[under construction]The Paternity of the H-Bombs: Soviet-American Perspectives
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The
US-Soviet Chronology of H-bomb
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The US-Soviet Chronology of H-bomb
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FAQHow much did the American road to the H-bomb differ from the Soviet one? A lot. It took one great leap to cross the chasm from nuke to thermonuke when Teller made his invention in 1951. Sakharov managed to do it in two smaller leaps: first, by inventing the "1st Idea" (= Sloyka) in 1948, then - in 1954 - by conceiving the 3rd Idea. It means that in Russia it was not exactly a chasm. Or, in other words, in 1951 Teller had to make a double invention. Since 1948 Sakharov dealt with compression, was thinking about “atomic compression” and was just to discover a proper tool – radiation – for proper compression. In both cases the development of the brilliant ideas required a great deal of creative effort in science and engineering by many people. It was “The Work of Many People,” as Teller titled his article of 1955, there were 31 names of scientists in the final Soviet report on the H-bomb in 1955. That is why the term “father of H-bomb” is not good enough. “Grandfather” is better, - it does not sound so dead serious, even if it is inapplicable to Teller and Sakharov. Could Klaus Fuchs be named a grandfather of all H-bombs? It is reasonable to think so at least for the first three H-bombs - American, Soviet, and British, since Fuchs contributed into all the three: 1) his invention of 1946 helped Teller to become the father of the American H-bomb in 1951; 2) his espionage report of Spring 1948 urged the Soviet leaders to boost H-bomb research, in particular, by establishing a new research team that included Sakharov; it is also probable that some ideas from the Fuchs's 1948 report contributed (via Zeldovich) into development of the 3rd idea in 1954; 3) in Britain he was the first Head of the Theoretical Division at the Harwell Atomic Energy Research Establishment. Is it true that Sakharov, the most prominent Soviet expert in H-bomb affairs, never saw the most valuable Soviet intelligence on H-bomb - Fuchs’s espionage report of 1948? What are the reasons to believe it, and how could it be? To see these reasons it's worthwhile to compare two most prominent theorists of the Soviet thermonuclear weaponry, Zeldovich and Sakharov. There is unambiguous documentary evidence that Zeldovich examined Fuchs’s report in the Spring of 1948 as well as earlier reports, while there is no evidence that he ever talked about intelligence’s involvement into the Soviet H-bomb. On the other hand there is no documentary evidence that Sakharov had ever access to Fuchs’s reports (there is only documentary evidence of Sakharov’s access to the pure data on DT-reaction extracted from the report and presented as “preliminary experimental data, and these data had been published in Physical Review two weeks before!). What is even more important, Sakharov did discuss intelligence’s involvement into the Soviet H-bomb. His clear statement of his commitment to maintain secrecy together with his surmise about "imported" 0th idea (= Truba), and his reference to D. Holloway's article imply that Sakharov never saw (Fuchs’s) espionage report of 1948. Otherwise he would had known for sure that Zeldovich's Truba design was based on intelligence and therefore by surmising on the subject he would had breached secrecy. Regardless all the Soviet irrationalities there were quite rational reasons not to show Fuchs’s 1948 report to Sakharov. First, this report had been examined, assessed, and therefore assimilated by Zeldovich before Sakharov was drafted into the H-bomb business. Second, Sakharov made his name in this business by inventing Sloyka design that had nothing to do with Truba design which was detailed in Fuchs’s report. So this report was just irrelevant to development of Sloyka, and there were no good reason to disclose top sensitive information to a new person. Are there alternative views on the history of the 3rd-Idea H-bomb? Yes, there are. The first who questioned the Soviet originality of the 3rd Idea was Lev Feoktistov, a Soviet H-bomb veteran. He based wholly on his recollections and impressions. He worked under Zeldovich since 1951 and knew him quite well, but he had never heard Zeldovich confirm his role in the invention of the 3rd Idea, although Zeldovich was not overly humble about taking credit and priority for his ideas. A crucial fact for Feoktistov was too sudden emergence of the 3rd Idea. The idea seemed to have dropped from the sky, and he surmised that someone – presumably some American – had propelled this idea into the Soviet firmament. He concluded his 1996 article, “The Hydrogen Bomb: Who Betrayed Its Secret?” with “the feeling that we weren’t entirely independent at that time.” The amazement about the sudden emergence of the 3rd Idea could be dealt with by comparing it with the similar moment in the history of the American H-bomb. It’s known that Bethe characterized Teller’s invention of radiation implosion as an unpredictable, accidental discovery, a stroke of genius. If amazed Bethe could imagine that there might have been some extraneous source of Teller’s insight – such as espionage – and if Bethe had not known his long-time close friend Teller so well, he could think like Feoktistov. Sakharov’s description of the coauthoring of the 3rd Idea does challenge historians. How could several people come up with a brainchild like this simultaneously? And why “one of the main authors” was so unsure in his account of the invention? The comparative history of the H-bomb again shed light on these questions. One should keep in mind that Sakharov didn’t know that, a few months before he joined the H-bomb project, Zeldovich had examined (Fuchs’s) 1948 espionage report but failed to appreciate the embryo of the 3rd Idea, aka radiation implosion (just like American colleagues of Fuchs until 1951). Although Zeldovich dismissed the idea, he must have remember some details from the Fuchs’s report, and as soon as Sakharov, in the spring of 1954, achieved his insight on the constructive role of radiation (or the 3rd Idea), Zeldovich could add his extraneous knowledge. As an honest man of secret science, Zeldovich, could not disclose his extraneous source and could not claim coauthorship of the 3rd Idea. However, if Zeldovich did use some ideas from Fuchs’s report in developing the 3rd Idea, that would strengthen his contribution in Sakharov’s eyes, so that Sakharov’s perception of the origin of the idea had to be ambiguous. Sakharov apparently tried to describe honestly, without going into classified technical details, a picture that to him was indeed ambiguous. The real combination of Sakharov’s actual knowledge, surmises, and lack of knowledge conforms to Zeldovich’s great appreciation of Sakharov’s talent at the time when the 3rd Idea was born. As Zeldovich put it: “I can understand and take the measure of other physicists, but Sakharov – he’s something else, something special.” Zeldovich grasped Sakharov’s uniqueness when they were working together on the 3rd-Idea H-bomb. Quite recently, two specific scenarios of American involvement in the birth of the 3rd Idea were suggested. A Soviet H-bomb veteran, German Goncharov, believes that in the 1954 Sakharov and Zeldovich revisited the 6-years-old Fuchs’s report and discovered there a seed idea of radiation implosion. An American veteran Tom Reed believes that the Soviets acquired the seed idea via a brand new (late by now) Soviet spy at the Los Alamos who was involved in the American H-bomb work. Both German Goncharov and Tom Reed were very important sources and interlocutors for my research on history of the H-bomb and biography of Sakharov. However, in my view, these hypothetical scenarios are incompatible with the whole net of available well documented facts and chronology of the Soviet H-bomb history. This incompatibility is demonstrated in details in the revised 3rd edition of my book on Andrei Sakharov that is due this year in Moscow. See you there, if you can read Russian. If you can’t, you are welcome to e-ask specific questions in English Sincerely yours Gennady Gorelik |