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Two types of coordination in clause combining[☆]

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Abstract

This paper argues for a constructional approach to the analysis of coordination in English, with comparative evidence from a number of other Germanic languages. The analysis of coordination proposed here is functionally based on the notion of illocutionary force and formally reflected in the behavior of the basic clause types (declarative–imperative–interrogative) in the clauses that make up the coordinate construction. On the one hand, it is argued that this approach can help to explain why traditional syntactic criteria like clause order and word order can be used to distinguish coordinate constructions from subordinate ones, and that it can easily handle cases where one conjunction allows both coordinate and subordinate construal. On the other hand, it is argued that this approach also allows one to make a subdivision within the coordinate category depending on the presence or absence of restrictions in illocution type for the second member of the coordinate construction, and that this subdivision allows for a principled account of other features which subdivide the coordinate domain, like subject ellipsis and use in conjoining non-clausal categories.
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1. Introduction

In this paper, I will investigate the category of coordinate sentence constructions in English, with comparative evidence from a number of other Germanic languages. I will focus specifically on the relation between functional generalizations and syntactic criteria,

trying to answer the question **why** particular syntactic criteria can serve to delineate a specific functional domain. In the next section of this paper, I will investigate the category of coordination as such, and I will try to show how a functional definition in terms of illocutionary force allows one to explain why traditional criteria like word order or clause order can be used to define the category in formal terms. In the third section, I will show that, given a definition of coordination in terms of illocutionary force, it is possible to distinguish two subcategories of coordination on the basis of the range of types of illocutionary force allowed by the construction. I will further show that the subdivision proposed on the basis of this feature also correlates with other features like subject ellipsis, and use outside the domain of clause-combining constructions.

There are a number of formal criteria that have traditionally been used in the literature to distinguish coordinate structures from subordinate ones in the Germanic languages. Languages like German, Dutch, Danish and Swedish have an overt distinction in word order that has traditionally been associated with the distinction between coordinate and subordinate structures. In German and Dutch, for instance, the relevant parameter is the order of finite verb and object: main clauses have Verb–Object (VO) order, as in the Dutch structure introduced by *maar* ('but') in (1a), whereas subordinate clauses have Object–Verb (OV) order, as in the structure introduced by *hoewel* ('although') in (1b). In Danish and Swedish, subordination is marked by the position of the negative particle and certain clausal adverbs relative to the finite verb (see further in Allan et al., 1995: 490–498 on Danish, and Holmes and Hinchliffe, 1994: 507–510 on Swedish): main clauses have Verb–Adverb (VA) order, as in the Danish structure introduced by *men* ('but') in (2a), whereas subordinate clauses have Adverb–Verb (AV) order, as in the structure introduced by *skoent* ('although') in (2b).[1]

Dutch

(1a)   De   arbeiders bleven werken, maar de   directeur <u>betaalde</u> <u>hen</u> niet.
         The workers   kept   working but   the   manager   paid   them not

(1b)   Hoewel de directeur <u>hen</u> niet <u>betaalde</u>, bleven de arbeiders werken.
         Although the manager them not paid   kept   the workers   working

Danish

(2a)   Arbejderne fortsatte med at arbejde, men direktoeren <u>betalte</u> dem <u>ikke</u>
         The workers continued with to work   but the manager paid   them not

(2b)   Skoent   direktoeren <u>ikke</u> <u>betalte</u> dem, fortsatte arbejderne   med at arbejde
         Although the manager   not paid them continued the workers with to work

In English, there is no overt clause-internal marking to distinguish coordinate structures from subordinate ones. Instead, there are covert categories of coordinating and subordinating conjunctions distinguished by their ability to occur in initial position (see for instance Greenbaum, 1969: 29; Quirk et al., 1985: 921–922): clauses introduced by subordinating conjunctions can be moved into initial position, before their main clause, as shown for the

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[1] I will use the convention of underlining the forms under discussion in the example sentences. Examples taken from corpora are marked either with CB (Cobuild corpus) or IC (personal corpus of internet material).

when-clause in (3), whereas clauses introduced by coordinating conjunctions cannot be moved, as shown for the *but*-clause in (4). This criterion also correlates with the distinction in word order in the other Germanic languages: conjunctions that take subordinate word order in German or Dutch can also be preposed, whereas conjunctions that take main clause word order generally cannot. (See below in Section 2.2.2. on two apparent exceptions.)

English
(3a)   They attacked us when we got out of the train.
(3b)   When we got out of the train, they attacked us.
(4a)   We got out of the train, but they did not attack us.
(4b)   *But they did not attack us, we got out of the train.

