INCENTIVES IN HIERARCHIES

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Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of incentive-based theories of hierarchies. Models of managers as supervisors are initially discussed, focusing on implications for organizational scale diseconomies and for problems of collusion. Thereafter attention shifts to the control loss associated with delegating decision-making to managers, and how these relate to monitoring, evaluation and managerial compensation. The benefits of delegation owing to renegotiation of contracts, costs of contractual complexity or communication are subsequently discussed. These issues are examined in the context of a three-layer single-branch hierarchy. Models of more complex hierarchies involving multiple layers, branches and different ways of grouping activities into departments are subsequently described. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the achievements and shortcomings of this literature.

1. INTRODUCTION

The 20th century witnessed the emergence of large organizations in the private, public and non-profit sectors. Alfred Chandler’s classic studies Strategy and Structure and The Visible Hand document the historical transformation of American industrial enterprises from small or medium sized owner-managed firms in the early 19th century into large business conglomerates controlled by a hierarchy of professional managers by the middle of the 20th century. Likewise government agencies managed by professional bureaucracies have grown in size and scope throughout the course of the 20th century, accompanying the growth of the role of governments in taxation, regulation, and delivery of public services.

The internal organization of private firms and government agencies is a topic of considerable interest for both academics and policy practitioners interested in productivity, income distribution, human resource development, and efficiency of government. It is commonly believed that the size and ‘internal structure’ of firms is an important determinant of their productivity and profitability. As various management ‘best-sellers’ indicate, firms seem to vary considerably in how ‘well-managed’ they are. Organizations that are too large are widely believed to be overly bureaucratic, unresponsive and top management ‘out of touch’ with ground reality — and that this is the key problem with

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socialist economies with large state-owned firms or large government bureaucracies, compared with more decentralized market economies. Yet conventional economic theory has difficulty explaining why this is so, or why some organizations are not as well-managed as others, or the exact manner in which size, structure and operating rules of organizations determine their effectiveness and productivity. Relevant attributes of organizational structure include the shape (e.g., the number of vertical layers, spans of control), allocation of authority and responsibility across managers, grouping of functions and managers into different departments, processes by which information is distributed, processed and communicated across managers, the way that managers are evaluated and compensated, and how these eventually affect the way decisions get made and coordinated across the organization.

Managerial hierarchies pose a significant challenge for conventional economic theory, raising issues such as the separation of ownership from management, and the functional role of managers in productive enterprises. What prevents owners from managing the firms they own? Alfred Marshall listed ‘management’ as a fourth critical factor of production, besides land, labor and capital. Yet more than a century later, models of management are still not part of the central corpus of the neoclassical theory of the firm. In the context of industrial or service enterprises that account for the bulk of all economic activity in developed countries, fixed factors such as land do not play an important role, creating challenges for explaining limits to the size of firms. While many believe that time and attention of top managers is one of the most important fixed factors that account for limits to the size of firms, modeling this has posed a significant challenge for economic theory. Part of the reason is the difficulty of modeling cognitive capacities of managers to process information, make decisions, and get things ‘done’ — that belong to the realm of ‘bounded rationality’ that Herbert Simon and Oliver Williamson have emphasized are key to understanding organizations and the role that managers play in them.

Nevertheless, the 19th century view of a firm as an entity whose sole objective is to maximize profits, has now evolved to a ‘nexus of contracts’ among a large number of important stakeholders and functionaries (see, e.g., Milgrom and Roberts (1992)). The firm is viewed as an organization or collective of different agents with dispersed information, responsibilities and non-congruent interests. Accordingly, problems of asymmetric information and incentives play an important role in the modern theory of the firm. Yet contemporary mainstream theory of information economics as represented by the principal-agent paradigm is still struggling to explain why authority and responsibility is distributed across different managers in an organization, instead of being centralized. The Revelation Principle which plays a central role in standard principal-agent theory (e.g., Myerson (1982)), states that any allocation of authority in an organization can be replicated by a degenerate centralized organization in which all agents communicate their private information to the owner or a central headquarter office (‘Principal’), which processes this information and makes all relevant decisions, subsequently sends instructions to all agents concerning what they should do. In this kind of organization the only role of agents is to communicate information and receive instructions; the ‘mechanism’ needs to be designed in order to encourage honest and obedient behavior. In this setting, there is no role for a managerial hierarchy: all authority is vested in the Principal.
To create a theory of managerial organizations, it is necessary to go back to the foundational question: ‘what do managers do?’. How or why do they do these tasks better than the principal can? To quote Chandler on this:

“Just what, then, are the functions of the executives responsible for the functions of the enterprise? They coordinate, appraise and plan. They may, at the same time, do the actual buying, selling, advertising, accounting, manufacturing, engineering or research, but in the modern enterprise the execution or carrying out of these functions is usually left to such employees as salesmen, buyers, production supervisors and foremen, technicians and designers. In many cases, the executive does not even personally supervise the working force but rather administers the duties of other executives. In planning and coordinating the work of subordinate managers or supervisors, he allocates tasks and makes available the necessary equipment, materials, and other physical resources necessary to carry out the various jobs. In appraising their activities, he must decide whether the employees or subordinate managers are handling their tasks satisfactorily. If not, he can take action by changing or bringing in new physical equipment and supplies, by transferring or shifting the personnel, or by expanding or cutting down available funds. Thus, the term, administration, as used here, includes executive action and orders as well as the decisions taken in coordinating, appraising, and planning the work of the enterprise and in allocating its resources.” (Chandler (1962, p.8))

This description suggests at least three important roles that managers play: they (i) process information, used by the firm to make decisions regarding production, marketing, technology, employment and suppliers; (ii) supervise, i.e., generate and supply information used to evaluate and compensate employees and suppliers; and (iii) make decisions concerning production, marketing and contracting with employees and suppliers on behalf of the owners. The first two functions pertain to the role of managers as processors or generators of information which could be used by others in making decisions. Only the last function includes the role of managers as decision-makers.

It is common to think of a hierarchy as representing an inverted-tree-like pattern of distribution of authority within an organization. The concept of authority plays a central role in the modern theory of the firm. As emphasized in the writings of Coase and Simon, a firm conceptualized as a hierarchical relation between an owner and employee, as distinct from a more symmetric market relationship between the owner and an outside contractor. In this vein, van den Steen (2010) defines hierarchical or interpersonal authority as a situation where the owner or boss tells the employee what actions to take, which the latter is expected (or incentivized) to obey. The employee may be inclined to select other actions on the basis of her own information or her personal motivation; the terms of employment include monitoring of actions or their consequences, combined with suitable rewards and penalties, to induce the employee to obey the owner’s instructions. In contrast, an external contractor retains more control over her own actions. This is a definition of authority, then, which is based on the distribution of decision-making rights, and excludes the kind of indirect authority exercised by a supervisor over a supervisee.
It is also evident that this notion of hierarchical authority is closely related to that of centralization of decision-making: within a hierarchical firm, the owner decides what the employee should do, and incentivizes the latter to obey. A market-relationship with an external contractor involves greater delegation of decision-making to the latter. Nevertheless, one cannot identify firms as distinct from market relationships solely in terms of the distribution of decision-making authority. Intra-firm relationships can allow delegation of some decision-making authority to employees, just as market relationships may involve some instructions sent by clients to suppliers. For this reason, most modern theories of the boundaries between firms and markets emphasize ownership of assets as the defining characteristic. Property-rights-based theories of the firm define it entirely in terms of the ownership of relevant assets, while van den Steen extends it to incorporate both asset ownership and a decision-making hierarchy, i.e., where assets are owned by the employer, and the employer exercises hierarchical authority over the employee. In a market relationship on the other hand between the firm owner and an external contractor, the productive assets are owned by the latter, and the former does not exercise authority over the contractor in the same way as she does over her employees.3

It is important to clarify at the outset that the literature surveyed in this chapter does not address the question of boundaries between firms and markets, and abstracts entirely from issues relating to asset ownership. It is concerned instead with the question of distribution of decision-making authority within an organization. In a firm composed of a single employer and employee, the distribution of decision-making authority can be viewed as a matter of degree rather than entirely belonging either to one or the other. For instance, the employee could formally be delegated authority over the decision of how much to produce, and compensated on the basis of observed output or sales. Yet the effective extent of delegation would be limited if the compensation were to decline very sharply if output were to fall below some level stipulated by the employer, a situation which could be viewed as one where the employer sets a minimum output target. The slope and curvature of the compensation function would then define the extent of ‘real’ delegation.

The distribution of decision-making authority and the notion of a manager is somewhat clearer in a context of an organization which includes other employees or suppliers: authority pertains to decisions pertaining to contracting with others. In a managerial firm, a manager is empowered to make decisions over who to employ or procure from, negotiate contracts, allocate financial resources and eventually monitor, evaluate and compensate them. Hence one needs at least three vertical layers (owner-manager-employees/suppliers) in the organization to meaningfully represent a managerial firm, as distinct from a owner-managed firm with two vertical layers (owner-employees/suppliers). In order to pose the question of the choice between the two organizational forms one needs at least three players in the model: an owner or Principal, and two agents, one of whom may or may not be delegated authority over contracting with the other agent. And if there are more than two agents there are many different ways of designing a hierarchy.

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3Van den Steen’s theory provides reason for synergistic connections between asset ownership and decision-making authority patterns so that they tend to be distributed in a similar way: i.e., why asset owners tend to retain more decision-making authority.
For instance, if there are $n$ agents it could be organized at one extreme as a hierarchy with $n$ vertical layers and a single branch, where the agent at any given layer has authority to contract with the single agent directly subordinate to her. Here each manager has a span of control equal to unity. An alternative would be to create a hierarchy where each intermediate manager has a span of control of two, i.e., has authority to contract with two direct subordinates. Such a hierarchy would be ‘broader’, with fewer vertical layers. At the other extreme, the hierarchy could have just two vertical layers, with the owner at the top layer, and all other agents at the second layer. This would be a completely centralized organization where all decision-making authority is concentrated in the hands of the owner.

The primary questions in such a setting concern the desired shape and structure of the hierarchy: e.g., fixing organizational scale (i.e., the number of agents involved, or the number of products produced), how would the organization’s performance (measured by the expected profits of the owner, or some broader measure of social welfare) vary with breadth (span of control) and depth (number of vertical layers)? This requires first an analysis (within any given hierarchical structure) of optimal mechanisms for coordinating reporting and allocational decisions of diverse managers, as well as of incentive mechanisms (monitoring, evaluation and compensation) for managers and workers. Subsequently one can explore the implications of varying the scale of the organization on its performance. The framework can be applied not only to the internal organization of firms, but also of regulation, procurement agencies or government bureaucracies.

To set it in perspective, it is useful to delineate many issues not addressed in this chapter. We abstract for most part from theories of costly information processing, which are still in a state of relative infancy. It is undeniable that information processing is a key role played by managers. Yet there are no theories which currently blend incentive problems with information processing issues. The literature on information processing in hierarchies is addressed in chapters by Garicano and van Zandt, as well as Bolton and Dewatripont in this volume.

Our main focus is on models of hierarchies in which incentive considerations play an important role. Accordingly many interesting models of hierarchies based on team theory (Radner and Marschak (1972)) which abstracts from incentive considerations will not be included.

On the other hand, models based on (exogenously) incomplete contracts are mentioned only in passing as these are included in the chapter by Bolton and Dewatripont. In a similar vein, we ignore issues of interaction between formal and informal contracts within organizations, as studied by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999).

Nevertheless some form of contractual incompleteness is essential for delegation to have some benefit. Section 4 will consider contracting models where strategic renegotiation, complexity or communication costs are explicitly incorporated to explain why contracts may be incomplete, and then discuss their implications for the performance of different kinds of hierarchies.

Another proviso needs to be mentioned: the focus is primarily on theoretical models rather than empirical applications or testing. This reflects the state of the literature,
which has struggled with the purely conceptual elements and not progressed empirical analysis. Moreover some branches of the literature (e.g., dealing with collusion, complexity or communication costs) have posed challenges for conventional economic theory, and are nowhere near being settled. Despite this I have sought to include them for the sake of completeness, for those interested in pursuing these topics in future research, and the hope that they may generate useful applications in the future.

