

Map for the next lectures

- Goal: taxation and the public debt
 - Textbook century/region: England and France XVIII
- For this:
 - Parliaments
 - Requires: state
- Rise of the state in Europe
 - Side view: difference between Europe and China
- Comparison with the state building in Antiquity
 - Hence, we bypass (for now), some issues in Antiquity.

2. The rise of the state in Western Europe



(9/8)

- Leap from the Roman Empire (Great intermediary period)
- Birth around the year 1000
 - Climate
- Grand view about the evolution of states in Europe
 - Competing and growing monopolies (taxation)
 - Framework for case studies on the emergence of the state and of representation in
 - England and France
 - Spain
 - Germany and Italy
- Reading: Norbert Elias (1939), *The Civilization Process* (new editions)

Leap of 1000 years


Roman Empire.

- *Mare Nostrum*: the Med. Sea is the spine of the R.E.



The European “intermediary period”

- End of the Roman Empire



The Fate of Rome: Climate, Disease, and the End of an Empire




Figure 7.2. Change in Total Solar Irradiance v. 1986 (data from Steinhilber et al. 2009)

The Medieval Climate Anomaly

by Frédéric Saltré and Corey J. A. Bradshaw, The Conversation



As this reconstructed village shows, Vikings made it as far as Newfoundland d...

This Medieval period of warming, also known as the **Medieval climate anomaly**, was associated with an unusual temperature rise roughly between 750 and 1350 AD (the European Middle Ages). The available evidence suggests that at times, some regions experienced temperatures exceeding those recorded during the period between 1960 and 1990.

Climate





Fig.3. Temperatures (°C) prevailing in central England, 50-year averages. A: year; B: high summer (July and August), and C: winter (December, January and February). Observed values

Lam, H. H. (1965). "The Early Medieval Warm Epoch and its Sequel", *Palaeogeography, Palaeoclimatology, Palaeoecology*, Elsevier, 13-37.




LEGEND

- Vineyard, usually 1-2 acres or size not known.
- ▲ Vineyard, 5-10 acres.
- Vineyard, over 10 acres.
- Denotes evidence of continuous operation for 30-100 years.
- Denotes evidence of continuous operation for over 100 years.

Fig.6. English vineyards recorded between A.D. 1000 and 1300. Sources: CAMDEN, 1586; ELLIS, 1833; SIMON, 1946; DARBY, 1952; HYAMS, 1953; ORDISH, 1953.

Estimated temperature variations for the Northern Hemisphere and central England (1000–2000 CE)



Sources: M.E. Mann et al., "Northern Hemisphere Temperatures During the Past Millennium: Inferences, Uncertainties, and Limitations," *Geophysical Research Letters*, 26:759–762 (1999); P.D. Jones et al., "High-resolution Palaeoclimatic Records for the Last Millennium: Interpretation, Integration, and Comparison with General Circulation Model Control Run Temperatures," *Holocene*, 8:477–483 (1998); H.H. Lamb, "The Early Medieval Warm Epoch and Its Sequel," *Palaeogeography, Palaeoclimatology, Palaeoecology*, 1:13–37 (1965).

The rise of the states in Europe

- References

- Elias, Norbert (1939 and later editions). *The Civilizing Process*, hereafter CP.
- Hoffman, Phil (2012). “Why Europe Conquered the Word,” *JEH*.

Why Did Europe Conquer the World?, by Philip T. Hoffman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U.P., 2015; pp. 272. £24).

In this book Philip Hoffman makes an exceptionally stimulating intervention in the long-running debate on the 'great divergence', launched (perhaps more accurately relaunched) by Kenneth Pomeranz nearly twenty years ago. Hoffman offers an intriguing new angle on why Europe was able to exert such global predominance for nearly two centuries. He first clears the ground by dismissing Europe's industrialisation or its biological advantage (in disease) as primary causes. Europe's expansion by conquest, he claims, reasonably enough, started long before its economic performance had been drastically enhanced by industrial technology. He emphasises instead Europe's war-making capacity and, in particular, its remarkable lead from early modern times in gunpowder technology and its ancillary techniques. It was this, he insists, that, more than anything else, brought Europe and its North American annexe to a pinnacle of global supremacy by 1914.



The competition view

- Europe: fragmented in many states,
 - Internal warfare and competition
- China: often one large empire
 - Ming dynasty (1368-1644)
 - External threat (north)



The bellicists' view

- Europe: fragmented in many states,
 - fighting each other:
 - New institutions to finance wars: parliaments
 - Competition between states
 - Technological progress in warfare
- China: few states, often one large empire
 - Threat only from the North
 - Strong bureaucracy with competitive examination

Europe at war

(tables from Hoffman, EHR and JEH)

TABLE 1
FREQUENCY OF WAR IN EUROPE

Period	Average Percentage of Time Principal European Powers Were at War
1550–1600	71
1600–1650	66
1650–1700	54
1700–1750	43
1750–1800	29
1800–1850	36
1850–1900	23

Note: The principal European powers are defined as France, Austria, Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Turkey, and Poland.