The use of such syntactic criteria of course raises the question **what** they actually define: what is the basis of the coordinate-subordinate distinction as defined by word order and clause order? One of the functional characterizations that has been proposed in the literature is based on the notion of illocutionary force: coordinate and subordinate constructions are different in terms of illocutionary organization. (See, for instance, Bossong, 1979; Foley and Van Valin, 1984: 239–244; Hengeveld, 1998; Cristofaro, 1998.) The basic idea is that coordinate constructions are characterized by the presence of illocutionary force in both clauses in the construction, either separately or shared, whereas subordinate constructions are characterized by absence of illocutionary force in the subordinate clause. In the case of coordination, the presence of illocutionary force in both clauses reflects the 'equality' and 'independence' that has traditionally been associated with coordinate constructions: the clauses are equal and independent in that each constitutes a speech act just like independent main clauses. In the case of subordination, the absence of illocutionary force in the subordinate clause reflects its status as a discursively presupposed or backgrounded proposition relative to the main clause which does have illocutionary force. (See Verstraete, 2002: 185–194 on the functional and syntactic basis of concepts like discourse presupposition and backgrounding.)

In the next section of this paper, I will show how this functional characterization can be used to **explain** the use of traditional syntactic criteria like word order and clause order to distinguish between coordinate and subordinate constructions. More specifically, I will argue that the proposed distinction in terms of illocutionary force is formally reflected in divergent behavior of the basic syntactic markers of illocutionary force, viz. the different basic clause types, and that this formal reflection can be directly linked with the traditional syntactic criteria of word order and clause order. In section three, I will show how this approach to the coordinate–subordinate contrast also allows one to make a further distinction within the coordinate category, more specifically based on the **range** of types of illocutionary force that are available in the coordinate construction. I will argue that it is possible to distinguish between coordinate constructions where the secondary clause is restricted to a roughly assertive illocutionary force and coordinate constructions where there is no such restriction, and I will argue that this distinction is governed by the semantics of the interclausal relation. In the final section, I will show that the proposed subdivision also correlates with a number of other features, such as subject ellipsis and use of coordinators outside the domain of clause combining.

2. Functional value and formal criteria

2.1. Direct formal reflections

The distinction between coordinate and subordinate constructions in terms of illocutionary structure is formally reflected in the fact that the two construction types behave differently with respect to syntactic markers of illocutionary force, like the different basic clause types (declarative, interrogative and imperative) in the Germanic languages. Comparing the structure in (5a) with the structure in (6a), for instance, which respectively count as coordinate and subordinate on the basis of the syntactic criteria mentioned above, shows that the two structures behave differently with respect to the system of basic clause types. In the coordinate structure in (5), the *but*-clause structurally allows different clause types beyond the declarative in (5a), such as the interrogative in (5b) and the imperative in (5c). In the subordinate construction in (6), on the other hand, the *after*-clause does not allow any clause types beyond the declarative in (6a), as show by the unacceptability of the interrogative in (6b) and the imperative in (6c).

(5a)   John was imprisoned, but he didn't rob the bank.
(5b)   John was imprisoned, but did he really rob the bank?
(5c)   John was imprisoned, but don't forget that he robbed the bank!
(6a)   John was imprisoned after he robbed the bank.
(6b)   *John was imprisoned after didn't he rob the bank?
(6c)   *John was imprisoned after do keep in mind that he robbed the bank!

The divergent behavior of (5) and (6) with respect to the system of basic clause types can be interpreted as reflecting a functional difference in terms of illocutionary force. Because of the absence of a paradigmatic contrast with other basic clause types, the declarative in (6a) can be regarded as functionally different from the declarative in (5a). The declarative in (5a) functions as a marker of assertive illocutionary force, but the declarative in (6a) cannot equally be analyzed as a marker of assertive force: if the *after*-clause in (6a) were genuinely assertive, we would also expect this assertive force to be expressible with non-declarative clause types, like 'rhetorical' interrogatives (6b: *after didn't he rob the bank*) or imperatives (6c: *after do keep in mind that he robbed the bank*). Rather than marking asssertive illocutionary force, the declarative in (6a) should be analyzed as a typical instance of a switch to the unmarked option of a paradigm in contexts of neutralization, in this case neutralization of illocutionary force (comparable to the switch to the unmarked member of the paradigm in contexts of phonological neutralization, as discussed by Trubetzkoy, 1939: 77–79, 81). In the following section, I will show that this analysis in terms of neutralization is further confirmed by the word order phenomena found in contexts of subordination in German and Dutch.