1.1. Overview of the Chapter. Section 2 will describe the literature on ‘supervision hierarchies’ following the work of Calvo and Wellisz (1978), in which managers are modeled as supervisors. The rationale for supervision is that it helps limit the asymmetry of information between employees and owners, thus limiting the scope for opportunistic behavior by the former. Owing to limitations of time or expertise, owners may seek to supplement their own supervisory activities with information supplied by third party supervisors. Yet these hired supervisors also need to be motivated to apply effort in supervision, and thus need to be supervised themselves. This creates the rationale for a hierarchy of supervisors. Much of this literature has sought to explore implications for limits to the size of firms, as firms with a larger scale of operations employ more workers and thus need a larger hierarchy of supervisors, causing ‘organizational diseconomies of scale’ owing to resultant ‘losses of control’ across successive vertical layers of managers. This intuitive idea, expressed originally by Williamson (1967), however, has turned to be quite difficult to model formally based on a secure micro-foundation. We also describe some recent literature on supervision hierarchies following Tirole (1986) which focuses on problems of collusion between supervisors and supervisees, ways of combating these problems, and their implications for performance.

Section 3 turns to models of delegation of decision-making authority to managers. The focus in this Section is on the attendant cost or ‘control loss’ incurred by the Principal owing to incentive problems (i.e., non-congruence of goals and information between owners and managers). The benefits of delegation are not studied in this approach, as these are presumed to arise from unmodelled costs of centralizing all information processing and decision-making responsibilities with the Principal. The advantage of this approach is that it utilizes tools of mechanism design theory which rely on the assumption of ‘complete contracts’, in an environment where the Revelation Principle applies: the Principal is assumed to be able to commit to a comprehensive contract; there are no costs of communication or contractual complexity; and agents behave non-cooperatively. These models help identify the precise circumstances under which delegation arrangements can be structured in a way to avoid any loss of control, so that they can implement optimal allocations. Briefly, this requires three sets of conditions: risk-neutrality of managers, ability of the Principal to monitor measures of performance pertaining to the allocation of effort or payments between managers and their subordinates, and ability to prevent collusion (in the form of unobserved side-payments or communication). Violation of any of these conditions — financial constraints faced by managers, lack of suitable accounting systems, or collusion — constitute potential sources of control loss. The implications of collusion are subsequently considered: this branch of the literature is less settled, owing to the inherent complexity of the issue and different ways it has been formulated by numerous authors.
Section 4 subsequently addresses the question of the benefits of delegation in conjunction with its costs. This necessitates a framework in which the Revelation Principle no longer applies and contracts are ‘incomplete’. We describe models based respectively on limited commitment ability of the Principal, and on costs of communication or contractual complexity. Either of these frameworks generates a theory of delegation trading off its costs and benefits. When the underlying problem is the possibility of strategic renegotiation, delegating control is beneficial from an incentive standpoint, but raises problems of coordinating the agent’s actions with information that becomes available to the Principal subsequently. In contexts involving complexity or communication costs, delegation permits actions to be responsive to information available to agents that they cannot communicate to the Principal or to third-party contract enforcers. This has to be traded off against the costs of ‘control loss’ described in Section 3. The value of delegation thus depends on the determinants of control loss, such as managerial financial constraints, problems of monitoring or collusion. The theory also suggests the value of intermediate organizational structures, where some decisions such as contracting and evaluation are centralized, while authority over production decisions is delegated to employees.

The preceding sections deal with the simplest possible model of a hierarchy involving three vertical layers, consisting of a single Principal at the top, a single manager in the middle, and one or two productive agents at the bottom. Models of larger and more complex hierarchies are considered in Section 5, which build on the simpler models in earlier sections. These focus on problems of horizontal coordination across departments, scale diseconomies and grouping of activities into departments (e.g., U-form versus M-form hierarchies).

Finally, Section 6 concludes with an assessment of the achievements and shortcomings of the literature, and possible research directions for the future.

2. Organizational Scale Diseconomies and Supervision Hierarchies

Williamson (1967) initiated the modern literature on limits to size of hierarchical firms arising from the ‘control losses’ associated with internal management problems. His theory is based on a ‘behavioral’ theory of how losses of information and control arise across vertical layers of management. The other ingredient in the theory are limits to the ‘span of control’ of any given manager: i.e., the number of subordinates that any manager can oversee owing to problems of limited time and attention. Given the limits of span of control, it is not possible for the firm to grow without adding vertical layers of management. But then the vertical control losses cascade across the various layers, causing inefficiency to rise as the firm grows.

The source of these control losses are not explained by Williamson’s model. He provides as motivation ‘errors in serial reproduction’ demonstrated in social psychology experiments, wherein losses in information can occur when it passes through a succession of individuals, despite each individual in the chain being satisfied they have passed on all important features of their own information with little or no change. Hence top managers in organizations tend to be progressively out of touch with events at the ground level, as the number of vertical layers increase. Other sources of control loss are asymmetric
information and opportunistic behavior by subordinates, which were not however modeled formally. We start by describing Williamson’s formulation, followed by the effort of Calvo and Wellisz (1978) to provide a micro-foundation for vertical control losses owing to incentive problems.

2.1. The Williamson-Calvo-Wellisz Model. The simplest version of Williamson’s model has an exogenously given span of control $s$ at each layer. At the top level ($i = 1$) of the firm there is one owner or principal, supervising $s$ managers at level $i = 2$, each of whom are supervising $s$ level-3 managers in turn, and so on. At the very bottom layer $n$, there are $s^{n-1}$ employees, the production workers of the firm. All layers $i = 1, \ldots, n - 1$ consist of managers or supervisors, layer $i$ consisting of $s^{i-1}$ managers. The production function yields the firm’s output as a Cobb-Douglas function of the number of production workers $s^{n-1}$, and a level of total factor productivity that reflects a proportional loss of output owing to the control loss at each management layer: $y = (\bar{a} s)^{n-1}$, where $\bar{a} \in (0, 1)$ is the vertical control loss parameter reflecting communication and incentive problems. Williamson also assumes an exogenous rate of wage progression across layers of the hierarchy. $\beta > 1$ is the ratio of wages at one level to the level below. Hence if $w_0$ denotes the wage of production workers, level $n - 1$ managers earn $\beta w_0$, and level $i$ managers earn $w_0 \beta^{n-i}$.

If the firm faces product price $P$ on the output market (net of raw material costs per unit of output), and wage rate $w_0$ for production workers on the labor market, it selects a size (or number of layers $n$) to maximize $P (\bar{a} s)^{n-1} - w_0 \sum_{i=1}^{n} s^{i-1} \beta^{n-i}$. This yields an expression for the number of layers as a function of span of control, the vertical control loss parameter $\bar{a}$ the wage rate for production workers, and the rate of wage growth across layers:

$$n^* = 1 + \frac{1}{\log \bar{a}} \left[ \log \frac{w_0}{P} + \log \frac{s}{s - \beta} + \log \left( \frac{\log s}{\log \bar{a}} \right) \right]$$

Firm size is finite if $\bar{a} < 1$, and tends to $\infty$ as control losses disappear $\bar{a} \to 1$. It is also increasing in $s$, the span of control.

An extended version of this model makes the span of control $s$ endogenous by postulating that the vertical control loss at any layer is increasing in $s$. This captures the intuitive idea that limits on time and attention of any supervisor cause loss of control per subordinate, when the supervisor has to supervise more people. Hence $\bar{a}$ is decreasing in $s$. With the specific functional form $\bar{a}(s) = \exp[-ks^2]$, Williamson shows that larger firms have higher $n$ and lower $s$, but this result seems to depend on the specific functional form chosen.

Williamson’s model has the virtue of delivering predictions concerning size and structure of firms based on technology, product and labor market characteristics that can be empirically tested. However, the key ingredients of the theory: vertical control loss ($\bar{a}$) and the rate of wage progression $\beta$ in the hierarchy are taken as given. Much of the literature described in this chapter can be viewed as an attempt to endogenize these on the basis of incentive considerations, and thereby provide a micro-foundation for the Williamson model.
Calvo and Wellisz (1978) were among the first to do so, using a model of supervision and wage incentives. In this model, all workers and supervisors are identical: they have a utility function $u(c) - v(a)$ where $u$ is a smooth, strictly increasing, concave function of consumption or earnings $c$, and $v$ is a smooth, strictly increasing, convex function representing disutility of effort $a \in [0, 1]$ which is the fraction of the week worked, with $u(0) = v(0) = 0$. A production worker applying effort $a$ generates revenue $Pa$ for the employer, where $P$ is a given parameter depending on output price, raw material costs and technology.

The supervision process is as follows. Supervisors allocate their time equally between monitoring all their subordinates. If the number of supervisors at level $i$ is denoted by $M_i$, and if they work $a_i$ fraction of the week, the amount of time devoted to supervision per level-$(i+1)$-employee is $\frac{a_i M_i}{M_{i+1}}$. With probability $p_{i+1} \equiv g(\frac{a_i M_i}{M_{i+1}})$ the true value of $a_{i+1}$, the time worked by any level-$(i+1)$ employee will become known, where $g$ is a strictly increasing function satisfying $g(0) = 0$ and $g(\infty) \in (0, 1]$. Here it is assumed that supervisors report honestly their findings to the employer.

Let $w_{i+1}$ denote the wage paid for full-time work to a level-$(i+1)$ employee. This will be determined endogenously, as explained below. If the employer learns from supervisor reports that an employee at level $i+1$ worked $a_{i+1}$, this employee is paid $a_{i+1} w_{i+1}$. If no information is available, the employee is presumed to have worked full-time, and paid a wage of $w_{i+1}$. Hence workers detected ‘shirking’ are punished by having wages withheld for the fraction of time they are reliably known to have ‘shirked’.

Consider a worker who is monitored with probability $p$ and paid a full-time wage of $w$. This worker will choose to work $a^*$ fraction of the time, which maximizes $pu(wa) + (1 - p)v(a)$. Clearly this is increasing in $p$ and also a function of $w$: let this be denoted by $a^*(p; w)$. The worker will agree to work for the firm if $V(p, w) \equiv pu(wa^*(p, w)) + (1 - p)v(a^*(p, w)) \geq u$, a given positive level of utility that forms the worker’s outside option. Clearly $V(p, w)$ is increasing in $w$ and decreasing in $p$.

Consider first a firm where the owner herself supervises all production workers, in what we may call a 1-layer hierarchy. Assume that the owner has a fixed amount of time, normalized to unity, available to supervise the workers. The optimal size of such a firm is defined by the solution to the following problem: choose $n$, the number of production workers, and a wage $w$, to maximize $nP a^*(p, w) - [pwa^*(p, w) + (1 - p)w]n$, subject to $p = g(\frac{1}{n})$ and the participation constraint for workers. It is easy to verify there is an interior optimum for both $n$ and $w$ for this problem. In particular, as $n$ rises, the monitoring probability $p$ falls, inducing workers to shirk. As $n$ tends to $\infty$, $p$ tends to 0 and workers then tend to apply zero effort, in which case firm profits tend to $-\infty$ (since the firm needs to pay a positive wage to attract workers). Hence firm size is bounded if it owner-managed, i.e., a 1-layer hierarchy. Denote by $\pi^*_1$ the maximized level of profit achieved by the owner in this case.

