This paper measures the relative importance of party platforms versus expected policy outcomes in the voting decisions of individuals in proportional (PR) systems.
To do so, I use survey pre-electoral data from the 2006 Israeli elections. I assume there are two types of voters: party-oriented voters (voters who mainly care about
party identity) and policy-oriented (voters who mainly care about policy outcomes). I find that the proportion of coalition policy voters is around 5%-10%.
This is smaller than the proportion found in previous studies for other countries with PR systems. The key to explaining this di erence is the fact that this paper
uses individual subjective perceptions about party platforms and likelihood of the different coalitions. Moreover, including these perceptions in the model improves
the fit. Lastly, I show that Labour and Likud are the parties who gained most from policy voting.
Maoris in New Zealand have the option to choose every five years whether they want to vote in a General Electorate
(with all other citizens) or in a Maori-only Electorate. Under a MMP system like the one in New Zealand, this enrollment choice affects
only who they vote for local representative (not the party vote). This paper gathers Census and enrollment data at a meshblock level (smallest unit)
to analyze the reasons why Maoris opt for the General or the Maori electoral roll. The hypothesis is that Maoris opt to register where their
vote can be more pivotal. That is, they observe the past results in the district they are registered, and the one they could be registered in,
and opt for the one in which the last elections were closer.
Jointly with
Simon Hix (LSE) and
Rafael Hortala-Vallve (LSE)
The goal of this note is to re-interpret and further analyze the results of Bargsted and Kedar (2009). BK argue that voters who take into
consideration the probabilities of the different coalitions cast their vote in order to affect government formation and policy outcomes. Strategic
considerations only affect the likelihood of voting for Kadima, Labour or Likud, but not smaller parties. I contend that (i) what they are capturing
is indistinguishable from a bandwagon effect, and (ii) their fndings rely on the particular specification of the proxy for `Expected Coalition' they use.
I carry out the same exercise as BK using an extra set of controls for expected number of seats and an alternative specification of the proxy
for expected coalition. My results show two interesting patterns. First, expected seats seem to be more important in voters' strategies than coalition
considerations. Second, increased likelihood of a rightist coalition induces voters to vote less for rightist parties (as opposed to BK).
These somewhat puzzling results suggest that there were several kinds of strategic behavior in the 2006 Israeli legislative elections.
I really like their paper, very neat and worth reading. Click here to read the original Bargsted Kedar (2009)
Another project assesses how quickly agents learn to manipulate repeated lotteries when they have the means to do so.
To that avail, I collect data from F.C. Barcelona (a soccer team) on applications for tickets for important games,
between 2006 and 2011. These tickets are awarded through a lottery. Given the way this lottery is set, agents have effective
means of increasing their odds to get a ticket. The goal is to answer the following: First, are agents aware that they can affect
their odds? Second, do agents learn how to implement optimal strategies when the lottery is played repeatedly? And third, does
public information about other agents’ behavior affect individual strategies? The results have implications on the area of
mechanism design.