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Here are some working papers and some work in progress:
| selected Working Papers:
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The Political Economy
of Immigration: Limits of the Median Voter Model
We compare the predictions of the standard median-voter model of
immigration policy with data from the last century. We begin by
extending the model to allow for technological change and endogenous
schooling. This makes it possible for the model to be consistent with
the large increase over the second half of the 20th century in
education among native-born Americans. However, the model is still
unable to match other patterns observed in the data such as the
simultaneous increases in the proportion of immigrants who have
attended college. We conclude that the median voter is not appropriate
for analyzing US immigration policy. This failure of the median voter
model provides the context for the model of immigration policy in the
second chapter of my thesis.
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Technological Change and Immigration Policy
We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model to address the effects
of technological progress on immigrant skill composition. Our results
from this positive model suggest that neutral and skill-biased
technological change imply essentially different immigration policies.
On the one hand, skill-neutral change implies an immigrant skill
distribution that is dominated by the native skill distribution; on
the other hand, skill-biased change implies an immigrant
overrepresentation at the top and bottom of the skill distribution.
This result is interesting because of its unexpected nature. It
implies that if technology changes as it has in the last decades and
education has an increasing cost, then it is optimal to allow some
low-skill immigration along with high-skill immigration. We show
consistency of our model's predictions with data from the United
States and Canada.
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Discrimination
and Freedom of Speech
This essay shows that political correctness (self-censorship) may
benefit society by effectively avoiding discrimination in a fairly
general class of social interactions. The rationale for this effect is
that speech, despite being per se harmless, may permit others
to gauge the viability of any discriminatory action in a social
context. That is, speech may signal whether the individual will
approve or disapprove of discriminatory actions taken by others and
therefore influence the perceived cost of undertaking such actions.
Thus political correctness, an implicit convention of restrained
speech, need not have purely negative effects by suppressing welfare
enhancing information. Instead, political correctness may be an
effective instrument for reducing discrimination. |
Work in progress:
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Introducing a New
Estimator for Errors-In-Variables Models |
The typical solution to the
measurement-error problem in linear models is the IV estimator. In
theory this estimator has remarkable properties but in practice,
despite the ubiquitous use of it throughout the profession, there are
very few instances were it is actually a feasible alternative. Indeed,
good instruments are rare and the soundness of the rest is often
impossible to accurately judge. On the other hand, non-parametric
results are available but their application is severely limited when
it comes to linear models and normal disturbances. We would like to propose an
instrument-free estimator with good large-sample properties.
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Government Design:
Insights from Behavioral Economics
(joint with Jörgen
Weibull) |
We consider the phenomenon of
time-inconsistency in individual preferences and explore it's
implications for political economy in democracies (i.e. majority rule)
as well as for utilitarian governments. We introduce heterogeneity
(initially only) in the myopic behavior for more general results.
Finally, we put forth some examples of "stationary" inefficiencies
that can frequently happen in governments and propose a mechanism to
address/solve/minimize them.
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Language and Vagueness |
We consider the question posed by
Lipman(2006): "Why is language vague?". We try to answer this question
in the simplest possible framework. We then show how, indeed as Lipman
conjectures, bounded rationality is necessary to account for such a
phenomenon. Finally we point towards future extensions that would
benefit from a more general framework for language; and we postulate
some characteristics that such a framework must include.
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