One way for the firm to expand is to hire third party supervisors. In a 2-layer hierarchy, the owner employs a number of supervisors and asks them to monitor production workers. The owner herself monitors the supervisors, which ensures that the supervisors exert effort in monitoring production workers, which in turns motivates the latter to apply
effort in production. The incentive problem for choice of effort by supervisors as well as
the participation constraint is exactly analogous to that of production workers. In a 2-
layer hierarchy the owner selects the number of supervisors and the number of production
workers supervised by each supervisor, as well as the wages at each layer. Hiring level-1
supervisors relieves the owner with regard to supervisory responsibility, thus enabling
the firm to employ more production workers and ensure that their efforts do not get
diluted owing to the shrinking probability of being monitored when the owner alone has
to carry out all the supervision. This is a formalization of the vertical ‘control loss’ which
is increasing in the ‘span of control’. The Calvo-Wellisz model thus allows a simple and
elegant model of these critical variables that were assumed exogenous in the Williamson
model. Moreover, the wage structure in the hierarchy is also endogenously determined.
The interesting question is whether these control losses arising for incentive reasons limit
the size of the firm. Let \( \pi^*_n \) denote the level of maximum profit earned by the owner
in an \( n \)-layer hierarchy.

The interesting result in the Calvo-Wellisz paper is that this model does not provide
a limit to the size of the firm. The key Proposition is the following: suppose \( \pi^*_1 > P \),
i.e., it is more profitable for the owner to hire production workers and form a 1-layer
hierarchy rather than do all the production work herself. Then \( \pi^*_n \to \infty \) as \( n \to \infty \).

Here is an outline of the argument. It suffices to show there is a way of expanding the
number of production workers indefinitely by raising \( n \), which leads to unbounded profits.
This involves replicating the optimal incentive arrangement for production workers for
every layer of supervisor in a \( n \)-layer hierarchy. Specifically, letting \( a^*, w^*, n^* \) denote
the optimal values of \( a, n, w \) in a 1-layer hierarchy, select a constant span of control
\( s^* = n^* \) at each level of the hierarchy, and pay the same wages at all levels. Hence
the number of supervisors at pair of successive levels \( i-1 \) and \( i \) are selected so that
\[
\frac{a^* M_{i-1}}{M_i} = \frac{1}{n^*}.
\]
Provided supervisors at level \( i-1 \) are working \( a^* \) each, each level-\( i \) supervisor is monitored with the same probability \( p^* \equiv \frac{1}{n^*} \) as production workers in
a 1-layer hierarchy. Hence it is optimal for each such supervisor to agree to work for
this firm, and work \( a^* \) fraction of the time. Letting \( W^* \) denote the expected wage cost
per employee \( p^* w^* a^* + (1 - p^*) w^* \), expanding the firm from \( n-1 \) to \( n \) layers results
in an increase in profit by \( Pa^*(M_n - M_{n-1}) - M_n W^* = M_n [Pa^*(1 - \frac{M_{n-1}}{M_n}) - W^*]
\]
\[
= M_n [Pa^* - P \frac{1}{n^*} - W^*] = \frac{M_n}{n^*} [((Pa^* - W^*)n^* - P) = \frac{M_n}{n^*}[\pi^*_1 - P] \text{ which grows without limit as } M_n \to \infty.
\]
Essentially, the mechanism in place in a 1-layer hierarchy can be replicated independently for each supervisor at each layer. Hence the model shows that incentive problems do not necessarily constitute a source of control loss that limits the size of firms. Formalizing the simple Williamsonian intuition will require some additional ingredients.

Of course the preceding model is somewhat special in a number of respects, such as the
symmetry between workers and supervisors and their respective incentive problems. It
turns out, however, that the basic result is robust to many variations that make the model
more ‘realistic’ (Datta (1996), Tsumagari (1999)). Both these papers consider contexts
where supervisory effort cannot be directly monitored. Datta studies a context where
supervisors are evaluated indirectly by monitoring the output of production workers directly or indirectly under their supervision. Here the Calvo-Wellisz replication arguments continue to apply under plausible assumptions: supervisors are evaluated on the basis of the performance of their respective divisions, which induces them to internalize the effect of their own shirking on their subordinates’ efforts. Tsumagari considers a context in which supervisors have overlapping jurisdictions, with cross-checking of reports of different supervisors. In this context the firm can expand horizontally rather than vertically, with each supervisor being cross-checked against reports of adjacent supervisors, and again firm size is unbounded under reasonable conditions.

Another variation was suggested by Calvo and Wellisz themselves, in which supervisees know in advance exactly when they are being monitored, so the fraction of time they work equals the fraction of time they are monitored. This implies that to get $n$ production workers to work any fixed positive $a$ fraction of the week, it is necessary to have them supervised by the same number of supervisors working $a$ fraction of the week. The same is true in turn for the supervisors themselves. Ultimately the owner will have to personally spend at least $a \cdot n$ fraction of the week. Given the limit on the total time available to the owner, it is impossible to let $n$ grow indefinitely while $a$ is bounded away from zero. In that case firm size is limited. However, this is no longer so once there is some scope for random audits wherein workers do not know in advance when or whether they will be monitored. In that case one supervisor working $a$ fraction of the week can supervise and ensure that $n > 1$ subordinates will also work $a$ fraction of the week. The logic of the previous model then kicks in to ensure that the firm can grow indefinitely.

Qian (1994) returns to this question with a formulation that combines aspects of the Calvo-Wellisz model with Williamson’s 1967 model. The critical departure from the Calvo-Wellisz model is the production function. Since the number of production workers in the $n$-layer Calvo-Wellisz hierarchy equals $M_n$, the gross revenue of the firm in the Calvo-Wellisz model equals $P \cdot M_n \cdot a_n$ if the layer-$i$ employees apply effort $a_i$. Qian assumes instead a gross revenue which equals $P \cdot M_n \cdot a_n \cdot a_{n-1} \ldots a_1$. In other words, there is an additional source of revenue loss $a_{n-1} \ldots a_1$ arising from existence of supervisors at intermediate levels of the hierarchy. Qian uses a variant of the incentive model of Calvo and Wellisz, whereby any shirking of the employee below the mandated effort level $a^*$ is punished with a zero wage. Consequently, an employee monitored with probability $p$ needs to be paid an efficiency wage of $w \equiv \frac{v(a^*)}{p} = sv(a^*)$ in order to induce an effort of $a^*$, where $s \equiv \frac{1}{p}$ denotes the span of control of the employees’ supervisor. The costs of increasing the span of control are thus represented by corresponding linear increase in the efficiency wage, for a given level of effort.

Using the formulation, Qian studies the problem of determining the ‘optimal’ hierarchy, i.e., number of layers, span of control at every layers, efforts and corresponding wages at each layer. If feasible effort $a$ for any employee is zero or one, then clearly every employee must be induced to work ($a = 1$), and the formulation coincides with Calvo-Wellisz. In this case, there is no limit to firm size. The other case that Qian investigates is where $a$ can be any number in the unit interval, and $v(a) \to \infty$ as $a \to 1$. In that case it is impossible to get anyone to work fulltime, and every agent must put in an
interior $a \in (0, 1)$ in any optimal arrangement, with $a$ bounded away from 1. Given the specification of the production function, however, this implies that the supplementary control losses $a_{n-1} \ldots a_1$ arising due to the existence of intermediate supervisors must cascade, eventually implying that the firm’s revenue converges to zero as the number of layers grows without bound. A limit to the size of the firm obtains. But it owes entirely to vertical control losses which remain unexplained. It is not clear why the effort of the supervisors have any effect over and above the way they influence the effort of those they supervise. Perhaps managers do other things apart from supervise workers, but these are not included or explained by the model. Hence the Calvo-Wellisz puzzle of limits to firm size does not really get resolved in this theory.

This motivates the consideration of the possibility of collusion between supervisors and workers, a factor ignored by the preceding models.

2.2. Collusion and Supervision. The literature on collusion and supervision was pioneered by Tirole (1986). His model has a Principal $P$ and an agent $A$ who produces revenue $\theta + a$ for $P$, where $\theta \in \{\theta_L, \theta_H\}$ is a productivity realization which is observed by $A$ before choosing a level of effort $a$. Productivity can be either low ($\theta_L$) or high ($\theta_H$), where $\theta_H > \theta_L > 0$. P’s net payoff is the expected value of $\theta + a - w$, where $w$ is the wage paid to $A$. A’s payoff is $u(w - v(a))$, where $v$ is an increasing, convex function of $a \geq 0$, and $u$ is a strictly increasing, concave function. $A$ has a reservation utility normalized to 0.

$P$ can hire a supervisor $S$, who may observe the realization of $\theta$, though he cannot observe the agent’s effort $a$. The information that $S$ can observe in the process of supervision is represented by a signal $\sigma$ with three possible realizations: $\theta_L, \theta_H$ and $\phi$. If $\sigma = \theta_i, i = L, H$ the true state is exactly $\theta_i$: in this case $S$ learns the true state with certainty. However the signal may also equal $\phi$ in either state: in this case $S$ does not learn the true state. Tirole assumes that the signal represents ‘hard’ information: $S$ can submit definite evidence to $P$ concerning the realization of the signal when it reveals the true state. $S$ cannot fabricate evidence when there is none, i.e., cannot produce any evidence when $\sigma = \phi$. The only option for behaving strategically is to suppress evidence: $S$ can claim $\sigma = \phi$ when he did receive evidence of the true state. Unlike the Calvo-Wellisz model, supervisory effort per se generates no disutility for $S$. The latter’s utility is $V(c)$ where $c$ denotes the financial return of $S$ and $V$ is a strictly increasing, concave function. $S$ also has a given outside option level of utility.

$P$ lacks the capacity or time to supervise the agent herself. In this situation, she would design an incentive contract for $A$ which, as per the standard model of incentives with adverse selection, motivates the first-best effort $a^*$ satisfying $v'(a^*) = 1$ when $A$ observes $\theta = \theta_H$, and a lower level of effort $\bar{a}$ when $A$ observes $\theta = \theta_L$. In the former state $A$ earns an incentive rent, i.e., obtains a wage high enough to end up with a payoff above his outside option. In the latter state $A$ earns zero rent, i.e., a net payoff equal to the outside option. In this equilibrium, $A$ is indifferent in the high productivity state between producing the revenue of $(\theta_H + a^*)$ and $(\theta_H + \bar{a})$. The rent earned by $A$ in the high productivity state is the ‘price’ or ‘bonus’ paid by $P$ to induce $A$ to apply high effort.
in this state, rather than slacking off on effort (reducing $a$ from $a^*$ to $a - (\theta_H - \theta_L)$ and pretending the state is $\theta_L$ instead of $\theta_H$).

When $S$ is hired and does not collude with $A$, he reports the realization of the signal truthfully to $P$. This reduces the informational asymmetry between $P$ and $A$, enabling $P$ to avoid paying the incentive rent to $A$ when there is firm evidence that the true state is $\theta_H$. This is the benefit $P$ obtains from hiring $S$, which has to be traded off against the cost of hiring $S$. If $S$’s outside option is low enough, e.g., if it is zero, the cost of hiring $S$ is low enough that it is profitable for $P$ to hire $S$. Here $S$ earns a fixed salary of $c$, just equal to the level necessary to induce him to accept the job.

But now $A$ has an incentive to bribe $S$ to suppress evidence of the high productivity state, in order to qualify for the incentive rent. $S$ does not mind doing this, as the salary $c$ is fixed, while $A$ gains the incentive rent as a result of the suppression of evidence. Tirole assumes that there are no frictions in collusion — it can be modeled as an enforceable side-contract between $S$ and $A$, which cannot be observed by $P$. Moreover, $A$ knows exactly what evidence is available to $S$. So in the case where $S$ receives evidence there is no asymmetric information between $S$ and $A$. Effectively, then, $S$ and $A$ will jointly behave as if they are a single player, earning a pecuniary equivalent payoff of $c + w - v(a)$ equal to the sum of their respective payoffs. The second-best payoff achieved by $P$ is then no longer achievable in the presence of collusion.

