Talking about Antisemitism in France Before and After Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher

KIMBERLY A. ARKIN
Boston University, Boston, MA, USA
E-mail: karkin@bu.edu

Abstract This article explores tensions in French Jewish discourses about antisemitism in the post-2000 period. Drawing on commentary from French Jewish intellectuals, national Jewish organizations, and the French Jewish press from the mid-2000s until after the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks, I note a complex relationship between change and continuity in discursive characterizations of French antisemitism. While empirical manifestations of antisemitism were notably transformed by the Toulouse attacks of 2012, much French Jewish discourse insisted on continuity from the early 2000s onward. At the same time, Jewish narrative practices shifted rather dramatically. In a political context where Israel was often depicted as part of a history of violent settler colonialism, early 2000s Jewish discourse divorced French antisemitism from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and (post)colonial racism in France. After 2012, some Jewish commentators linked Israel to French antisemitism by likening terrorism in Israel with Islamic antisemitism in France. These disjunctures between narratives and empirical violence suggest that the “structures of feeling” behind Jewish reactions to contemporary antisemitism cannot be reduced to empirical questions about safety and security. Social scientists thus need to move beyond an empirical analysis of antisemitism itself and attend to the cultural and affective work Jewish discourses about antisemitism do in any particular moment.

Keywords Antisemitism · France · Israel · Colonialism · Belonging

When I did ethnographic research with young, predominantly North African–origin Parisian Jews in the mid-2000s, I found something that few historians or social scientists were expecting. In contrast to previous generations of French Jews, many of the young people I got to know saw Frenchness and Jewishness as mutually exclusive categories of belonging. In fact, calling someone français in certain French Jewish milieus had replaced the use of the word goy, suggesting that Frenchness increasingly indexed an ethnoreligious as well as national content for young Jews. As I show in my book Rhinestones, Religion, and the Republic: Fashioning Jewishness in France,1 this sense that Frenchness and Jewishness were no longer cumulative identities had quite a bit to do with the way some French Jews—most particularly those

from North Africa, rather than longer-established Ashkenazim—experienced and understood rising French antisemitism, French politics vis-à-vis Israel, and their own diasporic Israeli identities. For many North African Jews, the wider French public’s inability to understand Israel and European Jews’ linked vulnerabilities in connection with rising “Arab” or “Muslim” antisemitism signaled the incommensurable difference between French Jews and “the French.” In some ways, Israel divided Jews from Frenchness.

For some French Jewish elites committed to maintaining the storied link between Jews and France, this created a difficult situation. The early 2000s marked the beginning of what many French political pundits have called the le Penisation des esprits, a term that uses the last name of the Far Right Front National’s leaders (father and daughter Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen) to signal the colonization of mainstream politics by hard Right understandings of national identity, immigration, and even secularism. At the time, the French government was working to control public expressions of religion—banning the veil and the kippah from public schools; organizing a national body to officially represent Muslims—while calling for public debates about national identity and belonging. Although Muslims were clearly more at risk of being “denationalized” in this context, many French Jewish elites also found themselves forced to insist that Jewish Frenchness was unproblematic, particularly in contrast to Muslim foreignness. The disconnect that many young North African French Jews and their parents felt from France over the linked issues of antisemitism and Israel threatened this attempt to frame Jewish identity and Frenchness as a powerful foil for young Muslim alterity.

In this article, I explore some of the conflicting Jewish discourses about Israel and French antisemitism that have emerged in the shadows cast by this threat of denationalization. I look at discourses from French Jewish intellectuals, national Jewish organizations, and the Jewish press from the mid-2000s until after the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks. Antisemitism changed quite dramatically over the course of this period, most particularly after the murderous 2012 attacks against a Jewish school in Toulouse. Many Jewish elites denied these empirical changes while in fact shifting the way they talked about antisemitism. In the early 2000s, many Jewish accounts of French antisemitism worked (in often internally contradictory ways) to disconnect French antisemitism from the conflict in

---

2 For a clear statement of this fear of “denationalization,” see Shmuel Trigano, La démission de la République: Juifs et musulmans en France (Paris, 2003).
3 Often parents claimed to have been made “aware” of the difficulties of French Jewishness through their children’s experiences and stories. Arkin, Rhinestones, Religion, and the Republic.
4 Following anthropological conventions, only public figures are identified in this article. All other names are pseudonyms.
Israel/Palestine. After 2012—as Islamist attacks augmented theft-driven, street-corner antisemitism—some accounts of antisemitism made Israel the key to understanding antisemitic violence.

Why this shift in discourse and the simultaneous denial of its empirical roots? Why insist that everything had remained the same and yet tell a somewhat different story about what was happening? And what, if anything, might tracing out the relationship between discourse about and empirical manifestations of antisemitism teach those of us who are writing and thinking about contemporary antisemitism? I will argue that in a political context where Israel is often publicly read (and denounced) as a continuation of failed and violent settler colonialism—notably as instantiated in Algeria—Jewish accounts of antisemitism in the early 2000s often worked very hard to divorce French antisemitism from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and (post)colonial racism in France. After 2012, some Jewish commentators saw a way of divorcing Israel from such a colonial reading, notably by linking Israel’s struggle against terrorism, on the one hand, and French Jews’ struggles with antisemitism, on the other, to a wider civilizational battle against Islam. At the same time, the discursive denial that anything about the empirical reality of antisemitism had changed helped buttress the claim that attacks against Jews—whether in France or Israel—had never been a “weapon of the weak,” but rather the tactic of a powerful and perverse enemy. While this new discursive approach seemed to resolve some of the issues associated with Jewish belonging in contemporary France, it created others—particularly for North African Jews whose understandings of Muslim-Jewish relations were grounded in the experience or memory of colonial relations in North Africa. As I will suggest in the conclusion, discursive wrangling over antisemitism may thus be as much about complex affective negotiations of belonging as about the “facts” of antisemitism themselves. And this may be an important lesson for social scientists interested in antisemitism.