2.2. Relation to traditional syntactic criteria

The divergent behaviour of coordinate and subordinate constructions with respect to the basic clause types can now be used as an explanatory principle to make the connection

between the **functional** characterization of the distinction on the basis of illocutionary force, and the traditional **formal** criteria of word order and clause order.

2.2.1. Word order

In the light of the analysis of the previous section, the formal distinction between VO and OV order in German and Dutch, and between VA and AV order in Danish and Swedish, can be regarded as overt marking for the distinction between presence and absence of a paradigm of basic clause types. What has been described as VO and VA in the literature is actually the formal feature that is **shared** by the different basic clause types in these languages: except for specific object-focus constructions (which are object-initial), imperatives, interrogatives and declaratives all have a word order of object following finite verb, and they are internally differentiated by features of the subject (like presence and position). In this sense, VO or VA word order can be regarded as a formal generalization over the paradigm of basic clause types, and consequently also a formal marker for the **presence** of a declarative–interrogative–imperative paradigm. Conversely, what has been described as OV and AV in the literature is actually a structure that is formally **outside** the paradigm, and can therefore be regarded as an overt formal marker for the **absence** of a declarative–interrogative–imperative paradigm. Indeed, structures with OV or AV word order do not allow non-declarative clause types,[2] just like the paradigm-less declaratives in English illustrated in (6a) above.

The correspondence between the English paradigm-less declarative in (6a) and OV or AV order in the other Germanic languages actually further confirms the functionally distinct status of such paradigm-less declaratives in English and their analysis in terms of neutralization: in those cases where English has a declarative that is not related to a paradigm of other basic clause types, German and Dutch generally have a clause type that is formally outside the paradigm of basic clause types. In this sense, English is also typologically different from German and Dutch as far as its behaviour in contexts of syntactic neutralization is concerned. Whereas English resolves neutralization intra-paradigmatically, by switching to a fixed unmarked option, German and Dutch resolve neutralization extra-paradigmatically, by switching to a structure that is completely outside the paradigm. Table 1 summarizes this typological distinction.

2.2.2. Clause order

The use of clause order as a criterion for subordinate status can equally be explained on the basis of the behaviour of basic clause types, because the syntactic position that is used as a criterion for testing subordinate status has a specific value with respect to precisely these basic clause types. The initial position (i.e. before the main clause) is inherently

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[2] Some causal and concessive conjunctions in German, Danish and Dutch seem to constitute exceptions to this principle, because they allow both OV/AV order and non-declarative clause types. These exceptions are only apparent, however, because the conjunctions in question are always constructionally ambiguous: they can be construed both with VO/VA and with OV/AV word order, and there is clear functional evidence that the non-declarative clause types belong with the VO/VA construction rather than with the OV/AV one. See further in Section 2.2.2 for examples and references, and more generally in Section 2.3 on the distinction between constructional and lexical accounts of coordination.

Table 1
Intra-paradigmatic and extra-paradigmatic resolution of neutralization

		Coordinate	Subordinate
Danish, German, Dutch, Swedish	*Declarative*	SVO / SVA	≠ SOV / SAV
	Interrogative	VSO / VSA	
	Imperative	(S)VO / (S)VA	
English	*Declarative*	SVO	SVO
	Interrogative	VSO	
	Imperative	(S)VO	

restricted to a declarative clause type in English, as illustrated by the unacceptability of the interrogative structure in (7b), and is inherently restricted to OV or AV order in the other Germanic languages, as illustrated by the unacceptability of VO order in the German example (8b).

English
(7a)   <u>After</u> the bombing stopped this morning, a relief convoy arrived from Jordan. (CB)
(7b)   *<u>After</u> did(n't) the bombing stop this morning, a relief convoy arrived from Jordan.

German
(8a)   <u>Während</u> er den Reflexpunkt berührt, stellt er   die entsprechende   Frage (IC)
        while   he the reflex-point touches   asks he   the corresponding   question
(8b)   *<u>Während</u> er berührt den Reflexpunkt, stellt er die entsprechende Frage
        while   he touches the reflex-point asks   he the corresponding question

   The restriction to the declarative in English and to OV and AV order in the other Germanic languages must be attributed to the initial **slot** as such rather than to any specific type of filler. This is reflected in the fact that there are a number of conjunctions that allow non-declarative clause types or VO/VA order when occurring in final position, but do not allow this in initial position. In English, for instance, the conjunctions *because* and *although* allow non-declarative clause types in final position (see Couper-Kuhlen, 1996; Verstraete, 2002: 248–252 on the specific functional value of this phenomenon), as illustrated in (9a) and (10a), but this is no longer available for the same structures in initial position, as illustrated by the unacceptability of (9b) and (10b). Similarly, the German conjunctions *weil* and *obwohl* allow both VO and OV order when occurring in final

position, with corresponding functional differentiation in terms of illocutionary structure[3] (see, for instance, Küper, 1991; Günthner, 1996, 1999), as illustrated for *weil* in (11a). But they allow only OV order in initial position, as illustrated by the unacceptability of (11b). Such cases clearly show that the feature of absence of illocutionary force should be attributed to the initial position as such rather than to any specific conjunction.

