Visibility

Following Fabb 1984, Roberts (1985a,b,c) accounts for aspectual auxiliaries in terms of visibility: a verb is a licit \( \theta \)-assigner iff it is visible to \( \text{Infl} \). As mentioned directly above, a category is visible if it belongs to a dynasty of governors which agree in \( \{\text{an}, -\text{aV}\} \), and which includes a member which is referential. In this way, the thematic content of the verb acquires potential reference.

Roberts 1985a analyzes auxiliaries as verbs which, lacking \( \theta \)-grids, cannot be visible to \( \text{Infl} \) at \( s \)-structure; conversely, \( \theta \)-role assigners must be. Modern English aspectual and modal Auxes are \( s \)-structure constituents of \( \text{Infl} \): they “invert” by raising to \( \text{Comp} \) in root questions (Has John left?; Can John leave?) and occur outside negation (John has not left; John can not leave). In Germanic languages with “rich” agreement, main verbs raise to \( \text{Infl} \) (and \( \text{Comp} \)) in the absence of an Aux, and Roberts accordingly suggests that V-to-I movement is required by visibility, because a main verb in \( \text{situation} \) is not visible to affinal \( \text{Agr} \). That is, agreement is parametrically morphological in verb-second languages, but syntactic in Modern English with its comparatively impoverished agreement system. Roberts observes (1985a: 51, fn. 8) that this framework needs elaboration for English aspectual verbs which, unlike modals, display \( q \)-feature agreement (has, is) and occur with non-finite (participial) affixes (-ing, -en). That is, aspectuals unlike modals are morphologically governed by \( \text{Infl} \). He suggests that aspectuals but not modals resemble main verbs in a crosscutting property: selection, i.e. the ability to license a \( d \)-structure complement. Roberts 1985b places aspectuals in the \( V \)-grid as modifiers, hence governed by \( \text{Infl} \) at \( d \)-structure and in the domain of affix hopping.

(3) Modern English verb classes (after Roberts 1985a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( s )-structure ( \theta )-assigner under ( \text{Infl} )</th>
<th>( d )-structure ( \theta )-assigner under ( \text{Infl} ) selects complement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>main verbs</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aspectuals</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>modals</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) requires English aspectual Auxes to move to \( \text{Infl} \) from the \( V \)-grid. For concreteness, assume that \( \text{Asp} \) is a functional category with its own \( d \)-structure projection. Since \( \text{Asp} \) is not a lexical category, by the Projection Principle it cannot directly and exhaustively dominate thematic content. But if \( \text{Asp} \) raises to \( \text{Infl} \) head-to-head, it becomes morphologically governed in the affix hopping domain.

A formal implementation of Welmers’ factative idea suggests itself in the context of visibility-driven V-to-I movement. Suppose, in the spirit of the Barriers framework, that parametric variation in aspectual constituency of \( \text{Infl} \) yields structural constraints on movement. This requires us to assume that aspect morphemes, like main verbs, are subject to head movement, rather than base-generated in \( \text{Infl} \) as argued by Koopman 1984. The logic of \( X \)-theory requires in turn that there be a category \( \text{Asp}(\text{v}) \) which heads its own projection, call it \( \text{AsP} \), which is intermediate between the lexical \( V \)-projection and the \( \text{Infl} \) domain. For concreteness, I adopt the phrase structure proposals of Fukui 1986, essentially as follows:

- Functional projections are “closed” at the two-bar level iff the functional head contains a \( (f-) \)-feature which assigns Case to the Specifier position;
- Otherwise, they are closed at the one-bar level, and;
- Lexical projections iterate \( A \)-positions at the one-bar level.

(4a) represents V-to-I as head-movement (adjunction, or syntactic affixation). This view differs from Koopman’s 1984 concept of V-to-I as substitution (\( NP \)-type movement). Koopman motivates V-to-I for reasons of Nominative Case assignment, parallel to standard views of Passive as driven by “Case retraction”. For Roberts, the motivation is the Projection Principle: a main verb in second position directly and exhaustively dominated by I could not discharge its lexical content as driven by “Case retraction”. For Roberts, the motivation is the Projection Principle: a main verb in second position directly and exhaustively dominated by I could not discharge its lexical content as driven by “Case retraction”.

The representations in (4) suggest correlations between the inventory of \( \text{Asp} \) morphemes in tenseless Kru/Kwa, and word order differences. Language-particular restrictions on head movement of the verb from predicate-final position to ‘second position’ follow from differences in the parametric choice of category which serves as the functional head of S. Nor should this be surprising, since \( \text{Asp} \) is increasingly recognized that variation in the morphological constituency of \( \text{Infl} \) has parametric consequences for word order (cf. Koster 1986b, Pollock 1987, Lema 1988, Fassi-Fehri 1991a,b).

The Kru/\( \lambda_g \) factative phenomenon concerns the appearance of a default affix on the verb in second position, just in case \( \text{I} \neq \emptyset \) and \( \text{Asp} \neq \emptyset \). The apparent insertion of ‘dummy’ or resumptive Kase-bearing elements which save ECP violations is well known with possessors and Prepositional objects, i.e. the Kase in question may be either Genitive (Who do you suspect that I don’t like kris face?) or Accusative (What do you regret that I said Bill said it to Jane?) in \( \lambda_r \). Analogous effects occur with \( wh \) extractions of locative phrases like \( \text{where?} \), except that the
resumptive element is not a Kase (in argument position) but a Kase-assigner (t), cf. Carstens 1986, Šenayya 1987. At a further typological remove is English do-insertion. Factative morpheme insertion, viewed as a type of categorial 'support', differs from these more familiar examples in three ways. (i) It involves licensing by a functional head (Infl) rather than a lexical one (V or P). (ii) The ECP is invoked not by wh-movement but by X0 movement. (iii) It is Nominative rather than Accusative or Genitive which is assigned by the dummy.

These three differentiate spécifie are all expected, within the following scenario:

5. Factative morphemes fill empty Asp (making it pronounceable and a proper governor) in order to license head movement through the intervening maximal projection AsP, permitting the verb to raise to Infl for reference/visibility. (5) explains why the presence of a nonlexical aspect morpheme (negation, future or imperfective in Kru, all of these plus perfective in Igbo) is sufficient to block the appearance of the factative morpheme: a filled Asp provides a 'head movement escape hatch' for the Verb on its way to Infl. The factative morpheme itself, however, has no semantic content; when the verb raises to Infl , what triggers the relevant tense interpretation is the so-called 'Davidsonian' event argument, rather than any Tense morpheme. Notice that (5) is excluded, if aspect morphemes are base-generated in Infl, as Koopman standardly assumes.

Asp is embedded inside Infl, not the reverse. Unlike Tense or t-feature agreement, Aspect shares a semantic property with the lexical predicate it embeds. Tenny 1987 has characterised this property in terms of event structure. Evidently, an event can be inherently delimited (e.g. died), or it can be delimited by lexical or by functional material (respectively: went home or has gone). Interestingly, of the three possibilities, languages vary only with respect to the third type of delimitedness. Igbo, for example, has no perfective morpheme. Suppose that a feature [+delimited] is involved in all three cases. Then the "predicate-internal" property of Aspect, as opposed to Tense (which is strictly external), is reflected in the fact that Tense morphemes are always affixes, but Aspect morphemes can in principle be either affixes or words (i.e. Auxes).

3.1.1 Kru
In both Kru and Igbo are observed both O V and V O surface word orders. In both languages, however, there is evidence that the d-structure complement of V is projected to its left. Gerunds and control complements provide prima facie evidence for deep O V order in Kru:

6. (vōkə)
   a. Kọfr{'n} ẹ̀kọ̀ 'sí 'sí
      S O V-ING 'Kofi’s rice eating'
   b. N ọjọ ẹ̀kọ̀ ìlō 'kọ̀mọ̀
      S Aux [xp O V] V 'I will go eat rice'

   1sg Fut for rice eat for leave

Similar evidence in Igbo is presented by Teller 1987.

As described by Marchese and Koopman, surface order in "finite" clauses has a V-2 pattern. In the factative construction, the order is always V O, for both eventive and noneventive verbs:

7. (vōkə)
   a. N ọjọ ẹ̀kọ̀
      S V + particle O 'I ate rice'
   b. N ọjọ ẹ̀kọ̀
      S V + particle O 'I know that…'

As already mentioned, Koopman 1984 hypothesises that surface V O order correlates with the lack of a d-structure Infl that can assign Nominative Case (i.e. an "Aux"), thus V-to-I movement resembles NP movement in passive (which is also "Case-driven"). This raises two questions.

First, what Case-assigning feature distinguishes the set of 'weak' Infls (which require V-movement) from the set of 'strong' Infls (which prevent V-movement)? This is vital if we would avoid a circular definition of this feature, based solely on the occurrence of V-to-I movement (or its lack). I do not believe that this question has yet received an answer.

The second question, neutral with respect to the answer given to the first, is more theory-internal. If V-to-I movement is motivated by weak Infl (as Koopman proposed), then is it subject to the Head Movement Constraint? That is, can we say that even a weak Infl governs the Verb trace, and if so what is the configuration of the complex Infl which contains the Verb, and why doesn’t a strong Infl also license head movement? Alternatively, to escape this contradiction, the question can be asked in reverse: if V-movement is blocked by a strong Infl (which is the only other possibility), what prevents this movement?

Pollock 1987 holds that V-to-I movement of lexical verbs in English is blocked by "non-rich" (i.e. weak) Agreement, assuming that only strong agreement (as in French) can project the d-grid of an incorporated Verb. Apart from the problematic use of "richness" to describe French Agr, since this "richness" is still not sufficient to license the kind of subject "pro-drop" (found in other Romance languages with essentially the same freedom of V-to-I movement), and noting that neither Igbo nor the Kru languages exhibit any morphological agreement whatsoever, Pollock’s percolation hypothesis can nevertheless be adapted to the present problem, intuitively as follows.

If a "strong" Infl has significantly more of a certain property [+p] than a weak Infl does, then by standard assumptions about percolation (e.g. Lieber 1982), the presence of [+p] in the head of an incorporation structure will prevent the incorporated element from projecting its own [+p]. Concretely, a "full-fledged" Aux will block the incorporation of a Verb, whereas a "defective" Aux will, assuming that the first two categories share some property [+p] which is lacking in the third. Once again, we must be careful not to define this property in a circular manner.

In the languages at hand, [+p] is neither of the category Agr nor Tense, since neither of these is morphologically present. In other words, if these morphemes are absent, then their functional projections (called AgrP and FP in Chomsky 1988) are equally lacking. Although Fukui has argued that zero elements can head functional projections (1986: 179 fn. 20), this possibility is construction-specific and not parametric; otherwise, it would be necessary to hold that empty elements are proper governors, so as to allow these heads to trigger incorporation. Such a situation seems self-evidently unlearnable.

I propose that both questions about Koopman’s generalization are answered if the F(unctional)-feature in question is [delimited]. This feature is defined by Tenny 1987 as a property of predicates, either inherently (eat an apple) or through thematic composition (walk to the store). By definition, both perfect and imperative (for completive, cf. Wilkinson 1977, Johnson 1985) aspect are [delimited]. It then follows that only a [+delimited] auxiliary blocks V-movement in Kru.

Koopman says that V-to-I movement occurs unless Infl contains an Aux. This complementarity is seen in (8). "Particles" occur with V O order (8a-b), while "Auxes" occur with O V order (8c-e).
Marchese 1979, however, shows that maintaining the Aux/particle dichotomy independently—on grounds other than word order—is not a straightforward matter. Consider the following:

9. (Neyo, Eastern Kru; tone marking uncertain in source)

a. N ṣaká 1sg [eat] ‘I ate rice’

b. N ṣaká 1sg [eat] ‘I am eating rice’

c. N ṣaká 1sg [eat-IMP] ‘I will eat rice’

d. Ṣ Aux O V ‘I have eaten rice’

e. Ṣ Aux O V ‘I do not want rice’

If complementarity holds, then the NEG morpheme in (9a) is an Aux, while the imperfective NEG morpheme in (9b) is not. According to Marchese (1979: 147), my trans.), utterances referring to habitual or generic actions do not form an auxiliary-type negative. Conversely, all utterances with a factitive or perfective verb in the affirmative take an auxiliary-type negative. In several languages, the non-auxiliary form is also used for utterances describing durative actions, i.e. in the imperfective.

Two questions now arise, one descriptive and one theoretical. Descriptively, (9c) is indeed “factative” in the sense given to this term by Wolmers 1973. The verb ‘have’ is lexically stative, so that the factitive (unsuffixed) form has a nonpast interpretation. And as predicted, the order of “factative” in the sense given to this term by Welmers 1973. The verb ‘have’ is lexically stative, so that the factitive (unsuffixed) form has a nonpast interpretation. And as predicted, the order of

8. 

(NEG) (Aux, V) (l- (a-) ) ( [+ Tns] ) (REL) (NEG) (rice)

- 11. 

[IP  s/he [I PERF + finish] [VP  clothes wash] ]

180 1sg [eat+IMPF] rice

3sg PERF clothes stop

3sg PERF clothes wash stop

3sg PERF finish clothes wash

Aspec tually speaking, (10a) and (10b) are a near-minimal pair. While ‘stop’ is clearly the main verb in (10b), the main verb of (10b) is arguably ‘wash’ rather than ‘finish’. In this case, the s-structure of (10b) is closer to (11), consistent with the complementarity hypothesis:

11. 

[ s/he [PERF + finish] [VP clothes wash] ]

But even if the above is correct, there is a second question: whether Koopman’s complementarity hypothesis can be maintained in terms of the Case-assigning property. Otherwise, some other motivation for V-to-I movement, besides Nominative Case assignment, needs to be found.

Given Marchese’s description, the only way to maintain that OV vs. VO complementarity is determined by Case-assigning ability, is to explain why, across the Kru language family, durative morphemes lack the ability to assign Case, while perfective morphemes (as well as factitive—i.e. inflectionally null—negatives) have this ability. In other words:

12. Why should the Aux vs. particle (or [ ± Case-assigner ] ) distinction be aspectually based? Alternatively, if Case is not the motivating property for V-movement, then aspect itself must have some movement correlate.

In addition to lacking motivation for the Aux/particle distinction, the complementarity hypothesis as stated by Koopman lacks an account of Infl as the projection of some syntactic feature, or complex of features. Anachronistically, we can ask what is the head of IP. This turns out not to be a simple matter. In matrix clauses, the morphological constituents of Infl, namely Tense and (Subject) Agr, are both lacking throughout the Kwa languages, as a parametric matter. A careful reading of Koopman and Marchese suggests the same for Kru.

Recall the surface constituents of Infl in V ṣaká and Gbadi (Koopman 1984: 30):

13a. ṣaká: [NEG [Aux, V] (1-sg)] [(+- Trs)] (REL) ]

b. Gbadi: [NEG [Aux, V] (clitic) [(+- Trs)] (1-sg) (FOC) Q ]

Which of these is responsible for the IP projection at d-structure? There is good reason to regard NEG as aspectual (irrealis), and Focus/Relative markers are likely copular, thus members of the category V. In any case, both are optional.

From Koopman's description, both the adverbial particle ‘still’ and the polarity item ‘ever’ (cf. (15)) are clearly affixes on the Imperfective and NEG Auxes. And they are optional.

Kru Agr is zero by Koopman’s own argumentation. There is a tradition of analysis which treats subject clitics as agreement markers, but since these are not obligatory, they do not suffice to project IP. This leaves Tense as the only candidate for the head of IP.

The V ṣaká ‘tense’ system (Koopman 1984: 30) is so rich that it appears to be adverbial, with meanings like ‘today’, ‘eventually’ and ‘long ago’ (this was also Wolmers’ view). Barring coincidence, there is apparent underanalysis of the tones of these elements, since both past (x) and future (wa) ‘same day’ elements bear L tone, while ‘one day or more’ bear M tone in both past and future (x) and (x), and ‘remote’ past and future both bear raised-M tone (wa and x). In Gbadi, the sole ‘tense’ elements (x) and (x) are both [+past]. But, fatally for the hypothesis that [+-Trs] projects IP, they are optional in the factative construction (cf. also Koopman 1984: 30, fn. 2). The factative (cf. Marchese 1979: 132ff) is marked by a tonal alternation in the main verb stem, generally an L tone. This L tone triggers a [+past] interpretation for nonstative verbs as in (14).

14. Ṣ Aux [eat+IMPF] ‘I ate rice’

3sg NEG rice want

Recall the surface constituents of Infl in V ṣaká and Gbadi (Koopman 1984: 30):
3.1.2

Unlike Kru, Igbo shows V O order regardless of whether or not an Aux occurs:

16a. S V O

\[ Mə jə jə \]

1sg eat rice 'I ate/have eaten rice'

b. S Aux VO

\[ Mə jə jə jə \]

1sg Impf eat rice OR 'I am (in the process of) eating rice'

c. S Aux VO

\[ Mə jə jə jə \]

1sg going to eat rice

d. S Aux VO

\[ Mə jə jə jə \]

1sg Neg eat rice

e. S Aux VO

\[ Mə jə jə jə \]

1sg Neg.Impf eat rice OR 'I am not (in the process of) eating rice'

f. S Aux VO

\[ Mə jə jə jə \]

1sg Neg arrive eat rice

g. S Aux VO

\[ Mə jə jə jə \]

1sg Prog Impf eat rice

\[ Mə jə jə jə jə \]

1sg Prog.Impf arrive eat rice

\[ Mə jə jə jə jə \]

1sg just about to be eating rice

18.

\[ (18), where the higher verb, which selects for a VP complement, is affixed to the lower one:

19. S Aux VO

\[ Mə jə jə jə \]

1sg H [\[ Mə jə jə H \] ]

20. S Aux VO

\[ Mə jə jə jə \]

1sg H [\[ Mə jə jə H \] ]

The macron in (11) indicates accentual lowering of a tone, thus a ‘local downstep’ which is restricted to exactly one tone-bearing unit. (A similar process in Bantu languages has been called ‘Meeuwsen’s Rule’, and I will adopt this label for convenience.)

Notice that Meeuwsen’s Rule applies in two directions: leftward from V to Aux (16b, d and probably f); rightward from Aux to V (16c and probably also h) and not at all in (16g). The direction would follow from the relation of government under the ‘affix = head’ notion of morphology, if V is incorporated into Aux, and if the Aux word itself can be recursively built of Aux morphemes. In (16b,d,f), the moved verb downsteps the Asp to which it suffixes. In (16c), the reverse order indicates that it is ‘arrive’ which functions as an affix in its aspectual meaning (crucially, it is also a main verb, as indicated in the gloss). In (16h), there are two morphemes in Asp: Prog and Impf; plausibly, Prog modifies Impf, and hence downsteps it.

In the initial version of this study, (17) was taken as evidence for Meeuwson’s Rule applying within the VP projection, assuming that [begin to eat] is a complex predicate. But I am now convinced by Marco Haverkort that the lowering effect in (17) is due, not to the trace of the moved verb, but to a sentence-final negative high tone. This tone is also seen in negative WH-questions, where it is borne by an interrogative element [e], producing trealis aspect predication-internally:

21a. S V O

\[ Mə jə jə jə \]

1sg begin eat rice 'I have (already) started to eat rice'

b. S V O

\[ Mə jə jə jə \]

1sg NEG begin eat rice

The lack of complementarity in (16) is incompatible with Koopman’s hypothesis about V-to-I movement. Interestingly for the alternative (aspecual) hypothesis about V movement, there is no perfective Auxiliary in the language. The glosses in (16-17) show that every example with a perfective (present perfect) interpretation also has a [past] eventive interpretation. This ambiguity is systematic, to the best of my knowledge, in both affirmative and negative sentences.

22. S V O

\[ Mə jə jə jə jə \]

1sg NEG arrive market 'I didn’t arrive/haven’t arrived at market'
If this phenomenon is related to variable binding, reminiscent of effects discussed by Halk 1988, the subject- WH counterpart of (17) should show the Meeuwsen-type lowering, thus predicting (23). [Note: (23) has not been observed, but is hypothetical for the time being.]

23. C kọ ọ sọ sọ ọdụ ọtụ. Wh (has) started to eat rice?

In serial constructions, aspectual elements are obligatorily doubled as in (24):

24a. M ọ ọ sọ sọ ọdụ ọtụ. I will give rice to Yapi

1sg FUT take rice IMPF give

b. Yapi ọ ọ sọ sọ ọdụ ọtụ. Yapi won't be able to go

NEG FUT have power NEG FUT go

c. M ọ ọ sọ sọ ọdụ ọtụ. I won't be able to give

1sg NEG FUT have power NEG FUT take rice NEG FUT give rice to Yapi

The doubled aspect-word is an exact copy in negative sentences (24b-c), although not in affirmative sentences, e.g., (24a). If serial constructions are complex predicates composed of adjoined lexical projections, then aspect copying shows that Verb movement is required by something other than Nominative Case assignment, for a single instance of Aux in second position would suffice to Casemark a single subject. If subject agreement were operating in this language, one might argue that each verb in a serial construction has to bear the same ϕ-features, perhaps as a condition on same-subject interpretation. But the agreement option is not morphologically exercised in ãgbọ.

I propose that the "serial aspect copying" in (24) is forced for the same reason that verb movement is exceptional in the language: there is no [+delimited] aspect morpheme, and serial constructions contain multiple lexical projections, each of which contains a token of this aspect feature (whether inherently or compositionally).

Wellmer 1977 (cited by Marchese 1982) records a similar fact in Western Kru:

25. Ọ ọ ọ sọ sọ ọdụ ọtụ. He's going to cook meat (Dewoin)

I would be surprised only if such doubling occurred with a [ = delimited ] (i.e. perfective) aspect morpheme. If so, then some sort of Infl to Asp lowering would be the remaining possibility.

3.1.3 ãgbọ

In ãgbọ, Finneian 1981 identifies Aux-likes which mean 'before, previously' (cf. data (44) in Chapter 2.) However, in no dialect is Tense an obligatory constituent of Infl. Rather, if no Asp morpheme projects in a sentence, the factative interpretation arises: past if eventive, nonpast if noneventive. And, factativity, like overt aspect but unlike tense, interacts with transitivity.

ãgbọ dialects vary in the surface patterns of elements occupying argument positions. For some speakers, every indicative verb must have a complement, whether an object or a Bound Verb Complement. If both occur, the predicate is emphatic. This gives a paradigm like (26).

<i>3.1.3 ãgbọ</i>

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The southern Igbo perfective suffix with its harmonizing -ile-segment (-/-i-/-i-/-i-/-i-) analytically signals a delimited event in (30). The OVS occurs in a number of other verb forms, all of which assign Genitive ("associative") Case to the direct object in a serial construction. The tenseless, perfective morpheme -ile- is also used in the nonimperative. In most of northern Igbo, the perfective suffix is -ile (in ãgbọ), -ile, probably the aspectual -ile-segment "finish" plus the "open vowel suffix" -i. Note also that Meinhold et al. (1932: 49) describe a perfect suffix -ile in Proto-Bantu.

[i]-er is actually the synchronic form of the verb 'give' in ãgbọ.
Asp-t had stayed here
V3 NP i [notes]

1989 suggest that the H-tone which appears with the exception of
3.1.5 Finite verbs in Indo-European

imperfective is marked for Tense, a deictic or referential category, by a morpheme which also
functions as a Determiner; the aorist is marked for aspect; and both forms carry agreement.

This dependency argues that aspect is morphologically inside agreement. (As one is a prefix and

Watkins 1969 further analyses the primary desinence -ti as composed of 3sg. (secondary) agreement
vowel (e), 3sg. inflected forms of the verb /b h e r -/ 'carry' would have the following structure:

Although these are string-vacuous in effect. Second: the -i particle in (36a), like other Kase-
marking determiners, projects an obligatory (nonvacuous) Specifier position, on the side opposite its
selected complement. The extraposed surface position of AgrP in (36a) indicates that, within a DP,
this maximal projection is a potential argument, as befits its essentially nominal character. 3

b. aorist: 'NPj carried NPj'

33a. 
\[ e-bhere-t \] + primary desinence 
\[ augment + Root \] + secondary desinence 
\[ e-bher(e) -t \] + t

34a. Greek [ Root + Aspect ] + Tense Autonomous aspect, modified by Tense
b. Latin [ Root + Aspect + Tense ] Aspect as a modifier of autonomous Tense

In Indo-European, a verb is 'finite' if it bears subject person Agr (Kuryłowicz 1964: 24). It is this
Infl type which underlies the standard view of infinitives as containing a Caseless null subject.
However, in most IE branches (though not necessarily in the protolanguage), the form of the subject
desinence depends on (is selected by) the aspectual category of the verb (Kuryłowicz 1964: 124).
This dependency argues that aspect is morphologically inside agreement. (As one is a prefix and
one a suffix, there is no phonological "mirror principle" evidence which bears on this issue.)
Leaving aside "injunctive" forms, and without speculating on the function of the root-final thematic
vowel (e), 3sg. inflected forms of the verb /b h e r -/ 'carry' would have the following structure:

35. imperfective: 's/he carries' aorist: 's/he (has) carried'
[ e = Root ] + primary desinence 
[ augment + Root ] + secondary desinence 
[ e-bher(e) -t ] + t

Watkins 1969 further analyses the primary desinence -ti as composed of 3sg. (secondary) agreement
plus a deictic particle -i with the semantic or pragmatic value "hic et nunc." That is, the
imperfective is marked for Tense, a deictic or referential category, by a morpheme which also
functions as a Determiner; the aorist is marked for aspect; and both forms carry agreement.

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\( \text{ígbo and ŋĩgbo} \)

\( \text{Egbe linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits} \)

Head-movement can derive the surface VSO order said (by Kuryłowicz 1964: 132) to be typical of -i verbs, and SOV order otherwise, with two assumptions. First: the minimal assumption that an affix projects its complement directionally, i.e. that the Agr suffix -i is right-headed, and the
Asp prefix -e (in 36b) is left-headed. In (36), I have projected Specifier positions for AgrP; although these are string-vacuous in effect. Second: the -i particle in (36a), like other Kase-
marking determiners, projects an obligatory (nonvacuous) Specifier position, on the side opposite its
selected complement. The extraposed surface position of AgrP in (36a) indicates that, within a DP,
this maximal projection is a potential argument, as befits its essentially nominal character. 4

36a. imperfective: 'NPi carries NPj'

36b. aorist: 'NPj carried NPj'

To maximize the congruence of syntax and morphology, the trees in (36) are three-dimensional.
3.2 “Verb focus” in the typology of Kwa and Haitian

In this section, I attempt to establish the following, mutally implicated points.

Moved verb-focus (also known as ‘predicate cleft’) is a species of XP-movement. That is, despite various claims by Pinu 1982a, Koopman 1984, Lumsden and Lefebvre 1989, Lefebvre 1990, Lefebvre and Larson 1990, it is not an X0 dependency (i.e. head-movement, in particular the movement of V0 into some Comp position). Across the languages which have this construction, the category of the moved, focused constituent is demonstrably either nominalized-VP (in Yorùbá, Gbő and Igbo) or nominalized-V0 (in VÒ and Haitian). *Igbo also exemplifies a second verb focus construction in which the nominalized-V0 is a bound form and hence necessarily remains in situ. For a free nominal form, whether Nom-VP or Nom-V0, movement is the general option, though some in situ forms occur under special conditions.

Second, the deverbal nominal which appears in verb focus (whether moved or not) is thematically licensed as the aspectual, “event” argument of the verb (discussed most fully and recently by Tenny 1987). Syntactically, it corresponds to the “abstract object clitic” posited by Roeper and Keyser 1991. If the nominal remains in situ, it exhibits various transitivity effects, as befits an object clitic.

Third, if it is a free form, and unless it is licensed in situ by a VP-internal modifier, the event nominalization moves to [Spec, CP] (the position of a moved focus). There, it is licensed by Kase in one of two possible ways (cf. Fukui 1986): • by ECM from a “canonical” copula (a copula whose topic precedes it) that binds a null complementizer (Haitian se); • by Spec-head agreement with a null complementizer ([Və]\text{\textsuperscript{s}}); or else by some combination of these two mechanisms: • by an overt complementizer ([Igbo A] optionally preceded by a canonical copula ([\text{\textsuperscript{\textspirals}}])); • by a complementizer ([Yorùbá m]) which in some elliptical examples looks like an “inverse” copula (a copula whose topic follows it, cf. Ruwet 1974, Moro 1990).

The above considerations go some way towards accounting for the surface patterns of “verb focus” in Kwa/Kru and Haitian, in a morphology-driven barriers-type syntactic framework.

From this account, a number of reanalyses follow in the individual languages—reanalyses which are independently desirable. Some of these concern the morphology of the focused verb:

• the intransitive (antipassive) nature of the *Igbo perfective;
• the transitive status of the obligatorily reduplicated “intransitive” in Gbő;
• the definiteness of the topicalized gerund in Gbő;
• the extraction asymmetry of instrumental and resultative serial constructions in Yorùbá;
• the relationship between lexical and syntactic V-\text{\textsuperscript{\textamalgamation}} in Haitian;

Other consequences of the analysis concern the morphology of cleft constructions:

• the surface status of the [Yorùbá complementizer n] as an inverse copula;
• the status of Haitian se as a canonical copula (and not a noun);
• the status of Haitian li as a subject resumptive (and not a complementizer); and
• the presence of Comp ([\text{\textsuperscript{n}}]) and canonical copula ([\text{\textsuperscript{\textspirals}}]) in the internal structure of *Igbo wh-words.

From a Euro-American viewpoint, ‘predicate cleft’ is exotic, as shown by the pitfalls of its translation. In Germanic and Romance, as in Kwa/Kru and Haitian, focus-movement— as opposed to topicalization—has the form of a verb-dependency or cleft (cf. Higgins 1973, Cinque 1983, van Haaften et al. 1983). However, despite the general availability of a [Spec, CP] landing site for focused elements in Germanic and Romance, verb focus in those languages is not achieved by any one type of category movement; nor is it marked by a cognate object in situ, as happens most regularly in *Igbo.

Thus, attempts to translate the Haitian example in (37a) either with a clefted genitive (37b) or with an in situ cognate object (37c) fail spectacularly.

(37a) S’è patì li patì.  b. “It is leaving that s/he left.”  c. S’è left a leaving.

(37a) translates successfully in English either by contrastive stress (38a), or with an emphatic adverb (38b).

(38a) S’è he left (despite being expected to stay).

(38b) S’è really/certainly/indicated left.

The grammaticality contrast in (37) suggests that the property which permits moved verb focus in Kwa/Kru and Haitian is predictable from the lexicon as a whole: cross-category redundancy (cf. Voorhoeve 1981, Hutchison 1990). This property is absent in Romance/Germanic, not in the sense that gerunds or zero-affix nominalizations are lacking there (they aren’t), but in the deeper sense that the “mixed” lexical categories of adjective (standardly [+V, +N]) and preposition ([+V, -N]) are well established in those languages, are marginal in Kwa and Haitian, and stand in the way of ‘event-connectedness’ between verbs and nouns in languages which have them. Category change in deverbal nominals in Romance/Germanic involves flipping two lexical facets: [+V, -N] → [-V, +N], while in Kwa/Kru and Haitian it flips only one: [+V] → [-V], with [±N] being redundant. (Alternative feature representations for the major lexical categories, to be considered in due course, can state this basic typological difference more perspicuously.)

Koopman 1984: 184 fn. 1 cites anecdotal reports of ‘predicate cleft’ in Italian and Hungarian. To the list can be added Hebrew (cf. Oman 1969) and especially Chinese (the “A-not-A” type of yes/no question described by Hung 1982: 277-83). Ballin 1991 presents a unified account of the VÒ and Chinese constructions, framed (as is Larson and Lefebvre’s 1990 account of Haitian) in terms of the derivational level of Logical Form. Cruttual, Ballin assumes (following Koopman) that both constructions are instances of head movement. The contrary assumption, argued for in this paper, leads to the independently desirable result that only s-structure need be consulted in order to assign logical interpretations to ‘predicate cleft’ constructions in particular, and to focus constructions in general. If defensible, my result goes along with other arguments that LF is unnecessary in the derivational level of Logical Form. Crucially, Ballin assumes (following Koopman) that both constructions are instances of head movement. The contrary assumption, argued for in this paper, leads to the independently desirable result that only s-structure need be consulted in order to assign logical interpretations to ‘predicate cleft’ constructions in particular, and to focus constructions in general. If defensible, my result goes along with other arguments that LF is unnecessary in the derivational level of Logical Form. Crucially, Ballin assumes (following Koopman) that both constructions are instances of head movement. The contrary assumption, argued for in this paper, leads to the independently desirable result that only s-structure need be consulted in order to assign logical interpretations to ‘predicate cleft’ constructions in particular, and to focus constructions in general. If defensible, my result goes along with other arguments that LF is unnecessary in the derivational level of Logical Form. Crucially, Ballin assumes (following Koopman) that both constructions are instances of head movement. The contrary assumption, argued for in this paper, leads to the independently desirable result that only s-structure need be consulted in order to assign logical interpretations to ‘predicate cleft’ constructions in particular, and to focus constructions in general. If defensible, my result goes along with other arguments that LF is unnecessary in the derivational level of Logical Form. Crucially, Ballin assumes (following Koopman) that both constructions are instances of head movement. The contrary assumption, argued for in this paper, leads to the independently desirable result that only s-structure need be consulted in order to assign logical interpretations to ‘predicate cleft’ constructions in particular, and to focus constructions in general. If defensible, my result goes along with other arguments that LF is unnecessary in the derivational level of Logical Form. Crucially, Ballin assumes (following Koopman) that both constructions are instances of head movement. The contrary assumption, argued for in this paper, leads to the independently desirable result that only s-structure need be consulted in order to assign logical interpretations to ‘predicate cleft’ constructions in particular, and to focus constructions in general. If defensible, my result goes along with other arguments that LF is unnecessary in the derivational level of Logical Form.
type uniquely composed of "creoles". In the conclusion of this section, it is suggested that the enduring appeal of the "creole" view, recently popularized by Bickerton, derives not from grammatical theory and the study of "I-language" (intensional or mental grammar in the sense of Chomsky 1986b) but from the study of "E-language" (extensional language as individual behavior) and from the sociology of knowledge, race and class. That is, "creole languages" exist only insofar as we assume, contrary to observational data, that there is a unique linguistic correlate to the category of "creole person", which is to say a slave in an ethnical setting.

3.2.1 The verb focus type of wh-movement

Discussing Varela in particular, Manfredi and Léfebvre 1988 claim that the 'predicate cleft' construction, a type of verb focus or emphasis involving a wh-dependency, is not a species of verb movement as claimed by Koopman 1984. Rather, as has been long established in the descriptive literature on that language (e.g. in Léfebvre ed. 1972), predicate cleft involves movement of a nominal argument which denotes the event of the verb. Adjacent to the verb at d-structure (by hypothesis), the event argument occupies one of two s-structure positions. In Varela and Vâda it is fronted to [SPEC, CP], exceptionally or nearly so. Hutchison (1989, 1990) shows that, while movement is the favored option for verb focus in Haitian (the other language cited by Koopman, following Piou 1982a, as exemplifying "the wh-type of verb movement"), the event nominal can remain in situ within the VP under special conditions. In Igbo, both moved and in situ types freely occur, depending on the status of the nominalization. If it is a free form (gerund), it moves to [SPEC, CP]. If it is a bound form, it predictably stays in situ (V-to-I movement creates surface non-adjacency between the verb and the complement, but the latter remains adjacent to the verb's trace). The same critique applies to various non-movement (i.e. constellational) versions of the Piou/Koopman V0 analysis (e.g. Lumdén and Lefebvre 1990, Lefebvre 1990, Larson and Lefebvre 1990). Like the Piou/Koopman analysis, the analysis of the clefted element as an underlying nominal complement superficially involves a "copy" of the verb. But, pace Piou/Koopman, there is a change of syntactic category which must be accounted for somehow or other. Koopman's moved "verb" mysteriously loses its tone and thematic content, leaving behind a fully toned and assigning "copy". For Manfredi and Léfebvre, on the other hand, it is the "copy", appropriately nominalized, which moves from one NP-position to another (if it is a free form; otherwise it stays in situ). Admittedly, the language-internal evidence for nominalization of the clefted element is fairly subtle in Haitian, and far from overwhelming in Varela, but there is no excuse for ignoring the evidence of nominalization in Varela, which is represented in a rich descriptive tradition, and which Koopman nevertheless dismisses in a footnote, or for failing to exercise intellectual curiosity with regard to other Kwa/Kru languages where nominalization is also clear. And, the blatant awkwardness of any straightforward translation of this construction into Indo-European languages should have signalled the theoretician that word-for-word glosses in French or English would not convey the essence of the matter, no matter one's Sprachgefühl. In retrospect, it seems clear that the typological similarity between Germanic and Kru with respect to V-to-I movement was a boon to Koopman in her ground-breaking theoretical work, but that the lack of an equal resemblance with regard to 'predicate cleft' was correspondingly an impediment to understanding.

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10This critique does not affect Koopman's "NP type of verb movement" already discussed in §3.1.

Mufwene 1987 shows that nominalization is fundamental to 'predicate cleft' in many African and Caribbean languages. As he observes, the empirical issue is whether there exist any predicate clefts which do not involve nominalization. I report below that, in Kwa/Kru and Haitian at any rate, the answer (so far at least) is no. In Godi (Varela's close neighbor), Yoruba, Ogo and Igbo, the nominal status of the clefted predicate is shown by an overt nominalizing affix. In Vâda there is no such affix, but the effect of V → N conversion is nevertheless marked by overt morphology (cf. Koopman's own description and that of Marchese 1978). The only controversial case is Haitian, where, although there is no overt nominal morphology in predicate cleft, there is syntactic evidence for the nominal status of the clefted element.

The analysis of moved verb focus as involving nominalization clarifies its typological relationship with in situ verb focus, where the event argument also has nominal properties and is clearly distinct from the verb. While in situ verb focus is a marginal option in most of Kwa/Kru and in Haitian, it is the main option in Igbo. In offering a unified analysis of the moved and in situ variants of verb focus, the nominalization hypothesis also makes verb focus relevant to the larger question of what permits or requires syntactic movement in this case (wh-movement). By contrast, the Piou/Koopman V0 analysis obscures this typology and raises two conceptual problems:

39a. Unlike other instances of category movement, whether XP-movement to a Case position, or head-to-head (N0) movement, the focused "verb" always undergoes a derivational process which removes some properties of a full verb.

In the face of this refractory evidence, a V0 analysis must maintain that there really is a gap, and deny that the fronted element undergoes some kind of category change. As to the first point, Koopman (1984: 170) suggests that the expected gap is filled by a resumptive verb, lexicalizing the trace to satisfy the ECP. But this is implausible in Vâda: the supposed "resumptive" copy is the sole token of the full lexical verb in the sentence. On the second point, Koopman (1984: 153) admits that 'the focused verb merely consists of the segmental specifications of the verb, without its tonal specifications...The focused verb cannot be accompanied by any of its complements, indicating that the focused verb is somehow exempt from the constraints'. That is, the focused element differs from a lexical verb in both form and content. If the verb in situ were really resumptive, it is mysterious why it is the moved element—and not the supposed resumptive (lexicalized trace)—which is reduced both phonetically and semantically.

In various nonmovement versions of the V0 analysis (e.g. Lumdén and Lefebvre 1990, Lefebvre and Larson 1990), those problems remain. The evidence of category change remains unaccounted for, while the structural difficulties are if anything greater. If a predicate cleft like (40a) involves a V0, it must have a different structure from a nominal cleft like (40b). 40a. Se pati li pati. 'S/he ate bread'. 40b. Se pen li manje. 'It is bread that s/he ate' leave 3sg leave.

For Koopman 1984, there were few constraints on what could appear under S′. For Chomsky 1966a, however, V0 can neither move to [SPEC, CP] nor be base-generated there. To preserve the Barriers assumptions, therefore, Lumdén and Lefebvre 1990 treat (40a) as a kind of extraposition with a "sentential pronoun" (se), cf. (41a). Lefebvre and Larson 1990 make (40a) look more like other focus clefts, but only by implausibly generating se in an NP position, cf. (41b).
(41a) depicts a major structural difference between predicate cleft (41a) and other s-dependencies such as NP clefts (40b). (41b) draws a closer structural parallel between the two types of clefts, but still treats the syntactic dependency of 'predicate clefts' as unique, sui generis, handled by a special 'rule' of LF-construal. (41b) draws a closer structural parallel between the two types of clefts, but (41a) would correspond to (42a), and (40b) would correspond to (42b):
topic (a nonfocus) precedes it, and whose focus follows it. Further, a subpart of (42a-b) is relevant to other wh-dependencies—relatives and wh-questions—in Ibo and (modulo the lexicalization of Comp) many other languages. In different ways, both (41a) and (41b) obscure all of these points.

To deny (7a), for example by maintaining (41a) or (41b), entails loss of generality with respect to form (typology of long-distance dependencies) as well as interpretation (compositional meaning of focus constructions). Thus, the conceptual cost of a V0 analysis by construal as in (41a) or (41b) is not less than that of Koopman’s original V0 movement analysis (which at least had the virtue of simplicity). To maintain (42a), and with it the numerous consequences listed above, I must show that any special syntactic properties of predicate cleft, compared to other instances of wh-movement, follow from independent parameters. The two main parameters are: the form of deverbal nominalization (§3.2.2) and the licensing of [SPEC, CP] (§3.2.3).

3.2.2 Nominal morphology of the event argument

For Kwa/Kru and Haitian, the main parameter relevant to verb focus is the deverbal morphology of the focused nominal element. Its surface position in situ (the position of ti in (42a) above) or in [SPEC, CP] depends mainly on its status as bound/free. This in turn depends on the form of nominalization (conversion or affixation) and its domain (the affix may select either X0 or XP).

In Ibo, the nominal element in the most well known verb focus is formed by X0-affixation. In (43a), the BVC functions just as in (45a): it substitutes for the lexical object; however, as an event argument, it introduces an inchoative interpretation (46b). Both 1984 observes that the BVC becomes obligatory, and loses the emphatic interpretation. Instead, it stands for an unspecified s-selected object (the dummy reduplication of the verb. In the “Central” dialects, this reduplication has the form +rV).

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The aspectual difference accounts for the emphatic interpretation of (49b).

The aspectual contrast of emphatic (49b) with unemphatic (46b) shows that the BVC has an emphatic (verb focus) reading only if it cannot lexicalise another argument: either the direct object (when it stands for an expected object as in (45a) above) or the inherent complement (as in (46b) above). This demonstrates the licensing of the BVC as an "event argument".

The specifically nominal status of the BVC is also shown morphologically: by its function as the complement of various auxiliaries, and as the base of the perfective verb form. In both constructions, a lexical object receives Genitive Case, which is spelled out by a high tone in the "associative construction". The BVC is labelled by Igbo grammarians as the "participle" just if it occurs as the complement of an aspectual or modal auxiliary (50a). If it bears a perfective suffix as in (50b), it is called the "perfective verb base". (Elu-mayewo, 1978, 1981).