**Antisemitism in the Early 2000s**

The beginning of the Second Palestinian Intifada in the early 2000s brought a dramatic increase in antisemitic incidents and Jewish fear of antisemitism to France. Between 1999 and 2004, documented acts of antisemitism increased tenfold, from about one hundred acts in 1999 to almost one thousand in 2004. The actual incidents labeled as antisemitic were diverse. During this

---


period, Jewish cemeteries were vandalized and Jewish institutions attacked; antisemitic graffiti appeared on walls, in elevators, and on synagogues; wallets and cellphones were stolen as assailants verbally insulted victims; and there was also physical violence, including the horrific kidnapping, torture, and murder of Ilan Halimi in January 2006.7

Serious empirical work on this new post-2000s antisemitism suggested that motivations for these various incidents were complex and sometimes divergent.8 Traditional Far Right stereotypes and grievances continued to inspire some anti-Jewish acts. At the same time, some second- and third-generation North African (and, to a lesser extent, sub-Saharan African) Muslims expressed their economic and social resentments through antisemitism, particularly against Jewish youth of North African origin. For example, in the mid-2000s, a high school student left her observant Jewish day school in a working-class Parisian suburb for lunch. She was dressed in recognizably “Jewish” fashion,9 and she told a school administrator and me that while she was waiting for the bus to return to school, two twenty-year-olds accosted her, asked her for money, and then demanded her credit cards. When she said that she did not have credit cards, they slapped her and called her a sale juive (dirty Jew). Her story was hardly unique. I heard second hand or read about scores of such incidents in the early 2000s.10 These kinds of encounters suggested that North African Jewish children, who often hailed from upwardly mobile families but lived in very diverse working-class neighborhoods, were seen as proximate targets for other immigrant-origin youth living in the same neighborhoods. North African Jewish youth were both similar to and different from other immigrant-origin youth because of their relative class and social mobility; young Jews therefore symbolized both the promise of French republican assimilation and its impossibility for other kinds of immigrants, notably Muslims.11 On top of these proximate social and economic grievances, the violent ethnicization of both Jews and Muslims through the Israeli-Palestinian conflict led some adolescents and young adults to lash out

---

10Arkin, Rhinestones, Religion, and the Republic.
against Jews as Israelis (and even some young Jews to lash out against Muslims as Palestinians).12

But for many French Jews, such accounts of the complexity and non-Islamic nature of post-2000s antisemitism were at best incomplete and misleading, at worst dangerous. Frustrated by the French government’s initial refusal to address or even talk about antisemitism,13 many French Jews and some French intellectuals (both Jewish and non-Jewish) quickly developed an alternative narrative about early 2000s antisemitism. This narrative distinguished it from older French variants—it was referred to as the “new antisemitism”14—and linked it to a supposedly old and global story of Muslim hatred for Jews.15 In this narrative, Israel and Israeli politics served as an excuse for Muslim antisemitism, a way of masking racialized hatred through a discourse of anti-Zionism. As a result, it was incorrect to argue that the post-2000 rise in antisemitism was “caused” by the conflict in Israel-Palestine, let alone by socioeconomic conditions and exclusions in France. Instead, in this discourse, violent Muslim reactivity to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a symptom of a deeper reality, notably Muslim intolerance of and/or hatred for Jews, as well as Arab incompatibility with Western democracy.16 Here I would like to provide just a few examples of this kind of reasoning, from dramatically different social locations. In 2004, while standing outside his sons’

12 Again, just one example among many: Sarah, a high school student in an observant Parisian Jewish school, told me in the spring of 2004 that when “Arabs see Jews, they immediately think the Jew is killing little Palestinian children.” A friend of Sarah’s, who was listening to our conversation, added her own anecdote, noting that a man had come up to her in a public place and asked if she was Jewish, probably because she was wearing a Jewish star. When she said yes, the man asked her to tell her “brothers in Israel to stop killing Palestinians.”