English

(9a)   Johnny Depp was very good, <u>although</u> why did he have to have an Irish accent? (IC)

(9b)   *<u>Although</u> why did he have to have an Irish accent, Johnny Depp was very good.

(10a)   I think that this might be an error, however, <u>because</u> didn't he give up playing the organ altogether in his late twenties, due to problems with his arms and shoulders? (IC)

(10b)   *<u>Because</u> didn't he give up playing the organ altogether, I think that this might be an error.

German

(11a)   Das muss der Böse   sein, <u>weil</u>   er hat so   einen unglaublich
        that must the evil-one be   because he has such a   incredibly
        bösartigen Namen (IC)
        vicious   name

(11b)   *<u>Weil</u>   er hat so   einen unglaublich bösartigen Namen, muss   das der
        because he has such a   incredibly   vicious   name   must   that the
        Böse   sein
        evil-one   be

   The association between initial position and absence of illocutionary force explains why this position can be used as a criterion to test subordinate status. Given that the initial position is inherently characterized by absence of illocutionary force, checking whether a specific type of secondary clause can be moved into this position actually tests its potential for being construed with the feature of absence of illocutionary force.

2.3. Conclusion

   In conclusion, the behaviour of coordinate and subordinate clauses with respect to the basic clause types can be regarded as the explanatory principle that is needed to link the functional definition of the coordinate–subordinate distinction in terms of illocutionary force with its syntactic definition on the basis of the criteria of word order and clause order.

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[3] Availability of coordinate and subordinate construal, with corresponding functional differentiation, seems to be a more general tendency for certain causal and concessive conjunctions in several Germanic and Romance languages. Compare, for instance, Steensig (1998) on Danish *fordi* ('because'), Groupe λ-l (1975) on French *parce que*, and Goethals (2002) on Spanish *porque*. A referee has pointed out that for other cases with multiple construal, like German relative clauses with VO/OV variation, the formal distinction would be more difficult to relate to a functional distinction in terms of illocutionary force. There is evidence, however, that relatives with VO word order are also functionally distinct from their OV counterparts, for instance in that they cannot be fully backgrounded, and that this functional difference justifies positing some kind of illocutionary operator for this type of relative (as argued in Gärtner, 2001).

Table 2
Functional generalizations and syntactic criteria for coordination-subordination

Function	Form		
	Paradigm clause types	Initial position	Word order
+ Ill Force	+	−	VO/VA
− Ill Force	−	+	OV/AV

On the one hand, given that the basic clause types serve as the basic encoders of illocutionary force, the divergent behaviour of constructions with respect to these clause types can be regarded as a direct formal reflection of a divergent status with respect to illocutionary force: coordinate structures, which allow the full paradigm of basic clause types, are characterized by presence of illocutionary force, whereas subordinate structures, which are paradigmatically restricted to the declarative, are characterized by neutralization of the paradigm and absence of illocutionary force. On the other hand, the basic clause types can also be directly linked to the criteria of word order and clause order. The distinction between VO/VA and OV/AV word order is an overt formal marker of paradigmatic presence versus absence of basic clause types: VO and VA are simply formal generalizations over the declarative–interrogative–imperative paradigm, and OV and AV are structures that are formally outside this paradigm. Similarly, clause order is a covert criterion for paradigmatic absence of basic clause types, because the initial position is inherently characterized by paradigmatic restriction to the declarative in English, and by OV and AV word order in the other Germanic languages. Table 2 summarizes these correlations.

To round off this section of the paper, it is important to note that the analysis of the distinction between coordination and subordination presented here is primarily **constructional** rather than lexical; that is, it relies on internal properties of the clauses that make up the complex sentence construction rather than on specific conjunctions. One advantage of this constructional approach is that it can also incorporate cases where a single conjunction allows both coordinate and subordinate construal. Two cases of such multiple construal have already been discussed in the previous section: *because* and *although*, as well as their German counterparts *weil* and *obwohl*, illustrated in (9)–(11) above, allow both coordinate and subordinate construal, with corresponding functional differentiation. More surprisingly perhaps, a similar case of multiple construal can also be found with the most typical coordinate conjunction *and*,[4] as illustrated in example (12) below.

