

IMPACT OF RESERVATIONS OF PANCHAYAT PRADHANS ON TARGETING IN WEST BENGAL¹

Pranab Bardhan², Dilip Mookherjee³ and Monica Parra Torrado⁴

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Abstract

We examine effect of randomized reservations of Pradhan (chief executive) positions in West Bengal local governments (panchayats) for women and members of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST) following the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments of 1993. Our sample consists of 89 villages spread throughout 15 rural districts of West Bengal, in which we examine effects on targeting to poor and SC/ST households of IRDP credit, agricultural extension programs, employment programs, and budgetary policies. We find the reservations were associated with improved targeting of the IRDP program, but poorer targeting of employment programs, and lower local revenues raised by the panchayats. Aggregating pecuniary effects of the IRDP and employment programs, the net effect of the reservations appears to have worsened targeting to SC/ST and landless households. The effects also differ with local land inequality and poverty among SC/ST groups: reservations improved targeting in villages with low inequality and poverty, but worsened targeting among the rest.

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²Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley

³Department of Economics, Boston University

⁴Department of Economics, Boston University

1 Introduction

In this paper we examine the effect of reservation of Pradhans in West Bengal local governments (gram panchayats, or GPs for short) since 1993 on targeting of development programs towards the poor and minority groups. These reservations have been implemented since the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments of 1993. Pradhan positions have been reserved for scheduled caste/scheduled tribe (SC/ST) members since 1993, and for women since 1998. The fraction of GPs with Pradhan positions reserved for SC/ST members is decided on the basis of the demographic weight of SC/ST population in each district. Within the district the actual selection of GPs with reserved positions is chosen according to a random device. Reservations for women are implemented in one-third of all GPs, also according to a random device. Most accounts report that these randomizations were faithfully implemented. Accordingly, comparison of targeting of programs administered by GPs with and without reservations provides a statistically unbiased estimate of their impact on poverty alleviation efforts of these panchayats.

Besley, Pande, Rahman and Rao (2004), Besley, Pande and Rao (2005) and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004a, 2004b) have assessed the impact of reservations for villages in different parts of India. The first two study 181 randomly chosen GPs in three Southern India states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, in surveys conducted in September 2002. Besley, Pande, Rahman and Rao find that the effect of Pradhan reservation for SC/ST members depends on the type of public program and on location of the GP or Pradhan. With regard to distribution of private goods such as housing, building of toilets, water and electricity connections, SC/ST reservations improved targeting to SC/ST members *within* villages, but did not change their allocation *across* different villages. There was also no significant effect on allocation of village public goods such as building of roads, drains, street lights or water sources across different villages. The latter does however favor villages where the GP or Pradhan is located. In a second study of the same set of villages, Besley, Pande and Rao (2005) find that distribution of BPL (Below Poverty Line) cards were better targeted to SC/ST members when the Pradhan position was reserved for SC/ST candidate, but was not significantly affected when it was reserved for a woman

candidate. Reservation for a woman increased the tendency for ineligible members of the GP to obtain a BPL card, and in this sense worsened targeting. These studies thus indicate some improvements in targeting of private benefits to SC/ST members following an SC/ST reservation, but no corresponding benefits from women reservations.

Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004a, 2004b) examine effects of SC/ST and women reservations in Udaipur, Rajasthan and in Birbhum district in West Bengal on the allocation of GP investments across different village public goods until the year 2000. They find that women reservations significantly altered the composition of GP investments in favor of public goods preferred by women (more on drinking water, roads and less on adult education centers in West Bengal; more drinking water and less roads in Udaipur). SC/ST reservations altered only the allocation of spending across villages in favor of the village that the SC/ST Pradhan resides in, but otherwise had no discernible impact on the composition of spending.

This paper differs from the above studies in terms of the sample of villages and the range of panchayat activities considered. Our sample consists of 89 villages in 57 GPs spread throughout 15 districts in West Bengal (only Calcutta and Darjeeling are excluded). We focus on the impact of the reservations on a wide range of programs administered by the GPs, including allocation of IRDP credit, agricultural minikits, employment programs across different beneficiary groups, apart from local revenues raised, and allocation of spending across different areas. On the other hand, our data is restricted to years between 1993 and 1998, so the time span covered since the reservations were implemented is shorter than in the studies mentioned above. Moreover, unlike Chattopadhyay and Duflo's study, our data does not include indicators of preferences of different groups (women, SC/ST members, landless or marginal landowners) for alternative public spending areas. So we are not able to evaluate impact of reservations on shifting spending allocations towards those preferred by those groups. Our focus is therefore on the impact of the reservations on targeting of non-public good programs in favor of the poor and minority groups.

Our principal finding is that both kinds of reservations improved targeting of IRDP credit programs, principally by increasing the flow of credit into villages by 30–40% with a

reserved Pradhan position. The effect on targeting of agricultural minikits was negligible. On the other hand, reservations worsened targeting of employment programs, both across and within villages. However, the latter effects are less precisely estimated than the effects on the credit program (though this is no longer the case when we interact the reservation effects with local land inequality and poverty). Villages with a reserved Pradhan position obtained less funds for an employment program (on the order of 25–30%), then generated less employment per rupee of funds received (of the order of 30% and more). In GPs with a reserved woman Pradhan position, significantly fewer SC/ST members found work in these programs (the proportion of SC/ST employed was smaller by about 30%). In villages with SC/ST reserved Pradhans, farm wage rates were lower by about 10%, after controlling for relevant village characteristics. GPs with reserved Pradhan positions for women raised significantly less local revenues from non-tax sources (by over 100%), and those with SC/ST reservation raised less from local taxes (of the order of 40%).

With regard to the allocation across different spending programs, the only significant shifts were less spending on roads, employment programs and education (accompanied by small but insignificant increases in spending on water and irrigation). Since roads generate more employment per rupee expenditure than irrigation programs, this is consistent with the evidence on employment generated.

It is difficult to assess the overall impact of the reservations on the welfare of the poor or of minority groups, since this will require aggregating across the effects of these different programs. Nevertheless, our results indicate that reservations may be accompanied by significant deterioration of targeting towards the poor on a number of relevant dimensions. To illustrate the trade-offs, consider the effects of reservation on the inter-village allocation, which some of our earlier work (Bardhan-Mookherjee (2004)) has indicated dominates considerations of intra-village targeting of these programs in West Bengal. For the village as a whole, the magnitude of the loss of resources per household on employment program spending (of the order of Rs 50 per household, at 1980 prices) greatly exceeded the gain from higher resources received in the IRDP program (of the order of Rs 5 per household).

However, the impact on the village allocation on employment programs is not precisely

estimated, i.e., is statistically insignificant. If we look instead at the effect of reservation of Pradhan's position for women on days of employment generated for SC/ST households, we find a statistically significant reduction of six days work (from approximately eight days work in unreserved GPs) per SC/ST household per year. With a daily wage rate of between Rs 3–4 an hour during the mid-1990s, in pecuniary terms this loss is worth far more than the gain of Rs 11.50 per SC/ST household from superior targeting of the IRDP program. Aggregating across IRDP and the employment programs, it therefore seems that the net effect of women's reservation for SC/ST households was significantly negative. And in the case of a reserved SC/ST Pradhan, the benefits of superior targeting of IRDP would be outweighed by the 10% reduction in agricultural wages.

However, these calculations fall short of a comprehensive welfare evaluation. They exclude the effect of changes in spending on different kinds of welfare programs, and village public goods such as roads, water and schools. They also exclude possible benefits from better representation of preferences of women residents.

