'Augustine seems to have been the last to know at least what it once meant to be a citizen.' Hannah Arendt's judgement is all the more interesting because she clearly considered Augustine to be the single thinker most responsible for the Christian repudiation of the 'public realm' - a repudiation which she regarded as, in its modern guise, one of the major threats to the security, peace and sanity of the human world. The 'public realm' is seen by Arendt as the world we consciously have in common; to paraphrase her rather condensed exposition, we could say that the common world is what provides us with an identity in terms of language; it is the possibility of securing what I have been and done and said as an individual by locating it in a tradition of speech and recollection. It is what makes it possible for me to be remembered, for me to be part of the conversation of a future generation. Thus it is the sign of a common humanity, existing independently of my will or imagination: to engage in 'public' life is to accept that I am finite and timebound, born into a continuum of language and interaction I did not choose or invent, and yet also to transcend my finitude in the only way I can, by striving to contribute to
the language and interaction of the group some new qualification or nuance that can reasonably and properly become part of a tradition, a heritage. Our goal should be to make our lives 'a symbol perfected in death.' Without this, we are doomed to the futile insignificance of purely private and individual life, futile insofar as its value is perceptible only to my subjectivity and the subjectivities of those I am immediately in contact with, and because its conduct is likely to be constrained and dominated by my need to survive and meet my necessities and those of my dependents. In this sense, says Arendt, classical thought considered the public realm to be the sphere of true freedom: rule, coercive power, even violence, belong in the household, since they are the means of mastering necessity, organizing the threatening incipient chaos of daily life. Without the patterns of dominance securely fixed in the domestic order, no-one would be able to go out into the polis among equals, freed from private need so as to engage in the creative, intelligible work of constructing shared meanings and shared futures, in action worthy of remembrance, action establishing a human continuity that transcends the immediate and the local. The private has no history, because the struggle for survival and the meeting of needs has no history. And without this public realm of active, creative persons taking responsibility for the integrity and continuation of a form of talking and understanding, we are condemned either to the animal pointlessness of the mere effort to subsist, or to the more typically modern unfreedom of 'mass society', in which financial achievement and reward or security replaces glory and repute, the notion of workliness to be remembered, and the quality of public action as creative, as formative of a 'conversation' extending beyond individual death, is undermined. Society becomes increasingly incapable of intelligent speech, common imagination, increasingly enslaved to idolatrous objectifications, fetishes and slogans.

How then does Christianity - or Augustinian Christianity in particular - carry forward this subversion of the public? The early Church, Arendt suggests, is a community of people more or less marginalized by their refusal of Roman imperial authority and their anticipation of the end of the world; humanly speaking, the 'conversation' is simply not going to continue. What then can 'replace the world' as a bond between such persons? the sense of belonging to a community which is in important respects more like a kindred, a family, than a polis, a community in which achievement, excellence or creativity are irrelevant to membership, even damaging. It is a body held together by love, caritas: The bond of charity between people, while it is incapable of founding a public realm of its own...is admirably fit to carry a group of essentially wordless people through the world. Caritas is, in the Augustinian system, a love which is indifferent to merit and achievement: it sees the bonds between persons as resting simply on their common createdness and equal sinfulness, and thus operates impartially and, in a sense, impersonally. In her doctoral thesis of 1929, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin, Arendt had argued that caritas means 'loving the eternal' in ourselves and others, and that this is the essence of Christian 'neighbourly love': we see in one another tokens of both the creative and the redemptive work of God. As creatures, we love still at a distance, we 'coexist'; but as sinful objects of the saving work of Christ, we are brought together in communion. A non-worldly society is thus created, the 'City of God.' By the time she came to write The Human Condition in the 1950's, Arendt was far more openly hostile to the idea of non-worldly community than she had been in 1929 (that, as she would have doubt have said, was the twentieth century does to you); but the analysis of Augustine and the principle of 'worldless' love remains much the same. The civitas Dei is a substitute for the public realm, and thus its enemy.

Yet Augustine knew 'at least what it once meant to be a citizen'. This is a remark made in passing, puzzling in the light of the conclusion that it is Augustine who makes it more or less impossible for a Christian to be a citizen. In this paper, I want to explore precisely why Augustine might be said to understand what is involved in citizenship, and how far he may at the same time be rightly seen as a subverter of the values of the classical public and political realm. Hannah Arendt, I believe, right, though not perhaps for the right reasons. And on the other hand, a recent defence of Augustine as fundamentally political educator - Peter Bathory's Political Theory as Public Confession - seeks to correct the imbalance that prompts the notion that Augustine commended passivity or disengagement, yet does so at the expense of any analysis of the saint's radical assault on the conventionally political as such. Both Arendt and Bathory, in fact, seem to resolve what many readers of Augustine have found to be an irresolvable set of tensions. As will appear, I do not believe Augustine is guilty simply of flat contradictions; but I see little value in trying to extract a wholly consistent programme from the City of God. We should look less for a systematic account of 'church' and 'world' (let alone church and state), more for a scheme for reflecting on the nature of social virtue.