(12)   Do that again and I'll break your neck. (IC)

As is well-known from previous descriptions (Bolinger, 1968, 1977; Culicover and Jackendoff, 1997), this type of *and*-construction is semantically distinct from its more typical counterparts in that it has a conditional rather than an additive interpretation. Interestingly, this type is also constructionally distinct from other *and*-constructions: the

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[4] I am grateful to a referee for pointing this out to me.

conditional interpretation in (12) crucially relies on the status of the first clause with respect to the system of basic clause types that encode illocutionary force. The first clause in (12) cannot be turned into an interrogative without losing the conditional interpretation, as illustrated in (13), and in spite of its surface form the structure cannot be analyzed as an imperative or a declarative either. In spite of its optional subject, the first clause in (12) cannot be described as imperative: semantically, the speaker in (12) does not want the interlocutor to 'do that again', and this is also formally reflected in the fact that the structure allows a number of features which are excluded for genuine imperatives, such as predicates with a [− control] feature, as in (14a), and subjects that are not second or non-specific third person, as in (14b) (Bolinger, 1968, 1977; Bolkestein, 1980: 38–40).[5] On the other hand, the first clause in structures like (12) and (14) equally lacks a number of features of genuine declaratives. Semantically, the speaker in (12) does not take any position with respect to the actual occurrence of 'doing that again' but merely presents it as a hypothetical state of affairs that should be considered in terms of its potential consequences. The absence of speaker-positioning is formally reflected, for instance, in the fact that the tense of the first clause must be a non-specific present tense in order to retain the conditional interpretation: any deviation, like a past tense as in (15), shifts the interpretation from a conditional to a consequential one; see Culicover and Jackendoff (1997: 198) on this restriction. These features show how the conditional interpretation of *and*-constructions crucially relies on the status of its first clause with respect to illocutionary force: it must be a 'bare' State of Affairs that is semantically and structurally outside the system of basic clause types that encodes illocution.

(13)   *Will you do that again and I'll break your neck.

(14a)   Be sick and they put you to bed. (Bolinger, 1968: 345)
(14b)   Macy's advertises a sale and the whole town goes crazy. (Bolinger, 1968: 340)

(15)   Macy's advertised a sale yesterday and the whole town went crazy.

Thus, the functionally non-coordinate nature of conditional *and*-constructions like (12) is again reflected in constructional features that relate to restrictions on illocutionary force in the complex sentence construction. This construction is, of course, not entirely parallel to the subordinate constructions examined in the previous sections, but the fact that the restrictions as such can again be stated in terms of the basic clause types does show the value of a constructional definition of coordination–subordination in terms of illocutionary structure.

3. Subdividing the category of coordinate constructions

For English, the analysis presented in the previous section yields a set of conjunctions that consists of *or*, *but* and *for*, which are exclusively associated with coordinate construal,

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[5] In this respect, it is instructive to compare this construction with its *or*-counterpart (*Give me the money or I'll kill you*), in which the first clause is a genuine imperative and accordingly does not allow these features.

and *and*, *although* and *because*,[6] which allow both coordinate and subordinate construal. In coordinate construal, all of these conjunctions are characterized by the feature of presence of illocutionary force, which distinguishes them as a group from their subordinate counterparts. Within the category of coordinate constructions, however, it is still possible to make a further subdivision on the basis of the **range** of **types** of illocutionary force that are available following each conjunction. In this section, I will argue that the coordinate category can be subdivided depending on whether the coordinate clause is restricted to a roughly assertive illocutionary force, or whether it allows different types of illocutionary force.

3.1. Types of illocutionary force

On the basis of the discussion in the previous section, the construction with *or* in (16a) below and the construction with *for* in (17a) below can both be regarded as coordinate: they both allow different basic clause types beyond the declarative, as illustrated with the interrogative structures in (16b) and (17b), which reflects that they have their own illocutionary force and are therefore to be distinguished from subordinate constructions.

