A Clientelistic Interpretation of Effects of Political Reservations in West Bengal Local Governments

Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee

September 2011
Introduction

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Contrast with Chattopadhay-Duflo (2003): cover entire rural West Bengal, rather than a single district. Examine effects on intra-village targeting of private goods.

We find significant adverse impacts of women reservations on targeting to SC-ST groups, and negative (but statistically insignificant) impacts on targeting to female-headed households. Conversely, the effect of SC reservations is significantly positive for both groups.
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Bardhan and Mokherjee () Political Clientelism and Capture September 7, 2011 2 / 26
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We shall conclude by discussing normative implications: what this implies for how government accountability ought to be assessed.
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We conducted a household survey in 2004, with a stratified random sample of 2400 households covering all of rural West Bengal, asking their household heads to identify LG programs they have benefitted from since 1978.
### TABLE 1. Sample Characteristics: Household Heads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agricultural Land Ownership</th>
<th>No. of households</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>% Male</th>
<th>Maximum education in household</th>
<th>% SC</th>
<th>% ST</th>
<th>% Agriculture Occupation</th>
<th>% Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landless</td>
<td>1214</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-1.5 acres</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5-2.5 acres</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5-5 acres</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10 acres</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 acres and above</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>2402</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>VILLAGE % HH’s REPORTING</td>
<td>INTRAVILLAGE SHARES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SC/ST</td>
<td>FEM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Benefit</td>
<td>26.92</td>
<td>41.56</td>
<td>8.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking Water</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>38.03</td>
<td>8.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and Toilet</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>50.31</td>
<td>12.38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>63.26</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPL card</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>31.83</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>9.32</td>
<td>33.82</td>
<td>9.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRDP Loans</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>52.39</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minikits</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>47.57</td>
<td>7.79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Intravillage shares: proportion of benefits reported by designated group. SC/ST: scheduled caste or tribes; FEM: female-headed households percent of village households for SC/ST: 35; for FEM: 10.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>For Women</th>
<th>For SC/ST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># GPs</td>
<td>% GPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserved Dummy</td>
<td>Intra-Village SC/ST Share</td>
<td>Intra-Village FEM Share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.109**</td>
<td>(-.043)</td>
<td>-.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>.449***</td>
<td>.086***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.018)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number observations, villages: 164,87

R-sq.: .019 .115

Notes: ***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5%, 10%
Robust standard errors clustered at GP level, in parentheses
Village and GP timeblock dummies included
Dependent variable: intra-village share of specified group in distribution of benefits
Using data from two GP administrations: 1998-03, 2003-04
Consistent with Besley, Pande and Rao (2005) for BPL targeting in South Indian villages over three states, and with our earlier work (Bardhan, Mookherjee and Parra Torrado (2010)) in WB using local government data on spending and benefits distributed until 1998.
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Unless women elected to reserved posts came from non-SC-ST households, were more opposed to SC-ST groups than their male counterparts, and indifferent to the needs of female-headed households.

Can test this: look next at effects of joint women-SC reservations (accounting for about 10%) of GPs and checking whether the adverse impact on SCs vanishes.
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### TABLE 5: JT. SC/ST-WOMEN PRADHAN RESERVATION EFFECTS ON TARGETING TO SC/ST GROUPS (TOTAL NUMBER OF BENEFITS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intra-Village SC/ST Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserved Dummy</td>
<td>-.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>.540*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number observations, villages</td>
<td>164,87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq.</td>
<td>.027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** ***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5%, 10%

Robust standard errors clustered at GP level, in parentheses

Village and GP timeblock dummies included

Dependent variable: intravillage share of SC/STs

Includes control for demographic share of SC/STs
Perhaps women elected to reserved positions were more susceptible to elite capture, resulting in adverse targeting impacts to vulnerable groups?
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Elite capture is more likely in villages with greater land inequality and poverty of vulnerable groups.
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Then we would expect to see the adverse impact to be greater in villages with higher inequality and poverty.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intra-village SC/ST share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reservation dummy</td>
<td>-1.739***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.445)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reservation*% Land Medium and Big</td>
<td>.603***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reservation*SC/ST Landlack Rate</td>
<td>1.768***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.413)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Land Medium and Big</td>
<td>-.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.404)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC/ST Landlack Rate</td>
<td>-3.624***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.928)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.961***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.880)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of observations, villages: 157,82

**Notes:** SC/ST Landlack rate denotes fraction SC/STs either landless or marginal landowners. Controls include village and GP timeblock dummies, besides % households landless, % households SC/ST and their interactions with reserved dummy. 
***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at GP level.
Extend a standard Grossman-Helpman (1996) theory of probabilistic voting with elite capture:
Theory of Clientelism-cum-Capture

