Chapter 7

THE HUMAN CAPITAL MODEL*

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Abstract

This chapter contains a detailed treatment of the human capital model of the demand for health which was originally developed in 1972. Theoretical predictions are discussed, and theoretical extensions of the model are reviewed. Empirical research that tests the predictions of the model or studies causality between years of formal schooling completed and good health is surveyed. The model views health as a durable capital stock that yields an output of healthy time. Individuals inherit an initial amount of this stock that depreciates with age and can be increased by investment. The household production function model of consumer behavior is employed to account for the gap between health as an output and medical care as one of many inputs into its production. In this framework the “shadow price” of health depends on many variables besides the price of medical care. It is shown that the shadow price rises with age if the rate of depreciation on the stock of health rises over the life cycle and falls with education (years of formal schooling completed) if more educated people are more efficient producers of health. An important result is that, under certain conditions, an increase in the shadow price may simultaneously reduce the quantity of health demanded and increase the quantities of health inputs demanded.

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1. Introduction

Almost three decades have elapsed since I published my National Bureau of Economic Research monograph [Grossman (1972b)] and Journal of Political Economy paper [Grossman (1972a)] dealing with a theoretical and empirical investigation of the demand for the commodity "good health." My work was motivated by the fundamental difference between health as an output and medical care as one of a number of inputs into the production of health and by the equally important difference between health capital and other forms of human capital. According to traditional demand theory, each consumer has a utility or preference function that allows him or her to rank alternative combinations of goods and services purchased in the market. Consumers are assumed to select that combination that maximizes their utility function subject to an income or resource constraint: namely, outlays on goods and services cannot exceed income. While this theory provides a satisfactory explanation of the demand for many goods and services, students of medical economics have long realized that what consumers demand when they purchase medical services are not these services per se but rather better health. Indeed, as early as 1789, Bentham included relief of pain as one of fifteen "simple pleasures" which exhausted the list of basic arguments in one's utility function [Bentham (1931)]. The distinction between health as an output or an object of choice and medical care as an input had not, however, been exploited in the theoretical and empirical literature prior to 1972.

My approach to the demand for health has been labeled as the human capital model in much of the literature on health economics because it draws heavily on human capital theory [Becker (1964, 1967), Ben-Porath (1967), Mincer (1974)]. According to human capital theory, increases in a person's stock of knowledge or human capital raise his productivity in the market sector of the economy, where he produces money earnings, and in the nonmarket or household sector, where he produces commodities that enter his utility function. To realize potential gains in productivity, individuals have an incentive to invest in formal schooling and on-the-job training. The costs of these investments include direct outlays on market goods and the opportunity cost of the time that must be withdrawn from competing uses. This framework was used by Becker (1967) and by Ben-Porath (1967) to develop models that determine the optimal quantity of investment in human capital at any age. In addition, these models show how the optimal quantity varies over the life cycle of an individual and among individuals of the same age.

Although Mushkin (1962), Becker (1964), and Fuchs (1966) had pointed out that health capital is one component of the stock of human capital, I was the first person to construct a model of the demand for health capital itself. If increases in the stock of health simply increased wage rates, my undertaking would not have been necessary, for

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1 My monograph was the final publication in the Occasional Paper Series of the National Bureau of Economic Research. It is somewhat ironic that the publication of a study dealing with the demand for health marked the death of the series.
one could simply have applied Becker's and Ben-Porath's models to study the decision to invest in health. I argued, however, that health capital differs from other forms of human capital. In particular, I argued that a person's stock of knowledge affects his market and nonmarket productivity, while his stock of health determines the total amount of time he can spend producing money earnings and commodities.

My approach uses the household production function model of consumer behavior [Becker (1965), Lancaster (1966), Michael and Becker (1973)] to account for the gap between health as an output and medical care as one of many inputs into its production. This model draws a sharp distinction between fundamental objects of choice — called commodities — that enter the utility function and market goods and services. These commodities are Bentham's (1931) pleasures that exhaust the basic arguments in the utility function. Consumers produce commodities with inputs of market goods and services and their own time. For example, they use sporting equipment and their own time to produce recreation, traveling time and transportation services to produce visits, and part of their Sundays and church services to produce "peace of mind." The concept of a household production function is perfectly analogous to a firm production function. Each relates a specific output or a vector of outputs to a set of inputs. Since goods and services are inputs into the production of commodities, the demand for these goods and services is a derived demand for a factor of production. That is, the demand for medical care and other health inputs is derived from the basic demand for health.

There is an important link between the household production theory of consumer behavior and the theory of investment in human capital. Consumers as investors in their human capital produce these investments with inputs of their own time, books, teachers' services, and computers. Thus, some of the outputs of household production directly enter the utility function, while other outputs determine earnings or wealth in a life cycle context. Health, on the other hand, does both.

In my model, health — defined broadly to include longevity and illness-free days in a given year — is both demanded and produced by consumers. Health is a choice variable because it is a source of utility (satisfaction) and because it determines income or wealth levels. That is, health is demanded by consumers for two reasons. As a consumption commodity, it directly enters their preference functions, or, put differently, sick days are a source of disutility. As an investment commodity, it determines the total amount of time available for market and nonmarket activities. In other words, an increase in the stock of health reduces the amount of time lost from these activities, and the monetary value of this reduction is an index of the return to an investment in health.

Since health capital is one component of human capital, a person inherits an initial stock of health that depreciates with age — at an increasing rate at least after some stage in the life cycle — and can be increased by investment. Death occurs when the stock falls below a certain level, and one of the novel features of the model is that individuals "choose" their length of life. Gross investments are produced by household production functions that relate an output of health to such choice variables or health inputs as medical care utilization, diet, exercise, cigarette smoking, and alcohol consumption. In addition, the production function is affected by the efficiency or productivity of a given
consumer as reflected by his or her personal characteristics. Efficiency is defined as the amount of health obtained from a given amount of health inputs. For example, years of formal schooling completed plays a large role in this context.

Since the most fundamental law in economics is the law of the downward sloping demand function, the quantity of health demanded should be negatively correlated with its "shadow price." I stress that the shadow price of health depends on many other variables besides the price of medical care. Shifts in these variables alter the optimal amount of health and also alter the derived demand for gross investment and for health inputs. I show that the shadow price of health rises with age if the rate of depreciation on the stock of health rises over the life cycle and falls with education (years of formal schooling completed) if more educated people are more efficient producers of health. I emphasize the result that, under certain conditions, an increase in the shadow price may simultaneously reduce the quantity of health demanded and increase the quantities of health inputs demanded.

The task in this paper is to outline my 1972 model of the demand for health, to discuss the theoretical predictions it contains, to review theoretical extensions of the model, and to survey empirical research that tests the predictions made by the model or studies causality between years of formal schooling completed and good health. I outline my model in Section 2 of this paper. I include a new interpretation of the condition for death, which is motivated in part by analyses by Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) and by Ried (1996, 1998). I also address a fundamental criticism of my framework raised by Ehrlich and Chuma involving an indeterminacy problem with regard to optimal investment in health. I summarize my pure investment model in Section 3, my pure consumption model in Section 4, and my empirical testing of the model in Section 5. While I emphasize my own contributions in these three sections, I do treat closely related developments that followed my 1972 publications. I keep derivations to a minimum because these can be found in Grossman (1972a, 1972b). In Section 6 I focus on theoretical and empirical extensions and criticisms, other than those raised by Ehrlich and Chuma and by Ried.

I conclude in Section 7 with a discussion of studies that investigate alternative explanations of the positive relationship between years of formal schooling completed and alternative measures of adult health. While not all this literature is grounded in demand for health models, it is natural to address it in a paper of this nature because it essentially deals with complementary relationships between the two most important components of the stock of human capital. Currently, we still lack comprehensive theoretical models in which the stocks of health and knowledge are determined simultaneously. I am somewhat disappointed that my 1982 plea for the development of these models has gone unanswered [Grossman (1982)]. The rich empirical literature treating interactions between schooling and health underscores the potential payoffs to this undertaking.

2 Grossman (1972b) is out of print but available in most libraries.
2. Basic model

2.1. Assumptions

Let the intertemporal utility function of a typical consumer be

$$U = U(\phi_t H_t, Z_t), \quad t = 0, 1, \ldots, n,$$

where $H_t$ is the stock of health at age $t$ or in time period $t$, $\phi_t$ is the service flow per unit stock, $h_t = \phi_t H_t$ is total consumption of "health services," and $Z_t$ is consumption of another commodity. The stock of health in the initial period ($H_0$) is given, but the stock of health at any other age is endogenous. The length of life as of the planning date ($n$) also is endogenous. In particular, death takes place when $H_t \leq H_{\text{min}}$. Therefore, length of life is determined by the quantities of health capital that maximize utility subject to production and resource constraints.

By definition, net investment in the stock of health equals gross investment minus depreciation:

$$H_{t+1} - H_t = I_t - \delta_t H_t,$$

where $I_t$ is gross investment and $\delta_t$ is the rate of depreciation during the $t$th period ($0 < \delta_t < 1$). The rates of depreciation are exogenous but depend on age. Consumers produce gross investment in health and the other commodities in the utility function according to a set of household production functions:

$$I_t = I_t(M_t, TH_t; E),$$
$$Z_t = Z_t(X_t, T_t; E).$$

In these equations $M_t$ is a vector of inputs (goods) purchased in the market that contribute to gross investment in health, $X_t$ is a similar vector of goods inputs that contribute to the production of $Z_t$, $TH_t$ and $T_t$ are time inputs, and $E$ is the consumer’s stock of knowledge or human capital exclusive of health capital. This latter stock is assumed to be exogenous or predetermined. The semicolon before it highlights the difference between this variable and the endogenous goods and time inputs. In effect, I am examining the consumer’s behavior after he has acquired the optimal stock of this capital. Following Michael (1972, 1973) and Michael and Becker (1973), I assume that an increase in knowledge capital raises the efficiency of the production process in the nonmarket or household sector, just as an increase in technology raises the efficiency of the production process in the market sector. I also assume that all production functions are linear homogeneous in the endogenous market goods and own time inputs.

Equations (3) and (4) assume that $E$ does not vary over the life cycle. In Grossman (1972b, pp. 28–30), I consider the impacts of exogenous variations in this stock with age.
In much of my modeling, I treat the vectors of goods inputs, $M_t$ and $X_t$, as scalars and associate the market goods input in the gross investment production function with medical care. Clearly this is an oversimplification because many other market goods and services influence health. Examples include housing, diet, recreation, cigarette smoking, and excessive alcohol use. The latter two inputs have negative marginal products in the production of health. They are purchased because they are inputs into the production of other commodities such as “smoking pleasure” that yield positive utility. In completing the model I will rule out this and other types of joint production, although I consider joint production in some detail in Grossman (1972b, pp. 74–83). I also will associate the market goods input in the health production function with medical care, although the reader should keep in mind that the model would retain its structure if the primary health input purchased in the market was something other than medical care. This is important because of evidence that medical care may be an unimportant determinant of health in developed countries [see Auster et al. (1969)] and because Zweifel and Breyer (1997) use the lack of a positive relationship between correlates of good health and medical care in micro data to criticize my approach.

Both market goods and own time are scarce resources. The goods budget constraint equates the present value of outlays on goods to the present value of earnings income over the life cycle plus initial assets (discounted property income):

$$
\sum_{t=0}^{n} \frac{P_t M_t + Q_t X_t}{(1+r)^t} = \sum_{t=0}^{n} \frac{W_t T W_t}{(1+r)^t} + A_0.
$$

Here $P_t$ and $Q_t$ are the prices of $M_t$ and $X_t$, $W_t$ is the hourly wage rate, $T W_t$ is hours of work, $A_0$ is initial assets, and $r$ is the market rate of interest. The time constraint requires that $\Omega$, the total amount of time available in any period, must be exhausted by all possible uses:

$$
T W_t + T H_t + T_t + T L_t = \Omega,
$$

where $T L_t$ is time lost from market and nonmarket activities due to illness and injury.

Equation (6) modifies the time budget constraint in Becker's (1965) allocation of time model. If sick time were not added to market and nonmarket time, total time would not be exhausted by all possible uses. I assume that sick time is inversely related to the stock of health; that is $\partial T L_t / \partial H_t < 0$. If $\Omega$ is measured in hours ($\Omega = 8,760$ hours or 365 days times 24 hours per day if the year is the relevant period) and if $\phi_t$ is defined as the flow of healthy time per unit of $H_t$, $h_t$ equals the total number of healthy hours in a given year. Then one can write

$$
T L_t = \Omega - h_t.
$$
From now on, I assume that the variable $h_t$ in the utility function coincides with healthy hours.$^4$

By substituting for hours of work ($TW_t$) from Equation (6) into Equation (5), one obtains the single "full wealth" constraint:

$$
\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{P_t M_t + Q_t X_t + W_t (TL_t + TH_t + T_f)}{(1 + r)^t} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{W_t \Omega}{(1 + r)^t} + A_0.
$$

Full wealth, which is given by the right-hand side of Equation (8), equals initial assets plus the discounted value of the earnings an individual would obtain if he spent all of his time at work. Part of this wealth is spent on market goods, part of it is spent on nonmarket production, and part of it is lost due to illness. The equilibrium quantities of $H_t$ and $Z_t$ can now be found by maximizing the utility function given by Equation (1) subject to the constraints given by Equations (2), (3), and (8). Since the inherited stock of health and the rates of depreciation are given, the optimal quantities of gross investment determine the optimal quantities of health capital.

2.2. Equilibrium conditions

First-order optimality conditions for gross investment in period $t - 1$ are$^5$

$$
\frac{\pi_{t-1}}{(1 + r)^{t-1}} = \frac{W_t G_t}{(1 + r)^t} + \frac{(1 - \delta_t) W_{t+1} G_{t+1}}{(1 + r)^{t+1}} + \cdots + \frac{(1 - \delta_t) \cdots (1 - \delta_{n-1}) W_n G_n}{(1 + r)^n} + \frac{U h_t}{\lambda} G_t + \cdots (1 - \delta_t) \cdots (1 - \delta_{n-1}) \frac{U h_n}{\lambda} G_n.
$$

The new symbols in these equations are: $U h_t = \frac{\partial U}{\partial h_t}$, the marginal utility of healthy time; $\lambda$, the marginal utility of wealth; $G_t = \frac{\partial h_t}{\partial H_t} = -\frac{\partial TL_t}{\partial H_t}$, the marginal

$^4$ Clearly this is a simplification. No distinction is made between the quality and the quantity of healthy time. If the stock of health yielded other services besides healthy time, $\phi_t$ would be a vector of service flows. These services might or might not be perfect substitutes in the utility function.

$^5$ An increase in gross investment in period $t - 1$ increases the stock of health in all future periods. These increases are equal to

$$
\frac{\partial H_t}{\partial I_{t-1}} = 1, \quad \frac{\partial H_{t+1}}{\partial I_{t-1}} = (1 - \delta_t), \ldots, \frac{\partial H_n}{\partial I_{t-1}} = (1 - \delta_t)(1 - \delta_{t+1}) \cdots (1 - \delta_{n-1}).
$$
product of the stock of health in the production of healthy time; and \( \pi_{t-1} \), the marginal cost of gross investment in health in period \( t - 1 \).

Equation (9) states that the present value of the marginal cost of gross investment in health in period \( t - 1 \) must equal the present value of marginal benefits. Discounted marginal benefits at age \( t \) equal

\[
G_t \left[ \frac{W_t}{(1 + r)^t} + \frac{U h_t}{\lambda} \right],
\]

where \( G_t \) is the marginal product of health capital – the increase in the amount of healthy time caused by a one-unit increase in the stock of health. Two monetary magnitudes are necessary to convert this marginal product into value terms because consumers desire health for two reasons. The discounted wage rate measures the monetary value of a one-unit increase in the total amount of time available for market and nonmarket activities, and the term \( \frac{U h_t}{\lambda} \) measures the discounted monetary value of the increase in utility due to a one-unit increase in healthy time. Thus, the sum of these two terms measures the discounted marginal value to consumers of the output produced by health capital.

Condition (9) holds for any capital asset, not just for health capital. The marginal cost as of the current period, obtained by multiplying both sides of the equation by \( (1 + r)^{t-1} \), must be equated to the discounted flows of marginal benefits in the future. This is true for the asset of health capital by labeling the marginal costs and benefits of this particular asset in the appropriate manner. As I will show presently, most of the effects of variations in exogenous variables can be traced out as shifting the marginal costs and marginal benefits of the asset.

While Equation (9) determines the optimal amount of gross investment in period \( t - 1 \), Equation (10) shows the condition for minimizing the cost of producing a given quantity of gross investment. Total cost is minimized when the increase in gross investment from spending an additional dollar on medical care equals the increase in total cost from spending an additional dollar on time. Since the gross investment production function is homogeneous of degree one in the two endogenous inputs and since the prices of medical care and time are independent of the level of these inputs, the average cost of gross investment is constant and equal to the marginal cost.

To examine the forces that affect the demand for health and gross investment, it is useful to convert Equation (9) into an equation that determines the optimal stock of health in period \( t \). If gross investment in period \( t \) is positive, a condition similar to (9) holds for its optimal value. From these two first-order conditions

\[
G_t \left[ W_t + \left( \frac{U h_t}{\lambda} \right) (1 + r)^t \right] = \pi_{t-1} (r - \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \delta_t),
\]  

(11)
where $\bar{\pi}_{t-1}$ is the percentage rate of change in marginal cost between period $t-1$ and period $t$. Equation (11) implies that the undiscounted value of the marginal product of the optimal stock of health capital at any age must equal the supply price of capital, $\pi_{t-1}(r - \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \delta_t)$. The latter contains interest, depreciation, and capital gains components and may be interpreted as the rental price or user cost of health capital.

Equation (11) fully determines the optimal quantity at time $t$ of a capital good that can be bought and sold in a perfect market. The stock of health capital, like the stock of knowledge capital, cannot be sold because it is imbedded in the investor. This means that gross investment cannot be nonnegative. Although sales of capital are ruled out, provided gross investment is positive, there exists a user cost of capital that in equilibrium must equal the value of the marginal product of the stock. In Grossman (1972a, p. 230); (1972b, pp. 6–7), I provide an intuitive interpretation of this result by showing that exchanges over time in the stock of health by an individual substitute for exchanges in the capital market.