Even broader dimensions of the impact of the reservations may be missed by the statistical results. For instance, the latter pertain to the short-term impact of the reservations. The reservations have been in place for only a few years now. Our study looks at the effect of women's reservation in the very first year itself since the election of the women Pradhans, while the other studies have examined their impact within the first two to four years. Their long-run impact on allocation outcomes, deliberative and participative processes within local governance, and on the aspirations of poor minorities may well be more important, yet are inherently more difficult to assess. At any rate more time has to pass before the broader impacts can be evaluated.

Section 2 describes the data sources used, and the main results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.

2 Data and Empirical Specification

Our data consists of 57 GPs covering 15 districts of West Bengal, excluding Calcutta and Darjeeling. The villages are a subsample of an originally stratified random sample of villages selected by the Socio-Economic Evaluation Branch of the Department of Agriculture, West Bengal for the purpose of cost of cultivation surveys (for eventual use by the Central Government in setting prices of agricultural commodities). Some of these villages form pairs within the same GP, others form pairs within the same block. For each of these villages, we subsequently carried out village surveys with respect to operation and administration of various anti-poverty and development programs, such as:

- (i) land reforms (based on data from the local Block Land Records Office concerning each separate land reform transaction or activity);
- (b) IRDP credit (based on data from the corresponding lead bank concerning details of each IRDP loan)
- (c) agricultural minikits distributed (from the block office of the Department of Agriculture, concerning details of each kit distributed);
- (d) employment programs administered by the GP (by nature of project, and composition of beneficiaries by caste and gender status), from the accounts of the GP;
- (e) road projects implemented by the GP, from the accounts of the GP;
- (f) GP budgetary receipts from different sources, and allocation of spending across different areas, from the accounts of the GP.

The land reform data was collected for every year between 1971–1998 for each village in the sample. The data concerning IRDP, minikits, employment programs and roads was collected for each village and budgets of each GP for an average of four selected years between 1978 and 1998, corresponding to one year for each elected GP administration. In most cases we collected data for the election year (so for 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993 and 1998), except when this data was unavailable in which case we chose the next available year. For

instance the IRDP program started in 1979 so we collect data for that program for 1979 instead of 1978.

We also conducted indirect household surveys of these villages for the years 1978 and 1998 based on election voter lists (except for some villages for whom the 1978 lists were not available and were replaced by the 1983 lists). Based on interviews with a number of village elders who had previously performed important posts in the local governments, we used these lists to identify the composition of demographic, land, literacy and occupational characteristics of each household in the village for 1978 and 1998. This was used to construct an estimate of the distribution of population, land distribution, literacy, occupation and caste within each village in the beginning and end year of the study period. For intervening years they were estimated via interpolation. Estimated patterns of land distribution when aggregated to the level of the district turn out to correspond closely to data concerning distribution of operational holdings from the state Agricultural Census and the National Sample Survey. Further details of the data are provided in Bardhan and Mookherjee (2003, 2004).

Our empirical specification employs a combination of cross-sectional and panel data. Cross-sectional estimates of the effect of women’s reservation can be obtained by comparing the means of any outcome variable in 1998 between reserved and unreserved GPs or villages. An alternative estimate is provided by estimating the fixed effects regression:

$$Y_{it} = \delta_i + \eta_t + \gamma R_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

where i denotes village or GP in question, t the year, Y_{it} the outcome variable of interest in village/GP i in year t , δ_i is a village or GP fixed effect, η_t is a year fixed effect, R_{it} is a dummy variable denoting whether the Pradhan’s position in the GP or village i was reserved or not in year t , and ϵ_{it} is a residual of all excluded time-varying village characteristics, allowed to be correlated across different villages or GPs within a given district.⁵ Since the reservations were chosen randomly, they are uncorrelated with the residual, and an unbiased estimate of their effect γ can be obtained from the GLS estimator applied to regression (1).

⁵Accordingly all standard errors are clustered at the district level.

The cross-sectional estimator is obtained from limiting this regression to only a single year (1998, say, for women’s reservation), and corresponds to comparing the mean of Y for 1998 across reserved and unreserved constituencies. In that case the village fixed effect is effectively absorbed into the error term of the regression, while time-varying effects do not arise. In contrast, the panel estimator washes out the village fixed effects by examining time variations within each village of Y with corresponding time variations of reservations. In this case the error term includes time-varying village effects on the outcome. The relative efficiency of the two estimators depends on the relative variance of the time-invariant and the time-varying village effects. Accordingly we report both sets of estimates. For the average effects which exclude interactions with village characteristics, we focus more on the cross-sectional estimates since they happen to be more precise. When interaction effects are incorporated we turn to the panel, owing to the need for more data points with greater number of parameters to be estimated.

3 Empirical Results

Table 1 provides a profile of the sample villages, differentiated between reserved and unreserved constituencies. The differences are statistically insignificant for most variables in the case of the women reservations, and the number of reserved GPs is exactly one third the sample size. More variables are significantly different in the case of the SC/ST reservation, but this could reflect the fact that the proportion of such Pradhan positions reserved were set equal to the demographic weight of the SC/ST group in each district. This may have induced some correlation with village characteristics related to the SC/ST demographic weight. The reserved GPs for SC/ST candidates were on average more sparsely populated, with land more unequally distributed (a smaller proportion of land in small holdings and a larger proportion in medium holdings), with less illiteracy among the poor, and fewer household heads engaged in nonagricultural occupations. Most of the SC/ST reservations pertain to 1998, so we ignore the time difference between the 1993 and 1998 data in the cross-sectional estimates of the SC/ST reservation.

Tables 2A and 2B present the results regarding targeting of IRDP credit subsidy. Pan-

chayat officials recommended certain villagers to apply for IRDP loans, and followed up their applications with the lead bank disbursing the loans. The loans contained a subsidy component, which did not have to be repaid. The remainder were loaned at below market rates of interest, and the subsidy component was estimated assuming a 50% difference from the informal interest rate. The program was intended specially for SC/ST members, those owning no or little land (under 5 acres), and women, with a higher subsidy component (50% as against 25–35% in general) for SC/ST recipients.

Table 2A shows the cross-sectional 1998 effect of women’s reservation on IRDP disbursed in 1998. The total volume of credit subsidy in reserved villages increased from Rs 13 per household to Rs 19 (at 1980 prices). The panel estimate is similar, but statistically insignificant. Within reserved villages, the targeting share of SC/ST was lowered, while that of the landless increased, but these changes were quantitatively and statistically insignificant. The overall effect was to raise the credit subsidy received by the average SC/ST household (in the cross-section by about 20%), and of the average landless household by almost 100%. So there was a significant improvement in targeting of IRDP following reservation for women, mainly through the ability of GPs with women Pradhans to secure more credit for villages under their jurisdiction.

Table 2B shows corresponding effects of Pradhan reservation for SC/ST members. There is again a comparable increase in the amount secured per household for the village as a whole, of the order of Rs 5 per household in the cross-section. The cross-section and panel show contrasting effects for the intra-village share of SC/ST households, and the effect on the share of the landless and marginal landowners is insignificant. The overall effect on the subsidy received per SC/ST household is positive and significant (over 50% increase) in the cross-section, but has an insignificant effect in the panel and on the share of the landless. Hence SC/ST-reserved Pradhans also appear to succeed in securing more IRDP resources in favor of villages under their jurisdiction, with no clear effect on intra-village targeting.

Tables 3A and 3B shows effects on the distribution of agricultural minikits. These were distributed nearly free of charge, and contained seeds of high yielding rice varieties, potatoes, mustard, sesame, vegetables, fruits and lentils, besides fertilizers and pesticides.