Tirole goes on to solve for the third-best contract, which maximizes $P$’s expected pay-off subject to both individual and joint collusive incentives of $S$ and $A$. An argument analogous to the Revelation Principle shows that $P$ can confine attention to contracts which are collusion-proof, i.e., in which $S$ and $A$ have no incentive to enter into a collusive agreement, and $S$ reports his evidence truthfully to $P$. This is achieved partly by $P$ offering $S$ a selective ‘reward’ for disclosing evidence of high productivity, as well as reducing the ‘power’ of $A$’s incentives and rents, both of which reduce the stakes for collusion. $A$ has less to gain by bribing $S$ to suppress evidence of high productivity, and $S$ is less willing to suppress this evidence. The net consequence is that $S$ will be forced to bear risk associated with the availability of evidence, for which $P$ will have to pay $S$ a risk premium if $S$ is risk-averse. And $A$ will be provided with less effort incentive. On both counts $P$’s profitability will decline, compared with the second-best outcome. The extent to which this occurs depends on how risk averse $S$ is. If $S$ is risk-neutral, $P$ does not lose at all: $P$ can effectively ‘sell’ the firm to $S$ and thereby overcome the problem of collusion entirely: there is no loss of either profitability or productivity. At the other extreme, if $S$ is infinitely risk-averse, no risk can be imposed on $S$ at all. This implies no incentive rents can be paid to $A$; the firm ends up with low productivity and profitability. Nevertheless, even in this case, it pays $P$ to hire $S$ if the latter has a zero outside option, owing to the ‘advocacy’ role he plays on behalf of $A$ (by providing evidence of state $\theta_L$ when it occurs, which is in the joint interest of $S$ and $A$). In general, when $S$ is somewhat but not infinitely risk-averse, the 3-layer hierarchy is more profitable than the 2-layer hierarchy in which $S$ is not hired, though the agent may become less productive owing to the reduction in the ‘power’ of incentives.

Tirole’s model provides a clear illustration of the problem of collusion, and its consequences. Worker incentives are lower in the three-layer hierarchy compared with the
two-layer hierarchy. The ‘costs’ of collusion are the rents P has to pay the supervisor to deter collusion and the lower effort of the worker. The severity of these depend on the risk aversion of the supervisor. Despite these collusion costs, they are outweighed by the benefits of hiring a supervisor. We shall see in subsequent sections that similar results arise in the literature on delegation. Interesting extensions of this model to auditing and regulation have been developed. For instance, Kofman and Lawaree (1993) extend Tirole’s model to include external and internal auditors, and explain the role of the former in cross-checking reports made by internal auditors who may be colluding with workers. Laffont and Tirole (1993) develop a comprehensive theory of regulation of natural monopolies in which regulators that monitor firms’ technology and cost-cutting efforts can be potentially bribed to not disclose their findings publicly.

Comparatively less attention has been devoted to the question whether collusion can serve as a source of control loss which limits the size of firms. Datta (1996) sketches an example where collusion limits firm size. Supervisors are evaluated by audits of production workers in their ‘divisions’. Firms must grow by adding vertical layers owing to endogenous limits on span of control, and collusion is deterred by inconsistency of audit reports at successive vertical layers. The larger the firm gets, the lower the likelihood of such inconsistencies becomes. On the other hand collusion does not limit the size of the firm in the Tsumagari (1999) model based on overlapping jurisdictions of different supervisors. In his model, the firm grows ‘horizontally’, whence there is no problem of cascading control losses.

In summary, models of supervision hierarchies have illustrated some of the difficulties in explaining limits to firm size. Collusion is probably important in understanding why larger organizations tend to be less productive and why middle managers earn large rents. But we do not have many tractable models of determinate firm size and structure based on collusion and supervision.

3. Delegation and Loss of Control with Complete Contracts

The previous section has focused on the supervisory role of managers, pertaining to generation of information concerning the activities of subordinates which helps evaluate and motivate the latter. Supervision per se does not include any responsibility for actual decisions. Conceptually there is little difference between supervisors and external consultants that the principal may rely on to generate information relevant to the decisions she makes. Models of supervision do not address questions of distribution of decision-making; in these the principal still contracts with all workers and suppliers personally, and makes all relevant production, technology, marketing and sourcing decisions.

In this and succeeding sections we focus on the question of delegation of key operating decisions to managers. As the quote from Chandler in the Introduction indicates, while managers may play some role in the production process themselves, they rarely do at higher levels of the hierarchy. Their functions include contracting and supervision of subordinates, allocating resources and coordinating activities of departments under their control, apart from long-term planning. The principal or owners rarely get personally involved in the internal administration of the enterprise.
From an analytical perspective, we therefore need to understand the implications of delegation of contracting with subordinates to managers, where the term ‘contracting’ includes production and sourcing decisions, coordination of production and allocation of resources, recruitment, supervision and evaluation of employees and suppliers. In this section we shall not pose the question why the principal does not carry out these tasks herself, i.e., what the value of delegation of contracting is. Instead, we shall simply assume that decisions will be delegated, and study how the principal ought to evaluate and compensate a self-interested manager. This is precisely the problem of potential ‘loss of control’. The questions posed by these models are: what are the determinants of this loss of control? What are strategies for ameliorating it?

In the first subsection below, we assume the conditions underlying the Revelation Principle are valid: there are no costs of communication, complexity or information processing; the principal can commit to a comprehensive contract; and agents do not collude. Under these circumstances the Revelation Principle (e.g., Myerson (1982)) tells us that centralized decision making — where the Principal contracts and communicated with all agents personally, and makes all relevant decisions based on reports of private information of the agents — can always perform at least as well as any method of decentralizing these responsibilities. Hence delegation can never outperform centralization. The question addressed instead is: can delegation of key responsibilities to self-interested managers achieve the same level of profit for the Principal as any centralized mechanism?

We shall subsequently explore the consequences of dropping different assumptions underlying the Revelation Principle. The latter part of this section will explore the effects of collusion among agents, preserving all the other assumptions. Section 4 will examine the consequences of inability of the Principal to commit to a mechanism, or of costs of communication and complexity.

3.1. The Basic Model. The ‘standard’ model in this Section is a simple adverse selection contracting problem. Analogous questions in a moral hazard setting have been studied by Baliga and Sjostrom (1998) and Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1998). There is one Principal (P), one or two agents (A, or \( A_i, i = 1, 2 \)), and a third-party manager (M). Extension of these models to incorporate more agents, managers or layers will be covered in the penultimate section. The agents carry out productive tasks which generate a revenue or gross benefit \( B \) for P. In the single agent case, \( A \) delivers a good or service \( a \geq 0 \) which generates a benefit \( B(a) \). In the two agent case \( A_i \) delivers \( a_i \geq 0 \) and the benefit is \( B(a_1, a_2) \). The two goods delivered could be perfect substitutes in which case \( B \) depends only on \( a_1 + a_2 \): in this case the mechanism design problem reduces to a procurement auction with variable quantities. Or the two goods could be perfect complements: \( B = \min\{a_1, a_2\} \). More generally, \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \) could be neither perfect substitutes nor perfect complements, e.g., if \( B \) is a CES production function.

Agents are privately informed regarding their cost of production, before they need to commit to deciding whether or not to participate in the mechanisms concerned. In other words, contracting occurs at the interim stage, where each agent knows his own cost but not the cost realizations of others. Most authors assume that each agent’s unit cost does not vary with the level of production, and this unit cost is uncertain. Some authors
assume these costs can take one of two possible values; others assume they are distributed on an interval of the real line, with a standard monotone hazard rate assumption on the distribution which ensures that global incentive constraints can be ignored. Specifically, if $\theta_i$ is the unit cost incurred by $A_i$, it is distributed according to a c.d.f. $F_i$ and density $f_i$ on an interval $[\theta_i, \bar{\theta}_i]$ where $\theta_i + \frac{F_i(\theta_i)}{f_i(\theta_i)}$ is nondecreasing in $\theta_i$, an assumption satisfied by the uniform, exponential and many other well-known distributions. Throughout it is assumed that $\theta_1, \theta_2$ are independently distributed. Moreover, most formulations assume risk-neutrality and zero outside option utilities for agents. Hence P's payoff is $B(a_1, a_2) - t_1 - t_2 - t_M$ where $t_1, t_2, t_M$ denotes transfers made by P to $A_1, A_2, M$ respectively. The payoff of $A_i$ is $T_i - \theta_i a_i$, and of $M$ is $T_M$, where $T_i, T_M$ denote net transfers received by $A_i, M$ respectively. In the centralized mechanism without any collusion, $T_i = t_i, T_M = t_M$, but this is not the case in decentralized mechanisms or in the presence of collusion owing to side-transfers between the agents.

Many authors have studied what we shall call the restricted version of the standard problem, in which each agent’s cost takes one of two possible values, and the inputs produced by the two agents are perfect complements. Other authors have studied the continuous version of this problem, in which costs are distributed according to a density on an interval on the real line, and no restriction is imposed on the benefit function.

Decision-making responsibility can be delegated either to one of the productive agents, or to the third-party manager $M$. The latter may also act as a supervisor of the productive agents, receiving a private signal of their cost realizations. Agents and the manager all act in self-interested fashion.

In this section we assume that it is possible for anyone with contracting authority to commit to a comprehensive contract, which includes details of communication protocols (i.e., the message sets, who communicates with whom, when etc.), production assignments and transfers. Owing to the Revelation Principle it will suffice to focus on revelation mechanisms in the centralized regime, where agents report their private information, and receive instructions concerning production assignments. The outputs they deliver $a_i$ are assumed to be costlessly monitored; transfers can be conditioned on these, and/or reports communicated. In the decentralized regime, assumptions concerning sequencing, communication and observability will be make explicit in due course.

3.2. Single Agent; No Collusion. Here $A$ produces $a$ at cost $\theta a$, P’s net payoff is $B(a) - t$ and A’s is $t - \theta a$. In this setting, the following mechanisms can be compared: (a) centralization, denoted $(P^* - A)$, where the * depicts the decision-maker and a - indicates a line of hierarchical control; (b) agent-based-decentralization, denoted $(P - A^*)$; and (c) manager-based-decentralization, denoted $(P - M^* - A)$. In $(P^* - A)$, P retains all decision rights. In $(P - A^*)$, P contracts with A but delegates production decisions to A. In $(P - M^* - A)$, P delegates contracting and production decisions to M, and contracts with M alone. M contracts in turn with A. M is evaluated and compensated by P based on the revenue generated. Other mechanisms are also possible, such as $(P^* - (M, A))$, where M’s role is purely supervisory or consultative, thus is on the same hierarchical level as A, depicted by the parentheses () around the set of agents M,A at that level. Here P contracts with both M and A, and M’s responsibility is limited to submitting a report
to P concerning the signal concerning A’s cost. P uses this information to evaluate and compensate A.

It is obvious that centralization (P∗ − A) and agent-based decentralization (P − A∗) achieve equivalent outcomes, in what is often referred to as the Taxation Principle. Under the former, P designs an incentive compatible revelation mechanism a(θ), t(θ), in which A is always motivated to report truthfully. Equivalent outcomes are achieved in agent-based decentralization by P offering A instead a nonlinear incentive mechanism t(a) equal to t(θ) if a = a(θ) for some θ, and 0 otherwise. The incentive compatibility of the original revelation mechanism implies that this nonlinear function is well-defined, and motivates A to select the same production in every state as P did in the centralized regime. The converse is equally straightforward, amounting to the proof of the Revelation Principle. Generalizations of this result to contexts with production or monitoring uncertainty (i.e., where P’s revenue or measured performance is not a but some function R(a, ε) where ε is a random variable unobserved by A at the time of selecting a) have been provided by Melumad and Reichelstein (1987).

Now consider what happens when P has the opportunity of using the services of M to supervise the agent. If M and A do not collude, P can obtain M’s information costlessly in the centralized mechanism P∗ − (M, A), since M does not have any incentive to hide his information. Here the outcome is the same as if P contracted with A with the same information as M. This is no longer the case in the decentralized variant (P − M∗ − A), since M can act strategically with respect to his information. This is easy to see when M is perfectly informed about the cost realization θ. In that case M can procure any quantity a from A at cost θ.a, and the problem is equivalent to P contracting with A in the absence of M. The same result is also evident when M’s information about θ is identical to P’s. Hence delegation to M is typically costly in this setting.