Robert Markus, in what remains probably the finest survey of Augustine's political thinking in English, argues for a tendency in the De civitate to atomistic individualism' where Augustine is reflecting on what we should call state power. Augustine may write of a civitas terrena; yet his discussion deals not with anything that could be called an institution, but rather with persons and processes. Thus we cannot really say that he has
a theory of the state at all (even in the attenuated sense discussed by Figgis, who is careful to warn against the translation of civitas by any strictly political term). Augustinian does not think - or at least does not consistently think - of two distinct kinds of human association, the sacred and the secular, or even the private and the public. His concern is with the goal of human life as such. Thus, at the end of Book XVIII of the De civitate, we read that both cities, of God and of this world, experience the same vicissitudes of earthly life and make use of the same temporal goods, but diversa fide, diversa spe, diverso amore: their goals are distinct, and so will be their eternal rewards. Book XIX then opens the discussion of the end of human existence; and the political debate of this book must be read in this light. Augustine is not here seeking to pronounce on what might be an appropriate relationship between the two cities; he has just completed a fairly full account of the history of persecution, and concluded firmly that there can be no guarantee of persecution ever being a thing of the past. The last thing he is likely to wish to do is to draft a concordat between the city of God and its avowed enemies. His question in Book XIX is, rather, about the optimal form of corporate human life in the light of what is understood to be its last end. At this level, the De civitate is not at all a work of political theory in the usual sense, but sketches for a theological anthropology and a corporate spirituality. The political and the spiritual are not separate concerns: Book XIX seeks to show that the spiritual is the authentically political. Although it is in one sense quite true to say, with Markus, that Augustine abandons the classical idea of 'creative politics', of life in the empirical city as the sphere of the free development of moral persons towards the human goal, this does not mean that the saint repudiates the public realm for something else, or even that his perspective is 'atomistic' in quite Markus' sense. Rather he is engaged in a redefinition of the public itself, designed to show that it is life outside the Christian community which fails to be truly public, authentically political. The opposition is not between public and private, church and world, but between political virtue and political vice. At the end of the day, it is the secular order that will be shown to be 'atomistic' in its foundations.

In both Books II and XIX, Augustine refers us to Cicero's De re publica for a definition of the public realm or the 'commonwealth', as Healey accurately renders it. A populus is not just any contingent gathering of persons, but a group bound together juris communs et utilitatis communes. This, then, is where discussion of the properly political, consciously and articulately shared life, must begin: in agreement over what are and are not legitimate moves within the social grouping, and in some sort of guaranteed common access to the things that sustain life (not too far from access to the 'means of production', perhaps: there are worse translations of utilitatis!). In a celebrated polemical section, Augustine demolishes the claim of pagan Rome to be a 'commonwealth' on the grounds of what seems to be a piece of lexical sleight of hand: jus gives to each his or her due; but pagan society cannot give God his due. It offers sacrifice to demons; only the Christian community offers sacrifice to the true God, and, what is more, the only acceptable sacrifice, itself as a totality redeemed in Christ.

This is not, however, quite as disingenuous as it sounds. A social practice which impedes human beings from offering themselves to God in fact denies that central impulse in human nature which Augustine defined as the unquenchable desire for God and his truth. It provides erat, gratifications, finite substitutes for the infinite. And as such it diminishes humanity itself, in that it takes away the one principle that can rightly order our wills and affections. Quam quisque Deus non servienst nullo modo potest juste animus corporatus humana ratio vitis imperare. There are, indeed, other factors which may regulate the passions; but the supposed virtue resulting from this kind of control is really vice - pride and vainglory - insofar as it is not referred to God. So beate vivere is made impossible for us when society directs us to goals other than the glory of our maker. Thus if the pagan res publica is deficient as a commonwealth, it is not because Augustine polemically sets a standard of unattainably high righteousness or religious probity, but because a society incapable of giving God his due fails to give its citizens their due - as human beings made for the quest and the enjoyment of God. Where there is no jus towards God, there is no common sense of what is due to human beings, no juris consensus. And this theme proves to be the main burden of the De civitate's vision of political virtue.