The scheme was administered by block offices of the state's Agriculture department, in consultation with panchayat officials. In our sample, six out of seven villages received some kits, while within villages the program was small and selective: one in every seven households in participating villages received a kit.

Here the effects of reservations on inter-GP targeting were negligible, with a mild but statistically insignificant adverse effect (of less than 2%) on intra-village targeting towards those owning less than 5 acres of land. As with the case with the IRDP program, the intra-village targeting ratios for this group were close to 100%, so there was virtually no effect on the targeting of minikits.

Tables 4A and 4B show the effects on targeting of employment programs. These included the Food for Work program in the late 1970s, replaced by the National Rural Employment Program (NREP) and Rural Labour Employment Guarantee Program (RLEGP) in the 1980s, whose objectives were to generate employment for the landless, with a preference for scheduled castes and women. The stated objective of the RLEGP was to provide at least one member of every rural landless labour household with upto a hundred days of employment in a year. The projects typically involved construction of local infrastructure, especially roads and irrigation. In 1989 these were merged into the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY). All these programs were sponsored by the central government, with matching contributions from the state government. In West Bengal significant responsibility for implementing these projects were devolved to the panchayats, in contrast to other states. The programs were coordinated by the Zilla Parishads, while detailed selection of project, organization and supervision were delegated to the GPs.

The cross-sectional and panel estimates show conflicting effects on the scale of spending of these programs in reserved Pradhan villages, and are estimated imprecisely. The panel estimates are never statistically significant, so we focus on the cross-section estimates. These show a quantitatively large (but statistically insignificant) reduction in the scale of these programs at the village levels, of over Rs 50 per household per year. The effect of women's reservations on intra-village targeting was significantly negative (quantitatively and statistically), both with respect to the amount of employment generated per rupee grants received,

and on the proportion of SC/ST beneficiaries. The number of mandays employment generated per SC/ST household fell from nearly 9 days per year to 2 days per year, which was statistically significant at the 20% level. The effect of SC/ST reservation was less adverse, though even in this case employment generated by GPs with reserved Pradhans per rupee grant received was lower. But the adverse effect on SC/ST households was avoided.

Tables 5A and 5B show effects on the allocation of these employment programs across different infrastructure areas. In line with the results of Chattopadhyay and Duflo we find that these are directed more towards water programs, with less spent on education. But most of these effects are not large nor statistically significant. The only exception is that villages with SC/ST reserved Pradhans spent significantly less on school construction.

Tables 6A and 6B show effects on road building and maintenance programs. Villages with reserved women Pradhans invested significantly less on construction of new *pucca* roads. Similar negative effects though somewhat smaller in magnitude are seen to result in SC/ST reserved Pradhan villages, as well as large negative effects on maintenance of *kuchha* roads. These results contrast with those of Chattopadhyay and Duflo's findings for Birbhum district.

Tables 7A and 7B show effects on allocation of GP budgets between different spending areas. Women Pradhan reservations were associated with a large reduction (of the order of 10%) in proportion spent on employment programs, in both the cross-sectional and panel estimates. The cross-sectional estimate shows that these GPs also allocated less to roads and education, but these changes were small. At the same time they allocated more to water and irrigation programs, but these effects were statistically insignificant. If one accepts the argument of Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) that the preferences of the landed and landless are opposed with respect to allocation of spending between road construction and irrigation, these results suggest that women Pradhan reservations worsened pro-poor targeting within villages.

Tables 8A and 8B show effects on GP incomes. The cross-section estimates show a large reduction in local revenues raised by GPs with reserved Pradhans of either variety, that are statistically significant at levels between 10 and 20%.

3.1 Effects on Farm Wage Rates

The results on the employment effects of the reservations discussed above are not definitive, owing to the imprecision of those estimates. It is therefore useful to look at evidence of impact on wage rates for agricultural labour. Lower provision of employment will reduce the demand for farm workers and therefore also market wage rates. This in turn will have implications for poverty, because wage employment is the sole source of earnings for the poorest households in the villages, i.e., those who do not own any land.

We have data on wage rates for hired farm workers from the cost of cultivation surveys on farms in these villages until the year 1996. So we cannot estimate the impact of the 1998 women Pradhan reservations. But since the SC/ST Pradhan reservations went into effect from 1993, we are able to estimate their effect. Table 10 provides results of a regression on hired labor (nominal) wage rates utilizing the village panel (from the cost of cultivation surveys) over the period 1981–96. Besides village (mouza) fixed effects, the regression controls for the distribution of landownership, the cost of living of agricultural workers, illiteracy rates, the proportion of household heads in nonagricultural occupations, the population-land ratio, and annual rainfall in the nearest center of the West Bengal Meteorological Department (both yearly rainfall and its square are included to incorporate possible nonlinearity, besides their interaction with a North Bengal district dummy).⁶ After controlling for these factors, an SC/ST reserved Pradhan in the GP lowered the wage rate by about 10% of the wage in 1996: this effect is statistically significant at the 5% level.

3.2 Interaction with Village Characteristics

The panel estimates of the effects of the reservations were statistically insignificant for most part, in contrast to the cross-sectional estimates. We now explore the possibility that these insignificant panel estimates conceal possible interactions of the effects of reservations with various village characteristics. For instance, might it be the case that reservations have a

⁶Year dummies are not included since they are highly correlated with the cost of living index. However if we include year dummies and exclude the cost of living index then the estimate of the reservation dummy is unaffected and it remains statistically significant at 10%.

favourable impact in certain kinds of villages (e.g., with low inequality), and an unfavourable impact in other (more unequal) villages, so that the overall average effect when aggregating over the different types of villages tend to vanish?

This issue is explored in Tables 10–13. In the case of women’s reservation, we interact the reservation dummy with two measures of land inequality: the proportion of landless households, and the proportion of cultivable non-*patta* land in medium or big holdings (above 5 acres). Women Pradhans elected via reservation may be less effective in villages with a stronger landed elite, in which case the interaction effect with land inequality would be negative. When we look at measures of targeting to SC/ST households, we interact reservations with the demographic weight and poverty of the SC/ST groups, specifically the proportion of SC/ST households in the village, the poverty rate among the SC/ST group (the proportion of SC/ST households that own less than 2.5 acres of land), and the relative poverty rate among SC/ST group (the ratio of the poverty rate among the SC/ST group to the poverty rate of the entire village). These measures of poverty represent greater need and vulnerability of SC/ST groups. Hence whether these interactions are positive or negative will indicate the extent whether considerations of need or relative political power of these groups predominate.

Table 10A (resp. 10B) presents the estimated panel regressions of effect of women’s (resp. SC/ST) Pradhan reservation with interactions, for the IRDP and minikits distribution. None of the estimated effects are statistically significant in the case of the minikits distribution. In the case of IRDP, Table 10A shows that the adverse impact of women’s reservation on intra-village targeting to SC/ST households is indeed significantly accentuated in villages with higher land inequality, and greater poverty among the SC/ST group. In fact the pure effect of the reservation improves the targeting, i.e., in a village where no land is owned by medium or big landowners, and where all SC/ST households own at least 2.5 acres of land, a Pradhan reserved for women significantly improves the share going to the SC/ST group. A similar effect is seen for the targeting share of the intended beneficiaries of the program (those owning less than 5 acres of land), with respect to a Pradhan reserved for a SC/ST candidate. The pure effect of the reservation improves the targeting share, if there is no poverty among the SC/ST group. This effect is almost exactly neutralized with

a 100% poverty rate among the SC/ST. When averaging across different kinds of villages, the overall effect (reported in Table 2B) thus turned out to be insignificant. With respect to both kinds of reservations, thus, greater poverty among the target group of the IRDP program caused their actual share to fall significantly.

