

**CAS EC513(A1)  
Game Theory**

**Boston University  
Fall 2016**

**DR. HSUEH-LING HUYNH**  
**OFFICE HOURS:**  
**LECTURES:**

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M5:30-7PM & W2-3:30PM    RM.309, 270 BAY STATE RD.  
M & W 3:30-5PM    CAS 213

**TEXT:**

Martin J. Osborne, *An Introduction to Game Theory*, Oxford University Press 2004

**REFERENCES:**

1. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, *A Course in Game Theory*, MIT Press 1994  
(The full text of this book can also be accessed for free at <http://theory.economics.utoronto.ca/books/>. You must register and observe the authors' terms of usage.)
2. Robert Gibbons, *Game Theory for Applied Economists*, Princeton University Press 1992

**GRADE:**

Exam1 [40%] + Exam2 [60%]  
\*\*\* No make-up tests or exams will be given. \*\*\*

**COURSE DESCRIPTION**

The origins of modern game theory and its application to economics can be traced back to the 1830's, when the mathematician Antoine Augustin Cournot wrote his now famous model of duopoly, but for a century its development was fitful and slow. After the appearance of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's 'Theory of Games and Economic Behavior' in 1944, interest and research in the subject underwent a phase of rapid and extensive growth. It is now regarded by economists and social scientists as a central theory of human strategic interaction, and in recent years it has even entered the conversations of an educated public.

In this master's level course, we will study the logical and analytic underpinnings of game theory, as well as its economic applications. From the rigorous formulation of models of interaction and the concept of strategies, we will move on to the positive and normative assertions of game theory – Nash Equilibrium, Iterated Deletion of Dominated Strategies, Rationalizability, Sub-game Perfection, Evolutionary Stability etc., and examine assumptions about human decision and social institutions that may support these assertions. Many of these ideas have been motivated by economic phenomena, which still provide the best illustrations of game theory as well as inspirations for game theorists.

It is also well known that game theory frequently makes predictions which appear to be at odds with observed human behavior, whether seen in natural settings or deliberate experiments. We will discuss some of these findings, and may occasionally engage in experimentation ourselves. However, even when we feel that game theory fails to deliver empirically sound predictions or prescriptions, a useful way to understand why it may be so is to scrutinize its assumptions and logic as closely and deeply as we can.

The student is assumed to come equipped with basic knowledge of economic theory and mathematics (including some calculus and probability theory), but most important of all is his/her ability and willingness to think clearly and logically.

**COURSE SCHEDULE** See attached.

Registered students should check the course website at <https://learn.bu.edu/> frequently for course material, announcements, updates on the schedule, and grades.

**ACADEMIC CONDUCT**

It is the student's responsibility to read, understand and observe the University's *Academic Conduct Code*. (For graduate students <http://www.bu.edu/cas/students/graduate/grs-forms-policies-procedures/academic-discipline-procedures/>; for undergraduates: <http://www.bu.edu/academics/resources/academic-conduct-code/>). Cases of suspected misconduct will be referred to the appropriate University authorities. Furthermore, acts of plagiarism or cheating will be penalized with failing grades.

**COURSE SCHEDULE** Details of this schedule are subject to change. Registered students can log into the course website at <https://learn.bu.edu/>. You should visit this website frequently to get the latest course schedule, check announcements, obtain class material and verify your personal grading record.

- ◆ LECTURE and READING are complements rather than substitutes. To do well in this course, you must understand both thoroughly. Readings from the TEXT are given in this schedule. Additional reading will be assigned or suggested from time to time.
- ◆ HOMEWORK problems will be assigned from time to time in relation to the progress of the course. Although they will not be collected and graded, working through practice problems is essential for mastering the course material and preparing for the exams. SOLUTIONS to the exams and some homework problems will be posted on the course website, and we may devote some time in class to solving problems. But you will not benefit from the solutions until you have worked seriously on the problems.
- ◆ EXAM dates are given below. The two exams will test your comprehensive understanding of the course material up to the time of the exam.

DATE	LECTURE	READING
W9/07	<b>Modeling Strategic Interactions</b>	Chapter 1
M9/12	<b>Extensive Form Games with Complete and Perfect Information</b> Backward Induction and the problems it raises	Chapters 5, 6, 7
W9/14	Zermelo's Theorem and the Game of Chess Centipede Game & Chain Store Paradox	
M9/19	Rubinstein Bargaining Model and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium	Chapter 16 Section 16.1 (Sec.16.2-4 are of related interest but not part of the course)
W9/21	<b>Strategic (Normal) Form Games with Complete Information</b> Nash Equilibrium and the problems it raises	Chapters 2, 3, 4
M9/26	Cournot & Bertrand Models of Oligopoly	
W9/28	Strategic Substitutes vs. Strategic Complements	
M10/03	Iterated Deletion of Dominated Strategies Maximin and Rationalizable Strategies	Chapters 11, 12
W10/05	Mixed Strategy and Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies	
M10/10	<Holiday; Substitute Monday Schedule on Tuesday 10/11>	
T10/11	Existence of Nash Equilibrium	
W10/12	<b>Strategic (Normal) Form Games with Incomplete Information</b>	Chapter 9
M10/17	Decision under Uncertainty and Statistical Inference	
W10/19	Bayesian Nash Equilibrium	
M10/24	Correlated Equilibrium	
W10/26	Auctions, Price Discrimination & Contracts	
M10/31	Review, Discussion or Experiment	
W11/02	EXAM 1: covers course material through 10/31	

**EC513(A1)****FALL 2016**

<b>DATE</b>	<b>LECTURE</b>	<b>READING</b>
M11/07	<b>Repeated Games</b> Inter-temporal Preference and Decision	Chapters 14, 15
W11/09	Reward, Punishment and Cooperation Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Payoffs and Strategies	
M11/14	<b>Social Norms</b> Third-Party Sanction	
W11/16	Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and Recursive Strategies	
M11/21	<b>Extensive Form Games with Imperfect Information</b> Sequential Rationality and Inference about the Past Imperfect Recall	Chapter 10
	<i>&lt;Thanksgiving Recess&gt;</i>	
M11/28	<b>Extensive Form Games with Incomplete Information</b> Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium	
W11/30	Signaling and Screening in Labor Markets	
M12/05	Reputation in Repeated Interactions & Monetary Policy Cheap Talk, Persuasion & Debate	
W12/07	<b>Evolution of Behavior and Belief</b>	Chapter 13
M12/12	Population Dynamics and Evolutionary Stability	
F12/16 <3-5pm>	EXAM 2: covers material from the whole course	