(16a)   Well, you might have caretakers. It might be Americans or they might be perhaps locals that were trained to take care of the equipment. (CB)

(16b)   But with your mother's mother and father when they got older did they still live on their own or did they live with the children? (CB)

(17a)   In fact they were the alternative to privatization, for they were geared to making more efficient those bits of government which had been considered for sale but found to be worth keeping in-house. (CB)

(17b)   The balloon, inflated, is being tugged along by a mule. The wind blows more strongly; the mule rises from the ground; and balloon and mule float off, never to be seen again. The story would seem hyperbole, for who would be crazy enough to tether a balloon to a mule? Boyce would, of course. (CB)

The two constructions are different, however, in terms of the **types** of illocutionary force that they allow. The *for*-clause in (17) is restricted to a roughly assertive force: this is reflected in the fact that non-declarative clause types invariably receive 'rhetorical' or at least speaker-biased interpretations when occurring in a *for*-clause (see also Lakoff, 1984). Thus, for instance, the interrogative *who would be crazy enough to tether a balloon to a mule* in (17b) is not interpreted as a genuine information question, but rather as a rhetorical question conveying the speaker's opinion that 'only Boyce would be crazy enough to tether a balloon to a mule'. The *or*-clause in (16), on the other hand, does not impose any

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[6] On the basis of the criterion of clause order, the conjunction *so that* (in its resultative sense) should also be included here, because it cannot be moved into initial position. There is typological evidence, however, to assume that the fixed final position of resultative *so that* is not caused by an impossibility to be construed with the feature of absence of illocutionary force (note that *so that* actually never allows non-declarative clause types), but rather by a strong iconicity factor (see Diessel, 2001: 443–446 for the typological evidence, and Verstraete, 2002: 252–255 for further explanation).

restrictions on the illocutionary force of the clause it introduces: this is reflected in the fact that it does not require speaker-biased or rhetorical interpretations for non-declarative clause types but also allows 'straight' interpretations. Thus, for instance, the interrogative in (16b) is interpreted as a neutral information question about where the interlocutor's parents lived, and is not biased towards any type of assertion.

The distinction between (16) and (17) shows that there are different subcategories of coordinate constructions. Coordinating conjunctions like *for* in (17) impose specific restrictions on the type of illocutionary force for the clause they introduce, as reflected in the fact that they impose rhetorical interpretations on non-declarative clause types, whereas coordinating conjunctions like *or* in (16) do not impose such restrictions, as shown by the fact that they also allow non-rhetorical interpretations for non-declarative clause types.

Exploring the set of coordinating conjunctions listed above shows that this distinction is actually a more general one: *and* belongs with the *or*-category, and the coordinate uses of *because* and *although* belong with the *for*-category. Like *or*, *and* does not inherently impose any restrictions in interpretation on non-declarative clause types, as reflected in the fact that it allows interrogative structures functioning as genuine information questions, as in (18a) below, as well as imperative structures functioning as genuine orders, as in (18b) below. Similarly, the *for*-category can be further extended with *because* and *although*: like *for*, coordinate *because* and *although* impose rhetorical interpretations on non-declarative clause types. This is illustrated with the rhetorical imperative in the *because*-clause in (19) below, which is meant to convey that 'our expenses are very high', and the rhetorical interrogative in the *although*-clause in (20) below, which is meant to convey the speaker's opinion that 'nobody could have foreseen they would use it like that'.

(18a)   What's a "Nikolai", and why are they called that? (CB)
(18b)   Warren I love you. Ah? You can come over tonight, and don't forget the condoms. (COLT)
(19)   I only made US$ 6000 in the whole year, and even like the next two years, I was just like getting by, because don't forget that our expenses are very high. (IC)
(20)   I shouldn't have left that coathanger lying around, although who would have thought they would use it like that? (IC)

In conclusion, we can say that an investigation of the types of illocutionary force licensed by the different coordinating conjunctions allows for a subdivision of the category depending on whether there is an inherent restriction to a roughly assertive force or not. On a more abstract level, the distinction between these two categories can be interpreted in terms of a distinction between inherently asymmetrical and potentially symmetrical structures.[7] Given that *for*-, *because*- and *although*-clauses are restricted to assertive

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[7] It is important to note that this use of the terms 'symmetrical' and 'asymmetrical' coordination only refers to the illocutionary structure of the construction, and should not be confused with the distinction between 'balanced' and 'unbalanced' coordination as described, for instance, in Johannessen (1998).

Table 3
Symmetry and asymmetry in coordinate constructions

Illocution main clause	Conjunction	Illocution secondary clause
Free	*for*, *because*, *although*	Assertive
Free	*and*, *or*	Free

illocutionary force, the constructions in which they occur are inherently asymmetrical as far as illocutionary structure is concerned: the speech act in the main clause has no inherent restrictions, whereas the speech act in the secondary clause is invariably assertive. Conversely, given that there is no such restriction on *and*- and *or*-clauses, the constructions in which these clauses occur are symmetrical as far as illocutionary structure is concerned, because neither clause in the construction is inherently restricted to one specific type of illocutionary force. Table 3 summarizes this distinction.

