

FRANCISCO J. PINO

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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2012 (expected)

Dissertation Title: *Three Essays in the Political Economy of Under-Represented Groups*

Dissertation Committee: Dilip Mookherjee, Daniele Paserman, Laurent Bouton and Robert Margo

M.A. Political Economy, Boston University, Boston, MA, 2010

B.Sc., Industrial Engineering, University of Chile, Santiago, Chile, 2001

B.Sc., Electrical Engineering, University of Chile, Santiago, Chile, 2001

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Development Economics, Political Economy, Labor Economics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Labor Economics, Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2009

Teaching Fellow, Introductory Economic Analysis (EC101), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2009 and Fall 2008

Instructor, Macroeconomics, Engineering School, University of Chile, Spring 2007 and Fall 2004

Teaching Fellow, Industrial Organization, Engineering School, University of Chile, Fall 2005

Teaching Fellow, Macroeconomics, Engineering School, University of Chile, 2001-2003

WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant to Professor Dilip Mookherjee (Boston University), 2010-2011

Research Assistant to Professors Laura Alfaro (Harvard Business School), Andrew Newman (Boston University) and Paola Conconi (ECARES), 2009-2010

Research Analyst, Research Department, Superintendency of Pensions, Chile, 08/2003 – 06/2007

Junior Advisor, Ministry of Public Works, Chile, 11/2002 – 07/2003

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Research Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2011

Rosenstein-Rodan prize for the best paper in development economics, Institute for Economic Development, Boston University, 2010

Summer Research Grant, Boston University, 2010

Teaching Fellowship, Boston University, 2008-2009

Fulbright Scholarship, 2007-2009

Ministry of Planning Scholarship, Chile, 2007

Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award, M.P.P., University of Chile, 2003

PUBLICATIONS/SUBMITTED PAPERS

- Bardhan, Pranab, Luca, Mike, Mookherjee, Dilip and Pino, Francisco (2011) “The Evolution of Land Distribution in West Bengal 1967-2003: Role of Land Reform”, *IED Discussion Paper #217, May 2011. Submitted to the Journal of Development Economics*.
- Berstein, Solange, Larraín, Guillermo and Pino, Francisco (2006) “Chilean Pension Reform: Coverage Facts and Policy Alternatives”, *Journal Economía, 6, 125-137*.

WORKING PAPERS

- “Is There Gender Bias Among Voters? Evidence from the Chilean Congressional Elections”, Job Market Paper, October 2011
- “ $2+1<3$: Strategic Voting in the Chilean Congressional Elections”, November 2010
- “Income inequality in an Individual Capitalization Pension System: The case of Chile” (with Gonzalo Reyes), January 2006

WORK IN PROGRESS

- “Papal States: Division, Elections and Conflicts” (joint with Jordi Vidal-Robert)

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

- Alexander Hamilton Center Graduate Student Conference, New York University, New York, USA, May 2011
- Northeast Universities Development Consortium Conference (poster), Cambridge, MA, USA, Nov 2010
- Chilean Economic Society, Annual Meeting, Viña del Mar, Chile, Sept 2005
- 4th Meeting on Social Security and Complementary Pensions Systems, Lisbon, Portugal, May 2005

OTHER

- Boston University Political Economy Reading Group, coordinator (2010-present)
- Graduate Economics Association, Boston University, co-president (2009-2010)

LANGUAGES: Fluent in English, Spanish native speaker, Intermediate French

COMPUTER SKILLS: Stata, Matlab, LaTeX, ArcGIS

CITIZENSHIP: CHILE

REFERENCES

Professor Dilip Mookherjee

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November 2011

FRANCISCO J. PINO

Is There Gender Bias Among Voters? Evidence from the Chilean Congressional Elections (Job Market Paper)

Do women voters exhibit a bias in favor of female candidates? Previous research analyzing this question has relied on self-reported surveys, raising the possibility of differential survey response bias. I exploit the unique institution of gender-segregated voting booths in Chile, which allows me to use actual voting data to test for gender bias among voters. I find evidence of a small but significant negative gender bias—women less likely than men to vote for female candidates—on average, driven by female voters supporting center-right parties who tend to discriminate against female candidates. These results are robust to controls for endogenous selection of candidates by parties, and are not explained away by municipality characteristics or candidates' incumbency and experience. Roll-call voting data from the Chamber of Deputies show that elected female politicians in the center-right coalition deviate from the party line by taking a stronger pro-women stance on social issues such as health, family, education and justice. Moreover, women voters punish center-right female legislators who deviate from the party line, but reward those who deviate on social issues. This provides evidence against policy-based explanations of the gender bias of center-right women supporters.

2+1<3: Strategic Voting in the Chilean Congressional Elections

In 1989 Chile ended 17 years of dictatorship and resumed its democratic tradition with presidential and congressional elections. I take advantage of the distinctive features of the electoral system in congressional elections (commonly known as binominal) to test for the presence of strategic voting. I find that, under the preferred specification, having an election close to a doubling threshold (i.e. having both candidates elected from the same coalition) decreases the vote share of small coalitions by between 7% and 11%. The results are robust to different specifications, and to the inclusion of the lagged share of votes for small coalitions and the number of candidates as additional covariates. Most of the strategic behavior comes from supporters of small right-wing coalitions, who shift their vote to the center-right when the center-left is close to the doubling threshold.

Evolution of Land Distribution in West Bengal 1967-2004: Role of Land Reform and Demographic Changes (with Pranab Bardhan, Michael Luca and Dilip Mookherjee)

This paper uses recall data from a household survey to evaluate the roles of land reforms and demographic changes in explaining changes in land distribution in West Bengal between 1967-2004. The direct role of the land reforms was insignificant relative to household division, migration and land market transactions. We develop a model of how household division and market transactions are affected by demographic changes and land reforms, and find the evidence consistent with these predictions. However the tenancy registration program did not significantly reduce inequality, while the land title program reduced inequality by reducing landlessness directly.