If this reading of XIX, 21-23 is correct, then the argument about true and false commonweals cannot be resolved by appealing to Augustine's allegedly more pragmatic definition of the res publica in XIX, 24. Normally this has been seen as indicating that Augustine has exhausted his polemic, and is now attempting to work a more constructive vein. The definition of a populus as united by jus has been shown to be inapplicable to any but the people of God: is the Roman republic then no more than an arbitrary cosus? No, for there are other possible definitions; let us try one. We might define the commonwealth as unified rerum quas illiciti concordi communes - by harmony as regards the things it loves or values. On this showing, of course, there is a sense in which Rome counts as a commonwealth; so would any empirical political unit (we may as well say 'state' from now on, misleading as the term is in many respects). But what is often missed in this chapter is the note of irony: in the catalogue of nations thus admitted under the definition of a res publica, Athens begins the list, and Babylon ends it. There is a continuum between the ideal of classical politics
and its antithesis, the tyrannies of the Orient; for without God's justice, the one is merely on the way to becoming the other. Justitia veritas is by no means secured by this putative harmony about values. In this chapter, Augustine recalls the arguments of earlier books to the effect that, while Rome may once have been in principle committed to a genuinely common harmony, it has long since become an empty word. A state may claim to possess the necessary concord as regards the objects of its dilectio; but what degree of stability can such a society possess? It is doomed to vice (XIX, 25) and its security is transitory (XIX, 26). In short, while it may be empirically an intelligibly unified body, it is constantly undermining its own communal character, since its common goals are not and cannot be those abiding values which answer to the truest human needs.

So far from XIX, 24 representing a shift in Augustine's analysis towards a more pragmatic and positive view of the state, it is in its context a final stage in the argument begun in XIX, 21. Take even the most minimal and trivial definition of a political body - the unity of common aims - so that you include tyrannies as well as the classical polis, and you will still have a picture of societies that cannot cohere, that are their own worst enemies, condemning themselves to abiding insecurity. We may call them commonwealths if we will, since there is no doubt that they exist as identifiable social units, but their character and structure are inimical to the very nature of an ordered unity in plurality, a genuine res publica.

To understand this more fully, we must refer back to earlier books of the City of God, those more directly formed by controversial interest. Book I, 21, in its summary of the argument attributed in Cicero's De re publica to Scipio, lays great stress on justice and harmony as the conditions of unity in the state: the various orders of society collaborate rationally, each contributing its own particular note to the harmony. This, of course, assumes that the function of each person or rank in the civitas is uncontroversial. And if any class or functionary acquires disproportionate power, injustice is created, and the res publica there with ceases to exist. Thus all members of a society must know their place in a universal ordo, they must know how to live in accord with natural law. But, Book II argues, how are they to know this? Chapters 4 to 7, 14 to 16 and 22 to 26 in particular demonstrate that neither the pagan gods, nor the antique philosophers (for all their achievements) enable citizens to live well, in accord with a lex aeterna. A poet like Persius may exhort men and women to learn ordo, the bounds of aspiration, the will of God; but he writes as a private individual. Such are not the values celebrated in the public worship and festival of antiquity: how then are such values to be established as the common human heritage?

The classical world is thus shown to be without any authentic conception of public virtue. Book V takes this still further in its treatment of the motivation of virtue in Roman society. We have noted that in XIX, 25 it is admitted that virtue of a sort is possible where vice is restrained from motives other than the fear of God; that brief aside is meant to recall the bleak reductionism of V, 12-20. The longing for public praise, for glory and good name, controls that libido dominandi which so ruins the unity of any state. In this way (under the providence of God) a specious unity is given to the existing order, even a measure of stability. A small number of persons taking a leading role in the state, obsessed with their desire for glory, are enabled - one would almost think, supernaturally - to resist the greater power of other nations. The remarkable successes of the early Roman republic are not due to the favour of the Roman gods (we have already seen in Books II and III that they show little sign of being concerned for the welfare of their worshippers), nor simply to immanent causes like the extraordinary power of disinterested virtue. Augustine's explanation is at once cynical and theological: the lust for glory restrains the more obvious factors making for disintegration in the state; and God elects to raise up a new empire over against the ancient tyrannies of the East, one which at least represents some kind of judgment upon the unbridled libido dominandi of those older systems.

Yet the Roman polity is still vacuous at its core. Cicero recommends that the ruler of a city should be educated in the longing for glory: thus the rebellious impulses to tyranny, prodigality or whatever are governed and ordered by one supreme sin, pride. This means that the classical republic is shut out from ordo and lex aeterna: it is built on disorder, in that what should restrain passion is itself replaced by a passion. That sovereignty of spiritual over material interest which is the essence of ordo is parodied by the elevation to supreme status of a material or worldly interest capable of masquerading as spiritual. But this is not the only problem about a glory-dominated public ethic. 'Glory' is of its very nature an individual matter, won by competition, not open to all. Augustine mentions without stressing it in V, 12 that the classical Roman story is of the achievements and virtues of the few and while this is, in the context, part of a testimony to the striking nature of the republic's triumphs, it is also made clear that the majority of the population, politically inactive, are kept united only by fear of external enemies. The desire for glory is not a universal moral inductor or preserver of social order: it can assist the unity of a society only negatively, as we have seen, by restraining tyranny. And in Book X, Augustine has still harsher things to say. Romulus and Remus are alike prompted by the desire for glory in their work in founding the Roman state: but glory is not
easily shared. *Qui enim volebat dominando gloriari*, minus *unique dominaretur, si ejus potestas vivo consorte minueretur.*33 Preoccupation with achievement brings in its wake a preoccupation with power and pre-eminence: the whole point of the quest for glory lies in the urge to gain advantage over another. In contrast, the love and longing for goodness which marks the city of God is of its essence a desire which seeks to share its object: *tanto am* reperiet amplorem, *quanto amplius ibi potuerit amare consortem* - more is gained by the love of those others who share the quest and the goal. But the search for glory means that the *civitas terrena* is torn by constant strife. The very thing which in certain circumstances save a society from total dissolution is also potentially a murderous and divisive force.