2.3. Optimal length of life

So far I have essentially reproduced the analysis of equilibrium conditions in my 1972 National Bureau of Economic Research monograph and Journal of Political Economy article. A perceptive reader may have noted that an explicit condition determining length of life is absent. The discounted marginal benefits of an investment in health in period 0 are summed from periods 1 through $n$, so that the consumer is alive in period $n$ and dead in period $n+1$. This means that $H_{n+1}$ is equal to or less than $H_{\min}$, the death stock, while $H_n$ and $H_t$ ($t < n$) exceed $H_{\min}$. But how do we know that the optimal quantities of the stock of health guarantee this outcome? Put differently, length of life is supposed to be an endogenous variable in the model, yet discounted income and expenditure flows in the full wealth constraint and discounted marginal benefits in the first-order conditions appear to be summed over a fixed $n$.

I was bothered by the above while I was developing my model. As of the date of its publication, I was not convinced that length of life was in fact being determined by the model. There is a footnote in my Journal of Political Economy article [Grossman (1972a, p. 228, footnote 7)] and in my National Bureau of Economic Research monograph [Grossman (1972b, p. 4, footnote 9)] in which I impose the constraints that $H_{n+1} < H_{\min}$ and $H_n > H_{\min}$. Surely, it is wrong to impose these constraints in a maximization problem in which length of life is endogenous.

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6 Equation (11) assumes $\delta_t \bar{\pi}_{t-1} \equiv 0$.
7 First-time readers of this chapter can skip Sections 2.3 and 2.4. The material in the remaining sections does not depend on them.
8 Since the initial period is period 0, a consumer who is alive in year $n$ and dead in year $n+1$ lives for $n+1$ years.
9 Actually, I assert that I am assuming $H_n \leq H_{\min}$, which is incorrect because $H_n > H_{\min}$ if the consumer is alive in period $n$. The corrected footnote should read: “The constraints are imposed that $H_{n+1} \leq H_{\min}$ and $H_n > H_{\min}$.”
My publications on the demand for health were outgrowths of my 1970 Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation. While I was writing my dissertation, my friend and fellow Ph.D. candidate, Gilbert R. Ghez, pointed out that the determination of optimal length of life could be viewed as an iterative process. I learned a great deal from him, and I often spent a long time working through the implications of his comments. It has taken me almost thirty years to work through his comment on the iterative determination of length of life. I abandoned this effort many years ago but returned to it when I read Ried’s (1996, 1998) reformulation of the selection of the optimal stock of health and length of life as a discrete time optimal control problem. Ried (1998, p. 389) writes: “Since [the problem] is a free terminal time problem, one may suspect that a condition for the optimal length of the planning horizon is missing in the set of necessary conditions . . . . However, unlike the analogous continuous time problem, the discrete time version fails to provide such an equation. Rather, the optimal final period . . . has to be determined through the analysis of a sequence of fixed terminal time problems with the terminal time varying over a plausible domain.” This is the same observation that Ghez made. I offer a proof below. I do not rely on Ried’s solution. Instead, I offer a much simpler proof which has a very different implication than the one offered by Ried.

A few preliminaries are in order. First, I assume that the rate of depreciation on the stock of health \( \delta_t \) rises with age. As we shall see in more detail later on, this implies that the optimal stock falls with age. Second, I assume that optimal gross investment in health is positive except in the very last year of life. Third, I define \( V_t \) as \( W_t + (U_{ht}/x)(1 + r)^t \). Hence, \( V_t \) is the undiscounted marginal value of the output produced by health capital in period \( t \). Finally, since the output produced by health capital has a finite upper limit of 8,760 hours in a year, I assume that the marginal product of the stock of health \( (G_t) \) diminishes as the stock increases \( (\partial G_t/\partial H_t < 0) \).

Consider the maximization problem outlined in Section 2.1 except that the planning horizon is exogenous. That is, an individual is alive in period \( n \) and dead in period \( n + 1 \). Write the first-order conditions for the optimal stocks of health compactly as

\[
V_t G_t = \pi_{t-1} (r - \pi_{t-1} + \delta_t), \quad t < n, \tag{12}
\]

\[
V_n G_n = \pi_{n-1} (r + 1). \tag{13}
\]

Note that Equation (13) follows from the condition for optimal gross investment in period \( n - 1 \). An investment in that period yields returns in one period only (period \( n \)) since the individual dies after period \( n \). Put differently, the person behaves as if the rate of depreciation on the stock of health is equal to \( 1 \) in period \( n \).

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10 Readers seeking a definitive and path-breaking treatment of the allocation of goods and time over the life cycle, should consult Ghez’s pioneering monograph on this topic with Becker [Ghez and Becker (1975)]. In the late 1970s and 1980s, there was a tremendous growth in the literature on life-cycle labor supply and consumption demand using the concept of demand functions that hold the marginal utility of wealth constant. All this literature can be traced to Ghez’s treatment of the topic.
I also will make use of the first-order conditions for gross investment in health in periods 0 and n:

\[ \pi_0 = \frac{V_1 G_1}{(1 + r)} + \frac{d_2 V_2 G_2}{(1 + r)^2} + \cdots + \frac{d_n V_n G_n}{(1 + r)^n}, \]  
\[ I_n = 0. \]  

\[ (14) \]

In Equation (14), \( d_t \) is the increase in the stock of health in period \( t \) caused by an increase in gross investment in period 0:

\[ d_1 = 1, \quad d_t (t > 1) = \prod_{j=1}^{t-1} (1 - \delta_j). \]

Obviously, gross investment in period \( n \) is 0 because the individual will not be alive in period \( n + 1 \) to collect the returns.

In order for death to take place in period \( n + 1 \), \( H_{n+1} \leq H_{\text{min}} \). Since \( I_n = 0 \),

\[ H_{n+1} = (1 - \delta_n) H_n. \]  

\[ (16) \]

Hence, for the solution (death after period \( n \)) to be fully consistent

\[ H_{n+1} = (1 - \delta_n) H_n \leq H_{\text{min}}. \]  

\[ (17) \]

Suppose that condition (17) is violated. That is, suppose maximization for a fixed number of periods equal to \( n \) results in a stock in period \( n + 1 \) that exceeds the death stock. Then lifetime utility should be re-maximized under the assumption that the individual will be alive in period \( n + 1 \) but dead in period \( n + 2 \). As a first approximation, the set of first-order conditions for \( H_t (t < n) \) defined by Equation (12) still must hold so that the stock in each of these periods is not affected when the horizon is lengthened by 1 period.\(^{11}\)

But the condition for the stock in period \( n \) becomes

\[ V_n^* G_n^* = \pi_{n-1} (r - \tilde{\pi}_{n-1} + \delta_n), \]  

\[ (18) \]

where asterisks are used because the stock of health in period \( n \) when the horizon is \( n + 1 \) is not equal to the stock when the horizon is \( n \) (see below). Moreover,

\[ V_{n+1}^* G_{n+1}^* = \pi_n (r + 1), \]  

\[ (19) \]

\(^{11}\) This is a first approximation because it assumes that that \( \lambda \) does not change when the horizon is extended by one period. Consider the standard intertemporally separable lifetime utility function in which the current period utility function, \( \psi(h_t, Z_t) \), is strictly concave. With full wealth constant, an increase in the horizon causes \( \lambda \) to rise. But full wealth increases by \( W_{n+1} / (1 + r)^{n+1} \), which causes \( \lambda \) to decline. I assume that these two effects exactly offset each other. This assumption is not necessary in the pure investment model described in Sections 2.5 and 3 because \( V_t \) does not depend on \( \lambda \) in that model.
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\[ I_{n+1} = 0, \]
\[ H_{n+2} = (1 - \delta_{n+1}) H^*_n + 1. \]

If the stock defined by Equation (21) is less than or equal to \( H_{\text{min}} \), death takes place in period \( n + 2 \). If \( H_{n+2} \) is greater than \( H_{\text{min}} \), the consumer re-maximizes lifetime utility under the assumption that death takes place in period \( n + 3 \) (the horizon ends in period \( n + 2 \)).

I have just described an iterative process for the selection of optimal length of life. In words, the process amounts to maximizing lifetime utility for a fixed horizon, checking to see whether the stock in the period after the horizon ends (the terminal stock) is less than or equal to the death stock \( (H_{\text{min}}) \), and adding one period to the horizon and re-maximizing the utility function if the terminal stock exceeds the death stock.\(^\text{12}\) I want to make several comments on this process and its implications. Compare the condition for the optimal stock of health in period \( n \) when the horizon lasts through period \( n \) [Equation (13)] with the condition for the optimal stock in the same period when the horizon lasts through period \( n + 1 \) [Equation (18)]. The supply price of health capital is smaller in the latter case because \( \delta_n < 1 \).\(^\text{13}\) Hence, the undiscounted value of the marginal product of health capital in period \( n \) when the horizon is \( n + 1 \) \((V^*_nG^*_n)\) must be smaller than the undiscounted value of the marginal product of health capital in period \( n \) when the horizon is \( n \) \((V_nG_n)\). In turn, due to diminishing marginal productivity, the stock of health in period \( n \) must rise when the horizon is extended by one period \((H^*_n > H_n)\).\(^\text{14}\)

\(^\text{12}\) If \( H_n \leq H_{\text{min}} \), the utility function is re-maximized after shortening the horizon by 1 period.

\(^\text{13}\) It may appear that the supply price of capital given by the right-hand side of Equation (18) is smaller than the one given by the right-hand side of Equation (13) as long as \( 1 - \delta_n > -\bar{\pi}_{n-1} \). But Equation (18) is based on the assumption \( \delta_n \bar{\pi}_{n-1} = 0 \). The exact form of (18) is

\[ V^*_nG^*_n = \pi_{n-1}(r + 1) - (1 - \delta_n) \pi_n. \]

The difference between the right-hand side of this equation and the right-hand side of Equation (13) is \( -(1 - \delta_n) \pi_n < 0 \).

\(^\text{14}\) While \( G^*_n \) is smaller than \( G_n \), it is not clear whether \( V^*_n \) is smaller than \( V_n \). The last term can be written

\[ V_n = W_n + \frac{U_n h_n}{U_n} m_t, \]

where \( U_n \) is the marginal utility of \( Z_n \) and \( m_t \) is the marginal cost of producing \( Z_n \). The wage rate in period \( n \) \((W_n)\) and \( m_t \) are not affected when the length of the horizon is increased from \( n \) to \( n + 1 \). In equilibrium,

\[ \frac{U_n h_n}{U_n} = \left[ \frac{(\pi_{n-1}(1 + r)) / G_n - W_n}{m_n} \right], \]

and

\[ \frac{U_n h^*_n}{U^*_n} = \left[ \frac{(\pi_{n-1}(1 + r) - \pi_n(1 - \delta_n)) / G^*_n - W_n}{m_n} \right]. \]
When the individual lives for \( n + 1 \) years, the first-order condition for gross investment in period 0 is

\[
\pi_0 = \frac{V_1 G_1}{1 + r} + \frac{d_2 V_2 G_2}{(1 + r)^2} + \ldots + \frac{d_n V_n^* G_n^*}{(1 + r)^n} + \frac{d_n(1 - \delta_n) V_{n+1}^* G_{n+1}^*}{(1 + r)^{n+1}}. \tag{22}
\]

Note that the discounted marginal benefits of an investment in period 0 are the same whether the person dies in period \( n + 1 \) or in period \( n + 2 \) [compare the right-hand sides of Equations (14) and (22)] since the marginal cost of an investment in period 0 does not depend on the length of the horizon. This may seem strange because one term is added to discounted marginal benefits of an investment in period 0 or in any other period when the horizon is extended by one period -- the discounted marginal benefit in period \( n + 1 \). This term, however, is exactly offset by the reduction in the discounted marginal benefit in period \( n \). The same offset occurs in the discounted marginal benefits of investments in every other period except for periods \( n - 1 \) and \( n \).

A proof of the last proposition is as follows. The first \( n - 1 \) terms on the right-hand sides of Equations (14) and (22) are the same. From Equations (13), (18), and (19),

\[
V_n^* G_n^* = \frac{V_n G_n (r - \tilde{\pi}_{n-1} + \delta_n)}{(1 + r)},
\]

\[
V_{n+1}^* G_{n+1}^* = V_n G_n \left(1 + \tilde{\pi}_{n-1}\right).
\]

Hence, the sum of the last two terms on the right-hand side of Equation (22) equals the last term on the right-hand side of Equation (14):\(^{15}\)

\[
\frac{d_n V_n^* G_n^*}{(1 + r)^n} + \frac{d_n(1 - \delta_n) V_{n+1}^* G_{n+1}^*}{(1 + r)^{n+1}} = \frac{d_n V_n G_n}{(1 + r)^n}. \tag{23}
\]

Using the last result, one can fully describe the algorithm for the selection of optimal length of life. Maximize the lifetime utility function for a fixed horizon. Check to see

Suppose that

\[
G_n^* = G_n \left[ \frac{\pi_{n-1}(r + 1) - \pi_n(1 - \delta_n)}{\pi_{n-1}(r + 1)} \right].
\]

Then \( \frac{U h_n^*}{U_h} = \frac{U h_n^*}{U_n} \) and \( V_n^* = V_n \). In this case there is no incentive to substitute healthy time for the other commodity in the utility function in period \( n \) when the horizon is increased by one period. In other cases this type of substitution will occur. If it does occur, I assume that the lifetime utility function is separable over time so that the marginal rate of substitution between \( h \) and \( Z \) in periods other than period \( n \) is not affected. Note the distinction between \( H_{n+1} \) and \( H_{n+1}^* \). The former stock is the one associated with an \( n \) period horizon and \( I_n = 0 \). The latter stock is the one associated with an \( n + 1 \) horizon and \( I_n > 0 \). Clearly, \( H_{n+1}^* > H_{n+1} \).

\(^{15}\) In deriving Equation (23) I use the approximation that \( \delta_n \tilde{\pi}_{n-1} \cong 0 \). If the exact form of Equation (18) is employed (see footnote 13), the approximation is not necessary.
whether the terminal stock is less than or equal to the death stock. If the terminal stock
exceeds the death stock, add one period to the horizon and redo the maximization. The
resulting values of the stock of health must be the same in every period except for
periods \( n \) and \( n + 1 \). The stock of health must be larger in these two periods when the
horizon equals \( n + 1 \) than when the horizon equals \( n \). The stock in period \( t \) depends
on gross investment in period \( t - 1 \), with gross investment in previous periods held
constant. Therefore, gross investment is larger in periods \( n - 1 \) and \( n \) but the same
in every other period when the horizon is increased by one year. A rise in the rate of
depreciation with age guarantees finite life since for some \( j \):

\[
H_{n+j} = (1 - \delta_{n+j-1})H_{n+j-1} \leq H_{\min}.
\]

I have just addressed a major criticism of my model made by Ehrlich and Chuma
(1990). They argue that my analysis does not determine length of life because it
"... does not develop the required terminal (transversality) conditions needed to assure
the consistency of any solutions for the life cycle path of health capital and longevity"
[Ehrlich and Chuma (1990, p. 762)]. I have just shown that length of life is determined
as the outcome of an iterative process in which lifetime utility functions with alter-
native horizons are maximized. Since the continuous time optimal control techniques
employed by Ehrlich and Chuma are not my fields of expertise, I invite the reader to
study their paper and make up his or her own mind on this issue.

As I indicated at the beginning of this subsection, Ried (1996, 1998) offers the same
general description of the selection of length of life as an iterative process. He proposes

\[ H_{n+2} = (1 - \delta_{n+1})H_n, \]
\[ H_{n+1} = (1 - \delta_n)H_n. \]

Since \( \delta_{n+1} > \delta_n \), \( H_{n+2} \) could be smaller than or equal to \( H_{\min} \), while at the same time \( H_n \) could exceed
\( H_{\min} \). Note that one addition to the algorithm described is required. Return to the case when maximization
for a fixed number of periods equal to \( n \) results in a stock in period \( n + 1 \) that is smaller than or equal to the
death stock. The consumer should behave as if the rate of depreciation on the stock of health is equal to 1 in
period \( n \) and consult Equation (13) to determine \( I_{n-1} \) and \( H_n \). Suppose instead that he behaves as if the rate
of depreciation is the actual rate in period \( n (\delta_n < 1) \). This is the same rate used by the consumer who dies in
period \( n + 2 \). Denote \( I_{n-1}^* \) as the quantity of gross investment that results from using Equation (18) to select
the optimal stock in period \( n \). Under the alternative decision rule, the stock in period \( n + 1 \) could exceed the
death stock. The difference in the stock in period \( n + 1 \) that results from these two alternative decision rules is

\[
H_{n+1}^* - H_{n+1} = I_{n-1}^* + \delta_{n-1} (I_{n-1} - I_{n-1}^*),
\]

where I assume that \( I_n \) (gross investment in period \( n \) when death takes place in period \( n + 2 \)) equals \( I_{n-1} \)
(gross investment in period \( n - 1 \) when death takes place in period \( n + 1 \)). This difference falls as \( I_{n-1}^* \) falls.
In turn, \( I_{n-1}^* \) falls as \( \delta_n \) rises with rates of depreciation in all other periods held constant.
a solution using extremely complicated discrete time optimal control techniques. Again, I leave the reader to evaluate Ried's solution. But I do want to challenge his conclusion that "... sufficiently small perturbations of the trajectories of the exogenous variables will not alter the length of the individual’s planning horizon ... . [T]he uniqueness assumption [about length of life] ensures that the planning horizon may be treated as fixed in comparative dynamic analysis ... . Given a fixed length of the individual’s life, it is obvious that the mortality aspect is entirely left out of the picture. Thus, the impact of parametric changes upon individual health is confined to the quality of life which implies the analysis to deal [sic] with a pure morbidity effect” (p. 389).