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- Citizen groups $i = 1, \ldots, I$; (indivisible) private good benefits $k = 1, \ldots, n$ and a public good $g$
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- An elite group $e$ that can make campaign contributions to either party conditional on policies chosen; (parameter $h$, the sensitivity of votes to campaign finance, determines extent of capture)
With probability $z_i^p$ party $p$ can monitor how a type $i$ citizen voted and deny private benefits to those who didn’t vote for them.
Clientelism

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Voters assign weight $1 - \theta$ to personal, instrumental motive for voting, based on parties ability to discriminate in benefit distribution based on votes cast.
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Bardhan and Mokherjee ()

Political Clientelism and Capture

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- (Remaining weight $\theta$ to the standard non-instrumental motive for voting based on evaluation of parties’ policy platforms)
- Voters need to forecast likelihood of either party winning, to calculate the instrumental benefits.
- Impose some technical conditions (sufficient randomness in votes/turnout/counting errors) to avoid multiple sunspots equilibria.
Electoral Competition and Voters Payoffs

- Two parties $L, R$; each party selects for its policy platform an allocation $\{q_{ik}^p\}_{i,k}$, satisfying $q_{ik}^p \in [0, 1]$ and $\sum_i \sum_k \mu_i q_{ik}^p t_k \leq A$

- Voter payoffs are the sum of three components:

$$W_i = L_i + \theta_i N_i + (1 - \theta_i)I_i$$

where:

- $L_i$ Loyalties:

$$L_i \sim U[\epsilon_i + h(C^L - C^R) - \frac{1}{\sigma_i}, \epsilon_i + h(C^L - C^R) + \frac{1}{\sigma_i}]$$

where $C^p$ : campaign spending by party $p$, $h$ : effectiveness of campaign spending in swaying voters, $\sigma_i$ : ‘swing propensity’ of group $i$
Non-Instrumental Payoffs:

\[ N_i = \sum_k q_{ik} v_{ik} + V_i (A - \sum_j \sum_k q_{jk} t_k) \]

Instrumental Payoff: with probability \( z_i^P \), party \( p \) finds out how the voter voted, and will deny it private transfers if it comes to power subsequently. Voting for party \( L \) then yields payoff

\[ I_i = \gamma_L [V_i(g^L) + \sum_k q_{ik} v_{ik}] + (1 - \gamma_L) [V_i(g^R) + (1 - z_i^R) \sum_k q_{ik} v_{ik}] \]

if voter believes party \( L \) will win with probability \( \gamma_L \) (to be determined)
Voting

- A voter of type $i$ will vote for party $L$ if

$$
e_i + h[C^L - C^R] + \theta[V_i(g^L) + \sum_k q^L_{ik}v_{ik} - V_i(g^R) - \sum_k q^R_{ik}v_{ik}] + (1 - \theta)[\gamma_L z^L_i \sum_k q^L_{ik}v_{ik} - (1 - \gamma_L)z^R_i \sum_k q^R_{ik}v_{ik}] > 0$$

- Vote share of party $L$:

$$S_L \equiv \frac{1}{2} + \sum_i \mu_i \sigma_i \{\epsilon_i + h(C^L - C^R)\} + \sum_i \mu_i \sigma_i \{\theta[V_i(g^L) + \sum_k q^L_{ik}v_{ik} - V_i(g^R) - \sum_k q^R_{ik}v_{ik}] + (1 - \theta)[\gamma_L z^L_i \sum_k q^L_{ik}v_{ik} - (1 - \gamma_L)z^R_i \sum_k q^R_{ik}v_{ik}]\}$$
Election Outcome

- As in Grossman-Helpman (1996), probability that $L$ wins is $\phi(S_L)$ mapping from $[0, 1]$ to itself, strictly increasing, smooth function (reflects errors in voting and vote counting, besides macro swings in voter loyalties after parties have selected their platforms).
- However, owing to clientelism, vote shares depend on voters’ anticipation of the likelihood of party $L$ winning.
- Equilibrium defined by voter expectations that are fulfilled:
  \[ \gamma_L = \phi(S_L(\gamma_L; \pi^L, \pi^R)) \]
- Possibility of multiple ‘sunspots’ equilibria.
- To rule this out, assume sufficient electoral uncertainty (upper bound $\bar{\phi}'$ to slope of $\phi$):
  \[ \bar{\phi}' < [2(1 - \theta) \sum_i \mu_i \sigma_i \max_k \sum_k v_{ik}]^{-1} \]
Proposition 1: Case of No Capture

