

GUILLEM RIAMBAU

90 Academy Hill Rd. apt. 2
Brighton MA 02135
Cell: (857) 225-0732
Fax: (617) 353-4449
Email: griambau@bu.edu

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, April 2012 (expected). *Essays on Strategic Voting Behavior*
B.A., Economics, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain, 2005
B.A., Political Science, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain, 2001

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Political Economy, Applied Microeconomics, Development Economics.
Electoral Systems, Comparative Politics, Voting Behavior.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Intermediate Macroeconomics (EC202), Boston University, Fall 2011, Spring 2012.
Guest Lecturer and Teaching Fellow, Principles of Economics (EconS10ab), Harvard Summer School, Summer 2010, 2011.
Instructor, International Finance (EC392), Boston University, Summer 2010, 2011
Teaching Fellow, Macroeconomic Theory (EC102), Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2010, 2011.
Teaching Fellow, Microeconomic Theory (EC101), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2009, 2010.
Teaching Fellow, Advanced Macroeconomics (Honors), Department of Economics, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spring 2006
Teaching Fellow, Intermediate Macroeconomics, Department of Economics, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Fall 2005

AWARDS

Special DGS prize for sustained excellence in teaching services, Boston University, 2011. (This award is meant to recognize long term excellence in teaching services. It is sponsored by the department of economics and the director of graduate studies and need not be given every year).
Extraordinary Degree Prize (Prize awarded to the top three graduates), BA in Economics, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2005.
UNESCO Center for Peace and Human Rights Research Grant, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2002-2003. (Research focused on the conflict in Northern Ireland).
Extraordinary Degree Prize, BA in Political Science, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2001.

FELLOWSHIPS

Boston University, Teaching Fellowship, Academic Year 2009/10 and 2010/11
Fundacion Ramon Areces (SPAIN) Scholarship, Academic Years 2006/7, 2007/8, 2008/9
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Teaching Fellowship, Academic Year 2005/6

WORKING PAPERS

“Voting for Parties or Policies? Evidence from Israel” November 2011.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Maoris in New Zealand: Voting with their Feet? How Citizens of Ethnic Maori Descent use their Right to Register in which Electorate to Vote”

“What Drives Strategic Voting in PR systems? Evidence from Multiple Countries”

“Do agents improve their odds in a lottery when they have means to *effectively* do so?”

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

JEPA, Tokyo, Japan (November 2010)

MPSA, Chicago, USA (April 2011)

WPSA, San Antonio, USA (April 2011)

MPSA, Chicago, USA (April 2012)

LANGUAGES

Spanish and Catalan (native) English (fluent) French, German (intermediate)

COMPUTER SKILLS: STATA, SAS, MATLAB, LaTeX, Scientific WorkPlace, Microsoft Office

OTHER: Graduate Economics Association president (2008/9). Co-founder and current president of the BU Political Economy Reading Group ([BUPERG](#)).

CITIZENSHIP/VISA: SPAIN/F1

REFERENCES

JORDI JAUMANDREU

SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
270 BAY STATE ROAD, 02215 BOSTON, MA
PHONE: 617 353 4010
EMAIL: JORDIJ@BU.EDU

DANIELE PASERMAN

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
270 BAY STATE ROAD, 02215 BOSTON, MA
PHONE: 617 353 5695
EMAIL: PASERMAN@BU.EDU

LAURENT BOUTON

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
270 BAY STATE ROAD, 02215 BOSTON, MA
PHONE: 617 350 5693
EMAIL: LBOUTON@BU.EDU

BRUCE WATSON

LECTURER
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
270 BAY STATE ROAD, 02215 BOSTON, MA
PHONE: 617 353 5832
EMAIL: BDWATSON@BU.EDU

October 2011

“Voting for Parties or Policies?. Evidence from Israel” (Job Market Paper)

This paper measures the relative importance of party platforms versus expected policy outcomes in the voting decisions of individuals in proportional (PR) systems. To do so, I use pre-electoral survey data from the 2006 Israeli elections. I assume there are two types of voters: party-oriented (voters who care mainly about party identity) and policy-oriented (voters who care mainly about policy outcomes). I find that the proportion of policy voters is around 5%-10%. This is smaller than the proportion found in previous studies for other countries with PR systems. The key to explaining this difference is the fact that this paper uses individual subjective perceptions about party platforms and likelihood of the different coalitions. Importantly, including these perceptions in the model improves the fit. Lastly, I show that Labour and Likud are the parties who gained most from policy voting.

“Maoris in New Zealand: Voting with their Feet? How Citizens of Ethnic Maori Descent Use their Right to Register in which Electorate to Vote”

Maoris in New Zealand have the option to choose every five years whether they want to vote in a General Electorate (with all other citizens) or in a Maori-only Electorate. This paper gathers Census and enrollment data at a meshblock level (smallest unit) since 1991 to analyze the reasons why Maoris opt for the General or the Maori electoral roll. The goal is to check whether Maoris opt to register where their vote is more likely to be pivotal. That is, Maoris observe how close the elections were in the district they are enrolled and in the one they could have been enrolled. Do they then register in the Roll in which results were closer? Results suggest that enrollment choices by and large respond to ethnic and cultural allegiances, but that pivotal considerations are a decisive factor for a non-negligible subset of the Maori population.

“What Drives Strategic Voting in PR systems? Evidence from Multiple Countries”

The degree of strategic voting has been measured in several countries with different PR systems. Nonetheless, there has been no study that has aimed to empirically analyze the particular impact of party system, polarization, electoral threshold and district size upon strategic voting in PR systems. This is the gap this paper addresses, using data from six different countries: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and New Zealand.

“Do agents improve their odds in a lottery when they have the means to *effectively* do so?”

This paper aims to answer three questions. First, if agents have some means to affect their odds, do they effectively maximize their chances of winning a lottery? Second, is there any Bayesian updating amongst agents when the lottery is played repeatedly? And third, does public information about other agents' behavior affect individual strategies? We use data from lotteries set to allocate tickets for soccer games played by F.C. Barcelona between 2006 and 2011 to answer them.