The only hope to account for these effects is with a syntactic representation that expresses the interaction of aspect and transitivity. Because the BVC is a bound form, Nwachukwu's 1987 claims that it originates adjacent to the verb, "inside" the direct object. The d-structure adjacency of the verb and the BVC is obscured by the verb's head movement to Infl, cf. (44). Developing this interaction of aspect and transitivity is known in the grammatical tradition by three or more different labels does not alter its formal and categorical identity in all the above contexts. As stated above, I follow Lieber in constraining homophony in a morpheme-based lexicon to those lexical entries which share only phonological representation... and have neither category, nor semantic representation, nor any argument structure or diacritics in common. (1982: 179)

Unlike the factative (53a), the perfective does not require a surface object, (53b):

53a. *Eze ate something = an entire meal!
53b. Eze ate (of) fermented.cassava-Acc Nom-eat

The fact that the BVC fills the empty patient theme slot with intransitive verbs while retaining its emphatic meaning (1987: 18); the second part of this description is falsified by examples with stative (noneventive) verbs like 'be fat' in (46b). Nwachukwu himself shows that an intransitive stative verb can be focused (emphatised) by the BVC only in the perfective aspect which independently induces an inchoative (eventive) meaning.

Note that, in both instances, the verb assigns Genitive Case to its IO-marked internal argument. That is, an Igbo perfective verb is intransitive (antipassive). The high tone spellout of the Genitive results in tonal downstep on the object, e.g. Igbo-akpu= Igbo-akpu in (50). The same tonal alternation is found in the genitive ("associative") NP, e.g. Igbo (51a). In an ECM construction with the verb nasal 'know', in (53b), assigning to the left and assigning no Case, the BVC is also called a "participle".

\[51a. \text{Ihara} \quad \text{akpu} \quad \text{pounded.food fermented.cassava-Gen} \quad \text{basic form} \]
\[51b. \text{Ihara} \quad \text{akpu} \quad \text{pounded.food fermented.cassava-Gen} \quad \text{basic form} \]

\[52a. \text{Eze ate} \quad \text{akpu} \quad \text{pounded.food fermented.cassava-Acc Nom-eat} \]

\[52b. \text{Eze ate} \quad \text{akpu} \quad \text{pounded.food fermented.cassava-Acc Nom-eat} \]

A factative ( Aspect) verb assigns Accusative (structural) Case, with no tonal spellout:

\[53a. \text{Eze ate} \quad \text{akpu} \quad \text{pounded.food fermented.cassava-Acc Nom-eat} \]

\[53b. \text{Eze ate} \quad \text{akpu} \quad \text{pounded.food fermented.cassava-Acc Nom-eat} \]

The fact that the BVC is sensitive to Aspect, is not surprising in comparison with Igbo, a neighboring Benue-Kwa language for which Cook 1989 observes a particularly close morphological relationship between focus and Aspect.

To summarize, the BVC is optional and has the verb focus interpretation under two conditions:

54a. The base verb assigns Accusative Case to an overt internal argument.
54b. The base verb assigns Genitive Case (whether or not the internal argument is overt).

Otherwise the BVC is obligatory and correspondingly lacks its focus reading.

13Nwachukwu's 1978 has cogent reservations about using the term participly to describe a bound form.
14In northern dialects, the habitual aux nasal is ambiguous between habitual and progressive readings.
Adopting Koopman’s proposal, an explanation for the aspectual effects of the BVC can be constructed in terms of Tenny’s (1987: 210) hypothesis that aspect determines “the mapping between cognitive (thematic) and syntactic structure” through the property of delimitedness (total affectedness). In (57), I repeat the argument which functions as the aspectual delimiter as [DEL].

57a. transitive factitive b. lexically intensive factitive  c. perfective (antipassive) e.g. (43a, 52a) e.g. (45a, 53a)

generalized.

57b. undelimited.

The BVC is nonemptic in (57b) because there is no other delimiter. If a BVC is projected in either (57a) or (57c), with a delimiter already present, it would be interpreted as emphatic (= verb focus).

2.2 V→N conversion

Koopman 1984, following Pouteau 1982a, claims that predicate cleft is formed by V0 movement to a position outside S’ (IP). Lumdsen and Lefebvre 1990 rephrase the Koopman’s analysis. But, as noted, Koopman herself cites two reasons to doubt that the moved element in V→N is V0.

In Haitian, unlike V→N, there is no phonological indication of V→N conversion of the clefted element. Nevertheless, there is a variety of syntactic evidence. Filipovich 1987 shows that V→N applies freely in the lexicon just to intransitive verbs. For example, transitive bwo tey ‘move’ (like French transporter) in (61a) has a lexically intransitive form (like French déménager) as in (61b).

b. Jak bwoye ale nan Dorchester.

There are other differences between the clefted and the “imperfective/generic” forms. In the latter, a high root vowel is lowered, whereas this lowering takes place in the clefted form only if the in situ verb is also “imperfective/generic” (Koopman 1984: 155). A third difference: Koopman notes that the clefted form loses its ability to mark—but the “imperfective/generic” retains its grid. Thus, numerous properties distinguish the “clefted verb” from any real verb, in V→N.

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b. Jak bwoye ale nan Dorchester.

Filipovich (1987: 108f.) observes that V→N conversion is blocked, just if the object is expressed: 62a.

bwo tey-dey jo move-Nom chair Det-pl
b. bwoye Jak la move-Nom Det

Filipovich’s generalization, Lumdsen and Lefebvre 1990 point to the fact that even transitive verbs can occur in predicate cleft constructions, as evidence that the clefted form is not nominal. But this conclusion does not follow. For one thing, lexical intransitivity is not at stake in syntactic V→N conversion. Unlike what occurs in predicate clefts, the lexical operation is not semantically regular. Many derived nouns have an unpredictable, concrete meaning.

d. bwoye Jak la move-Nom Det

Appealing to Filipovich’s generalization, Lumdsen and Lefebvre 1990 point to the fact that even transitive verbs can occur in predicate cleft constructions, as evidence that the clefted form is not nominal. But this conclusion does not follow. For one thing, lexical intransitivity is not at stake in syntactic V→N conversion. Unlike what occurs in predicate clefts, the lexical operation is not semantically regular. Many derived nouns have an unpredictable, concrete meaning.
By contrast, the nominal form in predicate cleft has a semantically regular, abstract (process) meaning, even for intransitive verbs. Lumsden and Lefebvre assume that the only possible analysis of the clefted instance of manje in (65) is the noun 'food'; they do not envision the additional possibility that it might be a productive nominalization roughly translatable as 'eating'.

65. Se manje li mange pen.
    'S/he ate bread'

With regard to the latter possibility, Hutchison 1989 shows that Filipovich’s constraint does not prevent other cases of nominalization in the syntax. Apart from predicate cleft (66a), there is also no transitivity restriction in the light verb construction (66b) and in the nearly synonymous "copy complement" construction (66c). Damoiseau (1982: 11) also cites nominalized thet and hit in the examples in (66d):

66a. Se te achte Marte te achte fè a. 'Marti bought these flowers'
    Cop past Nom.buy Det past buy flower Det (Lefebvre and Lumsden 1990)

b. Jak pral fè yon ti achte/mange/domi/chant.
    Asp do a little buy-Nom/hit-Nom/eat-Nom/sleep-Nom/sing-Nom
    'Jak is going to do some shopping' / 'eating' / 'sleeping' / 'singing'

c. Jak pral achte yon ti achte.
    Jak pral manje yon ti manje.
    Jak pral dimi yon ti dimi.
    Jak pral chant yon ti chant.

d. Li pa na achte kounyayea. 'S/he is not "into" buying (things) right now'
    3sg Neg at buy-Nom now

e. Li bat li yon bat ki pa ti krat
    'S/he struck him/her a blow, not a tap!'
    3sg hit 3sg Det hit-Nom pro Neg small bit

Filipovich cites achte as a verb which does not undergo V → N conversion in the lexicon, but it nevertheless appears in nominal form in (66d). This fact motivates the claim that achte is also nominal in the predicate cleft construction (66a), i.e. that (66a) has a structure like (42a).

Although Lefebvre and Lumsden cite the ability of the clefted element to occur with the overt tense element te, e.g. te achte in (66a), as selectional evidence that the clefted element is of the category V0, Fauchois 1982 shows that it is equally possible with clefted nouns, e.g.:

67. Se te di yo ki te koum ap touye moun.
    'It was these rivers that could kill people'
    Cop past water pl pro past Med Asp kill person
    'This water is overflowing'
    (Fauchois 1982: 6)

In fact, there is no reason to suppose that it is a tense element, since Haitian also derives past tense readings with no overt ‘past’ morpheme via a factative effect (Damoiseau 1982, Déchaîne 1991). As in many Kru languages (Welmers 1977), the Haitian ‘past’ morpheme appears to be an adverb, rather than a member of the inflectional category Tense (like English -ed). By contrast, the nominal form in predicate cleft has a semantically regular, abstract (process) meaning, even for intransitive verbs. Lumsden and Lefebvre assume that the only possible analysis of the clefted instance of manje in (65) is the noun ‘food’; they do not envision the additional possibility that it might be a productive nominalization roughly translatable as ‘eating’.

68a. Jak koupé pen an.
    'Jak cut the bread'

b. Pen an koupé.
    bread Det cut

The morphology of Haitian thus makes it unnecessary to maintain all these distinct types:

69. ‘predicate cleft’

Se te achte Marte te achte fè a.
    Cop past Nom.buy Det past buy flower Det (Lefebvre and Lumsden 1990)

‘predicate cleft’

Se te achte Marte te achte fè a.
    Cop past Nom.buy Det past buy flower Det (Lefebvre and Lumsden 1990)

‘predicate cleft’

Se te achte Marte te achte fè a.
    Cop past Nom.buy Det past buy flower Det (Lefebvre and Lumsden 1990)
In West African languages, at least as far as Kru and Kwa languages are concerned, verbal relatives seem to be more widespread than predicate cleft. The presence or absence of predicate cleft varies even in closely related languages. (1986: 257, fn 20)

For the V0 analysis of predicate cleft, such variation must be mysterious, and the formal parallels between ‘verbal relatives’, ‘redoublement verbal’ and predicate cleft can have no significance.

The nominalization analysis predicts that the event argument can be fronted via wh-movement (as in Yoruba and Võ) or left in situ (as in Igbo). Igbo comes close to freely having both types: Hutchison 1989 shows that the verb focus element in Haitian, which he terms a ‘copy nominal’, can occur in situ just if it is modified in some way. This gives paradigms like the following:

74. Se domi [jak domi].
  'Jak really slept' moved OK
cop sleep sleep
75a. Jak domi [yon domi].
  'Jak took a little nap'
sleep Del little sleep-Nom
de
75b. Jak le [yon domi].
  'Jak took a little nap'
sleep sleep-Nom
75c. Domi [yon domi] u.[sleep sleep-Nom
76. 'Jak domi domi. sleep sleep nom
  'Jak slept sleep' unmodified in situ

Those facts form a typological bridge from Võ, where movement of the nominalized verb is obligatory, to Igbo, where it is impossible. Similar facts can be observed in Yoruba.

In Yoruba, the focused nominal is a reduplicated gerund, formed not from V0 but from VP (optionally including any lexical complements of the verb, as well as any VP-operator such as an aspectual Aux). In Yoruba serial constructions, the nominalization can be formed from any projection of V including the maximal, polyvalent VP, so that several verb roots can be nominalized together. (78) shows clefting of a focused object or subject NP. As described for Võ by Koopman 1983, subject trace is lexicalized with a resumptive clitic if. cf. (78b).

77. Aje ra inwé.
  'Aje is buying, bought' [a book/ books] buy paper
78a. inwé ni [Aje rí tì].
  'It is [a book/ books] that Aje [bought/buying'/ buy paper Comp [i.e., he didn’t buy some]
78b. Aje ni [oni ra inwé].
  'It is Aje who [bought/buying'] [a book/books] buy paper [i.e., it’s not (6a)]

Focus verb involves the wh-extraction of a reduplicated gerund, which is distinct from the verb itself since the verb does not gap. Like English “Acc-ing”, the Yoruba gerund prefix selects an entire VP, optionally including an Accessive complement, but not a possessive subject ("poss-ing"). Mandredi and Lefebvre 1988 propose that the base for reduplication is a bivalent verb complement. In fact, the nominalized BVC is visible in situ, in certain intransitive, echoic constructions:18

79a. Aje la tì, yí nà, ko to ụlọ ụlọ.
  'Aje went on a side trip, go going turning Ngr go going one'
79b. yí ụlọ nà ha'.' "Death and Disease [were] haunting death’disease PROG reach house of 3sg going his house’ [r è rè]

In ordinary examples, the nominalized verb is invisible in situ, although Awoyábi 1972 argues that it is underlyingly present, nonetheless.

18(79a) was pointed out to me by 'Nsup Oyesiakọ. Oyesiakọ 1990 cites (79b) from Akhburun (1976: 160).
The generalization is that a well-formed wh-dependency with a gerundive nominalization must be licensed by extended government (in the sense of Kayne or Koster). As the complement of V1, the constituent [V2 NP2] is connected to the maximal projection (V^max1), and from there to the position [SPEC, CP], but V2 by itself is not.

Why don't the other languages permit Accusative complements to be clefted in verb focus? It has been suggested that this is not a matter of the landing site, but of the selectional type of the nominalizing morpheme: X0-governor in Yoruba, X0-governor in the other languages.

The paradigm of ac differs from that of an. The gerund fùm is not extractable, whether or not its accusative complement comes along, cf. (88).

88a. Àjè mú yà fùm nì ọ̀pọ̀jú fùm nì, 'Àjè gave a/the box to me'

b. Òmù nì [Àjè mú yà fùm nì tì], 'It's me that Àjè gave the box to'

giving Comp take.hold.of box give

89a. *Àjè nì [Àjè mú yà fùm nì tì]; Àjè nì [Àjè mú yà fùm nì tì],

b. *òmù nì [Àjè mú yà fùm nì tì]; òmù nì [Àjè mú yà fùm nì tì],

giving Comp take.hold.of box give

In general, doubling (or resumptive) strategies save island violations by 'strengthening' the path between landing site and extraction site. Perhaps complement doubling is exceptionally possible with ac, licensing its extraction, because its complement selection is exceptionally strong, making it a sufficiently strong constituent to count as connected to [SPEC, CP].

But in an instrumental construction, wh-extractions of the gerund is possible from V2, cf. (90).

90a. Àjè fì ọ̀gbè gbè ìà, 'Àjè used a/the knife to cut a/the yam'

b. Òmù nì [Àjè fì ọ̀gbè gbè ìà]

cutting Comp use knife cut yam

91a. Gòò fì ọ̀gbè gbè ìà ọ̀gbà, 'It's yam that Àjè used a knife to cut'

giving Comp use knife cut yam

91b. Gòò gù òmù nì [Àjè fì ọ̀gbè gbè ìà ọ̀gbà]

cutting yam Comp use knife cut yam

The pattern in (91) follows from the structure in (92). (92) differs from (87) only in the direction of V-adjunction, a difference which ÀgbòjáÀgbòmotivates semantically.

\[\text{\textbf{ñ}}\]Compared to ac, English arrive is only marginally transitive: John arrived late, *John arrived late.
inventory of functional heads (C, I, D…): present in English, absent in Japanese. A [+F] head induces in-movement by projecting a SPEC position with its agreement features. SPEC may also be licensed by ECM: structural Case-marking by a lexical category (V). Fukui generalizes the two licensing types in the label Kase. The biunique relationship between SPEC and Kase, expressed in Fukui’s Functional Projection Theorem (95a), reflects a deeper property of the agreement relation (95b):

\[ \text{(95a)} \]

\[ \text{(95b)} \]

95a. A functional head projects to the X” level iff there is Kase to be discharged to its specifier position. (Otherwise, it projects only to X”.)

(1986: 79)

95b. If X, a functional head, agrees with Y, then there is no Z such that Z = Y and X agrees with Z.

Predicate cleft shows the two kinds of Kase licensing: SPEC-head agreement and ECM, suggesting that it involves movement to a specifier position. If a language has an “event” nominalization which is a free form, it undergoes in-movement under either of two conditions: if there is a Comp with agreement features (as in Yoruba) or if there is a higher lexical category for ECM (such as the copula or in Haitian). If, as in Igbo, the event nominalization is not a free form, there is no movement.

This leaves two types unaccounted for: Vvak, with zero Comp and no copula; and Romance/Germanic, which has appropriate landing sites but no predicate cleft. For Vvak, Marchese observes that a null copula is implied in focus constructions. (96a), where the parenthesized material is optional, she translates as (96b), but a more literal rendering would be (96c), representing a structure like (97).

\[ \text{(96a)} \]

\[ \text{(96b)} \]

\[ \text{(96c)} \]

96a. N\text{ê} (m\text{ê})-	ext{ho} ni\text{nak}.

w\text{ine} 3sg-\text{child} drink

(1978: 181)

b. C’est du vin\text{FOCUS} que l’enfant a bu. It’s wine\text{FOCUS} that the child drank.

c. Vin\text{TOPIC}, it is \text{FOCUS}\text{ the child drank.}

\[ \text{(97)} \]

It is a deep typological feature of Benue-Kwa as a whole (i.e. Greengberg’s Kwa/Kru plus Benue-Congo) that relatives, in-movement and focus clefts are morphologically related through the presence of a copula-type morpheme. In Kru, Marchese 1982b reports that it has the form no, ne, ni or h. In Kikuyu, it has the form ne, cf. this paradigm from Bergvall 1988b:

\[ \text{(98a)} \]

\[ \text{(98b)} \]

\[ \text{(98c)} \]

\[ \text{(98d)} \]

It is a deep typological feature of Benue-Kwa as a whole (i.e. Greengberg’s Kwa/Kru plus Benue-Congo) that relatives, in-movement and focus clefts are morphologically related through the presence of a copula-type morpheme. In Kru, Marchese 1982b reports that it has the form no, ne, ni or h. In Kikuyu, it has the form ne, cf. this paradigm from Bergvall 1988b:

\[ \text{(98a)} \]

\[ \text{(98b)} \]

\[ \text{(98c)} \]

\[ \text{(98d)} \]
and

C/VC P

101a. [the relative construction (with although (100a) would be more appropriate (less redundant) in that context. Abraham relates the surface copula ni to the complementizer and an underlying focus cleft construction (101a), which embeds either the canonical copula ri (101b) or the pre-verb pr 'do' (101c):

101a. [ni John [p/se ti: 'My friend is what John is/does'] friend 1sg-Gen Comp [BE/DO])
101b. 'John is my friend'
101c. 'John is my friend'

The general structure of focus clefts, and the source of the "presentative" copula, is (102):

As shown in (102) above, there is no difference in the possible elements which can be clefted in the relative construction with and the focus construction with. Manfredi and Larizza 1988 suggest that the only structural difference between relatives and the focus type is the presence of an additional transparent domain in the former:

103a. [NP1 NP2 Nom-V
Nom-[V NP2]

103a. [NP1 NP2 Comp
ni
NP1/6
Infl
v

At a deeper level of analysis, the form ri is analyzable as Comp plus H-tone—the Nominative Agr element that may directly signal the presence of an empty operator in the subject position.

Haitian

In Haitian, the licensing morpheme for clefts is the copula sr which selects either the NP in [SPEC, CP] (as in the clefts) or an ordinary NP or DP.

Citing examples like (104a), Lumsden and Letellier 1993 observe that the 'past' morpheme tr can occur in the focus position, doubling its occurrence in the IP.

(104a) Se te ache lari: 'Mari bought these flowers'

CoP past Nom-buy Det past buy flower Det (i.e. she didn't steal them)

104b. Se te mi te pro an? 'Who should not have (wasn't expected to) come?'

Cop past Neg past BE

104c. Se pa 1sg pa te pro an? 'Who should not have (wasn't expected to) come?'

Cop past Neg past BE

But (104b-c) show that it is equally possible with a focused noun, indicating that it is an adverbial (lexical) element, rather than a functional head (such as a "Tense" marker). As to the negation following sr in (104a) Fauchois (1982, 7) holds that it locally licensed by the copula sr (albeit, for semantic reasons, the possibility of negated sr is not independent of negation in the IP). The structure of Haitian clefts is as in (105):

As shown in (105) above, (105) represents Haitian cleft constructions as licensed by a succession of local relations between heads: vmax...[V...[V...[V...[V...]]]]]. The copula sr takes either an NP or CP complement. The focused element is in [SPEC, CP], where it is Case-marked from src (like it's John Mary says). By Spec-Head agreement between [Spec, CP] and C, the empty operator in C (posited by Koopman 1984: 183) is able to govern Infl, creating extended head-government.

K i is not in Comp

Based on the data in (106), Koopman (1982b: 228) argues that ki is not in subject position but in Comp. Her proposal, if defensible, would challenge (105).

106a. Ki-moun ki pou 1sg pa t vini an?

Who past come Det

"Who should not have (wasn't expected to) come?"

Koopman's analysis was required by the (then-current) indexing treatment of Comp-trace phenomena in English and French, e.g:

107. the woman who (*that) t; arrived

107. the woman who (that) t; arrived

in the sentence (quisque...[que...[que...[que...]]]]) is presumably a typo for (106c).
resumptive subject (in SPEC, IP), than it is like the analysis of French and English in (107) with an indexed Comp properly governing an empty subject.24

Comparing (106a-b), Koopman observes that ki must precede pou, and then asserts that this pou is a complementizer and not a modal because it precedes negation. This refers to the observation by Koopman and Lefebvre (1982: 75) that modal pou may either follow or precede to and negation:

108a. Koon moun ki pou vini an?
who Neg past come Det 'Who didn’t have to (wasn’t obliged) to come?'

b. Koon moun ki pou vini an? [not translated by K&L]
who Neg past come Det

But although they do not indicate a meaning difference between the two sentences in (108), Koopman and Lefebvre (1982: 79) observe that the two orders are not synonymous, specifically:

... pou a perdue une partie de son sens d’obligation quand il apparut sous S.

In the Barriers system of functional categories, Koopman and Lefebvre’s evidence underdetermines the conclusion that pou in (108b) is in Comp. A modal can also raise to Infl. For example, Roberts 1985 has argued that only a verb governed by Infl can assign a theta; and a modal which occupies Infl is not governed by Infl. This would account for the “weaker” semantics of pou in (108b). Employing the terminology of Ross 1969, pou is either a deontic VP-operator, or an epistemic IP-operator.

A similar ordering effect occurs in English although no raising of a modal is involved. In (109a), the expression be supposed to is a deontic modal, and it is preceded by negation. In (109b), with the reverse order, the deontic reading is excluded and be supposed to is an epistemic predicate.

109a. When alone, John is not supposed to drink.  
[John is thought, *obliged to not drink]  

b. When alone, John is supposed [to, not to drink].  
[John is thought, *obliged to not drink]

The order modal@negation proves nothing about the position of ki, since complementizer pou occurs after nouns only in purpose clauses like those in (110), cf. Koopman and Lefebvre (1982: 70, 77):

110a. M gen [wɔy bany pou m montenc].  
'I have something to show you'

b. Ki [wɔt pou n te dwe ʁi]. 'What was there for us/you to have done?'

In (110), pou is plausibly a preposition and not a complementizer. But, even granting the assertion that pou in (108b~106c) is in Comp, their quoted observation about its non-deontic interpretation in that position undermines Koopman’s deontic translation of pou in (106c), while still assuming that it is in Comp. Either (106c) is not deontic, or else pou in (106c) is in the modal and ki is not proved to be in Comp.

Based on its scope difference before or after to, Sterlin 1988 has claimed that epistemic pou moves from V to Infl, although she also preserves Koopman’s hypothesis that pou ends up in Comp ("pou modal en position de complémenteur"). Sterlin’s best evidence that pou does not remain in Infl involves pou before overt lexical subjects, i.e. the reverse of the order ki pou seen above. Citing minimal binding contrasts as in (111), Sterlin constructs an explanation in terms of Case.

111a. Jak vle [pou 1 vini ].  
'Jak wants (her/him) to come'
want Comp=3sg come

b. Jak vle [pou 1 vini ].  
'Jak wants her/him to come'

opaque binding domain

24For objections to the indexing approach to that-trace, cf. Koster 1986.

If pou is in Comp and l (phonologically reduced to l) is a pronoun, the obligatory disjoint reference between l and (Jak in (111b) follows from the fact that embedded subject l is brought within the binding domain of jl by Exceptional Case Marking (just as in the English translation). Since there is no ECM in (111a), there is no domain transparency and l is free to refer to Jak or anyone else.

Even if the pronoun/analogy distinction of Chomsky 1981 applied to Haitian, there is an alternative to Sterlin’s analysis that pou is in Comp. If pou in (111a) is a preposition, forming a complex predicate [vle ou [pou l…]], there is still a Case difference with (111b). A parallel difference occurs in English, where the status of the preposition near, behind is unquestioned:  

112a. John saw a snake near him. 

b. John, saw him.

113a. John, watched behind him.  

b. John, watched him.

Déchaine and Manfredi 1988 argue that the 1981 binding theory cannot be maintained for Haitian, because of the absence of lexical anaphors in that language (as in many Kwa languages, cf. Awoyale 1983). Reflexives are phrasal, composed of possessive pronoun plus nonreferential classifier:\[25\]

114a. bipt, hitj biad 3sg  
'himself/herself'  
(lit = nonreferential classifier)

b. bipt, hitj biad 3sg  
'his/her head'  
(lit = referential N0)

ko, hitj body 3sg  
'his/her body'  
(lit = referential N0)

As a result, the form ki is generally ambiguous between bound and free interpretations, e.g.:

116a. Jak, we hitj nan glas  
 Jak saw himself in the mirror  

la.  

'Jak saw him in the mirror' OR see 3sg Loc mirror Det

b. Jak, blese hitj  

'Jak hurt himself' OR 'Jak hurt him/her'

i/j

114. 'himself/herself' (lit = nonreferential classifier)

114b. 'his/her head' (lit = referential N0)

114c. 'his/her body' (lit = referential N0)

i/j

i/j

The alternative to standard binding theory, which accounts for the ambiguity in (116), follows Williams 1989 who reduces binding theory to 0-theory. For the problem at hand, these observations add plausibility to the idea the binding difference between vle and pou is thematically based, and does not require Sterlin’s supposition that pou is in Comp. To summarize: if (108b) shows raising of pou, and pou retains its deontic modal sense, it is not raised to Comp, but to Infl, in which case, ki can still be in SPEC. IP. Or else, if pou in (108b) is base-generated in Comp, it cannot have the meaning of obligation, and ki (like benny in (110b) is in a higher clause, i.e. it is not extracted from subject position. In other words, (108) and (110) either do not show that ki is in Comp, or else they have nothing to do with subject extraction.

25The Kwa languages have no reflexive/reciprocal distinction; in Haitian the reciprocal is not lexical but phraseal: pres…let.
The copula se

Following Fauchois 1982, I hold that the copula se selects nominalis as its internal and external arguments. If diacritic homophony is rejected, then the se morphone which appears in moved verb focus should manifest the same constraint, so one expects that only nominals can be focused. Hutchison 1990 provides supporting evidence for this assumption, describing a systematic constraint on the complement of se: its complement cannot be interpreted as a process:

117a. Jak se timoun.
   Jak se dokité.
   Jak se (yon) parese.
   Jak se (yon) malad.

In (117-i), where se is present, its complement is interpreted strictly as a substantive. In (117-ii), where se is absent, Hutchison regards the complement of se as a verb. Hutchison makes the further, important observation that the semantic contrast between nouns (117-i) and denominal verbs (117-ii) is preserved under focus. If the noun is focused, it is clefted and its trace is lexicalised as the pro-predicate ye (118-i); if the denominal verb is focused, nothing happens to the verb, but its root nominal is clefted (118-ii):

118a. Se timoun Jak ye. ‘A child is what Jak is’
   Se dokité Jak ye.
   Se (yon) parese Jak ye.
   Se (yon) malad Jak ye.

Hutchison’s conclusion that parese and malad, which translate English adjectives, are stative verbs is relatively uncontroversial; in parallel fashion, he regards timoun and dokité in these examples as denominal verbs of activity. Alternatively, one could adopt a small clause analysis, as originally advanced for Hebrew by Rapoport 1985 and extended to Haitian by Rapoport (1987: 245f.). Else one could posit a default or null ‘lite verb’, with roughly the semantics of English do, interpolated in between the two nouns thus: Jak ∅ timoun and Jak ∅ dokité. Whichever analysis of (117-18) one chooses is consistent with the basic claim that the complement of se is nominal, as claimed by the representation of predicate cleft in (41a)—but not (41b).

Other than the nominalized verb, an NP can be focused from subject or object position (119-20).

A focused object leaves a gap; a focused subject leaves a resumptive element ki, unless the subject is emphatic X memn as in (119b). The examples in (119-20) are from Fauchois 1982.

119a. pro Se [lougawou] Cop kj, meman timoun nan.
       Foc werewolf 2sg eat child Det
       It’s a werewolf who ate the child

119b. Se [yon memn], Or Cop tj, taj bay mwen.
       Foc ->3sg Empty past Aap give me
       It’s them who were giving [to] me!

Déprez and Vinet account for these facts with an implicit stipulation which I spell out in (127):

120a. pro Se [yen ti dyare], Or Cop li genyen ti, Foc a Dom diarrhea 3sg have
       ‘It’s a little diarrhea [that] s/he has’

120b. pro Se pa [nepiljan], Or Cop li kapab sevi, Foc Neg any person 2sg able.to serve 3sg
       ‘It’s not everyone [that] you can serve’

Throughout (119-20), pro is a discourse-bound topic. A topic can also be overt in this position; in that case, Fauchois shows that a topicalized object can precedes a focused subject (121), and a topicalized subject can precedes a focussed object (122).

121a. [Dyare a], se [milokwib], Or Cop li ba li tj, 3sg give 3sg
       ‘As for diarrhea, it’s someone that gave [it to] him/her’

122a. [Moun nan], se [ou memn-sell], Or Cop li konon tj, 3sg know
       ‘As for that person, it’s only you [that] s/he knows’

Marchese gives a parallel example, with topicalized subject plus focussed object (here a locative) in Godie, the Kru language adjacent to Vlak:

123a. [Wi sib], Or Cop li xò tj, intelligence head 3sg be.in
       ‘Intelligence, it’s the head that it’s in’

By maintaining Piou and Koopman’s assumptions of ki as a Comp (discussed above), Déprez and Vinet 1991 are forced to taxonomize se as both a “subject pronominal” and an “assertion particle”, i.e. as projecting simultaneously both as Xmax and as X0. By this dichotomic hypothesis, Déprez and Vinet can generate se either in “subject position” (canonically filled by XP) or as “the head of an Assertion Phrase” (limited, by definition, to X0).

On such a highly flexible analysis as theirs, one may legitimately ask what excludes the ungrammatical examples in (124a), whose well-formed counterparts are given in (124b). The examples in (124b) are, after all, just as assertive as the well-formed ones in (125) which contain se.

124a. *Jak se pati.
       *Jak pa frè.
       *Jak se nan lekòl.

124b. Jak se bel.
       Jak bel.
       Jak nan lekòl.

125. Jak se yon doktè.
    Jak se tankou sè m.
    Jak se pou mwen.

126a. *Jak se frè m.
      *Jak pa frè m.
      *Jak se pati.

126b. Jak is my brother.
      Jak is like my sister.
      Jak is for me.

On the view that se is simply a copula (X0), this puzzle does not arise: there is no reason to expect it to occur in (124b), since these examples already contain independent predicates. There is, however, one selectional difference between the copula se and ordinary verbs, Déprez and Vinet observe that, while pronominal subjects are possible for all the examples in (124-25), complementarity between lexical and pronominal subjects arises in negative copular sentences.

127a. Jak se frè m.
      Jak pa frè m.
      Jak se pati.

127b. Li se frè m.
      Li pa frè m.
      Li se pati.

28The idea of postulating two se’s, “assertive” and “pronominal”, seems to have been lifted, without attribution, from by Fauchois 1992. It would be nice if speaker-linguists got credit for their work.

29The judgements in (126) are theirs; the glosses mine (Déprez and Vinet don’t view se as a copula).
According to Michel DeGraff (p.c.), (128b) is ungrammatical, and I conclude from this contrast that negation is inherently focused, and that this focus is associated with the lexical complement which triggers ungrammaticality is fre m in (128b). A specified N is referential, and does not occur as a free occurrence.

Here we see that the very same string [... li se pa ...] which is impossible in (128b) and (128a), where the lexical complement is variously modified, is possible in (128b), just if the lexical complement is bare. That is, the ill-formedness of [... li se pa ...] apparently depends not on the status of the subject, but on the occurrence of a specified lexical complement. Another specified complement which triggers ungrammaticality is fre m in (128b). A specified N is referential, following Roberts (1985b: 44), I assume that a N which is not referential is not an argument, so that (128b) falls together with cases like predicate times in (118-ii).

Second, notice that alongside Li pa frét m (from 119b), there is also (129) parallel to (118-i):

129. Se pa frét m li ye. 'It’s not my brother that he is'

A reasonable judgement is how, or if, (129) differs in meaning from Li pa frét m. A reasonable answer is that the two differ in discourse structure (i.e. pragmatic meaning). Specifically, I claim that fre m is a focus in (129), but a topic in Li pa frét m. This goes along with the following mini-discourses:

130a. Se pa frét m li ye. Li se konpè m. 'It’s not my brother (focus) that he is. He’s my pal.'
130b. Li pa frét m. Se Michèl. 'It’s not him who is my brother (topic). It’s Michèl [who is].'

I conclude from this contrast that negation is inherently focused, and that this focus is associated with the closest nonreferential element (i.e. an element with no independent focus, be it of the category N or V).31

These two observations suggest a selectional account of the contrast in (126). Suppose that topics, inherently definite, are therefore referential (pronouns are nonreferential by definition). Now, as a canonical copula, se selects a complement which is a Focus, and additionally selects a subject which has (potentially null) Topic. Consider the s-structure of the relevant examples.

(133b) represents the structure of grammatical (132a), (133b) of grammatical (133a), and (134b) of ungrammatical (134a). Well-formed (132a) has the same pragmatic structure as (131). 132a. Jak se pa frè m. 3sg BE-NEG brother 1sg

In the ill-formed example (134) observe that, with a referential internal argument and a nonreferential external argument, by hypothesis the inherent focus of pa is attracted to the subject, thereby violating the selectional requirement of se. 134a. *Li se pa frè m. 3sg BE-NEG brother 1sg

This analysis of Haitian focus constructions (including but not limited to clefts) appeals just to independently attested pragmatic facts: the selectional properties of se as a canonical copula and those of negation as a focus assigner. The alternative account by Déprez and Vinet simply restates the problem of copular se plus negation as a categorial stipulation (reconstructed in (127)), while saying nothing about the pragmatic force of se clefts.
Haitian; in the latter, yo-sa. The two classes can be represented by ki and gi, both translating ‘what?’ The former is generally characteristic of Northern Igbo, the latter of Southern Igbo, but today at least both classes of elements occur more widely.

Historically and perhaps synchronically as well, ki is composed of (n)hi ‘the one’ + ha ‘copula’. Gi is synchronically opaque, historically [wh] + (FOC). Compare: gi ‘what.thing’ (i-gi) ki ‘what.thing’ (i-yo-ka), as well as ni (i-yo-sa) and na (Ki-a-wi-yi). In many Igbo dialects (including Aghok, Morikan, and Ijagbara), the focus morpheme gi occurs independently at the end of a subject relative clause or the ki type of inquestion:

136a. Kẹẹẹ ọfẹ mọrẹ ni? (n)hi ‘copula’. Gi is synchronically opaque, historically [wh] + (FOC). Compare: gi ‘what.thing’ (i-gi) ki ‘what.thing’ (i-yo-ka), as well as ni (i-yo-sa) and na (Ki-a-wi-yi). In many Igbo dialects (including Aghok, Morikan, and Ijagbara), the focus morpheme gi occurs independently at the end of a subject relative clause or the ki type of inquestion:

136a. Kẹẹẹ ọfẹ mọrẹ ni? (n)hi ‘copula’. Gi is synchronically opaque, historically [wh] + (FOC). Compare: gi ‘what.thing’ (i-gi) ki ‘what.thing’ (i-yo-ka), as well as ni (i-yo-sa) and na (Ki-a-wi-yi). In many Igbo dialects (including Aghok, Morikan, and Ijagbara), the focus morpheme gi occurs independently at the end of a subject relative clause or the ki type of inquestion:

137a. Ọfẹ mọrẹ gi? (n)hi ‘copula’. Gi is synchronically opaque, historically [wh] + (FOC). Compare: gi ‘what.thing’ (i-gi) ki ‘what.thing’ (i-yo-ka), as well as ni (i-yo-sa) and na (Ki-a-wi-yi). In many Igbo dialects (including Aghok, Morikan, and Ijagbara), the focus morpheme gi occurs independently at the end of a subject relative clause or the ki type of inquestion:

138. (O)ki eko ká ọfẹ mọrẹ? (n)hi ‘copula’. Gi is synchronically opaque, historically [wh] + (FOC). Compare: gi ‘what.thing’ (i-gi) ki ‘what.thing’ (i-yo-ka), as well as ni (i-yo-sa) and na (Ki-a-wi-yi). In many Igbo dialects (including Aghok, Morikan, and Ijagbara), the focus morpheme gi occurs independently at the end of a subject relative clause or the ki type of inquestion:

139. O ki eko ká ọfẹ mọrẹ? (n)hi ‘copula’. Gi is synchronically opaque, historically [wh] + (FOC). Compare: gi ‘what.thing’ (i-gi) ki ‘what.thing’ (i-yo-ka), as well as ni (i-yo-sa) and na (Ki-a-wi-yi). In many Igbo dialects (including Aghok, Morikan, and Ijagbara), the focus morpheme gi occurs independently at the end of a subject relative clause or the ki type of inquestion:

140a. Ọfẹ mọrẹ gi? (n)hi ‘copula’. Gi is synchronically opaque, historically [wh] + (FOC). Compare: gi ‘what.thing’ (i-gi) ki ‘what.thing’ (i-yo-ka), as well as ni (i-yo-sa) and na (Ki-a-wi-yi). In many Igbo dialects (including Aghok, Morikan, and Ijagbara), the focus morpheme gi occurs independently at the end of a subject relative clause or the ki type of inquestion:

140b. Ọfẹ mọrẹ gi? (n)hi ‘copula’. Gi is synchronically opaque, historically [wh] + (FOC). Compare: gi ‘what.thing’ (i-gi) ki ‘what.thing’ (i-yo-ka), as well as ni (i-yo-sa) and na (Ki-a-wi-yi). In many Igbo dialects (including Aghok, Morikan, and Ijagbara), the focus morpheme gi occurs independently at the end of a subject relative clause or the ki type of inquestion:

141. Ọfẹ mọrẹ gi? (n)hi ‘copula’. Gi is synchronically opaque, historically [wh] + (FOC). Compare: gi ‘what.thing’ (i-gi) ki ‘what.thing’ (i-yo-ka), as well as ni (i-yo-sa) and na (Ki-a-wi-yi). In many Igbo dialects (including Aghok, Morikan, and Ijagbara), the focus morpheme gi occurs independently at the end of a subject relative clause or the ki type of inquestion:

142. Ọfẹ mọrẹ gi? (n)hi ‘copula’. Gi is synchronically opaque, historically [wh] + (FOC). Compare: gi ‘what.thing’ (i-gi) ki ‘what.thing’ (i-yo-ka), as well as ni (i-yo-sa) and na (Ki-a-wi-yi). In many Igbo dialects (including Aghok, Morikan, and Ijagbara), the focus morpheme gi occurs independently at the end of a subject relative clause or the ki type of inquestion:

143a. Ọfẹ mọrẹ gi? (n)hi ‘copula’. Gi is synchronically opaque, historically [wh] + (FOC). Compare: gi ‘what.thing’ (i-gi) ki ‘what.thing’ (i-yo-ka), as well as ni (i-yo-sa) and na (Ki-a-wi-yi). In many Igbo dialects (including Aghok, Morikan, and Ijagbara), the focus morpheme gi occurs independently at the end of a subject relative clause or the ki type of inquestion:

144a. Ọfẹ mọrẹ gi? (n)hi ‘copula’. Gi is synchronically opaque, historically [wh] + (FOC). Compare: gi ‘what.thing’ (i-gi) ki ‘what.thing’ (i-yo-ka), as well as ni (i-yo-sa) and na (Ki-a-wi-yi). In many Igbo dialects (including Aghok, Morikan, and Ijagbara), the focus morpheme gi occurs independently at the end of a subject relative clause or the ki type of inquestion:

145a. Ọfẹ mọrẹ gi? (n)hi ‘copula’. Gi is synchronically opaque, historically [wh] + (FOC). Compare: gi ‘what.thing’ (i-gi) ki ‘what.thing’ (i-yo-ka), as well as ni (i-yo-sa) and na (Ki-a-wi-yi). In many Igbo dialects (including Aghok, Morikan, and Ijagbara), the focus morpheme gi occurs independently at the end of a subject relative clause or the ki type of inquestion:

146a. Ọfẹ mọrẹ gi? (n)hi ‘copula’. Gi is synchronically opaque, historically [wh] + (FOC). Compare: gi ‘what.thing’ (i-gi) ki ‘what.thing’ (i-yo-ka), as well as ni (i-yo-sa) and na (Ki-a-wi-yi). In many Igbo dialects (including Aghok, Morikan, and Ijagbara), the focus morpheme gi occurs independently at the end of a subject relative clause or the ki type of inquestion:
category within which he includes focus. However, Cinque’s own analysis suggests that he is too pessimistic in at least this respect. Focused constituents in Romance and Germanic, and also in Kwa, if “moved”, share the basic properties of wh-elements. Marchese 1980 expresses this as “the focus nature of relatives”; in a government-binding perspective, it becomes “the relative nature of focus”.

Continuing Ross 1967, Higgins 1977, Prince 1981 among others, Cinque distinguishes among two basic “pragmatic” constructions in which a referential element appears to the left of a coreferent, syntactic argument position. Before defining these constructions, I reproduce examples of each in Italian, Dutch and German, in (148-50). The mnemonic labels HT and CD are explained in (151).

Throughout, I have departed from the English translations in the sources and followed my own intuition in tailoring the translations to serve double duty as English examples in good standing. By convention, coreference is indicated by italics (which entail no descriptive claims as to intonation).

148. Italian (Cinque 1983)!!

HT (Speaker A: As a child, you had no appetite. …) ...Two fratelli, invece, lui si che [e] aveva sempre fame.36

CD (Speaker A: My brother and I are going to the party. …)

149. Dutch (van Haaften et al. 1983)

HT Een kabouter, Jan zocht terveergeefs naar hem. ‘A gnome, Jan looked in vain for one’

CD Een kabouter, daar zocht Jan terveergeefs naar [e]’A gnome what Jan looked for [e] in vain’

150. German (van Haaften et al. 1983), cited by Cinque 1983

HT Der Hans, mit dem spräche ich nicht mehr. ‘That Hans guy, I’m not talking to him any more’

CD Des Hans, des habe ich gesehen. A striking thing about these data is that, across the four languages (including English), the examples of CD display several minor differences with respect to the occurrence of empty categories, clitics or determiners; but the corresponding variation in HT is not at great.

Abstracting somewhat from Cinque’s analysis, these two types correlate with two pragmatic functions, which I label new topic and contrastive focus. Syntactically, CD also exhibits two clusters of syntactic properties which are absent in HT:

151. hanging topic (HT) new topic

The term wh-diagonstics (due to H. van Riemsdijk), is shorthand for a cluster of four properties: a Comp, a gap, subordinacy and cyclicity (cf. Riemsdijk and Williams 1986: 100). This term may introduce a red herring into the typology: the (standard) assumption of syntactic movement in CD. For this reason, instead of connectedness (originally due to Higgins, and further defined by Kayne 1984), I employ Koster’s (1987) term property sharing for the licensing of a discontinuous syntactic dependency. This change is calculated to sidestep the issue of category movement. Koster’s

36The discourse contexts in (103) are slightly simplified from Cinque’s original examples.