3.3. Two Agents, No Collusion. We now come to a model involving two productive agents and a single Principal, considered by a number of different authors in diverse settings of regulation and internal organization (Baron and Besanko (1992), Gilbert and Riordan (1995), Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992, 1995), Laffont and Martimort (1998), Severinov (2008)). Since this model is extended in subsequent sections on collusion and incomplete contracts, it makes sense to present the results in some detail. The chief question concerns implications of delegating contracting and production decisions to one of the two agents. In the regulation context, the regulated entity may be a downstream service provider who procures an essential input from an upstream firm. The question is whether the regulator should regulate both firms directly as well as all aspects of production and transfers among them, or whether only the downstream firm ought to be regulated and is free to procure its inputs from the upstream provider. In a team production setting within a firm, the employer could either retain all authority and treat the different team members symmetrically. Alternatively it could appoint one of them as the manager, and delegate decisions concerning contracting with other agents to the manager. An additional alternative is to hire a manager M∗ who plays no productive role but supervises the producing agents.
In this setting, the alternatives are: (a) centralization \((P^* - (A_1, A_2))\), (b) agent-based-delegation \((P - A_1^* - A_2)\) where P delegates to A1 the responsibility of communicating and contracting with A2, and (c) manager-based-delegation \((P - M^* - (A_1, A_2))\) where P delegates to M the responsibility of contracting with A1, A2. Variants of these include \((P - (A_1^*, A_2^*))\), where P contracts with the two agents, but delegates to them the right to make their own production decisions. Another is \((P^* - (M, A_1, A_2))\) where P retains all decision rights and the sole responsibility of M is to communicate reports to P.

Consider the comparison between the centralized \((P^* - (A_1, A_2))\) and decentralized \((P - A_1^* - A_2)\) variants. There are many variants of the decentralized version, differing with respect to the precise sequencing of contracting, and of the information available to P concerning the ‘performance’ of the manager-cum-worker A1.

A key result here is that delegation to A1 is optimal, i.e., can achieve the same expected profit as centralized contracting, if (a) the sequence of contracting is ‘top-down’ in the sense that P contracts with A1 before A1 communicates or contracts with A2, (b) P monitors both the gross revenue \(B\) and either the payment \(t_2\) made by A1 to A2 or the input \(a_1\) delivered by A1 alone; and (c) A1 is risk-neutral and not subject to any limited liability constraint.

The argument is constructive: P can offer A1 a contract which makes the latter a residual claimant on profits earned by the former, adjusted by a subsidy for payments made to A2 or on the extent of input supplied by the latter. The subsidy corrects for the tendency of A1 to procure too little from the other agent, owing to her tendency to maximize her own information rents. This is the key problem with delegation, closely related to the phenomenon of double marginalization of rents (DMR) in the industrial organization literature on vertical contracting relationships (see, e.g., Tirole (1988)). Contracting with adverse selection gives rise to ‘monopsony’ distortions: owing to the trade-off between productive efficiency and incentive rents, too little tends to be procured by those in middle tiers.

Nevertheless these papers show that the problem can be overcome under the specified assumptions of risk-neutrality, appropriate sequencing of contracts to prevent collusion, and monitoring of contributions of the ‘manager’ vis-a-vis the rest of the team. When the latter takes the form of monitoring of payments, the incentive system for the manager resembles that of decentralized profit or cost centers within firms (Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992)). Observability of aggregate ‘cost’ of the division suffices to overcome the DMR problem. It is not necessary for P to observe further details of the side-contracts designed by A1, nor the communication of the latter with his subordinates.

Nevertheless, some monitoring of side-contracts (or A1’s contribution \(a_1\)) is essential, as long as there is some substitutability between \(a_1\) and \(a_2\). Only in the case of perfect complementarity (a Leontief production function) can the DMR problem be avoided if P

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4This includes both a commitment from A1 to participate in the mechanism, as well as submission of a report concerning his own state.

5Severinov (2008) shows that additional conditions on the degree of complementarity between the inputs supplied by the two agents are needed if cost types have a discrete rather than a continuous distribution.
does not monitor any aspect of the transactions between $A_1$ and his subordinates. And even in that case, there would be a tendency for $A_1$ to generate ‘too much’ aggregate revenue. This provides a possible explanation for the ‘empire-building’ tendencies of managers, which shareholders seek to limit in various ways (such as using a compensation formula where fractional bonus coefficients are used to reduce the manager’s inclination to over-expand operations). The conflict of interest between owner and manager arises owing to the informational rents earned by the manager, which the manager sees as a benefit but the shareholders see as a cost. Baron and Besanko (1992) who study the case of perfect complementarity avoid this problem by centralizing the production decision while delegating $A_1$ only the responsibility for contracting and communicating with $A_2$. The DMR problem is then avoided by reducing the extent of responsibility delegated.

The other assumptions (a) and (c) also play an essential role in ensuring the optimality of delegation. Delegation enlarges the extent of asymmetric information between $P$ and $A_1$, as the latter is now privately informed both about his own cost $\theta_1$ as well as that of his subordinates $\theta_2$. This would expand the informational rents that $A_1$ would earn vis-a-vis $P$, on top of the rents that $A_2$ earns. This is another version of the DMR problem. It is avoided with assumption (a) of top-down contracting, since $A_1$ contracts with $P$ before he learns the realization of $\theta_2$. These additional rents can then be ‘taxed’ away at the time of contracting. For this it is necessary that $A_1$ end up with a negative payoff in some states of the world (e.g., when both $\theta_1$ and $\theta_2$ end up too high). This would not be possible if there were a limited liability constraint requiring $A_1$’s payoff be nonnegative in all states of the world. This is the central point made by McAfee and McMillan (1995), which underlies their model of organizational diseconomies of scale. Such a context is similar to one where $A_1$ communicates with $A_2$ before contracting with $P$, so the former knows the state of the world before committing to participate in the contract offered by $P$. In that world, $A_1$ will earn additional informational rents owing to the privacy of his information concerning the realization of $\theta_2$. There is then a ‘cascading of information rents’ across successive vertical layers of the hierarchy.

Similarly, if $A_1$ were risk-averse, he would incur risk associated with realization of his subordinates’ costs in the delegation arrangement, for which $P$ would have to compensate $A_1$ with an additional risk premium. This is the main idea underlying Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2001) and Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2000)’s model of the cost of delegation. The point is qualitatively similar to that made by Tirole (1986) in a different setting, as well as McAfee and McMillan (1995). It is particularly relevant to the case of managers in firms who are likely to be risk-averse and subject to limited liability concerns. The optimality result seems applicable, if at all, to the case of supply chains in defense procurement or health-care contracting in which $P$ is the government and the agents correspond to large corporations with deep pockets and ample access to capital markets.

3.4. **Delegation to Information Intermediaries.** Consider next the costs of delegating management of the firm with two (or more) productive workers to a third-party supervisor or intermediary $M$ who does not carry out any productive tasks. As Chandler
noted, most ‘top-level’ executives in large organizations are not involved in any productive activity themselves. The value of hiring such professional managers lies presumably in their ability to supervise and coordinate the activities of productive agents. So suppose that $M$ receives signals about the realization of costs of different agents. Presumably, $M$ is better informed than $P$, otherwise it would not pay for $P$ to hire the former.

An interesting question here are the costs and benefits of $P$ managing the firm herself (the $(P^*- (A_1, A_2))$ organization) with delegating management to $M$ (the $(P-M^* - (A_1, A_2))$ organization). The advantage of delegation is that it takes advantage of $M$’s expertise and supervision. The disadvantage is that $M$ will behave strategically with respect to this information vis-a-vis $P$ and extract corresponding informational rents.

It is simplest to consider the case where $M$ is perfectly informed about the costs of the two agents. Then the delegated organization reduces to the problem of $P$ contracting with a single consolidated agent who produces both inputs $(a_1, a_2)$ at a cost of $\theta_1a_1 + \theta_2a_2$, since this will be the cost that $M$ will incur in procuring these inputs from the agents. Hence the comparison is between $P$ contracting with two separate agents each of whom produces one of the inputs, with a consolidated agent who produces both at the same aggregate cost.

This problem has been considered by Baron and Besanko (1992), Gilbert and Riordan (1995), Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) and Severinov (2008). The main result is the following. If $M$ is perfectly informed about agents’ costs, delegation to $M$ is better than $P$ managing the firm herself without involving $M$, if the two inputs $a_1, a_2$ are complements in the sense that $\frac{\partial^2B}{\partial a_1\partial a_2} \geq 0$ and the costs have i.i.d. exponential distributions with a lower bound of $0$. The converse is true if $a_1, a_2$ are perfect or near-perfect substitutes (i.e., infinite or near-infinite elasticity of substitution).\(^6\)

The intuitive explanation is the following. When $P$ contracts with separate suppliers, each supplier exerts an externality on the other supplier through their cost reports. This gets internalized when the suppliers are consolidated into a single entity. If the inputs are near-perfect substitutes, the two agents are competing suppliers, and a lower cost report by one agent tends to decrease the production target awarded to and hence the payoff earned by the other agent. Internalizing this externality implies that cost reports will tend to become higher — which lowers $P$’s profits. Consolidation here suppresses competition. On the other hand when the two inputs are complements, a lower cost report by one agent expands the production target and the payoff of the other agent.

\(^6\)There is a third alternative $(P^*- (M, A_1, A_2))$ in which $P$ retains control and treats $M$ as a supervisor rather than a manager. In the absence of collusion, $P$ can costlessly acquire $M$’s information and then use this to contract with the agents. However, for the reasons provided by Tirole (1986), this would be vulnerable to collusion between $M$ and the agents. In the presence of collusion, which we consider in the next subsection, it will turn out that this alternative is closely related to the one we are considering now, where authority is delegated to $M$.

\(^7\)Again, this is for the case of continuously distributed costs. The result as stated above is an implication of Proposition 5 in Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004). Severinov (2008) considers the case of a discrete set of cost types, and provides detailed results concerning how the comparison depends on the degree of substitutability and asymmetry across agents. However, the results are broadly similar to the continuous distribution case.
Internalization of this externality results in lower cost reports – which works to P’s advantage. Here consolidation fosters ‘cooperation’.

There is another effect of consolidation: two one-dimensional adverse selection problems are replaced by a single multi-dimensional problem. The consolidated agent can consider ‘coordinated deviations’ of cost reports along the two dimensions that were not possible when the agents were separate. This adds to the problems of control of $M$. These problems are not severe when the two agents are ex ante symmetric and have exponentially distributed costs (which contains uniformly distributed cost as a special case).\(^8\)

### 3.5. Delegation and Collusion

How do the preceding results get modified in the presence of collusion among agents? One heuristic view is that centralized contracting is generally vulnerable to collusion (e.g., it undermines P’s efforts to induce competition among agents when they supply substitutes), while delegation is not vulnerable as the latter already incorporates a form of side-contracting between agents. Hence collusion increases the relative value of delegation, and renders it optimal in a wider class of circumstances. Extending the models considered above allows us to appraise the extent to which this view is correct. In fact, once we allow for collusion among agents, the Revelation Principle no longer applies. Is it even possible that delegation can then be superior to centralization?

The first note of caution is that the results concerning the incentive-constrained optimality of delegation ($P - A_1^* - A_2$) that was described above, relied on particular assumptions regarding the nature of side-contracting which are inconsistent with collusive behavior. For instance, P must be able to observe side payments between the two agents, or their relative contribution to the firm’s revenues. The ‘profit center’ arrangement implies $A_1$’s compensation increases by less than a dollar for every dollar’s increment in payments to $A_2$. This will tempt $A_1$ to “pad” costs or payments to $A_2$, in exchange for ‘under-the-table’ kickbacks. The manager must be prevented from communicating with the subordinate before contracting with the owner. Preventing either of these will typically be difficult for P. In the absence of ability to monitor side-payments between the agents, we have already noted that the firm will be prone to the ‘empire-building’ tendency of the manager: delegation is then no longer second-best.

