Economics 716: Game Theory, First Half

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1 Description

I teach the first half of the course. My part will focus on models of communication and information transmission, including cheap talk models and models with evidence or hard information. The second half will be taught by Chiara Margaria, beginning Thursday October 26. She plans to cover dynamic social learning.

2 Requirements

The requirements for my part of the course are two referee reports — short (two to three page) discussions giving a thoughtful, critical summary of a paper in the literature. These will be due Thursday September 28 and Tuesday October 24. I provide more instructions for these reports on my website.

3 Office Hours

My office hours will be Wednesdays from 2 to 3:30 and Fridays from 11:30 to 1. These office hours will begin Wednesday September 13 and end Wednesday October 25. Due to prior commitments, my office hours the first week of class will be only Friday September
8 from 11 to 1. Office hours are subject to change, with all changes announced in class. Also, of course, I will be available at other times by appointment.

4 Course Outline

I will discuss only a small portion of the papers listed below and may end up covering papers not listed here. The starred readings are the ones I’ll primarily discuss, while the others are to give you some guidance if you wish to do further reading and to give you some possibilities for referee reports. The papers are listed in alphabetical order within topics, not the order in which I will discuss them. I will let you know as we work our way through the literature which papers we will be covering a few lectures in advance. We will begin with Crawford and Sobel 1982.

4.1 Cheap Talk


4.2 Evidence, Etc.

4.2.1 Games


Dziuda, W., “Communication with Detectable Deceit,” working paper, February 2012.


### 4.2.2 Mechanism Design and Implementation


4.2.3 Costly Verification


4.3 Language