Tables 11A and 11B show the results for the employment program. We see the same pattern again in the case of the scale of employment grants secured by a GP with Pradhan reserved for a woman, as well as the proportion of employment generated for the SC/ST group and for women. In a village with low land inequality and poverty among this group, women's reservation significantly increased the size of the employment grant for the GP as a whole, and intra-village targeting of the program to SC/ST households. Higher land inequality and poverty among the SC/ST group worsened intra-village targeting significantly, as well as the scale of the grant for the village as a whole. Corresponding effects of SC/ST reservation are however statistically insignificant.

4 Conclusion

Overall, these results suggest that Pradhan reservations for minorities had complex effects on targeting of non-public good poverty alleviation programs such as IRDP and employment. On average, they resulted in weaker ability of GPs to raise revenues locally, to attract funds from higher levels of government for employment programs, to direct village programs towards more employment-intensive activities such as road-building, and in the case of women reservations to allocate them to SC/ST households. Villages in a GP with a SC/ST reserved Pradhan experienced significantly lower agricultural wages. These effects were sensitive to the extent of inequality in land, and poverty among the SC/ST group. Minority candidates filling reserved Pradhan positions in villages with low inequality and SC/ST poverty exhibited the opposite patterns and improved targeting significantly. Greater land inequality and SC/ST poverty reversed these effects.

These targeting shortcomings have to be set against the positive effect of the reservations on targeting of the IRDP program. The pecuniary equivalents of these contrasting effects

suggest that on average the shortcomings in employment targeting outweighed the benefits of improved targeting of IRDP. Nevertheless a more comprehensive welfare evaluation will face the more challenging task of incorporating effects on the allocation of village public goods.

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TABLE 1: Village characteristics in sample villages

	Women Reservation, 1998			SC/ST Reservation, 1993-1998		
	Reserved GP	Unreserved GP	Difference	Reserved GP	Unreserved GP	Difference
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
Number of households	449.9 (72.8)	373.2 (52.6)	76.7 (76.8)	412.5 (113.5)	363.9 (42.8)	48.6 (102)
Operational land-household ratio (acre/hh)	336.0 (53.3)	348.6 (43.6)	-12.6 (51.3)	524.9 (120.1)	315.5 (35.7)	209.4 * (120.1)
% households landless	52.5 (2.1)	42.5 (6.6)	10.1 ? (6.9)	40.3 (5.6)	45.5 (4.7)	-5.2 ? (3.6)
% households marginal (0-2.5 acres)	38.8 (2.6)	45.0 (4.5)	-6.2 (5)	42.2 (3.7)	42.2 (3.3)	0.0 (3.2)
% households small (2.5-5 acres)	6.3 (1.1)	9.3 (2)	-3.0 ? (2.2)	10.7 (1.7)	8.3 (1.5)	2.4 *** (0.9)
% households medium (5-12.5 acres)	2.0 (0.4)	2.7 (0.8)	-0.7 (0.9)	4.4 (0.9)	2.4 (0.5)	2.0 *** (0.6)
% households big (+12.5 acres)	0.3 (0.1)	0.5 (0.3)	-0.2 (0.3)	0.8 (0.3)	0.4 (0.2)	0.3 (0.4)
% land small	79.3 (3.9)	78.5 (3.8)	0.7 (5.1)	66.3 (4.2)	77.6 (2.8)	-11.3 *** (3.6)
% land medium	15.3 (2.5)	15.9 (2.1)	-0.7 (2.9)	24.7 (2.5)	17.4 (1.6)	7.3 *** (2)
% land big	5.5 (1.9)	5.5 (2.1)	-0.1 (2.8)	9.0 (2.5)	4.9 (1.6)	4.0 ? (2.7)
% households SC/ST	34.6 (4)	36.6 (4.8)	-2.0 (5)	41.7 (8.2)	34.5 (3.9)	7.2 (7.9)
% poor households SC/ST	35.7 (4.2)	38.1 (4.9)	-2.4 (5.3)	44.3 (7.8)	35.8 (3.95)	8.5 (7.4)
% upto small household head illiterate	33.6 (6.6)	33.8 (3.5)	-0.2 (7.1)	42.3 (3.8)	33.5 (3.6)	8.8 ** (3.8)
% household head in nonagricultural occupation	51.8 (3.4)	43.9 (3.7)	7.9 ? (4.9)	32.9 (3.4)	46.5 (2.8)	-13.7 *** (3.5)
Population-Bank ratio	23.8 (1.2)	21.7 (0.9)	2.1 ** (0.9)	21.2 (1.2)	21.5 (0.8)	-0.3 (0.7)
Number of GPs						
1993				5	52	
1998	19	38		16	41	
Number of villages						
1993				9	80	
1998	29	60		25	64	

Note1: "Upto small" refers to either landless, marginal or small landowner; "Poor household" refers to either landless or marginal landowner.

Note 2: Clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses.

***, **, *, ?: denotes significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 20%

TABLE 2A: Effect of Women's Reservation on Credit

	FE Regression, 1978-98				Reserved GP, 1998		Unreserved GP, 1998		Difference, 1998	
	Coefficient	No. Obs	No. Groups	w-R ²	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	
Intervillage										
Credit subsidy per household, 1980 Rs / hh	5.57 (5.19)	448	85	0.16	18.91 (2.56)	14	13.34 (1.49)	30	5.57 (2.11)	**
Intravillage										
% Credit subsidy going to SC/ST	-1.15 (11.28)	448	85	0.34	96.00 (3.03)	14	100.00 (0)	30	-4.00 (3.03)	?
% Credit subsidy going to landless	4.77 (9.29)	421	82	0.04	58.20 (11.91)	13	52.68 (10.11)	26	5.51 (13.38)	
% Credit subsidy going to upto small	-0.70 (1.46)	421	82	0.18	100.00 (0)		98.56 (1.5)		1.44 (1.5)	
Total (village)										
Credit subsidy going to SC/ST per SC/ST headed household	-0.88 (15.95)	436	81	0.13	68.82 (11.56)	14	57.31 (10.33)	28	11.51 (15.54)	
Credit subsidy going to landless per landless headed household	10.07 (7.70)	? 448	85	0.11	27.63 (7.42)	14	12.07 (2.9)	30	15.56 (6.78)	**

Note 1: "Upto small" refers to either landless, marginal or small landowner.

Note 2: Clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses.

Note 3: FE Regression includes year dummies.

***, **, *, ? : denotes significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 20%

TABLE 2B: Effect of SC/ST Reservation on Credit

	FE Regression, 1978-98				Reserved GP, 1993-98		Unreserved GP, 1993-98		Difference, 1993-98	
	Coefficient	No. Obs	No. Groups	w-R ²	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	
Intervillage										
Credit subsidy per household, 1980 Rs / hh	2.9 (7.51)	448	85	0.16	22.39 (2.82)	27	17.61 (1.42)	200	4.78 (2.65)	?
Intravillage										
% Credit subsidy going to SC/ST	-17.25 (10.21)	* 448	85	0.34	63.66 (12.49)	27	52.00 (4.9)	200	11.66 (13.71)	
% Credit subsidy going to landless	9.38 (8.81)	421	82	0.05	36.38 (12.81)	26	45.76 (7.85)	184	-9.38 (11.89)	
% Credit subsidy going to upto small	2.18 (3.18)	421	82	0.18	99.51 (0.47)		97.41 (1.97)		2.11 (2.02)	
Total (village)										
Credit subsidy going to SC/ST per SC/ST headed household	-4.24 (15.55)	436	81	0.13	47.04 (10.83)	27	29.50 (3.72)	193	17.54 (10.68)	?
Credit subsidy going to landless per landless headed household	-4.96 (5.26)	448	85	0.11	16.53 (2.4)	27	18.13 (3.88)	200	-1.61 (3.19)	

Note 1: "Upto small" refers to either landless, marginal or small landowner.