In my view it is somewhat unsatisfactory to begin with a model in which length of life is endogenous but to end up with a result in which length of life does not depend on any of the exogenous variables in the model. This certainly is not an implication of my analysis of the determination of optimal length of life. In general, differences in such exogenous variables as the rate of depreciation, initial assets, and the marginal cost of investing in health across consumers of the same age will lead to differences in the optimal length of life.

To be concrete, consider two consumers: a and b. Person a faces a higher rate of depreciation in each period than person b. The two consumers are the same in all other respects. Suppose that it is optimal for person a to live for \( n \) years (to die in year \( n + 1 \)). Ried argues that person b also lives for \( n \) years because both he and person a use Equation (13) to determine the optimal stock of health in period \( n \). That equation is independent of the rate of depreciation in period \( n \). Hence, the stock of health in period \( n \) is the same for each consumer. For person a, we have

\[
H_{n+1}^a = (1 - \delta_n^a)H_n^a \leq H_{\text{min}},
\]

where the superscript a denotes values of variables for person a. But for person b,

\[
H_{n+1}^b = (1 - \delta_n^b)H_n^a.
\]

Since \( \delta_n^b < \delta_n^a \), there is no guarantee that \( H_{n+1}^b < H_{\text{min}} \). If \( H_{n+1}^b > H_{\text{min}} \), person b will be alive in period \( n + 1 \). He will then use Equation (18), rather than Equation (13), to pick his optimal stock in period \( n \). In this case person b will have a larger optimal stock in period \( n \) than person a and will have a longer length of life.

Along the same lines parametric differences in the marginal cost of investment in health (differences in the marginal cost across people of the same age), differences in initial assets, and parametric differences in wage rates cause length of life to vary among individuals. In general, any variable that raises the optimal stock of health in each period

\[^{17}\text{Technically, I am dealing with parametric differences in exogenous variables (differences in exogenous variables across consumers) as opposed to evolutionary differences in exogenous variables (differences in exogenous variables across time for the same consumer). This distinction goes back to Ghez and Becker (1975) and is explored in detail by MaCurdy (1981).}\]
of life also tends to prolong length of life.\footnote{Consider two people who face the same rate of depreciation in each period. Person b has higher initial assets than person a and picks a larger stock in each period. Suppose that person a dies after period n. Hence, 
\[ H_{n+1}^{a} = (1 - \delta_n) H_{n}^{a} \leq H_{\text{min}}. \] 
Suppose that person b, like person a, invests nothing in period n. Then 
\[ H_{n+1}^{b} = (1 - \delta_n) H_{n}^{b}. \] 
Clearly, \[ H_{n+1}^{b} > H_{n+1}^{a} \] since \[ H_{n}^{b} > H_{n}^{a} \]. But both people could die in period \n + 1 if \[ H_{n+1}^{a} < H_{\text{min}}. \] This is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition. For this reason, I use the term "tends" in the text. This ambiguity is removed if the condition for death is defined by \[ H_{n+1} = H_{\text{min}}. \] That definition is, however, unsatisfactory because the rate of depreciation in period n does not guarantee that it is satisfied. That is, death takes place in \n + 1 if \[ \delta_n \geq (H_{n} - H_{\text{min}}) / H_{n}. \]}

Thus, if health is not an inferior commodity, an increase in initial assets or a reduction in the marginal cost of investing in health induces a longer optimal life. Persons with higher wage rates have more wealth; taken by itself, this prolongs life. But the relative price of health (the price of \( h_t \) relative to the price of \( Z_t \)) may rise as the wage rate rises. If this occurs and the resulting substitution effect outweighs the wealth effect, length of life may fall.

According to Ried, death occurs if \( H_{n+1} < H_{\text{min}} \) rather than if \( H_{n+1} \leq H_{\text{min}} \). The latter condition is the one that I employ, but that does not seem to account for the difference between my analysis and his analysis. Ried's only justification of his result is in the context of a dynamic model of labor supply. He assumes that a non-negativity constraint is binding in some period and concludes that marginal changes in any exogenous variable will fail to bring about positive supply.

Ried's conclusion does not appear to be correct. To see this in the most simple manner, consider a static model of the supply of labor, and suppose that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure time and consumption evaluated at zero hours of work is greater than or equal to the market wage rate at the initial wage. Hence, no hours are supplied to the market. Now suppose that the wage rate rises. If the marginal rate of substitution at zero hours equaled the old wage, hours of work will rise above zero. If the marginal rate of substitution at zero hours exceeded the old wage, hours could still rise above zero if the marginal rate of substitution at zero hours is smaller than the new wage. By the same reasoning, while not every parametric reduction in the rate of depreciation on the stock of health will increase optimal length of life (see footnote 18), some reductions surely will do so. I stand by my statement that it is somewhat unsatisfactory to begin with a model in which length of life is endogenous and end up with a result in which length of life does not depend on any of the exogenous variables in the model.

2.4. "Bang-bang" equilibrium

Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) assert that my "key assumption that health investment is produced through a constant-returns-to-scale ... technology introduces a type of indeterminacy ('bang-bang') problem with respect to optimal investment and health maintenance.
choices. . . . [This limitation precludes] a systematic resolution of the choice of both (their italics) optimal health paths and longevity. . . . Later contributions to the literature spawned by Grossman . . . suffer in various degrees from these shortcomings. . . . Under the linear production process assumed by Grossman, the marginal cost of investment would be constant, and no interior equilibrium for investment would generally exist” (pp. 762, 764, 768).\(^{19}\)

Ried (1998) addresses this criticism by noting that an infinite rate of investment is not consistent with equilibrium. Because Ehrlich and Chuma’s criticism appears to be so damaging and Ried’s treatment of it is brief and not convincing, I want to deal with it before proceeding to examine responses of health, gross investment, and health inputs to evolutionary (life-cycle) and parametric variations in key exogenous variables. Ehrlich and Chuma’s point is as follows. Suppose that the rate of depreciation on the stock of health is equal to zero at every age, suppose that the marginal cost of gross investment in health does not depend on the amount of investment, and suppose that none of the other exogenous variables in the model is a function of age.\(^{20}\) Then the stock of health is constant over time (net investment is zero). Any discrepancy between the initial stock and the optimal stock is erased in the initial period. In a continuous time model, this means an infinite rate of investment to close the gap followed by no investment after that. If the rate of depreciation is positive and constant, the discrepancy between the initial and optimal stock is still eliminated in the initial period. After that, gross investment is positive, constant, and equal to total depreciation; while net investment is zero.

To avoid the “bang-bang” equilibrium (an infinite rate of investment to eliminate the discrepancy between the initial and the desired stock followed by no investment if the rate of depreciation is zero), Ehrlich and Chuma assume that the production function of gross investment in health exhibits diminishing returns to scale. Thus, the marginal cost of gross or net investment is a positive function of the amount of investment. Given this, there is an incentive to reach the desired stock gradually rather than instantaneously since the cost of gradual adjustment is smaller than the cost of instantaneous adjustment.

The introduction of diminishing returns to scale greatly complicates the model because the marginal cost of gross investment and its percentage rate of change over time become endogenous variables that depend on the quantity of investment and its rate of change. In Section 6, I show that the structural demand function for the stock of health at age \(t\) in a model with costs of adjustment is one in which \(H_t\) depends on the stock at age \(t + 1\) and the stock at age \(t - 1\). The solution of this second-order difference equation results in a reduced form demand function in which the stock at age \(t\) depends on all past and future values of the exogenous variables. This makes theoretical and econometric analysis very difficult.

\(^{19}\) For an earlier criticism of my model along the same lines, see Usher (1975).

\(^{20}\) In addition, I assume that the market rate of interest is equal to the rate of time preference for the present. See Section 4 for a definition of time preference.
Ch. 7: The Human Capital Model

Are the modifications introduced by Ehrlich and Chuma really necessary? In my view the answer is no. The focus of my theoretical and empirical work and that of others who have adopted my framework [Cropper (1977), Muurinen (1982), Wagstaff (1986)] certainly is not on discrepancies between the inherited or initial stock and the desired stock. I am willing to assume that consumers reach their desired stocks instantaneously in order to get sharp predictions that are subject to empirical testing. Gross investment is positive (but net investment is zero) if the rate of depreciation is positive but constant in my model. In the Ehrlich–Chuma model, net investment can be positive in this situation. In both models consumers choose an infinite life. In both models life is finite and the stock of health varies over the life cycle if the rate of depreciation is a positive function of age. In my model positive net investment during certain stages of the life cycle is not ruled out. For example, the rate of depreciation might be negatively correlated with age at early stages of the life cycle. The stock of health would be rising and net investment would be positive during this stage of the life cycle.

More fundamentally, Ehrlich and Chuma introduce rising marginal cost of investment to remove an indeterminacy that really does not exist. In Figure 1 of their paper (p. 768), they plot the marginal cost of an investment in health as of age \( t \) and the discounted marginal benefits of this investment as functions of the quantity of investment. The discounted marginal benefit function is independent of the rate of investment. Therefore, no interior equilibrium exists for investment unless the marginal cost function slopes upward. This is the basis of their claim that my model does not determine optimal investment because marginal cost does not depend on investment.

Why, however, is the discounted marginal benefit function independent of the amount of investment? In a personal communication, Ehrlich informed me that this is because the marginal product of the stock of health at age \( t \) does not depend on the amount of investment at age \( t \). Surely that is correct. But an increase in \( I_t \) raises the stock of health in all future periods. Since the marginal product of health capital diminishes as the stock rises, discounted marginal benefits must fall. Hence, the discounted marginal benefit function slopes downward, and an interior equilibrium for gross investment in period \( t \) clearly is possible even if the marginal cost of gross investment is constant.

Since discounted marginal benefits are positive when gross investment is zero, the discounted marginal benefit function intersects the vertical axis.\(^2\) Thus corner solutions for gross investment are not ruled out in my model. One such solution occurs if the rate

\[^2\text{This follows because}\]

\[
\frac{\partial h_{t+j}}{\partial I_t} = \frac{\partial h_{t+j}}{\partial H_{t+j}} \frac{\partial H_{t+j}}{\partial I_t},
\]

or

\[
\frac{\partial h_{t+j}}{\partial I_t} = G_{t+j}(1 - \delta_{t+1})(1 - \delta_{t+2}) \cdots (1 - \delta_{t+j-1}) = G_{t+j}d_{t+j}.
\]

Clearly, \( d_{t+j} \) is positive and finite when \( I_t \) equals zero. Moreover \( G_{t+j} \) is positive and finite when \( I_t \) equals zero as long as \( H_{t+j} \) is positive and finite.
of depreciation on the stock of health equals zero in every period. Given positive rates of depreciation, corner solutions still are possible in periods other than the last period of life because the marginal cost of gross investment could exceed discounted marginal benefits for all positive quantities of investment. I explicitly rule out corner solutions when depreciation rates are positive, and Ried and other persons who have used my model also rule them out. Corner solutions are possible in the Ehrlich-Chuma model if the marginal cost function of gross investment intersects the vertical axis. Ehrlich and Chuma rule out corner solutions by assuming that the marginal cost function passes through the origin.

To summarize, unlike Ried, I conclude that exogenous variations in the marginal cost and marginal benefit of an investment in health cause optimal length of life to vary. Unlike Ehrlich and Chuma, I conclude that my 1972 model provides a simple but logically consistent framework for studying optimal health paths and longevity. At the same time I want to recognize the value of Ried’s emphasis on the determination of optimal length of life as the outcome of an iterative process in a discrete time model. I also want to recognize the value of Ehrlich and Chuma’s model in cases when there are good reasons to assume that the marginal cost of investment in health is not constant.

2.5. Special cases

Equation (11) determines the optimal stock of health in any period other than the last period of life. A slightly different form of that equation emerges if both sides are divided by the marginal cost of gross investment:

$$y_t + a_t = r - \hat{\pi}_{t-1} + \delta_t.$$  
(24)

Here $y_t \equiv W_t G_t / \pi_{t-1}$ defines the marginal monetary return on an investment in health and $a_t \equiv [(U h_t / \lambda)(1 + r) G_t] / \pi_{t-1}$ defines the psychic rate of return. In equilibrium, the total rate of return to an investment in health must equal the user cost of capital in terms of the price of gross investment. The latter variable is defined as the sum of the real-own rate of interest and the rate of depreciation and may be termed the opportunity cost of health capital.

In Sections 3 and 4, Equation (24) is used to study the responses of the stock of health, gross investment in health, and health inputs to variations in exogenous variables. Instead of doing this in the context of the general model developed so far, I deal with two special cases: a pure investment model and a pure consumption model. In the former model the psychic rate of return is zero, while in the latter the monetary rate of return is zero. There are two reasons for taking this approach. One involves an appeal...
to simplicity. It is difficult to obtain sharp predictions concerning the effects of changes in exogenous variables in a mixed model in which the stock of health yields both investment and consumption benefits. The second is that most treatments of investments in knowledge or human capital other than health capital assume that monetary returns are large relative to psychic returns. Indeed, Lazear (1977) estimates that the psychic returns from attending school are negative. Clearly, it is unreasonable to assume that health is a source of disutility, and most discussions of investments in infant, child, and adolescent health [see Currie (2000)] stress the consumption benefits of these investments. Nevertheless, I stress the pure investment model because it generates powerful predictions from simple analyses and because the consumption aspects of the demand for health can be incorporated into empirical estimation without much loss in generality.

3. Pure investment model

If healthy time did not enter the utility function directly or if the marginal utility of healthy time were equal to zero, health would be solely an investment commodity. The optimal amount of \( H_t \) \((t < n)\) could then be found by equating the marginal monetary rate of return on an investment in health to the opportunity cost of capital:

\[
\frac{W_t G_t}{\pi_{t-1}} = \gamma_t = r - \bar{\pi}_{t-1} + \delta_t. \tag{25}
\]

Similarly, the optimal stock of health in the last period of life would be determined by

\[
\frac{W_n G_n}{\pi_{n-1}} = \gamma_n = r + 1. \tag{26}
\]

Figure 1 illustrates the determination of the optimal stock of health capital at age \( t \). The demand curve MEC shows the relationship between the stock of health and the rate of return on an investment or the marginal efficiency of health capital. The supply curve \( S \) shows the relationship between the stock of health and the cost of capital. Since the real-own rate of interest \((r - \bar{\pi}_{t-1})\) and the rate of depreciation are independent of the stock, the supply curve is infinitely elastic. Provided the MEC schedule slopes downward, the equilibrium stock is given by \( H_t^* \), where the supply and demand functions intersect.

The wage rate and the marginal cost of gross investment do not depend on the stock of health. Therefore, the MEC schedule would be negatively inclined if and only if the marginal product of health capital \((G_t)\) diminishes as the stock increases. I have already assumed diminishing marginal productivity in Section 2 and have justified this assumption because the output produced by health capital has a finite upper limit of 8,760 hours in a year. Figure 2 shows a plausible relationship between the stock of health and the amount of healthy time. This relationship may be termed a production function...
of healthy time. The slope of the curve in the figure at any point gives the marginal product of health capital. The amount of healthy time equals zero at the death stock, $H_{\text{min}}$. Beyond that stock, healthy time increases at a decreasing rate and eventually approaches its upper asymptote as the stock becomes large.

Equations (25) and (26) and Figure 1 enable one to study the responses of the stock of health and gross investment to variations in exogenous variables. As indicated in
Section 2, two types of variations are examined: evolutionary (differences across time for the same consumer) and parametric (differences across consumers of the same age). In particular I consider evolutionary increases in the rate of depreciation on the stock of health with age and parametric variations in the rate of depreciation, the wage rate, and the stock of knowledge or human capital exclusive of health capital ($E$).

3.1. Depreciation rate effects

Consider the effect of an increase in the rate of depreciation on the stock of health ($\delta_t$) with age. I have already shown in Section 2 that this factor causes the stock of health to fall with age and produces finite life. Graphically, the supply function in Figure 1 shifts upward over time or with age, and the optimal stock in each period is lower than in the previous period.

To quantify the magnitude of percentage rate of decrease in the stock of health over the life cycle, assume that the wage rate and the marginal cost of gross investment in health do not depend on age so that $\alpha_t = 0$. Differentiate Equation (25) with respect to age to obtain

$$\tilde{H}_t = -s_t \epsilon_t \delta_t.$$

(27)

In this equation, the tilde notation denotes a percentage time or age derivative

$$\tilde{H}_t = \frac{dH_t}{dt} \frac{1}{H_t}, \text{ etc.},$$

and the new symbols are $s_t = \delta_t/(r + \delta_t)$, the share of the depreciation rate in the cost of health capital; and

$$\epsilon_t = -\frac{\partial \ln H_t}{\partial \ln (r + \delta_t)} = -\frac{\partial \ln H_t}{\partial \ln \gamma},$$

the elasticity of the MEC schedule.

Provided the rate of depreciation rises over the life cycle, the stock of health falls with age. The life cycle profile of gross investment does not, however, simply mirror that of health capital. The reason is that a rise in the rate of depreciation not only reduces the amount of health capital demanded by consumers but also reduces the amount of capital supplied to them by a given amount of gross investment. If the change in supply exceeds the change in demand, individuals have an incentive to close the gap by increasing gross

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23 As Ghez and Becker (1975) point out, none of the variables in a discrete time model are differentiable functions of time. Equation (27) and other equations involving time or age derivatives are approximations that hold exactly in a continuous time model.
investment. On the other hand, if the change in demand exceeds the change in supply, gross investment falls over the life cycle.

To begin to see why gross investment does not necessarily fall over the life cycle, first consider the behavior of one component of gross investment, total depreciation \( D_t = \delta_t H_t \), as the rate of depreciation rises over the life cycle. Assume that the percentage rate of increase in the rate of depreciation with age \( \delta_t \) and the elasticity of the MEC schedule \( \epsilon_t \) are constant. Then

\[
\tilde{D}_t = \delta(1 - \delta_t \epsilon) \geq 0 \quad \text{as} \quad \epsilon \leq \frac{1}{\delta_t}.
\]

From the last equation, total depreciation increases with age as long as the elasticity of the MEC schedule is less than the reciprocal of the share of the depreciation rate in the cost of health capital. A sufficient condition for this to occur is that \( \epsilon \) is smaller than one.

