# L11: Urbanization and Migration The Harris-Todaro Model 

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## Introduction

- Key aspect of structural transformation of developing countries: urbanization
- Rate of growth of urbanization in LDCs is far higher than in DCs
- World's largest cities are progressively in LDCs
- Readings: DR text Ch 10, Section 3


## Key Policy Issues

- urban unemployment, social unrest
- large urban informal sector: slums, unproductive workers
- urban public services: housing, sanitation, transport
- rural-urban migration:
- too little or too much?
- controlling migration flows

Table: UN Projections for Changes in Urban and Rural Populations between 2011-2050 (millions)

| Region | Urban <br> Population | Rural <br> Population |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |


| Africa | 851 | 295 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Asia | 1414 | -480 |
| Europe | 52 | -72 |
| LAAC | 178 | -24 |
| N America | 110 | -11 |
| Oceania | 14 | 4 |

Table: Annual Growth of Urban and Slum Populations, 1990-2001

| Region | Slum <br> Population | Urban <br> Population |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| SE Asia | 1.3 | 3.8 |
| West Asia | 2.7 | 3.0 |
| South Asia | 2.2 | 2.9 |
| East Asia | 2.3 | 3.4 |
| S-S Africa | 4.5 | 4.6 |
| LAAC | 1.3 | 2.2 |

Table: World's Largest Cities: Population (millions)

|  | 2011 | 2025 <br> Projected |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Tokyo | 37.2 | 38.7 |
| Delhi | 22.7 | 32.9 |
| New York | 20.4 | 23.6 |
| Mexico City | 20.4 | 24.6 |
| Shanghai | 20.2 | 28.4 |
| Sao Paulo | 19.9 | 28.8 |
| Mumbai | 19.7 | 26.6 |
| Beijing | 15.6 | 22.6 |
| Dhaka | 15.1 | 22.9 |
| Kolkata | 14.4 | 18.7 |

## Harris-Todaro Model: Backdrop

- Critique of the Lewis Model:
- unemployment is primarily in urban areas, not rural areas
- no noticeable surplus labor in rural Africa in late 60s (land abundance relative to population)
- Lack of coherent explanation of migration motives and consequences in Lewis model:
- Altruism within rural households
- Household benefits from migration


## Harris-Todaro Model: Backdrop, contd.

- Lewis model suggests the problem is too little rural-urban migration, so policy-makers should focus on increasing migration flows
- But many urban migrants do not get 'good' jobs and remain in unproductive informal sector, besides raising social tensions and straining urban facilities: maybe there is too much migration?
- If so, what can policy-makers do to reduce migration and overcrowding in urban slums?


## Harris-Todaro Model: Building Blocks

- Unemployment arises in urban areas owing to minimum wage regulations set above the market-clearing level
- Those unemployed in urban areas work in unproductive informal sector, and keep searching for good jobs
- No unemployment in rural areas, owing to land abundance, flexible labor markets with no minimum wage regulation
- Urban formal sector (minimum) wage $\bar{w}=M P_{L}^{U}$ exceeds rural wage $w_{R}=M P_{L}^{R}$


## Harris-Todaro Model: Migration as a Lottery

- Rural workers earn $w_{R}$, are attracted to the 'bright lights' of the city where they would earn $\bar{w}$ if they succeeded in getting a formal sector job
- But they are not guaranteed a formal sector job if they arrive in the city: get it with a probability $p$
- $p$ equals 1 minus the urban unemployment rate
- If they are unlucky and don't get a good job, they work in low productivity occupations in the informal sector


## Harris-Todaro Migration Equilibrium

- Migration to the city is therefore a risky proposition
- For simplicity assume:
- earnings in urban informal sector are zero
- $w_{R}$ is constant, owing to flat $M P_{L}^{R}$ schedule
- Migration equilibrium condition: rural wage $w_{R}$ equals expected wage in the city $=p * \bar{w}$


## Harris-Todaro Migration Equilibrium,

 contd.- Migration equilibrium condition determines the urban unemployment rate

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u=1-p=1-\frac{w_{R}}{\bar{w}}
$$

- This implies that without coercive controls on migration, there will always be a sizeable urban informal sector comprising unemployed people in unproductive occupations
- The size of this sector depends on the ratio of the urban minimum wage to the rural wage, and nothing else


## The Paradox of Urban Job Creation

- Suppose the government tries to address the urban unemployment problem by creating/inducing additional jobs in urban areas (e.g., public sector investment, subsidy for private industry)
- Far from reducing the number of urban unemployed, it would actually increase
- Because every new job created will attract $1+u$ migrants from rural areas
- Transport analogy: effect of new highway or bridge on traffic congestion


## Other Policy Options to Control Migration

 Flows- Lowering the urban minimum wage: violates fairness/legal norms, politically unpopular, could increase worker shirking/turnover
- Offer private employers a wage subsidy equal to $\bar{w}-w_{R}$ : enlarges number of urban unemployed, costly for government
- Raise agricultural productivity (and hence $w_{R}$ ) would be a solution, if feasible