16 See further Pierre-André Taguieff, La nouvelle judéophobie (Paris, 2002).
Jewish day school on the periphery of Paris, an unemployed, Moroccan-born father explained to me that what had happened between Jews and Muslims in colonial and postcolonial Morocco was happening again in France. “Jews and Muslims have never gotten along, for obvious reasons,” he explained. For this man, not only does an “Arab” see a Zionist every time he looks at a Jew, but the Qu’ran encourages Muslims to “hate Jews. . . . In Morocco you couldn’t wear a kippah in the street because they would come after you with stones; they’ve just restarted the whole thing in France.” The French Jewish philosopher Shmuel Trigano’s extensive commentary on the “new” antisemitism is similar, but written with greater tact and sophistication. Trigano, an Algerian-born Jewish intellectual who issued some of the first calls to denounce public silence around post-2000 antisemitism, wrote in 2002 that the rise in antisemitism in France was not tied to an ethnicized conflict between two “communities” with conflicting foreign allegiances. Instead, it was the result of a specific religious and political ideology: “Viewed in these terms, a serious problem arises, notably knowing where Islam ends and Islamism starts. We personally hope that this is a real distinction. . . . Courageous interventions like those of the Grand Mosque’s rector Dalil Boubakeur help immensely. We hope he is articulating the perspective of French Islam, despite the fact that what happens in schools, on the radio, and on the internet . . . leaves us fearful that anti-Judaism and antisemitism are widely shared in Muslim opinion.” For Trigano, this proximity between Islam and anti-Judaism, plus the seemingly indiscriminate attacks on Jews or people who “look Jewish” in France, seemed to be a sign “of the disturbingly endemic character of this antisemitism, which has come from a universe that has remained foreign to fifty years of changes in Europe and that is redolent with archaic nineteenth-century images.” Like the father cited above, and despite his elaborate rhetorical hedging, Trigano clearly thinks of Islam as lending itself to violent Islamism; he also assumes that Islam is inherently non-Western, nonmodern, and a major vehicle for Jewish hatred. By 2015, Trigano’s language

19 It is also noteworthy that around this same time, some revisionist histories about the Second World War in the Middle East began to appear in French. I have written more extensively about this elsewhere; see Kimberly Arkin, “Temporality, Peoplehood, and Politics: Holocaust Talk in 21st Century France,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 60, no. 4, forthcoming. Suffice it to note that sometimes these accounts suggest that if the Allies had not landed in Tunisia when they did, the Arab populations of North Africa would have helped the Nazi occupiers murder Jews en masse, just as Eastern European populations had helped murder Ashkenazim. See also Georges Bensoussan, Juifs en pays Arabes, Le grand déracinement, 1850–1975 (Paris, 2012); Claude Nataf, ed., Les juifs de Tunisie sous le joug nazi (Paris, 2012).
had become less careful. Reflecting on the entire post-2000s history of antisemitism in France, he wrote: “Behind the pretext of Palestine, the religious motivations of the anti-Jewish violence remain misunderstood. It would cost French elites too much doctrinal and psychological effort to accept this fact, after such a long period of denial, for it overturns their erroneous prism of interpretation. The thesis that France faces an ‘imported conflict’ still reigns today—and it remains as false now as it was 14 years ago at the time of the Second Intifada. We are in the same place.”

In some ways, this attempt to disassociate Israel from mid-2000s antisemitism in France “renationalized” Jews. Understanding antisemitism as an intrinsically Muslim problem suggested that Jews were French in ways foreclosed to Muslims. This version of the story refused the conflation of Jews with Israelis, insisting instead that if Jews were being attacked as Jews it was in fact the French Republic and its secular, nonethnicized vision of the nation as a voluntary political community that was the real target. Antisemitism thus functioned as the proverbial canary in the coal mine, indicating when the noxious gases of alternative political ideologies like ethnonationalism or Islamism threatened the race-blind, assimilationist Republic. This is clear in the slogans chanted by members of the UEJF (Union des étudiants juifs de France) during a 2004 demonstration against antisemitism: “Synagogues brûlées, République en danger” (Burned synagogues mean the Republic is in danger) and “Juifs agressés, République en danger” (An attack on Jews is an attack on the Republic). Or, as public intellectual Alain Finkielkraut noted, “hatred of the French is spreading just like hatred of the Jews, and is becoming indistinguishable.” In its most general form, this argument saw the targeting of Jews as the forerunner to and sign of a general war against “the West” and its democratic and civilizational values.

In addition, disassociating antisemitism from Israel helped deflect attention from the political divide between many French Jews and the wider French public. As Michel Feher has noted, in the wider French public and French political spheres, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often understood through a colonial framework. This framework is heavily influenced both

---

21 Alain Finkielkraut, quoted in “Finkielkraut, Kouchner, Taguieff, Ghaleb Bencheikh signent un appel contre les ‘ratonnades anti-blancs,’” Agence France Presse (website), March 25, 2005. See also Georges Bensoussan’s work under the pseudonym Emmanuel Brenner, which makes a similar point about the proximity between anti-French and anti-Jewish racism. Brenner, *France, prends garde de perdre ton âme*, pt. 1.
by what Todd Shepard has called “the invention of decolonization” and by Marxist approaches to social relations. From this perspective, Israel is seen as not having learned the lesson of the French Algerian war. Instead, in Israel-Palestine, an invader population continues to dominate, oppress, and control an autochthonous regional majority. This is a very common position in France, exemplified by everything from street protests to casual conversation, particularly although not exclusively among those who identify with the political Left. For example, in 2016 when a retired manual laborer who finished his career as a union organizer overheard that I worked on Jews in France, he immediately spluttered: “One day they are going to have to learn to stop colonizing Palestine.”

This particular framework has two effects on Jews. First, it highlights one of the very few contemporary political issues where “Arab Muslim” populations are more closely aligned with mainstream French politics and sensibilities than are Jews. If Jewish discourses about “Muslim” antisemitism highlight the cultural alterity of French Muslims, understanding Israel through a colonial framework emphasizes the political alterity of French Jews. In a sense, then, a colonial reading of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also denationalizes French Jews, highlighting their inability to participate in what is otherwise a very wide-ranging political consensus.

