

# Chien-Yuan Sher

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## EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston, MA, May 2012 (expected)  
Dissertation Title: *Voting Behavior and Political Campaigns*  
Dissertation Committee: Marc Rysman, Laurent Bouton, and Daniele Paserman  
M.A., Economics, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, 2001  
B.A., Economics, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, 1998

## FIELDS OF INTEREST

Political Economy, Development Economics, and Empirical Microeconomics

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Fellow, Macroeconomics (Graduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2007, Fall 2007, Spring 2008, Spring 2009, and Spring 2010 (Evaluation: 4.6/5.0)  
Teaching Fellow, Monetary and Macroeconomics (Graduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2007  
Teaching Fellow, Mathematical Economics (Graduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2006  
Teaching Fellow, Intermediate Microeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2006 and Spring 2008  
Teaching Fellow, Intermediate Macroeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2007, Fall 2008, Spring 2009, and Fall 2009  
Teaching Fellow, Monetary and Banking, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2007

## WORKING EXPERIENCE

Executive Assistant, Ming-Cheng Trading Co., Kaohsiung, 2005  
Research Assistant for Prof. Ming-Ching Luo, Department of Economics, National Taiwan University, Taipei, 2003–2004  
Academic Division Secretary, Hsinchu Bamboo Lake Community College, Hsinchu, 2000  
Researcher, Shui-Bian Chen Presidential Campaign Headquarters, Taipei, 1999–2000

## FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

University Fellowship, Taiwanese-American Foundation, 2011  
IED Travel Grants, Boston University, 2011  
Teaching Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2006-Spring 2010  
Distinction in Ph.D. Microeconomics Qualifying Exam, Boston University, 2006  
The Best Master's Thesis Competition Academic Year 2001, sponsored by Taiwan Economic Association and received the excellent thesis of the year, 2001

## WORKING PAPERS

- “Social Interactions in Voting Behavior: Distinguishing Strategic Voting from a Bandwagon Effect,” April 2011.  
“Estimating the Effects of Campaigning between Incumbents and Challengers: Doorstep Canvassing and Telephone Canvassing,” December 2010.  
“Network Marketing in a Political Campaign: Political Machines in Taiwan,” August 2011.

## WORK IN PROGRESS

- “Social Network and Incumbency Advantage in Taiwan”  
"Strategic Voting and Voter Coordination under Single Non-Transferable Vote: Legislative Elections in Taiwan" (joint with Guillem Riambau Armet)

## REFEREE EXPERIENCE

*Public Choice*

## CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

- 2012 Second World Congress of the Public Choice Society, Miami, USA, March 2012  
Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties Conference 2011, Exeter, UK, September 2011  
26th Annual Congress of the European Economics Association and 65th European Meeting of the Econometric Society, Oslo, Norway, August 2011  
Meeting on Political Machines and the State-Business Relationships, Taipei, Taiwan, January 2000

## LANGUAGES

Native in Taiwanese and Mandarin, Fluent in English

## COMPUTER SKILLS

STATA, Gauss, MATLAB, C++, CwTEX, HTML, Microsoft Office

## OTHER

- Board Member (elected), Taiwanese Association of America, Boston Chapter, 2010-2012  
President (elected), College Forum Club, National Taiwan University, 1995-1996  
President (elected), Student Association, Kaohsiung Senior High School, 1992-1993

## CITIZENSHIP/VISA

Taiwan/F-1 VISA

## REFERENCES

### **Professor Marc Rysman**

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### **Professor Laurent Bouton**

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### **Professor Daniele Paserman**

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March 2012

### **Social Interactions in Voting Behavior: Distinguishing Strategic Voting from a Bandwagon Effect (Job Market Paper)**

Most previous empirical studies about strategic voting included the bandwagon effect with the results from strategic votes, and thus might overestimate the extent of strategic voting. This study proposes an indirect method for distinguishing the two effects by using a multinomial probit model and a data set with indexes for voters' subjective expectations. Strategic voting is motivated by the intention to affect which party wins the election in the constituency, but the bandwagon effect is driven by a desire to conform with the majority. Therefore, I infer that strategic voting occurs by voters who both believe their vote is pivotal and tend to vote for expected top two contenders; whereas those people who respond only to expected winning parties regardless of whether those vote matters may be bandwagon voters. Using data from the United Kingdom general election in 2005, this method estimates that 4.38 percent of the voters casting ballots among the three main parties in England voted using strategic voting, and that 0.88 percent of the voters casting ballots among the three main parties did not vote for their most preferred parties because of the bandwagon effect.

### **Estimating the Effects of Campaigning between Incumbents and Challengers: Doorstep Canvassing and Telephone Canvassing**

This study does an individual-level analysis of the effect of campaigning in the UK general election of 2005 by using a multinomial probit model with social interactions and a data set measuring various advertising activities. After controlling for voters' electoral forecasts, respondents' party identification and positions on political issues, local activities before the campaign, and demographic variables, I find that doorstep canvassing has a significant effect on the performance of challengers, but that done by incumbents has no significant effect on voters' behavior. The difference between incumbents and challengers implies that doorstep canvassing has only an informative effect. I also find that telephone canvassing has no significant effect on the result regardless of who does this, and that telephone canvassing is far less effective than doorstep canvassing. This may imply that the "tacit" information that can be sent only by face-to-face interaction is the key for the informative effect in canvassing.

### **Network Marketing in a Political Campaign: Political Machines in Taiwan**

This study regards political machines as companies specializing in network marketing in politician markets, and examines whether machines can mobilize the persons within voters' social networks to work for them, and whether the contact of persons within voters' social networks can affect voting behavior through either rewards, word-of-mouth (WOM) communications or both. By using data collected in Taiwan legislative election of 2008, I find that voters' ward or village heads tend to canvass for candidates from political machines. I also find that the canvassing of voters' ward or village heads has a statistically significant effect on individuals' voting behavior, and works partly through decreasing the incentive of abstention. This solicitation plays a role of WOM through at least an informative effect. This result implies that machines' capacity for collecting votes comes from not only distributing material rewards (the traditional viewpoint) but also their capacity to involve in voters' social networks.