The conclusion is clear enough: classical society and classical political thought provide ideals for the corporate life of humanity which they cannot provide the means to realize. Already, in the *Confessions*,44 Augustine had had much to say about those (in that case the Platonists) who offered the possibility of vision without transformation: here, in the *De civitate*, the same complaint can be heard. It is all very well to talk about the public realm, about justice and commonality; but, empirically speaking, the means employed to make a *coetus* of persons more than a chance aggregate consistently subvert true common life. It does not greatly matter whether or not we decide to accord the name of *res publica* to this or that political order: the reality of common or public life is not there. Unity will always be something imposed from outside rather than growing from within; and so it comes about that states need enemies. As Augustine observes in Book I, Carthage played a highly significant role in securing order and justice in Rome. The destruction of the Republic's great rival meant that the *libido dominandi* hitherto checked by the need for discipline and unity and to some extent exercised in defence against an external aggressor came to be exercised within the state, producing gross inequality and injustice.45 Aggression not dealt with in the inner ecology of social beings seeks outlets - if not against a stranger, then by making strangers of fellow-citizens. Fear, hatred and the struggle to survive become characteristic of relations between those orders of society which, for Augustine as for Cicero, ought to live in interdependent harmony. But such a vision of interdependence is empty without the undergirding of a vision of humanity in the purposes of its maker.

This interdependence, and the critique of internal social aggression must not be misconstrued: it is nothing to do (as a modern liberal might hope) with collaboration and exchange between equals. Augustine believed that we enjoyed a measure of equality as God's creatures;46 but his universe, including his social world, is unmistakably hierarchical. The subordination of

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the less rational to the more is certainly part of the *ordo* spelled out in Book XIX, and the authority of the Roman *paterfamilias* over family and slaves is accepted and defended as a model.47 Slavery as such is a punishment for *sin*,48 the way in which God conserves the *ordo* menace by Adam's transgression. Yet the implication of much of what Augustine says, here and elsewhere,49 is that, although it may be a decline from primitive liberties that some human beings are so drastically at the disposal of others, it is servitude, not subordination, that is the new thing. That subordination needs reinforcement by mechanisms of compulsion is the consequence of our falleness; and that compulsion so readily converts itself into a tool for selfish interest, a means of exercising the *libido dominandi*, is the sign of how far fallen we are. Markus argues persuasively that the origin of strictly political rule, like the origin of slavery, lies in the necessities of our falleness; and that therefore (on Augustinian principles) the empirical state will be distinguished from the city of God insofar as it is always characterized by the exercise of coercive power.40 Eschatologically this holds true: there will be no compulsion in heaven.41 But meanwhile the citizens of the heavenly city certainly do exercise coercion,42 nor are they necessarily compromising with the *civitas terrena* when they do so. They are merely working within the inescapable constraints of fallen finitude. No, the city of God is not set over against 'the state' as a body which invariably exercises its power in a different manner from the secular arm (Augustine is emphatically not a Tolstoyan); the difference is, as we should expect, in the ends for which power is exercised, and the spirit in which it is exercised. While it is true that the hierarchy of command in the *res publica* does not have to correspond to any natural hierarchy,43 the purpose under God of the former is, so far as possible, to restore the rebellious wills of human beings to some approximation to the divine *ordo* - which, as Augustine repeatedly reminds us, is also the right ordering of our *internal* lives, the dominance of soul over body, reason over passion. In household and society, coercion is properly aimed at restoring the offender *paci unde destituerat*44 and as we have been told by Augustine in XIX, 13 that 'peace is indivisible', so to speak, that the *pars* of the individual soul and the *par* of the universe are parts of a single continuum, so that attempts at peace on the lower levels without regard to the higher are doomed to disaster, it is clear enough that just rule (including, where necessary, the use of force) must aim at a peace which is not restricted only to temporary adjustments or passing convenience.