37In this example, there are actually two referential dependencies: between two fratelli and li; and between li si and [e]. The latter is an instance of CD: the former is the relevant one for HT.
Its etymology (given above) shows that the term “creole” is not primarily linguistic, although it is used to refer to certain E-languages. In this respect, “creole” is like other terms such as vernacular (< Latin vern“in the household” - Oxford Classical Dictionary). Originally and primarily, “creole” describes a social situation: the status of culturally assimilated slave-descendants. The concept of “creole” forms part of the ideology of slave-owning households engaged in extractive and agrarian commodity production in the 16th-19th Centuries. This ideology has been maintained and richly elaborated in present-day Caribbean society:

“Passing” from one status position to another means negotiating the public signification of the social structure along several dimensions. It is the double or triple articulation of the systems of status symbolization which makes Caribbean society one of the most complex social systems on earth. But this complexity and, especially, the role of the race-colour or ‘ethnic’ signifier within this complex, should not permit us to reinterpret this as a system of cultural pluralism. For the positions between black and white form a single spectrum: the complex cultural connotations of ‘African’ and ‘European’ and ‘creole’ are hidden composites of the system of social notation. Once again, these concealed cultural elements are not ‘pure’. ‘African’ does not mean African, but the highly modified, adapted and transformed cultural patterns, relations and institutions of New World blacks. We have suggested that the formative context for these institutions is not Africa but slavery (even where African ‘survivals’ and influences remain profound). (Hall 1977: 177).

The question is: why should theoretical linguists rehabilitate a term laden with racist baggage? In the absence of some unique grammatical content for the term, the only remaining explanation for its use by linguists is ideology—something from which linguists are not aloof. It is pointless to pretend the word “creole” does not exist. But linguists are not professionally obliged to provide this antique term with a new, “scientific” basis, and if none exists they should admit as much.

The social science analogy to “creolist” linguistic bioprogramming is sociobiology. Some social scientists elevate the behavior of homo economicus to an evolutionary principle (consciously or unconsciously), or others (consciously) refuse to do so. In the same way, linguists can pinpoint an innate (or “biological”) basis for the category of “creole languages”, or they can criticize same. But usually, they choose to believe they are doing neither, and this is also in the nature of ideology. In contrast to the theoretical constructs, the ideological usages of linguists or sociologists are derivative. As historian Sterling Stuckey puts it:

The final resolution of the names controversy is not likely to come until African peoples as a whole have won freedom, a development inevitably linked to their status in America. (1987: 244)

3.3 Antilogophoricity as domain extension

Important syntactic differences within Igbo and Benua-Kwa concern Case assignment mechanisms; Fukui’s (1986) unification of Case and functional categories allows a simple and general parametric account. Logophoric effects in pronominal binding exemplify Koster’s (1986) grammar-independent mechanism of domain extension; “a pronoun is a pronoun is a pronoun”, but its Condition B domain is extended to include a matrix verb of propositional assertion. The set of “logophoric” contrasts which is possible in a given dialect depends on independent facts about Case absorption (pro-drop).

3.3.1 Logophoricity and binding

Logophoricity occurs in the pronominal systems of Igbo and Yorùbá, eastern Kwa languages with significant syntactic differences but residual phonetic and morphological similarity. An analysis which captures both the differences and similarities would illuminate the syntactic typology of Kwa, both internally (e.g. vs. Kpelle—western Kwa—cf. Koopman and Sportiche 1987) and in comparison with the rich agreement systems of Bembe-Congo.

Logophoricity, along with other “perspectival” phenomena, has been brought to bear on binding theory by Kuno (1972; 1987). I propose to explain logophoric effects in ìghọsọ and Yorùbá by combining two innovations in binding theory: Roberge’s (1986) recoverability-based account of the clitic licensing of pro, and the Kayne (1984)/Koster (1987) idea of percolation projection/extended locality domain. My proposal can be compared to Pulleyblank’s (1986) account of Yorùbá antilogophoric clitics as operator-bound variables (described below). The same framework carries over directly to ìghọsọ, enabling the difference in logophoricity phenomena between those languages to be captured in an independently needed parameter concerning Case assignment.

In logophoric constructions, the subject (Source) argument of a matrix verb of speaking is the obligatory antecedent of a given embedded, nonreferential expression, which in most cases has the phonetic shape of a pronoun or a reflexive. Logophoricity resolves certain ambiguities in indirect discourse. For example, in the English sentence Mary told Sue she was exploited, the pronoun she is three-ways ambiguous between Mary, Sue and some third female person identified in the preceding discourse. In other languages, the ambiguity is partly resolved by rendering the corresponding sentence in two constructions, logophoric and nonlogophoric. The logophoric construction (in the simplest case) would have the interpretation Mary told Sue, she/*i was exploited, such that the element which translates she is obligatorily bound by the matrix subject. In the nonlogophoric construction, she takes the complementary range of reference: disjoint with respect to Mary, but otherwise free, i.e. potentially coreferent with the entities identified by the indices [i, k]³⁹

There are different ways to characterise the complementarity of the logophoric vs. nonlogophoric sets of indices, in this example [i/*i, k/*k] vs. [i, k]. One idea might be to exploit the complementarity of Conditions A and B (Chomsky 1983). Although this move is possible in languages where the logophor is morphologically reflexive (e.g. zihun the Japanese “long-distance reflexive”); it does not work in ìghọsọ and Yorùbá, where both the logophoric and the nonlogophoric expressions are morphologically pronominal (respectively a lexical pronoun and a pronominal clitic). Alternatively, a covert distinction could be introduced between ordinary pronouns and a special entities, call them “logophoric pronouns”. Still another possibility is to directly encode discourse function in lexical representations, for example a feature [logop]. But it is prudent to suppose that the language learner makes full use of the available morphological information, so that, even in logophoric constructions a pronoun is a pronoun is a pronoun. In the languages to be discussed, logophoric expressions are exclusively drawn from the class of so-called ‘independent’ pronouns, while the non-for anti-logophors are always pronominal clitics. If any binding properties are involved in logophoric constructions, and if logophors have the shape of pronouns, perhaps the learner will not treat this as an accident.

In fact, the anaphor/pronominal distinction need not enshrine a direct correspondence between morphology and binding domains. Bouchard (1984: 126) revises the Avoid Pronoun principle of Chomsky 1981 as an “elsewhere condition” between pronominal and anaphoric elements. It can be

³⁹ Matrix verbs of hearing select the nonsubject (Goal) argument as antecedent, e.g. Mary heard from Sue that she/*i was exploited. Significantly, this is not so in every language with logophoric effects.
paraphrased: a pronoun which appears where an anaphor is possible (e.g. the An-g pro relation counts as anaphoric—Bouchard 1984: 38) is interpreted as [+Bound] in that anaphoric domain.36

This default explains two kinds of asymmetrical distribution of morphological pronouns and reflexives—an which Avoid Pronoun by itself says nothing. If domain complementarity of Conditions A and B breaks down, it is only in one direction. On pragmatic grounds (Zribi-Hertz 1980: 161), morphological pronouns may appear in certain contexts where binding structurally requires an anaphoric element: Hugo est content de lui. ‘Hugo is happy with himself’. But, apparently, there are no corresponding examples of morphological reflexives appearing in [+Bound] contexts. Similarly, if the anaphoric wh-variable is caselexicated by Case spellout (an option permitted in popular varieties of French), a resumptive element appears which, though [+Bound], nevertheless has the form of a pronoun: [NP le gars [i.e. pa de qui je pense à lui, [1]]] (the guy that I think about [him]), cf. the null variable bound by the Case-marked, WH-operator in SPEC, CP as required in literary French: [NP le gars [i.e. pa de qui je pense x[1]]].

What prevents this result from applying directly to the appearance of [+Bound] lexical pronouns in logophoric constructions, is the fact in Kwa languages both the logophor and the antilogophor are morphological pronouns, i.e. [-anaphoric] in Chomsky’s terms. This means that logophoric constructions in these languages are not examples of a pronoun spellout occurring in the Condition A domain, rather the antilogophoric constructions are examples of Condition B applying in a wider domain than expected. Nevertheless, an elsewhere condition is still involved, because the set of possible antecedents for the logophoric, lexical pronoun is, for a given domain, the complement of that for the antilogophoric clitic.

Put another way: if the logophoric pronoun and antilogophoric clitic are both morphologically pronounal, then Condition B is the relevant interpretive principle for both. On this assumption, the only way to account for the noted complementarity of interpretation is to assume that the local domain to which Condition B refers—governing category—is extended just for the antilogophoric expression so as to include the logophoric antecedent, from which it then becomes referentially free. Schematically, extending the binding domain of the clitic in (153a) from α to β induces an effect of “antilogophorarity” with respect to the next higher subject NP. The independent pronoun is then logophoric (i.e. [+Bound]) in β by default, along the lines suggested by Bouchard.

153a. [NP, said that [I clitic VP]]
   Condition B domain of clitic = β (extended domain → antilogophoric effect)

b. [NP, said that [α pronoun VP]]
   Elsewhere condition: pronoun must be bound in α (default interpretation → logophoric effect)

Under this general approach, and contrary to most of the literature, there is nothing special about logophoric pronouns, rather it is the antilogophoric clitic—and its extended locality—which requires explanation. Elevating this idea to a hypothesis, is to predict independent consequences of domain extension, which follow without additional stipulation, and determine if they in fact occur. My claim here is that the mechanism of domain extension alone accounts for logophoricity effects in these two related languages, relying on independent parametric differences in their binding systems. A consequence is that this theory need not refer to a logico-semantic representational level (LF), since these facts at least can all be accommodated at s-structure.

36Surfaces non-nominal pronomes are ambiguous between [-reflexive] and [+reflexive] (Kuno 1987:260).

That logophoric phenomena are products of binding theory, given the appropriate formulation of domain (whether at s-structure or at LF), can be called the configurational hypothesis. Kuno 1987, on the other hand, denies that binding theory is primarily a matter of domain; rather, for him, domain effects arise indirectly from functional principles. Despite this difference, Kuno’s view shares with the configurational hypothesis an appeal to economy: either functional phenomena receive a configurational explanation, or vice-versa, but the two are not independent. A third view is possible: Clements 1979 claims that ΩE logophors are morphologically (i.e. lexically) distinct from pronouns; accordingly, their referential values are computed independently of the binding conditions, presumably on the basis of direct functional marking in the lexical entry of coreference with the speaker θ-role. This view is mystifying, however, to the extent that the logophors morphologically resemble extant pronouns. The possibility of underanalysis must be excluded, otherwise a feature [+ilogo] would be purely diacritic.

The ΩE logophors ye’3sg and yege’3pl differ minimally from the pronouns ye’3sg and we’3pl. Either the apparent morphological relationship is illusory; or else the ΩE learner computes logophoric effects from a baseline of binding theory. The logophor ye’ is not used in bound variable examples like John, said the person who criticized him (G. N. Clements, p. c.). As John Whitman has pointed out to me, this leaves the null hypothesis that the core phenomenon is pronoun binding.

Before turning to Kwa, I will briefly review Kuno’s account of logophoricity in English.

Kuno (1972; 1987: 109, 147f.) describes a functional restriction on English pronoun binding that supplements (and, ultimately, replaces) structurally-based binding conditions by ruling out certain cases of coindexing, as follows. Full NPs in logophoric complements are blocked from coindexing with [+ilogo] pronouns in the main clause, even if this would be otherwise allowed:

154a. That he was the best boxer in the world was repeatedly claimed by Ali.
   b. That Ali was the best boxer in the world was repeatedly claimed by him.

By widely held assumptions, coindexence of him with Ali in (154b) should violate binding condition B, because the ‘covert reflexive’ seen in sentences like (155) is independently possible.

155. John, said a snake near him.

And because Ali in (154b) is neither c-commanded nor preceded by him, the marginality of that sentence is not due to condition C. Kuno explains the contrast in (154) with reference to the corresponding “direct discourse representations” in (156).

   b. “Ali, is the best boxer in the world,” he, repeatedly claimed.

(156b) is not a possible direct discourse, so Kuno’s antilogophoric condition marks (154b) as marginal. In the same vein, consider the reversal of potential binders between (157a-b), in relation to the direct discourse versions in (158), where parallel—albeit stronger—judgements obtain:

157a. John, said to Bill, that there was a picture of himself(i)/γ in the post office.
   b. John, heard from Bill, that there was a picture of himself(i)/γ in the post office.

158a. John, said to Billy, “There is a picture of me/γ in the post office.”
   b. John, heard from Bill, “There is a picture of me/γ in the post office.”

36The special reading, under which the picture is a self-portrait taken by John or Bill respectively, is excluded here by the phrase in the post office.
Despite the general preference for subjects as antecedents of reflexives, the preferred antecedent of himself in (157b) is Bill. This implies that what causes the binding domain to extend outside the picture NP is not a subject opacity condition, but a domain extension of Condition A from a logophoric complement to a speaker/Source antecedent (Kuno 1987: 96, 126).

3.3.2 Kwa binding domains

Even without logophoricity to contend with, Kwa pronominal systems would be challenging to standard binding theory because these languages have essentially no lexical anaphors comparable to English herself/himself etc. This puts the relevance of Condition A, as an autonomous principle of grammar, into question. Instead, anaphors (which, in Kwa, ambiguously translate both reciprocals and reflexives) are phrasal, of the form [X's N], where X is a pronominal and N is a referentially defective lexical item which independently denotes some inalienable possession (typically, 'head' or 'body', cf. Ndo yaging). Similar facts in Haitian, a language with many resemblances to the Kwa family, suggest that condition A effects are derived—in this language type, and perhaps more generally—by the induced opacity of the domain of praphal anaphors.

The parametric absence of condition A in Kwa has many consequences. Koster’s 1987 account of Kwa anaphors from the class of potential logophors for the same reason that other ‘phrasal’ or morphologically complex anaphors (like Dutch zichzelf) do not extend their domains. Anaphors are irrelevant for the logophoric effects below, although it should be kept in mind that domain extension and domain contraction are two sides of the same coin: syntactically induced transparency/opacity. Opacity (domain contraction) is induced by a nonreferential phrasal head. What about the mechanism of transparency (domain extension)? It is oft observed that many Kwa complementizers are synchronically homophones with, and diachronically identical to, verbs of speaking. Clements 1979, following Westerman, notes this about be ‘say’, the V:V indirect discourse complementizer. The thematic structure of a ‘say’ complementizer might be the ‘escape hatch’ through which domain extension occurs. Binding of domains would be predicted, if binding were computed on thematic structure à la Williams (1987a-b). A similar idea about logophoric Comp is couched by Kooper and Sportiche 1987 in terms of the theory of control. But Comp is not present in all logophoric constructions. 41

40An exception is the Igbo morpheme niwa. Although niwa is a bound form in the emphatic reflexive yß niwa ‘3sg. self’, reflexive niwa is an unemphatic, independent form in Igbo. As shown by the true form ÿ niwa in Chichewa, niwa is probably congruent to ÿ niwa ‘self’ (literally ‘own’), which is the head morpheme of the phrasal anaphor in the standard language. Bound morphemes like ÿ niwa ÿ niwa ‘like their head’ and ‘body’ counterparts in many languages are noun classifiers (or specifiers, cf. Reinhart 1987) which induce opaque binding domains. In fact, ÿ niwa ‘child’ occurs nonreferentially, as a classifier, in other expressions such as ÿ niwa ÿ niwa ‘kinship category’ (lit. child of a child) or ÿ niwa ÿ niwa ‘small quantity’. S/he did her/himself [in] ÿ niwa 3sg do sel 3sg Gen.

Haitian phrasal anaphors, like those of jwac, are generally ambiguous between referential-literal and nonreferential-anaphoric readings (his body vs. ‘himself’). α-driven binding might explain the correlation of domain contraction with the nonreferential reading (DeChaine and Manfredi 1990).

41Haitian phrasal anaphors, like those of jwac, are generally ambiguous between referential-literal and nonreferential-anaphoric readings (his body vs. ‘himself’). α-driven binding might explain the correlation of domain contraction with the nonreferential reading (DeChaine and Manfredi 1990).
Topic-bound null arguments of the Mandarin type are unattested in Kwa languages. Kwa clitics and pronouns agree with their antecedents in person and number (gender and animacy are not morphologized). Object agreement on the verb is completely absent; any subject agreement in Infl is quite abstract, lacking person and number features. Compared with the obligatory non-cl class concord in Benue-Congo, Kwa non-cl class and concord morphology is only vestigial (cf. Welmers 1973). The Agr portion of Kwa Infl, when present at all, is maximally unspecified.

If parametrically in Kwa, Tense = Ë and the featural content of Agr is restricted to pronominal antecedents, Roberge’s (1986: 198) representation of subject and object clitics in Romance can be modified for Kwa as follows:

![Diagram of clitics and agreement]

In (5), V-to-I movement has taken place. The subject clitic (subjCl), governed by its antecedent, is indirectly licensed by the featural content of pronominal agreement (PronAGR); the object clitic is directly licensed by the empty category it governs (before head movement of the verb).

Following tradition, Pulleyblank 1986 identifies the Yoruba independent or ‘strong’ pronouns (e.g., àwè̀n ‘3sg’, àwòọ̀ ò̀rì ‘3pl’) as N0 pronouns, and the ‘weak’ pronouns (‘3sg’, òwò ‘3pl’), as clitics. The respective genitive clitics are òwọ̀ ‘3sg’, òwò ‘3pl’, and the object clitics: òwọ̀ ‘3sg’, òwò ‘3pl’.

Pulleyblank further proposes that all the clitics except 3sg govern pro, while 3sg governs a null variable (cf. Huang 1984). Because logical variables are not licensed by agreement, this stipulation would account for the failure of the 3sg clitic to show obligatory number agreement in subject or possessive positions with overt A-bar antecedents. But the fact that all clitics including 3sg show obligatory number agreement in all other contexts, including direct object A-bar chains, means that the variable proposal simply pushes the problem from s-structure to LF. It also introduces a nonparallelism between the 3sg and 3pl clitics, which is falsified by even very elementary binding facts. There is no way for Pulleyblank to account for logophoric effects in the 3pl, without claiming that the 3pl clitic also governs a variable—and then two null variables, bound by empty operators, would paradoxically have to be distinguished in terms of ϕ-feature agreement—a purely diacritic use of radical underspecification.

Finally, even restricting attention to the 3sg clitic, the attempt to represent its antilogophoricity as variable binding at LF incorrectly excludes certain nonlogophoric antecedents which intervene between the empty operator and the variable. Thus, Pulleyblank’s proposal is both unmotivated (stipulative) and empirically falsified. The alternative, employing the concept of domain extension, treats both 3sg and 3pl clitics as pronominal, and makes correct predictions for intervening, nonlogophoric antecedents. The isolated failure of 3sg number agreement, on which Pulleyblank’s proposal rests, has an independent explanation in terms of Case assignment.

Consider, first, matrix A-positions: only clitics can appear there:

158a. S/he saw Ọ̀rì

b. They saw Ọ̀rì

c. They saw her/him/it

d. Ọ̀rì saw them

As in (158a), the 3sg object clitic—‘a copy of the final vowel of the verb—is optional after a monosyllabic H tone verb. Since this “object deletion” is phonologically conditioned, it has no bearing on null argumenthood, although it is relevant to Accusative Case spellout.

If ọ identifies a variable and not small pro then, just as in Mandarin, ọ constructions involve null arguments, not empty categories; but this contradicts the fact in (158a,d) that they are licensed by person/number features. It might be argued that ọ is unambiguously ‘3sg’ even though not licensed by a ϕ-feature bundle, since this content can always be recovered by default from the absence of the other clitics with their specific feature contents. This would amount to a kind of underspecification in the pronominal system, reminiscent of signer zero in structuralist analyses (e.g. Benveniste 1946).

If, on the other hand, ọ governs pro, its ϕ-feature licensing in (158) is no surprise. Either way, a version of the Avoid Pronoun principle (possibly in the more general form proposed by Bouchard) must be posited, as to rule out (158c,f).

Lexical (or ‘strong’) pronouns are required in A-bar positions, as in the “focus” construction:

159a. It is s/he that came.

b. It is her/him/it that Ọ̀rì saw

c. It is s/he whose mother Ọ̀rì saw...

This requirement may be explained by Joge Adeboye’s observation (p. c.) that the strong pronouns are inherently deictic, since deixis and focus probably share a semantic property.
The obligatory Nominitive and Genitive clitics in (159a,c) are resumptive; this ECP effect is paralleled in the Kru languages, cf. Koopman 1984. As Pulleyblank observes, while these resumptives may show agreement with a plural antecedent, agreement is not necessary:

160a. [CP 3pl say Comp.REL 3pl come] … ‘those who came…’
160b. [CP 3pl see Comp.REL 3pl exit] … ‘those whose mother Tola saw…’

Pulleyblank appeals to the lack of obligatory agreement on resumptive clitics in A-bar chains, to support the broader claim that the 3sg clitic always governs a variable and not pro. But resumptive agreement is not always optional. WH-type dependencies like (159-160) are not the only contexts where resumptives are found, and (as 'Sope-Oyelaran points out to me) the resumptive clitics which must follow subject relatives show obligatory number agreement:

161a. [AG 3sg see Comp.REL 3sg exit] ‘Those who 3sg saw, left’
161b. [AG 3sg exit Comp.REL see 3sg exit] … ‘those whose mother came’

To cover all the facts so far, it might be suggested that the 3sg clitic is actually homogenous between two distinct categories, variable and pro. That is, in terms of Sportiche’s (1986) approach to lexicalization, these two categories, while structurally distinct, could conceivably be lexicalized together in some languages. But then, the nontrivial question would remain how to predict when number agreement actually occurs. The purported variable shows obligatory agreement in (161) but not in (160), so there is no bijective correspondence between the values [variable] and [pro]. To save the story, the type of derivation of the variable would have to be taken into account: a resumptive variable being [Agr] only when its operator is local—i.e. in (159-160) but not in (161). But this condition would completely divorce agreement from clitic licensing such that, if some 3sg clitics are instances of a variable, variable and pro are essentially merged, leading back to the original problem posed by matrix clitics which are clearly licensed by Agr, cf. (158).

This negative result leaves two logical possibilities: either the 3sg clitic always governs a variable, leaving (159) unexplained; or else it always governs pro. On the latter assumption, something must be said about the failure of number agreement in (160). This phenomenon, diachronically related to the loss of Benue-Kwa concord morphology, is widespread in Kwa. As to its synchronic status, my best guess is that default singular agreement is restricted to nominative/genitive A-bar chains because the singular clitic is really the spellout of Nom/Gen/Generic Case in these island contexts. It seems reasonable to think that the 3sg clitic would be inaccessible to an Agr/Case morpheme in an island. This hypothesis would still predict the obligatory number agreement in (161), because although the plural clitic is in subject position, the antecedent is directly adjacent.

45Endnote 39: 1978 observes a failure of subject clitics to show number agreement with a left dislocated, topic bound, in some Igbo dialects (cf. i), versus obligatory agreement in the standard language (cf. ii).

i. N n a gi: 3pl say i j k m n o l ‘Your mother and father, they’re fine?’
ii. N n a gi: 3pl say i j k m n o l ‘Your mother and father, they’re fine?’ (Standard)
For (164b), the elsewhere condition correctly predicts that the referential range of the pronoun is the strict complement of the clitic’s domain must be bound in the same domain where it is free.

Another issue is the maximum size of the domain which can contain a logophoric antecedent. The data in (165) and (166) — reproduced here from Pulleyblank (1986: 62) including a slight but crucial inaccuracy — would require that the domain in which it is free includes all arguments which intervene between it and the purported sentence-initial empty operator: 

165a. $\phi_1 [\ldots] \text{Comp}\ldots \text{say Comp} \ldots \text{think Comp} \text{Comp} \text{Comp} \text{Comp} \text{say Comp} \ldots \text{think Comp} \ldots \text{come}$

$\text{think Comp}$ thought that $\phi_2$ said that $\phi_3$ thought that $\phi_4$ [someone/thing else] came.

166a. $\phi_1 [\ldots] \text{Comp}\ldots \text{say Comp} \ldots \text{think Comp} \text{Comp} \text{Comp} \text{Comp} \text{say Comp} \ldots \text{think Comp} \ldots \text{come}$

$\text{think Comp}$ thought that $\phi_2$ told $\phi_3$ that $\phi_4$ thought that $\phi_5$ [someone/thing else] came.

Actually, the potential reference of the clitic $\phi_1$ is wider than what Pulleyblank reports in (165a) and (166a). First, take an example with just two potential logophoric antecedents: 

167a. $\phi_1 \text{say Comp} \ldots \phi_2 \text{say Comp} \ldots \phi_3 \text{say Comp}$

$\phi_4$ said Mary said that $\phi_5$ [someone/thing else] came.

$\phi_3$ said Mary said that $\phi_5$ [someone/thing else] came.

This symmetry of the embedded subject and object positions is not replicated in $\text{Igbo}$.

But, while the positions are symmetrical in terms of the binding properties of the elements which occupy them, the morphemes themselves are not freely distributed with respect to each other. (170a-c) show that an embedded clitic treats any pronominal in its binding domain like a name, from which it is disjoint. But when two lexical pronouns share the same condition B domain, the result (170d) is simply ungrammatical. This follows because, by the elsewhere condition, both antecedents of the clitic must find an antecedent in the extended domain of the corresponding clitic, which means that they are coreferent, but this contradicts condition B.

170a. $\phi_1 \text{say Comp} \ldots \phi_2 \text{say Comp} \ldots \phi_3 \text{say Comp}$

$\phi_4$ says that $\phi_5$ [someone/thing else] came.

170b. $\phi_1 \text{say Comp} \ldots \phi_2 \text{say Comp} \ldots \phi_3 \text{say Comp}$

$\phi_4$ says that $\phi_5$ [someone/thing else] came.

170c. $\phi_1 \text{say Comp} \ldots \phi_2 \text{say Comp} \ldots \phi_3 \text{say Comp}$

$\phi_4$ says that $\phi_5$ [someone/thing else] came.

This suggests a way to derive the symmetry of pro-drop in subject and object positions: given the elsewhere condition, pronouns are barred in all matrix A-positions (apart from contexts of contrastive stress) just because domain extension cannot occur in matrix clauses:

171a. $\phi_1 \text{say Comp} \ldots \phi_2 \text{say Comp} \ldots \phi_3 \text{say Comp}$

$\phi_4$ says that $\phi_5$ [someone/thing else] came.

$\phi_5$ says that $\phi_6$ [someone/thing else] came.

$\phi_6$ says that $\phi_7$ [someone/thing else] came.

$\phi_7$ says that $\phi_8$ [someone/thing else] came.

To summarize: the $\text{Yoruba}$ clitic is pronominal, licensed in A-positions by obligatory person and number agreement with its antecedent (regardless of whether the dependency is syntactic or located in discourse). The clitic also shows obligatory number agreement in subject relatives (9), but not in subject/possessor A-bar chains (8); this split is consistent with the pronominal hypothesis, since the subject and possessor positions are ECP islands, from which syntactic agreement features

...
are not accessible. The full set of referential possibilities for both singular and plural clitics, in subject and object positions of logophoric complements (162-170) can be explained, if the [-pronoun] binding domain of a clitic in a logophoric complement is extended to include the phonetically connected (accessible) argument of the matrix clause containing the indirect discourse verb. Given domain extension for the clitic, the referential potential of the lexical pronominal in logophoric complements is set by the elsewhere condition: the complement of the clitic's impossible antecedents in the extended domain. (164), (167) and the corrected version of (166a) show that logophoric domain extension does not include lexically governed arguments (Genitive or Accusative), and is constrained by subjacency. Numerous examples show that a complementizer of 'speaking', connecting the matrix clause and the embedded discourse, is not required in order for domain extension to occur; in fact, with certain verbs of speaking (e.g. ni) the indirect discourse Comp is actually prohibited. What triggers domain extension, therefore, is thematic in nature: the embedding of an IP under a verb of speaking.

While ḥqbo logophoric effects closely parallel those found in Yoruba, there is a parametric difference: ḥqbo shows a subject/object asymmetry with regard to the clitic/pronoun distinction, which is ultimately related to a difference in Case assignment. As would be expected if it is Case-related, this asymmetry holds uniformly in ḥqbo, in both embedded and matrix clauses, suggesting that the binding mechanism of matrix clauses operates as well in logophoric complements. This would make the domain extension account the null hypothesis for that language.46

** ḥqbo

** ḥqbo grammarians like Ọménanye 1981 recognize the following categories of pronominals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'independent'</th>
<th>'dependent'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'strong'</td>
<td>'weak'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3sg.</td>
<td>3sg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3pl.</td>
<td>3pl.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The strong forms can be considered inherently focused, i.e. contracted from the focus construction Ọ ọ wá yá ha ‘It is 3sg/3pl’. As phonological clitics, the dependent forms each have two vowel harmony variants; I take them to be syntactic clitics as well, leaving the weak, independent forms to answer the label of N-place pronouns. This establishes the following parallels with Yoruba: ḥqbo clitics = ọ ’ ( qbo , ọ́ ) (Yoruba); ḥqbo lex. pronom = ya ( ḥqbo ), dem ( Yoruba ). Because of subject inversion in the 3pl forms, I restrict discussion here to 3sg.

As in Yoruba, ḥqbo lexical pronouns are required in A-bar positions, e.g. in the focus:relative construction. Note that the relative subject in (173a) lacks a complementizer and is antecedent-
There are, however, two classes of exceptions to the subject pro-drop hypothesis. First, observe that apparent matrix pronominal subjects occur in conditional clauses:

176a. \( \text{John said that Mary saw him.} \)

This is required for Case reasons. In other words, although object clitics are always unmarked for animacy (this is often called “Case competition”), the embedded subject of a conditional receives Exceptional Case Marking from 3sg.

(177) suggests that the embedded subject of a conditional receives Exceptional Case Marking from the Comp (which is homophonous with a lexical category: the locative preposition). The other class of exceptions to the Case generalization for \( \text{Igbo} \) pro-drop is indirect discourse.

In logophoric complements, unlike matrix clauses, object pro-drop is possible (in \( \text{Igbo} \) but not in the standard form of the language). This possibility introduces a difference between Igbo and \( \text{Yoruba} \) indirect discourse complements.

For the interpretation of the clitic/NP pronoun contrast in logophorically embedded subject positions, the Igbo examples in (26) are identical to their \( \text{Yoruba} \) counterparts, described above in (10). But this identity breaks down in embedded object position, in two respects. For the 3sg clitic, there is a difference in agreement features, compare the glosses of (178a) and (16a). In \( \text{Yoruba} \), the clitic is always unmarked for animacy, e.g. the embedded subject of (16a) may be either animate or inanimate. In all dialects of \( \text{Igbo} \), subject 3sg is always unmarked for animacy (this is often disambiguated by the selectional properties of the subject). In \( \text{Igbo} \), the embedded clitic is always possible just in logophoric complements, and is always [+animate], cf. (179a). In Standard \( \text{Igbo} \), object 3sg is not possible in any context, so the question does not arise.

For the lexical pronoun, there is a structural difference, compare the sets of indices in (179b) with those in (168b). The \( \text{Yoruba} \) embedded object pronoun \( \mathfrak{a}\mathfrak{g}\mathfrak{b}\mathfrak{o} \) in (168b) is strictly logophoric; it can refer only to the matrix subject, cf. (168b). In \( \text{Igbo} \), however, the embedded object pronoun \( \mathfrak{a}\mathfrak{g}\mathfrak{b}\mathfrak{o} \) is ambiguous between the main clause subject and some other discourse antecedent, cf. (178b):

178a. \( \text{John said that Mary saw him.} \)
178b. \( \text{John said that Mary saw someone/thing else.} \)

To maintain the overall generalization, it seems reasonable to say that the conditional subject in (176a) receives structural Case. This speculation is supported by the evidence of (177), the fuller paraphrase of (176a) in which the conditional subject is embedded by the factive Comp under a matrix copula with expletive clitic subject:

177. \( \text{If it is [the case] that (s)he sees Mary, then she saw (s)he.} \)

The presence of the matrix copula with expletive clitic subject: \( \text{Mary} \) is possible just in matrix clauses, so that there is no Avoid Pronoun effect for objects. Indeed, what is operative in embedded position, as rightly pointed out to me by Jack Martin, is a kind of “Avoid clitic” effect, and since clitics are never required to be antiliglophonhie with respect to an inanimate antecedent, the object clitic is always animate.

The \( \text{Igbo} \) lexical pronoun \( \mathfrak{a}\mathfrak{g}\mathfrak{b}\mathfrak{o} \) in (176) downstream subject position has two readings: [-bound] with respect to the logophoric antecedent in the extended domain, and [-bound] outside this domain. The [-bound] reading follows, just in the corresponding \( \text{Yoruba} \) example, from the elsewhere condition: the logophoric subject is the only antecedent in the condition B domain of the corresponding clitic (178a in 178b). The [-bound] reading shows that the \( \text{Igbo} \) object pronoun is more than just an elsewhere form. The presence of the [-bound] reading means that, apart from the lack of gender agreement in \( \text{Igbo} \) (179b) is synonymous, in its range of ambiguity, with the English sentence “John said that Mary saw him.” Nevertheless, only the elsewhere condition, and not Condition B, applies to \( \mathfrak{a}\mathfrak{g}\mathfrak{b}\mathfrak{o} \) in subject position, where it is just [-bound], cf. (179a). The puzzle therefore is why \( \mathfrak{a}\mathfrak{g}\mathfrak{b}\mathfrak{o} \) should be interpreted like a regular, non-logophoric pronoun, just as a subject clitic.

This possibility introduces a difference between Igbo and \( \text{Yoruba} \) indirect discourse complements.

The embedded clitic in subject position, whether in object or subject position, strictly obeys condition B in its extended binding domain, just as with the \( \text{Yoruba} \) clitic (175a in 175b, 176a in 176b). The restriction that the \( \text{Igbo} \) object clitic is [+animate] seems related to the fact that object clitics are excluded from matrix clauses, so that there is no Avoid Pronoun effect for objects. Indeed, what is operative in embedded position, as rightly pointed out to me by Jack Martin, is a kind of “Avoid clitic” effect, and since clitics are never required to be antiliglophonhie with respect to an inanimate antecedent, the object clitic is always animate.

The \( \text{Igbo} \) lexical pronoun \( \mathfrak{a}\mathfrak{g}\mathfrak{b}\mathfrak{o} \) in downstream subject position has two readings: [-bound] with respect to the logophoric antecedent in the extended domain, and [-bound] outside this domain. The [-bound] reading follows, just in the corresponding \( \text{Yoruba} \) example, from the elsewhere condition: the logophoric subject is the only antecedent in the condition B domain of the corresponding clitic (168b in 178b). The [-bound] reading shows that the \( \text{Igbo} \) object pronoun is more than just an elsewhere form. The presence of the [-bound] reading means that, apart from the lack of gender agreement in \( \text{Igbo} \) (179b) is synonymous, in its range of ambiguity, with the English sentence “John said that Mary saw him.” Nevertheless, only the elsewhere condition, and not Condition B, applies to \( \mathfrak{a}\mathfrak{g}\mathfrak{b}\mathfrak{o} \) in subject position, where it is just [-bound], cf. (179a). The puzzle therefore is why \( \mathfrak{a}\mathfrak{g}\mathfrak{b}\mathfrak{o} \) should be interpreted like a regular, non-logophoric pronoun, just as a subject clitic.

This possibility introduces a difference between Igbo and \( \text{Yoruba} \) indirect discourse complements.
ECM. If subject clitics are the spellout of agreement features which license pro, this means that they fall together with lexical Nominative Case as instances of Functional-Kase.

ECM contexts, such as the subject position of in conditional clauses, will therefore never have clitic subjects, since what is assigned by ECM is (Structural)-Kase; there will be just the contexts in which pronoun subjects are possible despite subject pro-drop. The cross-linguistic difference already observed in focus/relative constructions is therefore predictable. In , these constructions fall together with the other ECM cases, because Comp and the copula are morphologically separate, and focused/relative arguments receive S-Kase from the copula, whose own subject is expletive, cf. (177a). In , any focused/relative argument can only occur external to Comp (e.g. or ), and there can be no expletive subject.

The object clitic has a problematic status in Fukui’s system. As a clitic, it is licensed by a feature agreement (F-Kase); but as the antecedent for pro in argument position, it is licensed by lexical government, therefore it receives S-Kase. The only possibility in Fukui’s tightly constrained system is that, following Kayne’s idea of Case absorption (cited in Berter 1984: 36), object clitics represent the intersection of the two different kinds of Kase. Both may “overlap” in the clitic, giving the French/possessive clitic subject object double, with a clitic. Or else, the two kinds may “split”, giving object doubling as in Spanish ( ). The subtraction of Kase features is given in (180):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F-Kase (ϕ-features)</th>
<th>S-Kase (lexical government)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Nominative arguments, subject clitics)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(object clitics)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(object doubling)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Accusative arguments)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(180) predicts that clitic doubling as double (or “dummy”) Kase marking is restricted to objects. This prediction is correct: Roberge (1986: 191) shows that subject doubling never involves double Kase-marking. Clitic doubling in a possessive construction stands formally in between an object and object doubling. Extrapolating from (180), the prediction is that possessive clitics double only in those languages where Genitive Kase is assigned lexically. This seems to be true.

For example, there is a parametric difference between English and French Genitives. Possessives in both languages are Specifiers: the -feature licensing of French possessives is particularly clear, since they show gender agreement (e.g. or ). In English, where Fukui shows that both possessive and Genitive are licensed by the functional head with the form ( ), possessive doubling is impossible ( ). But in French, where the Genitive is licensed by the quasi-prepositions and de ( )—lexical categories which can be thought of as transmitting the government relation from the lexical N—doubling of the possessive clitic by an overt argument is possible ( ), cf. Tremblay 1988.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F-Kase</th>
<th>S-Kase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(English Genitive arguments)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(French possessive clitics)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(French possessive doubling)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(French Genitive arguments)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on (182), the parametric difference between and is the type of Kase absorption:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F-Kase</th>
<th>S-Kase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Nominative arguments, subject clitics)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Accusative arguments)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(183) excludes matrix object clitics in , because F-Kase can’t be assigned there. It is therefore interesting that ECM from Comp (or a matrix ‘‘say’’ verb) to logophorically embedded subjects is apparently optional, since either a clitic or a pronoun can occur there, cf. (178). It is difficult to understand how Case assignment could be optional, so something else must be going on. The logophoric effect in embedded subject position suggests that what prevents ECM from applying is a failure of locality: F-Kase absorption evidently requires that the suppressed -features are recoverable. If the antecedent is in the same extended domain as the -features, recoverability is ensured by binding: the Accusative pronoun in () is bound by the matrix subject, so F-Kase absorption is not blocked. A non-local antecedent for the embedded subject (i.e. in the preceding discourse) will not suffice to ensure -feature recoverability, therefore the clitic is not absorbable.

In an ECM context, the -features in question are on the embedded Infl, whereas the S-Kase is assigned by the matrix Comp. In embedded object position, by contrast, both kinds of Kase are assigned by the verb. Now consider the data. In ( ), the dialect reported on in this paper, embedded object clitics are found just when their agreement features are unrecovareable, i.e. not found in the extended domain. In Standard , embedded object clitics are never possible, in other words the parametrically available type of absorption (of F-Kase by S-Kase) is never blocked. This suggests that domain extension in fact never occurs for embedded objects in the Standard form of the language, just for ECM contexts (i.e. for embedded subject position). In other words, the parameter which distinguishes Standard from ( ) is domain extension which includes two object positions. If ECM is viewed as an automatic instance of domain extension, from a lexical category (the matrix verb) to a functional category (the embedded IP), then what is parametrized is the ability of domain extension to include embedded objects, which entails the merger of two lexical government domains. In other words, the antilogophoricity of an embedded subject clitic is guaranteed by ECM (lexical-to-functional domain extension) plus -feature recoverability. The antilogophoricity of an embedded object clitic requires that domain extension cross a “lexical barrier” between the lower and upper predicate. This means that logophoric effects in general arise from two interacting parameters, one thematic and one Kase-based, as in (184).

\[ \text{Absorption of:} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F-Kase</th>
<th>S-Kase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Nominative arguments, subject clitics)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(object clitics)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(object doubling)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Accusative arguments)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the asymmetrical partitioning of licensing properties among subject and object clitic forms in (180), as in the possessive/Genitive split in (181), a logical possibility is missing: absorption of F-Kase by S-Kase. And it is precisely F-Kase absorption that seems to occur in , or any other language with subject pro-drop but not object pro-drop. The complete version of (180) follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F-Kase</th>
<th>S-Kase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Nominative arguments, subject clitics)</td>
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<td>(object doubling)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Accusative arguments)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The consequence of (184) for 3sg in Eznáhíhe is that a 3rd person Accusative clitic can escape absorption only if its agreement features are unrecoverable in its binding domain. For matrix object position, the only absorption parameter will be relevant (185a), while for embedded object position, the two parameters will interact (185b):

185a. For matrix objects, the 3sg features of the Eznáhíhe clitic are always recoverable; since it can't have a local antecedent (Condition B), therefore the clitic's 3sg features are always absorbed by the pronoun.

b. For embedded objects, the 3sg features of the Eznáhíhe clitic are unrecoverable iff (i) the clitic is free from the matrix subject, and (ii) it contains some additional feature, apart from the person and number. To satisfy (185b-i), the embedded object clitic must be [+animate]. This additional feature is forced because the antecedent excluded by domain extension is a speaker, and therefore [+animate].

(186) shows that the Kase requirements of embedded subjects and objects are independent:

186a. 3sg said that (the) [3sg] saw (Mary)

b. 3sg said that he [3sg] saw (Mary)

c. 3sg said that (the) [3sg] saw (him/him [someone else])

d. 3sg said that he [3sg] saw (him/her [3sg])

This independence remains, even if the matrix clause contains a potential antecedent for the embedded subject clitic, i.e. a lexically governed argument such as Mary in (187). As seen in (187a-c), the embedded object clitic must remain distinct from the antecedent of the embedded subject.

187a. 3sg said that Mary that (the) [3sg] saw (Mary)

b. 3sg said that he [3sg] saw (Mary)

c. 3sg said that (the) [3sg] saw (him/him [someone else])

d. 3sg said that he [3sg] saw (him/her [3sg])

Finally, consider an example in which the clitic appears to be locally bound:

188a. 3sg said not to be in trouble, as (the) [BE-Neg in problem BE Comp 3sg believe 3sg] thought [to be the case]

b. 3sg not to be in trouble, as (the) [BE-Neg in problem BE Comp 3sg believe 3sg] thought [to be the case]

Kuno has pointed out to me that (188) is paratactic, like the similarly ambiguous English example cited by Reinhardt 1983: John will be late, he said. The only relevant binding condition is therefore condition B. The slim acceptability of (188b) relies on a stressed interpretation of 3sg forcing it to cross over 3sg to a prior discourse topic (thus supporting the idea of topic-linkage for the pronoun, rather than for the clitic as Pulleyblank proposed for Yorùbá).

\[\text{Igbo linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits} \]

3.3.4 Against lexical binding features

If the behavior of the object clitic in Eznáhíhe was an isolated phenomenon, and the "core" of logophoricity was restricted to embedded subject position, as in Standard Igbo, it might be proposed that the clitic 3sg behaves diacritically [-log] marking it disjoint from an NP 'speaker'. In support of this idea are some data from Clements 1979, showing that if the matrix verb is one of hearing, the object and not the subject is the antecedent of the logophoric 3sg. In no dialect of Igbo, however, does a predicate of hearing undo coreference of 3sg with the matrix subject:

189a. O'gi mu ru wà 3sg Stoú! 3sg hear-verb 3sg [not 3sg] would be king'

b. 3sg mu ru wà Chìkà na ya yi jà gà wà 3sg.