If \( \epsilon_t \) and \( \delta_t \) are constant, the percentage change in gross investment with age is given by

\[
\tilde{I}_t = \frac{\delta(1 - \delta_t \epsilon)(\delta_t - \delta_t \epsilon \delta) + \delta^2 \epsilon \tilde{\delta}^2}{(\delta_t - \delta_t \epsilon \delta)}.
\] (28)

Since health capital cannot be sold, gross investment cannot be negative. Therefore, \( \delta_t \geq -\tilde{H}_t \) or \( \delta_t \geq -\delta_t \epsilon \tilde{\delta} \). Provided gross investment is positive, the term \( \delta_t - \delta_t \epsilon \tilde{\delta} \) in the numerator and denominator of Equation (28) must be positive. Thus, a sufficient condition for gross investment to be positively correlated with the depreciation rate is \( \epsilon < 1/\delta_t \). Clearly, \( \tilde{I}_t \) is positive if \( \epsilon < 1 \).

The important conclusion is reached that, if the elasticity of the MEC schedule is less than one, gross investment and the depreciation rate are positively correlated over the life cycle, while gross investment and the stock of health are negatively correlated. In fact, the relationship between the amount of healthy time and the stock of health suggests that \( \epsilon \) is smaller than one. A general equation for the healthy time production function illustrated by Figure 2 is

\[
h_t = 8,760 - BH_t^{-C},
\] (29)

where \( B \) and \( C \) are positive constants. The corresponding MEC schedule is

\[
\ln \gamma_t = \ln BC - (C + 1) \ln H_t + \ln W + \ln \pi.
\] (30)

The elasticity of this schedule is \( \epsilon = 1/(1 + C) < 1 \) since \( C > 0 \).

Observe that with the depreciation rate held constant, increases in gross investment increase the stock of health and the amount of healthy time. But the preceding discussion indicates that because the depreciation rate rises with age it is likely that unhealthy (old)
people will make larger gross investments in health than healthy (young) people. This means that sick time \((TL_t)\) will be positively correlated with the market good or medical care input \((M_t)\) and with the own time input \((TH_t)\) in the gross investment production function over the life cycle.

The framework used to analyze life cycle variations in depreciation rates can easily be used to examine the impacts of variations in these rates among persons of the same age. Assume, for example, a uniform percentage shift in \(\delta_t\) across persons so that the depreciation rate function can be written as \(\delta_t = \delta_0 \exp(\delta t)\) where \(\delta_0\) differs among consumers. It is clear that such a shift has the same kind of effects as an increase in \(\delta_t\) with age. That is, persons of a given age who face relatively high depreciation rates would simultaneously reduce their demand for health but increase their demand for gross investment if \(\varepsilon < 1\).

3.2. Market and nonmarket efficiency

Persons who face the same cost of health capital would demand the same amount of health only if the determinants of the rate of return on an investment were held constant. Changes in the value of the marginal product of health capital and the marginal cost of gross investment shift the MEC schedule and, therefore, alter the quantity of health capital demanded even if the cost of capital does not change. The consumer’s wage rate and his or her stock of knowledge or human capital other than health capital are the two key shifters of the MEC schedule.\(^{24}\)

Since the value of the marginal product of health capital equals \(WG\), an increase in the wage rate \((W)\) raises the monetary equivalent of the marginal product of a given stock. Put differently, the higher a person’s wage rate the greater is the value to him of an increase in healthy time. A consumer’s wage rate measures his market efficiency or the rate at which he can convert hours of work into money earnings. Hence, the wage is positively correlated with the benefits of a reduction in lost time from the production of money earnings due to illness. Moreover, a high wage induces an individual to substitute market goods for his own time in the production of commodities. This substitution continues until in equilibrium the monetary value of the marginal product of consumption time equals the wage rate. Thus, the benefits from a reduction in time lost from nonmarket production are also positively correlated with the wage.

If an upward shift in the wage rate had no effect on the marginal cost of gross investment, a 1 percent increase in the wage would increase the rate of return \((\gamma)\) associated with a fixed stock of capital by 1 percent. In fact this is not the case because own time is an input in the gross investment production function. If \(K\) is the fraction of the total

\(^{24}\) In this section I deal with uniform shifts in variables that influence the rate of return across persons of the same age. I also assume that these variables do not vary over the life cycle. Finally, I deal with the partial effect of an increase in the wage rate or an increase in knowledge capital, measured by the number of years of formal schooling completed, on the demand for health and health inputs. For a more general treatment, see Grossman (1972b, pp. 28–30).
cost of gross investment accounted for by time, a 1 percent rise in \( W \) would increase marginal cost (\( \pi \)) by \( K \) percent. After one nets out the correlation between \( W \) and \( \pi \), the percentage growth in \( y \) would equal \( 1 - K \), which exceeds zero as long as gross investment is not produced entirely by time. Hence, the quantity of health capital demanded rises as the wage rate rises as shown in the formula for the wage elasticity of capital:

\[
e_{H W} = (1 - K)\varepsilon.
\]

Although the wage rate and the demand for health or gross investment are positively related, \( W \) has no effect on the amount of gross investment supplied by a given input of medical care. Therefore, the demand for medical care rises with the wage. If medical care and own time are employed in fixed proportions in the gross investment production function, the wage elasticity of \( M \) equals the wage elasticity of \( H \). On the other hand, given a positive elasticity of substitution in production (\( \sigma_p \)) between \( M \) and \( TH \), \( M \) increases more rapidly than \( H \) because consumers have an incentive to substitute medical care for their relatively more expensive own time. This substitution is reflected in the formula for the wage elasticity of medical care:

\[
e_{MW} = K\sigma_p + (1 - K)\varepsilon.
\]

The preceding analysis can be modified to accommodate situations in which the money price of medical care is zero for all practical purposes because it is fully financed by health insurance or by the government, and care is rationed by waiting and travel time. Suppose that \( q \) hours are required to obtain one unit of medical care, so that the price of care is \( Wq \). In addition, suppose that there are three endogenous inputs in the gross investment production function: \( M \), \( TH \), and a market good (\( X \)) whose acquisition does not require time. Interpret \( K \) as the share of the cost of gross investment accounted for by \( M \) and \( TH \). Then Equation (31) still holds, and an increase in \( W \) causes \( H \) to increase. Equation (32) becomes

\[
e_{MW} = (1 - K)(\varepsilon - \sigma_{MX}),
\]

where \( \sigma_{MX} \) is the partial elasticity of substitution in production between \( M \) and the third input, \( X \). If these two inputs are net substitutes in production, \( \sigma_{MX} \) is positive. Then

\[
e_{MW} \gtrless 0 \quad \text{as} \quad \varepsilon \gtrless \sigma_{MX}.
\]

In this modified model the wage elasticity of medical care could be negative or zero. This case is relevant in interpreting some of the empirical evidence to be discussed later.

As indicated in Section 2, I follow Michael (1972, 1973) and Michael and Becker (1973) by assuming that an increase in knowledge capital or human capital other than
health capital \((E)\) raises the efficiency of the production process in the nonmarket or household sector, just as an increase in technology raises the efficiency of the production process in the market sector. I focus on education or years of formal schooling completed as the most important determinant of the stock of human capital. The gross investment production function and the production function of the commodity \(Z\) are linear homogeneous in their endogenous inputs [see Equations (3) and (4)]. Therefore, an increase in the exogenous or predetermined stock of human capital can raise output only if it raises the marginal products of the endogenous inputs.

Suppose that a one unit increase in \(E\) raises the marginal products of \(M\) and \(TH\) in the gross investment production function by the same percentage \(\rho_H\). This is the Hicks-or factor-neutrality assumption applied to an increase in technology in the nonmarket sector. Given factor-neutrality, there is no incentive to substitute medical care for own time as the stock of human capital rises.

Because an increase in \(E\) raises the marginal products of the health inputs, it reduces the quantity of these inputs required to produce a given amount of gross investment. Hence, with no change in input prices, the marginal or average cost of gross investment falls. In fact, if a circumflex over a variable denotes a percentage change per unit change in \(E\), one easily shows

\[
\hat{\pi} = -\rho_H. \tag{34}
\]

With the wage rate held constant, an increase in \(E\) would raise the marginal efficiency of a given stock of health. This causes the MEC schedule in Figure 1 to shift upward and raises the optimal stock of health.

The percentage increase in the amount of health capital demanded for a one unit increase in \(E\) is given by

\[
\hat{H} = \rho_H \varepsilon. \tag{35}
\]

Since \(\rho_H\) indicates the percentage increase in gross investment supplied by a one unit increase in \(E\), shifts in this variable would not alter the demand for medical care or own time if \(\rho_H\) equaled \(\hat{H}\). For example, a person with 10 years of formal schooling might demand 3 percent more health than a person with 9 years of formal schooling. If the medical care and own time inputs were held constant, the former individual's one extra year of schooling might supply him with 3 percent more health. Given this condition, both persons would demand the same amounts of \(M\) and \(TH\). As this example illustrates, any effect of a change in \(E\) on the demand for medical care or time reflects a positive or negative differential between \(\hat{H}\) and \(\rho_H\):

\[
\hat{M} = \hat{TH} = \rho_H (\varepsilon - 1). \tag{36}
\]

Equation (36) suggests that the more educated would demand more health but less medical care if the elasticity of the MEC schedule were less than one. These patterns are
opposite to those that would be expected in comparing the health and medical care utilization of older and younger consumers.

4. Pure consumption model

If the cost of health capital were large relative to the monetary rate of return on an investment in health and if \( \bar{\pi}_{t-1} = 0 \), all \( t \), then Equation (11) or (24) could be approximated by

\[
\frac{U_h t G_t}{\lambda} = \frac{U H_t}{\lambda} = \frac{\pi (r + \delta_t)}{(1 + r)^t}.
\]

Equation (37) indicates that the monetary equivalent of the marginal utility of health capital must equal the discounted user cost of \( H_t \). It can be used to highlight the differences between the age, wage, or schooling effect in a pure consumption model and the corresponding effect in a pure investment model. In the following analysis, I assume that the marginal rate of substitution between \( H_t \) and \( H_{t+1} \) depends only on \( H_t \) and \( H_{t+1} \) and that the marginal rate of substitution between \( H_t \) and \( Z_t \) depends only on \( H_t \) and \( Z_t \). I also assume that one plus the market rate of interest is equal to one plus rate of time preference for the present (the ratio of the marginal utility of \( H_t \) to the marginal utility of \( H_{t+1} \) when these two stocks are equal minus one). Some of these assumptions are relaxed, and a more detailed analysis is presented in Grossman (1972b, Chapter III).

With regard to age-related depreciation rate effects, the elasticity of substitution in consumption between \( H_t \) and \( H_{t+1} \) replaces the elasticity of the MEC schedule in Equations (27) and (28). The quantity of health capital demanded still falls over the life cycle in response to an increase in the rate of depreciation. Gross investment and health inputs rise with age if the elasticity of substitution between present and future health is less than one.

Since health enters the utility function, health is positively related to wealth in the consumption model provided it is a superior good. That is, an increase in wealth with no change in the wage rate or the marginal cost of gross investment causes the quantity of health capital demanded to rise. This effect is absent from the investment model because

\[ U_h t = \frac{\pi (r + \delta_t) G_t}{(1 + r)^t}. \]

Given diminishing marginal productivity of health capital, the undiscounted price of a healthy hour, \( \pi (r + \delta_t) G_t \), would be positively correlated with \( H \) or \( h \) even if \( \pi \) were constant. Therefore, the consumption demand curve would be influenced by scale effects. To emphasize the main issues at stake in the consumption model, I ignore these effects essentially by assuming that \( G_t \) is constant. The analysis would not be greatly altered if they were introduced.

\[ ^{25} \text{Solving Equation (37) for the monetary equivalent of the marginal utility of healthy time, one obtains} \]

\[
\frac{U_h t}{\lambda} = \frac{\pi (r + \delta_t) G_t}{(1 + r)^t}.
\]
the marginal efficiency of health capital and the market rate of interest do not depend on wealth.\textsuperscript{26} Parametric wage variations across persons of the same age induce wealth effects on the demand for health. Suppose that we abstract from these effects by holding the level of utility or real wealth constant. Then the wage elasticity of health is given by

\[ e_{HW} = -(1 - \theta)(K - K_Z)\sigma_{HZ}, \]  

(38)

where \( \theta \) is the share of health in wealth, \( K_Z \) is the share of total cost of \( Z \) accounted for by time, and \( \sigma_{HZ} \) is the positive elasticity of substitution in consumption between \( H \) and \( Z \).\textsuperscript{27} Hence,

\[ e_{HW} \leq 0 \quad \text{as} \quad K \geq K_Z. \]

The sign of the wage elasticity is ambiguous because an increase in the wage rate raises the marginal cost of gross investment in health and the marginal cost of \( Z \). If time costs were relatively more important in the production of health than in the production of \( Z \), the relative price of health would rise with the wage rate, which would reduce the quantity of health demanded. The reverse would occur if \( Z \) were more time intensive than health. The ambiguity of the wage effect here is in sharp contrast to the situation in the investment model. In that model, the wage rate would be positively correlated with health as long as \( K \) were less than one.

Instead of examining a wage effect that holds utility constant, Wagstaff (1986) and Zweifel and Breyer (1997) examine a wage effect that holds the marginal utility of wealth constant. This analysis is feasible only if the current period utility function, \( \Psi(H, Z) \), is strictly concave:

\[ \Psi_{HH} < 0, \quad \Psi_{ZZ} < 0, \quad \Psi_{HH}\Psi_{ZZ} - \Psi_{HZ}^2 > 0. \]

With the marginal utility of wealth (\( \lambda \)) held constant, the actual change in health caused by a one percent increase in the wage rate is given by

\[ \frac{\partial H}{\partial \ln W} = \frac{K\Psi_{HZ} - K_Z\Psi_Z\Psi_{HZ}}{\Psi_{HH}\Psi_{ZZ} - \Psi_{HZ}^2}. \]  

(39)

\textsuperscript{26} For a different conclusion, see Ehrlich and Chuma (1990). They argue that wealth effects are present in the investment model given rising marginal cost of investment in health and endogenous length of life.

\textsuperscript{27} I assume that the elasticity of substitution in consumption between \( H_t \) and \( Z_i \) is the same in every period and that the elasticity of substitution between \( H_t \) and \( Z_j \) (\( t \neq j \)) does not depend on \( t \) or \( j \). The corresponding equation for the wage elasticity of medical care is

\[ e_{MW} = K\sigma_p - (1 - \theta)(K - K_Z)\sigma_{HZ}. \]
Equation (39) is negative if $\Psi_{HZ} \geq 0$. The sign of the wage effect is, however, ambiguous if $\Psi_{HZ} < 0$.28

The human capital parameter in the consumption demand function for health is

$$\hat{H} = \rho \eta_H + (\rho_H - \rho_Z)(1 - \theta)\sigma_{HZ},$$

(40)

where $\rho_Z$ is the percentage increase in the marginal product of the $Z$ commodity's goods or time input caused by a one unit increase in $E$ (the negative of the percentage reduction in the marginal or average cost of $Z$), $\eta_H$ is the wealth elasticity of demand for health, and $\rho = \theta \rho_H + (1 - \theta)\rho_Z$ is the percentage increase in real wealth as $E$ rises with money full wealth and the wage rate held constant. The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (40) reflects the wealth effect and the second term reflects the substitution effect. If $E$'s productivity effect in the gross investment production function is the same as in the Z production function, then $\rho_H = \rho_Z$ and $\hat{H}$ reflects the wealth effect alone. In this case, a shift in human capital, measured by years of formal schooling completed or education is "commodity-neutral," to use the term coined by Michael (1972, 1973). If $\rho_H > \rho_Z$, $E$ is "biased" toward health, its relative price falls, and the wealth and substitution effects both operate in the same direction. Consequently, an increase in $E$ definitely increases the demand for health. If $\rho_H < \rho_Z$, $E$ is biased away from health, its relative price rises, and the wealth and substitution effects operate in opposite directions.

The human capital parameter in the consumption demand curve for medical care is

$$\hat{M} = \rho(\eta_H - 1) + (\rho_H - \rho_Z)[(1 - \theta)\sigma_{HZ} - 1].$$

(41)

If shifts in $E$ are commodity-neutral, medical care and education are negatively correlated unless $\eta_H \geq 1$. If on the other hand, there is a bias in favor of health, these two variables will still tend to be negatively correlated unless the wealth and price elasticities both exceed one.29

The preceding discussion reveals that the analysis of variations in nonmarket productivity in the consumption model differs in two important respects from the corresponding analysis in the investment model. In the first place, wealth effects are not relevant in the investment model, as has already been indicated. Of course, health would have a positive wealth elasticity in the investment model if wealthier people faced lower rates of interest. But the analysis of shifts in education assumes money wealth is fixed. Thus, one could not rationalize the positive relationship between education and health in terms of an association between wealth and the interest rate.

28 I assume that $\Psi_Z \Psi_{HZ} > \Psi_H \Psi_{ZZ}$ so that the pure wealth effect is positive and a reduction in $\lambda$ raises health. When $\Psi_{HZ}$ is negative, this condition does not guarantee that Equation (39) is negative because $K_Z$ could exceed $K$.

29 The term $(1 - \theta)\sigma_{HZ}$ in Equation (40) or Equation (41) is the compensated or utility-constant price elasticity of demand for health.
In the second place, if the investment framework were utilized, then whether or not a shift in human capital is commodity-neutral would be irrelevant in assessing its impact on the demand for health. As long as the rate of interest were independent of education, $H$ and $E$ would be positively correlated.\footnote{I relax the assumption that all persons face the same market rate of interest in Section 7.} Put differently, if individuals could always receive, say, a 5 percent real rate of return on savings deposited in a savings account, then a shift in education would create a gap between the cost of capital and the marginal efficiency of a given stock.