Note 2: Clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses.

Note 3: FE Regression includes year dummies.

***, **, *, ? : denotes significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 20%

TABLE 3A: Effect of Women's Reservation on Minikits Allocation

	FE Regression, 1978-98				Reserved GP, 1998		Unreserved GP, 1998		Difference, 1998	
	Coefficient	No. Obs	No. Groups	w-R ²	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	
Intravillage Targeting										
Minikits going to upto small, %	1.03 (2.30)	313	85	0.18	99.17 (0.54)	24	98.35 (0.62)	51	0.82 (0.53)	?
Intervillage Targeting										
Minikits per household	0.04 (0.10)	359	89	0.05	0.14 (0.09)	27	0.08 (0.02)	58	0.06 (0.09)	

Note1: "Upto small" refers to either landless, marginal or small landowner.

Note 2: Clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses.

Note 3: FE Regression includes year dummies.

***, **, *, ? : denotes significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 20%

TABLE 3B: Effect of SC/ST Reservation on Minikits Allocation

	FE Regression, 1978-98				Reserved GP, 1993-98		Unreserved GP, 1993-98		Difference, 1993-98	
	Coefficient	No. Obs	No. Groups	w-R ²	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	
Intravillage Targeting										
Minikits going to upto small, %	-1.19 (1.38)	313	85	0.18	96.15 (1.29)	31	97.96 (0.93)	127	-1.80 (1.03)	*
Intervillage Targeting										
Minikits per household	0.07 (0.07)	359	89	0.07	0.14 (0.07)	34	0.09 (0.02)	143	0.06 (0.06)	

Note1: "Upto small" refers to either landless, marginal or small landowner.

Note 2: Clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses.

Note 3: FE Regression includes year dummies.

***, **, *, ? : denotes significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 20%

TABLE 5A: Effect of Women's Reservation on Allocation of Employment Programs - Village level

	FE Regression, 1978-98				Reserved GP, 1998		Unreserved GP, 1998		Difference, 1998
	Coefficient	No. Obs	No. Groups	w-R ²	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	No. Obs	Mean
% of employment program expenditure on:									
Irrigation	-3.64 (7.61)	355	87	0.11	7.32 (6.18)	25	15.72 (3.37)	47	-8.40 (7.59)
Water	6.78 (6.96)	355	87	0.12	17.31 (7.26)	25	10.98 (4.51)	47	6.33 (7.6)
Drinking water	1.44 (0.80)	* 355	87	0.16	0.00 (0)	25	0.00 (0)	47	0.00 (0)
Tubewell and dugwell	5.35 (6.69)	355	87	0.11	17.31 (7.26)	25	10.98 (4.51)	47	6.33 (7.6)
Roads	-11.88 (8.51)	? 355	87	0.14	50.26 (8.45)	25	55.05 (5.33)	47	-4.78 (9.35)
Education	-5.54 (5.64)	355	87	0.05	5.90 (3.58)	25	6.73 (2.68)	47	-0.83 (4.54)
Schools	-0.641 (5.54)	355	87	0.06	3.39 (2.23)	25	4.92 (2.36)	47	-1.53 (3.38)
Other	0.87 (2.42)	355	87	0.07	2.51 (2.21)	25	1.80 (1.76)	47	0.70 (2.75)

Note 1: "Other" refers to literacy and library.

Note 2: Clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses.

Note 3: FE Regression includes year dummies.

***, **, *, ? : denotes significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 20%

TABLE 5B: Effect of SC/ST Reservation on Allocation of Employment Programs - Village level

	FE Regression, 1978-98				Reserved GP, 1993-98		Unreserved GP, 1993-98		Difference, 1993-98
	Coefficient	No. Obs	No. Groups	w-R ²	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	No. Obs	Mean
% of employment program expenditure on:									
Irrigation	-1.18 (5.16)	355	87	0.11	15.05 (4.69)	28	9.73 (2.29)	139	5.32 (5.23)
Water	6.37 (7.10)	355	87	0.12	17.32 (5.85)	28	14.76 (3.49)	139	2.56 (6.51)
Drinking water	2.40 (1.65)	? 355	87	0.17	1.26 (1.27)	28	0.86 (0.41)	139	0.40 (1.4)
Tubewell and dugwell	3.97 (6.66)	355	87	0.11	16.06 (5.91)	28	13.90 (3.6)	139	2.16 (6.56)
Roads	-4.52 (10.04)	355	87	0.13	47.52 (6.71)	28	55.78 (5.38)	139	-8.26 (7.86)
Education	0.10 (3.78)	355	87	0.05	4.90 (2.85)	28	9.54 (2.24)	139	-4.64 (3.4)
Schools	-1.07 (3.55)	355	87	0.06	1.94 (1.16)	28	8.53 (2.23)	139	-6.59 (2.35)
Other	1.17 (2.07)	355	87	0.07	2.96 (2.84)	28	1.01 (0.6)	139	1.95 (2.48)

Note 1: "Other" refers to literacy and library.

Note 2: Clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses.

Note 3: FE Regression includes year dummies.

***, **, *, ? : denotes significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 20%

TABLE 4A: Effect of Women's Reservation on Employment Programs

	FE Regression, 1978-98				Reserved GP, 1998			Unreserved GP, 1998			Difference, 1998	
	Coefficient	No. Obs	No. Groups	w-R ²	Mean	se	No. Obs	Mean	se	No. Obs	Mean	se
Inter-GP												
Employment budgetary grants per household, 1980 Rs / hh	69.15 (57.38)	275	57	0.16	138.47 (46)	46.00	14	186.38 (65.24)	65.24	32	-47.91 (80.4)	80.40
Intravillage												
Mandays created / Employment budgetary grants	0.0008 (0.0315)	256	86	0.11	0.0126 (0.0029)	0.00	20	0.0098 (0.0016)	0.00	43	0.0028 (0.0035)	0.00
Mandays created / Employment program expenditure	-0.1910 (0.2021)	355	87	0.05	0.0803 (0.0084)	0.01	25	0.5997 (0.3684)	0.37	46	-0.5194 (0.3671)	0.37 ?
% SC/ST beneficiaries	-2.99 (7.28)	313	84	0.06	40.1944 (5.95)	5.50	25	54.2504 (5.95)	5.95	46	-14.0560 (7.47)	7.47 *
% Woman beneficiaries	-2.12 (3.38)	295	82	0.06	9.79 (4.11)	4.11	24	13.99 (3.78)	3.78	44	-4.20 (5.31)	5.31
Total (village)												
Mandays going to SC/ST per SC/ST headed household	6.25 (9.01)	298	80	0.06	2.18 (0.6)	0.60	25	8.93 (4.8)	4.80	44	-6.75 (4.83)	4.83 ?
Mandays going to woman per household	0.15 (0.18)	294	82	0.14	0.23 (0.15)	0.15	24	0.33 (0.11)	0.11	44	-0.10 (0.17)	0.17

Note 1: Clustered Standard errors at district level in parentheses.