Second, a colonial reading of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has an impact on the way power relations between French Jews and Muslims are understood. Many French Jews increasingly see themselves as an isolated minority threatened by “Arab Muslims,” both in France and on a more global scale. In the early 2000s, when the mainstream press emphasized Israel’s disproportionate power and therefore responsibility vis-à-vis the Palestinians, many French Jews saw only Israel’s fragility. A Jewish school that I worked in during the early 2000s had a poster in the lunchroom that encapsulated this worldview. On a map Israel was represented as a handful of blue soldiers wearing Jewish stars surrounded by a sea of green soldiers wearing Islamic crescents. The map made no distinction between, for example, Turkey, a non-Arab country with, at the time, perfectly cordial diplomatic relations with Israel, and Syria, a country against which Israel was periodically in a violent proxy war. As a result, the map figured the Israeli-Palestinian conflict not as a territorial or even a political war between Israelis and Palestinians, or Israelis and “Arabs,” but rather as a religious war between a tiny Jewish population

and a vast, multinational Muslim world. Other variants of this imaginary pitted Arabs, a designation that in France refers almost interchangeably to an ethnogeographical and religious identity, against Jews and Israelis. When the pro-Israel foreign-affairs specialist Frédéric Encel came to speak in a Parisian Jewish day school about Israel-Palestine, he gently mocked his audience for the way they linked geopolitics to “Arabness.” He opened by telling them that he already “knew” what they thought about the conflict:

There are 300 million Arabs in the world [willing to fight Israel.] ... First, no no, ... there are fewer. It’s not true. There are 280 million Arabs. ... And then, I don’t see why all Arabs would be viscerally concerned with the [Israeli-Palestinian] problem, notably our friends the Mauritanians [who vote for Israel at the United Nations]. But [you say], around Israel there is this mass, this mass ... Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Chad. ... Oh but wait, they are not around Israel. It doesn’t make any sense to include them in this sort of power relation. ... To say that in [19]73 Morocco officially went to war with Israel, what did they do?²⁵

In other words, both the map and Encel pointed in different ways to a widespread, visceral sense among many Jews that Israel and Jews more generally were going to be devoured by (interchangeably) antisemitic and anti-Israeli Arab Muslim hordes.

In contrast to this sense of Jewish endangerment, a colonial reading of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict facilitates a postcolonial reading of the relative status of Jews and Muslims in France, one that reverses the power relations revealed by both the map and Encel’s comments. Most of the contemporary French Jewish population either hails from, or are direct descendants of someone who hails from, North Africa. During the colonial period, French colonial policies and metropolitan Jewish organizations encouraged the Frenchification and upward mobility of many—although certainly not all—North African Jews.²⁶ In addition, in the years following decolonization, legal status and behavioral norms acquired in the colonies, as well as

²⁵Frédéric Encel, public talk, Sarcelles, June 8, 2004, recorded by the author.
the concerted effort of metropolitan Jewish organizations, facilitated the social integration and upward mobility of North African Jews who emigrated to the metropole. As a result, although the social conditions of French Jews are as diverse as the population itself, Jews overall exceed French population averages in measures like general education level and white-collar employment. In contrast, similar indicators among Muslims from North Africa paint a portrait of a population that dramatically trails French averages in education level, income, and rates of employment. In other words, reading contemporary French antisemitism through a postcolonial lens suggests that it is a “weapon of the weak,” an attempt on the part of a fragile and excluded population to avenge itself against the practices of the French state and a group imagined as unfairly benefiting from those practices. And although this antisemitism may have significant consequences for a small number of individuals, it cannot be seen as threatening the relatively privileged social and political standing of French Jews.

For many French Jews, such a point of view encapsulates the incommensurability between “French” and “Jewish” sensibilities. As a result, some French discourses work to decouple discussions of Israel and antisemitism from conversations about political and social domination. Behind closed doors some Jewish intellectuals made fun of their Jewish audiences in the mid-2000s for their “irrational” ideas about both French Jewish and Israeli fragility, insisting entre nous (among ourselves) that it was far better to be Jewish than to be Muslim in France. In addition, as we can hear in Encel’s exhortation, there was an attempt to convince the Jewish public that Israel was actually in a position of power in the region. But these comments were always made behind closed doors and seemed to provoke incredulity among Jewish audiences. As one shocked community-center participant noted in response to a pedagogical attempt to talk her out of her sense of existential crisis: “They [unclear antecedent] are going to eat us.” Often, rather than abandoning their sense that Jews were an embattled and threatened population, many well-educated French Jews described simply turning away from

30 Scott, Weapons of the Weak.
31 Mandel, Muslims and Jews in France.
mainstream media sources, cancelling newspaper subscriptions, relying on Jewish internet sources, and refusing (so they said) even to try to talk politics with French non-Jews. Jews therefore found the content of a leaked policy letter from Socialist Party advisor Pascale Boniface to sitting Prime Minister Lionel Jospin both scandalous and unsurprising; the letter, which never became the foundation of a formal policy, seemed to urge the Socialist Party to favor the Palestinian cause because there were more Muslims than Jews in France.33