Muurinen (1982) and Van Doorslaer (1987) assume that an increase in education lowers the rate of depreciation on the stock of health rather than raising productivity in the gross investment production function. This is a less general assumption than the one that I have made since it rules out schooling effects in the production of nondurable household commodities. In the pure investment model, predictions are very similar whether schooling raises productivity or lowers the rate of depreciation.\footnote{If an increase in schooling lowers the rate of depreciation at every age by the same percentage, it is equivalent to a uniform percentage shift in this rate considered, a matter briefly in Section 3.3 and in more detail in Grossman (1972b, pp. 19, 90). The only difference between this model and the productivity model is that a value of the elasticity of the MEC schedule smaller than one is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for medical care to fall as schooling rises.} In the pure consumption model, the assumption made by Muurinen and Van Doorslaer is difficult to distinguish from the alternative assumption that $\rho_Z$ is zero. Interactions between schooling and the lagged stock of health in the demand function for current health arise given costs of adjustment in the Muurinen–Van Doorslaer model. These are discussed in Section 6.

### 5. Empirical testing

In Grossman (1972b, Chapter IV), I present an empirical formulation of the pure investment model, including a detailed outline of the structure and reduced form of that model. I stress the estimation of the investment model rather than the consumption model because the former model generates powerful predictions from simple analysis and more innocuous assumptions. For example, if one uses the investment model, he or she does not have to know whether health is relatively time-intensive to predict the effect of an increase in the wage rate on the demand for health. Also, he or she does not have to know whether education is commodity-neutral to assess the sign of the correlation between health and schooling. Moreover, the responsiveness of the quantity of health demanded to changes in its shadow price and the behavior of gross investment depend essentially on a single parameter – the elasticity of the MEC schedule. In the consumption model, on the other hand, three parameters are relevant – the elasticity of substitution in consumption between present and future health, the wealth elasticity of demand for health, and the elasticity of substitution in consumption between health and the $Z$ commodity. Finally, while good health may be a source of utility, it clearly is a
source of earnings. The following formulation is oriented toward the investment model, yet I also offer two tests to distinguish the investment model from the consumption model.

5.1. Structure and reduced form

With the production function of healthy time given by Equation (29), I make use of three basic structural equations (intercepts are suppressed):

$$\ln H_t = \varepsilon \ln W_t - \varepsilon \ln \pi_t - \varepsilon \ln \delta_t, \quad (42)$$

$$\ln \delta_t = \ln \delta_0 + \tilde{\delta} t, \quad (43)$$

$$\ln I_t = \ln H_t + \ln (1 + \tilde{H}_t/\delta_t) = \rho_H E + (1 - K) \ln M_t + K \ln TH_t. \quad (44)$$

Equation (42) is the demand function for the stock of health and is obtained by solving Equation (30) for $\ln H_t$. The equation contains the assumption that the real-own rate of interest is equal to zero. Equation (43) is the depreciation rate function. Equation (44) contains the identity that gross investment equals net investment plus depreciation and assumes that the gross investment production function is a member of the Cobb–Douglas class.

These three equations and the least-cost equilibrium condition that the ratio of the marginal product of medical care to the marginal product of time must equal the ratio of the price of medical care to the wage rate generate the following reduced form demand curves for health and medical care:

$$\ln H_t = (1 - K)\varepsilon \ln W_t - (1 - K)\varepsilon \ln P_t + \rho_H \varepsilon E - \tilde{\delta} \varepsilon t - \varepsilon \ln \delta_0, \quad (45)$$

$$\ln M_t = [(1 - K)\varepsilon + K] \ln W_t - [(1 - K)\varepsilon + K] \ln P_t + \rho_H (\varepsilon - 1) E$$

$$+ \tilde{\delta}(1 - \varepsilon) t + (1 - \varepsilon) \ln \delta_0 + \ln (1 + \tilde{H}_t/\delta_t). \quad (46)$$

If the absolute value of the rate of net disinvestment ($\tilde{H}_t$) were small relative to the rate of depreciation, the last term on the right-hand side of Equation (46) could be ignored. If the absolute value of the rate of net disinvestment ($\tilde{H}_t$) were small relative to the rate of depreciation, the last term on the right-hand side of Equation (46) could be ignored. Then Equations (45) and (46) would express the two main endogenous variables in the system as functions of four variables that are treated as exogenous within the context of this model – the wage rate, the price of medical care, the stock of human capital, and

32 Recall that $\delta_t > -\tilde{H}_t$ since gross investment must be positive. Given that the real rate of interest is zero

$$\frac{-\tilde{H}_t}{\delta_t} = \varepsilon \delta_t^2 \frac{d\delta_t}{dt}.$$

Since $\varepsilon$ is likely to be smaller than one and the square of the rate of depreciation is small for modest rates of depreciation, $\delta_t$ is likely to be much larger than $-\tilde{H}_t$. 

age—and one variable that is unobserved—the rate of depreciation in the initial period. With age subscripts suppressed the estimating equations become

\[ \ln H = B_W \ln W + B_P \ln P + B_E E + B_t t + u_1, \]

\[ \ln M = B_{WM} \ln W + B_{PM} \ln P + B_{EM} E + B_{tM} t + u_2, \]

where \( B_W = (1 - K)\varepsilon \), et cetera, \( u_1 = -\varepsilon \ln \delta_0 \) and \( u_2 = (1 - \varepsilon) \ln \delta_0 \). The investment model predicts \( B_W > 0 \), \( B_P < 0 \), \( B_E > 0 \), \( B_t < 0 \), \( B_{WM} > 0 \), and \( B_{PM} < 0 \). In addition, if \( \varepsilon < 1 \), \( B_{EM} < 0 \) and \( B_{tM} > 0 \).

The variables \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \) represent disturbance terms in the reduced form equations. These terms are present because depreciation rates vary among people of the same age, and such variations cannot be measured empirically. Provided \( \ln \delta_0 \) were not correlated with the independent variables in (47) and (48), \( u_1 \) and \( u_2 \) would not be correlated with these variables. Therefore, the equations could be estimated by ordinary least squares.

The assumption that the real-own rate of interest equals zero can be justified by noting that wage rates rise with age, at least during most stages of the life cycle. If the wage is growing at a constant percentage rate of \( \dot{W} \), then \( r_t = K \dot{W} \), all \( t \). So the assumption implies \( r = K \dot{W} \). By eliminating the real rate of interest and postulating that \(-\dot{H}_t\) is small relative to \( \delta_t \), \( \ln H \) and \( \ln M \) are made linear functions of age. If these assumptions are dropped, the age effect becomes nonlinear.

Since the gross investment production function is a member of the Cobb–Douglas class, the elasticity of substitution in production between medical care and own time (\( \sigma_p \)) is equal to one, and the share of medical care in the total cost of gross investment or the elasticity of gross investment with respect to medical care, \( (1 - K) \), is constant. If \( \sigma_p \) were not equal to one, the term \( K \) in the wage and price elasticities of demand for medical care would be multiplied by this value rather than by one. The wage and price parameters would not be constant if \( \sigma_p \) were constant but not equal to one, because \( K \) would depend on \( W \) and \( P \). The linear age, price, and wage effects in Equations (47) and (48) are first-order approximations to the true effects.

I have indicated that years of formal schooling completed is the most important determinant of the stock of human capital and employ schooling as a proxy for this stock in the empirical analysis described in Section 5.2. In reality the amount of human capital acquired by attending school also depends on such variables as the mental ability of the student and the quality of the school that he or she attends. If these omitted variables are positively correlated with schooling and uncorrelated with the other regressors in the demand function for health, the schooling coefficient is biased upwards. These biases are more difficult to sign if, for example, mental ability and school quality are correlated with the wage rate.\(^{33}\)

There are two empirical procedures for assessing whether the investment model gives a more adequate representation of people’s behavior than the consumption model. In

\[^{33}\] See Section 7 for a detailed analysis of biases in the regression coefficient of schooling due to the omission of other variables.
the first place, the wage would have a positive effect on the demand for health in the investment model as long as $K$ were less than one. On the other hand, it would have a positive effect in the consumption model only if health were relatively goods-intensive ($K < K_Z$). So, if the computed wage elasticity turns out to be positive, then the larger its value the more likely it is that the investment model is preferable to the consumption model. Of course, provided the production of health were relatively time intensive, the wage elasticity would be negative in the consumption model. In this case, a positive and statistically significant estimate of $B_W$ would lead to a rejection of the consumption model.

In the second place, health has a zero wealth elasticity in the investment model but a positive wealth elasticity in the consumption model provided it is a superior good. This suggests that wealth should be added to the set of regressors in the demand functions for health and medical care. Computed wealth elasticities that do not differ significantly from zero would tend to support the investment model.  

In addition to estimating demand functions for health and medical care, one could also fit the gross investment function given by Equation (44). This would facilitate a direct test of the hypothesis that the more educated are more efficient producers of health. The production function contains two unobserved variables: gross investment and the own time input. Since, however, $-\tilde{H}_t$ has been assumed to be small relative to $\delta_t$, one could fit

$$\ln H = \alpha \ln M + \rho H E - \tilde{\delta} t - \ln \delta_0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (49)

The difficulty with the above procedure is that it requires a good estimate of the production function. Unfortunately, Equation (49) cannot be fitted by ordinary least squares (OLS) because $\ln M$ and $\ln \delta_0$, the disturbance term, are bound to be correlated. From the demand function for medical care

$$\text{Covariance}(\ln M, \ln \delta_0) = (1 - \varepsilon)\text{Variance}(\ln \delta_0).$$

Given $\varepsilon < 1$, $\ln M$ and $\ln \delta_0$ would be positively correlated. Since an increase in the rate of depreciation lowers the quantity of health capital, the coefficient of medical care

34 Health would have a positive wealth elasticity in the investment model for people who are not in the labor force. For such individuals, an increase in wealth would raise the ratio of market goods to consumption time, the marginal product of consumption time, and its shadow price. Hence, the monetary rate of return on an investment in health would rise. Since my empirical work is limited to members of the labor force, a pure increase in wealth would not change the shadow price of their time.

35 In my monograph, I argue that a one percent increase in medical care would be accompanied by a one percent increase in own time if factor prices do not vary as more and more health is produced. Therefore, the regression coefficient $\alpha$ in Equation (49) would reflect the sum of the output elasticities of medical care and own time. Given constant returns to scale, the true value of $\alpha$ should be unity [Grossman (1972b, p. 43)]. This analysis becomes much more complicated once joint production is introduced [see Grossman (1972b), Chapter VI and the brief discussion of joint production below].
would be biased *downward*. The same bias exists if there are unmeasured determinants of efficiency in the production of gross investments in health.

The biases inherent in ordinary least squares estimates of health production functions were first emphasized by Auster et al. (1969). They have been considered in much more detail in the context of infant health by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983, 1988, 1991), Corman et al. (1987), Grossman and Joyce (1990), and Joyce (1994). Consistent estimates of the production function can be obtained by two-stage least squares (TSLS). In the present context, wealth, the wage rates, and the price of medical care serve as instruments for medical care. The usefulness of this procedure rests, however, on the validity of the overidentification restrictions and the degree to which the instruments explain a significant percentage of the variation in medical care [Bound et al. (1995), Staiger and Stock (1997)]. The TSLS technique is especially problematic when the partial effects of several health inputs are desired and when measures of some of these inputs are absent. In this situation the overidentification restrictions may not hold because wealth and input prices are likely to be correlated with the missing inputs.

In my monograph on the demand for health, I argued that “a production function taken by itself tells nothing about producer or consumer behavior, although it does have implications for behavior, which operate on the demand curves for health and medical care. Thus, they serve to rationalize the forces at work in the reduced form and give the variables that enter the equations economic significance. Because the reduced form parameters can be used to explain consumer choices and because they can be obtained by conventional statistical techniques, their interpretation should be pushed as far as possible. Only then should one resort to a direct estimate of the production function” [Grossman (1972b, p. 44)]. The reader should keep this position in mind in evaluating my discussion of the criticism of my model raised by Zweifel and Breyer (1997) in Section 6.

5.2. Data and results

I fitted the equations formulated in Section 5.1 to a nationally representative 1963 United States survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center and the Center for Health Administration Studies of the University of Chicago. I measured the stock of health by individuals’ self-evaluation of their health status. I measured healthy time, the output produced by health capital, either by the complement of the number of restricted-activity days due to illness or injury or the number of work-loss days due to illness or injury. I measured medical care by personal medical expenditures on doctors, dentists, hospital care, prescribed and nonprescribed drugs, nonmedical practitioners, and medical appliances. I had no data on the actual quantities of specific types of services, for example the number of physician visits. Similarly, I had no data on the prices of these services. Thus, I was forced to assume that the price of medical care \(P\) in the reduced form demand functions either does not vary among consumers or is not correlated with the other regressors in the demand functions. Neither assumption is likely to be correct
in light of the well known moral hazard effect of private health insurance. The main independent variables in the regressions were the age of the individual, the number of years of formal schooling he or she completed, his or her weekly wage rate, and family income (a proxy for wealth).

The most important regression results in the demand functions are as follows. Education and the wage rate have positive and statistically significant coefficients in the health demand function, regardless of the particular measure of health employed. An increase in age simultaneously reduces health and increases medical expenditures. Both effects are significant. The signs of the age, wage, and schooling coefficients in the health demand function and the sign of the age coefficient in the medical care demand function are consistent with the predictions contained in the pure investment model.

In the demand function for medical care the wage coefficient is negative but not significant, while the schooling coefficient is positive but not significant. The sign of the wage coefficient is not consistent with the pure investment model, and the sign of the schooling coefficient is not consistent with the version of the investment model in which the elasticity of the MEC schedule is less than one. In Grossman (1972b, Appendix D), I show that random measurement error in the wage rate and a positive correlation between the wage and unmeasured determinants of nonmarket efficiency create biases that may explain these results. Other explanations are possible. For example, the wage elasticity of medical care is not necessarily positive in the investment model if waiting and travel time are required to obtain this care [see Equation (33)]. Schooling is likely to be positively correlated with the generosity of health insurance coverage leading to an upward bias in its estimated effect.

When the production function is estimated by ordinary least squares, the elasticities of the three measures of health with respect to medical care are all negative. Presumably, this reflects the strong positive relation between medical care and the depreciation rate. Estimation of the production function by two-stage least squares reverses the sign of the medical care elasticity in most cases. The results, however, are sensitive to whether or not family income is included in the production function as a proxy for missing inputs.

The most surprising finding is that healthy time has a negative family income elasticity. If the consumption aspects of health were at all relevant, a literal interpretation of this result is that health is an inferior commodity. That explanation is, however, not consistent with the positive and significant income elasticity of demand for medical care. I offer an alternative explanation based on joint production. Such health inputs as cigarettes, alcohol, and rich food have negative marginal products. If their income elasticities exceeded the income elasticities of the beneficial health inputs, the marginal cost of gross investment in health would be positively correlated with income. This explanation can account for the positive income elasticity of demand for medical care. Given

36 See Zweifel and Manning (2000) for a review of the literature dealing with the effect of health insurance on the demand for medical care.
its assumptions, higher income persons simultaneously reduce their demand for health and increase their demand for medical care if the elasticity of the MEC schedule is less than one.

I emphasized in Section 2 that parametric changes in variables that increase healthy time also prolong length of life. Therefore, I also examine variations in age-adjusted mortality rates across states of the United States in 1960. I find a close agreement between mortality and sick time regression coefficients. Increases in schooling or the wage rate lower mortality, while increases in family income raise it.

6. Extensions

In this section I deal with criticisms and empirical and theoretical extensions of my framework. I begin with empirical testing with cross-sectional data by Wagstaff (1986), Erbsland et al. (1995), and Stratmann (1999) in Section 6.1. I pay particular attention to Wagstaff’s study because it serves as the basis of a criticism of my approach by Zweifel and Breyer (1997), which I also address in Section 6.1. I turn to empirical extensions with longitudinal data by Van Doorslaer (1987) and Wagstaff (1993) in Section 6.2. These studies introduce costs of adjustment, although in a rather ad hoc manner. I consider theoretical developments by Cropper (1977), Muurinen (1982), Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1987, 1990), Selden (1993), Chang (1996), and Liljas (1998) in Section 6.3. With the exception of Muurinen’s work, these developments all pertain to uncertainty.

6.1. Empirical extensions with cross-sectional data

Wagstaff (1986) uses the 1976 Danish Welfare Survey to estimate a multiple indicator version of the structure and reduced form of my demand for health model. He performs a principal components analysis of nineteen measures of non-chronic health problems to obtain four health indicators that reflect physical mobility, mental health, respiratory health, and presence of pain. He then uses these four variables as indicators of the unobserved stock of health. His estimation technique is the so-called MIMIC (multiple indicators-multiple causes) model developed by Jöreskog (1973) and Goldberger (1974) and employs the maximum likelihood procedure contained in Jöreskog and Sörbom (1981). His contribution is unique because it accounts for the multidimensional nature of good health both at the conceptual level and at the empirical level.

Aside from the MIMIC methodology, there are two principal differences between my work and Wagstaff’s work. First, the structural equation that I obtain is the production function. On the other hand, the structural equation that he obtains is a conditional output demand function. This expresses the quantity demanded of a health input, such as medical care, as a function of health output, input prices, and exogenous variables in the production function such as schooling and age. In the context of the structure that I specified in Section 5.1, the conditional output demand function is obtained by solving Equation (44) for medical care as a function of health, the own time input,
schooling, age, and the rate of depreciation in the initial period and then using the cost-minimization condition to replace the own time input with the wage rate and the price of medical care. Since an increase in the quantity of health demanded increases the demand for health inputs, the coefficient of health in the conditional demand function is positive.

Second, Wagstaff utilizes a Frisch (1964) demand function for health in discussing and attempting to estimate the pure consumption model. This is a demand function in which the marginal utility of lifetime wealth is held constant when the effects of variables that alter the marginal cost of investment in health are evaluated. I utilized it briefly in treating wage effects in the pure consumption model in Section 4 but did not stress it either theoretically or empirically. The marginal utility of lifetime wealth is not observed but can be replaced by initial assets and the sum of lifetime wage rates. Since the data are cross-sectional, initial assets and wage rates over the life cycle are not observed. Wagstaff predicts the missing measures by regressing current assets and the current wage on age, the square of age, and age-invariant socioeconomic characteristics.