Note 2: FE Regression includes year dummies

***, **, *, ? : denotes significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 20%

TABLE 4B: Effect of SC/ST Reservation on Employment Programs

	FE Regression, 1978-98				Reserved GP, 1993-98			Unreserved GP, 1993-98			Difference, 1993-98	
	Coefficient	No. Obs	No. Groups	w-R ²	Mean	se	No. Obs	Mean	se	No. Obs	Mean	se
Inter-GP												
Employment budgetary grants per household, 1980 Rs / hh	-22.40 (63.58)	275	57	0.16	175.40 (33.29)	33.29	19	252.01 (54.74)	54.74	94	-76.61 (65.61)	65.61
Intravillage												
Mandays created / Employment budgetary grants	0.0253 (0.0309)	256	86	0.11	0.0074 (0.0014)	0.001	22	0.0107 (0.0017)	0.002	115	-0.0033 (0.0022)	0.002 ?
Mandays created / Employment program expenditure	0.0176 (0.1094)	355	87	0.05	0.1310 (0.0243)	0.024	28	0.3319 (0.1706)	0.171	140	-0.2009 (0.1556)	0.156
% SC/ST beneficiaries	1.27 (3.23)	313	84	0.06	53.20 (8.15)	8.15	28	51.69 (4.85)	4.85	131	1.51 (8.08)	8.08
% Woman beneficiaries	-2.05 (2.46)	295	82	0.06	13.25 (4.12)	4.12	27	12.25 (2.71)	2.71	124	1.00 (3.34)	3.34
Total (village)												
Mandays going to SC/ST per SC/ST headed household	-8.49 (17.19)	298	80	0.06	17.58 (10.22)	10.22	27	13.79 (7.3)	7.30	127	3.79 (8.68)	8.68
Mandays going to woman per household	0.39 (0.45)	294	82	0.15	0.57 (0.33)	0.33	27	0.27 (0.08)	0.08	124	0.30 (0.3)	0.30

Note 1: Clustered Standard errors at district level in parentheses.

Note 2: FE Regression includes year dummies

***, **, *, ? : denotes significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 20%

TABLE 6A: Effect of Women's Reservation on Expenditure on Roads - Village level

	FE Regression, 1978-98				Reserved GP, 1998		Unreserved GP, 1998		Difference, 1998	
	Coefficient	No. Obs	No. Groups	w-R ²	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	
1980 Rs per household										
Pucca	27.88 (24.16)	307	84	0.02	5.69 (5.64)	24	23.043 (5.65)	53	-17.350 (6.93)	**
Maintenance	12.35 (21.72)	303	84	0.03	5.65 (5.64)	24	10.614 (5.38)	49	-4.967 (7.56)	
New	7.59 (7.55)	297	83	0.04	0.05 (0.04)	24	13.230 (4.33)	53	-13.184 (4.33)	***
Kucha	4.03 (4.56)	358	89	0.13	8.03 (2.14)	25	5.435 (1.55)	55	2.595 (2.32)	
Maintenance	1.00 (5.01)	356	89	0.07	2.80 (1.3)	25	1.153 (0.63)	51	1.642 (1.49)	
New	2.96 (2.51)	335	85	0.14	5.23 (1.5)	25	4.366 (1.23)	55	0.869 (1.4)	
Km per household										
Pucca	-0.0006 (0.0010)	297	82	0.02	0.0004 (0.0004)	24	0.0026 (0.001)	49	-0.0022 (0.0011)	*
Maintenance	0 (0.0000)	149	37	0.53	0.0004 (0.0004)	11	0.0016 (0.0008)	62	-0.0011 (0.0009)	
New	0.0003 (0.0006)	297	82	0.01	0.0000 (0)	24	0.0026 (0.002)	7	-0.0026 (0.002)	
Kucha	0.0045 (0.0089)	156	41	0.16	0.0102 (0.0039)	11	0.0048 (0.0038)	17	0.0054 (0.0063)	
Maintenance	0.0036 (0.0080)	156	41	0.11	0.0009 (0.0006)	11	0.0001 (0.0001)	15	0.0008 (0.0006)	
New	0.001 (0.0010)	144	32	0.22	0.0093 (0.0043)	11	0.0047 (0.0037)	17	0.0046 (0.0064)	

Note 1: Clustered Standard errors at district level in parentheses.

Note 2: FE Regression includes year dummies.

***, **, *, ? denotes significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 20%

TABLE 6B: Effect of SC/ST Reservation on Expenditure Roads - Village level

	FE Regression, 1978-98				Reserved GP, 1993-98		Unreserved GP, 1993-98		Difference, 1993-98	
	Coefficient	No. Obs	No. Groups	w-R ²	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	
1980 Rs per household										
Pucca	2.65 (33.57)	307	84	0.02	10.696 (7.36)	27	30.140 (16.19)	134	-19.445 (17.25)	
Maintenance	4.07 (23.83)	303	84	0.03	8.864 (6.38)	26	21.833 (13.04)	129	-12.968 (14.72)	
New	-8.86 (16.47)	297	83	0.04	1.902 (1.47)	27	9.498 (4.79)	130	-7.596 (4.01)	*
Kucha	-8.97 (11.14)	358	89	0.14	6.162 (0.99)	30	11.786 (1.9)	142	-5.624 (2.12)	***
Maintenance	-12.36 (10.14)	356	89	0.09	0.689 (0.61)	30	3.811 (1.09)	129	-3.122 (1.38)	**
New	3.27 (4.59)	335	85	0.14	5.519 (1.22)	28	8.270 (1.68)	144	-2.751 (2.02)	?
Km per household										
Pucca	-0.0007 (0.0011)	297	82	0.02	0.0006 (0.0004)	27	0.0017 (0.0008)	126	-0.0010 (0.0008)	?
Maintenance	0 (0.0000)	149	37	0.53	0.0003 (0.0002)	12	0.0013 (0.0007)	141	-0.0011 (0.0007)	?
New	-0.0006 (0.0006)	297	82	0.01	0.0008 (0.0009)	27	0.0008 (0.0008)	40	0.0001 (0.0011)	
Kucha	0.0102 (0.0072)	? 156	41	0.20	0.0128 (0.0068)	12	0.0057 (0.0014)	54	0.0071 (0.0065)	
Maintenance	0.0095 (0.0078)	156	41	0.16	0.0001 (0.0001)	12	0.0018 (0.0006)	50	-0.0017 (0.0006)	***
New	0.0004 (0.0022)	144	32	0.22	0.0127 (0.0068)	11	0.0039 (0.0011)	55	0.0088 (0.0068)	

Note 1: Clustered Standard errors at district level in parentheses.

Note 2: FE Regression includes year dummies.