This suggests that in the mid-2000s, Jews were increasingly telling a story about the experiential disconnect between their Jewishness and their Frenchness that was most visible, if not entirely rooted, in their sense that “the French” either could not or would not understand the real relations of domination that marginalized and endangered both French Jews and Israel—relations of domination that were often described in stark, Holocaust-like terms. And this story was not altered in the slightest by increased government attention to antisemitism by the mid-2000s. The head of youth programming at the Fonds Social Juif Unifié, an Algerian-born Jew with a very firm and deep commitment to French republicanism, told me in February 2005:

I’ve had the sentiment myself [of not being able to be both Jewish and French]. . . . It’s true that there are lots of things that have changed [for the better] in relation to anti-Judaism with this government [which had changed from Jospin to Center Right Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin]. . . . I’ve also had the sentiment, at the beginning of the antisemitic acts and over the course of two years, when we heard the media, the people in government, etc. etc., talk. When we heard the minister of the interior say that nothing was happening, nothing happened, when we felt the antisemitic attacks, the attacks in the street, etc. It’s not surprising to say, and I tell you once again that I had this impression, ultimately I said to myself, it’s that they don’t want Jews in France. In the raw state, I don’t know if you were in France at the time, you had to see what happened. It was hundreds of acts a day in the metro etc. that were never on the front page of newspapers. We can say to ourselves when it happens to that point that ultimately it’s a country that doesn’t want its Jews. If they don’t want me, why would I attach myself to a French identity? . . . It’s not the sentiment that was traditionally the sentiment of the Jewish community in France, which once again is a community that is very integrated.34

In other words, long after the government began denouncing antisemitic attacks (even in cases where they turned out to be hoaxes), many of my French Jewish informants thought both politicians and the wider public were incapable of hearing or understanding Jewish concerns about either Israel or Muslims.

**Antisemitism and Terrorism Post-2012**

Publicly, Jewish writers and intellectuals figured the attacks against the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* and the kosher market Hyper Cacher in January 2015—as well as the attacks that followed in Paris in November 2015 and in Nice in July 2016—as a particularly deadly continuation and confirmation of earlier trends. I would like to suggest, however, that they are part of a different kind of antisemitism, one that first showed its colors in 2012 in France. As I have already suggested, French Jewish discourses about antisemitism do not emphasize the discontinuity between antisemitism in the early 2000s and in the second decade of the new millennium. Quite the opposite. The 2006 torture and murder of Ilan Halimi by the “Barbarian Gang” is often cited as proof that there is in fact no real difference between antisemitism motivated by economic resentments and murderous, Islamically inspired anti-Jewishness. Halimi—a young Jewish cell phone salesman of North African origin—was kidnapped, held for ransom, and tortured by a Muslim man of Ivorian origin (Youssouf Fofana) and a large group of accomplices for twenty-four days. Many of Fofana’s accomplices were identified as “Muslim.” When it became clear to Fofana that no ransom would be forthcoming, Halimi was left by the side of the road to die. This is a horrendously brutal and very obviously antisemitic story. But it is unclear that

---

35I am thinking here of the infamous case of the RER D, one of the regional railway lines that connects the often working-class and troubled neighborhoods around Paris to the center of the city. In 2004, a young woman identified only as Marie L. told police officers that she and her baby had been showered with antisemitic insults, physically assaulted, and robbed by six “Maghrebi” men while she was riding a regional train. In her account, the other passengers on the train watched these men harm her and her baby without lifting a finger to help. The story, which turned out to be completely false, provoked national outrage. It also mobilized many of the tropes associated with the “new” antisemitism: Muslim aggressors, pecuniary motives, and a completely indifferent French public. Solenn de Royer, “La fausse agression du RER D,” *La Croix*, July 14, 2004.


37I put “Muslim” in scare quotes here because it is unclear whether this means that they were second- or third-generation immigrants from Muslim countries or whether they were practicing Muslims.
radical Islam played a major role in Fofana’s depravity and/or in the vicious inhumanity of his accomplices. Since his arrest and incarceration, Fofana has emphasized his religious attachments. He cried “Allahu Akbar” at the opening of his trial and, according to recent newspaper reports, has become increasingly radicalized in prison.\(^{38}\) But prior to kidnapping Halimi, Fofana had a long history of attempting to kidnap and ransom important or wealthy individuals.\(^{39}\) It is thus not fully clear that Halimi’s murder served either an Islamist or a symbolic function; rather, Fofana seemed to have assumed in classic European antisemitic fashion that Jewishness meant wealth. In keeping with that, he attacked a Jew who worked in a field closely associated with visible and attractive wealth in the France of the mid-2000s; cell phones—as many of my interlocutors told me over and over again—were reputed to be the most frequently stolen items of the period.

In some ways, Fofana was the horrible apotheosis of the often theft-related, youth-on-youth antisemitism that characterized the early 2000s. And while this antisemitism still exists, it has been overshadowed by the growth of a far more spectacular and murderous Islamist variety. The beginning of this shift was signaled by Mohammed Merah’s attacks in Montauban and Toulouse in 2012. Merah claimed affiliation with Al Qaeda and Islamist jihad as a way of justifying lethal attacks against three French soldiers, as well as parents and children at a Jewish school. These attacks had absolutely no pecuniary or pragmatic motive; they were instead viciously symbolic. Both attacks performatively and discursively linked Jews as targets with other institutions and groups seen as antithetical to Islamist interests. For the first time, Jews and republican soldiers (one of whom was Muslim) were seemingly interchangeable targets of Islamist rage.