However, neither is centralization invulnerable to collusion. For instance, consider the case of a procurement auction designed by P, between two competing and ex ante symmetric agents. The second-best mechanism is a second-price auction, which creates strong incentives for the suppliers to enter into a hidden agreement to raise their cost reports. Whether centralization or delegation is more vulnerable to collusion is therefore a nontrivial question.

The answer depends partly on the precise way that collusion is modeled. Most of the literature follows Tirole (1986) and ignores possible problems with the enforceability of side-contracts. The usual ‘handwaving’ justification offered for this assumption is that the agents are engaged in a long-term relationship with one another and can thus enter

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\(^8\)Da Rocha and de Frutos (1999) and Severinov (2008) provide examples where consolidation performs worse owing to asymmetries between the agents, even when they perform complementary tasks.
into self-enforcing agreements. Additional problems arise with the allocation of bargaining power within the coalition of colluding agents. Owing to asymmetric information among the agents regarding their respective costs, the Coase Theorem does not apply to the analysis of \textit{ex ante} optimal side contracts: the allocation of bargaining power affects decisions they make concerning the cost reports they decide to send P in a coordinated fashion. This is one complicating feature of this class of models compared with the context studied by Tirole (where there was effectively complete information within the coalition of the agent and the supervisor, so that their joint behavior could be represented simply by that of a consolidated entity earning the sum of their respective payoffs). There is a nontrivial contracting-within-contracting aspect to the problem.

A related question concerns how the allocation of bargaining power between colluding agents varies between the centralized and decentralized contracting regimes. Laffont and Martimort (1998) postulate that it is symmetric in the centralized regime, and asymmetric in the decentralized regime. This seems intuitive, insofar as the two agents are at the same layer of the hierarchy in the centralized world, and at different layers in the decentralized one. However, this seems to be based on the notion that the structure of unobserved side-contracting (which is hidden, illegal or informal) reflects the structure of the regular or permitted contracts in the respective hierarchies. Their theory provides no account of why this may be so.

The Laffont-Martimort (1998) model focuses on the restrictive case of the standard model with two agents, i.e., where costs take two possible values for each agent, and tasks are perfectly complementary. In centralization with collusion, the two agents enter into an \textit{ex ante} side contract which decides on a coordinated set of cost reports submitted to P, and associated hidden side-transfers between themselves. This side contract is chosen to maximize the sum of their \textit{ex ante} payoffs subject to incentive and participation constraints within the coalition. The incentive constraint states that each agent has an incentive to report his cost truthfully within the coalition, while the participation constraint states that each agent must attain at least the expected utility he would attain by not entering the collusive agreement and playing the mechanism designed by P noncooperatively.

In contrast in the delegation setting, Laffont and Martimort assume that \( A_1 \) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of an unobserved side contract, in which they again coordinate the cost report that \( A_1 \) makes to P on their joint behalf, and enter into side-transfers unobserved by P. There are two main differences in the nature of this side-contracting problem. First, the objective function is different: it is the expected utility of \( A_1 \) alone. Second, the participation constraint is different. Since P does not offer a formal contract to \( A_2 \), and delegates this authority to \( A_1 \), \( A_2 \) does not have the option of participating in another mechanism should he refuse the side-contract offered by \( A_1 \).

Using the restrictive version of the standard model with \textit{ex ante} symmetric agents, Laffont and Martimort (1998) find that delegation and centralization both achieve equivalent (second-best) profits for P, irrespective of whether or not there is collusion. This is no longer the case when there is an additional constraint of symmetric treatment of the agents — which they interpret either as a ‘fairness’ requirement, or the result of communication or information processing costs wherein P can only keep track of the
aggregate cost $\hat{\theta}_1 + \hat{\theta}_2$ reported by the two agents, rather than their separate cost reports. They find that delegation then still achieves second-best profit, but centralization does not. The control of collusion requires asymmetric treatment of the two agents, which is not permitted in the centralized regime, but is possible in the delegation setting owing to the asymmetry in bargaining power that it allows through the side contract.

Bargaining power shifts to $A_1$ in the delegation setting for two reasons in the Laffont-Martimort (1998) theory. The first results from the assumption that the implied welfare weight on $A_2$’s expected payoff is zero under delegation, but equal to that on $A_1$’s payoff under centralization. This is based on an implicit assumption of a change in the bargaining protocol itself as a result of a shift in the formal contracting regime. The second reason for a diminution of $A_2$’s relative bargaining power is that he no longer has a backup option of participating noncooperatively.

The second reason for reduction in bargaining power of $A_2$ is intrinsic to the nature of the contracting: delegation gives no backup noncooperative option to $A_2$ should he refuse to collude, unlike centralization. The first reason is less intrinsic: it seems conceivable that the bargaining protocol itself does not change as a result of the formal contracting regime. For instance if the two agents belong to a union or a cartel or an industry association with ‘fairness’ norms which require equal treatment, and this association mediates the collusion, the allocation of welfare weights would not change across the two regimes. It therefore seems more natural to keep the bargaining protocol itself unchanged by the contracting regime, and focus only on the second reason for alteration in bargaining power which is entirely intrinsic to the regimes concerned.

For this reason, most of the subsequent literature assumes that welfare weights do not change between centralization and delegation; only the participation constraint for the side contract differs. It is assumed that in both regimes, the same agent $A_1$ makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of side contract to $A_2$.

If collusion is modelled in this way, it is evident that delegation cannot outperform centralization. A version of the Revelation Principle reappears: any outcome achieved by delegation can be replicated in centralization with P designing a contract which is null for $A_2$, i.e., offers no transfers or production assignments to this agent. Then the nature of the constraints in P’s contracting problem are exactly the same, since the induced side contracting games are identical.

The question to be resolved, then, is whether delegation is costly relative to centralization. In other words, is it valuable for P to contract with both agents rather than just one of them? Doing so allows her to manipulate the bargaining power within the coalition.

One additional ingredient of the models need to be mentioned: the treatment of participation constraints in the contract offered by P. Some authors (such as Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004)) assume these are ex post, i.e., the agents decide whether or not to agree to participate after exchanging cost reports within the coalition. Others such as Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2003) and Celik (2009) assume these are interim: participation decisions must be made at the outset before the agents have had an opportunity to communicate with each other.
Mookherjee and Tsumagari consider the standard model with continuous types with two agents; they compare centralized contracting \((P^* - (A_1, A_2))\) with delegation to one of the productive agents \((P - A_1^* - A_2)\), and to delegation to an intermediary \((P - M^* - (A_1, A_2))\) who is perfectly informed about the agents’ costs. Using \textit{ex post} participation constraints (in the sense described above where agents can collude in their participation decisions as well as in reports), they find the same rankings between these regimes hold as in the case of no collusion. Specifically, centralized contracting is always superior to delegation to one of the agents, while the ranking of the former \textit{vis-a-vis} delegation to \(M\) depends on whether the two agents supply substitute or complementary inputs. Similar results also obtain in the discrete types case where \(M\) is not perfectly informed about the agents’ costs, provided \(M\) is ‘sufficiently’ well-informed. These results provide an explanation of Chandler’s observation that authority tends to be predominantly delegated by owners to managers who are pure intermediaries and not personally involved in productive tasks; their principal responsibility is to supervise and coordinate complementary tasks carried out by different workers.

Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2003) and Celik (2009) consider analogous questions in a setting with one agent \(A\) and one supervisor \(M\), with a discrete set of cost types and where \(M\) is better-informed than \(P\) but not perfectly informed about \(A\)’s cost. While they both assume participation decisions in the mechanism offered by \(P\) must be made at the interim stage, their models differ with respect to details of the information structure. Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort study the two cost type case, where \(M\) receives a signal which also takes two possible values. They find that delegation to \(M\) (i.e., \((P - M^* - A)\) and centralization \((P^* - (M, A))\)) achieve equivalent payoffs for \(P\). Celik considers a case with three cost types, where \(M\)’s information consists of a partition of the state space. He finds that delegation to \(M\) does strictly worse. Hence the cost of delegation in these papers seems very sensitive to fine details of the information structure.

The results of Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) and Celik (2009) are similar and have a similar intuition. Collusion renders inoperable the second-best optimality of delegation, owing to the DMR problem, i.e., the adverse selection problem between the manager and his subordinate. The incidence of this problem can be reduced by raising the bargaining power of the subordinate \textit{vis-a-vis} the manager. This can be achieved by \(P\) contracting with both agents, so as to allow \(A_2\) (or \(A\) in the case of the Celik model) a positive outside option if he refuses the side contract offered by \(A_1\) (or \(M\) in the case of the Celik model). However it is not easy to provide a simple intuition for why the same does not happen in the case considered by Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2003).

Motta (2009) argues that the analyses of Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2003) and Celik (2009) impose the overly restrictive assumption that contracts offered by \(P\) in the centralized regime are always accepted by both \(M\) and \(A\) on the equilibrium path. He shows that if we continue to assume that both parties must decide on whether or not to participate in \(P\)’s mechanism at the interim stage, i.e., before they can collude, then there

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9Baliga and Sjostrom (1998) compare centralized contracting with delegation to one of the agents in a setting with moral hazard with limited liability, rather than adverse selection. They find that the two are equivalent in a wide variety of circumstances, though not in all.
exists a centralized mechanism in which the second-best outcome can be achieved. This is true for either of the type or information structures considered by Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2003) and Celik (2009). The mechanism constructed by Motta involves offering a menu of contracts to $A$ in which some options selected by $A$ are associated with $M$ not being employed to supervise $A$. These are tantamount to allowing an ‘amnesty’ scheme or ‘self-reporting’ by $A$ which obviate the necessity of supervision. Motta shows that such schemes are useful in combating collusion, irrespective of how bargaining power is distributed within the coalition. Hence using such mechanisms which further augment the bargaining power of $A$ allows the problem of collusion to be completely overcome in the centralized regime. This is irrespective of the structure of information available to the supervisor. At the same time, delegation continues to be unable to achieve the second-best, owing to the weak bargaining power of $A$ in that regime. This suggests that centralization is superior to delegation in the presence of collusion, when agents cannot collude in their participation. Whether this continues to be so for the more relevant case where agents and supervisors can collude in their participation decisions as well, has not yet been studied.

In summary, the dust is yet to settle on how to model collusion and what it implies for the optimality of delegation. If delegation and centralization do not change bargaining weights of colluding participants, delegation cannot be superior to centralization. Whether it is inferior to centralization depends on the context and fine details of the nature of collusion.

4. Contractual Incompleteness, Renegotiation and Complexity

The preceding section considered contexts of ‘complete’ contracts, where the Principal can commit to a comprehensive mechanism in which there are no restrictions on the ability of agents to communicate their private information, of the Principal to process this information, make decisions and communicate corresponding instructions back to agents. These assumptions, combined with noncooperative behavior of agents, allows the Revelation Principle to hold, implying that delegation cannot out-perform centralization. To understand the benefits of delegation, it is therefore necessary to explore settings where the assumptions underlying the Revelation Principle fail to apply. Since we saw in the last section that collusion among agents does not provide a convincing theory of the benefits of delegation, it is necessary to explore some of the other assumptions. This confirms the well-known proposition (going back to Williamson (1975) and reiterated by Hart (1995)) that one needs an ‘incomplete contract’ framework to have a cogent theory of allocation of control rights within an organization.

Contractual ‘incompleteness’ is however a very broad notion and there are different approaches to modeling it. The simplest approach is to exogenously rule out complete contracts, and impose ‘realistic’ restrictions on contracts — e.g., limiting their duration, or the kinds of contingencies they can incorporate. Aghion and Tirole (1997), Dessein (2002), Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008), Bester and Krahmer (2008) and Rantakari (2008) use this approach to model the costs and benefits of delegation. Most of
these models model communication between the agent and the Principal under centralization as a cheap-talk game, where the latter is unable to commit \textit{ex ante} to decisions following any particular set of reports received. This is the principal drawback of centralization, which limits the extent of information that the agent communicates owing to the desire of the latter to manipulate the Principal’s subsequent decision. Decentralization in contrast results in decisions which depend more sensitively on the agent’s information, but tend to serve the agent’s personal interests rather than the Principal’s. We pass over this interesting literature (described further in the chapter on authority by Bolton and Dewatripont), and focus instead on theories where ‘incompleteness’ arises endogenously from either of two additional frictions: inability of the Principal to commit, and costs of communication or contractual complexity.