3.2. Relation to interclausal semantics

The distinction in illocutionary potential between the asymmetrical category and the symmetrical category in the previous section is of course not unmotivated. If we look at the semantics of the conjunctions in the two categories, it is obvious that the conjunctions in the asymmetrical category share a specific semantic feature of 'argumentation', which is not present in the conjunctions in the symmetrical category. In the asymmetrical category, the speech act in the secondary clause is used by the speaker as an argument in favor of (as with *for* and *because*) or against (as with *although*) the main clause, and this explains the existence of the restriction to assertive illocutionary force observed in the previous section. A speaker can only use a secondary clause to argue in favor of or against some aspect of the main clause if that secondary clause expresses an assertion to which the speaker him/ herself is committed. This is why non-declarative clause types invariably receive rhetorical or speaker-biased interpretations in argumentative contexts. Interrogative structures typically do not express an assertion by the speaker, but rather a request to the interlocutor for an answer, and imperatives typically express a request to the interlocutor to take a particular course of action. Neither of these specifications is compatible with the basic argumentative feature in the interclausal relations marked with *because*, *for* and *although*: a speaker cannot use a question or an order as an argument, unless the question is oriented towards a particular answer, or unless the deontic character of the order is backgrounded relative to the proposition it contains. This explains why argumentative conjunctions impose rhetorical interpretations on non-declarative clause types: rhetorical interrogatives, like (17b) and (20) above, express a certain bias by the speaker towards a specific reply, and rhetorical imperatives like (19) above downplay the deontic feature of ordering in favor of the proposition described in the *that*-clause. In both cases, the rhetorical interpretation is what makes the non-declarative structure compatible with an argumentative interclausal relation, which requires a roughly assertive force in the secondary clause.

The proposed connection between the illocutionary restriction observed in the previous section and the argumentative meaning of the conjunctions that impose the restriction,

is actually confirmed by one conjunction that was not dealt with in the preceding section, viz. *but*. This conjunction allows both an argumentative reading and a non-argumentative one: given this ambiguity, it is significant that the argumentative reading can be shown to correlate with a restriction to a roughly assertive force, whereas the non-argumentative reading does not impose any illocutionary restrictions.

The relevant semantic features for the semantic ambiguity of *but* have been described by Anscombre and Ducrot (1977) for French, and applied to English by König (1985: 5–7): *but* can either be used in a purely contrastive sense or in a counter-argumentative sense. In the counter-argumentative sense, main clause and *but*-clause serve as counter-arguments relative to some conclusion: in (21), for instance, the main clause presents high costs as an argument against renting a flat on one's own, and the *but*-clause presents the privacy this provides as a stronger argument in favor of renting a flat alone. In the contrastive sense, on the other hand, no counter-argumentative relation is involved, but main clause and secondary clause are simply construed as being in contrast, as in (22) below.

(21)   Gonzalves, a freelance hair and make-up artist, has been renting a one-bedroomed flat in south London for a year, having shared with another person previously. ''It's a bit more expensive <u>but</u> there are so many benefits, like having your own space, being able to see people when you choose basically just being in charge of your life.'' (CB)

(22)   More than 250 British citizens from Kuwait were also evacuated today. They had traveled overland from Kuwait to Iraq in a convoy, <u>but</u> other foreigners trapped in Iraq and Kuwait haven't been so lucky. (CB)

Significantly, the distinction between counter-argumentative and purely contrastive meaning of the relation marked by *but* can be shown to correlate with the parameter of assertive versus free illocutionary force. The argumentative semantics of the counter-argumentative use is reflected in the restricted illocutionary potential of the *but*-clause: the interrogative *but*-clause in (23) below, for instance, is necessarily interpreted as a rhetorical question (conveying the speaker's conviction that 'this does not mean that studies of NSMs can have no bearing on religion') because the speaker uses it as a counter-argument to the argument that studies on NSMs are not relevant to religion. With the purely contrastive use of *but*, on the other hand, there is no such restriction, as shown by the fact that non-declarative clauses like the interrogative in (24) can still be interpreted as neutral information questions.[8]

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[8] A similar case of argumentative versus non-argumentative ambiguity may in fact be arising for *although*, which, in addition to its basic concessive (counter-argumentative) sense, also seems to be developing a non-argumentative sense that could be described as 'corrective', in which the speaker uses the *although*-clause to correct or re-assess a previous utterance. Again, this non-argumentative use allows genuine non-rhetorical interpretations for interrogative and imperative structures, as illustrated for the imperative by an example like *Apart from all of that, your dream has most likely occurred because you recently had a new hairstyle. I wouldn't worry too much about it, although do prepare for words with this enemy.* (CB). Thanks to Michael Hegarty (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.