O'gi heard from Chìkà that 3sg [not 3sg] would be king'

And in Eznáhíhe, the facts in object position are the same for a matrix 'hearing' verb:

190a. O'gi mu ru n'ni Chìkà na ya gà wà 3sg.

O'gi heard from Chìkà that he [3sg] would be king'

Sportiche 1986 suggests an analysis with non-diacritic lexical features. He distinguishes overt nominal and anaphoric elements by two features specifying relationship to an antecedent: c-command [±bound], and locality/antilocality within the governing category [±local]. This yields four possibilities, which might be lexicalized in different languages as follows:

English

Japanese

Yorùbá

Igbo

191a. [±bound, ±local] reflexives, reciprocals zibun ara ré òwé yá yá nwà

b. [±bound, -local] pronouns used as variables zibun ém yá

c. [-bound, -local] pronouns used referentially kare 6 é/é

d. [-bound, +local] ...

English morphologically confines two lines and three, which together constitute a category with the properties of condition B. Sportiche observes, however, that Japanese zibun, as a 'long-distance reflexive', confines lines one and two, leaving line three to kare. He further speculates that Fulfulde has a distinct class of morphemes for each line; Igbo and Yorùbá might be so viewed as well. But we have seen in that yá in embedded object position is ambiguous between the speaker and a distinct discourse antecedent, hence it is not [-bound].

3.3.5 Subject inversion in Igbo

Though logophoricity contrasts do not extend to the 1st and 2nd persons, the clitic/pronoun contrast is consistent in the singular. However, of the four clitic subjects in (192), only 1sg and 3pl invert.

\[\text{The gap is explained by the fact that 'natural languages do not seem to impose locality requirements not involving c-command'} (\text{Sportiche 1986:370})\]
The lexical 3pl pronoun ĩ-go has been analyzed by Goldsmith 1985 as resulting from syntactic movement. The inverted 3sg form is ambiguous between [PROarb have killed] and [I have killed], cf. (194).

With an Aux, the "inverted" order is possible only for 1sg, which loses its inherent H tone.

a. Émile j/*i has killed you sg.
   b. Émile k/*i have killed us
   c. *Émile l/*i have killed him/her/it
   d. *Émile m/*i have killed you pl.

Suppose that what happens with Aux is really no inversion at all, but failure of the clitic to raise to subject position. Then (193a) falls together with the ECM facts already discussed, with one condition: a clitic can receive ECM from an AUX iff it cannot desyllabify. This condition is related to the syllabic morphology of Case. The difference between 1sg and 3pl in this respect reduces to the difference between the segments /m/ and /h/. Because /m/ is a potential syllable, the 1sg pronoun clitic Acc /j/ cannot desyllabify, whereas the 3pl pronoun /h/ can. This suggests that logophoric effects are distinct from (and irreducible to) control.

3.3.6 Logophoricity and control together

Koopman and Sportiche 1987 propose that logophoricity is licensed by control relations. The following facts (extracted from Newáčačewu 1978) seem consistent with this hypothesis:

195a. ĩ-go-choro (k) ha ỹa, /j/-γaw ahyà.
"ĩ-go wants to go to market"

b. ĩ-go-choro (k) ha ỹa, /j/-γaw ahyà.
"ĩ-go wants her/him (of ĩ-go) to go to market"

3.4 Although they do in others, e.g. as subject clitics in ã-go.
and has eaten meat, which has been deleted in the indicative form in (202a) and which is amoureuse.

199a. Anne dit à Marie que Paul enj y est amoureuse.  ‘Anne told Marie that Paul is in love with her’

b. Emile serait très malheureux si Sophie enj y disait du mal.  ‘Emile would be very sad if Sophie spoke ill of him’

199a. Anne dit à Marie que Paul enj y est amoureuse.  ‘Anne told Marie that Paul is in love with her’

b. Emile serait très malheureux si Sophie enj y disait du mal.  ‘Emile would be very sad if Sophie spoke ill of him’

In more even striking confirmation of the logophoric basis of the phenomenon, Pica 1991 demonstrates that the condition B effect is much weakened if the matrix predicate changes from one of intention (vouloir) to one of disregard (vouloir bien).

201a. Chacun veut qu’on parle de soi, ‘Everyone wants to be talked about’

b. *Marie veut qu’on parle de soi, ‘Marie’s want that of herself’

c. *Marie veut bien qu’on parle de soi, ‘Marie doesn’t mind that one talks of her’

3.4 Ergative tonal morphology: Accusative and Genitive in Igbo

The fact that Igbo has no passive reduces trivially to the fact that its lexicon contains no passivizing morpheme, i.e. no morpheme that blocks -θ-pereflexion (in the analysis of Burzio 1981). But one is left to wonder if this property of the language is accidental (as it could perfectly well be on Burzio’s two-parameter account of passive). Is there anything about Igbo verb morphology which rules such a morpheme out of existence?

In confronting this question, it is interesting to observe that the perfective of Igbo transitives is antipassive: it does not assign Accusative Case, and requires a Genitive Case-assigner (a tonal morpheme, i.e. no morpheme that blocks -θ-pereflexion) to license the internal argument:

202a. ëzê -a awa ñnụ ‘I ate (some) meat’

202b. ëzê -a akwa ñnụ ‘I have eaten [of] meat’

Both the aspectual and the Case differences between (202a-b) are expressed tonally; the perfective form in (202b) additionally contains a special prefix (which is nominal to some extent, given its occurrence on the bound verb complement). The perfective in (202b) bears two high tone marks (corresponding to two H tonal autosegments). The first ‘on the verb in (202b) is the lexical high tone of the root -aw which has been deleted in the indicative form in (202a) and which is shifted in (202b) onto the toneless prefix -a (‘+A’) by regular tone mapping principles. The second ‘on the verb in (202b), which surfaces on the root -aw, is not part of the root and is independent of the perfective affix, which is toneless (thus Williams 1971); it is a tonal morpheme (syntactico-semantically comparable to English that) which can be identified as the Genitive Case-assigner responsible for the shift of the lexical high tone of ñnụ onto the second syllable (‘+ñnụ’).

This antipassive analysis challenges Burzio’s Generalization, however, since the verb in (202b) is apparently [+θ, -A]. How is this possible, and what does it mean to say that Igbo has antipassive but no passive?? A possible answer to both questions suggests itself: Igbo morphology does not distinguish between Nominative and Accusative Case; it is therefore impossible to say that its morphology is not actually ‘ergative’, and this ambiguity means that the lexicon could not contain two morphemes, passive and antipassive, since they would be nondistinct. And, though I know of no discussion of the matter, an antipassive is plausibly not a violation Burzio’s Generalization if its morphology is ergative, since by definition it is not [-A]. In this connection it is interesting to observe that antipassives do not occur in morphologically nominative-accusative languages, where indeed they would violate Burzio’s Generalization. Apart from antipassive morphology, many types of verb diathesis alternation in Igbo must be described in ergative terms, as analyzed in §2.1.5.

Some historical background can perhaps explain why this analysis of Igbo tonal morphology should be controversial as it is.

Welmers had already described at least one Igbo suffix as toneless; Williams 1971 proposed that all of what had previously been described (by Ward, Welmers and Williamson) as CV suffixes bearing high tone in Igbo are really toneless morphemes, unspecified on the tonal tier and subsequently concatenated with a High tone affix in a subset of verbforms. The unaesthetic existence of toneless morphemes follows, on grounds of symmetry with respect to tonal morphemes, in any theory which grants formal autonomy to tones and tone-bearing units.

Williams shows that a grammar of Igbo using autosegmental tone formulas is more highly valued than one in which the domain of tone association is the syllable, because the same formulas also predict phrase-level tone alternations in adjacent NP arguments, both Subject and ‘Object’. Morpheme-based association domain is required because, in Igbo, verb derivation affects not just the tone of the verb, but also the tone of adjacent arguments.

203a. ëzê si-ch’ara inị. ‘Eze cooked all the food’

b. Àbàchè si-ch’ara inị. ‘Ada cooked all the food’

( in Ibo language; elsewhere 1b’)

c. ëzê ni-ch’ara inị. ‘Eze, who cooked all the food…’

Four surface alternations, seen in (203), can be described as follows:

204. Indicative Lowing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Concord</th>
<th>Low Tone</th>
<th>Flop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ëzê</td>
<td>→</td>
<td>àbàchè</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Tone Relative Complementizer</td>
<td>ëzê → àbàchè</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Object’ Downstep</td>
<td>inị → inị</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

57 Greenlandic Inuktituk is a syntactically nominative-accusative, and morphologically ergative, language which permits both passive and antipassive (Marantz 1984: 150-2).

58 Proto-Bantu Kwa, probably had a full system of subject and object agreement morphology (called concord in Bantu linguistics). Standard Igbo has lost all productive agreement morphology, although some dialects preserve subject agreement vestigially. Within Bantu, object agreement is lacking in some languages like Kikuyu, but rich subject agreement is universal for these languages.
Indicative Lowering, on its face, is a candidate to be represented as a tone formula (or melody). But, confronted with a formula composed of a just a single tonal autosegment (L), the mechanism of a formula seems unnecessary. A simpler move for the learner would be to analyze the Indicative L tone as a morpheme.

Subject Concord Tone Flop, first formulated in Goldsmith 1976, is easily represented as an autosegmental tone rule, as in (205):

```
Tj   Tj
\hfill x\hfill\hfill S
```

But (205) overstates the facts. Tone flop is restricted to configurations where a verb which lacks a segmental prefix bears indicative L tone. On syntactic grounds, I argued in §3.1.2 that the L tone is a default Infl morpheme; licensing head movement of the verb, so that the problem reduces to the association domain of tonal Infl. In Ọmụta, its domain includes both the verb and the subject, whereas in other dialects its domain is just the verb.

High Tone Relative Comp is an example of an alternation handled by Williams (1971: 474) and Goldsmith 1976 as part of a complex tone formula:

```
\hfill \hfill \hfill H_{\text{pref}} + T_{\text{Root}} + \text{Indic. Rel.}
```

But the initial H of (206) can be more restrictively analyzed as a separate morpheme with independent syntactic motivation, namely Relative Comp, spelled in Igbo with a High tone. Welmers had already seen the next step: treating the head of a relative like the head of any associative construction, which is followed by a H tone agreement morpheme. In other words, the H “prefix” is nothing other than the associative morpheme. As to Williams’ representation of suffix tone, a zero does not have to be indicated; it is simply the absence of any tonal morpheme. Nor does Root tone have to be indicated in the formula, since it is given in the lexical representation of the verb. So out of all the stuff in (206), the only necessary part is the information that subject relative clauses have the same structure as associative constructions. But, that much is predictable from the syntax.

Another loss of generality in Williams’ tone mapping approach is his refusal to identify the associative morpheme with the trigger of identical tone alternations in the notional “objects” of some verb forms. This is because tone mapping leads him to identify the latter with the High tone found on tonless suffixes in the applicable verbforms. But the latter is a spurious generalization, as should be clear from the fact that he has to resort to an extremely powerful mapping algorithm, using a variable, which in any case produces the wrong results. He does not provide empirical data for his two predictions, data which he acknowledges would be crucial. His theory fails both tests.

Indeed the only form which supports Williams’ claim at all is the so-called Conditional, reported by Green and Igbo (1963: 79):

```
* ‘Share meat (plural addressee)!’
```

But the empirical status of (211) is shaky. Noachukwu 1966 denies the existence of a non-periphrastic Conditional form in the language. Even if someone actually uttered (211), its analysis is unclear. There is no overt inceptive morpheme (toneless we) which could explain the toneless suffix (we) in Green and Igbo’s gloss. It is therefore likely that the example in (211) was extracted from a text, so it could well be elliptical. Conclusion (211), which is the only empirical support for Williams’ second claim, does not have the same undisputed status as examples (207-210), which contradict that claim.

This chapter forms a unit with Chapters 1-2, in describing Igbo speakers’ untaught knowledge of their unique language. The basic assumption throughout— an assumption borne out by what I judge to be relative success of the individual analyses—is that Igbo speakers resemble each other and differ from each other, and resemble each other and differ from speakers of neighboring languages such as Yoruba and Ọrụ Ọzọ, not in the possession/recognition of principles or rules of grammar, but in the possession of particular lexical representations. There is a certain contrast between the consequences of differing knowledge with respect to the so-called “lexical” (open-class) morphemes and “functional” (closed-class) morphemes. This contrast reflects the special role of functional morphemes in licensing s-structure. By virtue of this contrast, functional morphemes are more difficult for non-speakers to learn, and equally they constitute more challenging material for...
linguistic analysis. It is certainly no accident that all three chapters have hinged on the grammatical a morpheme composed of just a high tone.

Whatever the ultimate merit of the individual syntactic solutions posed in the above pages, it is inevitable than analyses of the syntactic properties of inflectional and derivational Igbo morphemes—including purely tonal elements—will play an ever greater role.

The next (and final) chapter engages the role of linguistic knowledge in consciousness, through a series of studies of pragmatics. There are two sides to this picture: the effects of linguistic knowledge in practice, and the effects of practice on linguistic knowledge. Both sides are included in the metaphor of accumulation, which—as any dictionary can tell you—is ambiguous (in English) between an action and a result interpretation. The same ambiguity inheres in the social-science notion of unintended consequences: the ideas of the past, while actively built up for specific purposes, nevertheless—as any Marxist can tell you—weigh down the brains of the living.
4.1 Lexical shift: motion verb empathy

Gruber's entry for *come* (1965/76: 299) refers to the external argument of the matrix S; the schema in (1) suppresses its generative-semantic abstractness, which violates current doctrine on locality.

Thus, to handle (3), Fillmore needs to refer to syntactic position, adding the essence of Gruber's analysis: an intervening subject (Ann) breaks the c-command relation between John and there.

A purely configurational approach runs into trouble with other data, however. To license examples like (4a), which are unproblematic for Fillmore's pragmatic approach, Gruber must posit an underlying performative clause which abstractly embeds it as in (4b):

4a. I will come there in an hour.

b. I say to you [that I will come there] in an hour.

However, as argued by Faurenius 1985 among others, the generative-semantic type analysis of performatives as abstract predicates (cf. Ross 1970) obscures the distinction between linguistic and pragmatic presupposition. Accordingly, the analytic strategy in (4b) is untenable in principle.

To summarize: Fillmore's approach, which encodes pragmatic factors in lexical semantics, is not structural enough to account for (3), but Gruber's approach, which appeals to grammatical structure, is not pragmatic enough to account for (4a). Evidently, both Fillmore and Gruber share an assumption which prevents a unified account of the phenomena in (3) and (4). At different degrees of formalization, neither Fillmore nor Gruber has a principled basis for distinguishing between syntactic and pragmatic components of lexical meaning.

Another possibility, in fact the only remaining one, is that the special interpretation of verbs like come is constrained by principles which systematically distinguish perspectival ("functional"), pragmatic from syntactic-semantic (grammatical) factors. Citing observations by Viktor Bergvall (p.c., 1981), Kuno 1987 offers the following definition, formalized in terms of empathy:

X comes to Y if the speaker is closer to Y than to X such that X moves toward the speaker (as well as toward Y), or if Y is the hearer [and the speaker adopts Y's frame of reference for some reason]. Empathy is the speaker's identification with a person/thing that participates in the event or state that [X] describes in a sentence... The speaker's empathy with X, E(x), ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 signifying total identification with X, and 0 signifying total lack of identification. (1987: 225, 20A, emended)

Accordingly, the special "functional" requirement of come can be concise restated as in (5):

5. X comes to Y if E(Y) > E(X).

Given (3), the principle in (6) predicts the observations in (6).

6. Descriptive Empathy Hierarchy: E(x) ≥ E(f(x)).

(Kuno 1987: 207[3])

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[3] Fillmore's "semantic cases" and Gruber's "prelexical categories" inspired the theory of lexical-semantic roles ([θ]-theory) behind Chomsky's 1981 Projection Principle. Chapter 2 observed that [θ]-theory (including its most elaborate version: argument-structure theory) fails to distinguish the semantic/select of internal arguments from the pragmatic/select of external arguments. [θ]-theory inherited this flaw from generative semantics. Reinhart 1983b, drawing on Kuno's binding papers of the 1970s, separates two strands of binding theory, syntactic and pragmatic. Historically, therefore, Kuno's empathy analysis of deixis continues the interpretivist critique of abstract syntax, while Chomsky's [θ]-theory limits that critique.

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[4] Though Kuno doesn't speculate on the basis of (6), the SPEC DP is plausibly more 'prominent' than the NP position which complements D. This suggests that principle (6), along with Kuno's other principle (5) which concerns [SPEC, DP] to [SPEC, IP], reduces to the more general and (more structural) statement in (6).

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[7] Insofar as the Specifiers of DP and IP are inherently positions of topicalization (as opposed to [SPEC, CP] which is a position of focus, see §3.2 above), (6) accords with another of Kuno's principles:

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[8] Iσ, Eσ, Eπ.

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In “face-to-face society”—where individuals perpetually check each other’s location and condition by eye and voice contact—elaborate spoken greetings are employed. Some of these, like English Hi and Good morning, have little informational content which is not redundant in context. Jakobson 1960, following Malinowski 1923, characterizes such utterances as “phatic”, serving mainly to establish and maintain an open channel of communication. Equally phatic are the Nigerian greetings in (9). To the extent they are analyzable, most have the form of imperatives.

9. ọ-wọjọ ni y? (ọgbẹ, said to junior)\(^3\) ọgbẹ BE if you please(?)
   3sg ọgbẹ become old(7)?-Imper
   pay homage.Imper
   N-ọgbẹ\(^2\) (ọgbẹ) Ọgbẹ\(^1\)
   be_peaceful_IMMper
   contin-be-peaceful_IMMper

Other greetings have the form of yes/no questions whose only possible answer is “Yes”, as in (10), or of yes-questions with obligatory answers, as in (11):

10a. i-ta-te ọ? ọgbẹ \(^{+}\text{subjunctive}^{+}\)
    2sg pro-wake-up-Definite [a.m., addressed to someone obviously awake]
   ‘Have you gotten up?’ (ọgbẹ)

10b. \(\) ọgbẹ\(\) ọgbẹ\(\)
    2sg dawn-Definite-Perf day-light-Gen [a.m., addressed to someone obviously awake]
   ‘Have youawakened the day?’ (Ọgbẹ\(\))

10c. Chí ọgbẹ\(\) ọgbẹ\(\)
    2sg pro-wake-up-Definite Q pro-move-Definite today
   ‘Has the sun risen today?’ (ọgbẹ\(\))

11a. ọmụ ọgbẹ ahụ?
    3pl \(\) \(\)
   children ungrown-Gen that/those
   ‘Those small children?’ (ọgbẹ)

11b. ọgbẹ\(\) kwa ọgbẹ\(\) ọgbẹ\(\)
    3sg head.for-Comp pro-pass pro-do-in-sun
   ‘How does python move in the sun?’ (ọgbẹ\(\))

11c. \(\) ọgbẹ\(\)
    3sg \(\)
   be_how Exclamation
   ‘How the hell are you?’ (ọgbẹ\(\))

12a. i-ta-te ọ? ọgbẹ \(^{+}\text{subjunctive}^{+}\)
    2sg pro-wake-up-Definite [a.m., addressed to someone obviously awake]
   ‘Have you gotten up?’ (ọgbẹ)

12b. \(\) ọgbẹ\(\) ọgbẹ\(\)
    2sg dawn-Definite-Perf day-light-Gen [a.m., addressed to someone obviously awake]
   ‘Have youawakened the day?’ (Ọgbẹ\(\))

12c. Chí ọgbẹ\(\) ọgbẹ\(\)
    2sg pro-wake-up-Definite Q pro-move-Definite today
   ‘Has the sun risen today?’ (ọgbẹ\(\))

12d. ọmụ ọgbẹ ahụ?
    3pl \(\) \(\)
   children ungrown-Gen that/those
   ‘Those small children?’ (ọgbẹ)

12e. ọgbẹ\(\) kwa ọgbẹ\(\) ọgbẹ\(\)
    3sg head.for-Comp pro-pass pro-do-in-sun
   ‘How does python move in the sun?’ (ọgbẹ\(\))

12f. \(\) ọgbẹ\(\)
    3sg \(\)
   be_how Exclamation
   ‘How the hell are you?’ (ọgbẹ\(\))

The pragmatic entailments of "Be quick [about it]!" ('S/he threw it in this direction') and "'Have you gotten up?' ('They threw it in this direction') in (12a) as well as to "Where are you going?" ("They threw it in this direction") and "'How the hell are you?' ('They threw it in this direction') in (12b) is a greeting is also ritually, not necessarily in the a.m., to "wake" a shrine’s invisible inhabitants. Other such greetings are the ones in (12a). 250

The empathy notation in (14) does not limit this to first person subjects; in fact, there is no such restriction, as shown by these examples (quoth from Ormichon 1974):

14. \(\) ọgbẹ\(\)
    3sg \(\)
   be_how Exclamation
   ‘How the hell are you?’ (ọgbẹ)

The empathy notation in (14) does not limit this to first person subjects; in fact, there is no such restriction, as shown by these examples (quoth from Ormichon 1974):

15a. \(\) ọgbẹ\(\)
    3sg \(\)
   be_how Exclamation
   ‘He’s heading [off] to battle’

15b. \(\) ọgbẹ\(\)
    3sg \(\)
   be_how Exclamation
   ‘He’s heading [off] to battle’
A priori, that is, one doubts that a predicate in the semantic range of ‘walk’ or ‘eat’ might be specified ‘(Ex)x – 1’. Intuitively, the denotation ‘head for’ entails a purposive directionality which matches the empathy requirement of ‘total identification’.

In this light, it is interesting that the cognate of Agbọ shi in other dialects differs in two respects: it lacks both the empathy dialectic, and the component of direction: 16. shi ‘pass from/via’ [pass from/via x] (Owerri)

17. ọrhọ ọrụ m Egbọ gye-gwa-a. ‘I returned [home] from/via Egbọ’ (Owerri)
pro-pass-via-OAsp 1sg return-pass-OVS

The Agbọ counterpart of Owerre shi is gbọ ‘pass via’, cf. (18).

18. gbọ m Aba gbọ. ‘I returned [home] from/via Aba’ (Agbọ)
pro-pass-via 1sg return

Another facet of this difference involves the predicate ‘come from’ (often used in the sense of genealogical origin, like ‘hail from’). In Owerre, this is expressed in a serial construction whose second member is kwa ‘come’ (to), and whose first member is either shi or hị, cf. (19).

19. kwa gbọ kwa. ‘We came from Egbọ’ (Owerre)
1pl pass from/via-OAsp come

Agbọ has the same serial construction, but first verb can only be hị, cf. (20).

20. gbọ kwa. ‘We came from Aba’ (Agbọ)
1pl originate from come

hị and shi, apparently synonymous in Owerre, may have a common historical origin, since the phonetic innovation sho is general in southern Igboid, to which both Owerre and Agbọ hị belong (cf. Fig. 4, §3.3 above). The non-synonymy of hị and shi in Agbọ could indicate a lexical split at some stage, and the question would be whether Agbọ shi or its homophone Owerre counterpart represents the etymological meaning. The cognate noun gbọ ‘head’ and the Yoruba’s ‘preposition’ sị ‘towards’ both suggest that the semantic shift took place in Owerre. If hị and shi began as independent morphemes, the case for semantic shift of shi in Owerre, where they are now synonymous, is also clear. Some evidence for the latter scenario is the Owerre noun hị ‘cause/reason’, as in the prepositional phrase n’hị ma ‘because’ (lit: ‘for the reason that’). If shi is cognate to hị, then it etymologically means ‘originate from’.18

The hypothetical semantic shift of shi in Owerre and the other non-Agbọ settlements, from ‘head for’ to ‘pass via’, may be causally related to a demographic, ultimately ecological, difference between Agbọ and other Igboid communities. Agbọ occupies relatively fertile, moderately populated land. By comparison, settlements east of the river Oviri (Niger) have undergone ‘horticultural involution’, converting farmland to residential compounds. There, one does not today find the consonant relationship between a village and its farmland, which Jones (1943, 1949b, 1961) presented as the Agbọ ideal type, and which Henderson 1972 observed vestigially in pre-Civil-War Oviri. To the north and east of Owerre, for example, most farmland is held in small, dispersed individual parcels with a short fallow cycle, close to domestic farmland is held in small, dispersed individual parcels with a short fallow cycle, close to domestic

16 Alternatively: 2sg pro-return-Incep ‘Are you returning [to where you left from, i.e. home]?’

27 Yes! I'm off for home!’

18Prepositional shift of gbọ, from ‘heading [out and back]’ to ‘passing [via x]’ – motivated a semantic shift of gbọ from ‘head for’ in the protolanguage, to ‘pass via’ in non-Agbọ dialects. In Agbọ, for example, important compounds (e.g. Chief Akbari’s palace in Ìfẹm-Iṣẹ, Ṩeṣẹ-Ilọwa) did not relocate to the colonial roadside; today they stand apart from the rest, connected by long footpaths.

It is conceivable that this demographic shift—away from a hypothetical stage at which most Igboid settlements had the land use pattern which still prevails in Agbọ—motivated a semantic shift of gbọ from ‘head for’ in the protolanguage, to ‘pass via’ in non-Agbọ dialects. In Agbọ, daily horticultural journeys follow an out-and-back pattern with respect to inhabited areas, such that a farmer has a consistent orientation to the community. The decline of this pattern in other areas might have motivated a reanalysis of the verb gbọ, from ‘heading [out and back]’ to ‘passing [via x]’ – motivated a semantic shift of gbọ from ‘head for’ in the protolanguage, to ‘pass via’ in non-Agbọ dialects. In Agbọ, daily horticultural journeys follow an out-and-back pattern with respect to inhabited areas, such that a farmer has a consistent orientation to the community. The decline of this pattern in other areas might have motivated a reanalysis of the verb gbọ, from ‘heading [out and back]’ to ‘passing [via x]’ – motivated a semantic shift of gbọ from ‘head for’ in the protolanguage, to ‘pass via’ in non-Agbọ dialects. In Agbọ, daily horticultural journeys follow an out-and-back pattern with respect to inhabited areas, such that a farmer has a consistent orientation to the community. The decline of this pattern in other areas might have motivated a reanalysis of the verb gbọ, from ‘heading [out and back]’ to ‘passing [via x]’ – motivated a semantic shift of gbọ from ‘head for’ in the protolanguage, to ‘pass via’ in non-Agbọ dialects. In Agbọ, daily horticultural journeys follow an out-and-back pattern with respect to inhabited areas, such that a farmer has a consistent orientation to the community. The decline of this pattern in other areas might have motivated a reanalysis of the verb gbọ, from ‘heading [out and back]’ to ‘passing [via x]’ – motivated a semantic shift of gbọ from ‘head for’ in the protolanguage, to ‘pass via’ in non-Agbọ dialects. In Agbọ, daily horticultural journeys follow an out-and-back pattern with respect to inhabited areas, such that a farmer has a consistent orientation to the community. The decline of this pattern in other areas might have motivated a reanalysis of the verb gbọ, from ‘heading [out and back]’ to ‘passing [via x]’ – motivated a semantic shift of gbọ from ‘head for’ in the protolanguage, to ‘pass via’ in non-Agbọ dialects. In Agbọ, daily horticultural journeys follow an out-and-back pattern with respect to inhabited areas, such that a farmer has a consistent orientation to the community. The decline of this pattern in other areas might have motivated a reanalysis of the verb gbọ, from ‘heading [out and back]’ to ‘passing [via x]’ – motivated a semantic shift of gbọ from ‘head for’ in the protolanguage, to ‘pass via’ in non-Agbọ dialects. In Agbọ, daily horticultural journeys follow an out-and-back pattern with respect to inhabited areas, such that a farmer has a consistent orientation to the community. The decline of this pattern in other areas might have motivated a reanalysis of the verb gbọ, from ‘heading [out and back]’ to ‘passing [via x]’ – moti...
22a.  Kele ve el! 'Greet them! (i.e. when you reach home)!'
22b.  Oclo. 'OK!' [extra high pitch; acknowledgment]

Unlike the paradigm in (12-13), here speakers (a) and (b)—respectively stationary and mobile—do not differ in the choice of verb.  & differs for & expresses the trajectory of motion: the endpoint for & must be the point of departure, whereas for & it cannot be, so & cannot describe a trip home.17

On arrival home, an &-speaking traveler might be greeted, and respond, as follows:

23a.  &-a: 'Welcome'  pro-arrive.home pro
23b.  &-a: 'OK! I'm home!'  [acknowledgement] pro-arrive.home teg

As in (21), both speakers in (23) use the same verb.  The first puzzle with the verbs in (21) and (23), discussed by & (1981, 1983), is not a matter of inherent empathy (as it is with &), but rather of contextual s-selection, i.e. specification of the goal (endpoint) of motion.  The relevant effects concern the interpretation of null vs. overt objects.  First, consider (24).

24a.  &-e la ra &-y- &-a: 'Uche returned home: return-Asp house
24b.  &-e ya-yo &-y- &-a: 'Uche arrived home: arrive-Asp house/BVC

As the internal argument of both & and & is unambiguously the goal.  For & this is to be expected, if—as & claims, developing Fillmore's analysis of predicate deixis—the verb inherently refers to the 'home base' of the subject.  An inherent reference to 'home' as a goal is also plausible for & since this verb is the root of the noun 'house/home', cf. the comparative data in (25), repeated from §1.3.1.

25.  &-y- &-e &-e &-e &-e &-e &-a: 'other
arrive home &-a: ('home'?)
&-a: (Vila)
&-a: (Oka)
&-a: (Oka)
&-a: (Oka)
&-a: (Oka)
&-a: (Oka)

The reverse situation holds with & 'market': as the complement of both verbs, it receives the unambiguous interpretation of source:

26a.  &-e la ra &-s- &-a: 'Uche headed [homewards] from the market': return-Asp market
26b.  &-e ya-yo &-y- &-a: 'Uche arrived [home from] the market': arrive-Asp market

17Even then, one would more appropriately use the verb & 'pass via', cf. (18) above.

The opposition of the two verbs is maintained in the nouns & & (Asp) 'a return home', & & (Asp) 'journey [abroad]' and & & (Asp) 'a return home' (Vila)'s wayfarer'.  The text of & concludes:

i.  & & (Asp)
ii.  & & (Asp)
iii.  & & (Asp)

The expression & & literally 'the return of the ancestral spirits [to earth]', is the name of an all-night vigil, one of nine stages in the & title (Oka).  (Oka) (as in §19), which is restricted to older speakers (cf. Williamson 1972), underlies the & & greeting & &.  'Welcome' just as & & underlies & & 'Welcome', cf. (23a).

The effect is understandable as pragmatic entailment, since a market is not usually someone's home.  If there was a chance that & pitched in the market, one would expect & to receive the same interpretation as & 'namely goal, for both verbs.

However, this expectation is not fulfilled.  Consider a pragmatically neutral object like the place name &.  Here, available judgements are inconsistent.  The & speaker who I consulted has a split between the two verbs, with & interpreted as the goal of & and the source of &.  & judges & to be ambiguously source or goal of either verb.

27a.  &-e la ra &-a: 'Uche returned towards [home which is at] Aba': return-Asp &-a: also 'Uche returned [towards home] from Aba': arrive-Asp &-a: 'Uche arrived [home from] Aba': arrive-Asp &-a: also 'Uche arrived [home to] Aba': arrive-Asp

For my consultant, at least, the interpretation of & as the indirect, presuppositional object of these verbs in (28) is the reverse of its interpretation as the direct object in (27):

28a.  &-e la ra &-a: 'Uche returned [home from] Aba': return-Asp &-a: also 'Uche arrived [home which is at] Aba': arrive-Asp &-a: 'Uche arrived [home which is at] Aba': arrive-Asp

The data in (28) suggest that the ambiguity of the examples in (27) for & may have to do with the optionality of the preposition (orthographically & & ) with verbs of motion in &'s dialect (Oka).  This is independently shown by examples like the following:

29.  &-e &-a: 'Uche went to the farm [to work]': &-a: walk-0At as farmwork

The readings in (27) and (28) follow compositionally from the representations in (30).  The interpretation of & & 'arrive [home] from Aba' indicates that the constant HOME is itself argument-taking, perhaps as spelled out in (30b).  Of course, (24b) equally shows that HOME can be overtly projected by the noun & & , recalling an effect which was much observed in §2.1.5.  In that case, there is no other internal argument, nouns being intransitive.

30a.  & & (to) [come to be at location x, by reversing direction] in

b.  & & (arrive from) [come to be at location HOME (from location x)] in

In (28), the preposition introduces an additional location, interpreted as distinct from the verb's internal argument, whether or not that internal argument is syntactically projected.  The ambiguity of & (27b) for && would then reflect the latent presence of the preposition.

Cf. the V-V compound & & 'return-enter', which means 'go to bed, turn in for the night'.  & can also refer to reincarnation, understood as arriving home to the visible world (I. & & ) viewed as the 'home' of the lineage, vs. & & for the first appearance of a species on earth (cf. 'The Pelican and the Vulture' in the Appendix).  The & & inanimate form & can refer, not just to change of location, but to metaphorical motion such as the receding stack of yams in a storeroom.  In an & & storyteller's closing refrain (i), the opposition & & depicts narrative as a cyclical journey.  An & & prayer for travelers (ii) paraphrases this opposition slightly, with & replaced by the phrase & i & 'much home'.  The same pairing as in (ii) occurs in the & & prayer in (iii), in which the null object of & 'arrive' is construed as 'home'.

i.  & & [x & & ]
ii.  & & [x & & ]
iii.  & & [x & & ]
Now consider what happens if the verbs are suffixed with -‘e/-‘a’:

For both -‘g’- and -‘y’- suffixes, my Igboe consultant interprets an overt object HOME as the source of motion, not the goal:

31a. Čehe ‘e-’ara Abha. ‘Uche returned [home] from Aba’
   [‘...to Aba’]

31b. Čehe ‘y-’ara Abha. ‘Uche arrived [home] from Aba’
   [‘...to Aba’]

These data suggest that -‘e/-‘a’ is an intransitive predicate which introduces a lexical constant locatum argument with an empathy value of 1. This can be represented as in (32).

32. -‘e/-‘a’ ‘back’ [to come be in a LOCATION of E = 1]^{23}

There is independent evidence for (32). The Igboe lexicon abounds with pairs of verbs minimally distinguished by the suffix -‘a’ or its [-ATR] variant -‘e’ (= Igboe ‘-e/-‘a’), e.g.:

33. -bà ‘enter’
   -bà ‘know’
   -bà-ta ‘come inside’
   -bà-ta ‘find out’
   -bà ‘think about’
   -bà ‘have, possess, own’
   -bà ‘remember’
   -bà ‘obtain’
   -bà ‘collect, herd together’
   -bà ‘think’
   -bà-ta ‘fetch’
   -bà-ta ‘remember’
   -bà ‘look for, seek, want’
   -bà ‘carry [on the head]’
   -bà ‘find, discover’
   -bà ‘carry back [on the head]’
   -bà ‘go out’
   -bà ‘take hold of’
   -bà ‘come out, mean’
   -bà-ta ‘bring’
   -bà ‘trade [in a market commodity]’
   -bà-ta ‘gather and bring back’
   -bà-ta ‘buy’

Two observations about (33) are relevant to the problem in (31). Notice first that the derived (suffixed) verb is always eventive, even if the base verb is stative (non-eventive), e.g. nà ‘obtain’ vs. a ‘possess’. This justifies the inclusion of a change of location component in the conceptual structure of -‘a’. (For abstract predicates like ‘think’ and ‘know’, the change of location is metaphorical, amounting to a change of state.) By compositionality, this change of location/state is added to the meaning of the derived verb.

^{23}In English, the copula is intransitive, while the content verb is non-eventive, e.g. ‘John is eating’. The status of Igboe -‘e/-‘a’ is problematic, and I have chosen to regard it as an intransitive copulative verb.

The problem for compositionality arises in (31a). Given the interpretation of home as source of motion, in contrast to its interpretation of goal in (27a), the empathy value of the internal argument of -‘a’ has the effect of an implicit argument, saturating the internal argument of like. However, since like remains stative, the internal argument of -‘e’ evidently receives a secondary semantic role, as represented in (35) by the extra component (from location y).

35. V1 max
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A variety of ‘stories’ might be told about the secondary licensing of HOME in (35). I appeal to the component of direction in the meaning of -‘a’. Jackendoff (1983) posits a basic notion of PATH in all events of motion, as well as in various states of orientation and extension which are derivative of
such events (Jackendoff 1990: 43f.). Intuitively, indeed, there is a close relationship between PATH to X, PATH from Y and PATH from X to Y.

My approach to syntactic licensing differs from Jackendoff's. Jackendoff projects phrase structure autonomously from lexical structure; I posit a close relationship between the two—the projection relation—which represents syntactic affectedness and selection as lexical domains. Jackendoff preserves Gruber's idea that the basic semantic relations are location and motion; I treat change-of-location and change-of-state predicates as equivalent, except that the former, lacking total affectedness, fails to display the causative/inchoative alternation in syntax (cf. Guerssel 1986, Tenny 1989). Jackendoff departs from Gruber by adopting Chomsky's (1970) Lexicalist Hypothesis, which rules out generative semantics (cause-to-die → kill). I adopt a morpheme-based lexicon and allow syntactic word-formation (incorporation), consistent with syntactic locality (minimality). Jackendoff's grammar is rule-based, I assume a government-based, principles-and-parameters framework. These issues cannot be resolved on the basis of (35), but see Chapter 2.

On surer ground is the more general claim of this section, that the pragmatic factor of empathy—rather than deixis as conceived in traditional, structuralist or generative semantics—contributes to the interpretation of some $\mathfrak{g} \mathfrak{e} \mathfrak{o}$ motion verbs. The next section considers a different kind of pragmatic entailment by lexical items.

4.2 Textual resources and strategic symbols

To unlock a society, look at its untranslatable words.

The ethical effect indicates a systematic, social relationship between knowledge of language and self-consciousness. By hypothesis, this relationship is mediated in the lexicon, on the premise that individual lexical entries bridge the domains of implicit and explicit semantics. Then, the diffuseness of lexical structure (which sorts entries either word-by-word or morpheme-by-morpheme) is available to explain the relative opacity of ideological effects vs. grammatical ones (as noted by Chomsky 1986b under the heading of Orwell's Problem).

That lexical entries contain knowledge of the world is uncontroversial (except for extreme neo-Platonic realists like Katz 1981, 1990). It is not even excluded by the Saussurean doctrine of arbitrariness, which limits itself narrowly to the sound-meaning relation: Arbritraire ne doit jamais s'entendre du rapport entre signe et chose signifiée (contenu de conscience), rapport étranger à la langue, non étudié par Saussure... (Geul 1960: 255, emphasis in original).

The live issue is the range of lexical mechanisms actually involved in the ethical effect. At the present, preliminary stage of inquiry, any answer must unfold example-by-example rather than in a principled manner. Since, as discussed in Chapter 6, most standard assumptions rule out such interactions altogether, it is nonetheless interesting if any mechanisms exist at all.

Pragmatic entailments, discussed in the preceding section, are a strong candidate. They are more accessible to consciousness than are semantic details like s-selection (transitivity) and affectedness. At the same time, the interaction of pragmatics (formalized in terms of empathy) with the lexical semantics of certain $\mathfrak{g} \mathfrak{e} \mathfrak{o}$ verb roots is both robust and regular, as shown by the affixation paradigm in (33) above. In principle, too, these entailments have a historical dimension, as conjectured for the apparent loss of pragmatic annotation by the verb $\mathfrak{g} \mathfrak{e} \mathfrak{o}$ in nearly all dialects, in apparent correlation with an ecological/demographic trend.

$\mathfrak{g} \mathfrak{e} \mathfrak{o}$ linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits

There are other potential mechanisms by which lexical items affect consciousness, as implicated in apparent collective beliefs and in observable practices. Care is required in defining these formally, and assessing them empirically. For example, the strong claim that a speaker of language L is committed to the existence of all ontological elements in the lexical entries of L is certainly false. Etymology's literal realism has its limits; Gramsci observes that language is at the same time a living thing and a reason of fossils of life and civilizations. When I use the word "disaster" no one can accuse me of believing in astrology, and when I say "by love" no one can assume that I am a worshipper of pagan divinities.

Gramsci's etymological scepticism is not total, however. It arises in the course of a lengthy critique of a Soviet sociology text (Bukharin 1921) which, like other authoritarian expressions of the Marxist movement, took pains to deny the historic foundations of Leninist philosophical concepts—in this case, the non-metaphysical usage of "immanence". On the contrary, Gramsci points out that Renaissance rationalists like Giordano Bruno did employ "immanence" in a secular context, and that this usage was actually transmitted to Marxism through classical German philosophy. Bukharin's "immanence" descends from Bruno's. The same Gramsci quote continues: These expressions are however a proof that modern civilization is also a development of propaganda of etymology... [Present language is metaphorical with respect to the meanings and the ideological content which the words used had in preceding periods of civilization (1971: 450)].

Gramsci's point is that an etymology can be simultaneously opaque (as a matter of subjective salience) and yet valid (as a matter of objective history). The tension between these two propositions reflects the difference between two kinds of linguistic archaeology: traditional Wörter und Sachen studies of proto-Indo-European society (notably by E. Benveniste and M. Cambiaso), and Foucault's critical account of Les mots et les choses (which showed that the ideological concept of "human sciences" began only in the 17th century).

Gramsci's examples show that, even with a firm historical foundation, there are still two big steps between etymology and belief/consciousness. An etymological exercise is only as rigorous as the linguistic equation of claimed cognate elements; this first step in reconstruction must be established independent of any socio-cultural implications. In addition, there must be a mechanism by which the etymological meaning is placed into consciousness.

On the question of rigor, there are two possibilities. On the one hand, African cognates in Europe have often been denied, for blatantly ideological reasons. In the mid-19th century, Indo-European studies were purged of Phoenician and Egyptian etymologies, the better to portray "Aryan" culture as independent of Semitic and African sources. Particularly anathema, to scholars imbued with European Romanticism and nationalism, were any claims of Egyptian antecedents of Greek political and religious vocabulary.25 At the root of this irrationalism was Christian racism: before Hitler burned Jews, the Roman Inquisition burned Giordano Bruno as an Egypto-pagan animist.26

25 Many of the Aryan alternatives were implausible, but that was beside the point. Bernal 1987 offers etymologies like 'chief', 'master', 'minotaur', Aphrodite, Apollo, Artemis, Osiris, Rhadamanthus, and convincingly discounts Greek folk etymologies for these terms.

26 Critiquing the standard hero-story of heliocentric science vs. terrestrial religion, Blumenberg argues that "Bruno's Copernicanism was not part of the substance of the changes that were brought against him" (1975: 373); cf. also Yates 1964, 1972, cited by Tambiah 1990. Bernal's argument explains this discrepancy: Bruno radicalized Copernicanism by taking it back to its Egyptian source.
Conversely, the etymological path from sub-Saharan Africa to the ancient Near East is littered with blatantly invalid "cognates". For example, Wescott (n.d., reprinted in *Aegyptiaca* 1973: 208f.) debunks the band of etymologies proposed by Archdeacon (Oglimpfas Lucas (1948)) in support of an Egyptian origin for **Yoruba** religion. Not that an ancient Egyptian source for the ancestral culture of West African forest-dwelling peoples can be ruled out in advance, but no remotely plausible linguistic trace of such a source has yet been found.