Hence the significance of the link which Augustine makes between *imperare* and *consulere*; *imperant enim, qui consulunt.*45 *Consulere* is spiritual nurturing. Because it is itself an activity based on a lively
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apprehension of the true meaning of *ordo* and of the indivisibility of peace (as XIX, 14 explains at length), it does not run the risk of slipping over into *libido dominandi*. The exercise in authority as *consulare* takes it for granted that the body's peace must serve the soul's, and that the soul's peace is in the love of God and neighbour. The natural order of family life - with the not-quite-so-natural appendage of the household slaves - is the primary locus for the exercise of such an office: a dramatic reversal of what Hannah Arendt saw as the classical set of priorities. So far from being the sphere of bondage and necessity, the household has become a 'laboratory of the spirit', a place for the manumission of souls (the soul of the ruler as well as the ruled). This may sound like a privatizing strategy - creativity being shifted into the domestic sphere. Yet Augustine makes it plain in what follows in the same discussion (two chapters later) that the *pax* of the household is to be referred *ad pacem civicam*, even that the *paterfamilias* should derive his standards from the law of the city. The implication seems to be that the *civitas* is itself, like the household, ideally a creative and pastoral community, educating the *paterfamilias* as to his priorities as he educates his own subjects. The family has become, in some sense, the paradigm political community; but instead of this meaning either that family is opposed to large-scale *civitas* (as in certain sorts of bourgeois politics) or that the *poles* is conceived in organic and 'totalizing' ways, the implication here is that both the small and the large-scale community are essentially *purposer* or *purposive*, existing so as to nurture a particular kind of human life: in both, authority is determined in relation to a specific goal.

This is not spelled out in any detail; but it helps us to see why Augustine, despite his distaste for blindly triumphalist ideologies of the Christian empire, can wax so lyrical in Book V. About the virtues of the Christian emperor, who is not afraid of sharing or delegating authority, who uses his power to point to the majesty of God, whose primary longing is to possess and rule his own soul in *ordo*, and whose motive in all he does is love and not the lust for glory. Theodosius I is regarded (V.x) as a ruler well on his way towards this ideal. We should not read this as any kind of uncritical eulogy for a despot; however, Augustine is not doing for Theodosius what Eusebius did for Constantine, but depicting those features of Theodosius' reign least congenial to an ideology of the emperor's sole authority and unlimited right. He does not cling to undivided supremacy, he is not swayed by private grudges, when (as a result of sharing his responsibilities and being influenced by counsel?) he makes mistakes such as the Thessalonian massacre, he accepts the role of penitent. We may be more suspicious of Theodosius than was Augustine, but we should note what exactly it is that Augustine picks out as the marks of good government - law and coercion employed for the sake of the subject by one who is manifestly not in thrall to *libido dominandi* or vainglory, because he is capable of sharing power and accepting humiliation.

This is good government, but it is not, Augustine is careful to tell us, necessarily *successful* government in the world's sense. The well-governed state is not automatically the victorious state; God gives or withholds the commonwealth the redeemed rationality of a Christian prince is precisely a government whose policy is not determined by considerations of worldly triumph. And this leads us to consider a final and very searching paradox in Augustine's reflections on power and rule. The commonwealth is, ideally, a pastoral reality, its ruler a director of souls. Thus it is understandable that Augustine is happier with the idea of a world composed of small states, comparable to the households of a city: only so is the *pax* and *ordo* of the individual city truly related to the *pax* of the whole world as it should be. 'He favoured', wrote Figgis, poignantly, at the end of the Great War, 'a League of Nations' - though for theological reasons rather than pragmatic ones. Augustine's devastating critique of imperialism in Books III and IV of the *De civitate* displays the impossibility of an expansionist state doing the proper job of a *civitas* : imperial adventures, arising out of the *libido dominandi*, are always a distraction from the real problems of a community, an attempt, conscious or not, to create an *ars urbe* unity in a fundamentally fragmented and disordered group. Occasionally, Augustine grants, there is a case for a war waged to subdue an enemy whose aggression directly menaces your own survival; but he has severe words for those who seek, in effect, to provoke another's aggression, to harden attitudes, to provide themselves with an object of hatred and fear, with the goal of reinforcing or extending a nation's power (words not without some contemporary pertinence). And he adds, wryly, that the Romans have been fortunate in being confronted with enemies sufficiently unjust and unpleasant to give their own cause some semblance of righteousness.

However, to go to war is to enter the arena of historical risk and uncertainty in a most dramatic way; the just community is not guaranteed protection in such a conflict. In a not very much discussed passage in Book XXI, Augustine takes the issue a little further. Cicero considers that state to be just which goes to war only in self-defence or for the sake of its *fides* - its honour, in particular its treaty obligations; and the obligation of self-defence rests, for him, on the fact that the perishing of a *civitas* is the perishing of a whole 'world'. Death for the individual may be a happy release:
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'death' for the state is the dissolution of those bonds of speech and meaning which make the world rational and properly human (hence the connection of its fate with the preservation of fides, covenanted legal mutuality). But, Augustine responds, the city of God as such never goes to war even in self-defence; for to go to war is for it to lose its integrity, its fides. In this case, fides and security are one and the same, for the fides of the Church (there is an obvious but nuanced play on the word) is its trust in the abiding city of God, which is not found on earth. Ultimately, the true bonds of human speech and meaning, the sense of the human world, are preserved in God's eternal will and in the ordo of the universe as a whole. It is not contingent upon the survival of any human system of meaning. To defend the city of God would thus be a sign of unfaith, an abandonment of the Church's integrity.