Three health inputs are contained in the data: the number of physician visits during the eight months prior to the survey, the number of weeks spent in a hospital during the same period, and the number of complaints for which physician-prescribed or self-prescribed medicines were being taken at the time of the interview. To keep my discussion of the results manageable, I will focus on the reduced form and conditional demand functions for physician visits and on the demand function for health. The reader should keep in mind that the latent variable health obtained from the MIMIC procedure is a positive correlate of good health. Good health is the dependent variable in the reduced form demand function for health and one of the right-hand side variables in the conditional demand function for physician visits.

Wagstaff estimates his model with and without initial assets and the sum of lifetime wage rates. He terms the former a pure investment model and the latter a pure consumption model. Before discussing the results, one conceptual issue should be noted. Wagstaff indicates that medical inputs in Denmark are heavily subsidized and that almost all of the total cost of gross investment is accounted for by the cost of the own time input. He then argues that the wage coefficient should equal zero in the pure investment demand function since $K$, the share of the total cost of gross investment accounted for by time, is equal to one. He also argues that the coefficient of the wage in the demand function for medical care should equal one [see the relevant coefficients in Equations (45) and (46)].

Neither of the preceding propositions is necessarily correct. In Section 3 I developed a model in which the price of medical care is zero, but travel and waiting time ($q$ hours to make one physician visit) are required to obtain medical care as well as to produce health. I also assumed three endogenous inputs in the health production function: $M$, $TH$, and a market good whose acquisition does not require time. I then showed that the wage elasticity of health is positive, while the wage elasticity of medical care is indeterminate in sign [see Equations (32) and (33), both of which hold $q$ constant]. If there are only two inputs and no time required to obtain medical care, the wage elastici-
ties of health and medical care are zero. The latter elasticity is zero because the marginal product of medical care would be driven to zero if its price is zero for a given wage rate. An increase in the wage rate induces no further substitution in production. With travel and waiting time, the marginal product of care is positive, but the price of medical care relative to the price of the own time input \((Wq/W)\) does not depend on \(W\).

An additional complication is that Wagstaff includes a proxy for \(Wq\) – the respondent’s wage multiplied by the time required to travel to his or her physician – in the demand function for medical care. He asserts that the coefficient of the logarithm of this variable should equal the coefficient of the logarithm of the wage in the demand function for medical care in a model in which the price of medical care is not zero. This is not correct because the logarithm of \(W\) is held constant. Hence increases in \(Wq\) are due solely to increases in \(q\). As \(q\) rises, \(H\) falls and \(M\) falls because the price of \(M\) relative to the price of \(TH[(P + Wq)/W]\) rises.\(^{37}\)

In Wagstaff’s estimate of the reduced form of the pure investment model, the wage rate, years of formal schooling completed, and age all have the correct signs and all three variables are significant in the demand function for health. In the demand function for physician visits the schooling variable has a negative and significant coefficient. This finding differs from mine and is in accord with the predictions of the pure investment model. The age coefficient is positive and significant at the 10 percent level on a one-tailed test but not at the 5 percent level.\(^{38}\) The wage coefficient, however, is negative and not significant. The last finding is consistent with the three-input model outlined above and is not necessarily evidence against the investment model.

The time cost variable has the correct negative sign in the demand function for physician visits, but it is not significant. Wagstaff, however, includes the number of physicians per capita in the respondent’s county of residence in the same equation. This variable has a positive effect on visits, is likely to be negatively related to travel time, and may capture part of the travel time effect.

Wagstaff concludes the discussion of the results of estimating the reduced form of the investment model as follows: “Broadly speaking ... the coefficients are similar to those reported by Grossman and are consistent with the model’s structural parameters being of the expected sign. One would seem justified, therefore, in using the ... data for exploring the implications of using structural equation methods in this context” (p. 214). When this is done, the coefficient of good health in the conditional demand function for physician visits has the wrong sign. It is negative and very significant.

This last finding is used by Zweifel and Breyer (1997) to dismiss my model of the demand for health. They write: “Unfortunately, empirical evidence consistently fails to

\(^{37}\) The complete specification involves regressing \(H\) on \(W\) and \(q\) and regressing \(M\) on \(W\) and \(q\), where it is understood that all variables are in logarithms. In the three input model in which the money price of medical care is zero, the coefficients of \(q\) are negative in both equations. The coefficient of \(W\) is positive in the health equation and ambiguous in sign in the medical care equation.

\(^{38}\) A one-tailed test is appropriate since the alternative hypothesis is that the age coefficient is positive. The age coefficient is positive and significant at all conventional levels in the demand functions for hospital stays and medicines.
confirm this crucial prediction [that the partial correlation between good health and medical care should be positive]. When health status is introduced as a latent variable through the use of simultaneous indicators, all components of medical care distinguished exhibit a very definite and highly significant negative (their italics) partial relationship with health . . . . The notion that expenditure on medical care constitutes a demand derived from an underlying demand for health cannot be upheld because health status and demand for medical care are negatively rather than positively related” (pp. 60, 62).

Note, however, that biases arise if the conditional demand function is estimated with health treated as exogenous for the same reason that biases arise if the production function is estimated by ordinary least squares. In particular, the depreciation rate in the initial period (the disturbance term in the equation) is positively correlated with medical care and negatively correlated with health. Hence, the coefficient of health is biased downward in the conditional medical care demand function, and this coefficient could well be negative. The conditional demand function is much more difficult to estimate by two-stage least squares than the production function because no exogenous variables are omitted from it in the investment model. Input prices cannot be used to identify this equation because they are relevant regressors in it. Only wealth and the prices of inputs used to produce commodities other than health are omitted from the conditional demand function in the consumption model or in a mixed investment-consumption model. Measures of the latter variables typically are not available.

In his multiple indicator model, Wagstaff does not treat the latent health variable as endogenous when he obtains the conditional demand function. He is careful to point out that the bias that I have just outlined can explain his result. He also argues that absence of measures of some inputs may account for his finding. He states: “The identification of medical care with market inputs in the health investment production function might be argued to be a source of potential error. If non-medical inputs are important inputs in the production of health – as clearly they are – one might argue that the results stem from a failure to estimate a system (his italics) of structural demand equations for health inputs” (p. 226). Although I am biased, in my view these considerations go a long way toward refuting the Zweifel–Breyer critique.

As I indicated above, Wagstaff estimates a reduced form demand function for health in the context of what he terms a pure consumption model as well as in the context of a pure investment model. He does this by including initial assets and the lifetime wage variable in the demand functions as proxies for the marginal utility of wealth. Strictly speaking, however, this is not a pure consumption model. It simply accommodates the consumption motive as well as the investment motive for demanding health. Wagstaff proposes but does not stress one test to distinguish the investment model from the consumption model. If the marginal utility of health does not depend on the quantity of the Z-commodity in the current period utility function, the wage effect should be negative in the demand function for health. Empirically, the current wage coefficient remains positive and significant when initial assets and the lifetime wage are introduced as re-
gressors in this equation. As I noted in Section 4, this result also is consistent with a pure consumption model in which the marginal utility of $H$ is negatively related to $Z$.

The initial assets and lifetime wage coefficients are highly significant. As Wagstaff indicates, these variables are highly correlated with schooling, the current wage, and other variables in the demand function for health since both are predicted from these variables. These intercorrelations are so high that the schooling coefficient becomes negative and significant in the consumption demand function. Wagstaff stresses that these results must be interpreted with caution.

Zweifel and Breyer (1997) have a confusing and incorrect discussion of theoretical and empirical results on wage effects. They claim that their discussion, which forms part of the critique of my model, is based on Wagstaff’s study. In the demand function for health, they indicate that the lifetime wage effect is negative in the pure consumption model and positive in the pure investment model. If the current wage is held constant, both statements are wrong. There is no lifetime wage effect in the investment model and a positive effect in the consumption model provided that health is a superior commodity. If their statements pertain to the current wage effect, the sign is positive in the investment model and indeterminate in the consumption model whether utility or the marginal utility of wealth is held constant.

Zweifel and Breyer’s (1997) discussion of schooling effects can be characterized in the same manner as their discussion of wage effects. They claim that the consumption model predicts a positive schooling effect in the demand function for health and a negative effect in the demand function for medical care. This is not entirely consistent with the analysis in Section 4. They use Wagstaff’s (1986) result that schooling has a positive coefficient in the conditional demand function for physician visits as evidence against my approach. But as Wagstaff and I have stressed, estimates of that equation are badly biased because health is not treated as endogenous.

A final criticism made by Zweifel and Breyer is that the wage rate does not adequately measure the monetary value of an increase in healthy time due to informal sick leave arrangements and private and social insurance that fund earnings losses due to illness. They do not reconcile this point with the positive effects of the wage rate on various health measures in my study and in Wagstaff’s study. In addition, sick leave and insurance plans typically finance less than 100 percent of the loss in earnings. More importantly, they ignore my argument that “... the inconvenience costs of illness” are positively correlated with the wage rate. The complexity of a particular job and the amount of responsibility it entails certainly are positively related to the wage. Thus, when an individual with a high wage becomes ill, tasks that only he can perform accumulate. These increase the intensity of his work load and give him an incentive to avoid illness by demanding more health capital” [Grossman (1972b, pp. 69–70)].

Erbsland et al. (1995) provide another example of the application of the MIMIC procedure to the estimation of a demand for health model. Their database is the 1986 West

\[39\] Joint production could account for a negative lifetime wage effect, but Zweifel and Breyer do not consider this phenomenon.
German Socio-economic Panel. The degree of handicap, self-rated health, the duration of sick time, and the number of chronic conditions, all as reported by the individual, serve as four indicators of the unobserved stock of health. In the reduced form demand function for health, schooling has a positive and significant coefficient, while age has a negative and significant coefficient. In the reduced form demand function for visits to general practitioners, the age effect is positive and significant, while the schooling effect is negative and significant. These results are consistent with predictions made by the investment model. The latent variable health, which is treated as exogenous, has a negative and very significant coefficient in the conditional demand function for physician visits. This is the same finding reported by Wagstaff (1986).

In my 1972 study [Grossman (1972b)], I showed that the sign of the correlation between medical care and health can be reversed if medical care is treated as endogenous in the estimation of health production functions. Stratmann (1999) gives much more recent evidence in support of the same proposition. Using the 1989 US National Health Interview Survey, he estimates production functions in which the number of work-loss days due to illness in the past two weeks serves as the health measure and a dichotomous indicator for a doctor visit in the past two weeks serves as the measure of medical care. In a partial attempt to control for reverse causality from poor health to more medical care, he obtains separate production functions for persons with influenza, persons with impairments, and persons with chronic asthma.

In single equation tobit models, persons who had a doctor visit had significantly more work-loss than persons who did not have a visit for each of the three conditions. In simultaneous equations probit-tobit models in which the probability of a doctor visit is endogenous, persons who had a doctor visit had significantly less work-loss. The tobit coefficient in the simultaneous equations model implies that the marginal effect of a doctor visit is a 2.7 day reduction in work loss in the case of influenza. The corresponding reductions for impairments and chronic asthma are 2.9 days and 6.9 days, respectively.

6.2. Empirical extensions with longitudinal data

Van Doorslaer (1987) and Wagstaff (1993) fit dynamic demand for health models to longitudinal data. These efforts potentially are very useful because they allow one to take account of the effects of unmeasured variables such as the rate of depreciation and of reverse causality from health at early stages in the life cycle to the amount of formal schooling completed (see Section 7 for more details). In addition, one can relax the assumption that there are no costs of adjustment, so that the lagged stock of health becomes a relevant determinant of the current stock of health.

Stratmann identifies his model with instruments reflecting the price of visiting a physician which differs according to the type of health insurance carried by individuals. The specific measures are Medicaid coverage, private insurance coverage, membership in a Health Maintenance Organization, and whether or not the employer paid the health insurance premium.
Van Doorslaer (1987) employs the 1984 Netherlands Health Interview Survey. While this is a cross-sectional survey, respondents were asked to evaluate their health in 1979 as well as in 1984. Both measures are ten-point scales, where the lowest category is very poor health and the highest category is very good health.

Van Doorslaer uses the identity that the current stock of health equals the undepreciated component of the past stock plus gross investment:

\[
H_t = (1 - \delta_{t-1}) H_{t-1} + I_{t-1}. \tag{50}
\]

He assumes that gross investment is a function of personal background variables (schooling, age, income, and gender). Thus, he regresses health in 1984 on these variables and on health in 1979. To test Muurinen's (1982) hypothesis that schooling lowers the rate of depreciation (see Section 4.2), he allows for an interaction between this variable and health in 1979 in some of the estimated models.

Van Doorslaer's main finding is that schooling has a positive and significant coefficient in the regression explaining health in 1984, with health in 1979 held constant. The regressions in which schooling, past health, and an interaction between the two are entered as regressors are plagued by multicollinearity. They do not allow one to distinguish Muurinen's hypothesis from the hypothesis that schooling raises efficiency in the production of health.

Wagstaff (1993) uses the Danish Health Study, which followed respondents over a period of 12 months beginning in October 1982. As in his 1986 study, a MIMIC model is estimated. Three health measures are used as indicators of the unobserved stock of health capital in 1982 (past stock) and 1983 (current stock). These are a dichotomous indicator of the presence of a health limitation, physician-assessed health of the respondent as reported by the respondent, and self-assessed health. Both of the assessment variables have five-point scales. Unlike his 1986 study, Wagstaff also treats gross investment in health as a latent variable. There are six health care utilization indicators of gross investment: the number of consultations with a general practitioner over the year, the number of consultations with a specialist over the year, the number of days as an inpatient in a hospital over the year, the number of sessions with a physiotherapist over the year, the number of hospital outpatient visits over the year, and the number of hospital emergency room visits during the year.

Wagstaff explicitly assumes partial adjustment instead of instantaneous adjustment. He also assumes that the reduced form demand for health equation is linear rather than log-linear. He argues that this makes it compatible with the linear nature of the net investment identity (net investment equals gross investment minus depreciation). The

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41 The health limitation variable for 1982 is based on responses during October, November, and December of that year. The corresponding variable for 1983 is based on responses during the months of January through September. It is not clear which month is used for the self- and physician-rated health measures. I assume that the 1982 measures come from the October 1982 survey and the 1983 measure comes from the September 1983 survey.
desired stock in period \( t \) is a linear function of age, schooling, family income, and gender. A fraction \( (\mu) \) of the gap between the actual and the desired stock is closed each period. Hence the lagged stock enters the reduced form demand function with a coefficient equal to \( 1 - \mu \). Solving Equation (50) for gross investment in period \( t - 1 \) and replacing \( H_t \) by its demand function, Wagstaff obtains a demand function for \( I_{t-1} \) that depends on the same variables as those in the demand function for \( H_t \). The coefficient of each sociodemographic variable in the demand function for \( H_t \) is the same as the corresponding coefficient in the demand function for \( I_{t-1} \). The coefficient on the lagged stock in the latter demand function equals \( -(\mu - \delta_{t-1}) \). By estimating the model with cross-equation constraints, \( \mu \) and \( \delta_{t-1} \) are identified.

Wagstaff emphasizes that the same variables enter his conditional demand function for \( I_{t-1} \) in his cost-of-adjustment model as those that enter the conditional demand function for \( I_{t-1} \) in my instantaneous adjustment model. The interpretation of the parameters, however, differs. In my case, the contemporaneous health stock has a positive coefficient, whereas in his case the coefficient is negative if \( \mu \) exceeds \( \delta_{t-1} \). In my case, the coefficient of schooling, for example, is equal to the negative of the schooling coefficient in the production function. In his case, it equals the coefficient of schooling in the demand function for \( H_t \).

To allow for the possibility that the rate of depreciation varies with age, Wagstaff fits the model separately for adults under the age of forty-one and for adults greater than or equal to this age. For each age group, schooling has a positive and significant effect on current health with past health held constant. The coefficient of \( H_{t-1} \) in the demand function for \( I_{t-1} \) is negative, suggesting costs of adjustment and also suggesting that \( \mu \) exceeds \( \delta_{t-1} \). The implied value of the rate of depreciation is, however, larger in the sample of younger adults than in the sample of older adults. Moreover, in the latter sample, the estimated rate of depreciation is negative. These implausible findings may be traced to the inordinate demands on the data attributed to the MIMIC methodology with two latent variables and cross-equation constraints.

Some conceptual issues can be raised in evaluating the two studies just discussed. Wagstaff (1993) estimates input demand functions which include availability measures as proxies for travel and waiting time (for example, the per capita number of general practitioners in the individual’s district in the demand function for the number of consultations with general practitioners). Yet he excludes these variables from the demand functions for \( H_t \) and \( I_{t-1} \). This is not justified. In addition, Wagstaff implies that the gross investment production function is linear in its inputs, which violates the cost-minimization conditions.