Yet the Oriental idea thrives all the same. In 1976-77, I was often told by Igbo-speakers that the name **Igbo** itself is "a corruption of Hebrew". The notion finds a place in every popular work of Igbo studies, even if only to be rejected (as by Nwokwunma 1983: 37f.). E.g.:

**(Igbo) are descendants of Israelite, and of the tribe of Levi who are not Jews.** (In *Impressions of Black Africa. The Third World and the West*, 1987: 7, tonemarks added)

Some think that Igbo people originated in the East from where they entered this land they now inhabit. Some think that they came from Ancient Egypt, that they are those Hebrews who didn’t follow the tribe of Israel which others drove out of Egypt when Moses led them across the Nile.

Why were adventurers, missionaries and imperialists so anxious to "explain" West African civilizations as echoes of the Mediterranean/Middle-East? And why does this Orientalist construct persist among the catechized Igbo-speaking elite? **A*** 1985 argues that the administration of indirect rule required exotic ideological charters for the African elite who would stand, in place of foreign overlords, as a local 'master race' of Aryan-surrogates fulfilling the colonizers' own desires for legitimacy.27 Although such charters were short-lived as official doctrine, by the 1960’s they had acquired subjective value for the colonized. [Most educated Igbo have seen their historical vicissitudes in this century as paralleling only those of the Jews since the days of the exodus. What is important from the practical point of view, however, is that this widespread, though probably unhistorical, ideological feeling of oneness with the Jews, which as we have seen goes back to the ex-slave boy Equiano in the eighteenth century, provides some clue to understanding of Igbo psychology, motivation and drive.](Qogha 1983: 3)

Chatterjee 1986 identifies a similar inversion of colonial ideology in Indian nationalism. He distinguishes between the "problematic" of post-colonial ideology—how to change from being the object of social relations to become the subject—and its "thematische"—e.g. the historically constructed racial/ethnic types of East and West. At the level of the thematic..., nationalist thought accepts and adopts the same essentialist conception based on the distinction between 'the East' and 'the West', the same typography created by a transcendent studing subect, and hence the same 'objectifying' procedures of knowledge constructed in the post-Enlightenment age of Western science. (1986: 38)

In the Igbo case, **A** 1980 finds that the thematische of an exotic, Hebrew identity remained constant in shifting from the object value of a decadent Near Eastern racial/cultural remnant, in the view of colonist Palmer, to the subject value of righteous status of biblical underdog, in the minds of the colonized. The Biafran episode further entrenched the latter valuation, as tellingly reflected in Ogbo’s choice of the Russian word *progrém* (pronounced by most Igbo speakers like the English *program*) to describe massacres of Igbo-speaking Nigerians in May and September of 1966 (cf. Ogbo 1969: passim). (Russian and Polish Jews suffered Cossack *pogrém* in the 1880’s.) Igbo elites’ embrace of Middle Eastern and Middle European Jewish ancestors, first imported by British Christians, is a paradigm example of false consciousness. The success of pseudo-etymology in this case underlines the corresponding chance of failure of the real thing. Many formally educated Igbo-speakers have avowed surprise (or dismay) upon hearing from me that their language is closely related to both **Igbo** and **Yoruba**.28 Even if a validly etymological meaning plays a role in synchronic grammar—e.g. as claimed in chapter 2 for the lexical decomposition of "inherent complement" verbs—there is no necessary conscious effect, since knowledge of language is implicit. An etymology’s current relevance to speakers’ beliefs can be guaranteed only by a mechanism which puts lexical entries directly into consciousness.

The rest of this section shows, with both positive and negative examples, that such a mechanism exists—a mechanism which relies on two related properties of lexical items: their role as textual resources and as strategic symbols. That oral texts are central to the ethnic effect, makes all the more remarkable some recent doctrines on memory and textual authority, which ignore or devalue the oral component of intellectual property.

4.2.1 Goody vs. Braudel

Goody has recently restated and expanded the "literacy hypothesis" of Goody and Watt 1968. The original version proclaimed an evolutionary approach to cognition and consciousness:

We can no longer accept the view that anthropologists have as their objective the study of primitive man, who is characterized by a ‘primitive mind’, while sociologists, on the other hand, concern themselves with civilized man, whose activities are guided by ‘rational thought’ and tested by ‘logical-empirical procedures’. The reaction against such ethnocentric views, however, has now gone to the point of denying that the distinction between literate and non-literate societies has any significant validity. This position seems contrary to our personal observation...

Goody’s newer studies divide between “the impact of writing on human societies” (1986) and “the interaction between distinct oral and written cultures” (1987). The latter branch of inquiry has yielded a clear statement on the role of writing as a support of social inequality:

All over the world, the techniques of writing have been used to acquire, that is, alienate, the land of ‘oral’ peoples. It is a most powerful instrument, the use of which is rarely devoid of social, economic and political significance, especially since its introduction usually involves the domination of the non-literate segment of the population by the literate one, or even the less literate by the more. Where writing is, ‘class’ cannot be far away.

This idea of writing as a "means of alienation" recalls Goody’s (1971) discussion of cavalry power as the "means of destruction" in West African state formation. On the other side, Goody has been obliged to make more specific his negative claims with regard to oral culture, in order to compare it with "written [i.e. literate] culture". His recent statements, much amplified from the early articles, entrench the basic dichotomy with which Goody and Watt began, correlating literacy with cognitive capacities and achievements.

What I am trying to explain is not logical operation on a day-to-day level, since it never occurred to me that this was absent on oral cultures, but why they do not have the "logic" of philosophers. Not why they cannot add (they can) but why they do not have mathematicians and mathematics, not whether they analyze language (they do) but whether they have grammars and grammarians (in *sensus stricti*), not whether they have poetry, but whether they have literature (that is written literature). (1987: xvii)

27 The same mindset underlay Lugard’s promotion of the Fulani Emirs in terms of the Hamitic hypothesis, as noted in the Introduction. Greenberg 1963 decisively refined the linguistic foundation of the Hamitic hypothesis, along with a similarly Romantic view of the Iluano languages held by Guthrie.

28 But see the mostly irreparable *Igbo*/*Yoruba* cognates offered by Nwokwunma (1983: 13f.).
Each of these claims testers between empirical falsity and trivial, circular truth. Nonliterate people can add and subtract. What if they also multiply and divide, and posit various numerologies? Unless they do so on paper, there is no risk that Goody will esteem it as “mathematical” (of which he offers no definition, leaving the matter up to the reader’s literal prejudice). Similarly, there is no logical way for nonliterate people to have grammar “in sensu stricti”, if literacy is part of the definition of this strict sense (about which, again, Goody makes us guess). Worst of all is the circularity of the statement that non-literate cultures do not have “literature (that is written literature)”. Since Goody doesn’t say what he is prepared to admit as a counterexample, and rules out most by definition, implicit or otherwise, it is easy for him to ignore threatening cases, or blithely to dismiss them.

In the field of religion, Goody’s unspoken bias towards a technological reduction of literacy to writing, and his notorious predilection for the evolutionist “implications” of technology, blind him to ethical facts. However, there is no denying the geographical uniformity, temporal fixity, conversation appeal, and “universalist”, “ethical” force, of oral religions such as the West African ṣe religion, as in its oral recension in the Ifa divination texts. Goody can avoid these observations only by clinging to a dated, narrowly localistic framework of Africanist ethnography, wholly consistent with his own positivistic premises:

[Wir define a religion, not only by its characteristics as a sect or church... but as Kikuyu religion or Asante religion. In other words we define a religion in terms of the practices and beliefs of a particular group of territorially bounded individuals—tribe or a kingdom... The reason for this state of affairs is obvious. Literate religions have some kind of autonomous boundary. ... Contrast the situation in societies [formerly] without writing. You cannot practice Asante religion unless you are an Asante. (1986: 4-5)]

The logical circularity is as obvious in this statement as it is in Goody’s non-observations on mathematics, grammar and literature. It assumes what it wishes to prove, namely that nonliterate culture is inherently bounded by ethnicity, as if ethnic units were given in advance of analysis or were immune to historical processes (including the spread of an oral tradition). With Goody’s assumptions, nonliterate religious institutions are unimaginable, so he cannot reasonably claim to be testing their possibility against the historical record.

Goody’s devaluation of orality is thoroughly falsified by ṣe’s detailed studies of the Ifa corpus of sacred oral poetry. The individual Ifa poems (called ṣe, literally ‘lines’), magnificant and numerous, have been orally composed, accumulated, transmitted and conserved over centuries. By maintaining these poems’ rigorous authority through time and space, the priesthood of Ifa diviners (babalawo) helped foster the ideological unity of modern Yoruba speakers (now numbering over 20 million), as well as the striking resilience of the Yoruba branch of the West African ṣe religion in its Western Hemisphere diaspora (where, despite the ethnic and cultural Atlantic slave trade and forced Christian conversion on plantations, it lives as Candomblé, Lucumi and Santería).

Pace Goody, the historical impact of ṣe Ifa has paralleled that of sacred written texts (like the Torah) in chartering religious institutions, and that of secular written texts (such as Dante’s Divine Comedy) in setting a prestigious dialect. Even in the European case, neither sacred nor secular written authority by itself sufficed to standardize language beyond a schooled elite. That was a matter for the state, and the administrative role of writing is not the issue here. But it is precisely the other kinds of efficacy, of religious and secular charters, which Goody wants to deny in the oral case.

Outside of Africa, Goody’s argumentation is more sophisticated, perhaps, but no less circular. He is plainly aware that the Hindu Vedic poems are oral texts which possess a degree of fixity and authority that his thesis would reserve for written doctrines—and are thus a potential counterexample. Accordingly, he devotes a chapter of his 1987 book to argue, against the Hindu tradition, either that the Vedas are “the product of... a literate culture”, or that they are “a written tradition passed on largely by oral means”.

For the latter (and stronger) hypothesis, Goody has no direct evidence, and he lets it drop. Otherwise he would place himself at odds, not just with some received ideas about Vedic literature, but with the foundations of Hindu philosophy. The Vedas (Knowledge) are indigenously classified as sruti, ‘the action/instrument of remembering, or something heard’ (cf. Renou 1946: 238), as opposed to smriti, ‘the action/instrument of remembering, or something remembered’. This inverted literate expectations: smruti refers not to the oral tradition, as something transmitted by memory, but to written interpretations of things “previously experienced” (Dasgupta 1922: 239). Writing is “memory”, memorization is “hearing”.

The Vedas are more a record than an interpretation of religious experience. While their authority is final, that of the expression and the interpretations of the religious experience is by no means final. The latter are said to be sruti or the remembered testimonies of great souls. (Renou 1946: 551)

This leaves the weaker hypothesis, which doesn’t deny that the Vedas were composed orally but asserts that they display the “cognitive style” of a “literate culture”, e.g., “rational” procedures and “logical” systems. For the latter (and stronger) hypothesis, Goody has no direct evidence, and he lets it drop.

To save the weaker hypothesis, Goody forces himself to contemplate a literate origin for ṣe, although his argumentation on this point (1987: 303 fn. 5) is disappointingly casual, and rules out most by definition, implicit or otherwise. Even in the course of divination (e.g. the ṣe). It is the mode of composition and “cognitive style” of these texts which is at issue—and each of the 256 chapters contains many ṣe, some quite lengthy.

Goody’s is neither Philip Glass ditties composed-by-numbers, nor New Age performance art improvised on Ouija Boards. None of the known ṣe has a demonstrable external origin, Arabic or otherwise; if they did, it would be surprising that one (Ofa) is devoted to unceasing accounts of the arrival of Islam in the Yoruba-speaking area (Akinkugbe 1973: 57ff). External origin is also not supported by comparison with divination systems practiced in the ṣe and ṣe-speaking areas,
called $\xi_{\text{I}}$ and $\xi_{\text{II}}$ respectively. As documented by Chanu, 1981, the materials, numerology and cosmology of $\xi_{\text{I}}$ divination at $\Sigma_{\text{I}}$ closely resemble those of $\xi_{\text{II}}$, but there is no formal or substantive similarity in the texts, although this would be predicted if they had a common source. This leaves a “cognitive style” argument which is even weaker than the one devised for the Vedas. Goody would have to claim that oral $\xi_{\text{II}}$ was authoritative just because it was inspired by the (numerological, material) divination apparatus of a distant, literate culture. To find such an argument convincing, one must suppose that “cognitive style” inheres more in physical objects than in texts, and that content of texts is irrelevant to their authority.

Prudently hedging his bets, and tacitly acknowledging $\xi_{\text{I}}'$s relevance as a counterexample, Goody also tries to dismiss its centrality as a resource and its coherence as a text: [9] would be difficult to see it as an intrinsic part of the thought of all Yoruba, since great care was taken to prevent the ‘secrets’ from spreading. Knowledge, ritual knowledge, was distributed in a deliberately uneven and restricted fashion, but in any case could not really be considered as a single corpus, knowable by a single individual.

Both parts of this assertion are false, with the trivial exception that no one person could know the whole of $\xi_{\text{II}}$. Nor is the error surprising, because Goody explicitly bases his claim on an assumed similarity between $\xi_{\text{II}}$ and the “Bagre” myth of northern Ghana—a text which Goody himself recorded and published. However, he cites no empirical resemblances between “Bagre” and $\xi_{\text{II}}$, leaving the impression that he believes all African oral texts (or “utterances” as Goody prefers to call them, reserving the buzzword text for literate productions) are inherently alike.

On $\xi_{\text{II}}$ itself, Goody mentions Bascom’s pioneer encounter with an (anonymous) “bagre” at [A-6] over 1957-38 (published in 1969). Had he consulted the considerable Nigerian scholarship on $\xi_{\text{II}}$ of the 1960’s and 70’s, produced by literate Yoruba speakers and published by Nigerian and British academic presses, he would have read (inter alia) that many Yoruba men and women get to know a good many of the ‘secrets’ of $\xi_{\text{II}}$ divination, so that these secrets are, in fact, no more than open secrets.

The priest of $\xi_{\text{II}}$ also learns more by attending weekly, monthly and yearly meetings of $\xi_{\text{II}}$ priests in his area. During these meetings, competitors in chanting $\xi_{\text{II}}$ are held. Whenever a priest of $\xi_{\text{II}}$ chants a complete sentence from an $\xi_{\text{II}}$, his colleagues are supposed to answer him with the word $\text{Aa}-\text{Aa}$, and if he misses another sentence, his colleagues will protest that he is perturbing the divinatory system. The protest may take the form of grumblings in the first instance to warn him that he is making a mistake. But if the priest persists in his mistake, more violent means including shouting him down or sending him out of the assembly may result.

Goody’s erroneous beliefs about $\xi_{\text{II}}$ show the futility of transferring literate ideas of intellectual property to nonliterate settings, especially insofar as this tends to sensationalize the concept of secrecy. By contrast, I now turn to describe a genuine example of “secret language”: the argot of the $\Sigma_{\text{I}}$ Kingdom. $\delta_{\text{II}}$ provides another illustration of the general mechanism by which etymology affects consciousness, namely the strategic role of lexical symbolism. In turn, discussion of $\delta_{\text{II}}$ raises the wider issue of how $\Sigma_{\text{I}}$ hegemony was sustained by manipulation of a lexically-based, symbolic code.

4.2.2 $\delta_{\text{II}}$

The ‘supernatural' aspects of African government are always puzzling and often evanescent to the European administrator (Fortes and Evans-Fitchard 1940: 19).

The royal town of $\Sigma_{\text{I}}$ (settlement 17 in Fig. 1) is linked to excavations at nearby $\lambda_{\text{I}}$ and $\lambda_{\text{II}}$ of an elaborate burial containing ivory, iron, beads, textiles, ceremonial pottery and exquisite bronze castings (cf. Shaw 1970). The burial is radiocarbon dated as over a thousand years old. $\lambda_{\text{I}}$ and $\lambda_{\text{II}}$, which contextualize these finds, are the outstanding works on Igbo ethnography and precolonial history. His analysis of the relationship between ritual and politics has the great merit of placing at center stage the role of symbolism in a theocratic “system of communication and control.” I will briefly summarize his main findings, before turning to a linguistic dimension of $\Sigma_{\text{I}}$ control: $\delta_{\text{II}}$, the argot of the $\Sigma_{\text{I}}$ political elite.

In contrast with the trading states which developed along the River $\Omega_{\text{I}}$ (Niger) and its delta, and on the River $\gamma_{\text{I}}$ (Cross), the inland hegemony centered at $\Sigma_{\text{I}}$ was remarkable for having no element of militarism, and for not employing slave labor. Indeed, middleman and productive activities were secondary to $\Sigma_{\text{I}}$ regional interests. Critiquing Northrup’s (1972) analysis of early Igbo trade, $\delta_{\text{II}}$’s (1980: 59) remarks that $\Sigma_{\text{I}}$ “...at its peak in the 16th century was based on a ‘service’ economy of ritual monopolies in surrounding settlements. Within this regional framework, individual communities specialized in the production and trade of various food, craft and luxury commodities, eventually including European goods. The regulating presence of itinerant $\Sigma_{\text{I}}$ in these settlements was absorbed into its lineage structure, leaving traces like the name $\lambda_{\text{I}}$ (a $\Sigma_{\text{I}}$ assembly) on the west side of $\delta_{\text{II}}$.

The $\delta_{\text{II}}$ phenomenon makes no sense in the Africanist dichotomy of states vs. “acephalous” societies. However, $\delta_{\text{II}}$’s study notes the difference between hegemony and violence. $\Sigma_{\text{I}}$ example is strongly consistent with Gramsci’s theory that hegemony, while not a sufficient condition for the formation of a state, is nonetheless a necessary condition. The aspect of hegemony is conspicuously lacking in the definitions of “state” offered by Radcliffe-Brown (1940: xiv) and (Fortes and Evans-Fitchard 1940: 14), who focus on territory, and on the use or threat of violence (“the command of organized force”). These definitions are, accordingly, falsified by $\Sigma_{\text{I}}$.

In this example, we see that $\delta_{\text{II}}$'s indigenous political organization and the medicine against yam pestilence. These ritual perquisites...
were interrelated both conceptually and materially—recalling Tambiah’s (1983) performatative analysis of ritual as composed of mutually sustaining “inner” and “outer” frames of meaning and action. A case in point is the semantic and pragmatic relationship between taboo and abomination. Paraphrasing Nt. elders, Ørnerørring (1980: 49) distinguishes åp ‘taboo’ from åg ‘abomination’ as respectively principle vs. action. This logical relationship has a clear etymological basis. Åg, from *ąg ‘avoid’, is ritual prohibition. Åg from *ąg ‘pollute’ is the defilement which results from violating åp. Major åp and åg are qualified with the word ána ‘earth’, indicating that such defilement can be cleansed only at the shrine of the earth. Literally, the violator of åp has polluted the ‘land’, i.e. an entire community. In many Igboid areas (e.g. in Igbo, but not in Efik ána for its cognates ána, d, an etc.) is used to refer to a major lineage, i.e. as the inhabitants of a discrete ‘land’.

Ørnerørring (1980: 52-54) details an Nt. classification of 105 åp major and minor. Some åp apply to specific categories of citizens (married women, non-titled men, tsp-titled men, tsp+tsp:1:1:1). some are valid for all of these groups. (63 åp still remained in force at Nt; in 1972.) An oral version of this system was presumably what tspōs used in order to define åp for the whole kingdom. Correspondingly, tspōs controlled the ritual cleansing of åp(t) for each òpọ, by exercising a monopoly over the earth cult (ána ásọ) of abomination-cleansing sacrifices (ıpọ ásọ). Literally covering the abomination,266

In the related functions of regulating åp and åg, tsp guard against the possibilities of upstream and downstream oppression by the priests.267 Others included:

- tsp, tsp: the four days of the market week tsp (cf. *p: become complete)
- tsp, tsp: the ‘Herbalism/Divination’ divinity (cf. tsp ‘medicine’)
- tsp, tsp: the Pillar (i.e. upland source) of Water
- tsp, tsp: the ‘Cult-of-Yam-Fertility’

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Nt. authority over these and other åp cults was ultimately based on the monarch’s claim, as the focus of the sky cult (g Responses to the sun god Ch’i’Uwọ). Recent monotheistic reinterpretations of Ch’i and Ch’i’Uwọ (cf. §4.6.2 below) are contradicted by the subjective meanings of these terms expressed by nonliterate nonchristians. For example, in praying to Ch’i’Uwọ, Nt. elders break a kola nut while pointing it to the sun and addressing the epiphany tspọs ‘the orb of the sun’ and tspọs ‘life force’ (Ørnerørring 1980: 31f). Nt ownership of åp cults is commemorated in myths. The four market days are said to have been visitors sent to earth by Ch’i’Uwọ. They remained tspọs until tspọs discovered their names by a clever trick.268 Similarly, in time of famine, tspọs received the first yam and palm oil from Ch’i’Uwọ after sacrificing his first son.

Ørnerørring speculates that tspọs, reliance on surplus from its ritual service monopolies of åp cults was a long-term adaptive response to declining agricultural yields in the eroded scrablands around Nt. Manipulation of the åp system required tspọs elders to migrate to outlying settlements and found Nt. lineages there. From this process, two benefits accrued: subsistence for the emigrants themselves, and tribute for those who remained in Nt.269 By cross-checking genealogies collected between 1966-72, Ørnerørring has documented Nt. lineages in 22 major Igboid settlements; nearly all of these are also listed as tspọs outposts by Leonard 1906. This indirect evidence indicates that, by the end of the 16th century, tspọs agents were collecting fees and tribute from more than half of the present Igbo area, through a network which covered many of the land-based trade routes. By contrast to ritual prohibitions (åp, civil laws (åp = ṣọ ‘set up, build’) are established by ‘lineage leaders’ reflecting decisions in each community, and enforced ‘by fines or social ostracism’ (Ørnerørring 1980: 49). As a non-militaristic state, tspọs wielded greater power in other settlements by manipulating åp than it could ever have done by setting and enforcing tspọs. tspọs could pronounce a ritual curse of anathema on a local market, effectively ending trade in the towns served by that market; it was thus unnecessary to besiege these towns directly—a feat which would have been impossible anyway. Ørnerørring (1972: 48f) aptly compares tspọs ritual power in this respect to the Roman Pope’s power of excommunication, which had political clout throughout Europe before the Protestant Reformation, and in the remaining Catholic countries thereafter. Much as the Holy Roman Empire gave christian Europe a common ideological charter, Afo (1980: 317) argues that the Nt. system effectively ‘synthesized Igbo culture’.

In the 18th-19th centuries, tspọs influence was partially displaced by the Igbo aliagbardy, as inland trade routes were re-directed via water transport towards new Atlantic coastal supplies and markets. The area under tspọs control and colonization expanded up the Igbo river, westward from the Enugu [Cross] river basin into the central plateau and across the southern palm belt to the Igbo River (Coskey 1972; Éborhọ 1972; Afo 1981 b,c,d; Afo 1984; Igbo to appear). In 1911, tspọs was an independent, well-confined dominion, with a clear administrative and political structure, which endured until the end of World War II.

In Cuban rumba: El Sol que allumbra la Tierra. The original Igbo word for ‘sun’ was either tspọs (for ‘season’) or tspọs. The phonetic change tspọs in most dialects, plus secondary labialization of velars before rounded vowels, caused the word for ‘face’ (originally tspọs) to sound like sun, cf. data (24) in §3.1.3 above, repeated in §4.2.5 below. The lexical distinction was subsequently reestablished by replacing tspọs as ‘eye’ or ‘orb of the sun’.

While the four visitors slept in his house, tspọs sent a rat to chew on their baskets, one after another. As they called to wake each one in turn, the four secret names were revealed.

In its adaptive dimension, this ancient tspọs demographic pattern resonates strongly in recent patterns of Igbo outmigration and home remittance as a response to land hunger.
The ritual status of N1 people is signified by the secret language used with them. The chief external officials were the eldest-titled men, the 시행 (ritualists) and traders who were the older 이족 settlements. A secret language was developed and used only by the tenement men so that information could pass between the political elite in the tenement and the tenement men outside. The tenement language was used in a technical sense to refer to the 'deep' meaning of a proverb: the speaker's nonliteral intension. On one dimension, both 이족 and 이족 are symbolically opposed to 이족 which is literally 'mouth' or 'entrance', metaphorically 'meaning' or 'prior'. The tenement was called the 'eyes and ears of the tenement' (이족; 이족.Our, 1980: 16) not his tongue or mouthpiece.

In August 1977, it was quietly arranged for me to record a handful of sentences in the 이족 format from an elderly 이족-titeldholder at his tenement home. Data (36:531) below transcribe selection #2 on the accompanying cassette tape. The speaker chose to portray fragments of hypothetical, secret conversation between 이족-titled N1 elders negotiating with a non-N1 stranger. Two further sentences (52:533) were dictated, but not recorded, on the same occasion. These materials exemplify the basic principle by which 이족 is related to the ordinary spoken language.

41 The examples, produced spontaneously after a general request, attest the verbal skill of the speaker, who could refer to any domain of experience, even very complex concepts.

42 The other 'personality cult' represents 이족 'power of the right hand'; 이족 'face' i.e. charisma, 이족 'a traveling feet' i.e. migrant enterprise, and 이족 which refers to a wooden storage bowl which depicts 'the question [this] man is asking, is [this] man putting his understanding deep?'

43 The examples, produced spontaneously after a general request, attest the verbal skill of the speaker, who included a tongue-twister (example 43) that may be further twisted in my transcription.

44 This is literally 'the one of above', 'the high-up one'. The 고운 bird portends misfortune because it nods its head if confirming bad news while rendered speechless by grief.

45 Effective use of the tongue can suppress the emotional reactions ('hearts') of others. As mentioned in §11, 이족 can also refer to the 'deep' meaning of a proverb: the speaker's nonliteral intension. On a different dimension, both 이족 and 이족 are symbolically opposed to 이족 which is literally 'mouth' or 'entrance', metaphorically 'meaning' or 'prior'. The tenement was called the 'eyes and ears of the tenement' (이족; 이족.Our, 1980: 16) not his tongue or mouthpiece.

46 The examples, produced spontaneously after a general request, attest the verbal skill of the speaker, who included a tongue-twister (example 43) that may be further twisted in my transcription.

47 This is literally 'the one of above', 'the high-up one'. The 고운 bird portends misfortune because it nods its head if confirming bad news while rendered speechless by grief.
52a. expansion of a lexical item like [V expansion of the general lexicon ("complex dictionary"), as the limiting case of periphrasis—the
determination of predicates.  It can be verified by inspection that idioms, as opposed to word games, are the predominant
feature of socially restricted slangs and argots.  Examples from 1890’s New York City:
55a. metaphor autumn bawler ‘a person’ (from Asbury 1927: 375-79)
amazoned ‘flagged’
braking iron ‘pistols’
Bilky Noodle ‘a soft fellow who believes all the girls are in love with him’
diving bell ‘a rum shop in a basement’
driver ‘a pickpocket’
stretch ‘a year [i.e. in jail]’
b. metonymy black box ‘lawyer’
roombox ‘a judge who can be bribed’
c. rhyme Cain and Abel ‘a table’

The greater productivity of metaphor as opposed to metonymy is expected, because metonymy needs to
identify a salient and canonically associated object or part of the denotatum.  In the above sample of
[aju], there are three types of idioms—three levels of semantic noncompositionality.  At the upper extreme of idiomaticism, names replace ordinary NPs and
predicates.  For example, [aju] [name] and [aju] [name] stand for [aju] ‘person’ and [aju] ‘wine’, while
Ch’est-qui-là (literally ‘Daylight shines out’) and méty Oriné (literally ‘touch Oriné’) substitute for [aju]
[aju] ‘watch out’ and [aju] [name] ‘to be nearby’, respectively.

How do these substitutions qualify as idioms, and of what type?  Before the recording, the [aju]
speaker offered that there was a metaphorical relationship between the names and their
idiomatic interpretations.  He said that [aju] was the name of a very tall person, so that its
aju interpretation ‘depth [of understanding]’ is not completely arbitrary.  To be sure, this limited
degree of semantic motivation does not dispense with the need for rote learning of the substitutions,
but such iconicity as does exist might aid a
degree of semantic motivation does not dispense with the need for rote learning of the substitutions,
but such iconicity as does exist might aid a

The path from ‘a tall man’ to ‘depth of understanding’ might be folk etymology.  Lexical
coinage from proper-names is rare in ordinary language; examples cluster in the fields of politics
and technology, more metonymic (e.g. angierum, chaucivism, reagamism, sandwich, suvicit—which
are independently confirmed by oral history:

At least some of these names are [aju] [name] ‘praise names’, derived by metaphor and metonymy.  I have not
followed up the internal analysis of these forms.

i. Elmer George Bushed his ex-buddy Joe.  Without context, it is impossible to know from (ii) whether Elmer kidnapped Joe (à la Saddam), or eased him into retirement (à la Marcos, Duvalier, Pinochet).  Similarly in (36), the [aju]
denotation of the predicate-name [aju] is underdetermined by the linguistic context, even for a listener who
is otherwise acquainted with the real-world person named.
In the first quarter of the eighteenth century, during the lifetime of slow k'we (a renowned traditional medicine man and divine in the sec), the omg anum ak'ewa major lineage had segmented into three minor lineages, but all were under the leadership of slow k'we ak'ewa. slow k'we ak'ewa was growing older and losing his visibility he was not able to cope with the administration of the various temples in omg anum ak'ewa. The lineage numbers of omg anum ak'ewa, which had produced an iwa ari a generation before slow k'we ak'ewa, were imperative and could not wait for the old man to arrive. The head of omg anum ak'ewa, a man named chun k'we, decided to perform the sacrifices, which were the responsibility of slow k'we ak'ewa, without obtaining permission. When the old man arrived, he found to his astonishment that chun k'we had done his job. Enraged, he struck his k'we spear-staff into the ground and cursed: "The head is head, the tail is tail, since the tail separates, let it always be on the man." Since then the minor segments of the major lineage omg anum ak'ewa had had their own leaders.

This stereotypical picture of the two elders corresponds closely to the idiomatic sëj usage of their names, denoting 'herbalist' and 'look out for [someone]', in the data. I take this correspondence as corroborating the speaker's general view of sëj etymology of this type.

In a second type of sëj idiom, the metaphor is less specialized, more accessible to an outsider (analyst or eavesdropper). The predicate sëj k'we 'do head of farm basket' is interpreted 'be corpse-like', probably because the sturdy, rectangular sëj basket, with its thick wooden base, resembles a bier or casket. The nominal expression sëj k'we nchë literally 'the white [individual]', stands for sëj 'corvée', i.e., 'money'. Corvée shells, the most general form of pre-British currency in the Igbod area, are bright white in color. The NP i start k'we ['a head of the start k'we bird'] means a grief-stricken person, for metaphoric (and proverbial) reasons given in footnote 46 above.

Like the name type of idioms, common noun sëj idioms are metaphors. Unlike them, however, they utilise productive word formation devices of ordinary language, such as noun classifiers. A classifier is a noun with no inherent reference, which overtly signals a lexical, derivational relationship. As classifiers, the nouns sëj 'head' and sëj 'child' mean 'type of individual' and 'individual' respectively, as in the ordinary-language expressions sëj k'we sëj 'dummy' (literally 'bone-headed individual'), and sëj k'we k'we 'Caucasian' (literally 'child of the Europeans'). The sëj phrase sëj k'we sëj, literally 'going up', means 'tricks', perhaps in the same way that the English phrase send up means 'parody'. Nevertheless, despite the regular morphology and partial semantic motivation of this second type of sëj expressions, they are semantically noncompositional, impeding decipherment.

The mildest idiomaticity is periphrasis without lexical coinage; in the above, a frequent example is the reflexive expression ma sëj sëj 'he know him/herself', which in ordinary language expressions, they are metaphorically semantic noncompositional, impeding decipherment.

In Section 4.2.3, I discuss the phenomenon which uses tacit linguistic knowledge to control strategic, explicit knowledge. This use, being purposeful, involves an element of self-consciousness which goes beyond that associated with normal "stylistic" usages (or registers, to use the argot of sociolinguists).

The consciousness in question is not strictly ethnic, since knowledge of sëj divides initiates from non-initiates, not sec, people from non-sec. In practice, however, sëj was a device by which the sec Kingdom maintained a hegemony conceived in ethnic terms as an opposition between "sec" and "lòmbà" (cf. omg nchëvë 1980:30, fn. 31 and §4.6.1 below). Thus, the sëj example shows that the derivational workings of the lexicon need not be consciously known—in the manner of a linguist—in order for lexical knowledge to become a political resource, contributing to the ethnic effect.

In this way, magical acts constitute another potential example of the general pragmatic strategy of linguistic consciousness. Consider a three-word idiom of linguistic magic. Tambiah's performative theory of ritual (1968, 1973, 1981) holds that the magical property of a text is inheres neither in a Malinowskian "coefficient of weirdness", nor in erroneously believed, efficient-causal effects of "medicine" as proposed by Evans-Pritchard. Rather, Tambiah argues that magical acts are performative acts by which a property is imperatively transferred to a recipient object or person on an analogical basis. In one way, magical acts constitute another potential example of the general pragmatic mechanism of linguistic consciousness. Consider a three-word sëj linguistic term.

I was fortunate to join in the celebration of the annual lbz sec lòmbà 'Feast of the Medicinal Food' at the sec Ilede lineage of k'we sëj. I joined on sëj/Friday 4 March 1977. This ritual marks the start of the agricultural year. Libation and food sacrifice are offered by the oldest male at the patrilineage ancestor shrine. Each resident household in the lineage contributes pànyà (round portions of pounded yam used in public feasting) as well as a pot of fish stew containing balls of ground sëj melon (Cucumis vulgaris, cf. sëj k'we 1980:16). Since I professed some literacy}

46Classificatory kinship terms are formed with sëj and its plural sëj, cf. data (50) in §4.2.5 below and omg k'we sëj [1990:135, fn. 35]. The classifier expression sëj k'we sëj is a bahuvrihi (encratic) compound which denotes [someone who has a head [of bone]]. Here, the modifier sëj k'we sëj 'bone' (< k'we 'bone') is a metaphor of stupidity, like English knockheaded.

47In k'we, sëj k'we k'we denotes 'an elder'. Noting my puzzlement, people explicitly derived this meaning as a bahuvrihi [someone of the age grade [whose hair is white]], where 'head' denotes hair and 'bone' denotes white color. My doubts about this spontaneous metaphorical analysis were reinforced on the day I left k'we, crossed east of the Niger and sincerely referred to an old man as sëj k'we k'we k'we (This intended honor was not appreciated.) For a speculative account of the meaning 'elder', cf. §4.2.4 below.
in Igbo, I was asked to record the contributing household heads, who numbered 40. All the stews were mixed together, and served out with the yam. Then, as evening fell, "Ôkú ọrụ" (children igbo: the head priest of Ọzọ ọnụụ Marketplace) led the following call-and-response chant:


Seniority: Seniority, seniority surpass longevity.

The chant in (56) became the theme of a joyful dancing procession which made several circuits of the compact, hilltop village, passing each time over all its paths, before dispersing.

This text illuminates the relationship between etymology and pragmatics. The word ọzọ ọnụụ Marketplace, which I gloss "seniority," is at best a marginal lexical item in the synchronic Igbo lexicon. A participant translated the chant into English for me as "Old age is very fine!", expressing the force of (56) as an incantation to ensure that each participant attains the ideal state which Òwụọ 1984 describes as ọzọ ọnụụ Market place: "a life of fulfillment" combining longevity with socially valued achievements. (On ọzọ ọnụụ see §4.2.8 below.)

A more literal interpretation of (56) is suggested by comparing the Igbo word ọzọ ọnụụ Market place with the Igbo expression ọzọ ọnụụ Market place ọzọ ọnụụ Market place, i.e. 'member of a senior age grade' (cf. ft. 51 above). If this comparison is correct, then the chant states that seniority, attained by initiations and titles is 'better,' more important, than reaching old age without such titles. As a status measure, initiation surpasses age. The same morpheme is probably seen in the lexical item ọzọ ọnụụ Market place, which names a title society for ọzọ ọnụụ Market place 'lineage daughters.'

An ọzọ ọnụụ who is advancing in age but has not performed it ọzọ ọnụụ Marketplace suffers from inferiority complex for she is not well treated if she is around [her natal lineage] and is always taunted.

(Ọzọ ọnụụ: n.d.: 26)

For most present-day Igbo speakers, including speakers of Igbo, the word ọzọ ọnụụ Market place in a neutral context simply means 'bone.' However, there is another evidence that one meaning of ọzọ ọnụụ Market place is 'seniority.' Ọzọ ọnụụ (1979: 87) cites the following proverb:

57. Ọzọ ọnụụ na-ọzọ ọzọ ọnụụ n'ị ọzọ ọnụụ Marketplace.

Children growing in flesh elder. Prog-surpassing in bone. While the youth grows bigger in the flesh, the elder grows stronger in the bone.

Ọzọ ọnụụ paraphrases his literal translation of (57) as implying that "status has never been equated with stature." However, the opposition of flesh and bone does not correspond in any obvious way to youth and old age. Perhaps bone represents hidden strength, as opposed to the visible strength of fleshy muscle, but this is not the only possibility. The word ọzọ ọnụụ (in many dialects gù) means 'flesh,' dynamically as the part of the body which develops with maturation (tr' produce') and in the static sense of 'soft tissue on the bone.' By extension, however, it also commonly means 'profit' in the sense of surplus or visible gain. Therefore, a plausible but nonliteral interpretation of (57) is that, while youths grow in physical strength, elders grow in the authority derived from the seniority of initiation status, despite their declining physique.

There is a piece of evidence which might explain the noted ambiguity of ọzọ ọnụụ between 'seniority' and 'bone.' According to Ọzọ ọnụụ Marketplace (1980: 82), the Ọzọ ọnụụ Marketplace title confers an ọzọ ọnụụ 'with a round head.' ọzọ ọnụụ refers to a family of metal staffs "symbolizing the power that is derived from the seniority of initiation status, despite their declining physique.

To link the text with the context, the song with the food, and hence to represent the pragmatic force of (57) it may be derived from the verb ọzọ ọzọ (grow old) (cf. the vowel shifts ọzọ ọzọ and ọzọ in §3.1.1.). Armstrong 1987 cites a related, ọzọ form ọzọ izọọ 'old.' The verb probably derives from ọzọ izọọ 'surpass,' i.e. in age, so there may be an element of playfully intentional ambiguity in the ọzọ ọzọ in (56).

Another derivative of ọzọ ọzọ (grow old) occurs in the phrase ọzọ izọọ ọzọ ọzọ 'young children' (ọzọ izọọ ọzọ ọzọ, literally 'individuals/descendants/children who aren't grown old,' formed with classifier ọzọ izọọ (ọzọ izọọ)). This interpretation was not offered by speakers; they glossed the form ọzọ izọọ either as "young—despite the fact that it doesn't have this meaning in any other expression—" or else as the noun ọzọ izọọ 'hand.' Supporting the latter suggestion, an Igbo person suggested that 'children of the hand' means 'one's own children,' hence 'young children' in the sense of dependents under one's control and care, cf. the Igbo phrase ọzọ izọọ 'one's own farm.' "Farm of the hand.

However, Ọzọ ọnụụ Marketplace gives independent evidence that ọzọ izọọ 'hand' can mean 'ungrown':

If a male dwarf, ọzọ izọọ, or a female dwarf, ọzọ izọọ, knocked at one's door and said 'ę ọzọ izọọ warm you,' the person obeyed without delay. In the past if ọzọ izọọ wanted to summon leaders of other towns or wanted to settle a dispute, he sent ọzọ izọọ men accompanied by one of his palace dwarfs. The presence of a ọzọ izọọ dwarf in an Igbo village was a matter of great concern and anxiety.

A dwarf, ọzọ izọọ, is therefore literally someone who is not physically grown, despite their age.

Another expression derived from ọzọ izọọ (grow old) is the name of the mythical Igbo figure Ọzọ ọnụụ Ọzọ ọnụụ, translated to me as 'Yaws Widow' (see the story 'My son the little doctor' in the Appendix). Literally, it means 'Old-Person-with-Yaws.' Also in Igbo, Ọzọ izọọ, literally 'Old House,' is the name of the royal burial ground (ọzọ ọnụụ ọzọ ọzọ), cf. ọzọ ọzọ 'last year.'

In sum, the incantation in (56) opposes chronological age or as in (57) physical maturation, an index of age and 'seniority' (initiation status). It remains to explain the chant's pragmatic force. The chant climaxed the Medicinal Food ritual, which comes at the turning of the agricultural calendar, in the dry season before yam planting. The key celebrants were the eldest lineage male, someone whose father is alive. In Igbo, ọzọ izọọ, or a female dwarf, ọzọ izọọ, knocked at one's door and said 'ę ọzọ izọọ warm you,' the person obeyed without delay. In the past if ọzọ izọọ wanted to summon leaders of other towns or wanted to settle a dispute, he sent ọzọ izọọ men accompanied by one of his palace dwarfs. The presence of a ọzọ izọọ dwarf in an Igbo village was a matter of great concern and anxiety.

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House,' is the name of the royal burial ground (ọzọ ọnụụ ọzọ ọzọ), cf. ọzọ ọzọ 'last year.'
The symbolic contract is between the dead, as the source of fertility, and their living beneficiaries.

Critical discussions of this analysis, notably Rey 1973, question whether the economic contract between elders and youths is exploitative, either as unequal exchange (not every youth who labors on the farm reaches elderhood) or even as surplus value (elders extract bridewealth and other payments from the youths). In response, Meillassoux distinguishes class exploitation, based in unequal production relations (e.g. property in farmland) from unequal access to means of reproduction (food and wives). The chant in (56) raises a different issue: the representation of age.

The *Nk* lineage ritual combines two different kinds of symbolic content and pragmatic meaning. Pragmatically, in one great idealized token of communion, the ritual action represents exchange of agricultural and fishing surplus among patrilineage members. Selon Meillassoux, patrilineage ancestors—invisible lineage members—enter this exchange because over the long haul current elders owe their reproduction to them and not to the youths—although it is equally true that, in terms of production, it is youths who feed elders. Appropriately, the oldest male is the one to become the chief among others.

Semantically, the chant states the ambiguous status of elderhood. In the *Nk* kingdom, Bradbury 1969 describes an inherent contradiction between “patrilinealism” (“tied hierarchies of descent”) and “gerontocracy” (authority by chronological age). Aside from ascribed inequalities of gender and slave status, *Nk* society is often cited as an exemplar of two potentially contradictory principles: egalitarianism and achievement. In *Nk* ideology, these two principles have a semantic meeting point: achieved initiation status (titles) are represented in terms of age, contradicting principles: egalitarianism and achievement. In *Nk* ideology, these two principles have a semantic meeting point: achieved initiation status (titles) are represented in terms of age, contradicting the gerontocratic principle (approximatively) as follows. As recounted in the preceding section, *Nk* counts as another example of the mechanism by which etymological meaning reaches consciousness.


54 Thomas 1984 assembles and interprets evidence of slave-based production in the Igboid area; *Amadi* 1987 presents critical discussion of *Nk* gender inequality.

