

# Cascades and Herds

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PSE

March 11, 2024

# The 2x2x2 Model

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- Minimum elements of the model
  - What is the minimum number of states needed for a SL model ?
  - What is the minimum number of signal values in the canonical SL model?
  - What is the minimum number of possible actions?

# The 2x2x2 Model

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## ■ Minimum elements of the model

- What is the minimum number of states needed for a SL model ?
- What is the minimum number of signal values in the canonical SL model?
- What is the minimum number of possible actions?

## ■ The model

- 2 states  $\omega \in \{0, 1\}$ .
- 2 signal values  $P(s = \omega) = q \in (0, 1)$ . (symmetric binary signal, SBS)
- $x \in 0, 1$ , payoff  $U = x(\omega - c)$ ,  $c \in (0, 1)$ .

## Social learning in the 2x2x2 Model

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■  $\mu_t = P(\omega = 1|h_t), \quad \tilde{\mu}_t = P(\omega = 1|h_t, s_t).$


■ Use LR : with  $s_t = 1,$

$$\tilde{\ell}_t = \frac{\tilde{\mu}_t}{1 - \tilde{\mu}_t} = \frac{P(\omega_1|s=1)}{P(\omega_0|s=1)} = \frac{\frac{P(s=1|\omega_1)P(\omega_1)}{P(s)}}{\frac{P(s=1|\omega_0)P(\omega_0)}{P(s)}} = \ell_t \frac{P(s=1|\omega_1)}{P(s=1|\omega_0)}.$$

■ Use LLR:  $\lambda_t = \text{Log}\left(\frac{\mu_t}{1 - \mu_t}\right): \quad \tilde{\lambda}_t = \lambda_t \begin{cases} +a & \text{if } s_t = 1, \\ -a & \text{if } s_t = 0. \end{cases} \quad , \text{ with } a = \text{Log}\frac{q}{1-q}.$

■ Action  $x_t = 1$  iff  $\tilde{\lambda}_t > \gamma = \text{Log}(c/(1-c)).$

# Cascade representation



# Cascade representation

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- Convergence.
- Right and wrong cascades

# Continuum of beliefs

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- Individual beliefs (instead of signals) are distributed according to the *c.d.f.*  $F^\omega(\mu)$   
First order stochastic dominance: if  $\omega_1 > \omega_0$ ,  $F^{\omega_0}(s) > F^{\omega_1}(s)$

Observations

	$x_t = 1$	$x_t = 0$
States of Nature	$1 - F_t^{\omega_1}(\gamma)$	$F_t^{\omega_1}(\gamma)$
	$1 - F_t^{\omega_0}(\gamma)$	$F_t^{\omega_0}(\gamma)$


$$\text{with } \gamma = \text{Log}\left(\frac{c}{1-c}\right).$$

- Social learning

$$\lambda_{t+1} = \lambda_t + \nu_t, \text{ with } \nu_t = \text{Log}\left(\frac{P(x_t|\omega_1)}{P(x_t|\omega_0)}\right). \quad (1)$$

# Representation

(Replace  $\theta$  by  $\omega$ ).





# Unbounded support of private beliefs

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- There is no cascade.
- Discussion of the evolution of beliefs

# Crashes and booms

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■ Model: Two states  $\omega_0$  and  $\omega_1$ ,  $s_t = \omega + \epsilon_t$  with  $\omega$  and  $\epsilon$  Gaussian;  $x_t \in \{0, 1\}$ .

■ Belief (LLR) of agent with signal  $s$   $\lambda(s) = \lambda_t + \frac{\omega_1 - \omega_0}{\sigma_\epsilon^2} \left( s - \frac{\omega_0 + \omega_1}{2} \right)$ .

■ Cutoff for investment ( $x_t = 1$ ):  $s > s^*(\lambda_t) = \frac{\omega_0 + \omega_1}{2} - \frac{\sigma_\epsilon^2}{\omega_1 - \omega_0} \lambda_t$ .



■ Model with one agent. Discussion

■ Model with a continuum of agent in each period:  $X_t = 1 - F(s^*(\lambda_t) - \theta; \sigma_\epsilon)$ .

■ Observed aggregate activity  $Y_t = 1 - F(s^*(\lambda_t) - \theta; \sigma_\epsilon) + \eta_t$ .

# Crashes and booms with a continuum of agents

- Observed aggregate activity  $Y_t = 1 - F(s^*(\lambda_t) - \theta; \sigma_\epsilon) + \eta_t$ .
- $\lambda_{t+1} = \lambda_t + \text{Log}\left(\frac{f(x_t - (1 - F(s^*(\mu_t) - \omega_1; \sigma_\epsilon))); \sigma_\eta)}{f(x_t - (1 - F(s^*(\mu_t) - \omega_0; \sigma_\epsilon))); \sigma_\eta}\right)$ , ( $f$  density function).
- On the left,  $\eta_t \equiv 0$ .
- On the right, the evolution of the public belief is represented for random realizations  $\eta_t$ .



## Signals and private beliefs

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- 2 states  $\{\omega_0, \omega_1\}$  with equal probabilities. Private signals with distributions, cdf  $F^\omega(s)$ .
- Call  $p$  the probability of  $state_1$  for an agent with signal  $s$ . When an agent receives the signal  $s$ , by Bayes' rule, the likelihood ratio between the two states is

$$\frac{F^{\omega_1}(s)}{F^{\omega_0}(s)} = \frac{p}{1-p}. \quad (2)$$

In state  $\omega$ ,  $F^\omega$  generates a distribution of signals, for which the belief is given by the previous equation.

- The reverse applies: belief is a signal. The distribution of this signals must satisfy the previous equation.

# Cascades and bounded private beliefs

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- Previous model: **distribution of private beliefs** with cdf  $F^\omega(s)$  and density  $f^\omega(s)$ .
- Assume that  $f(s) > 0$  for  $s \in (a, b)$  with  $0 < a < b < 1$  and  $f(s) = 0$  otherwise. Private beliefs are **bounded**.
- Payoff: agent choose the state that is more likely (equivalent to  $c = 1/2$ ).
- Update:  $\frac{\tilde{\mu}}{1 - \tilde{\mu}} = \frac{\mu}{1 - \mu} \frac{s}{1 - s}$ . Invest ( $x = 1$ ) if  $s > 1 - \mu$ .
- Cascade set with investment  $a > 1 - \mu$  which is equivalent to  $\mu > 1 - a$ .
- Cascade set with no investment  $\mu < 1 - b$ .
- MCT  $\implies \mu_t \rightarrow \mu^*$ .
- The limit  $\mu^*$  cannot be in the interval  $(1 - b, 1 - a)$ .
- A cascade occurs with probability one.

# Cascades and unbounded private beliefs

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- Assumption  $f(s) > 0$  on  $(0, 1)$  (to simplify)
- Assume that  $f(s) > 0$  for  $s \in (a, b)$  with  $0 < a < b < 1$  and  $f(s) = 0$  otherwise. Private beliefs are **bounded**.
- Payoff: agent choose the state that is more likely (equivalent to  $c = 1/2$ ).
- Update:  $\tilde{\ell} = \ell \frac{s}{1-s}$ . Invest ( $x = 1$ ) if  $s > \frac{1}{1+\ell}$ .
- Cascade set with investment  $a > \frac{1}{1+\ell}$  which is equivalent to  $\mu > 1 - a$ .
- Cascade set with no investment  $\mu < 1 - b$ .
- MCT  $\implies \mu_t \rightarrow \mu^*$ .
- The limit  $\mu^*$  cannot be in the interval  $(1 - b, 1 - a)$ .