Assume the capture parameter $h$ equals zero. Then there is a unique equilibrium which is characterized as follows. The probability $\gamma_L(\pi^L, \pi^R)$ of party $L$ winning is a smooth function of policy choices $\pi^L, \pi^R$ of the two parties. The policy choice $\pi^p$ maximizes the quasi-utilitarian welfare function

$$\sum_i \sum_k \mu_i \sigma_i [\theta + (1 - \theta)z_i^p \gamma_p]q_{ik}v_{ik} + \theta \sum_i \sum_k \mu_i \sigma_i V_i(A - \sum_i \sum_k \mu_i q_{ik} t_k)$$

taking as given $\gamma_p$, the equilibrium probability of party $p$ winning.
Equilibrium policy choice induced for party $p$ maximizes

$$\sum_i \mu_i \sigma_i [\theta \sum_k q_{ik}^p v_{ik} + V_i(g^p)]$$

$$+ (1 - \theta) \hat{\gamma}_p z_i^p \sum_k q_{ik}^p v_{ik} + h\hat{\gamma}_p [\sum_k q_{ek}^p v_{ek} + V_e(g^p)]$$

\[\text{clientelism} \quad \text{capture}\]

where $\hat{\gamma}_p$ denotes the equilibrium probability of party $p$ winning
Implications

- Suppose $i$ is a specific non-elite group with regard to which party $p$ has a high clientilistic parameter $z_i^p$.
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- Contrast to capture, which induces the party to allocate goods (private or public) to the elite highly valued by them.
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- Contrast to capture, which induces the party to allocate goods (private or public) to the elite highly valued by them.
- If non-elite group is poor, while elite group is affluent, they will prefer different kinds of goods (inferior versus non-inferior goods).
- With heterogenous preferences, party will tend to allocate inferior goods to clientelistic non-elite poor groups, and non-inferior goods to elites.
A fall in capture (i.e., $h$) will reduce private transfers of non-inferior goods to the elite group, improving targeting of these goods to non-elites.
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On the other hand, they both have positive effects on public good provision (assuming elites do not value public goods).
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Clientelism reduces political competition, provided the more popular party has a superior party organization at the local level which translates into superior clientelistic ability (e.g., PRI in Mexico, Left Front in West Bengal).
Ruud (1999) provides case studies of two villages in which the dominant Left Front party developed a clientelistic relation with a particular scheduled caste (Bagdis) who were traditionally very poor.
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- Women reservations resulted in election of politically inexperienced Pradhans, who could not manage the machine as effectively in terms of directing benefits to clients — i.e., a reduction in clientelistic ability.
- Also a reduction in extent of elite capture, owing to disruption of traditional deal of party bosses with elites.
Predictions

- Women reservations will:
  - (a) reduce transfers of inferior goods to SCs

Employment programs, BPL cards, housing and toilets, drinking water taps constitute inferior goods; agricultural minikits and IRDP loans constitute non-inferior goods.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote for Left Front</th>
<th># one-time own-benefits*Left-share</th>
<th>.044</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># one-time acquaint.-benefits*Left share</td>
<td>-.038</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># recurring own-benefits*Left share</td>
<td>.403**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># recurring acquaint.-benefits*Left share</td>
<td>-.277*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP help with occupation*Left share</td>
<td>.410**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP help in emergencies*Left share</td>
<td>.284*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income improvement since 1978*Left share</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement in house type since 1978*Left share</td>
<td>.128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in #rooms since 1978*Left share</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agri. income improvement since 1978*Left share</td>
<td>.093***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.028)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of observations, villages: 1637.89