Although I have been unable to consult Tovey 1929, I am reliably informed that a chant closely similar to (56) was pronounced by the *Nk* *Nk* in 1911, in the event where was foreordained to abrogate his control over *Nk* within the *Nk* Kingdom. If this is true, the above analysis would apply (very speculatively) as follows. As recounted in the preceding section, *Nk* hegemony rested in the ritual representation of the *Nk* as a living ancestor, someone who has already died. *Nk* quotes an observer of the initiation of *Nk* in *Nk* in 1936:

The *Nk* was buried in a shallow grave. His wives began to perform the real mortuary rites, which lasted for twenty-one days. He ‘rose’ from the ‘dead’ clothed with white cloth and decorated with white cloth and dressed for tennis, crossing the public palace courtyard. A youth, waiting near the entrance, said that his father, an elderly chief, had sent for the king. He had become a spirit (Nk) and a living spirit. He announced his name and the people greeted him as *Nk*, the sky, the most high. He had used the formula *Nk*...

*Nk* shows how the lineage system represents the *Nk* at the apex of a double ‘conical clan’, just as *Nk* lineages are superior to all other settlements, through their collective descent from *Nk*, there is a special *Nk* “lineage” with only one visible member: *Nk*-Nk-i*Nk* comprises only past and present *Nk* in *Nk*. This authority of this ‘hyper lineage’, based on the gerontocratic principle (*Nk*), negates the title system (*Nk*), just as the title system negates gerontocracy among living people. By forcibly pronouncing (56)—if indeed this happened—*Nk* (Nk) thereby renounced the special status of *Nk* in *Nk*, becoming just a big chief among others.

The above analysis of ritual meaning as emergent from the pragmatic use of textual resources corroborates Bleich’s important observation that ritual communication... unlike that manifest in the cognitive system of everyday communication... does not directly link up with empirical experience. (1977: 297)

If I am correct, and the reference of *Nk* is determined pragmatically not semantically, this counts as another example of the mechanism by which etymological meaning reaches consciousness.

55 According to *Nk* (1980: 95, fn. 14) this description substantially agrees with accounts of the initiation of *Nk* etc. in *Nk* 1988, as reported by Jeffreys (1934).
4.2.4 Chîma and Kîmê

The next example is negative, a case where etymological meaning has been lost, apparently beyond recovery. The loss is predictable from phonological and morphological factors. As recounted by Aţculo (1930, 1933, 1970) and Egbewe (1982), there is a tradition of origin whereby Òpọchá Kímê (settlement 7 in Fig. 1) and nine communities on the west bank of the river Òmpîlì [Niger] claim to derive their ruling, royal lineages from descendants of an ÒÀ warrior whom they call "Éè Chîma". (Éè is conventionally translated as 'king', but cf. §4.2.8.) Chi-mà [pronounced Chîma], an Ògbô personal name translated as 'God-Knows may', may abbiate a fuller sentence such as Chi-mà mí-nà-àìà 'God-Knows-Everything', or Chi-mà-ì维奇 'God-Knows-Human-Thought' (cf. Ògbewe 1981-20).

The Éè Chîma claim of Benin origin is superficially plausible, because the palace organization of Òpọchá Kímê and the others attests features of the Ògbô palace, which exercised its influence throughout the west bank of Òmpîlì at various times. These features, massively documented by Òṣeìmírè 1972, include most of the names on long-ranked lists of titles of "political elite (òúìché)" in three hierarchical grades. However, Òṣeìmírè (1972, 1980) observes three problems with accepting the Éè Chîma tradition at face value. There is no corroborating tradition of outmigration from Ògô. Many elements of the palace organization, including the central rites of initiation, are unmistakeably derived from Òrì. And the name Chîma does not remotely resemble an Ògbô name. He remarks that all three problems are resolved by an alternative hypothesis, which posits not one but four layers of long-distance influence in the present Òèè Chîma area.

First, as discussed in §4.2.2, there is corroborated genealogical evidence that Òrì lineages were established west of Òmpîlì [Niger], including part of the Ògbô Kingdom, perhaps 700 years ago. The basic cosmological features of Òrì ritual hegemony are still strongly visible in this area.

Second, Ògbewe (1972, 34) reports 36 Ògô campaigns to Ògbô and the Éè Chîma area in the reign of Òba Ògânu (1579-1608). The Ògô word for the river Niger, Òmpîlì, is nearly identical to the Ògbô name Òmpîlì, whereas the Éè Chîma communities call it Òmpîlì, cf. data (18b) in §1.3. This suggests that the primary Ògôbô link with Ògbô occurred at Éè Chîma.

Third, Òṣeìmírè ms. describes the flight from Ọṣeìmírè to Ògbô of prince Kîmê. A failed contestant to the Ògbô throne in the late 1600's, Òṣeìmírè's account deserves to be quoted in extenso.39

Around 1698 [Adigwe] succeeded [Ọṣeìmírè] his father as Ògbô Ogbo. Before the installation, Kîmê, the son of Ọṣeìmírè's senior daughter had hoped to become heir to the throne, as succession was not rigidly hereditary from father to senior son. [Adigwe]'s mother was contemptuously beheaded in the farm when she went to pluck (ọnà) leaves for soup, and died the following day as a result. Kîmê was charged for sending his servant (Àalọ) to flog the old mother, but [Adigwe] set his free and punished his by hanging. Kîmê continued to plot against [Adigwe] and the people of Òlú-Ìfìn[Ìwè] revolted under the pretense that their daughter's son [Ìfìn[Ìwè] was cheated and that [Adigwe] should abdicate. They attacked the Òpìè-ìfìn 'palace' and the Òpìè-ìfìn 'palace house', removing the Òpìè's 'ancestral staff' of Ògbọ-Ómìlì.Óìliàà (i.e., Ògbọ-Ómìlì.Óìliàà 'royal lineage'). This infuriated the Ògbọ-Kîmê-Dìrinì, who raided Ògô-Ìmìlì.Óìliàà in return. Kîmê himself was hastily pursued, but Abomò people stopped the avengers while he fled to a hiding place at Òṣeìmírè. At last the Òpìè was recovered but he refused to return to Ògbô under any threat. In Ògbô, Kîmê's exodus is remarkable commemorated during the annual Òpìè-ìfìn festival.

The name Kîmê abbreviates Kîmê-Ìfìn[Ìwè]. 'What am I to say again?', a question stylizing a father's satisfaction in producing an heir. A discourse variant of this name is borne by the present Ògbọ prince Kîmê-Ìfìn[Ìwè]-ezizì. What is Ògbọ to say again?35 If palatalization of proto-Ôgbọ *Kîmê < Kì(1) data (17a in §3.1.3) applied to Kîmê, the predicted outcome in the Ògbọ Chîma area would be Chîme or Chîmê. Both forms are attested: one of the nine villages of Ògbọ-Ìfìn[Ìwè]-Ìfìn[Ìwè] is named Ògbọ Ògbọ-Chîma Ògbọ-Chîma's meeting, Ògbọ-Ìfìn[Ìwè] (1982). 3635. There is no regular way to derive Chîma from Chîmê. Palatalization also forces morphological reanalysis: Kîmê or k'ìmê 'what', palatalized to ch'ì, does not correspond to any uh-verb. In the Ògbọ Chîma area "what?" is either g'ì [kìmê] or g'ìmê. Evidence of morphological reanalysis is the application of 'subject tone flop': Chîma-Chîmê. Chîma-Chîma, the large village federation behind the Ògbọ royal lineage, and which Ògbọ identifies as Kîmê's maternal home, has some interesting features in common with Ògbọ and the Ògbọ Chîma communities. They all share a structure of nine component wards or quarters: Ògbọ-Ìfìn[Ìwè] (sometimes called Ògbọ Chîma). 37 Further, Henderson (1972: 483) notes that most Ògbọ names hail from Ògbọ-Ìfìn[Ìwè]-Ìfìn[Ìwè] is also the name of a ward adjacent to Ògbọ Chîma, directly behind the palace, which Ògbọ describes as the ritual kingsmakers of Ògbọ. (The r/correspondence in Ògbọ-Ìfìn[Ìwè] is regular, cf. data (19c) in §3.3.)

Fourth, Ògbewe 1934 and Òṣeìmírè ms. record 36 Ògô campaigns throughout the Ògbọ and Ògbọ Chîma area during the reigns of Ògbọ Ògânu (1735-1750) and Ògânu (1750-1854). Òṣeìmírè (1972) argues that the present-day Ògô Chîma traditions, as reported by Ògô-Ìfìn[Ìwè]-Ìfìn[Ìwè] and Ògbọ-Ìfìn[Ìwè], telescope these four sedimented layers of influence into one, which bears the name of the royal Ògbọ emitter, but which is translated as an Ògbọ migration, probably because of the prestige of the Ògô of Benin. The puzzle, then, is the loss of the etymological connection between Ògô and Chîma. To be sure, there are indirect references to Ògô in the Ògô Chîma traditions; for example, Henderson (1972: 79) reports that two of the royal immigrants to Ògọchina are referred to as Ògbọ-Ìfìn[Ìwè] (Chîma of Ògbọ) and Ògọchina (Chîma of Ògbọ). But why should the name Kîmê be reanalyzed so as to obscure its Ògô origin?

Much blame for the present etymological opacity of Ògô-Chîma can be laid at the doors of phonology (palatalization, vowel shift) and morphology (the difference in uh-words, the application of subject tone flop). There is no possible path to the etymology of Kîmê which relies strictly on the grammatical knowledge (including phonological knowledge) possessed by speakers in the Ògô Chîma area. Grammar being a relationship between sound and meaning, recoverability is destroyed by a drastic alteration of underlying sound units, either in paradigmatic shape (phonology) or syntagmatic segmentation (morphology).36 That these changes resulted from cross-dialect borrowing, rather than from dialect-internal innovation, explains why such opacity arose in the space of a few hundred years.

4.2.5 mà, mánàwà and mìевых

The next example also involves apparently unrecoverable etymology. Again, the main culprit is historical phonology, but this case is more clearcut because the opacity holds within, not across, individual dialects. For that very reason, the etymology is certainly much older. The data below, from §3.3 above, support the derivations 'dead-one' > 'ancestral spirit' and 'begotten-one' > 'child'.

57This question was posed by his father Òsììchù, who remained monogamous and for a long time homeless, over the objections of titled elders of the royal lineage Ògbọ-Ìfìn[Ìwè]-Ìfìn[Ìwè]. 38 Typically, few English-speakers can gloss the word yoke (= French pêche 'sack, pocket') in the phrase Ògbọ yoke a pig in a pole (= Haitian achat sul makout) - a phrase which they nonetheless use meaningfully.

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35 As elsewhere in this work, I place in square brackets words whose tones I don't know.

278 Àgbọ and Àgbọ
The five groups of lexical items show the interaction of several phonetic innovations. Much further evidence would be necessary to establish the precise innovations and their historical interrelationships. Below, I propose a set of derivations for illustrative purposes. However, it should be noticed that some of the tentative reconstructions presupposed by these derivations are confirmed by external evidence: in particular: 'bee/mosquito' as 'drinker', 'child' as 'begotten one', can be cited the independent occurrence of the 3sg clitic pronoun  as usually found in subject position, in complement position in [ 1975:163], for example, glosses as 'the abode of [his] dead fathers'.

The word 'ancestral mask' is derived in several intersecting ways. The  plural of the noun 'ancestral spirit', i.e. the symbolic representation of an ancestor.

Now, if 'ancestral spirit' is etymologically 'dead-one', the most abstract parse of the protoform of 'ancestral spirit' is *-  'ancestral-spirit', i.e. the symbolic representation of an ancestor. The word 'ancestral mask' is derived in several intersecting ways. The plural of the noun 'ancestral spirit', i.e. the symbolic representation of an ancestor.

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relevant data may be difficult to find. I assume here that \( \text{ike} \) and \( \text{ichu} \) are not etymologically related, since the latter but not the former root contains a historic */Cn/ cluster. This assumption allows me to derive \( \text{ichu} \) from the verb root of \( \text{ike} \) as the frozen plural of the personal noun class, which normally bears an \( *-i/j\text{-}g(u) \) prefix. An apparently related noun \( \text{ike} \) in \( \text{Ngbe} \) and elsewhere, simply means ‘old’ (presens); that it too contained a nasal is shown by the \( \text{Ngbe} \) forms \( \text{ime}-\text{be ‘elders/elder’, \text{ike}-\text{be ‘elders/elder’}.}^{46}

It can be observed that the title \( \text{ike} \) differs in meaning between areas which practice the \( \text{ngbe} \) title, such as \( \text{Nt} \), and areas which don’t, such as \( \text{Ngbe} \). At \( \text{Nt} \), \( \text{ike} \) designates a type of male ancestor, represented on the \( \text{iri \, ndi\text{mọ̄p}} \) (‘face of the ancestors’ or altar of the \( \text{ndi} \) ancestral shrine, cf. \( \text{ndi\, ndi\text{ọ̄p}} \ \text{ancestral altar}, \ \text{literally ‘eye/face of sacrifices’} \)) in one of two forms, \( \text{bele\, ndi\, ndi\text{ọ̄p}} \ \text{great \( \text{ike} \) ‘staff’ or \( \text{bele\, ndi\, ndi\text{ọ̄p} \text{‘a small \( \text{ike} \) ‘staff’}.}^{46}

A dead person is \( \text{ime\, ndi\text{mọ̄p}} \). It was once popular on earth he became \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p}} \) that is a canonized father. \( \text{Bele\, ndi\text{mọ̄p}} \) is the title, such as \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p}} \), a great


denoting the change of state ‘become closed off [at the endpoint]’ (as in the compound verbs \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{‘shut, close off [e.g. a doorway], \ kwe\text{-}ndi\text{mọ̄p} \ ‘stop up [e.g. a bottle]’} \)). In that case, \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{is an inchoative, inherent complement verb which as a causative would mean ‘become filled with respect to age’, or as an anticausative would mean ‘fulfil the [requirements of] \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{the discussion of inherent complement verbs in §2.1.5}.}^{46}

In the same way, the etymology of \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{means something like ‘partitioning surface’ (‘Dutch scherm ‘protection’). Today, however, all screens do not protect: prudent people sit far from the TV set, and buy special lead screens to filter out radiation from unshielded computer monitors. The reference of \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{to luminous (and dangerous) image display devices arose as a direct result of technological, i.e. pragmatic change. Despite CRT technology, however, we still speak of \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{and \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{ screens, fire screens and \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{screen}.} \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{is nasalised or aspirated in dialects where this is possible, then the closest cognate verb in many dialects is \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{. If \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{is in turn related to the predicate \( \text{cọ\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{then the latter expression means literally ‘to become ‘old’ [i.e. senior] by taking the \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{title’. Alternately, the verb \( \text{cọ\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{but depending on dialect] may have a more abstract meaning, denoting the change of state ‘become closed off [at the endpoint]’ (as in the compound verbs \( \text{cọ\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{‘shut, close off [e.g. a doorway], \ kwe\text{-}cọ\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \ ‘stop up [e.g. a bottle]’; in that case, \( \text{cọ\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{is an inchoative, inherent complement verb which as a causative would mean ‘become filled with respect to age’, or as an anticausative would mean ‘fulfil the [requirements of] \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{the discussion of inherent complement verbs in §2.1.5}.}^{46}

Either way, the semantic connection of status and age would go along with the idea that \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{denotes the status of someone who is ‘senior’ by virtue of being ‘fulfilled [with respect to initiation]. The specific interpretation of ‘seniority’ will therefore vary predictably according to the specific details of initiation in the seniority/title system in each community. This semantic interpretation goes along with a morphological analysis: the form \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{comes to have the general denotation ‘be elder’ or ‘be fulfilled’ from the generic interpretation of a null syntactic complement, spelled out perhaps by the \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{titular phrase ya} \text{which by vowel coalescence predictably comes out [e.g. in this context]. The assumption that age is the ‘currency of status, so that seniority is fulfillment par excellence, is quite a general, underlying one in \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{society, as described in the preceding section (§4.2.3). The specific differences arise in local contexts. At \( \text{Nt} \) where the title-system is sharply focused on \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{status interpretation of \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{is generic: someone who was ‘good and popular on earth’}; of course, this general requirement cannot be fully met until after death, hence the signification ‘good ancestor’. The achievement of \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{status triggers the focal meaning of \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{great \( \text{ike\, ndi\text{mọ̄p} \text{denotes the culminating title, taken by someone who has fulfilled all other title requirements. This analysis needs to be tested with details of title nomenclature morphology and of the organization of status systems, in more different communities throughout the Igboid area. It is a
promising area of investigation, since (as noted by Forde and Jones 1950 and every subsequent investigator) the specifics of title initiation vary widely from one part of the Igbo area to another—even leaving aside the corruptions and elaborations of titles which have played so great a part of colonial and neocolonial politics. Before one can speak of a 'title system', the titles themselves must be regarded as more than a laundry list of names, but rather as a semantic-pragmatic manifold wherein inherited lexical-semantic resources are played out against the practical realities of status. The process of semantic accumulation, at the core of the title system, occurs at the intersection of semantic and pragmatic domains.

If this analysis is headed in the right direction, then the interpretation of iche is count as an example of the interaction of semantics and pragmatics. I know of no research on ritual mechanisms which would directly provide a pragmatic component for iche comparable to that described for ọghọghọ in (4.2.3). Evidence of such mechanisms should nevertheless be sought in the fabric of anhọ consecration, whether this takes place before or after the death of the individual.

The above discussion has shown an irreducible pragmatic component in the meaning of the word iche stemming from the real world conditions of 'fulfilment', part of encyclopedic knowledge (culture in the relative sense) as opposed to lexical semantics (culture in the absolute sense). In both ị and ọghọghọ, representing nearly the extremes of 'plus and minus hierarchy' in terms of title systems which recognize an iche title, the term denotes a 'terminal' status achievement. The proposal is that any interpretative difference from one place to another arises primarily with respect to the other available initiation statuses, as these happen to be defined in each community, for good historical reasons of which the lexicon knows nothing.

4.2.7 ọbụ and ọ bụ (owu, ovu)

The word which varies among the above phonetic forms across the Igbo area also varies in meaning between two extremes: 'king' and 'lineage temple'. In ọghọghọ, for example, ọ bụ is the lineage temple which serves a maximal patrilineal section in a compact village. Its shaded veranda, a favored relaxation spot for initiated males, attracted the colonial label 'dwell-er'. In ọ bụ, too, ọ bụ is a lineage shrine, but one which differs in architectural structure and social access: an a part of colonial and neocolonial politics. Before one can speak of a 'title system', the titles themselves must be regarded as more than a laundry list of names, but rather as a semantic-pragmatic manifold wherein inherited lexical-semantic resources are played out against the process of semantic accumulation, at the core of the title system, occurs at the intersection of semantic and pragmatic domains.  |

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and. Then, in the run-up to flag independence, ethnic competition
would begin with an etymology of the word itself. Although Igbo lexicography has never flourished, available
published materials contain at least two verb roots which are superficially plausible etyma. Both
Green and Igbo (1970: 180) and Temnepi (1979: 31) gloss the verb as ‘avoid... reverse, raising
Durkheimian hopes for deriving ‘priest’ as ‘sacred person’. On the other hand, Green and Igbo
(1963: 233) list an additional gloss ‘be luxuriant’, which might plausibly underly the form ‘big’ as recorded in Akwukwo by Meir et al. (1975: 255).

Neither of these derivations, however, takes us any great distance towards unifying the range
of meanings listed above. Having thus exhausted the obvious etymological leads, the only remaining option is to investigate the semantic of what words actually derived from the same root. These obviously include 

In Igbo, refers to the status of a person with children, as opposed to unmarried/childless women.71 This suggests a notion of lineage seniority, which is perhaps closest to the meaning of ‘ancestral priest’, but not particularly close at that.

Thomas 1914 (v: 40f) describes nze as ‘consumers of yam as hereditary or elected titles; Temnepi (1979: 89) defines as ‘is what is due to [title] men’, i.e. as privileges of office. This is consistent with the reference to .

Akhiala or ‘is the word of the Agbala Nze Society. Akhiala’s gloss of Akhiala as ‘servants of’ (1972: 254), if literally correct, indicates the equivalence of Akhiala and nze akhiala is pragmatically rather than semantically based. Henderson (1972: 239) describes as referring to the of the founding ancestor, hence a royal lineage cult; (1980: 167) reports that, at Nze akhiala is an oracle controlled by the (cf. the Igbo word ‘divination medicine-bundle’). The meaning of Akhiala as ‘servant’ could therefore be derived as ‘devotee of the oracle of , a role which is also consistent with the high status reported by . However, the meaning of remains less clear.

There is always the possibility that phonological changes have obscured the etymology of potential cognates may not have exactly the same phonetic shape. There are three Igbo isoglosses which appear promising in this regard: /t/ /p/, /t/ and /p/. The verb meaning ‘walk.’

71Nwakaa (cf. nwa ‘child’, from ‘young’) may also be e-akha someone who hasn’t completed adolescent initiation (cf. §4.6.3). (The has a different metaphor for adolescent initiation: ‘be in , literally ‘thing(s) going to people’). In Igbo, the (cf. the Akwukwo gloss in the Appendix.)
has at least six phonetic variants within Igbo: \( \tilde{a} / \tilde{e} / \tilde{u} / \tilde{e} / \tilde{a} / \tilde{i} \). Another permutation of these isoglosses is -\( \tilde{a} \)-, a possible nominal derivative of which is the Ọmụgha expression ọsọ ọdụ, ‘place for selling cloth’ (Green and Igbo 1960: 226). With a low tone, there is the verb ụlị ‘step on’ and the derived noun ọsọ ‘path, road, way’. Also with low tone are the nouns ịtụ ‘journey’, ọsọ ‘pre-arranged journey’, ọsọ ‘aimless wandering’ (Ememam 1978: 142), ọsọ ọdụ, cf. “The-Child-That-Knows-Its-Mother” in Appendix.\(^{72}\)

Accordingly, I propose that the high tone ụdụ variant of the verb ‘walk’ is the root of the noun ọsọ, the name of the central title of the Ọrụ system. By this derivation, the ọsọ title would denote the person who ‘goes’ (into sacredness) by ‘walking’ (with a cotton thread around his ankle, with a [ngu gugli] staff in hand, with a bell being rung before him as he goes).

Similarly, I propose that the noun ọsọ- derives from the metonimically weak high tone verb ụdụ (or ụdụ) ‘walk’, and came to refer to a ‘priest’ or highly initiated person by denoting the someone who walks to (or with, in the way of) the ancestors. This etymology would be semantically paralleled by the priesthood title (found in Igbo- and elsewhere) ọsọ- ọdụ literally ‘s/he who goes to the ancestors and returns’. The specific meaning ‘king’ would be pragmatically derived as ‘priest of the royal ancestors’ in a conical clan lineage structure such as Ọrụ, come to stand as the ancestors of the entire community (ọsọ). The meaning ‘rich person’ would be metonymic with respect to the – ọdụ, ‘heir, eldest patrilineal descendant’, (1983: 87-89). Ọrụ- ‘hunting’, literally ‘s/he who goes to the land’.

On this view, there is no semantic anomaly in the ‘father’ (cf. ‘grip’) but because the former is a specialization of the latter. Of course, speakers may invert this context. Indeed, nothing apart from translation convenience requires the ọsọ title, which names the ancestor of the royal lineage or some segment thereof (Szirmai 1972, Henderson 1972), and is also a title of the monarch (ọdụ–in fact it is the main form of address to him, alongside more descriptive praise epithets like Ọwa Ọwụ ‘Demonic Child’ (cf. Ọkere ms.). Although ọsọ is not synchronically analysable, a plausible derivation might be from such an apparent ‘extended’ usage of ọsọ to mean ọsọ is equally consistent with the opposite, bottom-up, trajectory suggested by my proposed etymology: if ọsọ is so closely related to ọsọ, it is not because the latter is an extension of the former, but because the former is a specialization of the latter. Of course, speakers may invert this relationship, in the manner suggested by Henderson, if the terms are semantically opaque—as undoubtedly they are in this instance.

\[4.2.9 \text{ di, } \text{Đị, } \text{Anụ, } \text{Ogụbi, } \text{Ogụbụ and } \text{Oma di} \]

A final example of semantic-pragmatic interaction is di: The conventional translation of this noun —as ‘husband’—fails to make sense in a long list of lexicalised phrases and compounds containing di, including the titles di-bụ, di-ọdụ ‘diviner’, di-i ‘expert zam farmer’ (cf. di-yam), di-agụ ‘strong man’ (di-ịgbụ-ịgbụ), di-ọdụ ‘expert hunter’ (di-Ụdụ-hunting), di-ọsọ-sacred/lineage head (ọsọ ‘heir, eldest patrilineal descendant’), (ọsọ-akọ ‘strong person/adventurer’) (ọsọ-akọ ‘strength’) and (ọsọ-akọ ‘co-linear’ (ọsọ ‘descendant’). Other forms containing this morpheme include

\[\text{72 Cf. } \text{Ọgụbi- } \text{di- } \text{a walk like an old person (with small shuffling steps).} \]

\[\text{73 The existence of both high and low tone variants of this root, in derived contexts, is fully predicted by the analysis of ọsọ as bearing metonimically weak lexical H tone; cf. ante. (91) - (97) in §1.3 above. Nk. also that } \text{di- } \text{a walk} (\text{cf. with low tone}) \text{is attested in } \text{Ọgụbi (Capo 1991).} \]

\[\text{74 In other dialects: } \text{ọsọla / ọsọrụ / ọsọha / ọsọrụ } (\text{Ọghọbọ}), ọsọra / ọsọha (\text{Ọghọbọ}), \text{probably from the } \text{verbal } \text{ọsọ-’collect’, the noun may refer to the } \text{host } \text{the } \text{collecter (i.e. inheritor) of the lineage } \text{ọsọ.} \]

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\[\text{77Approximately the same use of } \text{‘master’ to denote } \text{husband’ occurs with the Hebrew word haš.} \]

\[\text{78 The theory of domestic command in Igbo was explained to me by } \text{Ọha naakọ in December, 1983.} \]
insofar as it entails a status concept which is absent in Igbo. A master may be a possessor of skills, but it may also be an unskilled person with the unrestricted right to command others. The latter idea is expressible in Igbo, but the qualifying criterion is genealogical age, rather than marital status (this may be why wives are ideally much younger than their husband). Some indirect evidence: in standard Igbo, ‘father’ translates as ndị, but in Igbo (where, as already noted, father is ndị), ndị means ‘master’ in just the required authoritarian sense, as in the expression ndị enem ‘master of [a] dog’—a dog’s controller, not its geritor! The notion of ‘master over humans’, as entailed both in anyị (ironically) and also in Dém, is more explicitly rendered in Northern Igboid as either anyị mkwụ or anyị mkwụ ndị (Thomas 1913: 162), literally a ‘master who owns [someone]’; here again, however, what is referred to by anyị is not ownership in the absolute sense, but the combined ability-and-authority to direct the labor power of others productively.

In other words, there is a cross-cultural distinction between English master and Igbo anyị, posing a problem for translation in either direction which cannot be resolved in isolation from the comparison of status systems in different types of political economy, where labor power and language and pragmatics are combined in contrasting ways. Similar kinds of contrasts emerge in recent debates on cross-cultural parameters of slavery (e.g. Meillet 1912; Watson 1960).

This kind of comparison has also been as a crus for critical sociologists like Louis Dumont (and no less for his many critics, including Meillassoux 1973). However, while Dumont takes his analysis of caste ideology back to lexical semantic categories, and away from the practices, the above discussion points in the opposite direction, in keeping with the asymmetry between knowledge of language and pragmatics. A detour to Dumont is therefore relevant.

4.3 Questions of equality: an excursus on Dumont and comparison

Through a series of examples, the preceding section has shown how considerations of pragmatic entailment, and problems of translation, lead to incommensurability in the comparison of social types. Analytic-semantic analysis may be able to operate in a closed space of lexical denotations, composed of universal elements of lexical conceptual structure (as worked out in chapter 2), the representational space of pragmatics is open to context. This openness certainly affects the translation of Igbo status vocabulary: the interpretation of lexical items such as mkpụsụghụ mkpụsụghụ ndị requires extralinguistic, locally specific assumptions about the conditions of seniority, fulfillment, initiation, habitation and expertise/mastery. If translation occurs in a cross-cultural setting, these assumptions need to be spelled out somehow; however, if (as often happens) translation occurs within a single cultural milieu, extensive calquing (glossing by means of direct lexical equations) can take place without risk of pragmatic inelegance.

An Igbo-English bilingual can meaningfully speak of a king of yam or husband of yam only to others who have access to encyclopedic knowledge regarding the status of horticultural expertise/mastery, as entailed by the phrase anyị ejị ejị. (Effectively, most such people are themselves Igbo-English bilinguals.) From a monolingual Euro-American standpoint, however, in the absence of certain felicity assumptions, such translated phrases are pragmatically anomalous. To interpret the examples in question, one must have recourse to certain auxiliary hypotheses about the speakers, roughly: that “they” are more egalitarian than “us”, so that “their” ejị, though glossed as ‘king’, is less absolutist than “ours”, and applies to any “initiated” status including that of expert cultivator. Similarly, it must be assumed that “their” ejị, whether glossed as ‘husband’ or ‘master’, is more economic than “ours”, because “their” households are units of production as well as reproduction, or their production is more artisanal, respectively. And so forth.

This pragmatic approach to translation contrasts with the structuralist account of comparison developed by Louis Dumont, beginning with his Homo Hierarchicus. Dumont’s analysis of caste and kingship ideologies in the Orient and Occident defines such contrasts in terms of an abstract systems representation which is hardly accessible to most speakers/social actors. In effect, Dumont restates pragmatic translation difficulties in semantic terms, in a rarefied metalanguage of comparative sociology and/or comparative philology.

As affirmed by the subsequent Homo Aquilus and Essays on Individualism, Dumont’s oeuvre responds to positivistic Western sociology of the 1950’s and 1960’s which reduced caste, feudalism and class to ‘stratification’. Dumont aimed to replace this Occidental monism with a dualistic conception that recognises caste and Euro-American style inequality as incomensurable values. In particular, he asserts that an absolute value of hierarchy is the irreducible and totalizing element of Indian civilization. This value is culturally defined as the Brahmanical, Vedic ideology of purity and pollution which orders four abstract, pan-Indian varṇa (‘colors’) and thousands of concrete, local, endogamous gotra (birth groups). By contrast, Dumont holds that the West operates with economically-conceived individuals, equal to another as a matter of ideological abstraction, but quite unequal (‘stratified’) in their shares of political and economic goods. Both systems operate with inequality, but systemic consequences are strikingly different in each case.

As defended and restated by the English godfather of French structuralism, Dumont’s position on hierarchy vs. class is that the former is a relation of complementarity while the latter is marked by competition. And as a structural matter, the complementarity extends to all aspects of the inter-varṇa or inter-gotra relationship, in which political, economic and ritual relations are external, while kinship relations are exclusively internal.

Elaborating, Leach distinguishes structural, caste domination from the dominance asserted by individual members of an aristocracy upon individual members of the lower classes (emphasis added).

In support of this distinction, Leach observes that an aristocracy is invariably a numerical minority (while) a dominant caste... usually is... a majority element in the total population. (1960: 10).

Apart from the (empirically uncertain) appeal to demography, Leach’s restatement reduces to the assertion that class domination is a matter of “individuals”, and caste domination isn’t.

Dumont himself, confronting anomalies in gotra hierarchy (e.g. as noted Tambiah 1972: 833), backed away from Leach’s extreme formalistic view, and admitted that “complementarity remains confined to the universe of discourse” (1971: 77). Indeed, Dumont also does not exclude gotra from that universe; he holds that the varṇa system is an “old model” of the “gotra” ideology (1971: 73). He concludes from these claims that ideology is not simply a matter of discourse, but is ‘structural’ for Indian society in some more fundamental sense which is lacking in Euro-American stratification. In effect, the category of ideology itself does not have the same significance in East and West.

To justify such extended significance for concepts which are primarily stated in ancient religious texts (both oral and written), Dumont assigns analytical primacy to ideology. This position disqualifies direct political and economic comparison of social types, as in the Marxist and
Parsonian traditions as well as in Angkophone structural-functional anthropology, on the assumption (disputed by Tambiah 1972: 834) that politics and economics are inherently non-ideological. *Homo Hierarchicus* thereby transforms ideology from a functional (determined) to a structural (determining)—and therefore structurally relative—domain in social theory. Another way of putting this is to say that Dumont endowed ‘religion’ (specifically, Vedic Hinduism) with the full abstractness of the category ‘ideology’—a sweeping hypostasis.

As already pointed out, one interesting consequence of this move is to make the immense historical unity of India (or even of South Asia) a single anthropological datum, as it had not been since the comparative legal scholarship of Sir Henry Maine. Another consequence is to break with the tacit sociology of (self-)interests which reigns both in individualist sociology (in which camp Dumont would lump both Marx and Parsons) and in the anthropological personification of lineages as corporate social actors (a sin committed by “English empiricism” but not by Evans-Pritchard, according to Dumont 1966/1970: 354, fn. 23b). In the terminology of Polanyi and his followers, the category of ideological interests recognized by Dumont differs from these hegemonic frameworks in being ‘substantive’, that is ‘embedded’ and ‘institutionalized’ in a historical frame. In the argot of critical Marxism, Dumont can be said to have denied the transparency of ideology to individual practices.

These steps have the desirable effect of revaluing the exercise of comparison, which had become disused in the construction positivistic, neo-Weberian typologies of tradition and modernity; and of delegitimizing one-sided, Eurocentric evolutionism. However, Dumont cannot be followed uncritically. First, there is a problem with how he defines the historical frame. Affirming, perhaps unintentionally, the philological and antiquarian values of Indologists, he gives greatest weight to ancient, textual evocations of caste ideology. The texts provide a key to social relations which, although powerful, is nonetheless partial, in two senses. The key is partial it fits with difficulty the whole regional variety of caste configurations (e.g. North vs. South India). It is also ‘partial’ in the more idiomatic sense that it privileges Vedic, Brahmanical conceptions over those of other social actors. Further, in denying ‘ideological transparency’ in the case of India, Dumont concedes it in the West, where he speaks of the economic point of view which predominates in modern ideology (and subordinates relations between men (including political relations) to relations between men and things (property, productivity and the like). (1976: 77).

This is a limited concession to Marx and Polanyi: while comparison of India with the West is thereby highlighted, local comparisons within the subcontinent are rendered invisible.

There are other comparisons obscured by Dumont’s dualistic view of caste ideas. Endogamous, artisanal caste systems have been described in combination with agrarian slavery outside of South Asia, e.g. in the former Soninke empire region of present-day Mali (Pollet and Winter 1968, 1971), and elsewhere in the western sahel: Maure (Hamès 1969), Futa Toro (Diop 1971), Serer (Diop 1972, Gosselin 1974) and Wolof (Cruise O’Brien 1975: 27f.). Such comparisons are not superficial: Meillassoux (1986: 107) notes a common element in Indo-European and West-African caste systems: the distinction between “born” (or “twice-born”, e.g. Sanskrit *dvija*) and “non-born” (Fulfulde *rinya*). In addition, the famous status/power disjunction, which Dumont regards both as the *very* essence of caste and as unique to India, has been observed by Blish (1979) in Madagascar.

These impediments of dualism aside, Dumont makes a fundamental contribution when he argues that caste principles are, in Bourdieu’s terminology, “structuring structures”. While social segments exist in the form of endogamous ranked occupational groups, Dumont relativizes their interests to the *caste* hierarchy: the opposition of purity and pollution reduces neither to the relation between noble and serf, nor to the dialectic of master and slave. This is a gain, in Dumont’s terms, because it evens the comparison of Orient and Occident, previously carried out in an ethnocentrically individualist and economistic framework. In addition, by breaking with the narrowly localistic, empiricist perspective of Anglo-American anthropology, Dumont brings renewed attention to historical “continuities” in the relationship between political and religious functions and functionalities (as, for example, Tambiah 1976, 1977 does for the Theravada Buddhist states).

Finally, Dumont’s notion of ideology was immediately understood as a gain for symbolic anthropologists like Leach who wished to generalise the autonomy of ‘culture’ (ritual and mythology) and social structure. But, as pointed out by Blish 1978, recognizing the autonomy of these two categories (in Blish’s terms, rank and power) still carries the challenge of relating them to each other, nonreductionistically, unless one is to surrender the task of analysis to the ancient texts. Unlike Barnett et al. 1976, I do not find Meillassoux 1973 “parodic” in stressing the autonomous reality of clientage (among artisanal groups) and proletarization (of the agrarian labor force) in South Asian political economy. Nevertheless, even if caste categories both “mispercept” production relations, and are still irreducible to them, it remains necessary to show how the two systems are related. Such an account can be framed in various ways: in historical-evolutionary or (more abstractly) in processual terms, or dialectically in terms of ‘practice’, but in any case it must avoid treating ideology as monolithic.79

In the same spirit, the late Pierre Clastres polemicized against Marxist anthropologists who discover state formation and class contradiction in every local trading network. The State is an important analytical construct, but it is not universal, and the same can be said for ideology. For instance, the anarcho-Marxist writers Castoriadis and Lefort have insisted on treating ideology as specifically capitalistic (cf. Thompson 1984, Lefort 1986); their accounts of ideology promise to respect its autonomy vis-à-vis politics and production—to which it is nevertheless linked. Lefort and Augé, as critical French Marxists, are not innocent of linguistics. They both make crucial reference to ‘practice’ in defining this elusive link, by constraining political or economic practices through symbolic mechanisms modeled on ‘grammar’.

Once ideology, politics and production are linked by means of a grammar of symbolic intelligibility, comparative differences across social types are no longer simply differences in essence (e.g. caste vs. feudalism vs. class as phenomena sui generis). Even analyses in terms of modes of production identify an essential feature, such as a production relation, for each mode. This move can only proliferate modes and explain nothing.

Functionalist sociology, from Durkheim to Parsons, stresses ideology’s integrative function by showing how it expresses the complementation of roles in the political economy. Orthodox Marxist analysis makes almost the same point when it describes ideology as false consciousness ‘masking’ contradictions in these roles, or even as ‘inverting’ reality in its ideological representation. The

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79Blish and his colleague Jonathan Friedman construct evolutionary explanations from local tendencies reproduced over the long run. They do not differ from functionalists like Parsons in expecting ideology to induce acceptance of other aspects of ‘the system’; where they differ is their class conception of that system. By relying on local units of arbitrary extent, all these systems theories (and their Althusserian kin, even more so) reduce in the final instance to aesthetic combinatoires.
relevant difference between these two perspectives is that functionalism takes the individual role, with its corresponding ideology, as the unit of analysis, while Marxism treats roles within social relationships, and ideology as the supra-individual representations which span the relationships.

This leads to a tension in Marxist analyses between ideology as respectively class-specific or hegemonic. The composite position is reconciled in the “ideological thesis” of Marx and Engels, which has been developed by Gramsci and Lukács as an open dialectic of class struggle. There is a difficult prior step in these theories, however, namely the mechanism by which a class-specific ideology becomes hegemonic. In History and Class Consciousness, this mechanism is an “idealistic notion of a collective meta-subject” which overcomes reification and achieves “open-ended totalization” (Jay 1984: 413, 349).

The twin totalitarianisms of fascism and Soviet communism have made the concept of totality problematic. As shown by Jay, Sartre ducked this issue in the Critique of Dialectical Reason by placing totalization in the future tense. The Frankfurt school saw the question pessimistically, as one of individual vs. mass psychology, and esthetics. Lefort draws on both traditions when he describes ideology as a “gap... between discourse and power” (Thompson 1984: 28) created by the multiple presence of extraneous discourses of the state, the firm, the church:

Social division and temporality are dissolved by the incantation of familiarity and the management of novelty. (Thompson 1984: 32)

These theorists all assert that the mechanism of ideology is specific to capitalist society (including state capitalism). What about the recurrent references to precapitalist ideologies in the works of Marxist anthropologists such as Bourdieu and Godelier? For Bourdieu 1982, the notion of ideology is extended to a non-class-specific sense: “ideological even when state capitalism is ended totalization” (Jay 1984: 413, 349).

Critique of Dialectical Reason

The case examined in Augé’s book is the dual ideology of witchcraft. A witch is viewed by individual inhabitants of the lagoon region of Côte d’Ivoire as being either “powerful and famous” or “isolated and despised”. The difference arises from the position of the witch in the individual’s matrilineage or patrilineage, respectively. (A witch from ego’s village who falls into neither lineage is subject to ambiguous valuation.) Augé derives this ideological difference from the same set of representations. The matrilineage is associated, in this conceptual “syntax”, with the notion of ñwa ‘spirit’, while the father’s patrilineage is linked to ñwona ‘blood’, and the patrilineage to ñwaima ‘flesh’. [Tones are not given in the source.] Augé shows how individual ideologies are constituted by the transmission of these properties through the régime of restricted exchange.

For Augé, a single coherent set of representations constitutes the social order’s intellectual and institutional relationships, as in (59), by establishing symbolic differences which organize exchange. The precise socio-economic relations are defined in turn by conditions of material force. This analytical framework is three-dimensional, since the two sets of organizing principles are mutually autonomous. There is no fundamental difference between Augé’s approach, and an analysis in terms of semantics and pragmatics, as in the previous section.

What is important here for Dumont’s problem is the nondualistic concept of ideology which includes both individual practice and collective representations. This concept can be applied to the specific issue of hierarchy. Bloch for example has described a Madagascar “caste system” which, like the Hindu case, places the priestly function ‘higher’ than the king. He shows how the institutionalization of power through ritual “tends to separate out the person of the power holder into the roles of priest and of politician” (Bloch 1978: 335). In other words, the incommensurability of ideologies is not a phenomenon sui generis, as held by Dumont, but results from the pragmatic dependency of strategic symbols.

Dumont’s dualism is a critical reaction, or overreaction, to systems-theoretic model building which delves too deeply. His contribution is most attractive when viewed against the backdrop of classical and neoclassical Western sociology. When Tönnies and Parsons examine comparative social morphology, for example, it is not mainly for the direct comparison of Western capitalist society with other attested forms of organization. Instead, contemporary social stratification is their focus, and comparison illuminates it in ways corresponding to the different explanatory program of each theorist. Regarding stratification in capitalist society, Tönnies defines class in contrast with the historically residual ordering principle of estate. Parsons reductively demonstrates the universality of social valuation as the principle that links ranking-structure with individual motivation-to-action in an ordered system. In both these discussions, comparison is one-
This social order, prefigured in ancient Rome, was seen as standing midway between Tönnies’ conceptions (not to be confused with Durkheim’s use of the organic metaphor). Tönnies observes that one might imagine that an insightful treatment of capitalist society would stress the role of property in social stratification, but Parsons downplays this while stressing the couplet of economic, political and ideological criteria. But abstractly understood, a class exhibits noncorrespondence of these elements because it is economic by nature. As the role of capital increases, the correspondence of occupation with status begins to erode at the top of the social order. Class oppositions manifest themselves at the two extremes of the social order, in different ways: at the top, in a thorough differentiation of the category of the self-employed into rentiers, proprietors, tenants, master craftspeople, entrepreneurs and (sic) administrators; at the bottom, in the polarization of wage-earners from subsistence workers (e.g. peasants) and non-workers (e.g. women and the lumpenproletariat).

Tönnies is led by his categories to a direct and unproblematic comparison of feudal Europe and Indian castes. Since European estates were variously based on descent (e.g. aristocracy) and occupation (priesthood, peasantry, artisanat), it seemed reasonable to extend the concept to castes, which exhibited both features at once; and to regard the Indian system as the Ur-Aryan origin of the European phenomenon, thus transforming the category into an ideal type based on the harmonious division of labor.81 This proposition was seemingly confirmed by the fact that the two most characteristic institutions belonging to Gesellschaft, namely capitalism and the state, were conspicuously absent from the Orientalizers’ evocation of the Indo-European home with Romantic stereotypes of India (especially by Max Müller).