TABLE 2
FREQUENCY OF FOREIGN WAR IN CHINA AND EUROPE, 1500–1799

Country	Percent of Time Country is at War Against Foreign Enemies, 1500–1799
China	
All wars	56
Excluding wars against nomads	3
France	52
England/Great Britain	53
Spain	81
Austrian dominions	24

ANNUAL PER CAPITA TAXATION IN CHINA, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE, 1578 AND 1776
(in grams of silver)

		1578	1776
China	Total	6.09	8.08
China	Portion under central government control	3.56	7.03
England	Portion under central government control	10.47	180.06
France	Portion under central government control	16.65	61.11




Figure 3

Per capita revenue across Eurasia in the 1780s. See Dincecco (2017) for construction methods. Sources:

Table 1 Exit, voice, loyalty: Europe versus China

Attribute	Europe	China
Political geography	Fragmentation	Centralization
State size	Small	Large
Exit ability ^a	High	Low
Warfare	Common	Common
Conflict type	External	Internal
Threat direction ^b	Multidirectional	Unidirectional
Power balance	Favors elite	Favors ruler
Political representation	More likely	Less likely

^a“Exit ability” refers to the elite’s ability to move abroad to another polity.

^b“Threat direction” refers to the directionality of external (i.e., interstate) attack threats by military rivals.

Different military technologies in Europe and China

- Europe's internal wars
 - Cavalry is useful only occasionally
 - PH incorrect. Shift in the 14th century.
 - Infantry (Crécy, the Tercios of the Spanish army)
 - NE correct (implication for social structure)
 - From 16th century, gun powder dominates, fire arms, artillery, siege warfare
 - Naval warfare (artillery critical), but only between England/Netherlands against others
 - Efficient navy for worldwide expansion
- China's threat from the North
 - Gun powder, invented before the year 1000
 - Cavalry dominates
 - Mounted archers
 - Navy useless

Proc

Assumed factor shares							Estimated total factor productivity growth
Weapon	Initial-final dates	Skilled labour	Capital	Iron	Copper	Wood	(% per year/t-statistic)
France							
Artillery	1463-1785	0.5	0.125	0.125	0.125	0.125	0.6/16.35
Muskets	1475-1792	0.5	0.167	0.167		0.167	0.1/0.96
England							
Artillery	1382-1439	0.5		0.25		0.25	1.4/5.37
Muskets	1620-78	0.5	0.167	0.167		0.167	0.6/2.48
Pistols	1556-1706	0.5	0.167	0.167		0.167	0.8/4.08

Table 3. *Military labour productivity in the French army: rate of successful fire per infantryman, 1600–1750*

<i>Approximate date</i>	<i>Rate of successful fire per handgun (shots/minute)</i>	<i>Handguns per infantryman</i>	<i>Rate of successful fire per infantryman (shots/minute)</i>	<i>Assumptions</i>
1600 (1620 for handguns per infantryman)	0.50	0.40	0.20	1 shot per minute with matchlock; 0.50 misfire rate
1700	0.67	1.00	0.67	1 shot per minute with flintlock, 0.33 misfire rate; bayonets have led to replacement of pikemen
1750	2.00	1.00	2.00	3 shots per minute with flintlock, ramrod, and paper-cartridge; 0.33 misfire rate

Table 5. *Relative price of handguns in Europe and Asia*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Weapon</i>	<i>Price (grams silver)</i>	<i>Food</i>	<i>Price (grams silver/1,000 calories)</i>	<i>Calories/gun (England 1620–21 = 100)</i>	
							<i>Correction for using flour</i>
1619	China	Matchlock muskets	150	Rice	0.108	549	345
1630	China	'Hawk muskets'	374	Rice	0.174	852	535
1601–25	France	Matchlock muskets	86	Wheat flour	0.353	96	96
1626–50	France	Matchlock muskets	117	Wheat flour	0.471	98	98
1620–1	England	Muskets	76	Wheat flour	0.302	100	100
1819	India	Guns	54	Wheat flour	0.426	50	50
1796–1807	Britain	Guns exported to Africa	74	Wheat flour	0.861	34	34

Opium wars (1839-1842, 1856-1860)

- Imports of opium forced on China by England (and France)