***, **, *, ? denotes significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 20%

TABLE 7A: Effect of Women's Reservation on Budgetary Expenditure - GP level

	FE Regression, 1978-98				Reserved GP, 1998		Unreserved GP, 1998		Difference, 1998
	Coefficient	No. Obs	No. Groups	w-R ²	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	No. Obs	Mean
% of total expenditure on:									
Irrigation	3.43 (4.13)	274	57	0.04	5.319 (2.748)	14	1.684 (0.72)	32	3.635 (2.848)
Water	2.88 (2.74)	274	57	0.11	3.014 (2.458)	14	0.609 (0.283)	32	2.405 (2.445)
Drinking water	-0.15 (0.16)	274	57	0.05	0.004 (0.004)	14	0.003 (0.003)	32	0.000 (0.005)
Tubewell and dugwell	0.52 (0.89)	274	57	0.04	0.588 (0.451)	14	0.567 (0.287)	32	0.021 (0.454)
Well schemes	2.50 (2.76)	274	57	0.15	2.422 (2.348)	14	0.039 (0.027)	32	2.384 (2.348)
Roads	0.61 (0.94)	274	57	0.06	0.148 (0.138)	14	0.735 (0.336)	32	-0.587 (0.364)
Education	-0.86 (0.66)	? 274	57	0.07	0.479 (0.32)	14	1.489 (0.452)	32	-1.010 (0.549)
Schools	-0.09 (0.44)	274	57	0.05	0.335 (0.324)	14	0.607 (0.256)	32	-0.272 (0.43)
Other	-0.67 (0.53)	274	57	0.08	0.145 (0.106)	14	0.836 (0.429)	32	-0.691 (0.44)
Health	-0.08 (0.13)	274	57	0.07	0.118 (0.043)	14	0.234 (0.112)	32	-0.116 (0.137)
Sports	-0.07 (0.13)	274	57	0.17	0.256 (0.178)	14	0.137 (0.045)	32	0.119 (0.186)
Cultural	-0.22 (0.35)	274	57	0.09	0.070 (0.073)	14	0.052 (0.032)	32	0.018 (0.079)
Social welfare	-0.92 (1.37)	274	57	0.05	0.957 (0.844)	14	1.515 (0.656)	32	-0.558 (0.941)
Employment	-10.00 (7.66)	? 274	57	0.30	33.877 (5.639)	14	44.528 (5.304)	32	-10.651 (5.583)
Administrative and salaries	-6.91 (8.40)	274	57	0.17	27.144 (3.486)	14	29.570 (2.961)	32	-2.426 (3.505)

Note 1: Other refers to literacy, library, books, student aids
 Note 2: Clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses.
 Note 3: FE Regression includes year dummies.
 ***, **, *, ? : denotes significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 20%

TABLE 7B: Effect of SC/ST Reservation on Budgetary Expenditure - GP level

	FE Regression, 1978-98				Reserved GP, 1993-98		Unreserved GP, 1993-98		Difference, 1993-98
	Coefficient	No. Obs	No. Groups	w-R ²	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	No. Obs	Mean
% of total expenditure on:									
Irrigation	3.19 (2.44)	? 274	57	0.05	3.211 (1.401)	19	1.708 (0.609)	94	1.503 (1.529)
Water	0.33 (0.86)	274	57	0.10	0.763 (0.503)	19	1.497 (0.653)	94	-0.734 (0.623)
Drinking water	0.10 (0.09)	274	57	0.05	0.000 (0)	19	0.041 (0.038)	94	-0.041 (0.038)
Tubewell and dugwell	0.71 (0.57)	274	57	0.05	0.763 (0.503)	19	1.012 (0.533)	94	-0.249 (0.518)
Well schemes	-0.48 (0.89)	274	57	0.14	0.000 (0)	19	0.444 (0.376)	94	-0.444 (0.376)
Roads	-0.55 (1.13)	274	57	0.06	0.067 (0.055)	19	0.391 (0.182)	94	-0.324 (0.137)
Education	1.43 (1.14)	274	57	0.08	1.931 (0.933)	19	1.083 (0.342)	94	0.848 (1.007)
Schools	0.21 (0.40)	274	57	0.05	0.452 (0.307)	19	0.600 (0.356)	94	-0.148 (0.486)
Other	1.15 (1.12)	274	57	0.12	1.401 (0.84)	19	0.402 (0.131)	94	1.000 (0.894)
Health	0.10 (0.14)	274	57	0.08	0.176 (0.124)	19	0.109 (0.042)	94	0.068 (0.141)
Sports	0.07 (0.10)	274	57	0.17	0.279 (0.145)	19	0.086 (0.021)	94	0.194 (0.154)
Cultural	0.03 (0.12)	274	57	0.09	0.066 (0.054)	19	0.180 (0.119)	94	-0.114 (0.13)
Social welfare	1.88 (1.20)	? 274	57	0.06	1.682 (0.983)	19	0.478 (0.167)	94	1.204 (1.02)
Employment	0.82 (6.10)	274	57	0.30	48.952 (6.427)	19	51.575 (2.207)	94	-2.624 (5.142)
Administrative and salaries	0.43 (6.49)	274	57	0.17	29.547 (4.118)	19	30.544 (2.127)	94	-0.997 (3.851)

Note 1: Other refers to literacy, library, books, student aids
 Note 2: Clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses.
 Note 3: FE Regression includes year dummies.
 ***, **, *, ? : denotes significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 20%

TABLE 8A: Effect of Women's Reservation on Local Revenue - GP level

	FE Regression, 1978-98				Reserved GP, 1998		Unreserved GP, 1998		Difference, 1998	
	Coefficient	No. Obs	No. Groups	w-R ²	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	
1980 Rs per household										
Own revenue per household	26.39 (25.99)	277	57	0.05	45.41 (21.2)	14	85.59 (24.12)	32	-40.18 (35.25)	
Tax revenue per household	2.67 (5.20)	277	57	0.4	5.14 (0.93)	14	9.83 (3.7)	32	-4.69 (3.73)	
Non-tax revenue per household	17.69 (23.90)	277	57	0.04	30.67 (15.06)	14	71.57 (20.53)	32	-40.91 (27.58)	?
Grants revenue per household	355.7 (191.03)	* 277	57	0.05	401.97 (83.77)	14	378.94 (88.44)	32	23.03 (125.25)	

Note 1: Own revenue = Taxes + Fees + Non-tax revenue; Grants = Total income - Own revenue

Note 2: Clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses.

Note 3: FE Regression includes year dummies.

***, **, *, ?: denotes significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 20%

TABLE 8B: Effect of SC/ST Reservation on Local Revenue - GP level

	FE Regression, 1978-98				Reserved GP, 1993-98		Unreserved GP, 1993-98		Difference, 1993-98	
	Coefficient	No. Obs	No. Groups	w-R ²	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	No. Obs	Mean	
1980 Rs per household										
Own revenue per household	27.55 (52.51)	277	57	0.05	58.13 (16.74)	19	83.68 (15.81)	96	-25.55 (19.9)	?
Tax revenue per household	-2.02 (5.93)	277	57	0.4	6.58 (1.59)	19	11.88 (3.06)	96	-5.31 (3.22)	*
Non-tax revenue per household	29.51 (50.19)	277	57	0.04	46.73 (16.52)	19	67.37 (14.11)	96	-20.65 (17.59)	
Grants revenue per household	48.21 (149.79)	277	57	0.04	362.19 (65.13)	19	487.29 (104.23)	96	-125.10 (118.84)	

Note 1: Own revenue = Taxes + Fees + Non-tax revenue; Grants = Total income - Own revenue

Note 2: Clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses.

Note 3: FE Regression includes year dummies.