Cicero's picture is, in fact, Augustine implies, a naive one. What of those tragic circumstances in which a civitas seems to be faced with the choice between integrity or loyalty and security (as in the well-known case of the Saguntines in the Second Punic War)? The secular politician has no means of deciding here; the city of God has no need to decide. This poses a considerable problem for the interpreter. There are, it seems, legitimate - if risky - defensive wars which may be waged in self-defence; yet such wars cannot be waged in defence of the city of God. The wise ruler will refrain from conquest and aggression, and will only reluctantly and even persistently take up arms to pacify an aggressive neighbour: it is not recommended that he abduct entirely from defence. But what it seems he must beware of is supposing that what he is defending is the city of God. Insofar as the commonwealth is just and orderly, it is worth preserving, and its ruler will take steps to preserve it; that is, insofar as it is imperfectly just and orderly, it justifies defensive action. True justice and orderliness cannot be defended by such means, because they participate in the city of God, which depends upon defenceless trust in the continuance of God's ordo.

The Christian ruler is thus left with a stark and more or less theoretically insoluble dilemma: if he makes the state's earthly triumph or survival his over-riding goal, he betrays any real justice in the civitas he seeks to defend. There can be no crusades, no victory at any price: he has the alarming task of discerning the point at which what he is defending has ceased to be defensible because the means of defence beyond this point undermine the real justice in the state by implicitly treating it as an absolute, to be preserved at all costs. No particular ordo is identical with the order of God's city, and so no state can rightly be defended as an absolute 'value' in itself; the potential tragedy of the ruler is in his responsibility to determine the moment at which he must condemn his civitas to defeat.

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At first sight, this seems to confirm Marcus' conclusion that Augustine points towards a 'secular' neutral space for the state; no political system can be regarded as sacred, as having final legitimacy in itself. But the conclusion is not in fact quite so clear. All this is true; but, for Augustine, there is only one person who can be trusted to perform the task of the ruler in such circumstances - the detached and mature believer, who in his own soul knows the true nature and the true ordo of sovereignty. In such a situation, what will the unbeliever do but yield to the libido dominandi, with all its ruinous consequences for the genuinely common or public character of the commonwealth. So we arrive at the paradox that the only reliable political leader, the only ruler who can be guaranteed to safeguard authentically political values (order, equity, and the nurture of souls in these things) is the man who is, at the end of the day, indifferent to their survival in the relative shapes of the existing order, because he knows them to be safeguarded at the level of God's eternal and immutable providence, vindicated in the eternal civitas dei. Politics and the art of government take on the Socratic colouring of a discipline of dying; and only so do they avoid the corruption of the civitas terrena, the anti-city, the realm of what Bathory aptly calls 'anti-politics', which value and unity rest on essentially divisive and contingent factors and yet are utterly and unscrupulously fought for.

This is not precisely to say that only the saint should be 'allowed' to govern. Augustine does not envisage a situation in which anyone is able to decide about the structures of governmental authority, nor does he ever provide any basis for a systematic discussion of why such should be the best form of government, or who the best persons to administer it. In this, he is conspicuously a man of the bas-empire, assuming, unclassically, the givenness of the existing order. Indeed, the most disturbing and incongruous feature of this analysis for most modern students is probably the absence of any idea that the actual structures of government and society are answerable to some critical principle. Christians are to be indifferent to the more of the nations among whom they live, and the word is wide enough to include many of the institutions of public or civil life. It is demonstrably good that the state should be ruled by persons aware of the right order of sovereignty because of their own spiritual maturity; and insofar as anyone has the choice of assuming or rejecting the exercise of official power, it is good for them to accept, however reluctantly, but he is not interested in reinvoking the inherited forms of power or guaranteeing a succession of saints in office (a form, surely, of defending the city of God by worldly means). Here lies Augustine's great difference from all sides in the mediaval debates about sovereignty - from the ardent defenders of papal hegemony to Thomist
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rationalists. However, we should also remember that he is not a Luther, for whom the Law of God in the earthly kingdom can be dispensed equally well by Duke Frederick or Sultan Suleiman. The Christian has - at least - the authority and the duty to point out what will happen in the land whose king is a moral and spiritual child, incapable of unifying his people through the evangelical exercise of command as nurture.