4.1. Commitment Problems. In many contexts it can be difficult for P to commit to not deviate from \textit{ex ante} promises to behave in a certain way in particular \textit{ex post} contingencies, even though the latter can be anticipated and specified in advance. The reason is that \textit{ex ante} decisions promised by P may not be optimal \textit{ex post}, as the former may have been prompted by the need to provide certain kinds of incentives to A. Once the required actions have been chosen by A, P may wish to revert to a different decision which is in the subsequent \textit{ex post} mutual interest of P and A. Delegation of authority to an ‘independent’ third party may be a way to overcome this commitment problem. Examples of this ‘time-inconsistency’ problem in the context of monetary policy have been familiar to macroeconomists since the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977). Governments with a short-term interest in expansionary monetary policy tend to create excessive inflation when they possess discretionary control. This forms the primary motivation for delegation of monetary policy to an independent Central Bank (Rogoff (1985)). The solution to the problem of commitment to an anti-inflationary monetary policy is for the government to delegate day-to-day policy-making to bureaucrats or technocrats with a known commitment to anti-inflationary policy, and insulate them from short-term political pressure. Similar problems arise also in fiscal policy, such as the problem of bailouts of public sector firms or ‘soft budget constraints’ (see, e.g., Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Qian and Weingast (1997)), or in income tax audits (Melumad and Mookherjee (1989)). Cremer (1995) provides an interesting model of commitment problems in organizations along similar lines, in the context of design of employment contracts: owners will find it difficult to follow through on threats to fire high quality agents detected shirking, if these agents are expected to be superior relative to others who might replace them. Delegation of employment decisions to a manager who is provided strong incentives to fire unproductive workers via an incentive scheme, may be a way of committing to implement termination threats which induce workers not to shirk.

One problem with this explanation of delegation is that it is based on an implicit assumption that it is easier for Principals to commit to delegating the allocation of control rights, than it is to commit to detailed decisions if they retain the rights themselves. There may be problems arising even with these delegation arrangements, wherein the Principal may seek to reallocate control rights \textit{ex post}, or attempt to influence the decisions made by agents to whom authority has been delegated (see Katz (1991) for a detailed analysis).
In Cremer’s model for instance, if employment decisions were delegated to a manager who is supposed to be penalized for retaining unproductive workers, the owner would have an \textit{ex post} incentive for not applying this penalty when the worker in question was discovered to be a high quality type. Neither the worker nor manager would have an interest in opposing P’s opportunistic intervention. Hence there could be problems with the enforcement of commitments to delegate. It is not clear whether and why it is easier to commit to delegate authority than to commit to actual decisions.

A tighter argument for the value of delegation on the basis of renegotiation problems is provided by Beaudry and Poitevin (1995) and Poitevin (1995, 2000) in the context of a standard principal-agent production problem. Opportunities for \textit{(ex post Pareto-improving)} renegotiation are provided in both centralized and decentralized environments. They show that the decentralized regime is less vulnerable to renegotiation, and can accordingly generate a higher level of payoff for the Principal.

The argument is simplest in a single agent setting. Suppose the agent A produces \textit{a} at a cost of $\theta_a$, which generates revenue $B(a)$ to P, and A is privately informed about the realization of \textit{\theta}. Under centralization the contracting game is as follows. In Stage 1, P offers a contract $a(\theta), t(\theta)$. At Stage 2, A observes the realization of \textit{\theta}, decides whether to participate and submits a cost report to P. At Stage 3, P can offer a new contract to A. If A accepts, the game continues with the new contract in force. Otherwise the previous contract continues to apply. The output and transfer are then determined by the prevailing contract, and the report already submitted by A.

Attention can be restricted to contracts which are not renegotiated on the equilibrium path. It can then be shown that the equilibrium renegotiation-proof allocation must be separating, i.e., P will learn the true cost of A at the end of Stage 2.\textsuperscript{10} Hence P will subsequently offer an \textit{ex post} efficient allocation at Stage 3. This implies that the second-best solution, i.e., the allocation associated with a commitment contract, cannot be supported in the presence of opportunities for renegotiation, as long as it involves \textit{ex post} distortions.

Now consider delegation, wherein P offers A an incentive contract $t(a)$ at Stage 1. At Stage 2, A observes \textit{\theta}, decides whether to participate and selects \textit{a}. At Stage 3, P observes \textit{a} and can offer a new contract. But given that \textit{a} has already been chosen, the only scope for renegotiation is over the transfer payment. But there cannot be any scope for an \textit{ex post} Pareto-improving renegotiation over the transfer payment alone. Hence the second-best allocation can be implemented under delegation. It follows that delegation typically dominates centralization as it is less vulnerable to renegotiation. The key difference is that in centralization, decisions over production and transfers are made by P following communication from the agent. In delegation renegotiation can happen after the production decision has already been made by A.

Does this suggest that delegation generally out-performs centralization? Poitevin (1995) points out this is not the case when P also receives relevant information after signing the initial contract. Suppose P learns the value of a ‘market’ parameter $\eta$ that enters the revenue function: $B(a; \eta)$ at the same time that A learns the realization of cost $\theta$.

\textsuperscript{10}See Beaudry-Poitevin (1995, Proposition 5) for details.
Delegating production decisions to A without any communication from P regarding the realization of $\eta$ would then imply independence of production decisions with regard to the realization of market information. Conversely, the benefit of centralization based on communication of cost information from A would be that production decisions would be responsive to market information, at the cost of being vulnerable to renegotiation with A. There are now four possible organizational alternatives: pure centralization (decisions are made by P without communication from A), pure decentralization without communication (production decisions are made by A without communication from P about the realization of $\eta$), and corresponding versions with communication (which Poitevin calls a hierarchy). A hierarchy is more responsive to information about both cost and market parameters, at the cost of being more vulnerable to renegotiation.

4.2. Communication and Complexity Costs. Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992, 1997) explore the implications of costly communication or contractual complexity for the costs and benefits of delegation vis-a-vis centralization, in the context of the 'standard' production model with one Principal and two agents. Their 1992 paper focuses on communication costs, which are argued to arise from expertise of agents not shared by the Principal, which makes it impossible for the agents to communicate all they know to the latter. Languages used by Principal and agents may not be exactly the same, and they could lack a rich enough shared vocabulary. There could also be limits on the Principal’s ability to process the reports sent by the agents, within a given time limit within which decisions need to be made.

Such restrictions are incorporated as an (exogenous) finite limit on the message set available to any agent for communicating with P (under either centralization or decentralization), while the agent’s private information is real-valued. This implies that full ‘revelation’ is impossible: agents must compress what they know into messages in a way that entails loss of information. The finite limit could represent a common finite alphabet used for communication. Alternatively if sending each ‘bit’ of information takes one unit of time, then a given time limit for making decisions imposes an upper bound to the number of ‘bits’ that can be communicated. This is similar to the approach used in computer science to measure communicational complexity, e.g., ‘tree complexity’ of communication protocols (Karchmer (1989), Segal (1995)). Nevertheless, Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein do not model the underlying sources of the communicational restrictions. Instead they impose a common restriction on the size of message sets which applies uniformly to both centralization and decentralization, and compare their performance under any given size restriction. This follows in the tradition of earlier models of Green and Laffont (1986, 1987). A similar approach was adopted by Laffont and Martimort (1998) in which the Principal was assumed to only be able to receive aggregates of cost reports sent by different agents.

The Melumad-Mookherjee-Reichelstein (1992) model imposes a number of additional restrictions on communication and contracting. Only one round of communication takes place, either sequentially or simultaneously. Other conditions are those that ensure zero control loss from delegation in a full communication setting — i.e., risk neutrality, suitable monitoring and sequencing of contracts to eliminate collusion and the DMR problem.
Then for any finite message set restrictions, delegation is shown to out-perform centralization. A similar result is obtained in their follow-up 1997 paper, in which restrictions on communication are derived from restrictions on complexity of contracts, where the latter is measured by the total number of contingencies (which correspond to message combinations in centralization, and message-action combinations in decentralization). The underlying idea is that finite communicational restrictions prevent agents from fully revealing their real-valued cost realizations to the Principal under centralization. Delegating decision-making authority to agents enables decisions to be based on greater ‘local’ information, resulting in a flexibility gain. Offsetting this is the incentive (DMR) problem, which cannot be fully overcome owing to limits on communication (since P has to calibrate ‘outsourcing’ subsidy rates on the basis of reports made by the manager regarding her own costs of production). The tradeoff is then based on a comparison of the flexibility gain and the control loss.

The main result of this paper is that under the conditions described in Section 3 for there to be no control loss in a complete contract setting (i.e., absence of risk aversion or financial constraints, top-down contracting, absence of collusion and monitoring of transactions between agents), the flexibility gain of delegation outweighs the control loss in the incomplete contract setting. At the same time, if P lacks the ability to monitor detailed production assignments or transfers between the agents, examples can be constructed where the control losses inherent in delegation outweigh the gains in flexibility to ensure that centralization is superior. Hence the theory provides contexts where either one of the two modes is superior, depending on the ability of P to monitor the side contract.

These results provide a rationale for studying conditions for delegation to be optimal with ‘complete’ contracts: the very conditions that ensure this turn out to ensure that delegation is superior to centralization when communication or contractual complexity is costly. When delegation is inferior with complete contracts, it may also be so when contracts are incomplete owing to communication or complexity costs. In general, there is a trade-off between the ‘flexibility’ advantage of delegation (which arises only when contracts are incomplete) and its control loss (which arises also when contracts are complete).

Nevertheless a number of problems remain with this theory, as argued by Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2008). For one, the restriction to a single round of communication is ad hoc: most real world organizations are characterized by interactive multistage communication between agents. The mechanism design problem includes the design of communication protocols. Mookherjee and Tsumagari consider a context where agents take time to read and write messages, and production decisions need to be made within a finite time horizon, combined with time taken to read and write messages. This allows a wide range of finite communication protocols, varying with regard to the number of rounds and message set size at each round.

Mookherjee and Tsumagari develop a theory of mechanism design which allows a broad class of finite communication protocols with multiple stages, as well as a wide range of mechanisms where different components of contracting, communication and production can be centralized or decentralized. Based on an assumption that messages exchanged
between agents are costlessly verifiable by \( P \), they show that centralized contracting can generally perform as well as decentralized contracting. At the same time, decentralized production and communication systems generally outperform centralized ones — owing to the greater flexibility they allow in choice of production and coordination of information across agents. In other words, it indicates the optimality of an intermediate form of organization where contracting and monitoring are centralized while production decisions are decentralized to workers, as in the prototypical ‘Japanese’ firm (e.g., Aoki (1990)).

5. More Complex Hierarchies

The preceding two sections have been concerned with foundational issues in the modeling of costs and benefits of delegating control to managers or intermediaries. Accordingly they focused on simple contexts involving one principal or owner, one manager and one or two agents who play a productive role. In this section we describe models of more complex hierarchies, involving more agents or departments, which help address a number of additional questions concerning the organization of hierarchies. An example of such a question concerns grouping of activities into different ‘departments’. In *Strategy and Structure*, Chandler described the evolution of many large vertically integrated firms producing a multitude of products in various regions or markets from unitary (U-form) to multidivisional (M-form) organizations. In the former, departments are organized along functional lines: departments concentrate plants and activities producing the same input or intermediate good. In the latter, they are organized by product or market or region, with each division being internally vertically integrated and relatively independent of other divisions (except for overhead, capital or top management allocated by top management across divisions). Socialist economies likewise can be organized by ministries producing specific intermediate inputs (as in the erstwhile Soviet economy), or by regions each of which is relatively self-contained (as in the Chinese economy). Chandler argued that the shift away from the U-form freed up the time and effort of central management from day-to-day management of operations in each division that was required owing to the need to coordinate activities of different producing divisions. In the M-form they could delegate internal management of divisions to divisional managers, and focus more on long-range issues. However this meant giving up on the advantages of scale economies and specialization possible from the concentration of similar activities within the same division in the U-form.