81 A relic of this stratified representation is seen most in present-day legislatures with their upper and lower chambers. For example, the U.S. Senate is essentially the estate of white male millionaires.

82 Beyond the primary three, Tönnies has two kinds of ‘middle estates’: retail traders and the salariat. This historical moment, therefore, the politically organized Stände were the ideal type of interest group, defined with a correspondence of economic, political and ideological criteria. But abstractly understood, a class exhibits noncorrespondence of these elements because it is economic by nature. As the role of capital increases, the correspondence of occupation with status begins to erode at the top of the social order. Class oppositions manifest themselves at the two extremes of the social order, in different ways: at the top, in a thorough differentiation of the category of the self-employed into rentiers, proprietors, tenants, master craftspeople, entrepreneurs and (sic) administrators; at the bottom, in the polarization of wage-earners from subsistence workers (e.g. peasants) and non-workers (e.g. women and the lumpenproletariat).

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Tönnies recognized the rise of individualism in capitalist society as essential to the development of ‘association’ over ‘collectivity’. This shows the potential of his framework for a certain type of dualistic comparison. Like any Marxist, he recognized “that in present-day society, occupational estates have a questionable existence” — i.e. they are incompatible with the effects of capitalism on the division of labor. On the other hand, he like Weber and other academic Marxists was troubled by the historical failure of class consciousness — the ideal type of an interest on which pure ‘association’ would form — to fully supplant the medieval categories of occupational estate. Thus contemporary Europe, rather than a point of comparison, seemed bound to remain a mixed, transitional reality for “more than a century”.

Parsonian functionalism employs abstract, universal categories to an extreme, indeed pathological degree. Stratification is a general property of both order and action, although individual assignment to a given rank may determined by ascription (= kinship, which he calls ‘birth’) or by a laundry list of achieved factors: personal qualities, achievements, property, authority, power. To the comparativist, it is the sociocultural definition of each of these categories which is truly interesting, but to Parsons they are all self-evident empirical indices; what matters is their relative weight in a particular social system (1940: 176). One might imagine that an insightful treatment of capitalist society would stress the role of property in social stratification, but Parsons downplays this while stressing the couplet of occupation/income as the primary ranking criterion (1940: 178f.). It is tempting to explain this analytical preference by observing that occupation is the primary subjective ranking category of individuals living in capitalist society. The “theory of social stratification” thus looks like our ideology of same. Castes and classes are equated as occupational groups, differing simply in the
means of individual recruitment. This is the tradition of analysis which led Dumont to characterise the category of “the individual” as an impediment to comparative sociology.

The fundamental feature of caste in Dumont’s framework, the veritable ‘pheneome of Indian society’, is the status/power relation: the “encompassment of artha by dharma.” In practical terms, this means the ritual superiority of brahmins to kṣatriya, alongside the temporal superiority of the latter over the former, with the additional notion that ritual considerations predominate in matters of status. Through the varṇa system, an ideological totalization, this structure is supposed to extend throughout the subcontinent.

Dumont acknowledges local variation (1971: 80, 367), but the question is the precise significance of this variation for the comparative type he wishes to establish. In much of South Asia, as studied by Béteille, Srinivas, Gough and Bailey, the kṣatriya and vaishya categories are effectively absent at the local level. Until monetization and market processes became important in land tenure, the brahmins were the major landowners (primarily as a result of royal grant). Now many former tenant-cultivator jāts, although classified as īdāna, are nevertheless landlords, and challenge the ritual status of kṣatriya groups. Agricultural labor continues to be performed by people in the harijan or ‘ādi-draśida’ category; but regional and national politics and markets have altered the local balance of power in even this respect.

In such settings, rather than speak of one status system governed by varṇa, the aforementioned ethnographers of South India have resorted to various Weberian formulations separating out ritual, political and economic status (or power; indeed the two categories appear to merge at the local level in a generic dominance). Of the three, ritual status appears the least relevant to social dynamics at the community level (panchayat), also in larger contexts (where the ‘non-Brahmin’ political party has been very successful). The three dimensions of status have corresponded more or less closely, depending on the historical situation. Apart from the quasi-mythical Vedic past, the classical period (16th-19th century) was an era of Indian society governed under British colonial rule. But before and after that time, considerably more individual/group mobility, as well as systemic flexibility, has existed than Dumont’s model can interpret.

The problem posed by the status/power couple is not erased by confining analysis to a particular locality. Rather it raises the issue of the units of comparison. Classical ‘varṇa theory is most persuasive in a state structure, whether Vedic or colonial. This means that stratification, while based in civil society, is affected by polity. But if the existence and type of the state is important, this limits the possibility of comparison without comparable political regimes. The problem is inherent in the systematic ambiguity in the word ‘society’: as a structural/morphological type or as a concrete, bounded polity whose ideal is the nation-state. Because of this ambiguity, political sociology and structuralism are simply impediments to comparison.

### 4.4 Rituals of power

Tambiah takes a different tack from Dumont. Rather than framing his totalising social analysis in terms of dualistic comparison, he ties regional complexes of ideas to predominant ritual processes. In Buddhist South Asia, particularly in Thailand, Tambiah views polities as “galactic”, comprising a “pulsating mandala” of relative prominence among individual states within a regional political order. One moment of this pattern was centrifugal, driven by the “twin motors” of intensive peasant extraction and taxation of interregional trade (1976:128). But there was another, centrifugal moment: when “incremental centralization” of administration reaches its “logistical limits”, the only way to rescue divine kingship from the invocation of ritual factions is to launch frenzied, “heroic” local raids, a step which only raises the temperature of instability. The political-economic and symbolic connection among southern Nigerian states is not galactic but—as illustrated most clearly in the above discussion of “Penz Chũ” states —‘sedimentary’, telescoping at least four layers of formation. There was a long period of Şri hegemony, involving non-militaristic manipulation of the agricultural calendar (the sky cult) and the code of taboos and abominations (the earth cult). There were multiple episodes of Şi military expansion to collect tribute. There was the shift of trade from inland to riverine routes, which opened new opportunities for state formation. And there was a second outburst of militarism to monopolise trade routes. By the 18th-19th centuries, southern Nigerian states overlapped each other’s spheres of influence based on the propulsive rhythm of a ‘single engine’/trade monopoly. Sedimentation is the “total” social fact of royal ritual in this region.

Feeley-Harnik 1985 notes the attention paid, by sub-Saharan Africanists (Fortes, Richards, Beidelman, H. Kuper, de Heusch…), to the “social construction” of indigenous concepts of wealth and force. While such concepts are also the focus of the comparative Hinduists Dumont and Dumont, Feeley-Harnik shows how the Africanist studies go beyond presenting religious ideology to try and explicate its political role. This postulation of political linkages in turn raises historical as well as sociological questions concerning the introduction or appropriation and transformation of custom as a means of domination (1985: 282). These institutional analyses of ‘religion as politics’ are significant for the problem of ritual textuality, because they have posed the question of who is speaking through a ritual text. The answers offered by ‘institutionalists’ are not envisioned by interpretivists, whose picture of social texts is essentially two dimensional, a flat surface to be read from a privileged standpoint.

Feeley-Harnik cites a varṇa theory as an example of institutional argumentation. In reply to Gluckman’s 1954 thesis of ritual rebellion as cathartic legitimization, Beidelman 1966 considers the possibility that Swazi ncuvela texts which seem to diminish the king’s authority are actually central to the constitution of that authority, as emanating from a nonperson, “stranger-king”. Gluckman supposes a transparent subjecthood of the ‘rebellious’ ritual discourse, and ascribes the ritual’s cohesive function to its status as anti-structure. Without Turner’s metaphysical connotations for this term. In seeing contradictory meanings in the central ncuvela symbol, Beidelman denies this transparency; his is a theory of symbolically ‘opaque’ ritual language, expressing underlying ideological tensions rather than conscious sentiments. Beidelman’s analytical move therefore places the ‘surface’ ritual text in an explanatory relationship with a symbolic substructure constituted by historical, institutional processes such as state formation.

Kuper’s 1973 discussion of animal symbolism in the same rite amounts to a synthesis of the two positions on ritual textuality, transparent and opaque, when (in the summary of Feeley-Harnik 1985:281) he characterizes Swazi interpretations of the event as ‘representing a king who epitomizes and stands outside against Swazi society, a primordial wild thing that is ultimately brought under the control of the people. In other words, when Swazi people symbolically equate the king with a wild bull, they simultaneously both affirm the Otherness of his power [Beidelman: the “estrangement” of his
person] and assert the need to control it. The discursive ‘Subjection’ of the king’s subjects is maintained in Kuper’s analysis, in that they possess an active voice in the ritual text; but at the same time their active participation is incorporated (or coopted) in the reconstitution/legitimation of power relationships which continue to dominate them after the ritual’s conclusion. Thus it is not so much a question of moving from structure to anti-structure and back again, as it is of recreating institutional constraints through the symbolic incorporation of all sides of the social relationships involved (e.g. royalty, chieftaincy, priesthood, peasantry). This is what happens in ‘sedimentary’ Nigerian social formations, as well.

Before taking up some examples, consider a final analytic perspective: action-oriented theories of ritual language. Two opposed positions dominate recent literature on speech-pragmatics. First is the theory of speech acts developed by Anglophone ‘ordinary language’ philosophers (initially Austin 1962 and Searle 1969, more recently Bach and Harnish 1979) and quickly adopted by linguists in the generative semantics tradition (Ross, Lakoff, Sadock). Although motivated by considerations of sentence-meaning, typologies of speech acts have also been taken up in analyses of social action. Speech acts have been extensively used as raw empirical templates by linguistic anthropologists and sociolinguists dealing with long, complex recordings of dialogue (e.g. Labov and Fanshel 1977). Virtually identical typologies have been elevated to a ‘transcendental’ level by cultural Marxists in the critical Frankfurt tradition of sociology (Habermas 1976/1979 in particular—cf. Weiner 1981).

Such wide-ranging applications of the speech act concept might seem to ensure its acceptance as a basic component of communication theory. Unless, that is, all these applications can be shown to share an assumption about communication which is inbuilt into the speech-act concept itself. Such an assumption is what sociologists refer to as the basic postulates of interactionism. A striking similarity between the linguistic and sociological traditions of speech act theory is the positing of universal rules (Austin), “constitutive rules” (Searle) and “regulative validity claims” (Habermas). Observations such as these provide initial misgivings about speech act theory as an indispensable element in the analysis of ritual—a domain where game theories and their interactionist assumptions have already played out naively psychologistic, voluntaristic and consensual.

A number of vigorous critiques of speech act theory exist in its home disciplines, by philosophically-oriented linguists (Fillmore 1977; Durst 1972, 1984; Katz 1975, 1977; Katz and Langendoen 1976; Katz and Bever 1976; Lyons 1977; J. D. Fodor 1977), linguistic anthropologists (Levinson 1985) and sociologists (Bourdieu 1982). Not all these critiques are equally radical, nor do they all envision the same alternatives. While the uses of speech act theory in different disciplines bear a family resemblance to each other, the various critiques divide into two: critiques of interactionist methodology (by sociologists), and of performative semantics (by linguists).

Critics of speech act theory generally accept the competence/performance distinction, even when (as with Bourdieu) they are not very clear on the nature of that distinction. Katz and Bourdieu end up saying much the same thing, even though Bourdieu is unaware of the support his arguments could receive from Chomskyan interpretivist semantics, since he identifies Chomsky with de Saussure on the basis of the equations competence = langue, performance = parole. For sociologists like Bourdieu, and equally for Chomskyan linguists, the force of a promise or a request lies not in the meaning (intended or otherwise) of the sentence which is uttered to make that promise, not to linguistic competence. Rather the force of a promise resides in the event of its being uttered, the utterance which contains that promissory sentence being a form of activity which belongs to ‘linguistic performance’.

[a] pragmatic theory deals with the various mechanisms real speakers use to exploit the richness of the context in order to produce utterances whose meaning in the context diverges predictably from the meaning of the sentences of which they are tokens. … The correlation in context, that between tokens of sentences and their utterance-meaning in the context, is determined both by the grammatical structure of the sentence type to which the token belongs and by the special features of the context (such as the knowledge and beliefs of the speaker and the audience) (Katz 1977:15, 19).

Bourdieu berates Austin for employing an ‘intellectualist philosophy’ which “reduces an action to an act” (1982:13) just as he rails against those like Habermas, who substitute the speaking Subject of discourse for the social actor operating through mechanisms of ‘symbolic domination’ (1982:105).

Generative grammarians’ negative assessment of Austin does not mean that they are opposed to the notion of discourse rules, so long as these come within a theory of pragmatics as just defined. Linguists’ computational models of pragmatic inference (or ‘super-interpretation’, in the terminology of Gaš 1982) have begun to explicate Grice’s vague insights. Fodor describes Grice’s selective concept of speaker-intentions, as opposed to a theory of joint speaker-hearer intention such as held by true intentionalists like Austin.

First, only certain effects in the hearer are stipulated as relevant. …Secondly, and more importantly, success in the production of these effects is not presupposed; Grice rests his analysis on the intentions with which speakers utter sentences—a theory of ‘utterer’s meaning (Fodor 1977:23, emphasis in original).

Fodor and Gaš also show that what produces a Gricean implicature not the maxim itself but the violation of one or more maxims. As opposed to Searle’s idea of positive ‘felicity conditions’, Grice when explicitly interpreted is actually describing conditions of infelicity: when someone asks “Where is John?” and “No class today”, the latter is semantically ill-formed unless the additional, pragmatic assumption is made that John belongs to the class in question. Speakers are capable judging the sentence both acceptable and unacceptable, depending on the possibility of the pragmatically-driven assumption.

In sum, problems of textual performativity challenge structuralist analyses of ritual by raising certain embarrassing questions. When Levi-Strauss (1971: 600) describes the mute manipulation of objects as ritual ‘speaking’, this textual analogy can be accepted only after it is specified who is speaking and what the speaker intends to convey. When Greimas and Jameson invoke “transcoding” as the source of symbolic efficacy in discourse, this semiotic postulate may describe something universal about how symbols are used, but it does not go any distance toward explaining the effect of any symbolic utterance; to do that, one must know the semantics of the sentences in the utterance, and the difference between these semantics and the utterance’s discourse effect.

In §460, the noun ṣebo denotes the activity of performing a sacrifice for one’s own head, the seat of personal destiny; the lexical named ṣebo refers to the time when every male citizen sacrifices to his head and the heads of the members of his household, beginning with the royal head and household. The difference, however, is that everybody else performs his own sacrifice, but the king has his done to him by others. Given the semantics of the noun, the pragmatic implicature is that the destiny of the king is identical to that of the community which anoints him.
Although one of countless palace rituals, Igbo became the focus of royal legitimation during the 19th century (Bradbury 1969). Bradbury argues that it was during that period of military and bureaucratic expansion that the Igbo king (whose title is Ongwa N’Igba) began to be overshadowed by the ‘Town Chiefs’ (i.e. those chiefs who are not direct palace dependents). These are men of great wealth, acquired through official patronage, with large followings. The Ongwa would grant such men offices which made them indispensable to the annual reconstitution of his head. Not only did the payment of the steep title fees and the provision of sacrificial expenses keep chiefly wealth under control, but it linked the chiefs’ well-being to that of the Ongwa. As the Empire grew, however, patronage was no longer restricted to royal sources. The Town Chiefs acquired the status of an ‘opposition’ (Bradbury’s term) within the state as they began to have independent dealings with European factors. While the ‘sacrosanct quality’ of the titles did not diminish, their holders were no longer royal dependents.

Bradbury’s interpretation of Igbo political economy explains much of the textual composition of the Igbo. All the songs and chants refer to the activity of renewing the Igbo’s sacredness. The Subject of these texts is those who consecrate the Igbo’s sacredness; the royal doctors do the actual work, it is the Town Chiefs who are taken to be its real authors. This explains why, although its ingredients are ‘secret’, the medicine for the Igbo’s head is produced and announced publicly in the midst of the festival, directly in front of the assembled Town Chiefs. The preparation of the medicine requires blood sacrifice, numerous herbs, and secret materials from “Okpụ”—the town speaking of Igbo, from which the current Igbo dynasty is said to derive. The royal doctors sing “Have you brought [X ingredient], have you brought [Y ingredient]?” These questions, whose unspoken answer is affirmative, are asked in full view of the present ingredients (thus violating Grice’s Cooperative Principle). Their pragmatic implicature seems to be: “The Igbo’s sacredness is fully sanctioned by Ongwa and the Town Chiefs.”

As described by Chief Obiajulu, another chief, Igbo performs a public priestly dance at the palace gate, he is entreated to remain in this world. La ya Igbo “Don’t go to [the invisible spirit world]”. The Subject of this text is the entire citizenry, who throng to the palace to chant this three-word refrain to the endless repetition of a two-bar, four-hand conga riff. The chant and drumming are very soft, as if to avoid drowning out the Igbo’s silent tapping on an ivory bell. Apart from a single other excursion into the town, the Igbo’s egbepụgụgụ “procession of thanksgiving” for the successful completion of his initiation, Bradbury reports that late 19th century Igbo were closely restricted to the palace. As a spirit, the Igbo is publicly invisible, unable to participate directly in the civil society. The pragmatic implicature of the song seems to be twofold: that the Igbo is once again a spirit, portrayed in-between the sun and the moon on the Igbo program. Otherwise why ask him not to leave this world? His appearance in public produces a close conjunction of spirit and human worlds, similar to that produced by an oracular priest in trance possession. This is a time when the gods’ blessings can be received. On his return from the palace gate to the royal courtyards, people begin to recite praise poetry, and when he reaches the first building he is cheered three times. The next day, all citizen household heads can sacrifice to their own heads with the assurance that a new year’s destiny can begin. The following dawn, their children carry the embers of last year’s fires to the outskirts of town and bring back the freshly sprouted rụrụ leaves as confirmation of the new year’s beginning.

The Igbo Festival is named after ‘Friends Outside’, an expression which is interpreted as referring either to the markedly friendly public atmosphere of the season, or to the fact of Igbo intervention in an 18th century succession dispute; and thus to the legitimation of the occupant of the Igbo throne. In contrast with the Igbo festival consecration of the Igbo king is performed: (i) on his entire head not only his head; (ii) by the association of diviners-doctors in the villages which lie directly behind the palace; (iii) the anointing is done in private, without the presence of chiefs. These doctors are received and feasted like dignitaries.

Another contrast: the royal public dance evokes the king’s possible journey from human to spirit worlds. It differs in scale but not in style from the dances of the town chiefs and their entourage to the palace, dances which have preceded the king’s emergence. The Igbo festival does not establish the king as a spirit. Instead it is a season when the collective spirits of the ancestors (Igbo are referred to as the Igbo) return to the world of the living to bestow blessings, and to be fed with sacrifices. The sacrificial function is clearly related to the festival’s synchronization with the new yam harvest. Instead of a spirit, the Igbo king is regarded as a living ancestor, bearing the title cf. §4.2.8 above.

The textual subject of the Igbo festival songs is the general population, not a group of chiefs or palace specialists as in Benin. In fact, the first singing of these texts cannot occur in the capital: it must begin in the nearby village of Isiuzu Oka. And the Igbo festival songs are banned on any other occasion, public or private: why should this be so? As described by Mike-Igbo 1983, the songs’ content offers an interesting example of symbolic opacity. One festival song refers to the absence of the ancestors from the world, when the pragmatic fact of their presence at precisely the only time when the song is allowed to be sung. The same song characterizes the royal procession through the streets as “tupsi-turviness”, not the most natural attribute of a stable kingship. And some of the songs can be characterised as deeply pathetic in tone. The symbolic contestation of these lyrics is confirmed by the restrictions on singing: at any other time of the year, they could be seditious; during the festival, they bring out the more evenly balanced power relationship between the crown and the lineage system (the latter being symbolically represented by the ancestors, since each lineage’s collective dead return to it en masse, and by the age grade wrestling which is organized by descent).

The medium-sized town of Igbo lays historically at the outer periphery, and was made the seat of one of the rotating Native Courts established for Agbor District under British Indirect Rule in 1901. But Igbo and Igbo-Ebi fought an armed conflict in 1895, and one-by-one Igbo’s nine lineage wards appealed to the colonial power for reaffiliation the bordering Benin (Igbo) District, beginning with the predominant ward (Igbo) in 1916. Igbo’s iconography became especially strategic in the local rivalries under colonial and neocolonial administration. The town participates in the royal festivals of both Igbo and Igbo-Ebi with, however, an important difference: whereas official Igbo representatives attend the Igbo, along with delegations from all the tributary domains, Igbo-Ebi participation in the Igbo Festival is symbolically reversed: the king of Igbo-Ebi goes to them.

As described by Chief Igbo-Ebi in his festival narrative (in the Appendix), the semantic themes of the Igbo-Ebi festival are four. In sequence: the ending of new yam and other seasonal produce restrictions (as in Igbo’s ritual precedence (temporal order and political seniority) among lineage segments of the town; the authority of the ND Igbo priests within Igbo-Ebi as well as over the king of Igbo-Ebi, and age grade initiation. The agricultural, lineage and age grade foci are all

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(1) Igbo-Ebi asserts that the spelling Igbo-Ebi is a 1946 neologism, designed to hide former slave status.
present in the Igbo festival, thus the distinctive element is the Nweta cult, which is ritually superior to the kingship – the inverse of the Igbo situation.

The Igbo festival, like those of Edo and Ibo, exemplifies two dimensions of state ritual: a political institution reflecting the historically ‘sedimentary’ process of legitimation; and a communicative event in which institutional context determines the pragmatic implications of ritual texts. There is no assertion that state rituals are unique in this regard, but perhaps the conjunction of these two dimensions is more clearly recognizable when a symbolic order concerning the legitimacy of high officeholders is reproduced in a temporally restricted, recurrent and monumental event. The Oba of Edo is annually powerless unless publicly renewed by his own appointees. The songs which accompany the Edo king’s public display of ‘seniority’ and opulence speak of mortality and tragic loss. The Igbo king carries tribute to the priests of Nkwo in his own tribal state. These propositions strike a Westerner as less than royal politics. They reveal the contingency of the symbolic order on processes of ritual renewal.

4.5 Anti-Œdipus-Ottenberg

Intellectual racism is liberal.

— Sembene Ousmane

Corresponding, perhaps, to the royal festivals of the Bendel State monarchies described in the preceding section, are two Ibo institutions: the yam harvest festival, which represents control over food production, and the age-grade initiation which reproduces the political system. Whereas in the ST1 and Ibo-based monarchies, these two institutional domains are united in the Igbo title, in Ibo they are dispensed in a variety of local power centers. Although Ottenberg admirably describes the communicative and political dynamics of the age grade system, in a pair of substantial book-length studies (1968, 1971), his forays into psychological explanation of Igbo institutions are marked by linguistic amatuerism (1975) and self-indulgence (1989). With his 1989 study, Ottenberg jumps on the backband of psychoanalyzing himself through a rambling application of Freudian concepts to Ibo boyhood initiation.

The most egregious example of author’s projection (cathexis?) in Ottenberg’s 1989 book is his misogynist misinterpretation of a symbolically heavy act in the course of initiation: the boy’s stomping on a bathing calabash gourd in front of his mother. As interpreted by Ottenberg, this is an act of aggression towards and separation from the mother (1989, 67, 170). However, as made clear by the long text on the subject which I accidentally collected from a noted Ibo ritualist (see Nwosu-Egwureh (Little-child that knows its mother) in the Appendix), the stomping of the gourd is the breaking of the nont of children who die before they reach adulthood. The mother performs this stomping after childbirth, and the son annotates it. The repetition during initiation may also refer to the initiate’s ‘rebirh’, although this is speculative.

Another case of pop psychologizing is Ottenberg’s repeated claim that yam is a “phallic symbol”. The closest I came to indigenous ideas on the subject was during the New Yam feast at Akwau Olay, which I was privileged to witness in 1977 and which Ottenberg pictures on the third to last plate before p. 169. He never discusses this image, but I can confirm that the noble young women in the ritual are dressed as yams, addressed as such, describe themselves as such and act as such when, at the conclusion of the preparation of the yam medicine by the priestess (the ‘yam eating’ priest), they disperse to yam barns in the domestic compounds. No phallic symbols, they.

4.6 Translation and lexical revisionism

Each settlement preserves different texts as the “inner semantic frame” for political ritual action (Tambiah 1968). The present status of these resources has been affected by standardization and other prescriptive factors. In the historical context of literacy, the experience of Igbo speakers has varied at the hands of missionaries, colonial and national agents (Okech 1972, Afoke 1972, 1981), affecting the content of oral traditions (Onwe 1985, cf. Yei 1989).

Over 150 years, the framework of accumulation shifted from control over agricultural/artisanal surplus to mercantile capital, then to bureaucratic monopoly (Thomas 1984, Agyi 1984, Nzimande 1984). Prior régimes were incorporated in later ones (Okech 1973, Mielleusse 1975, Nzimande 1979). 19th century commercial “big men” adopted the symbols of sacred kings, for which they subsequently acquired colonial charters (Henderson 1972, cf. Bradbury 1968). In the nationalist period, these symbols were adopted by state brokers.

Symbolic incorporation has a politicizing effect (Zimbardo 1984). During the 1979 federal election campaign, the Igbo monarchy was nearly destroyed by a dispute over land expropriation. In the campaign, an Igbo vice-chancellor exchanged television sets for “chieftaincy” titles (Okech-emerie, etc.) in dormitories, polarizing the university. In Ibo, where sacred kingship was absent and commercial capital rare, state symbolic appropriation has been comparatively limited.

Igbo

Welmers (1975: 186-90) lists numerous vestigial noun class prefixes in Igbo. The ethnic names Eni, Eni, Eni, Eni, Ini, Ini, Ini and Ani all bear the - prefix which is very probably cognate with the personal plural nounclass seen in relics such as Ani ‘young men’ (Onweha). Thus the word Igbo is morphologically plural, at least from a diachronic point of view.

4.6.1 Igbo

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In an acute discussion of names, Onweha (1972: 408) cites data which show that, even synchronically, the term Igbo has the inherent, semantic plurality of a collective.88

88 Onweha's (1972: 408) gives an example which is the common noun:

A direct confession of what Ottenberg is up to comes on pp. 130-140, where he opposes “vernacular psychology” to what he himself practices: psychology of the unconscious. In other words, it is wrong to hold his study to ordinary standards of evidence, since the object of analysis is not explicit knowledge nor even explicable meaning. This also explains why he takes such evident delight in revealing the ‘secret knowledge’ which he obtains by undergoing boys’ initiation himself. Like the good psychoanalyst he imagines himself to be, he is interested in getting beyond the mere beliefs of his subjects by first exposing them, but ends up just exposing himself.
The division between the riverain and upland Igbo is that between ‘slave-dealing, kingdom- associated peoples’ and ‘slave-providing, kingdom-lacking populations.’ The Igbo, with their well-watered farms and protein-rich diet, despised the Igbo for their food and water shortages, and their role as slave suppliers. (1985: 1)

He goes on to suggest how this status difference became entrenched in the 19th century: At the time of the advent of modern government in Igbo-land, slaves and their descendants formed a large element of the societies of most Igbo communities. The Igbo tribes in the forest, still did the freemen in some of the riverain communities, notably those in the Oviri-Olens district whose names therefrom. That had resulted from the acquire of slave trade from the 18th century... that meant that, since the internal trade did not thereby cease, the slaves had them to be absorbed within the communities... As a result of the large increase in the number of slaves, the societies of the affected communities had become polarized. (Ogbu 1985: 122)

Two recent changes would account for the present opacity of the 'forest' part of the meaning. First, much of the upland area was deforested by agricultural land-hunger (Lagemann 1977). Deforestation may also have been compelled by the charcoal requirements of iron smelting (cf. Gough 1981). The species from which suitable charcoal could be produced are among the slowest growing, and hence hardest to replace. The most deforested areas between the Niger and Cross rivers are just where ancient ironworks have been excavated by the Igbo and others to g. (Lh. Lw.)

The second change is not ecological but social. The term anya Igbo Igbo person acquired negative prestige as coastal and riverine dwellers—who non-forest dwellers and hence non-Igbo by the etymological definition—obtained high status as intermediaries in long distance trade, including the slave trade. For example, (1980: 41) quotes a proverb, cited by Jeffreys (1954) and still used at Ovri, which is not riverine nor was it a slaveholding kingdom: The second change is not ecological but social. The term anya Igbo Igbo person acquired negative prestige as coastal and riverine dwellers—who non-forest dwellers and hence non-Igbo by the etymological definition—obtained high status as intermediaries in long distance trade, including the slave trade. For example, (1980: 41) quotes a proverb, cited by Jeffreys (1954) and still used at Ovri, which is not riverine nor was it a slaveholding kingdom: The second change is not ecological but social. The term anya Igbo Igbo person acquired negative prestige as coastal and riverine dwellers—who non-forest dwellers and hence non-Igbo by the etymological definition—obtained high status as intermediaries in long distance trade, including the slave trade. For example, (1980: 41) quotes a proverb, cited by Jeffreys (1954) and still used at Ovri, which is not riverine nor was it a slaveholding kingdom: The second change is not ecological but social. The term anya Igbo Igbo person acquired negative prestige as coastal and riverine dwellers—who non-forest dwellers and hence non-Igbo by the etymological definition—obtained high status as intermediaries in long distance trade, including the slave trade. For example, (1980: 41) quotes a proverb, cited by Jeffreys (1954) and still used at Ovri, which is not riverine nor was it a slaveholding kingdom: The second change is not ecological but social. The term anya Igbo Igbo person acquired negative prestige as coastal and riverine dwellers—who non-forest dwellers and hence non-Igbo by the etymological definition—obtained high status as intermediaries in long distance trade, including the slave trade. For example, (1980: 41) quotes a proverb, cited by Jeffreys (1954) and still used at Ovri, which is not riverine nor was it a slaveholding kingdom: The second change is not ecological but social. The term anya Igbo Igbo person acquired negative prestige as coastal and riverine dwellers—who non-forest dwellers and hence non-Igbo by the etymological definition—obtained high status as intermediaries in long distance trade, including the slave trade. For example, (1980: 41) quotes a proverb, cited by Jeffreys (1954) and still used at Ovri, which is not riverine nor was it a slaveholding kingdom:
On the other hand, the etymological meaning of *Chi* is opaque to members of the missionized *Igbo*-speaking elite. For example, *Echere* recently penned the following reflection:

> What we have is *Chi*, probably one of the most complex theological concepts ever devised to explain the universe. It is a concept which both accounts for the individual and the general law of the Universe, explains Good and Evil, tragedy and good fortune, order and conflict, character and destiny, free will and metaphysical order. There may be parallels in this idea with Christian thought. In fact, one Catholic priest who discussed the subject with me went so far as to suggest that perhaps *Chi* is Christus, the intermediary, an African anticipation of the revealed Saviour and mediator.

(1979: 24)

Even for organic, literate village intellectuals, the definition of *Chi* has been relativized to that of *Chikwue*, reversing the linguistic derivation.39 Here is a clear example of this inversion:

> To the Igbo man God is "Chi-kwe" which literally means God who talks commands. Secondly there is "Chi" which is a personal god or providence or fate which comes from Chukwu to each individual and returns back to God at each person’s death. "Chi" at a person’s death cannot properly return back to God without the specific rites and ritualistic timing of a god which traditionally are referred to as *s/second burial*. There is some similarity between the Bible in its aspect of having two resurrection in the twelfth chapter of the book of Revelation and the *Igbo* superstitious belief in two resurrections. (*Nwakuliri* 1983: 14)

4.6.3 *nnu* and *nwa*

Although in most dialects, *nnu* is usually translated ‘father’, I noted in §4.2.9 that the *Igbo* term for ‘father’ is *ndi*, literally ‘mother’s master’. Also in *Igbo*, *nnu* refers to master in the sense of owner, like the owner of a dog (*nnu ndi Chuke*). At *Ughido*, while *nnu* (*ego si* *nnu*) denotes ‘possessor’, there is a related word *nnu* which refers to a male non-initiate. It is not clear if one word derives from the other, but male initiation is regarded as an absolute prerequisite for marriage, so every *nnu* is no longer *ndi*. Given the suppression by Christian converts of the greater part of initiation ceremonies in most *Igbo* areas apart from *Ughido*, it is unlikely that these questions can ever be answered. There are today undoubtedly more *Igbo* speakers who can discourse learnedly on the Virgin Birth than can accurately describe the initiation process in their own community.

4.6.4 *nno* and *nwa*

Not only is there a semantic problem with the translation of *ndi* as ‘husband’ (cf. §4.2.9), but there is no one symmetrical term which designates ‘wife’ throughout the *Igbo* area. In some dialects, ‘wife’ is *nwa* (*Ughido* and other dialects); in others, someone’s wife is referred to peripherally with the avoidance term *ndo* *nde* (*Igbo*). There is a gender-neutral term *nwa* ‘spouse’, cf. §4.6.4. There is one widespread term which is conventionally given as the *Igbo* equivalent for English wife: *nwa* (*Ughido* and other dialects) / *no* (*Igbo*), *nde* (*Ughido* and other dialects). Two or three qualifications must be noted, however.

First, *nwa* (and cognates) is not the unique term; there is also an avoidance term for someone’s wife: *ndo* *nde*, literally ‘person of the [husband’s] place’ (in a virilocal marriage). And, in various phrases descriptive of marriage, *nwa* is replaced by the word ‘woman’: *nwa* (= *Igbo* *nde* + [Ugwa] *nde*; *nde* + *nde* + *nde*), *nde* + *nde*; *ndo* + *nde*; *ndo* + *nde*; *ndo* + *nde* + *nde*). E.g. *ndo* + *nde* to take a woman ([Ugwa] *nde* + *nde* + *nde*); to marry a woman ([Ugwa] *nde* + *nde* + *nde*). *nde* + *nde* + *nde*; *ndo* + *nde* + *nde*; *ndo* + *nde* + *nde* + *nde* + *nde* + *nde*. Second, in some localities, the term *nwa* has the specific connotation of a bride who has been taken with the combined ritual of the Christian church and the state, and with a substantial linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits

bride wealth payment to her family. *Igbo* describes the distinction between the viriloclal *nnu* and the usurolocal *nwa* / *nwa* forms of marriage as that between the payment of a monetary bride wealth and the provision of bride service. He cites the following proverb (tone conjectural):

> ‘A child married off to a husband, is sold’

Hence, certainly, the general *Igbo* use of the verb *nde* ‘work’ to denote the process of marriage, e.g. *nde* *nwa* / *nde* *wena*...

The above sections have suggested how certain *Igbo* lexical items support collective representations of locality, seniority, gender and authority, and how this process is obscured by the philological standards which prevail in the literature. As in previous chapters, it is worthwhile to link these issues with the wider contexts of *Kwa* and *Niger-Congo*.

Consider the following excerpt, which paraphrases a recent academic exchange:

**Africanist A** The term *Ogboni* referring to the famous *Igbo* ‘society’ is actually a misnomer. The correct name—denoted to myself and *Africanist B* (also in attendance) during our fieldwork last year in *Igbo* *Ogboni* is *Ngo*.... Secondly, according to the same *Igbo* consultant, the bronzes in figures which Denis Williams’ 1974 book describes as representations of *Ogboni* literally “Owner-of-the-House”, are actually representations of *Ogboni* / ‘Owner-of-the-House’ [ie of the [14] or [15], i.e. the *Ogboni* Lodge]. Williams’ mistake persisted in later work (e.g. Dobbelmann 1975).

**Africanist C** Do you mean that these uses of *Ogboni* and *Ngo* in the literature are not true reports of the usage of informed participants who are assuredly not readers of Williams or Dobbelmann? Or are these uses relative to particular places or times or situations, but are not general throughout the current *Igbo*-speaking area? Or did you year 1988 consultant wish to interpret oral or written usages, as quoted to him, to make a philosophical point? Or was he correcting your pronunciation of *Yoruba* words?

**Africanist B** Denis Williams’ book introduced the error of substituting *Ogboni* for *Ngo*. A common problem that you may come across is that many scholars today do not consider *Eyo* and *Ogboni* as names of religious associations, but rather as names of objects...
would be immensely beneficial to the cause of sound African Art research and scholarship if in our work more proper native names were employed in the identification of African art objects instead of the current practice of putting them in parentheses or leaving them out altogether. In the same vein, many indigenous terms that embody important artistic and esthetic concepts should be given prominence in our studies. To leave out these African names and terms is a practice that is entirely gratuitous and that ignores the major point of the above exchange. Building on a formidable tradition of literacy begun by Samuel Ajayi Crowther, who established the modern Yoruba orthography in 1875 (see Ajayi 1960), Yoruba happens to possess one of the outstanding dictionaries of any Niger-Congo language. Abraham 1958 gives the following entries:

### edan
- Brass images ... of human beings male and female that they are replicas of a pair of idols [sic] known as edan toba (the name which now on the earth) ... usually found in the centre of the shrine in every edan house.

### Ogbọn
- Ogbọn B: The Ogbọn Secret Society. ... omọ ọgbọn is an ọgbọn cult similar to ọghọsọ and has branches throughout Yorùbáland. ... In 1914, an attempt was made to form a merged ọghọsọ society: the principal mover was an Anglican priest, the Revd. T. A. J. Ogungbọn, who aimed at founding a Christian ọghọsọ society. A ban was placed on the name ‘Christian’ by two Anglican Bishops: Toppell and ìgbọsọ. This society has been banned by Muslims, the Anglicans and the Catholics.

### Osù
- The worshippers form a guild called Osùgbọ̀: in the days of the independence of Nigeria, the members of this guild formed a majority in the political council known as the Osùgbọ̀ Council.

### Oṣogbọ̀
- The ọṣogbọ̀ cult (this term being applied especially to its practice among the ọṣogbọ̀ ọsẹ). ... In other words, the standard Yorùbá dictionary contains descriptions sufficient to trivialize the reported debate. It is obvious from Abraham’s entries that the indirect quotations, by Africanists A and B from an ọṣogbọ̀ elder, do not establish anything like their assertion that ọṣogbọ̀ is the “real” name of ọgbọn. None of the Yoruba dictionary entries, by Africanists A and B from an ọṣogbọ̀ elder, do not establish anything like their assertion that ọṣogbọ̀ is the “real” name of ọgbọn. Rather, the history of missionary and colonial persecution and exploration of the ọṣogbọ̀, to which Abraham refers (see also Morton-Williams 1965), suffices to explain why someone might disavow the word ọṣogbọ̀ in the context of a (recorded) interview with foreigners. Further, if Abraham is correct that the guild of ẹgbọ worshippers, called ọṣogbọ̀ in illustrative usages takes political precedence over other ọgbọn, then the reported ọgbọn nomenclature follows; but the more extravagant claims do not.

Yorùbá ọṣogbọ̀ṣa’s novel ìráó distinguishing between ìgbọ̀ and ọgbọn. Indeed, the two words may not be as exclusive as our Africanists believe: as indicated by the common root ọgbọ̀ (pronounced old) or ìgbọ̀, a common semantic thread of ‘elders’ is present in both names. Similarly, Abraham reports an association between edan and the earth. This observation would not be relevant, if the two Africanists were simply reporting an association between a particular edan and ẹgbọ̀ (the ọgbọn house). But they go much further, to maintain that the latter association excludes the former one. However, this obliges them to a wholly implausible conceit: that Denis Williams confounded the Yoruba words ẹgbọ̀ ‘house’ and ọgbọn ‘earth’ — an error which is linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits

beneath the competence of the youngest Yorùbá-speaking child — when he cites a statement that an edan in is described as ọgbọn. Consider what Williams actually wrote:

A large bronze dagger by the ọgọọ̀ in an ọṣogbọ̀ cult house to be ọgbọn and worshipped them as such, fig. 257, is identical with one in the Nigeria Museum identified by Morton-Williams as ọgọọ̀, a terrible spirit standing in a close relationship to the Earth-God, whose image is used by the ọgọọ̀ to detect a member who has revealed a secret or otherwise acted treacherously. But in many shrines ọgọọ̀ is merely a concept symbolized in a certain object rather than an anthropomorphized spirit, and it is possible that like the High God in Yoruba cosmology, ọgọọ̀ is never anthropomorphised but [the figure is] regarded simply as a focus in the temple in which the spirit of the Earth-Principle is localised. In the sanctification of the shrine, theEarth-Principle itself, is placed in the floor of the shrine and the ọgọọ̀, which could be any object at all, is placed on it as a focus marking its existence. It may be a pebble, a conch shell, a figurative bronze-casting. The pattern is constant through many Yoruba cults and has led European observers from the earliest contacts erroneously to believe that worship is attached to such objects in themselves. Associated with this burial are certain natural substances symbolising the four elements of the ọgọọ̀: solid ọgọọ̀ (the Sky-God), ọye (the Earth-Principle), blood (judgement) and human being, represented respectively by powdered chalk, pure black mud from the river, powdered camwood, and powdered charcoal. Important in ọgọọ̀ imagery is the image of the spirit of ọgọọ̀, the spirit that rises from the earth. Symbolising the union of Heaven and Earth on which all human existence is based, in this part of figures, male and female, connected at their heads by a chain. (Williams 1974: 235-38)

Even if Williams could be accused of linguistic incoherence, his book was vetted (and tone-marked) by a Yoruba-speaking historian—S. Ọṣogbọ̀ṣa—who himself published a study of Ọgọọ̀ in 1949. By contrast, neither Africanist A nor Africanist B can pronounce simple Yoruba words without embarrassment of pronunciation, especially with regard to lexical tone. This does not inspire confidence in their ability to distinguish ọgbọn and ẹgbọ̀ in an oral interview.

Unlike Africanist art critics and museum curators—whose main interest has been in objects, not ideas—Williams does not try to reduce ọgọọ̀ symbolism to a one-to-one correspondence between words and things. Rather, he notes a variety of physical representations of the Earth-Principle, of which the bronze figure in question is one. He also suggests that this picture fits with some independent evidence: the associations with Ọṣogbọ̀s and Osù/Oṣogbọ̀s. (Williams also provides independent indication of the link between ọgọọ̀ and Osù, noted by Abraham.) By criteria of empirical adequacy and conceptual clarity, therefore, Africanists A and B add nothing substantial to Williams; not that no questions remain, but their intervention is a red herring. Africanists need to clarify whose representations are the object of study. (Mis)representations of African knowledge by non-African scholars are interesting, but it is solipsistic to suggest that they are all that exists. Otherwise, Africanists mimic Levi-Strauss’ celebrated dictum: whether the thought processes of the South American Indians take shape through the medium of my thought, or whether mine takes place through the medium of theirs. (1969: 13)

From a cognitive point of view, there is need for minimal scientific standards—beginning with observational adequacy—in representing African knowledge. That this knowledge is not univalent, but varies in time and space and according to social standing and discourse context, does not lift the need to distinguish between African and non-African perspectives, and above all between speakers and non-speakers. The first step is to insist on philological standards of evidence.
Oral composition, argot formation and ritual incantation are differentia specifica which literate cultures possess, if at all, only vestigially. These differences may explain why, for the most part, oral information is used by literate nonspeakers without due philological care.

As Pierre Clastres argued with respect to the state, the premodern polity is more than an absence which evolution waited to fill. Ancient Ñ1 polity, brilliantly documented by Goody's "means of destruction". By Gramsci's definition of the state as "hegemony plus coercion," was half a state, but not the expected half. For all its influence and achievements across a large area, Ñ1 wasn't militarist. Instead, Ñ1 relied on manipulation of divinities by a migrant, oral intelligentsia, recruited by initiation and possessing the "secret language". Just as Clastres argued a dimension of freedom is lost, with the onset of the violent state (cf. also Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 428 ff.), a dimension of consciousness is destroyed by the development of writing. Goody himself (1986) shows that writing first developed in four institutional domains:

The word of God; the word of mammon; the state, the bureau and the file; the letter of the law.