Where, then, are we left as regards Hannah Arendt's strictures on Augustine as the great enemy of the public realm? In one obvious sense, her criticism is well-directed: Augustine is profoundly at odds with anything resembling Arendt's notion of public involvement (and its motivation, which is so precisely what he castigates in Book II). Yet it is not right to see him as replacing it with a more 'private' love ethic. Two points need to be remembered: first, that Augustine's condemnation of 'public' life in the classical world is, consistently, that it is not public enough, that it is incapable of grounding a stable sense of community because of its pervasive implicit elitism, its divisiveness, its lack of a common human project; and second, that the person of God is committed ex professo to exercising power when called upon to do so, and, in responding to such a call, does not move from a 'church' to a 'state' sphere of activity, but continues in a practice of nurturing souls already learned in more limited settings. Bartholay considerably oversates his case in arguing that Augustine provides a universal political paideia for all believers, fostering in them the spirit of authentic public responsibility: such a picture, of an Augustine devoted to the cause of 'community politics' over against late Roman bureaucratic centralism, is seductive but anachronistic. It is true, however, that Augustine assumes that a person nurtured in the Church and in the ordered caritas it inculcates is uniquely qualified to take responsibility for wielding political power.

Arendt's further gravamen, that Augustine's model of community relationships represents a flight from time is a weighty one. For Arendt, we are summoned to join a conversation that was begun before our birth and will continue after we die, accepting, as we do so, precisely the fact that our participation is temporary, bounded by mortality and 'naturality': this is the conversation that constitutes rationality, and, frail as it is, can and must be celebrated as we join in it. But Augustine would have replied that the decision to 'inscribe' ourselves within the human conversation in the terms described by Hannah Arendt is bound to that quest for reputation and secular immortality that actually itself represents a deep denial of the temporal. The guarantee of a place in the human story, gained by active participation in the public realm, seeks to assuage the fundamental restlessness that is constitutive of our human creaturehood by offering us the glamour of an assured historical future. For our souls' sake, we need to know that there is no guaranteeable future such as Arendt's neo-classical vision might suggest: real temporality is more vulnerable, and so also more open to radical hope (hope in God). It is the awkwardness and provisionality, the endlessly revisable character (morally speaking) of our social and political relationships, that, in the Augustinian world, keeps us faithful to the insight of humility - that we are timebound in everything here below, that our love is an unceasing search.

In this dimension of the political vision of the De civitate, the deep scepticism about a human future and a continuing memory, we see not a further sign of 'Augustinian pessimism', so called, but, more subtly, a corollary of Augustine's pervasive hostility to two things: an elitist concept of human commonality (immortality as the acquisition of a remembered name) and a nostalgia for some escape from the shapelessness and uncertainty of temporal existence as such (the Manichean isolation of a pure and inviolate, ahistorical soul in us, the Platonic promise of ecstasy, the Donatist quest for absolute institutional purity, the Pelagian hope to achieve purity of will, unconditioned moral liberty). For Augustine, the problem of the life of the two cities is, like every other question presented to the theologian, inextricably linked with the fundamental issue of what it is to be a creative animated by desire, whose characteristic marks are lack and hunger, who is made to be this kind of creature by a central and unforgettable absence, by lack and hunger. On such a basis there is no possibility of building a theory that would allow final security and 'finishedness' to any form of political life. The claims of such a theory would be, ultimately, anti-political because anti-human; denials of death.

FOOTNOTES
2. Ibid., pp.50-58.
3. T.S. Eliot, Little Gidding III.
5. Arendt's analysis here should be compared with that of Adorno on objectification, and the menace of the 'totally administered society'.
6. Ibid., pp.53-54.
7. Ibid., p.33. Note that Arendt, in alluding to the Augustinian ascension of some kind of
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31. De civ. Dei V, 12 reverts several times paulus... pascorum.
32. Cf. De civ. Dei V, 12; 129, on the effects of the destruction of Carthage upon the internal affairs of Rome.
33. De civ. Dei XIX 5.
34. E.g. Conf. VII, 7-21.
35. Delata equipe Carthagins magnae sollicitur terrae Romanae rei publicae depulso et sancta tanta de rebus prosperitas orta multa continua subsecuta sunt, ut corrupta disrupsum conscia munis prius sevis cruentisque sollicitudine, deinde maximae cognitione casarum belli etiam civilibus tanae strages edentur... ut Romani illi, qui vivi integri, mortue mutentur ab hostibus, perdita integritate visce creaturum
36. The image of God is equally in all, irrespective of the differentiation of more and less rational: cf. the discussion of the image in women, De Trin. XII, 7, 9.
37. De civ. Dei XIX, 16 on the patrofamilias; the theme is not unfamiliar from Augustine's correspondence.
39. De civ. Dei XIX, 13, on the natural hierarchy in creation; the discussion of woman's postlapsarian subjection to men in De gen. ad lit. XI, 7, 11 brings out the distinction he makes to unite natural subordination experienced as joy and fulfillment and the (necessarily) enforced domination of the status quo. It is kindest to say that Augustine is seldom at his best in passages like this, Figiag (op.cit., pp.52-54) draws a helpful distinction between natural power over the inferior being and 'domination' in the strict classical sense of absolute right, almost possession, exercised by master over slave, and suggests that this is the distinction Augustine has in mind in the relevant portions of De civ. Dei XIX.
40. Markus, op.cit., p.95 and chs. 6, 7, naturally he observes that Augustine himself cannot be made to say that coercion is alien to the Church's life, but the point is that his principles ought to move him in this direction.
41. De civ. Dei XIX, 16... coelestium domon, uti necessarium non sit officium impressi mortalibus.
42. The anti-Donatist literature is clear enough on the rights of the Church to coerce recalcitrant members back into the fold, though there is no suggestion that it can use force against non-members; see the texts quoted by Markus, op.cit., pp.148-149.
43. This is implicit in De civ. Dei XIX, 15, 17 and 26; cf. IV, 33.
44. De civ. Dei XIX, 16.
46. De civ. Dei XIX, 16.
47. 24-26. On the portrait of Theodosius, see Y.M. Duval, "L'Image de Théodose dans la "Citè de Dieu" v, 26", Recherches Augustiniennes 4 (1966) 125-179. Markus' comment (op.cit., p.149, n.2) that Augustine's picture recapitulates the 'private' virtues of Theodosius is odd; he is commanded, after all, for ruling in a specific way.
49. Figlius, op.cit., p.58.
50. De civ. Dei IV; 16.
51. De civ. Dei XXII, 6; cf. III, 20 or "in incident in question.
52. I use the masculine advisedly.

