Stefania Garetto

 

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PUBLICATIONS

"Input Sourcing and Multinational Production". (2013). "The American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics " 5(2): 118-151.

Abstract. I propose a general equilibrium framework where firms decide whether to outsource or integrate input manufacturing, domestically or abroad. By outsourcing, firms may benefit from suppliers' technologies, but pay mark-up prices. By sourcing intrafirm, they save on mark-ups and pay possibly lower foreign wages. Multinational corporations arise when firms integrate production abroad. The model predicts that intrafirm imports are positively correlated with the mean and variance of the firms' productivity distribution, and with the degree of input differentiation. I use the model to quantify the U.S. welfare gains from intrafirm trade, which amount to about 0.23 percent of consumption per-capita.

 

WORKING PAPERS

"Risk, Returns, and Multinational Production", with Jose L. Fillat (July 2012), under revision

Abstract. This paper starts by unveiling a new empirical regularity: multinational corporations systematically exhibit higher stock market returns and earnings yields than non-multinational firms. Within non-multinationals, exporters tend to exhibit higher earnings yields and returns than firms selling only in their domestic market. To explain this pattern, we develop a real option value model where firms are heterogeneous in productivity, and have to decide whether and how to sell in a foreign market where demand is risky. Firms selling abroad are exposed to risk: following a negative shock, they are reluctant to exit the foreign market because they would forgo the sunk cost that they paid to start investing abroad. Multinational firms are the most exposed due to the higher sunk costs they have to pay to enter. The model, calibrated to match aggregate U.S. export and foreign direct investment data, is able to replicate the observed cross-sectional differences in earnings yields and returns.

 

"Firms'Heterogeneity and Incomplete Pass-Through" (March 2014), submitted

Abstract.A large body of empirical work documents that prices of traded goods change by a smaller proportion than real exchange rates between the trading countries (incomplete pass-through). The wedge between exchange rates and relative prices also varies across countries (pricing-tomarket).
I present a model of trade and international price-setting with heterogeneous firms, where firms' strategic behavior implies that: 1) firm-level pass-through is incomplete and a U-shaped function of firm market share; 2) exchange rate fluctuations affect both the prices of traded goods and the prices of goods sold domestically; and 3) firm-level pass-through varies across destination countries. Estimates from a panel data set of cars prices support the predictions of the model.

 

"Diversification, Cost Structure, and the Risk Premium of Multinational Corporations", with Jose L. Fillat and Lindsay Oldenski (May 2014), R&R at the Journal of International Economics

Abstract.We investigate theoretically and empirically the relationship between the geographic structure of a multinational corporation and its
risk premium. Our structural model suggests two channels. On the one hand, multinational activity offers diversification benefits: risk premia
should be higher for firms operating in countries where shocks co-vary more with the domestic ones. Second, hysteresis and potential losses
induced by fixed and sunk costs of production imply that risk premia should be higher for firms operating in countries where is costlier to
enter. Our empirical analysis confirms these predictions and delivers a decomposition of firm-level risk premia into individual countries' contributions.

 

WORK IN PROGRESS

"Multinational Banks", with Martin Goetz and Jose L. Fillat, [slides]

Abstract. 15% of the loans in the US are held by foreign banking institutions, headquartered in more than 50 countries. While earlier research documented the entry mode of foreign institutions in the United States, very little is known about foreign banks' motive to enter the U.S. We address this gap by asking: why do foreign banks enter in the US market? And what drives the institutional form they adopt upon entry? Using bank-level data, we present novel stylized facts describing characteristics of foreign institutions and compare then to the incumbent set of banks. Our findings suggest that several factors affect the form of entry: demand, business type, differences between countries' regulatory requirements, and access to funding. We incorporate these facts into a structural model of entry in the banking sector where profit maximizing foreign banks decide whether and how to enter the US market. The model sheds light on the relationship between market access, capital flows, regulation, and entry, and has implications for the risk exposure that different organizational forms entail.

 

"Large Firm Dynamics", with Bailey Brame and Jose L. Fillat

Abstract. The literature on trade dynamics documents patterns of entry and exit into and out of foreign markets mostly for small firms. This paper documents a similar dynamic behavior for large firms, distinguishing entry via export and via FDI, and switches across different modes of serving foreign markets. Using firm-level data for a sample of U.S.-based, publicly listed manufacturing firms, we find that: 1. the data exhibit significant entry and exit flows also for large firms, both via export and FDI sales; 2. export status is highly persistent, and FDI status is even more persistent. 3. the international status of the firm is linked to stock market-based financial indicators.

 

"Becoming a Multinational", with Jose L. Fillat

 

"The Long-Run Risk of Foreign Direct Investment", with Jose L. Fillat