The same can be said for the subsequent attacks against Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher. Once again, an explicit tie to Islamism and international terror was used as a justification for the attacks. And the terrorists saw an internal logic between attacking an offensive, militantly secular journal that had long been known to insult religious believers of all kinds and an institution that—however diverse its actual clientele and employees—seemed to stand as a public face for Jewishness.\(^{40}\) These attacks, therefore, foregrounded Islamist motivations. In addition, the symbolic links between Jews and various

---

\(^{38}\) Mallevoüe and Jouan, “Ilan Halimi.”


French national institutions (the military, the secular press) were clearly apparent. The November 2015 attacks were in some ways the culmination of this shift. Those attacks, which happened on a Friday night and targeted patrons at restaurants, a concert hall, and even in a sports arena, were probably not designed with Jews (particularly religious Jews) in mind. Instead, in the name of radical Islam, they seemed to target “French society” in its consumerist and pleasure-seeking forms. Jews here were simply a subset of a larger French social and political order.

There is little that directly links the kind of antisemitism young Jews recounted in the early 2000s with the explicitly Islamist attacks I just described. In fact, in the mid-2000s, street-corner antisemitism, such as the violent protests that wracked suburban French neighborhoods for weeks in 2005, may have been more likely to originate with youth estranged from Islam than with those who had close ties to religious practice and/or to mosque communities.41 In other words, a narrative that insists on the continuity between the antisemitism of the early 2000s and the Islamist attacks that started in 2012 may conceal major sociological and political shifts that have occurred with the increasing stigmatization of Islam in France, as well as with the rise of the Islamic State and the failure of the Arab Spring. But insisting discursively on the continuity in the kinds of acts and motivations that count as “antisemitic” does something important. It allows French Jews to argue against colonial and postcolonial readings of antisemitism without jeopardizing Jewish Frenchness. This can be seen most clearly in the ways that new French Jewish discourses emphasize the link between antisemitic attacks and Israel.

As noted above, in the early 2000s, both Jews and non-Jews in France saw Israel as a sign and an agent of the moral disconnect between Jews and the rest of French society. Not only did the Jews I got to know there feel as though Israel divided them from Arabs or Muslims, but they also saw their support for the Jewish state as incomprehensible to the rest of French society. But by the 2010s, shared French and Israeli experiences with Islamic terrorism had become a leitmotif of Jewish press communiqués. These communiqués emphasized two things: first, the identity of Islamic attacks against civilians and soldiers in Israel and those against civilians in places as diverse as France, Iraq, and the United States; and second, Israel’s role as a model of how to deal with Islamic terrorism in a liberal democratic context. A few

examples will illustrate this emphasis. Following the November 13 attacks, Jacques Tarnero, a documentary filmmaker well known in the French Jewish community for his criticisms of French media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, wrote in the French edition of the Huffington Post an article entitled “Eyes Wide Open.” In it, he argues: “As long as the targets were Israelis and then Jews [more generally], people ultimately accepted it as a new reality. A faraway conflict was exporting its ill effects here. . . . Naming this reality . . . facing the “real” seemed too difficult for the prevailing orthodoxy. . . . Since then, things have changed. . . . No war can be won if we cannot indicate whom we are fighting. No enemy can be defeated if we cannot name it. . . . This terrorism is Islamist. It claims its Islamic roots.” In other words, the Islamic roots of antisemitism and terrorism had been hidden as long as the attacks could be associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But once non-Jews were being attacked by the same terrorists and for the same reasons, people’s “eyes had been opened” to the real roots of violence against Israelis and antisemitism in Europe. Similarly, an Israeli army officer writing in the conservative weekly newspaper Actualité Juive after the November 13 attacks asked the French public to stop asking why. “Don’t look for an answer to the question: why France? . . . Israel is also touched by Islamist terrorism, and we know very well that no explanations can legitimate the killing of women, children, and men. Our fight is the same as that in Europe. We know that, but Europeans don’t know it yet.” Again, this suggests that just as French Jews have long identified religiously, ethnically, and politically with Israelis, Europeans will come to see that they too are far closer to Jews (whether European or Israeli) than they ever could be to Muslims (whether European or Palestinian). In July 2016, when Francis Kalifat took over as president of the CRIF (Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France), he gave an interview with Actualité Juive in which he noted: “We have to explain to our compatriots as well as our political leaders that terrorism has no borders. It’s the same terrorism that killed [Hallel] the young [Israeli] adolescent in his bed [in a West Bank settlement] and that killed the two police officers in Magnanville [France]. If it strikes in Paris, Jerusalem, Bagdad, or Istanbul, we should fight terrorism in the same way with the same

42In the mid-2000s, Tarnero made a film entitled Décryptage in which he sought to prove that Muhammed Al-Dura, the Palestinian child supposedly killed by Israeli soldiers and used by the French media as a symbol of Israeli aggression, was in fact still alive.


solidarity.” Just a month earlier, following an attack on a café in Tel Aviv, the CRIF had formally issued a similar communiqué before any news agency had identified the motives of the attackers: “The CRIF is horrified by the attack last night in Tel Aviv. For the CRIF, it is the same fanatical terrorism that attacks all democracies, as well as the signs and values associated with freedom.”