Competition in Europe for monopoly of taxation

- (more details on China, with comparisons, in PH, but today's focus:
- Europe: good, but partial account in Elias
- Elias emphasizes the drive towards absolutism (and culture)
- The material support was expansion of territory, through wars:
 - Tournament model of Hoffman,
- Big exception: the Habsburg (exploiting the succession rules of the Ancient Regime)
 - *Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria nube*
- Important flaw in Elias (because of his main argument towards absolutism): Parliaments (with different evolutions)

Evolution of parliaments in Europe





Figure 4. *Activity index of parliaments in three parts of Europe, twelfth to eighteenth centuries*

Van Zanden, Jan Luiten, Eltjo Buringh and Maarten Bosker (2012).
“The rise and decline of European parliaments, 1188—1789,”
The Economic History Review, Vol. 65 (3), 835-861.

Estates Generals in France (national parliament)

- Number of meetings (time interval of 25 years)




Long Interval in the West (450-1000)

End of travel and communication in the Mediterranean sea.

- Travel by land is 30 times more expensive
- Empire of Charlemagne, more an exception (not stable)
- CP



The Normans (900-1066)



French fear diplomatic stitch-up over Bayeux Tapestry loan


Paris (AFP) – French President Emmanuel Macron's promise to loan the Bayeux Tapestry to the United Kingdom in a diplomatic gesture has caused an outcry in the French art world given the ancient fabric's fragile state.

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
The Bayeux Tapestry tells the story of the 11th century Norman conquest of England © LOIC VENANCE / AFP/File

Ba



“Textbook” feudalism

Political system



Decentralized system


- No overall state of legal structure, but
 - Rules of legitimacy
 - Strong role of the Church
- No central collection of information
- Structure is decentralized
- Hierarchy is a pyramid where each member of a layer controls only a few subordinates in the lower layer.
- In the rural setting where all the production is agricultural, the pyramid is tied to the rights and titles of ownerships over the land
- To prevent “tax competition” between districts (fiefdoms), the labor force is fixed to the land (serfdom).
- Harsh punishment for deviation
- Services to the upper layer only for “evident necessity”
 - In kind,
 - money.


- Conflicts because of
 - Merger and acquisitions through marriages (Eleanor of Aquitaine (12th century) fuel for the conflict between England and France, for centuries after)
 - Hostile takeover: William the Conqueror (1066)
- King is a lord above the others, but limited power.
 - Revenues for regular expenditures (not emergency) should come from his own **domain**.
 - Taxation within the domain like any landlord, but no money taxation of the vassals.
 - Emergency met with feudal duties
 - Emergency has to be proven: doctrine of **evident necessity**, supported by the Church: reinforcement of the *defensive* orientation of the system.

Geography


- Size is essential
- Three types
 - 1. England
 - Right size (~ a French province)
 - Takeover by William I, like a “corporate” takeover. Particular type of feudalism
 - 2. “France”
 - Large country **and** stability of the society
 - In the North, textbook feudalism
 - 3. Holy Roman Empire
 - Much too large
 - 4. Spain
 - Different: Reconquista

The construction of France






England and France Comparison

Country	England	France
Geography	moderate size base (England) to conquer adjacent states within the envelope (Wales, Scotland, island)	country is “too large” with strong semi-independent close neighbor: Burgundy
Public finance resources	good potential for taxation: type of trade, harbors	low potential for taxation
Institutions	monetization of the feudal dues	persistence of in-kind services for the feudal dues
Shocks and technology	stimulus from conquests and military innovations	old military technology, main stimulus from king ransom
Personalities	very strong kings: Edward I (1273-1307) : Wales, Scotland Edward III (1327-1277) : France	


(1138 – 1254)




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1648



Spain in 750



Spain in 1036



England

- Hostile takeover by the Normans and William the Conqueror in 1066, with barons (like a corporate board).
- William I, like after a corporate takeover:
inventory of the property: **Doomsday Book**.
- From the beginning, some control by a centralized government.
 - Barons were part of a team and did not come from long local family tradition. Tenants in chief.
 - King and nobles ruled the realm in concert. They were mutually indispensable. (Holt, p.126).
 - England was a colony.
Mainland: Anjou and Normandy. Strong link with the continent (Normandy and after the marriage Henry II - Alienor of Aquitaine, the whole western part of France).
 - England the right size and the right borders.

Magna Carta

- Context: geography
- Context: History
 - Richard I (1189-1199), absentee king. Spent little time in England. Note that the administration was efficient.
 - John (1199-1216) weakened
 - (i) numerous previous taxes (repeated aids)
 - (ii) character,
 - (iii) conquest of Normandy by the king of France, Philip II (fall of Chateau Gaillard in 1204)
 - Philip II was a strong king
 - (iv) defeat of allies (on the continent) at Bouvines (1214) (Flanders)