***, **, *, ?: denotes significance at the 1, 5, 10 and 20%

TABLE 9: FARM WAGE RATE REGRESSION AND SC/ST RESERVATION

	Nominal wage per hour
SC/ST Reserved GP Dummy (SRD)	-0.35** (0.16)
% HH Landless	-22.60* (10.77)
% HH Small	-24.65* (11.92)
% HH Medium	-11.85 (16.74)
% Upto Small Illiterate	7.33* (3.46)
Cost of Living Index	1.21*** (0.24)
% Land Small	6.59 (3.79)
% Land Big	-1.47 (7.49)
% HH SC/ST	-1.44 (8.73)
% Nonagricultural occupation	13.69*** (2.72)
Land Household Ratio	4.71** (1.64)
Land Household Ratio Squared	-6.75e-01** (2.41e-01)
Mean	2.29
Standard deviation	(1.17)
Observations, Groups	311, 77
Within R-squared	0.62

Notes: 1. "Upto small" refers to landless, marginal or small landowner. 2. Clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses. 3. Village fixed effects included. 4. Also included as regressors: rainfall, rainfall square and their interaction with North Bengal districts dummy.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

TABLE 10A: EFFECT OF WOMEN'S RESERVATION ON CREDIT AND MINIKITS, INTERACTIONS

	Credit subsidy per hh	Credit subsidy			Minikits per hh	Minikits going to upto small
		% going to SC/ST	% going to landless	% going to upto small		
Women Reserved GP Dummy (WRD)	9.84 (25.25)	7.69** (2.98)	0.08 (0.18)	0.02 (0.04)	0.60 (0.44)	-0.04 (0.06)
WRD * % Land medium and big	29.77 (23.97)	-0.77*** (0.24)	-0.18 (0.15)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.76 (0.58)	-0.00 (0.10)
WRD * % HH landless	-16.28 (43.88)	0.74 (0.63)	-0.01 (0.19)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.78 (0.52)	0.09 (0.08)
WRD * % HH SC/ST		-0.28 (0.22)				
WRD * % Poverty rate SC/ST		-7.94** (3.45)				
Mean	27.22	0.45	0.45	0.97	0.11	0.98
Standard deviation	(61.14)	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.08)
Observations, Groups	448,85	428, 79	421, 82	421, 82	359, 89	313, 85
Within R-squared	0.16	0.33	0.04	0.18	0.17	0.19

Notes: 1. "Upto small" refers to landless, marginal or small landowner. 2. Clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses. 3. FE Regressions include year dummies. 4. Poverty rate: % poor SC/ST headed households among SC/ST headed households. "Poor" refers to either landless or marginal landowner. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

TABLE 10B: EFFECT OF SC/ST RESERVATION ON CREDIT AND MINIKITS, INTERACTIONS

	Credit subsidy per hh	Credit subsidy			Minikits per hh	Minikits going to upto small
		% going to SC/ST	% going to landless	% going to upto small		
SC/ST Reserved GP Dummy (SRD)	-84.23 (137.82)	-1.18 (1.09)	-0.29 (2.06)	1.65* (0.94)	-1.07 (1.99)	-0.02 (0.35)
SRD * % HH SC/ST	-35.36 (79.85)	0.20 (0.49)	0.50 (0.74)	0.13 (0.15)	1.30 (1.55)	0.01 (0.11)
SRD * % Relative poverty rate SC/ST	34.52 (60.15)	-0.51 (0.46)	-0.51 (0.54)	-0.20 (0.13)	-1.11 (1.40)	0.01 (0.10)
SRD * % Poverty rate SC/ST	88.03 (150.07)	1.15 (1.18)	0.44 (2.22)	-1.64* (0.92)	1.11 (2.07)	0.00 (0.35)
Mean	27.22	0.45	0.45	0.97	0.11	0.98
Standard deviation	(61.14)	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.08)
Observations, Groups	448,79	428, 79	401, 76	401, 76	336, 83	291, 79
Within R-squared	0.16	0.33	0.05	0.20	0.08	0.19

Notes: 1. "Upto small" refers to landless, marginal or small landowner. 2. Clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses. 3. FE Regressions include year dummies. 4. Poverty rate: % poor SC/ST headed households among SC/ST headed households. 5. Relative poverty rate: % poor SC/ST headed households among poor headed households. "Poor" refers to either landless or marginal landowner. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

TABLE 11A: EFFECT OF WOMEN'S RESERVATION ON EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS, INTERACTIONS

	Employment grants per hh	Mandays / Employment grants	Mandays / Employment expenditure	Employment beneficiaries		Mandays going to SC/ST per SC/ST hh	Mandays going to women per hh
				% SC/ST	% Women		
Women Reserved GP Dummy (WRD)	502.04*** (158.02)	0.0299 (0.0406)	-0.1729 (0.1772)	4.0436** (1.6621)	0.0825 (0.1318)	29.25 (64.17)	0.75 (0.97)
WRD * % Land medium and big	-369.58* (208.56)	-0.0701 (0.0831)	-0.1177 (0.1203)	-0.3436 (0.3187)	-0.3255 (0.2114)	4.56 (11.55)	-3.06** (1.09)
WRD * % HH landless	-610.93** (234.67)	-0.0260 (0.0501)	0.0077 (0.0974)	-0.0496 (0.1293)	-0.0779 (0.1371)	-4.35 (9.26)	0.26 (1.84)
WRD * % HH SC/ST				-0.0860 (0.1553)		10.35 (9.06)	
WRD * % Poverty rate SC/ST				-4.0040** (1.7310)		-31.56 (66.79)	
Mean	194.89	0.024	0.26	0.51	0.12	11.43	0.41
Standard deviation	(365.92)	(0.095)	(1.46)	(0.32)	(0.14)	(45.15)	(10.94)
Observations, Groups	275, 57	256, 86	355, 87	296, 79	295, 82	296, 79	295, 82
Within R-squared	0.17	0.11	0.05	0.09	0.10	0.06	0.15

Notes: 1. "Upto small" refers to landless, marginal or small landowner. 2. Clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses. 3. FE Regressions include year dummies. 4. Poverty rate: % poor SC/ST headed households among SC/ST headed households. "Poor" refers to either landless or marginal landowner.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

TABLE 11B: EFFECT OF SC/ST RESERVATION ON EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS, INTERACTIONS

	Employment grants per hh	Mandays / Employment grants	Mandays / Employment expenditure	Employment beneficiaries		Mandays going to SC/ST per SC/ST hh	Mandays going to women per hh
				% SC/ST	% Women		
SC/ST Reserved GP Dummy (SRD)	-179.26 (105.96)	0.1576 (0.2173)	-0.5641 (2.6932)	0.6206 (1.7515)	0.3679 (0.8715)	22.8566 (22.3089)	-46.8693 (139.1555)
SRD * % HH SC/ST	-636.98 (694.33)	0.0039 (0.1922)	-3.4100 (3.0223)	0.5936 (0.4510)	0.3591 (0.4516)	-46.7705** (20.9886)	-30.4530 (128.0281)
SRD * % Relative poverty rate SC/ST	503.27 (771.98)	0.0335 (0.1606)	3.4953 (3.0133)	-0.5013 (0.4198)	-0.3010 (0.4510)	43.8325** (19.0646)	17.4161 (99.6677)
SRD * % Poverty rate SC/ST	217.32 (151.79)	-0.1458 (0.2302)	0.4953 (2.7383)	-0.6391 (1.7811)	-0.4101 (0.8792)	-22.5979 (22.3872)	55.6796 (158.5164)
Mean	194.89	0.024	0.26	0.51	0.12	11.43	0.41
Standard deviation	(365.92)	(0.095)	(1.46)	(0.32)	(0.14)	(45.15)	(10.94)
Observations, Groups	254, 53	238, 80	332, 81	296, 79	278, 77	278, 77	296, 79
Within R-squared	0.16	0.12	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.25	0.06

Notes: 1. "Upto small" refers to landless, marginal or small landowner. 2. Clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses. 3. FE Regressions include year dummies. 4. Poverty rate: % poor SC/ST headed households among SC/ST headed households. 5. Relative poverty rate: % poor SC/ST headed households among poor headed households. "Poor" refers to either landless or marginal landowner.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%