Understanding this dimension of organizational design requires extension of the models described in previous section to incorporate multiple divisions and problems of horizontal coordination across these divisions. The previous models can be thought of as organizations consisting of a single division, which focus only on problems of vertical control and coordination.

\[ ^{11} \text{When however communication between agents is difficult to verify by employers, they provide an example where decentralized contracting outperforms centralized contracts.} \]
Rotemberg (1999) model the comparison between an U-form and a M-form hierarchy as involving a trade-off between coordination versus control. A firm produces two products \( A, B \) and two associated intermediate inputs 1, 2 each of which is required in the production of either good. There are four agents or plant managers, represented by a combination of a product and an input used for that product. Rotemberg assumes that a pair of agents will have a common supervisor, and thereby form a division. Implicit here is an exogenous upper bound on the span of control: a supervisor cannot oversee more than two agents. This rules out a fully centralized firm with a single division which contains all four agents. Rotemberg assumes therefore the firm has two divisions and two corresponding supervisors, who jointly own it. Another important assumption is that the supervisors operate independently and cannot share any information with one another.

In the U-form, divisions are organized by the inputs produced: division \( i \) produces input \( i \) and includes the two plants \( iA, iB \) producing this input, where \( i = 1, 2 \). In the M-form, they are organized by products: division \( j \) produces product \( j \) and includes the plants \( 1j, 2j \) producing the two inputs needed for this product, where \( j = A, B \). Each plant \( ij \) has to choose a level of activity \( x_{ij} \) and a method \( m_{ij} \). The inputs used in the production of each product need to be coordinated: there is a loss function for each product \( j \) which depends on the difference in activity levels \( x_{1j}, x_{2j} \). The M-form allows better coordination since it groups different plants involved in the same product group into the same department.

The optimal method of producing the same input across different products is the same. Incentive problems arise with respect to choice of method, an issue regarding the costs of which the respective plant managers are privately informed. The main advantage of the U-form is that the supervisor controls two agents producing the same input, thus allowing the report of each agent to discipline the other. Hence the U-form allows for better control of incentive problems.

The model has a number of interesting predictions. The U-form involves less high powered incentives for plant managers, owing to the stronger information available to the corresponding supervisor. As the firm expands in scale, it adds more plants within each division. In the M-form there are now multiple plants producing the same input, which helps reduce the incentive problem. But the U-form continues to be subject to coordination losses. Hence for sufficiently large scale, the M-form must dominate. This helps explain how the American firms shifted from one form to the other as described by Chandler: the coordination problems with the U-form got worse relative to the control problems as firms grew in scale.

Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1997, 2001) provide a model of hierarchies which generalizes the standard production model in preceding sections to the context of many agents, departments and products. They provide general sufficient conditions on the structure of the organizational production function or technology for a hierarchy with an arbitrary number of branches and layers to be able to achieve second-best profits for the Principal. The mechanism they use extends the ‘responsibility center’ mechanism described in Section 3 for the case of two agents that form a single division. With multiple divisions that constitute different branches of the hierarchy at any given layer, the mechanism has to
ensure horizontal coordination across these branches as well as vertical coordination and control across layers within any given branch. In addition to the assumptions concerning sequencing of contracts, absence of collusion and of risk-aversion or limited liability constraints, the key assumption required is that the organization of the hierarchy is consistent with the technology. This means that the technology is recursively decomposable into the production of intermediate inputs at different stages of production, and each plant has constant returns to scale.

Absent incentive problems, this consistency condition implies that an optimal production plan can be formed for the firm as a whole, with (one-dimensional) cost reports (or budgets or forecasts) sent by agents that flow up the hierarchy, which are aggregated at each layer and passed up by each manager to his manager in turn. Subsequently production targets are formed at the top of the hierarchy and these then flow down the hierarchy. Each divisional manager forms a contingent production plan, allocating production responsibility across subordinate divisions on the basis of their respective cost reports, and the aggregate production target assigned to the division. Mookherjee and Reichelstein show that the same kind of mechanism can be used even in the presence of incentive problems, where each agent is self-interested. It requires an initial phase is added wherein contracts flow down the hierarchy, in which the manager at any layer offers a contract to each subordinate, which the latter must respond to prior to offering contracts to their subordinates in turn. The assumptions required are the same as those that ensure optimality of delegation in a three-layer hierarchy: top-down contracting, monitoring of ‘costs’, and risk-neutrality of all agents. The construction resembles the Calvo-Wellisz method of ‘replicating’ the three-layer hierarchy to accommodate more layers and branches. Under these conditions, then, there is no limit to the size of the hierarchy.

Applied to the U-form versus M-form question, this model provides conditions when either can be optimal. The U-form is optimal if it is consistent with the technology — as would be the case if the firm produces a single product by combining different inputs each of which is produced by multiple plants. Each division then corresponds to the production of a particular input. The M-form is consistent with the technology if the firm produces multiple products, each of which combines a number of inputs (some of which are used in different products). The divisions are then organized along product lines. Each division is independent of others, except for allocation of some overhead facilities or capital resources by headquarters. When the technology takes this form, it is evident that the U-form is not consistent with it. This approach thus suggests the role of changing technology and product variety in explaining evolution from U-form to M-form organizations. With the emergence of multiple products produced by the same firm, the U-form would experience problems relative to the M-form in coordinating production of different inputs used in any given good (in the sense of being able to use the ‘budgeting’ system with one-dimensional cost and quantity aggregates in every division).

An alternative perspective on U-form versus M-form organizations is provided by Maskin, Qian and Xu (2000). Their theory abstracts from coordination issues altogether, and focuses on informational and incentive implications of these alternatives. Similar to the basic Rotemberg model, the Maskin-Qian-Xu model has a three layer hierarchy
producing two products $i = 1, 2$ in two different regions $r = A, B$. There are four plants, corresponding to a combination of a product and a region. Productivity shocks arise at the economy, regional and industrial levels. The organizational structure assigns responsibility to managers to devote costly effort to improving productivity. Observed performance levels are the confluence of effort and shocks, giving rise to moral hazard problems. In both U-form and M-form a top manager deals with the economy-wide shock. The essential difference arises at the middle layer of the hierarchy. In the U-form, departments are organized by industry, so there is a manager at the middle layer in each department whose effort affects the productivity of the two plants in the corresponding industry. In the M-form the departments are organized by region, so the middle-level manager's effort affects the performance of the two plants in two different industries which happen to be located in the same region. Bottom-level managers' efforts affect the plants they are assigned to. In the U-form (resp. M-form) these correspond to different regions (resp. industries) within the same industry (resp. region). The two organizational forms thus differ in the assignment of tasks across managers. In the M-form, for instance, only one manager (located at the middle tier) in the organization is dealing with the regional shocks, whereas there are two managers in the U-form (located at the bottom layer in two different industry divisions) who deal with regional shocks.

Managers are risk averse, giving rise to a trade-off between risk-sharing and effort incentives in the design of their compensation schemes. ‘Yardstick’ competition is an important way of dealing with these incentive problems, wherein agents performance is measured relative to that of peers whose performance is subject to similar (i.e., correlated) shocks. Maskin, Qian and Xu show that the U-form and M-form offer identical opportunities for evaluating performance of managers at the top and bottom tier, but they differ with regard to managers at the middle tier. If performance at the regional level (aggregating across industries) is more comparable (i.e., correlated) across regions, rather than performance at the industrial level (aggregating across regions), then the M-form allows more effective use of yardstick competition for middle-level managers. For top-layer managers, there is no opportunity for yardstick competition (as in the model this is the only firm in the economy). And for bottom level managers, there exists one other manager in the firm whose performance provides a comparable yardstick in both organizations. The model thus predicts that performance differences will arise owing to differential managerial effort incentives at intermediate levels of the hierarchy. Maskin, Qian and Xu go on to provide empirical evidence from Chinese firms that the structure of productivity shocks is such that performance is more comparable across regions than across industries. This suggests the superiority of the M-form, thus providing a potential explanation for superior performance of the Chinese over Soviet version of socialism.

6. Concluding Remarks

The literature overviewed in this chapter pertain mainly to the microfoundations of an incentive-based theory of hierarchies. The aim of this field has been to formalize Williamson’s ideas of control loss in hierarchies based on incentive problems per se, and examine how this affects the size and structure of organizations. This requires
understanding conceptually what managers ‘do’, and the costs and benefits of delegating to them authority.

The models described in the chapter focus on a particular source of ‘control loss’ in hierarchies, arising from incentive problems associated with supervision and delegation of authority. They address questions of the design of compensation for supervisors, how these relate to compensation of production workers and attendant problems of collusion. The models help pose the question of choice amongst different organizational designs, highlighting the different dimensions involved in these designs even in the simplest contexts involving one or two productive agents and one manager: breadth (span of control) and depth (number of vertical layers); extent of responsibility delegated at each level and related compensation rules and monitoring systems; how contracts, communication and production planning are sequenced. So far most of the models have been rudimentary, with only one or two production workers, one manager and one owner. At the next step one expects these will be used as building blocks for more complex organizations and design issues in the presence of more agents, managers, products and intermediate goods.

Despite their simplicity, the models enable the age-old question of centralization versus decentralization to be posed in different concrete ways. They have also generated a wide range of applications in fields as diverse as management accounting (profit centers and budgeting\textsuperscript{12}, transfer pricing\textsuperscript{13}, auditing\textsuperscript{14}), fiscal decentralization (hard versus soft budget constraints\textsuperscript{15}, treatment of externalities\textsuperscript{16}, or accountability in local governments\textsuperscript{17}), procurement and regulation\textsuperscript{18}, and comparisons between Soviet-style and Chinese-style socialism\textsuperscript{19}.

Nevertheless, much remains to be done. There is considerable scope and need to use these models to address more applied questions in industrial organization, and enable closer integration with empirical work on internal organization of firms. What are the effects of changes in information technology, competition on the product market or openness to trade on the internal structure of firms? These issues have been discussed extensively in fields of management (e.g., Hammer and Champy (1993)), and have been the subject of recent empirical studies (e.g., Acemoglu et al (2006), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002), Caroli and van Reenen (2001), Rajan and Wulf (2006)). With the exception of Acemoglu et al (2006), most of this literature lacks a theoretical framework. A closer integration of theory and empirics would enrich these analyses, and permit better understanding of normative implications.

Even within the context of purely theoretical analysis, significant challenges and open questions remain. An integration of incentive issues with costly information processing would represent a major step forward at the conceptual level. This would help formalize

\begin{enumerate}
\item Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1997)
\item Melumad and Mookherjee (1989), Kofman and Lawaree (1993)
\item Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Qian and Roland (1998)
\item Klibanoff and Poitevin (2009)
\item Seabright (1996), Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000, 2006))
\item Baron and Besanko (1992), Gilbert and Riordan (1995), Severinov (2008).
\item Jin, Qian and Weingast (2005), Maskin, Qian and Xu (2000), Qian and Weingast (1997)
\end{enumerate}
hierarchy design as a trade-off between information processing advantages with incentive and control disadvantages of delegating authority. Issues concerning the design of more complex hierarchies still remain to be addressed, e.g., models of delegation which address questions of size and structure of hierarchies, and related implications for compensation, rents and performance at different levels. The simple models described in this chapter suggest the role of collusion, limited liability or managerial risk aversion as sources of control losses in hierarchies. They need to be embedded in more complex settings to develop detailed predictions concerning size and structure of firms and how they are affected by technology and market parameters. This would then help realize the goal of constructing a Williamsonian model of hierarchies with secure microfoundations, which can be empirically tested.
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