How hard is it to imagine that these innovations did not entail corresponding losses? Philology feeds pedagogy. Like the creation of economic capital by "enclosure" movements (Thompson 1968, Cooper 1981), schooling involves the expropriation of powers and resources from one dispersed agency to another, concentrated one (Illich 1971 and Freire 1985). It is therefore no accident that the blockage of ñbọ literacy—compared to other major linguistic groups in West Africa—corresponds to the relative "freeing" of ñbọ labor power over the past 150 years.

To explain this blockage, it is not enough to cite conflicting missionary and state interests in the translation and training of African peasants (Fabian 1986). Such explanations reduce African history to the activities of imperial and colonial agents, with passive African responses. Instead, it is worth considering that ñbọ speakers themselves worked to sabotage ñbọ literacy, precisely because the literacy offered by missionaries and state agents was ethnocidal, entailing the destruction of oral, cognitive resources upon which people's daily survival relied. As a prerequisite, however, the failure of literacy as the resistance of oracy is thinkable only if the oral is understood as something more than a lack, and as contributing to consciousness.91

91 A similar debate has gone on "within English Marxism" (Thompson 1978, Anderson 1980). Did class formation proceed "from above" or "from below"? Was the source of proletarian consciousness the working class, or the "vanguard" party led by petty-bourgeois intellectuals? Gouldner 1980 reviews Marxists' attempt to reconcile their "scientific" discourse of control over peasant and industrial movements, with the "critical" discourse of their own verbal "labor power". 

Appendix: Lists and texts

The following lists were dictated to me in 1977.

**Aji-ilemiñ Êдуmu Òńgu: The nine quarters of Aji-ilemiñ (Àgbò)
listed by Chief Àgbàṣọ̀gún Douglas Àpaakọwẹ̀, Êdumu-Ọku**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>War-Chieftaincy Title</th>
<th>CurrentTitle-Holder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Êdumu-Ọku</td>
<td>'Great-quarter'</td>
<td>Àgbasọgùn Douglas Àpaakọwẹ̀</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Àjí-ilemi</td>
<td>Òpẹ̀nibẹ̀lẹ̀</td>
<td>Augustine Sìníyí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Àjí-Ọgbẹ̀</td>
<td>Àjí-ilemi</td>
<td>Àjí-ilemi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Àjí-Ọgbẹ̀</td>
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<td>Àjí-Ọgbẹ̀</td>
<td>Àjí-ilemi</td>
<td>Àjí-ilemi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chief Àgbásọgùn noted that the chieftaincy titles listed for three of the quarters of Àjí-ilemiñ have special roles in the installation of the Òbí of Àgbò as well as in the Òbí Òrìṣí royal festival.

**Èfun ńṣùju Àgbò: Some yam species in Àgbò
listed by Jacob Àwùrè Àgbáwarìmì, Àjíma**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yam</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ìmọ ègbọ</td>
<td>'heavy and smooth'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Òpẹ̀pẹ̀rẹ̀n yẹ̀jì</td>
<td>'black Òpẹ̀pẹ̀rẹ̀n'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Òpẹ̀pẹ̀rẹ̀n Ọchàn</td>
<td>'white Òpẹ̀pẹ̀rẹ̀n'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ìlọṣẹ̀ Ìgbẹ̀</td>
<td>'farm message' [a type of red yam]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Èmọ</td>
<td>'heavy-one' [a prestige type]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Àbhùkùnè</td>
<td>[a prestige type]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Àbhùkù</td>
<td>[a commercial type]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Àbọ̀</td>
<td>'eater'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Èbọ̀</td>
<td>[a water yam]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Òrhọ̀</td>
<td>'long-one'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Èbọ̀</td>
<td>'big'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Èfun ńṣùju Àgbò: Some mushroom species in Àgbò
listed by Julius Ògbù, Èdumu Ọku**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mushroom</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>È̀kòṣù</td>
<td>[grows on fallen trees]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Èyọ</td>
<td>'hill of 7' [sound only in deep forest]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Èpíègùnṣẹ́̀</td>
<td>[to find it, you call &quot;Èpíègùnṣẹ́̀ èra ẹ̀rù&quot;]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Èbọ̀ ọgbàdàn</td>
<td>'antelope droppings'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Èbọ̀ ìgbẹ̀</td>
<td>[poisonous]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Èrù</td>
<td>[hearty and smooth]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Èrù ẹ̀gù</td>
<td>'sweet mushroom'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

—313—
The above list differs from the one published by Ottenberg (1968: 157). An asterisk marks units not given by Ottenberg. Units in brackets are given by Ottenberg but not by [Ibi]. [Evuma]. Ottenberg does not indicate tone, and marks vowel quality inconsistently, using the 1930's vintage Roman Catholic (“New”) orthography.

Lists as a coordinate group with an independent market cycle, while Ottenberg lists it as a subgroup, possibly based on administrative maps. In 1977, neither I nor [Ibi] had access to Ottenberg’s list. According to [Ibi] (1977: 2), the recently created paramount chieftaincy title of [Ibi], called [Ibi], will rotate among all five segments (which [Ibi] describes as “village groups”), including [Ibi]. It may be no accident that, in [Ibi]’s list, three of the five subgroups contain seven units. The number seven is propitious, signifying completion: one month contains seven four-day weeks; and yam harvest comes six months after planting, referred to as occurring in the seventh month.

Names of the matrilineages in [Ibi] listed by “Okiri” (Chief). [Ibi], [Kpöghirikpö]

Household heads of [Ibi] listed by attendance at [Ibi] Nri Nsigh 1947

Transcribed, recorded texts

The audio of these texts is included in the accompanying C-100 cassette. Apart from the first selection, all selections on the tape are unedited, real-time recordings. All these recordings, together with various others from [Ibi], [Kpöghirikpö] and [Kpöghirikpö] which are not yet translated, have been recorded on reel-to-reel tapes and deposited at Harvard Audiovisual Services, Boylston Hall, and will be placed at the Universities of [Ibi], Lagos, Benin, [Ibi], Port Harcourt, Calabar, Yaoundé, the Colleges of Education at [Ibi], [Ibi] and Wari, the [Ibi] Museum ([Ibi]), the Nigerian National Language Centre (Lagos) and Labo Gbe (Garome, Bénin). These texts are as close as possible to “spontaneous”. That is, I never suggested particular topics or requested particular texts, nor did I approach particular people to record. Rather, those who offered texts either selected themselves or were nominated by others, and the choice of material was entirely theirs. The one time I deviated from this practice and conducted an interview-style recording session, the narrator was discomfited the result rushed. Preliminary transcriptions and translations were done within a few hours or days of the recording, with a younger friend or relative of the narrator as indicated. Some uncertainties remain in the translation; as most of these were overlooked at the time, I have been unable to rectify them. Major analytical difficulties in the texts, especially as regards the identification of particular morphemes, are boldfaced; their position in the English translation is indicated by a bracketed material plus question mark. I have left the translation fairly literal, to partially compensate for the absence of morpheme-by-morpheme glosses.

Tone marking, like the rest of the transcription, is as close to the underlying representation as I can determine for each dialect. But I have made no attempt to approximate more standard or familiar forms of the language. In some cases, those two practices may be contradictory, i.e. where the dialect form appears to be derived from the standard by some assimilation process. In such cases, I have opted for the less abstract form. Sung material is italicized in the transcription. In the songs, there is a clear rhythmic basis for line division. Non-italicized material (prose) is divided into lines by sentences, with a corresponding line-by-line English translation. In most of the texts, I have divided the prose into paragraphs, based on discourse topics; for each, I have supplied a subheading (in English).

The first selection on the tape, not transcribed below, is a composite recording made during the reconstruction of the age grade initiation drama [Ibi] by [Ibi]. A representative sample of the [Ibi] synopsis and lyrics are transcribed/translated in §2 above. The ninth selection, of [Ibi], is transcribed/translated in §4.2.2. A selection of (diviner’s dances) led by [Ibi] of [Ibi] (recorded in 1980) — referred to at various points in the above chapters — is included at the end of the tape (cf. fn. 9 below). The main chorus of each song is transcribed and translated in the table of contents; I leave detailed translation and analysis of [Ibi]’s brilliant solo to another occasion.
How they do the Igban'ki festival
(19 June 1977) by S. A. (1961),
transcribed and translated jointly with S. A. (1961)
and Samuel (1961).

Fixing the date

Kẹ wè mè égu Igban'ki
Ho w ọgbọn ọmọ, kẹ njẹ ọdún (1977)

and they do the Igban'ki festival

1A maximal lineage in Igban'ki.

2A maximal lineage in Igban'ki.

3A maximal lineage in Igban'ki.

We announce 5 weeks (16 calendar days).
When the king of ọgbọn offers the community sacrifice, we the people of ọgbọn ọmọ (1961)
announce the festival.

New year sacrifices

Eyi eyi n'ọgbọn, eyi n'ọgbọn, eyi n'ọgbọn, eyi n'ọgbọn, eyi n'ọgbọn, eyi n'ọgbọn, eyi n'ọgbọn.

ẹ̀kú ọgbọn.

Kọ ogbọn ọmọ, e n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

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Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

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Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbọn.

Ọjọ́ ọgbọn, eyi n'ogbơn.
The priests of Nwaka: they go to Ohuhu. They proceed to Ohuhu, every priest of Nwaka, all of them to the last, they get ready. They put on [cotton] wigs.7 Those who carry the cult parcel that they carry, they keep going. When they reach Igbo-land, the people in front of Igbo-land, all the people that left from the village, they wait, [then] they start to dance. The priest of all Nwaka is [the one] at Aki; he is the first to move past [the crowd at Igbo-land]. The reason that he is the first to go past [is that] there is one thing the Nwaka priests call ọtunśii.5 If it does not pass by, no other Nwaka priest will enter Igbo-land. The one who carries ọtunśii has passed, before the remaining Nwaka priests can follow along behind him. When we reach that place they call Igbo-land, they start to dance, men and women alike, those who know acrobatics, those who know various dances. The Nwaka cult members take up ọgụdụ8 and beat the ground [with their feet]. They sing, they dance, they shout. In a little while, the Nwaka priests head for the pit in the earth where they dig chalk. When they are going, whether they use age or they use the order in which they professed the cult, whether the order that they professed the cult, or who is the elder, so they proceed. A follower keeps his feet from the next person [in the line], they go along that way, both men and women, they call to each other “Arrive safely, arrive safely, arrive safely, lucky [i.e. safe] journey, arrive safely!”10

Home sacrifices

We went to Aki, we met Nwakaakers. We went to Aki, we met Nwakaakers. We went to Aki, we met Nwakaakers.8 We went to Aki, we met Nwakaakers.8 We met Nwakaakers. We got to their place. When we cut chalk, we got to their place.8 We got to their place. We met Nwakaakers.8 We met Nwakaakers.8 We went to Aki, we met Nwakaakers.8

6Literally ‘Descendant-of-the-collective-temple’. Nwakaakers bear a family resemblance to ọrụ-akụkụ houses (Ọkpọtụchọta 1976). Ọrụ akụkụ are shrines of Ọsọhụ, and ọra, shrines of Ọnọ. According to Ọkpọtụchọta, ọrụ akụkụ houses are principally dedicated to ọkọ Earth goddess and Akụkụ–Inuma Thunder god. ‘Freedom-of-the-people’; Inuma is further described as the mother of various streams. Interestingly for a comparison with Nwakaakers, he cites the name of the Earth goddess as “Ịba, or Ọghọ ọka” (p. 8). Even more interesting in comparison with this Igbo-land text, there is a connection between the ọrụ akụkụ new year festival and the chief ọrụ akụkụ divinities: The ceremony for the eating of the new yam is connected with ọka, the god of the earth; but it is also connected with ọma, the god of the earth. 

7Woven by post-menopausal women.

8Presumably a sacred medicine bundle.

9Paired diviner’s drums (approx. 15 x 40 cm.), loosely covered with the skin of the puff adder (Heteroconyx ọjọ), tuned a minor third apart. In Igbo, the same instrument is called ọgụdụ, although contra Melzian (1937: 85) only one end of the drum is skinned. By extension, the term ọgụdụ ‘diviners’ ọgụdụ, refers to the event of choral music and ecstatic dancing which accompanies ọgụdụ drumming. The role of the puff adder in Nwakaakers recalls the sacred python (the ọma) in igba (the Igbo-land area, as well as in the river temples of the âgbọ area), region around Igbo-land. 

10The two phrases are functionally synonymous, ọtunśii being an ọtun expression.
The ruler of Igbo, Ochukwu 14, continuing from [the time of] his reign [lit. ‘hand’] on down, the day they go to [sacrifice at] the grave [of the royal ancestors], it is a ram that he brings to give the Nvawu priests. That ram, a week after they go to “the Face”, the chief priest of Nvawu slaughters it. He calls all his family, and they use it to invoke the spirits for him. Because there was a time that Nvawu troubled him [i.e. Ochukwu], before. So they told him, every year, he should carry a ram, go and give them, to go and pray to Nvawu at Igkakwa, so that [misfortune] will not affect [lit. know] them. Up to today they are doing it.

Royal Initiation

Igwe nova. Ò nwó byen enyi agha byen omen byen. Yá seká náta mè eghu. Ò nwó náta rí, òtu agha. Agha we agha mú.

Íshé ke le tí ba osin aye byen, akin wé à. We seká náta mè enye, ke le [agbọ], Ò nwó náta mè le nwó byen, mè le nwó byen. We de enye enye ní egha de gbáhá nímmí. Ákaakwọ we ní ìbílú óhù, yáa/kwí nímmí wípe byen.

Rí níké óba ege enyi ahan hànn. When that is finished, there’s something we call going into manhood [lit. ‘thing going to thing’]. It can be [about the time] to do the festival, there are those “outsiders”. They pass outside and away [i.e. they are exempted from work]. Those who have never before entered initiation, they enter it. [If] when they can do that, that the women, that is those who bore a child before, [those who] bore a first child, all of them to the last go out, to pray again. They receive on their behalf a shilling [each], that is for their child who is going into manhood.

[That] is about where the story of our festival ends up.

7 sons, 7 occupations

It happened [that] there was one woman, the name they called her was [‘Patience’]. This woman, seven [male] children she bore. It reached one day, that she called her children, saying that every one should say what he could do [for work] in this world. When her children gathered, the one who was eldest of them said: farmland was what he could work. The one who came second said: market was what he could trade. The one who came third said: [hunting] gun was what he could shoot. The one who came fourth said: dancing was what he could perform. The one who came fifth said: wrestling was what he could do. The one who came sixth said: palm nuts was what he could cut. The one who came seventh said: divination was what he could do.

Their mother, it was very beautiful that she [had] matured. The beauty she possessed eventually reached the hearing of [lit. know] one day, she headed for the market at Ogbagọ’s [palace] frontage. When she reached the market at Ogbagọ’s [palace] frontage, Ogbagọ heard about her,
so he and his female servants seized the woman and they took her and headed back to Ògàsò's house.

When all the women had entered Ògàsò’s house, they loosened[16] rings and put them on her feet, [so that] she could not go outside again.

When day had darkened, the children did not see their mother [who] went to market but did not return.

That one [i.e. one child] eventually reached the house and said that Òka Ògàsò had seized their mother.

**The eldest son goes to Ògàsò**

Yà ké wé nì sì ròvà ọnyé cìrm. "Iyà báà dì ọnyé?

Ọnyé chújì ọjì, nì wéè lìgà. nì wéè ànyà.

Ọrì órì ìwú Òka Ògàsò. Òka Ògàsò nì pé sì "Kì jì hà de ènì?

Ọ sí ògàbò kè yì àrùn. nì wéè gòjì è fùyà.

Ọ ní èì ìwú, òrì ọgàbò dià ànyà ètò.

Ọ lókè, Òkà Ògàsò ègòìn ènì, ọgàbò ànyà.

Ọ wé ìpíkì. òrì níjìlì. ọ ápà ní mì ènì òọvà. o.

Ọ rì ọnì, ọ̣̀ ạ̀ ọ̣̀ ní yì mì, ọ sí wéè ní jì àghù ìnjì ní mì wé kà tì éjò. To. ní wù ní yì ìwú. Òtò ní wù ìwú. Òtò ọgàbò ní ọjì ètò.

So they said to the eldest child, “You come on and get going!”

The eldest started going, he took up a machete, he took up an axe. He reached Òka Ògàsò’s house, Òka Ògàsò said to him “What did you come to do?”

He said that it was farmland that he worked [so] he showed him the forest.

When he started home, Ògàsò [took ‘break’] the machete and the axe. He took [i.e. addressed] Bèntì, he said he was going, for he hadn’t seen his mother. He reached home, he said [what about] their mother, he told them that he hadn’t seen her for three years.

**The second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth sons go to Ògàsò**

Àǹì báà ìwú èntì ní jì jìmè. Òtò ní wéè àyìèn-

Ọ órì órì ówà. Òka Ògàsò sì kì ìtì àrùn. ní ní òọvà.

Ọ sìnìwè ọjì òọvà è fùyà.

Ọ gbùò ọjà àghù ìnjì àṣà òọvà níwè ènì òọ ọjà ní ní mì wé ènì. Ònòkè, Òkà Ògàsò è ní ènì. Ọ rì ọnì òọ, òọ ọjà èntì àghù ìnjì ní yì jì ènì òọvà. òọ sì. ní wéè wéè òọ ènì òọvà. Òkà Ògàsò, “Kì jì àrùn?” Òkà gù tà òọ.

Ọ sì ọjì òọ, òọ ọjà àghù ìnjì òọ, òọ “èsìgbọ̀ è fùyà.”

Hù wà ní wù àghù èntì. òrì ọgàbò dià àghù èntì è tò ní ní àntì ọjì ètò ófùyà. 16

The narrator translates “rings” may denote the leg spirals of copper wire depicted in Basden (1921: plates facing p. 88, 96). Alternatively, ògàbò might be the wide brass disks illustrated in Thomas (1913 vol. 1: plate 17b facing p. 80), also seen in Basden (1921: plate facing p. 112). The ambiguity seems to be inherent in the word: Crowther (1882: 86) translates ògàbò as either brass (in the form of a ring) or copper (on the leg, presumably in the form of spirals).

The one who came second started going. He took stinginess along. When he reached there, Òkà Ògàsò said what did he work at, he said he worked at the market.

He told him to show him the forest. He spent three good years trading in that market, he came back not having seen his mother. When he started home, Ògàsò refused him [his request]. He reached home, he told the siblings that he had not seen their mother.

The one who came third, the child who shot [a hunter’s] gun, started going.

He reached there, “What do you work at?” asked him.

He said that it was [a hunter’s] gun that he shot, he [said “Start looking at the forest!”]

The one who came third was shooting [his] gun, and remained at it for three years, [until] there was no animal left in the forest, whether pig or [?] or anything at all.

The one who came fourth, who danced, he started going. When he reached there, he said to them that it was dancing that he performed.

They summoned a dance, they made a wide circle, he taught them to dance, he was the king of the dancers, he danced in the air, he danced on the ground, he remained at it for three years, [but] nothing: he did not see their mother, he returned useless.

The one who came fifth started going, the wrestler.

He said to him, what did he work at, he said wrestling was what he did, he said “Just fine!” that there were sword-bearers, there were youths, there were [?]. He threw them all, for [the benefit of?]

He remained at it for three years, [but] he did not see their mother, so he headed home.

The one who came sixth, palm kernels [on] climbing rope.

Thomas (1913 vol 2: 287) glosses Ògàbò as ‘fork of legs’. It is hard to know if this meaning is relevant.

This suggests that ògàbò, ‘stinginess’ is an essential attribute of homo economicus.
He started going, he reached there,
he said to Ogba that it was palm nuts that he knew how to cut.
He told him to start looking at the plantation of palm trees.
He entered it, he cut palm nuts, he pressed palm nuts,
he filled drums with it [palm oil], he filled them all with it.

The seventh son meets the Yaws Widow

As he was going, he cooked everything that the mouth eats.
If he saw a woman along the way, he gave her something to eat.
If he saw a man, he gave him something to eat.
If he saw a youth, he gave him.
If he saw someone bigger than himself, he gave him.
That's how he started going.
He went a little ways, he looked upon Yaws Widow.
When he finished giving her food, he took her to the river and bathed her.
He took Yaws Widow and rubbed her, he rubbed her with pomade.
Yaws Widow got better.
Yaws Widow said to him, "Where are you going?" he said "Ogbo's house".
She told him "Ogbo's eldest child is fevered!" she told him doctors fill up that place.
She said you can't dig there,
she said all manner of stoniness [prevents it from] standing up in the open, straight.
A sword is [to be] put there.
If the sword did not dig the ground, they would kill him [on the spot], the people there.
She said that the very thing that was [going to] happen
was that she would be the first to go along.
She listened very carefully.
She said to him, when you reach there, look carefully on the ground, where I can place this leaf,
for there is where the empty ground is.
He told her "OK."
Yaws Widow entered there.
They said "Yaws Widow, what are you doing here? Get out out out!"
Yaws Widow placed the leaf on the ground, and she left.

The little doctor son divines for Ogbo's widow

If a diviner can't see the ground, he can't open up the oracle
(1975: 6, mistranslated there)
That doctor reached there, he greeted them “Ram killer, ram killer all of you!”

[After] they said it, they said to him “What do you work at?”

He said doctor was his work, they said “God has brought him here!”

“Stand the sword upright in the ground!”

He looked and looked at it, he stuck it inside where that leaf was.

It split the ground.

“Wow!” They moved over and gave him a place to sit down.

They said that fever was gripping the eldest son of [name], in a bad way.

Can you [cure] him, Is he not the one to look after [the child]?

It was the small doctor that told them “Yes.”

That it was a public oracle that they would consult for him.

They gathered the divination medicine bundle, came out into the open compound [When] he had begun to divine for him [the eldest son of [name]], and the people in front of him sat down and slept.

He began to sing as they sing:

The person who kills a doctor will not progress, will not progress, will not progress!

The person who kills a doctor will not progress, will not progress, will not progress!

The person who kills a doctor will not progress, will not progress, will not progress!

The person who kills a doctor will not progress!

He said to them “Very good!”, he said to [name]’s name “Greetings!”

“The killing thing is that there is a certain woman you seized in the market here, that she can slaughter the compound, can slaughter the house that she is starting from this child [name] to finish off everyone else, that she used this death to be able to tell us.”

“It [the oracle] says that she should pass by and go to the next world.”

22This speech is twice reported: the doctor reports the ancestors’ message through the oracle, and the narrator reports what the doctor said to [name].

23The auxiliary verb, translated here as ‘actually’, is widely borrowed into Nigerian English.

The narrator has speaking knowledge of [name].

24The expected form for ‘his name’ is [name’s name]; would be the form in many other dialects.

25This song is in [language]. At the end, the narrator sings an [language] version with a somewhat different meaning.
And 

He [?…] and collected [the materials], seven days [?passed], eventually did everything.

He told the retainers [lit. those in front] to take the woman and lead her out.

As they were going to do it, there was a leaf [?…], he plucked [?] it, and followed [so that the woman would] not know everything about him.

What he used it to [?do] was, if they removed his mother, his mother would not know that he was her son, she would not tell his name.

When they came out, the woman did not recognize [her] son!

They seized her and started off, leading the sacrifices [?] by a rope.

They sang a song:

**Drive her, drive her, let her not be doing it here!**

**Drive her, drive her, let her not be doing it here!**

**Drive her, drive her, let her not be doing it here!**

**Drive her, drive her, let her not be doing it here!**

That's how they took her [away].

A huge crowd of people reached [the grave], the doctor picked a leaf, he told them to go home.

They sprinkled a little of the leaf in the boy's eyes, they took the leaf and squeezed [its juice] for him to drink.

He [i.e. they] went home, [?] said they were going home.

He killed the goat, poured [its blood] there, led together all the things [i.e. animals], every one of them, brought all the things that were left, he covered [the grave], he said to his mother,

26This song is in [4]. At the end of the tape, the narrator sings an identical ṣẹ̀ẹ̀ version.

27A mother's daughter proverbially denotes the most precious of all commodities. In context, this remark means, in effect, 'The king went too far this time!'
It was the dog that went to the antelope's house. He told him to go and buy him a chair, the chair they use in sitting down. So the antelope took the money from him. He went off to do it. When evening arrived, the dog headed for the house of his in-laws. Reaching there, he squatted down on his haunches, he squatted. At this, his in-law told him that squatting became him very much \[i.e. suited him very well\]. He said that squatting became him. When the dog was reaching home, that's when he met up with his mates. When he reached there, he told them that he had gone to his in-laws' house. That his in-laws said that squatting befitted him. He went to where the antelope was. He said to the antelope, "It's you who should return the money you used to get him \[i.e. me\] a chair." He said that his in-laws said that squatting befitted him. The antelope said that he had already bought him the chair. He \[the dog\] said to him, "It is not you that brought it, it is not it which you brought him \[i.e. me\]." That is why, if \[ever\] the dog sees the antelope, he starts to chase him. If \[ever\] the dog sees the antelope, he starts to chase him. That is why the dog started killing antelopes.

On 13 September 1976, Ogbu referred to this story by means of the following wellerism:

"The dog, it said to its master, he should return the money it \[advanced him\] to buy it a chair, that \[i.e. because\] squatting suits it."
It was the pelican that was the first to come to the land of the birds. They told him to start going to the visible world. When he reached the world, there he started going. The pelican said that he would not go, so the vulture was the first to be going, [before] the pelican. The pelican... When the vulture reached there, the vulture landed. All the people of the ancient world didn't know about the vulture, came to look at it. One person who knew about it, one old person who knew about it, he said the were not to kill it, that is, the vulture. His children said, "Really?! This one is the very vulture?"

So the vulture came to land on the ground. He started to play. When he was playing, they did not kill him. When the vulture reached home, the pelican said "You should go, you should go!" Thus the vulture said for him to go.

When the pelican went, those who knew the pelican, those who knew the vulture, they had died, those who have known that the vulture, they don't kill it, they don't eat it. So the pelican started going. The pelican flewbuga-wugha-wugha. When the pelican reached there, it perched on top of a tree. So one child started running, [and] said to its father, "Come see the big, strange animal!"

"That it perched on that very tree!"

He said to it, "Is it the vulture?"

It said to him, "Nope."

So its father picked up a gun, he shot it at the pelican. The pelican fell. So they started eating pelican, [but] they never started eating vulture.

All those who knew that it was not the vulture nor the pelican, that they don't eat them, those who knew that they don't eat vulture, so they say told them not to kill vulture, [but] when it [i.e. the pelican] came back, the people who knew it were gone [lit. finished]. So they started to kill the pelican, this [very] pelican which they [now] eat. The pelican and the vulture were the first to come to the world. They [i.e. people] didn't eat them. When those who knew the pelican were gone, [and] then the pelican came down, they started eating it!

So it is pelican meat that they are [now, habitually] eating. They did not [formerly] eat either vulture or pelican.

The door, if you don't salute [i.e. acknowledge] it, you can't go inside the house.

\[33\]This line is the formulaic introduction to a story in Igbo.

\[32\]On the terms 'spouse' and 'wife', cf. §4.5.4.

\[31\]I.e., assuming he observes this affair, why doesn't he say react to it?

\[34\]Here the narrator says, first ògàsọ ọbà, and then (after some hesitation) Àgbọ, but context (and the subsequent two episodes) show that either Ògàsọ or Àgbọ is intended.
They say that there reached that day, "Mélu's" father "washed" a parrot, and he placed it aside for in [her] room. They say that the parrot reached there. The parrot took and put it [thus]:

35This song is (mostly) in Benin, consistent with the provenance of stories in Benin. I transcribe it with low and high tones marked on each syllable. The first line of the song is apparently relexified into.

36Melzian (1937: 181) glosses the ideophone as "loud (of shouting)."

37According to Melzian (1937: xvii, 175), and are suppletive forms of the verb which translates English 'come', cf. the verb 'arrive' in.

38The and swords are the two ceremonial, state swords of the Kingdom, roughly corresponding in function to the ritual and staffs of the Nu Kingdom. In both cases, the first object of the pair symbolizes ancestral authority, while the second object symbolizes temporal power. The represent the power of life and death over his subjects, and the delegation of this power to any chief to whom grants the right to display one among his regalia.

39In this line, the word 'there' has apparently been relexified with its counterpart 'there', which happens to be its cognate (or perhaps its borrowed version).

40i.e. he prepared the parrot as a messenger, by treating it with herbal medicine.
After a short time [lit: not to do doing], evening fell again, [and] Ògá, was on his way.

Ògá got ready for going [lit: prepared the body he used in going].

The parrot started going.

The parrot reached where they [lit: and Ògá were] sitting down.

The parrot said:

Ògá, spouse of Mélú;

Régérégéché, régérégéché;

Ògá, spouse of Mélú;

Régérégéché, régérégéché;

He is carrying a lamp, that he is coming with a lamp.

Régérégéché, régérégéché;

He is carrying an execution sword, that he is coming with an execution sword.

Régérégéché, régérégéché;

Ògá is coming, he is coming there.

Régérégéché, régérégéché;

Ògá reached there, [and] Ògá turned into an English [i.e. metal or ceramic] cup.

He is carrying a lamp, that he is coming with a lamp.

He is carrying an execution sword, that he is coming with an execution sword.

He said to his spouse, “Who again owns this cup?”

She said, “Didn’t you see it [before]?” that her father brought it for her.

That it was her father who brought it for her!

He said to her, “OK” and “Very well!”

He went back [to his house].

Ògá succeeds on his third attempt, by casting his own spell

Ògá entered the house.

Ògá picked up his lamp and went through all the chambers.

Ògá saw [the] cup.

He said, “Who is this?” to see.

He said to his spouse, “Who again owns this cup?”

She said, “Didn’t you see it [before]?” that her father brought it for her.

That it was her father who brought it for her!

He said, “OK” and “Very well!”

Ògá went back [to his house].

Ògá entered the house.

Ògá said, “Is this how you are doing this thing?”  “Is that the way these women tell lies?”

He placed it on its side.

He said, “May the spouse, may they sleep on [one] side, the [one] side that the knife sleeps!”

So he got ready.

He started going, the parrot reached there.

The parrot took and put it [thus]:

Ògá, spouse of Mélú;

Régérégéché, régérégéché;

Ògá, spouse of Mélú;

Régérégéché, régérégéché;

He is carrying a lamp, that he is coming with a lamp.
He is carrying an execution sword, that he is coming with an execution sword.

Alas! When Œgôs was reaching where they were, the parrot used its claw to scratch at and and [but] in vain!

It took its claw, it took it and scratched welts in them, in vain!

When Œgôs reached where it was, the parrot went into hiding.

So Œgôs reached there.

When he reached there, Œjurûhen and Môlû were laying down together.

He said “Ahah!”

He lifted the execution sword high.

He said that he should have cut [his] spouse.

He said [he would] not cut [his] spouse, so that she can use her mouth to tell the population of Benin what she was doing inside his house, that is Œgôs’s.

So he cut that man.

When he had cut him, he called the servants in his house, he told them to come.

His servants came out.

He said to them, carry his head and put it in his [i.e. Œgôs’s] shrine-house.

They carried the head of that man, they carried [it] and put it in the shrine house.

So they carried his corpse and dropped it in the tank.

The parrot was still looking at them.

When the finished doing [it], all of them left.

Môlû’s revenge

Œgôs apô, éfekhu.

Aô! Ô stîvô. Ùy sau rô élu uôsô.

Ôgué si a. “Éhî ôhî uran?”

Nî Òjôs a wôkôs Òjûrûhen.

Ôsi a “ëhô Amîn ô mé ê?”

Ôsû a nô e ðó sô ðó hû ðó sô chô Â!44

Ô sô Mûn êni savo ê kù ðó ðó șe șe ñê ðû êkù ñê ño uó zû ê e ñôgôkô.

ô. “ışâ!”

Ô sô ôsô. Ô sô a. “Ôsô!” Ùy ñêm-me têw ñêdê ðô.

Ô sô a ñêdê ðô wôkô ñôkô ren ðô kù tû. Ùme qû ñê.

Ya ahûwe.

Ôgué eferi bereiê.

Ôgué aâla.

Ôgué êbûkô ñôkô renê.

Ô sô a. “Sî mûn ô fôkôfôkô ìbûkô kàì!”

An adversative construction, literally: “Œgôs killed that dog of mine dog on me!” This whole song is in Ògué.

The narrator says Òjûrûhen here, although Môlû is clear from the next sentence.
When left, Ògùkò woke up. Alas! When she woke up, she alone was on the sleeping platform. The parrot said to her, "Is it not you that was sleeping?"

That had killed. She said to it, "Is it so? How did he do it?"

It said to her that he cut him, that he said to the boys of his household to carry his head and put it in the shrine house, that he told them to carry his corpse and put it in the domestic tank. She said, "OK!"

She said to the parrot, she said to it, "Quick!" It was to go to the compound of her father. She said to it, say to her father to bring a male dog for her, in the middle of the night. It was off.

The parrot flew straight. The parrot came back. The parrot brought a male dog.

He said to her, "Say to two young men to come!"

The two young men came in the night. They prepared the sleeping platform in Melù’s place, they cut it and split it open. They cut and broke the sleeping platform in the place, they cut off that dog [at] the neck, and carried the head of the dog and put it in the shrine house.

They brought the human head that was there, and put it into that grave. They carried the dog’s corpse and put it in the domestic tank.

They brought the human corpse that was there, [and] they put it on that bed, where she had broken inside the clay bed.

Just as she was doing that, the cock crowed.

When the cock crowed, so Melù started to take and put it [thus]:

Ògùkò killed that dog of mine!
He killed that dog of mine!
Ògùkò killed that dog of mine!
He killed that dog of mine!

47 This line is the formulaic conclusion, to which the listeners respond Òjì ò! ‘Welcome!’; cf. §4.1.4. In another telling, Òjì ò! adds the moral Òjì ò! a gbogbo: ‘Woman is greater than man.’
It was the first person to come, was Tortoise.
He said he wanted [to know] what went on in the world.
When he wanted what went on in the world, he went to collect intelligence in his hand.
When he collected intelligence in his hand, that is Tortoise, took it and headed home, one [bit] fell out.
Then someone on the top of a palm tree called out to him: 50
"Tortoise, do you want that intelligence should be your own and nobody else's?"
He said to him, "Yes."
He said to him, "When you find a leaf for it, wrap it up!"
Tortoise said, "Oh yeah? You say some living person is smarter that me? You say someone smarter than me exists?"
He went back and collected that intelligence in a clay dish and threw it in the water.
[Therefore] a newborn baby, he has intelligence, [also] a big person, he has intelligence.
It is Tortoise who collected intelligence and threw it in the water, water that knowledge pervades [i.e. now, as a result].
When he had done it, in the water, when he had done it, that said [i.e. showed, caused] that people do not take instructions.
If it was not for Tortoise throwing it in the water, intelligence would not be in the heart [= thoughts] of everyone, no matter who, like it is in the head.
It is Tortoise who gave birth to it [= brought it about].
In the version of the story, Thomas (1913 vol. 3: 78) has 

"This is because they collected in the fields."

An example of the adversative (antibenefactive), where the grammatical possessor of the food (3sg) is distinct from the antibeneficiary (1sg). In most examples cited in the literature on grammatical relations, these two roles are coreferent (e.g. "who would eat my food on me?"); but the text at hand shows that such an analysis does not hold necessarily, i.e. the antibeneficiary is not just a species of "possessor raising".

In the 1913 vol. 3: 79, which is probably a "calabash leaf that they collected in the fields."
This woman got up and bought a slave, went and kept him/her, and they were calling it that.

[It said,] “If you give me anything at all [to do], it is not good, if you assign me any chore!

She said to it, “You won’t go [near]!”

i.e. When she started heading home, it said to her that it would not go near fire [that fire would pierce it].

And she agreed. They picked up [the tools and] they worked, working, working, working, [until] the woman surprised this one which [then] slithered out, it fell down and was a calabash.

When she caught this one, it [fell and] was a calabash.

When she caught that one, it [fell and] was a calabash.

When she caught another one, it [fell and] was a calabash.

When she continued catching that one, she caught one which she seized, seized it on the stomach. It shouted to her, “Aaaah, my stomach!  Aaaah, my stomach!

When she caught this one, it [fell and] was a calabash.

When she caught that one, it [fell and] was a calabash.

When she caught another one, it [fell and] was a calabash.

When she continued catching that one, she caught one which she seized, seized it on the stomach. It shouted to her, “Aaaah, my stomach!  Aaaah, my stomach!

Little-child-that-knows-its-mother.  Don’t call me anything else!”

And she agreed. When she started heading home, it said to her that it would not go near fire [i.e. to cook], that fire would pierce it.

She said to it, “You won’t go [near]!”

[It said,] “If you give me anything at all [to do], it is not good, if you assign me any chore!

That the appellation that the people of the village will call me is

Little-child-that-knows-its-mother, or -father.  That’s what they’ll be calling me.” When she finished telling him/her, [and] she [i.e. the woman] was at the farm,

if you get some machetes, put them in her [i.e. your] farm basket, count the number of people, seven hoes, seven machetes, collect them and go, and those people that are eating your food on you, will turn into your people.”

When she would reach it [i.e. the farm], collect seven machetes and set them out [on the ground], collect seven hoes and set them out, she would stay working. Those still eating the food would come to eat it.

He [i.e. the diviner] said to her that “It is that one you catch that will be your child.

The one you don’t catch, won’t be your child.”

They ate the food, finished eating it, reached [the time that] was departure, one [of them] said, “It is really not right that we do not help [her], [by] Spirit and Destiny!  Those still eating the food would come to eat it.

i.e. When she finished telling him/her, [and] she [i.e. the woman] was at the farm,
The people at home called me Little-child-that-knows-its-mother.
If she doesn’t agree to smash it, “You stay there in the doorway of the house, you stand still.”
If she doesn’t smash it with her foot, if she is too weak to smash the gourd,
You ask the [name of the] person who first entered the house [i.e. who was previously born]
that they don’t want to tell you.
It is their prohibited action.56
If you don’t put down a big empty gourd, they won’t [be allowed to] enter the house.
That is what caused it to be, [even] if you have done everything and been well trained at home,
[and nevertheless] if you don’t procreate a child,
[and] if you don’t give birth to a child,
and yet you do everything to plant gourds in the farm, that they [will] become your child.
That is also why, when women give birth to a child,
It jumped past its father, ran on until it reached the farm to become round and be a gourd,
That-I-collected-at-the-gate-of-the-village-commons!
Gourd-leaf-that-I-collected-at-the-gate-of-the-village-commons!
The people in the village commons called me Little-child-that-knows-its-mother!
The people at home called me Little-child-that-knows-its-mother!
The door, if you don’t salute [i.e. acknowledge] it, you can’t go inside the house.
That’s how [far] this one goes.

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Conventional spellings of names are given in brackets; other words are corrected without noting the misspelling in the source (I apologize for errors.) Words whose pronunciation I don’t know appear in bracketed form only. Some authors (e.g. Ṣẹ̀rùnje) appear in both sections, ethnographic/general and linguistic. Alphabetization ignores diacritics: Ṣẹ̀rùnje/Seune.

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56I.e. a condition which is virtually impossible to satisfy. Cf. Ògàbó’s proverbial close to the story Ògàbó-ìrú ni òjú àwọn Òjú-ini. ‘The pelican and the vulture’, p. 335f. above.
57I.e. to go inside, since childbirth takes place outside in the woman’s domestic compound.
58I.e. a condition which is virtually impossible to satisfy. Cf. Ògàbó’s proverbial close to the story Ògàbó-ìrú ni òjú àwọn Òjú-ini. ‘The pelican and the vulture’, p. 335f. above.
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JolanPanNigerian typeface and PanNigerian keyboard for the Macintosh were created in 1987 by Edward Ogonosiyi and Victor Manfredi, as part of a comprehensive approach by the Federal Ministry of Education, Lagos, to the storage and production of texts in a Nigerian language medium. PanNigerian fonts support the full range of text technologies, including manual typewriters, handset letterpress, linotype, analog photocomposition, and digital output laserfaces. A PanNigerian font is one in which all the characters found in the orthographies of the major Nigerian languages, including especially Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba, with two further requirements. The diacritics, above and below the letter, must be fully legible in all combinations, and the keyboard production of all symbols must be convenient. Most phototypesetting systems do not accommodate tone marks on upper-case letters, and it is usually difficult to obtain exact placement of the tone mark or subdot on characters of all different widths. The PanNigerian system addresses these two problems by reducing the relative height of upper-case letters, and by individually defining each combination of a tone mark and/or subdot with a Roman letter. To these specifications, Hermann Zapf redrew the original PanNigerian design on the base of Impressum, a modern Bauer letterpress font which was provided for this purpose by Wolfgang Hartmann, Fundación Tipográfica Neuville, Travesera de Gracia 183, 08012 Barcelona, Spain. JolanPanNigerian is the experimental Macintosh version of PanNigerian, developed for the Journal of the Linguistic Association of Nigeria, Palatino is the Adobe/Macintosh version of Hermann Zapf’s original Stempel Palatino. JolanPanNigerian is defined in bitmap as well as outline forms using Fontastic/Fontographer software (Altsys Corp., 269 W. Benner RD, Richardson, TX 75080, 214-486-2060). JolanPanNigerian characters are conveniently accessed, with a minimum of keystrokes and employing straightforward key combinations, via the Macintosh keyboard customizer (Logiciel Avenue 2162 boul. Charest Ouest, Sainte-Per for Canada G1N 2G3)

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HARVARD UNIVERSITY
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

THESIS ACCEPTANCE CERTIFICATE
(To be placed in Original Copy)

The undersigned, appointed by the
Division
Department
Committee Linguistics and Social Anthropology
have examined a thesis entitled
Abọ and ịgbọ: ịgbo linguistic consciousness, its origins and limits
presented by Victor Manfredi

candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and hereby certify that it is worthy of acceptance.

Date 24 May 1991

Signature
Typed name S. J. Tambiah (chair)

Typed name Susumu Kuno

Typed name Sally Falk Moore

Typed name Kenneth Hale

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May 16, 1991

The Registrar
Harvard University
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Holyoke Center, Eighth Floor

Re: Victor Manfredi
Linguistics and Social Anthropology - Ad Hoc

This is to inform you that Victor Manfredi has fulfilled all requirements for a Ph.D. in Anthropology. I am sending you a letter from Professor Kuno stating the same for Linguistics.

Yours sincerely,

Stanley J. Tambiah
Professor of Anthropology

enclosure
xc: Victor Manfredi
SJT/rjg

May 7, 1991

Professor Stanley J. Tambiah
Department of Anthropology
William James Hall 420

Dear Professor Tambiah

This is to let you know that Victor Manfredi has fulfilled all the requirements for a Ph.D. in Linguistics.

Sincerely yours,

Susumu Kuno
Professor of Linguistics

cc: Prof. Calvert Watkins, Chairman
Linguistics Department
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>NOT recommended</th>
<th>RECOMMENDED</th>
<th>Special requirements to be met, if any</th>
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<tr>
<td>Manfredi, Victor</td>
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The candidate has fulfilled all requirements on the side of:
- [Signature of the advisor(s)]
- [Name(s) of other relevant persons]
- [Affiliation(s)]

Department, Division, or Committee of
Linguistics & Social Anthropology - Ad Hoc

Chairman

Remarks

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(Signature)

Date: April 22, 1991