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April 29th, 1929: see esp. pp. 50-68 (there is a good summary of this rather rare and inaccessible work on pp. 49-50 of Elizabeth Young-Bruhl's fine biography, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World, New Haven and London 1982).
10. De civ. Dei XVIII, 54; cf. XIX, 17 for the distinction between communis usus and the diversity in usus usque as between the city of God and the city of the world. It is important to recognize that the common use/divers use model has nothing to do with pluralism within a society; this clarification is forcefully made in an unpublished paper on 'Augustine's City of God XIX and Western political thought' by my colleague, Oliver O'Donovan, and I am much indebted to him for allowing me to read and discuss this essay with him.

51. De civ. Dei X, 16 on the patrofamilias; the theme is not unfamiliar from Augustine's correspondence.
53. De civ. Dei XIX, 13 on the natural hierarchy in creation; the discussion of woman's post-lapsarian subjection to men in De gen. ad lit. XI, 37, 1 brings out the distinction he makes to unite natural subordination experienced as joy and fulfillment and the (necessarily) enforced domination of the status quo. It is kindest to say that Augustine is seldom at his best in passages like this, Figiag (op.cit., pp. 52-54) draws a helpful distinction between natural power over the inferior being and 'domination' in the strict classical sense of absolute right, almost possession, exercised by master over slave, and suggests that this is the distinction Augustine has in mind in the relevant portions of De civ. Dei XIX.
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63. Figiag, op.cit., p. 58.
64. De civ. Dei IV; 16.
65. De civ. Dei XXII, 6; cf. III, 20 or "in incident in question.
66. I use the masculine advisedly.
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53. E.g., op.cit. p.165.
54. De civ.Dei XIX.17 (cf.19).
55. See Augustine's correspondence with Marcellinus (e.g. Ep.139) and Boniface (Ep.220) on the duties of public involvement; cf. Markus, p.94.
56. A notion excessively personalized and psychologized in Arendt's earlier discussion, and to some extent in The Human Condition also. We must bear in mind that it is more than a sensation for Augustine, more even than the fact of mutual acceptance for God's sake, but is ultimately the activation of what is ontologically basic in us, our humanness itself, and expresses itself in firm institutional ways, as the Holy Spirit binds us to Christ in the Church.
57. This is implied in the opposition sketched out between the Christian view and Arendt's own analysis of our involvement in the human conversation; see pp.54ff. in The Human Condition.
58. In the terms especially of De civ.Dei Books IV and V.
59. As indicated, Augustine does not think in terms of structural revisability; this is not within his political horizon.

AUGUSTINE INTERPRETED AND MISINTERPRETED:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR WILLIAMS.

Professor F.X. Martin, O.S.A.

To speak with authority on Augustine is never easy, but to speak on Augustine in the wake of Professor Rowan Williams is doubly difficult. However, I have one slight advantage in the brief which I received from Fr. James McPolin, S.J., President of the Milltown Institute of Theology and Philosophy. He suggested that I concentrate on one or two points of particular medieval interest to me and that, if possible, I would also relate the subject to contemporary events in Ireland and the wider world.

For this reason I am going to indicate (1) how Augustine was used from medieval times to the Protestant Reformation, and beyond, to justify what I would describe as a theology of revolt. Perhaps nowadays some would call it liberation theology. I shall (2) also refer to the prominence of clergy in present-day socio-political agitation in different parts of the world. Finally (3), I shall touch on the question of the tradition of church and state in modern Ireland from the time of Daniel O'Connell to the present day.

Augustine is an ideal quarry from which to extract relevant quotations on any subject. He is credited with writing 117 books. Many of the best known were written for polemical reasons and must be judged, but always in that