More fundamentally, both Van Doorslaer (1987) and Wagstaff (1993) provide ad hoc cost-of-adjustment models. I now show that a rigorous development of such a model contains somewhat different demand functions than the ones that they estimate. To simplify, I assume that the pure investment model is valid, ignore complications with cost-of-adjustment models studied by Ehrlich and Chuma (1990), and fix the wage rate at
\$1. I also make use of the exact form of the first-order condition for \( H_t \) in a discrete time model (see footnote 13):

\[
G_t = (1 + r)\pi_{t-1} - (1 - \delta_t)\pi_t. \tag{51}
\]

Note that \( \pi_{t-1} \) is the marginal cost of gross investment in health. Since marginal cost rises as the quantity of investment rises in a model with costs of adjustment, the marginal cost of investment exceeds the average cost of investment. Also to simplify and to keep the system linear, I assume that \( G_t \) is a linear function of \( H_t \) and that \( \pi_{t-1} \) is a linear function of \( I_{t-1} \) and \( P_{t-1} \) (the price of the single market input used in the gross investment production function):

\[
G_t = \varphi - \alpha H_t, \tag{52}
\]

\[
\pi_{t-1} = P_{t-1} + I_{t-1}. \tag{53}
\]

Given this model, the optimal stock of health in period \( t \) is

\[
H_t = \frac{\varphi}{\alpha} - \frac{(1 + r)}{\alpha} P_{t-1} - \frac{(1 + r)}{\alpha} I_{t-1} + \frac{(1 - \delta_t)}{\alpha} P_t + \frac{(1 - \delta_t)}{\alpha} I_t. \tag{54}
\]

Since \( I_{t-1} = H_t - (1 - \delta_{t-1})H_{t-1} \) and \( I_t(1 - \delta_t) = (1 - \delta_t)H_{t+1} - (1 - \delta_t)^2 H_t \),

\[
H_t = \frac{\varphi}{D} - \frac{(1 + r)}{D} P_{t-1} + \frac{(1 + r)(1 - \delta_{t-1})}{D} H_{t-1} + \frac{(1 - \delta_t)}{D} P_t + \frac{(1 - \delta_t)}{D} H_{t+1} + \frac{(1 - \delta_t)}{D} P_t, \tag{55}
\]

where \( D = \alpha + (1 + r) + (1 - \delta_t)^2 \). Alternatively, substitute Equation (55) into the definition of \( I_{t-1} \) to obtain

\[
I_{t-1} = \frac{\varphi}{D} - \frac{(1 + r)}{D} P_{t-1} - \frac{(1 - \delta_{t-1})[\alpha + (1 - \delta_t)^2]}{D} H_{t-1} + \frac{(1 - \delta_t)}{D} H_{t+1} + \frac{(1 - \delta_t)}{D} P_t. \tag{56}
\]

Equation (55) is the demand for health function obtained by Van Doorslaer (1987) and Wagstaff (1993). Their estimates are biased because the stock of health in period \( t \) depends on the stock of health in period \( t + 1 \) as well as on the stock of health in period \( t - 1 \) in a model with costs of adjustment. Equation (56) is the gross investment demand function obtained by Wagstaff. His estimate is biased because gross investment in period \( t - 1 \) depends on the stock of health in period \( t + 1 \) as well as on the stock of health in period \( t - 1 \). Note that this equation and Equation (55) also depend on measured and unmeasured determinants of market and nonmarket efficiency in periods \( t - 1 \) and \( t \).
The second-order difference equations given by (55) and (56) can be solved to express $H_t$ or $I_{t-1}$ as functions of current, past, and future values of all the exogenous variables. Similarly, $H_{t-1}$ and $H_{t+1}$ depend on this set of exogenous variables. Since one of the members of this set is the disturbance term in (55) or (56), the lagged and future stocks are correlated with the regression disturbance. Consequently, biases arise if either equation is estimated by ordinary least squares. Consistent estimates can be obtained by fitting the equations by two-stage least squares with past and future values of the exogenous variables serving as instruments for the one-period lead and the one-period lag of the stock.\footnote{The minimum requirements for instruments are measures of $P_{t+1}$ and $P_{t-2}$. The one-period lead of the price has no impact on $H_t$ with $H_{t+1}$ held constant. Similarly, the two-period lag of the price has no impact on $H_t$ with $H_{t-1}$ held constant.} Note that consistent estimates cannot be obtained by the application of ordinary least squares to a first-difference model or to a fixed-effects model. Lagged and future health variables do not drop out of these models and are correlated with the time-varying component of the disturbance term.

I conclude that cost-of-adjustment models require at least three data points (three observations on each individual) to be estimated. Calculated parameters of this model are biased if they are obtained by ordinary least squares. There is an added complication that arises even if all the necessary data are available because the procedure that I have outlined assumes that individuals have perfect information about the future values of the exogenous variables. This may or may not be the case.\footnote{The same issue arises in estimating the rational addiction model of consumer behavior. For a detailed discussion, see Becker et al. (1994).} While the two studies that I have reviewed are provocative, they do not contain enough information to compare instantaneous-adjustment models to cost-of-adjustment models.

6.3. Theoretical extensions

Muurinen (1982) examines comparative static age, schooling, and wealth effects in the context of a mixed investment-consumption model with perfect certainty. This approach is more general than mine because it incorporates both the investment motive and the consumption motive for demanding health. In deriving formulas for the effects of increases in age and schooling on the optimal quantities of health capital and medical care, Muurinen assumes that the undiscounted monetary value of the marginal utility of healthy time in period $t$, given by $(U_{ht}/\lambda)(1 + r)^t$, is constant for all $t$. If $m_t$ is the marginal cost of the $Z$ commodity and $U_t$ is its marginal utility, the undiscounted monetary value of the marginal utility of healthy time also is given by $(U_{ht}/U_t)m_t$. Hence, Muurinen is assuming that the marginal rate of substitution between healthy time and the $Z$ commodity is constant or that the two commodities are perfect substitutes. Clearly, this is a very restrictive assumption.\footnote{Ried (1998) also develops a framework for examining the impacts of changes in exogenous variables in the context of a mixed investment-consumption model. He uses Frisch (1964) demand curves to decompose}
In my formal development of the demand for health, I ruled out uncertainty. Surely that is not realistic. I briefly indicated that one could introduce this phenomenon by assuming that a given consumer faces a probability distribution of depreciation rates in every period. I speculated, but did not prove, that consumers might have incentives to hold an excess stock of health in relatively desirable "states of the world" (outcomes with relatively low depreciation rates) in order to reduce the loss associated with an unfavorable outcome. In these relatively desirable states, the marginal monetary return on an investment in health might be smaller than the opportunity cost of capital in a pure investment model [Grossman (1972b, pp. 19–21)].

Beginning with Cropper (1977), a number of persons formally have introduced uncertainty into my pure investment model. Cropper assumes that illness occurs in a given period if the stock of health falls below a critical sickness level, which is random. Income is zero in the illness state. An increase in the stock of health lowers the probability of this state. Cropper further assumes that savings are not possible (all income takes the form of earnings) and that consumers are risk-neutral in the sense that their objective is to maximize the expected discounted value of lifetime wealth.

In my view, Cropper's main result is that consumers with higher incomes or wealth levels will maintain higher stocks of health than poorer persons. While this may appear to be a different result than that contained in my pure investment model with perfect certainty, it is not for two reasons. First, an increase in the stock of health lowers the probability of illness but has no impact on earnings in non-illness states. Hence the marginal benefit of an increase in the stock is given by the reduction in the probability of illness multiplied by the difference between income and gross investment outlays. With these outlays held constant, an increase in income raises the marginal benefit and the marginal rate of return on an investment. Therefore, this wealth or income effect is analogous to the wage effect in my pure investment model with perfect certainty. Second, consider a pure investment model with perfect certainty, positive initial assets but no possibility to save or borrow in financial markets. In this model, investment in health is the only mechanism to increase future consumption. An increase in initial assets will increase the optimal stock of health provided future consumption has a positive wealth elasticity.

Later treatments of uncertainty in the context of demand for health models have assumed risk-averse behavior, so that an expected utility function that exhibits diminishing marginal utility of present and future consumption is maximized. Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1987), Selden (1993), and Chang (1996) all employ two-period models in the total effect into an effect that holds the marginal utility of wealth constant and an effect attributable to a change in the marginal utility of wealth. He obtains few, if any, unambiguous predictions. I leave it to the reader to evaluate this contribution.

Cropper begins with a model in which consumers are risk-averse, but the rate of depreciation on the stock of health does not depend on age. She introduces risk-neutrality when she allows the rate of depreciation to depend on age.

Cropper assumes that gross investment in health is produced only with medical care, but the above result holds as long as the share of the own time input in the total cost of gross investment is less than one.
which the current period utility function depends only on current consumption. Uncer-
tainty in the second period arises because the earnings-generating function in that period
contains a random variable. This function is \( Y_2 = W h_2(H_2, R) = F(H_2, R) \), where \( Y_2 \)
is earnings in period two, \( h_2 \) is the amount of healthy time in that period, \( H_2 \) is the stock
of health, and \( R \) is the random term. Clearly, \( F_1 > 0 \) and \( F_{11} < 0 \), where \( F_1 \) and \( F_{11} \) are
the first and second derivatives of \( H_2 \) in the earnings function. The second derivative
is negative because of my assumption that the marginal product of the stock of health
in the production of healthy time falls as the stock rises. An increase in \( R \) raises earn-
ings \( (F_2 > 0) \). In addition to income or earnings from health, income is available from
savings at a fixed rate of return.

Given uncertainty, risk-averse individuals make larger investments in health than they
would in its absence. Indeed, the expected marginal rate of return is smaller than the rate
with perfect certainty. This essentially confirms a result that I anticipated in the brief
discussion of uncertainty in my monograph.

The main impact of the introduction of uncertainty is that the quantities of health
capital and gross investment depend on initial assets, with the wage rate held constant.
The direction of these effects, however, is ambiguous because it depends on the way in
which risk is specified. Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1987) adopt a multiplicative specifi-
cation in which the earnings function is \( Y_2 = R H_2 \). They show that an increase in initial
assets raises the optimal quantities of health and medical care if the utility function ex-
hibits decreasing absolute risk aversion. \(^{47}\) Selden (1993) adopts a linear specifi-
cation in which the earnings function is \( Y_2 = F(H_2 + R) \) and \( \partial^2 Y_2 / \partial (H_2 + R)^2 < 0 \). He reaches
the opposite conclusion: health and medical care fall as assets rise given declining ab-
solute risk aversion.

Chang (1996) generalizes the specification of risk. He shows that the sign of the asset
effect depends on the sign of the second-order cross partial derivative in the earnings
function \( (F_{12}) \). If \( F_{12} \) is positive and \( F_{11} \) is zero, the asset effect is positive. This is
the case considered by Dardanoni and Wagstaff. In my view it is not realistic because
it assumes that the marginal product of the stock of health in the production of healthy
time is constant. Given the more realistic case in which \( F_{11} \) is negative, the asset effect is
negative if \( F_{12} \) is negative (Selden’s case) and indeterminate in sign if \( F_{12} \) is positive. \(^{48}\)

Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990) introduce uncertainty into pure consumption models
of the demand for health. Their study is a static one-period model. The utility func-
tion depends on the consumption of a composite commodity and health. Health is given
by \( H = R + I(M, R) \), where \( R \) is a random variable and \( I(M, R) \) denotes the health
production function. They consider two models: one in which \( H = R + M \) and one
in which \( H = R M \). In the first model an increase in the variance of \( R \) with the mean
held constant increases the quantity of medical care demanded under plausible assump-
tions about the utility function (superiority of the composite consumption good and

\[^{47}\] A utility function \( U = U(C) \) exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion if \( -U_{CC} / U_C \) falls as \( C \) rises.

\[^{48}\] Chang provides more results by assuming that the earnings function depends only on "post-shock health,"
\( f(H_2, R) \). The finding that the sign of the asset effect is ambiguous holds in his formulation.
non-increasing absolute risk aversion with regard to that good). In the second model the same effect is more difficult to sign, although it is positive if an increase in $R$ leads to a reduction in $M$ and an increase in the composite good and if the utility function exhibits non-increasing relative risk aversion with regard to the composite good.\footnote{Garber and Phelps (1997), Meltzer (1997), and Picone et al. (1998) also introduce uncertainty into a pure consumption model of the demand for health. I do not discuss the first two studies because they focus on cost-effectiveness analysis. I do not discuss the last one because it emphasizes the behavior of individuals in their retirement years.}

Liljas (1998) considers uncertainty in the context of a multiperiod mixed investment-consumption model. Uncertainty takes the form of a random variable that affects the stock of health in period $t$ in an additive fashion. He shows that the stock of health is larger in the stochastic case than in the certainty case. Presumably, this result pertains to the expected stock of health in period $t$. The actual stock should be smaller than the stock with certainty given a negative shock. Social insurance that funds part of the loss in income due to illness lowers the optimal stock. Private insurance that also funds part of this loss will not necessarily lower the stock further and may actually increase it if the cost of this insurance falls as the stock rises.

To summarize, compared to a model with perfect certainty, the expected value of the stock of health is larger and the optimal quantities of gross investment and health inputs also are larger in a model with uncertainty. In a pure investment model an increase in initial assets can cause health and medical care to change, but the direction of these effects is ambiguous. Under reasonable assumptions, an increase in the variance of risk raises optimal medical care in a pure consumption model.

How valuable are these results? With the exception of the ambiguity of the asset effect, they are not very surprising. The variance of risk is extremely difficult to measure. I am not aware of empirical studies that have attempted to include this variable in a demand for health framework. The possibility that the asset effect can be nonzero in a pure investment model provides an alternative explanation of Wagstaff’s (1986) finding that an increase in proxies for initial assets and lifetime earnings raise health. None of the studies has taken my suggestion to treat uncertainty in terms of a probability distribution of depreciation rates in a given period. This could be done by writing the stock of health in period $t$ as

$$H_t = H_{t-1} - \bar{\delta}_{t-1} H_{t-1} + I_{t-1} + R_{t-1},$$

(57)

where $\bar{\delta}_{t-1}$ is the mean depreciation rate and $R_{t-1} = (\bar{\delta}_{t-1} - \bar{\delta}_{t-1}) H_{t-1}$. I leave it to the reader to explore the implications of this formulation.

7. Health and schooling

An extensive review of the literature conducted by Grossman and Kaestner (1997) suggests that years of formal schooling completed is the most important correlate of good
health. This finding emerges whether health levels are measured by mortality rates, morbidity rates, self-evaluation of health status, or physiological indicators of health, and whether the units of observation are individuals or groups. The studies also suggest that schooling is a more important correlate of health than occupation or income, the two other components of socioeconomic status. This is particularly true when one controls for reverse causality from poor health to low income. Of course, schooling is a causal determinant of occupation and income, so that the gross effect of schooling on health may reflect in part its impact on socioeconomic status. The studies reviewed, however, indicate that a significant portion of the gross schooling effect cannot be traced to the relationship between schooling and income or occupation.

In a broad sense, the observed positive correlation between health and schooling may be explained in one of three ways. The first argues that there is a causal relationship that runs from increases in schooling to increases in health. The second holds that the direction of causality runs from better health to more schooling. The third argues that no causal relationship is implied by the correlation; instead, differences in one or more "third variables," such as physical and mental ability and parental characteristics, affect both health and schooling in the same direction.

It should be noted that these three explanations are not mutually exclusive and can be used to rationalize an observed correlation between any two variables. But from a public policy perspective, it is important to distinguish among them and to obtain quantitative estimates of their relative magnitudes. Suppose that a stated goal of public policy is to improve the level of health of the population or of certain groups in the population. Given this goal and given the high correlation between health and schooling, it might appear that one method of implementation would be to increase government outlays on schooling. In fact, Auster et al. (1969) suggest that the rate of return on increases in health via higher schooling outlays far exceeds the rate of return on increases in health via higher medical care outlays. This argument assumes that the correlation between health and schooling reflects only the effect of schooling on health. If, however, the causal relationship was the reverse, or if the third-variable hypothesis was relevant, then increased outlays on schooling would not accomplish the goal of improved health.

Causality from schooling to health results when more educated persons are more efficient producers of health. This efficiency effect can take two forms. Productive efficiency pertains to a situation in which the more educated obtain a larger health output from given amounts of endogenous (choice) inputs. This is the effect that I have emphasized throughout this paper. Allocative efficiency, discussed in detail by Kenkel (2000), pertains to a situation in which schooling increases information about the true effects of the inputs on health. For example, the more educated may have more knowledge about the harmful effects of cigarette smoking or about what constitutes an appropriate diet. Allocative efficiency will improve health to the extent that it leads to the selection of a better input mix.

Causality from schooling to health also results when education changes tastes or preferences in a manner that favors health relative to certain other commodities. In some cases the taste hypothesis cannot be distinguished from allocative hypothesis, partic-
ularly when knowledge of health effects has been available for some time. But in a situation in which the new information becomes available, the allocative efficiency hypothesis predicts a more rapid response by the more educated.

Alternatively, the direction of causality may run from better health to more schooling because healthier students may be more efficient producers of additions to the stock of knowledge (or human capital) via formal schooling. Furthermore, this causal path may have long lasting effects if past health is an input into current health status. Thus, even for non-students, a positive relationship between health and schooling may reflect reverse causality in the absence of controls for past health.

The "third-variable" explanation is particularly relevant if one thinks that a large unexplained variation in health remains after controlling for schooling and other determinants. Studies summarized by Grossman and Kaestner (1997) and results in the related field of investment in human capital and the determinants of earnings [for example, Mincer (1974)], indicate that the percentage of the variation in health explained by schooling is much smaller than the percentage of the variation in earnings explained by schooling. Yet it also is intuitive that health and illness have larger random components than earnings. The third-variable explanation is relevant only if the unaccounted factors which affect health are correlated with schooling. Note that both the reverse causality explanation and the third-variable explanation indicate that the observed relationship between current health and schooling reflects an omitted variable. In the case of reverse causality, the omitted variable is identified as past or endowed health. In econometric terminology, both explanations fall under the general rubric of biases due to unobserved heterogeneity among individuals.

Kaestner and I [Grossman and Kaestner (1997)] conclude from our extensive review of the literature that schooling does in fact have a causal impact on good health. In drawing this conclusion, we are sensitive to the difficulties of establishing causality in the social sciences where natural experiments rarely can be performed. Our affirmative answer is based on the numerous studies in the US and developing countries that we have summarized. These studies employ a variety of adult, child, and infant health measures, many different estimation techniques, and controls for a host of third variables.

I leave it up to the reader to evaluate this conclusion after reading the Grossman-Kaestner paper and the studies therein. I also urge the reader to consult my study dealing with the correlation between health and schooling [Grossman (1975)] because I sketch out a framework in which there are complementary relationships between schooling and health – the principal components of the stock of human capital – at various stages in the life cycle. The empirical evidence that Kaestner and I report on causality from schooling to health as well as on causality from health to schooling underscores the potential payoffs to the formal development of a model in which the stocks of health and knowledge are determined simultaneously.

In the remainder of this section, I want to address one challenge of the conclusion that the role of schooling is causal: the time preference hypothesis first proposed by Fuchs (1982). Fuchs argues that persons who are more future oriented (who have a high degree of time preference for the future) attend school for longer periods of time and
make larger investments in health. Thus, the effect of schooling on health is biased if one fails to control for time preference.