(23)   Certainly, most theorists of NSMs reject notions of transcendence and other-worldliness as sources of motivation, solidarity and integration in late-capitalist society. <u>But</u> does this mean that studies of NSMs can have no bearing on religion? (CB)

(24)   (All three women start talking at the same time, then crying.) Palmer: I know why I'm crying, <u>but</u> why are you guys so sad? A. Ziff: Because I sold my cello to get Bitzi her stupid drumsticks. Palmer: Oh, no. (CB)

3.3. Conclusion

In conclusion, the analysis in the preceding sections has shown that it is necessary to further subdivide the category of coordinate constructions on the basis of the range of illocution types they allow. All coordinate clauses have illocutionary force, which distinguishes them from their subordinate counterparts, but not all of them allow the same range of illocutionary force types. Coordinate clauses introduced by conjunctions which have a semantic feature of argumentation (*for*, *because* and *although*) are restricted to a roughly assertive force, as reflected in the fact that they impose rhetorical interpretations on non-declarative clause types. Coordinate clauses introduced by conjunctions that do not have any specific argumentative feature (like *and* and *or*), do not impose any restriction on the type of illocutionary force, as reflected in the fact that they allow straight interpretations for non-declarative clause types. The correlation between argumentative semantics and illocutionary restriction is confirmed by conjunctions like *but*, which can have either argumentative or non-argumentative interpretations, and accordingly also impose illocutionary restrictions or not. Table 4 summarizes these results.

4. Further implications

If we look at the subdivision proposed in the previous section, it is probably not a coincidence that the symmetrical coordinators *and*, *or* and *but* are the elements that have traditionally been regarded as the prototypical members of the category, and that have

Table 4
Subdivision of the coordinate category

		Illocutionary force	Type	Conjunctions
Subordination		Absence	/////////	/////////
Coordination	Asymmetrical	Presence	(Roughly) assertive	*for, because, although, but*
	Symmetrical		Free	*and, or, but*

received most attention in neighboring domains like philosophical logic. Similarly, it is probably not a coincidence that the inherently asymmetrical coordinator *for*, as well as the coordinate uses of *because* and *although*, have traditionally been regarded as more problematic members of the category, because they lack the semantic symmetry associated with the prototypical coordinators and/or because of the presence of (historically prior) subordinate uses in addition to the coordinate ones. In this sense, the analysis in terms of illocutionary symmetry versus asymmetry proposed in the previous section can provide a principled motivation for the traditional intuitive subdivision of the coordinate category.

The validity of the distinction between symmetrical and asymmetrical coordination is actually further confirmed by the fact that the two categories of coordinators are also set apart by a number of other features. Thus, for instance, *and*, *or* and *but* are not only distinct from *for*, *because* and *although* in terms of illocutionary force, but they are also the only coordinate conjunctions that can occur in other domains than complex sentence constructions, for instance between NPs and even within NPs, as in (25) below. Similarly, *and*, *or* and *but* are also set apart from *for*, *because* and *although* in that they are the only coordinate conjunctions that allow subject ellipsis, as illustrated for *and* in (26) below and for *but* in (27) below.

(25)   It's a warm, whimsical <u>but</u> slightly sad tale. (CB)
(26)   Eva came in <u>and</u> looked anxiously at him. (CB)
(27)   Her husband was conscious <u>but</u> didn't know what was going on. (CB)

It might even be speculated that these additional features can also be linked back to the semantic motivation proposed in the previous section. The restriction of *for*, *because* and *although* to complex sentence constructions, for instance, could be related to their argumentative meaning, in that argumentative relations typically operate between propositions and can therefore not be extended to non-propositional contexts like NPs. Similarly, the restrictions on subject ellipsis can probably be linked to the distinction between symmetrical and asymmetrical organization of the coordinate construction, in that ellipsis can only operate in symmetrical contexts and is therefore excluded from constructions that are inherently asymmetrical like the constructions with *for*, *because* and *although*.

To conclude, we can say that the analysis in this paper has provided a rationale both for including conjunctions like *and*, *or*, *but*, *for*, *because* and *although* in a single category of coordination, and for dividing this category into two subcategories, one consisting of *and*, *or* and contrastive *but*, the other consisting of *for*, *because*, *although* and counter-argumentative *but*. The inclusion in a single coordinate category is based on the feature of presence of illocutionary force, formally reflected in the paradigmatic presence of basic clause types that distinguishes these conjunctions from their subordinate counterparts. The division into two subcategories is based on the range of types of illocutionary force available, reflected in the restriction on the second subcategory to rhetorical interpretations for non-declarative clause types, and indirectly confirmed by the possibility of subject ellipsis and usability in non-clausal domains.

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