In these accounts, the presentation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is transformed. No longer a political struggle over territory and power that requires retooling how the French understand the (dis)advantage of Israeli Jews, it has been transformed into ground zero of a civilizational conflict that pits the democratic Western world against rising Islamism. In fact, it is no longer about either Israel or Palestine at all. “Palestinians” are here transformed into what Naomi Davidson has called “only Muslims,” and Israelis stand as tokens for Western civilization. And this is the case, as suggested above, even when the person targeted happens to be a Jewish Israeli living in a West Bank settlement. In other words, this presentation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict evacuates all politics and thus all colonial questions about power and control, leaving in their place a vision of naked and insatiable “Muslim” hatred that must be combated at all cost. This, at least in theory, should allow French Jews to continue to support Israel without risking political “denationalization.” It also works to displace questions about relative power between minority French communities in relation to antisemitism. On the scale of global civilizational confrontations, Muslims cannot figure as a disadvantaged national minority, but rather as a global plurality with the potential to dominate vast swaths of the globe. Similarly, in this particular reading of global conflict, Jews are neither dominant nor dominated; instead, they are tokens of Western civilization itself.

What remains very unclear is whether this discursive attempt to reposition Israel by eliminating (post)colonial accounts of contemporary political impasses will convince either Jews or non-Jews. It is certainly already being contested among Jews for the way it universalizes the experience of “Muslim

45Laëtitia Enriquez, “Francis Kalifat: ‘Tolérance zéro envers l’antisémitisme sous toutes ses formes,’” Actualité Juive, July 11, 2016. The attack in Magnanville was a lone wolf attack against a police commissioner, his wife, and his child (who was left alive, but was forced to watch his parents die). The attacker, Larossi Abballa, claimed to have pledged allegiance to the Islamic state. Elise Vincent and Julia Pascual, “Ce que l’on sait du meurtre d’un couple de policiers dans les Yvelines,” Le Monde.fr, June 13, 2016, http://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2016/06/13/un-policier-tue-devant-chez-lui-de-plusieurs-coups-de-couteau-dans-les-yvelines_4949770_1653578.html.


terrorism” and thereby ignores the specific dangers that Jews face, both inside and outside France. The Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher killings resulted in massive demonstrations where people held signs proclaiming Je suis Charlie (I am Charlie), Je suis juif (I am Jewish), and Je suis policier (I am a police-man). On one level, such protests seemed to suggest the deghettoization of the fight against antisemitism and the recognition of what French Jewish intellectuals like Alain Finkielkraut had argued in the mid-2000s: antisemitism and anti-French (or even anti-Western) sentiment have the same roots and the same promoters. But on another level, this outpouring of identification with Jewish victims was seen as too little, too late, and even as disingenuous. For example, in Le Figaro Gil Mihaely explained Jewish disappointment:

Lots of French Jews feel very alone. For example, after the attacks of the 7th, 8th, and 9th of January [2015], the leitmotif became liberty of expression; but that was not the common denominator among the victims: they were victims of terrorism. Neither the Jews of Vincennes [at the kosher market] nor the police officer from Montrouge were sacrificed on the altar of liberty of expression. For Montrouge, it was probably a botched attack on a Jewish school; at Vincennes, it was a successful attack against a kosher market. The attacks on [the Jewish school at] Toulouse and [the soldiers at] Montauban garnered far less of a reaction [than the Charlie Hebdo] attacks. During the attacks against [the synagogue] at rue Copernic in 1981, the prime minister at the time, Raymond Barre, said: “this odious attack was directed against Israélites going to synagogue and killed innocent French people crossing the street.” Today, there is a sense that this slip continues to reveal something deeply ingrained in the [French] collective unconscious: Jews are never innocent victims.

But even more than articulating Jewish disappointment, Mihaely also suggests that any attempt to disconnect terrorism from Jewish specificity misreads and betrays reality. This outpouring of support is yet another way of

---


disguising or ignoring unique Jewish vulnerability vis-à-vis both Muslim terrorism and French universalism. Similarly, when a group of self-identified Muslims published an open letter in the *Journal du Dimanche* condemning Islamist terrorism, the CRIF immediately noted that Jewish victims had been left off the list, an “oversight” the CRIF thought was both “heavy with meaning” and “prevented people from understanding all the dimensions of the Islamist terrorism that confronts France today.” It is thus very hard for many French Jews to talk about contemporary Islamic terrorism without evoking Jews’ unique vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Muslim persecutors. This difficulty may explain, in part, the flourishing popular literature that emphasizes the ways in which *dhimmitude*—the historically and geographically variable, religiously inspired framework for tolerating Christians and Jews in Islamic lands—was used to dominate, humiliate, and persecute North African Jews. Some French Jewish discourses may be attempts to replace this kind of colonially inflected understanding of contemporary antisemitism and terrorism. But this particular vision of Muslim terrorism—one in which Jews are the first, most helpless, and least recognized victims—remains a powerful framework for understanding contemporary Jewish/Muslim relations, particularly among the North African Jews I got to know.