The time preference hypothesis is analogous to the hypothesis that the positive effect of schooling on earnings is biased upward by the omission of ability. In each case a well-established relationship between schooling and an outcome (earnings or health) is challenged because a hard-to-measure variable (ability or time preference) has been omitted. Much ink has been spilled on this issue in the human capital literature. Attempts to include proxies for ability in earnings functions have resulted in very modest reductions in the schooling coefficient [for example, Griliches and Mason (1972), Hause (1972)]. Proponents of the ability hypothesis have attributed the modest reductions to measurement error in these proxies [for example, Goldberger (1974)]. More recent efforts have sought instruments that are correlated with schooling but not correlated with ability [for example, Angrist and Krueger (1991)]. These efforts have produced the somewhat surprising finding that the schooling coefficient increases when the instrumental variables procedure is employed. A cynic might conclude that the way to destroy any empirical regularity is to attribute it to an unmeasured variable, especially if the theory with regard to the relevance of this variable is not well developed.50

Nevertheless, the time preference hypothesis is important because it is related to recent and potentially very rich theoretical models in which preferences are endogenous [Becker and Murphy (1988), Becker (1996), Becker and Mulligan (1997)]. Differences in time preference among individuals will not generate differences in investments in human capital unless certain other conditions are met. One condition is that the ability to finance these investments by borrowing is limited, so that they must be funded to some extent by foregoing current consumption. Even if the capital market is perfect, the returns on an investment in schooling depend on hours of work if schooling raises market productivity by a larger percentage than it raises nonmarket productivity. Individuals who are more future oriented desire relatively more leisure at older ages. Therefore, they work more at younger ages and have a higher discounted marginal benefit on a given investment than persons who are more present oriented. If health enters the utility function, persons who discount the future less heavily will have higher health levels during most stages of the life cycle. Hence, a positive relationship between schooling and health does not necessarily imply causality.

Since the conditions that generate causal effects of time preference on schooling and health are plausible, attempts to control for time preference in estimating the schooling coefficient in a health outcome equation are valuable. Fuchs (1982) measures time preference in a telephone survey by asking respondents questions in which they chose between a sum of money now and a larger sum in the future. He includes an index of time preference in a multiple regression in which health status is the dependent variable and

50 See Grossman and Kaestner (1997) for a model in which ability should be omitted from the reduced form earnings function even though it enters the structural production function and has a causal impact on schooling.
schooling is one of the independent variables. Fuchs is not able to demonstrate that the schooling effect is due to time preference. The latter variable has a negative regression coefficient, but it is not statistically significant. When time preference and schooling are entered simultaneously, the latter dominates the former. These results must be regarded as preliminary because they are based on one small sample of adults on Long Island and on exploratory measures of time preference.

Farrell and Fuchs (1982) explore the time preference hypothesis in the context of cigarette smoking using interviews conducted in 1979 by the Stanford Heart Disease Prevention Program in four small agricultural cities in California. They examine the smoking behavior of white non-Hispanics who were not students at the time of the survey, had completed 12 to 18 years of schooling, and were at least 24 years old. The presence of retrospective information on cigarette smoking at ages 17 and 24 allows them to relate smoking at these two ages to years of formal schooling completed by 1979 for cohorts who reached age 17 before and after the widespread diffusion of information concerning the harmful effects of cigarette smoking on health.

Farrell and Fuchs find that the negative relationship between schooling and smoking, which rises in absolute value for cohorts born after 1953, does not increase between the ages of 17 and 24. Since the individuals were all in the same school grade at age 17, the additional schooling obtained between that age and age 24 cannot be the cause of differential smoking behavior at age 24, according to the authors. Based on these results, Farrell and Fuchs reject the hypothesis that schooling is a causal factor in smoking behavior in favor of the view that a third variable causes both. Since the strong negative relationship between schooling and smoking developed only after the spread of information concerning the harmful effects of smoking, they argue that the same mechanism may generate the schooling-health relationship.

A different interpretation of the Farrell and Fuchs finding emerges if one assumes that consumers are farsighted. The current consumption of cigarettes leads to more illness and less time for work in the future. The cost of this lost time is higher for persons with higher wage rates who have made larger investments in human capital. Thus, the costs of smoking in high school are greater for persons who plan to make larger investments in human capital.

Berger and Leigh (1989) have developed an extremely useful methodology for disentangling the schooling effect from the time preference effect. Their methodology amounts to treating schooling as an endogenous variable in the health equation and estimating the equation by a variant of two-stage least squares. If the instrumental variables used to predict schooling in the first stage are uncorrelated with time preference, this technique yields an unbiased estimate of the schooling coefficient. Since the framework generates a recursive model with correlated errors, exogenous variables that are unique to the health equation are not used to predict schooling.

Berger and Leigh apply their methodology to two data sets: the first National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES I) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLS). In NHANES I, health is measured by blood pressure, and separate equations are obtained for persons aged 20 through 40 and over age 40 in the period
1971 through 1975. The schooling equation is identified by ancestry and by average real per capita income and average real per capita expenditures on education in the state in which an individual resided from the year of birth to age 6. These variables enter the schooling equation but are excluded from the health equation. In the NLS, health is measured by a dichotomous variable that identifies men who in 1976 reported that health limited or prevented them from working and alternatively by a dichotomous variable that identifies the presence of a functional health limitation. The men in the sample were between the ages of 24 and 34 in 1976, had left school by that year, and reported no health limitations in 1966 (the first year of the survey). The schooling equation is identified by IQ, Knowledge of Work test scores, and parents' schooling.

Results from the NLS show that the schooling coefficient rises in absolute value when predicted schooling replaces actual schooling, and when health is measured by work limitation. When health is measured by functional limitation, the two-stage least squares schooling coefficient is approximately equal to the ordinary least squares coefficient, although the latter is estimated with more precision. For persons aged 20 through 40 in NHANES I, schooling has a larger impact on blood pressure in absolute value in the two-stage regressions. For persons over age 40, however, the predicted value of schooling has a positive and insignificant regression coefficient. Except for the last finding, these results are inconsistent with the time preference hypothesis and consistent with the hypothesis that schooling causes health.

In another application of the same methodology, Leigh and Dhir (1997) focus on the relationship between schooling and health among persons ages 65 and over in the 1986 wave of the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID). Health is measured by a disability index comprised of answers to six activities of daily living and by a measure of exercise frequency. Responses to questions asked in 1972 concerning the ability to delay gratification are used to form an index of time preference. Instruments for schooling include parents' schooling, parents' income, and state of residence in childhood. The schooling variable is associated with better health and more exercise whether it is treated as exogenous or endogenous.

Sander (1995a, 1995b) has applied the methodology developed by Berger and Leigh to the relationship between schooling and cigarette smoking studied by Farrell and Fuchs (1982). His data consist of the 1986–1991 waves of the National Opinion Research Center’s General Social Survey. In the first paper the outcome is the probability of quitting smoking, while in the second the outcome is the probability of smoking. Separate probit equations are obtained for men and women ages 25 and older. Instruments for schooling include father’s schooling, mother’s schooling, rural residence at age 16, region of residence at age 16, and number of siblings.

In general schooling has a negative effect on smoking participation and a positive effect on the probability of quitting smoking. These results are not sensitive to the use of predicted as opposed to actual schooling in the probit regressions. Moreover, the application of the Wu–Hausman endogeneity test [Wu (1973), Hausman (1978)] in the quit equation suggest that schooling is exogenous in this equation. Thus, Sander’s results,
like Berger and Leigh's and Leigh and Dhir's results, are inconsistent with the time preference hypothesis.

The aforementioned conclusion rests on the assumption that the instruments used to predict schooling in the first stage are uncorrelated with time preference. The validity of this assumption is most plausible in the case of measures such as real per capita income and real per capita outlays on education in the state in which an individual resided from birth to age 6 (used by Berger and Leigh in NHANES I), state of residence in childhood (used by Leigh and Dhir in the PSID) and rural residence at age 16 and region of residence at that age (used by Sander). The validity of the assumption is less plausible in the case of measures such as parents' schooling (used by Sander and by Berger and Leigh in the NLS and by Leigh and Dhir in the PSID) and parents' income (used by Leigh and Dhir in the PSID).

Given this and the inherent difficulty in Fuchs's (1982) and Leigh and Dhir's (1997) attempts to measure time preference directly, definitive evidence with regard to the time preference hypothesis still is lacking. Moreover, Sander (1995a, 1995b) presents national data showing a much larger downward trend in the probability of smoking and a much larger upward trend in the probability of quitting smoking between 1966 and 1987 as the level of education rises. Since information concerning the harmful effects of smoking was widespread by the early 1980s, these results are not consistent with an allocative efficiency argument that the more educated are better able to process new information.

Becker and Murphy's (1988) theoretical model of rational addiction predicts that persons who discount the future heavily are more likely to participate in such addictive behaviors as cigarette smoking. Becker et al. (1991) show that the higher educated people are more responsive to changes in the harmful future consequences of the consumption of addictive goods because they are more future oriented. Thus, the trends just cited are consistent with a negative relationship between schooling and the rate of time preference for the present.

Proponents of the time preference hypothesis assume that a reduction in the rate of time preference for the present causes years of formal schooling to rise. On the other hand, Becker and Mulligan (1997) argue that causality may run in the opposite direction: namely, an increase in schooling may cause the rate of time preference for the present to fall (may cause the rate of time preference for the future to rise). In most models of optimal consumption over the life cycle, consumers maximize a lifetime utility function defined as the discounted sum or present value of utility in each period or at each age. The discount factor \( \beta \) is given by \( \beta = 1/(1 + g) \), where \( g \) is the rate of time preference for the present. Becker and Mulligan point out that the present value of utility is higher the smaller is the rate of time preference for the present. Hence, consumers have incentives to make investments that lower the rate of time preference for the present.

Becker and Mulligan then show that the marginal costs of investments that lower time preference fall and the marginal benefits rise as income or wealth rises. Marginal benefits also are greater when the length of life is greater. Hence, the equilibrium rate of time
preference falls as the level of education rises because education raises income and life expectancy. Moreover, the more educated may be more efficient in making investments that lower the rate of time preference for the present – a form of productive efficiency not associated with health production. To quote Becker and Mulligan: “Schooling also determines ... [investments in time preference] partly through the study of history and other subjects, for schooling focuses students’ attention on the future. Schooling can communicate images of the situations and difficulties of adult life, which are the future of childhood and adolescence. In addition, through repeated practice at problem solving, schooling helps children learn the art of scenario simulation. Thus, educated people should be more productive at reducing the remoteness of future pleasures” (pp. 735–736).

Becker and Mulligan’s argument amounts to a third causal mechanism in addition to productive and allocative efficiency in health production via which schooling can cause health. Econometrically, the difference between their model and Fuchs’s model can be specified as follows:

\[
H = \alpha_1 Y + \alpha_2 E + \alpha_3 g, \quad (58)
\]

\[
g = \alpha_4 Y + \alpha_5 E, \quad (59)
\]

\[
E = \alpha_6 g, \quad (60)
\]

\[
Y = \alpha_7 E. \quad (61)
\]

In this system \(H\) is health, \(Y\) is permanent income, \(E\) is years of formal schooling completed, \(g\) is time preference for the present, and the disturbance terms are suppressed. The first equation is a demand for health function in which the coefficient of \(E\) reflects productive or allocative efficiency or both. Fuchs assumes that \(\alpha_5\) is zero. Hence, the coefficient of \(E\) in the first equation is biased if \(g\) is omitted.

In one version of their model, Becker and Mulligan assume that \(\alpha_6\) is zero, although in a more general formulation they allow this coefficient to be nonzero. Given that \(\alpha_6\) is zero, and substituting the second equation into the first, one obtains

\[
H = (\alpha_1 + \alpha_4 \alpha_3) Y + (\alpha_2 + \alpha_5 \alpha_3) E. \quad (62)
\]

The coefficient of \(Y\) in the last equation reflects both the direct effect of income on health \((\alpha_1)\) and the indirect effect of income on health through time preference \((\alpha_4 \alpha_3)\). Similarly, the coefficient of \(E\) reflects both the direct efficiency effect \((\alpha_2)\) and the indirect effect of schooling on health through time preference \((\alpha_5 \alpha_3)\).

Suppose that the direct efficiency effect of schooling \((\alpha_2)\) is zero. In Fuchs’s model, if health is regressed on income and schooling as represented by solving Equation (60) for \(g\), the expected value of the schooling coefficient is \(\alpha_3/\alpha_6\). This coefficient reflects causality from time preference to schooling. In Becker and Mulligan's model the schooling coefficient is \(\alpha_2 \alpha_5\). This coefficient reflects causality from schooling to time preference. The equation that expresses income as a function of schooling stresses that
schooling has indirect effects on health via income. Becker and Mulligan would include health as a determinant of time preference in the second equation because health lowers mortality, raises future utility levels, and increases incentives to make investments that lower the rate of time preference.

Becker and Mulligan's model appears to contain useful insights in considering intergenerational relationships between parents and children. For example, parents can raise their children's future health, including their adulthood health, by making them more future oriented. Note that years of formal schooling completed is a time-invariant variable beyond approximately age 30, while adult health is not time invariant. Thus, parents probably have a more important direct impact on the former than the latter. By making investments that raise their offsprings' schooling, parents also induce them to make investments that lower their rate of time preference for the present and therefore raise their adult health.

Becker and Mulligan suggest a more definitive and concrete way to measure time preference and incorporate it into estimates of health demand functions than those that have been attempted to date. They point out that the natural logarithm of the ratio of consumption between consecutive time periods (ln L) is approximately equal to $\sigma [\ln(1 + r) - \ln(1 + g)]$, where $\sigma$ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, $r$ is the market rate of interest, and $g$ is the rate of time preference for the present. If $\sigma$ and $r$ do not vary among individuals, variations in ln L capture variations in time preference. With panel data, In L can be included as a regressor in the health demand function. Since Becker and Mulligan stress the endogeneity of time preference and its dependence on schooling, simultaneous equations techniques appear to be required. Identification of this model will not be easy, but success in this area has the potential to greatly inform public policy.

To illustrate the last point, suppose that most of the effect of schooling on health operates through time preference. Then school-based programs to promote health knowledge in areas characterized by low levels of income and education may have much smaller payoffs than programs that encourage the investments in time preference made by the more educated. Indeed, in an ever-changing world in which new information constantly becomes available, general interventions that encourage future-oriented behavior may have much larger rates of return in the long run than specific interventions designed, for example, to discourage cigarette smoking, alcohol abuse, or the use of illegal drugs.

There appear to be important interactions between Becker and Mulligan's theory of the endogenous determination of time preference and Becker and Murphy's (1988) theory of rational addiction. Such addictive behaviors as cigarette smoking, excessive alcohol use, and the consumption of illegal drugs have demonstrated adverse health effects. Increased consumption of these goods raises present utility but lowers future utility. According to Becker and Mulligan (1997, p. 744), "Since a decline in future utility reduces the benefits from a lower discount on future utilities, greater consumption of harmful substances would lead to higher rates of time preference by discouraging investments in lowering these rates ..." This is the converse of Becker and Murphy's result that people who discount the future more heavily are more likely to become addicted. Thus,
harmful addictions induce even rational persons to discount the future more heavily, which in turn may lead them to become more addicted" [Becker and Mulligan (1997, p. 744)].

It is well known that cigarette smoking and excessive alcohol abuse begin early in life [for example, Grossman et al. (1993)]. Moreover, bandwagon or peer effects are much more important in the case of youth smoking or alcohol consumption than in the case of adult smoking or alcohol consumption. The two-way causality between addiction and time preference and the importance of peer pressure explain why parents who care about the welfare of their children have large incentives to make investments that make their children more future oriented. These forces may also account for the relatively large impact of schooling on health with health knowledge held constant reported by Kenkel (1991).

Some parents may ignore or be unaware of the benefits of investments in time preference. Given society's concern with the welfare of its children, subsidies to school-based programs that make children more future oriented may be warranted. But much more research dealing with the determinants of time preference and its relationship with schooling and health is required before these programs can be formulated and implemented in a cost-effective manner.

8. Conclusions

Most of the chapters in this Handbook focus on various aspects of the markets for medical care services and health insurance. This focus is required to understand the determinants of prices, quantities, and expenditures in these markets. The main message of my paper is that a very different theoretical paradigm is required to understand the determinants of health outcomes. I have tried to convince the reader that the human capital model of the demand for health provides the framework to conduct investigations of these outcomes. The model emphasizes the difference between health as an output and medical care as one of many inputs into the production of health and the equally important difference between health capital and other forms of human capital. It provides a theoretical framework for making predictions about the impacts of many variables on health and an empirical framework for testing these predictions.

Future theoretical efforts will be especially useful if they consider the joint determination of health and schooling and the interactions between these two variables and time preference for the present. A model in which both the stock of health and the stock of knowledge (schooling) are endogenous does not necessarily generate causality between the two. Individuals, however, typically stop investing in schooling at relatively young ages but rarely stop investing in health. I have a "hunch" that a dynamic model that takes account of these patterns will generate effects of an endogenously determined schooling variable on health in the health demand function if schooling has a causal impact on productive efficiency or time preference.

Future empirical efforts will be especially useful if they employ longitudinal databases with a variety of health outputs, health inputs, and direct and indirect (for
example, the rate of growth in total consumption) measures of time preference at three or more different ages. This is the type of data required to implement the cost-of-adjustment model outlined in Section 6. It also is the type of data required to distinguish between the productive and allocative efficiency effects of schooling and to fit demand for health models in which medical care is not necessarily the primary health input. Finally, it is the type of data to fully sort out the hypothesis that schooling causes health from the competing hypothesis that time preference causes both using methods outlined in Section 7.

These research efforts will not be easy, but their potential payoffs are substantial. Medical care markets in most countries are subject to large amounts of government intervention, regulation, and subsidization. I have emphasized the basic proposition that consumers demand health rather than medical care. Thus, one way to evaluate policy initiatives aimed at medical care is to consider their impacts on health outcomes in the context of a cost-benefit analysis of programs that influence a variety of health inputs. If this undertaking is to be successful, it must draw on refined estimates of the parameters of health production functions, output demand functions for health, and input demand functions for health inputs.

References


Ch. 7: The Human Capital Model