Notes: Dependent variable is based on vote cast at end of survey. Left Share denotes GP Left share at the time of receiving benefits. Controls include village dummies, agri. and other land owned, education, dummies for SC, ST, occupation, gender of head and immigrant. ***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 7: EFFECT OF FEMALE RESERVATIONS ON SC/ST SHARE OF SPECIFIC PROGRAMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reservation Dummy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reservation Dummy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reservation Dummy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reservation*% Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Big</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations,villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Controls include village and GP timeblock dummies, % Land medium and big, % households landless. ***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at GP level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Benefits</th>
<th>Drinking Water</th>
<th>Housing Toilet</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>BPL Card</th>
<th>Roads</th>
<th>IRDP Credit</th>
<th>Kits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reservation Dummy</td>
<td>-1.739*</td>
<td>-1.197</td>
<td>-5.467**</td>
<td>-4.576**</td>
<td>-1.741</td>
<td>-1.231</td>
<td>-4.417</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.445)</td>
<td>(2.478)</td>
<td>(2.399)</td>
<td>(1.878)</td>
<td>(2.191)</td>
<td>(1.026)</td>
<td>(4.962)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reservation*% Land</td>
<td>.603***</td>
<td>.343</td>
<td>.326</td>
<td>2.132**</td>
<td>1.346</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Big</td>
<td>(.181)</td>
<td>(1.020)</td>
<td>(1.452)</td>
<td>(.828)</td>
<td>(.841)</td>
<td>(.400)</td>
<td>(.100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reservation*SCST</td>
<td>1.768***</td>
<td>1.065</td>
<td>6.370**</td>
<td>4.592**</td>
<td>1.245</td>
<td>1.509</td>
<td>5.535</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlack Rate</td>
<td>(.413)</td>
<td>(2.378)</td>
<td>(2.38)</td>
<td>(2.193)</td>
<td>(1.893)</td>
<td>(1.034)</td>
<td>(4.70)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations, villages</td>
<td>157.82</td>
<td>115.73</td>
<td>72.49</td>
<td>92.63</td>
<td>100.64</td>
<td>126.74</td>
<td>65.49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq.</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Controls include village, GP timeblock dummies, % Land med/big, SC-ST lack, % households less. ***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at GP level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserved Dummy</td>
<td>-.100</td>
<td>.596</td>
<td>.403*</td>
<td>.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.105)</td>
<td>(.394)</td>
<td>(.229)</td>
<td>(.229)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserved*New GP Member</td>
<td>-.072</td>
<td>-1.091***</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.537***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.088)</td>
<td>(.383)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New GP Member</td>
<td>-.077</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.293</td>
<td>-.315**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.049)</td>
<td>(.105)</td>
<td>(.355)</td>
<td>(.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number observations, villages</td>
<td>160,87</td>
<td>116,75</td>
<td>67,51</td>
<td>111,61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** New GP Member dummy: Pradhan is GP member for first time. Last two columns run on 1998-2004 and 1978-2004 village panels respectively. Controls include village and GP timeblock dummies, % Land medium and big, % households landless and interactions of these with reserved dummy. ***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. Robust s.e.’s in parentheses, clustered at GP level.
Hypothesis: SC reserved pradhans (mostly male leaders of SC factions) have greater political experience than women elected to reserved posts, and are better informed (compared to non-reserved pradhans) about voting behavior of SC households.
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Hence the result is to increase clientelism with respect to SC groups, possibly decrease it for non-SC groups.

Implications for capture are ambiguous: no effect predicted by the model for purely opportunistic SC candidates that are equally politically experienced compared to non-reserved pradhans, otherwise a negative effect if they are less experienced.
Predicted Effects of SC Reservations

- (e) Increase transfers of inferior goods to SC groups
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- (e) Increase transfers of inferior goods to SC groups
- (f) Reduce (or leave unchanged) transfers of non-inferior goods to elites, leaving more to be distributed (resp. with no effect on transfers) to non-elite groups, including SCs and female-headed households
### TABLE 9: IMPACT OF SC RESERVATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Village Per HH # Benefits</th>
<th>SC/ST Share</th>
<th>FEM Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SC Pradhan Reservation</td>
<td>.053 (.045)</td>
<td>.092** (.042)</td>
<td>.033* (.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% HHs SC/ST</td>
<td>-.315*** (.104)</td>
<td>-.068 (.669)</td>
<td>.435 (.521)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.445*** (.046)</td>
<td>.405 (.263)</td>
<td>-.102 (.205)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of observations, Villages: 178.89
R-sq.: .24

**Notes:** Controls include village and time dummies.
***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at GP level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SC/ST HHs</th>
<th>All programs</th>
<th>Kits and IRDP</th>
<th>Inferior Goods</th>
<th>Roads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.124***</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.058*</td>
<td>.039**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.045)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td>(.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations, Villages</td>
<td>479,80</td>
<td>479,80</td>
<td>479,80</td>
<td>479,80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w-R-sq.</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEM HHs</td>
<td>.116**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.075*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.046)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
<td>.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations, Villages</td>
<td>408,68</td>
<td>408,68</td>
<td>408,68</td>
<td>408,68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w-R-sq.</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Dependent variable is per household number of benefits of specified type for specified group. Inferior Goods include drinking water, employment, housing toilets and BPL cards. Controls include village and GP timeblock dummies, % SC/ST, landless; % Land Medium and Big. ***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. Robust s.e.’s in parentheses, clustered at GP level.
Conclusion: Some Implications

- Our hypothesis based on clientelism-cum-capture is consistent with observed targeting patterns, unlike standard models of redistributive politics.

- The hypothesis implies that the effect of women reservations will be moderated over time as women Pradhans accumulate political experience.

- Normative implications of improved targeting to SCs are ambiguous: are these the result of enhanced clientelism or genuine responsiveness of local governments to the needy?

- Suggests it's not enough to use simple targeting ratios to measure government accountability.

- Need closer examination of detailed composition of benefit programs: by categories of benefits (e.g., one-time versus recurring, private versus public), whether they are excessively narrowly targeted within beneficiary groups.
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