It is equally unclear whether the wider French public has moved beyond a reading of the Middle Eastern conflict and/or domestic antisemitism through the lens of relative Jewish privilege. The schoolteacher who blurted out that Jews needed to stop oppressing Palestinians clearly suggests quite the contrary. And in terms of domestic antisemitism, the last presidential election was full of not-so-subtle hard left- and right-wing references to “old” European canards about Jewish economic and political power. During the campaign, both the dissident leftist camp run by Jean-Luc Mélenchon and the hard Right party headed by Marine Le Pen continually suggested that the economically liberal, relative outsider Emmanuel Macron was best understood as an agent of a powerful global banking industry, an industry indexed by the name of Macron’s previous employer, “Rothschild.” Needless to say, the name “Rothschild” continues to conjure up images that hark back to late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century assumptions about Jewish foreignness, global conspiracy, and power, all of which were assumed to be threats to the French “nation.” In other words, in a moment of rising French nationalism and Euroskepticism, presumptions about Jewish “power” may continue

---

to haunt and perhaps even threaten French Jews. Jews may not, however, be threatened in precisely the ways that they most seem to fear.

Conclusion

I have suggested that while dramatic, public manifestations of antisemitism in France shifted considerably from the early 2000s to the period following Mohammed Merah’s murderous rampage, public Jewish arguments about the roots of antisemitism changed very little. What did change was the way some French Jewish discourses worked to link Israel to France by suggesting that Jewish/Israeli experiences with terrorism and Palestinian politics in the Middle East were isomorphic with those of the French vis-à-vis Muslims in Europe. In the early 2000s, the invocation of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in relation to antisemitism seemed inextricably linked to colonially inflected power relations between Jews and Muslims in both France and the Middle East. After 2012, however, it became slightly easier to link French antisemitism to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict without raising the specter of unequal power relations. As a result, French antisemitism and Palestinian attacks against Jewish Israelis began to be more insistently portrayed as part of a growing “clash of civilizations,” a clash that rolled Israelis, Jews, the French, and even Europeans more widely into a single camp violently threatened by Muslims. But alternative discourses suggesting that Jews qua Jews are particularly and even uniquely threatened by Muslims continued to circulate, highlighting the continued salience of a frame focused on questions of power and domination.

All of these discourses about the nature and implications of French antisemitism are attempts to make claims about Jewish belonging in contemporary France. They are really only secondarily about the actual empirical facts of violence against French Jews. As David Feldman has suggested in another context, the “facts” themselves are in part built out of these discursive struggles over what belonging might mean for European Jews. This is not, however, what most social scientists interested in antisemitism in contemporary Europe are talking about. Instead, they tend to reproduce the same debates that Jews themselves are having by focusing almost exclusively on what they

---

see as the true empirical foundations for antisemitism. Among social scientists, there seem to be two basic approaches. The first focuses on what gets called “the new antisemitism” and fully embraces Jewish discourses about the Muslim threat. This approach is highly critical of any work that attempts to explain Muslim antisemitism as a function of economic and political exclusion. And it often insists that the real threat to French and European Jews is no longer the Far Right, but rather a coalition of the supposedly “dominated,” namely, leftists and Muslims. The second social-scientific approach is sometimes even critical of the term “new antisemitism.” It instead insists on the relative privilege of European Jews both in everyday socioeconomic terms and in relation to state discourses and practices that increasingly target Muslims while in fact making (more or less credible) overtures to a shared Judeo-Christian culture. From this perspective, Jews are neither politically nor existentially threatened by Muslim antisemitism, which can be explained as a misguided way of protesting relative Jewish wealth and integration into European societies.

Both of these positions are attempts to discuss “objectively” Jewish (lack of) safety and security in contemporary Europe. And they completely miss one of the central points of this article. To be sure, the causes and manifestations of anti-Jewish acts in France are constantly shifting and highly variable. And this is a worthy topic of study. The problem arises when researchers make such studies the blunt explanatory tool for how Jews experience and discuss their place in contemporary France. Despite empirical shifts in antisemitic acts, French Jewish discourses suggest a relatively stable structure of feeling, one centered around fear of Muslim domination and abandonment by French society and the state. It is this disjuncture—between a highly changeable empirical reality and relatively consistent, if nonetheless contested, contemporary discourses about antisemitism—that is most interesting. It suggests the need for a third approach to contemporary European antisemitism, one that we might call phenomenological. Social scientists should start moving beyond an analysis of “antisemitism” itself and pay more attention to the cultural and affective work Jewish discourses about antisemitism do in any

54 See further Bunzl, Antisemitism and Islamophobia.
55 See, e.g., Brenner, France, prends garde de perdre ton âme; Brenner, Les territoires perdus de la République; Richard Landes, “Secular Supersessionism and Post-Christian Europe’s Tolerance for Antisemitism” (presentation at the Council for European Studies, Philadelphia, April 14, 2016); Taguieff, La nouvelle judéophobie; Trigano, La démission de la République. For an alternative account of this “new antisemitism,” see Judaken, “So What’s New?”
56 See, e.g., Benbassa, La république face à ses minorités; Bunzl, Antisemitism and Islamophobia; Daniel Lindenberg, Le rappel à l’ordre: enquête sur les nouveaux réactionnaires (Paris, 2002); Mandel, Muslims and Jews in France.
particular moment. How are such discourses generated? How do they circu-
late? What understandings of Jewish belonging do they assume and help pro-
duce? And what might the answers to these questions mean for understanding
how Jews can and cannot think about their own futures in France and Europe
more generally? These are crucial questions because Jewish discourses about
antisemitism highlight structures of feeling that cannot be reduced to empiri-
cal questions about (lack of) safety and security. Perhaps by paying attention
to how and why contemporary antisemitism gets used to think through the
problem of Jewish belonging, social scientists can begin to empathetically
analyze, rather than simply echo or dismiss, Jewish discourses themselves.