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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2009 (expected)
Dissertation Title: *Three Essays on the Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism in Latin America*
Dissertation committee: Robert Margo, Aldo Musacchio (HBS) and Laurence Kotlikoff

M.A., Political Economy, Boston University, Boston, MA, 2006
B.A., Economics, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), Mexico, 2000

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Public Finance, Economic History and Development Economics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Economic Institutions in Historical Perspective, Boston University
Fall 2008, Spring 2009

Teaching Assistant, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), Mexico
Intermediate Microeconomics II, Fall 2002
Intermediate Macroeconomics I, Spring 2002
Intermediate Microeconomics, Spring 2001
Introduction to Economics, Fall 2001

WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Professor Aldo Musacchio, Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2004-2006, 2007-now

Economic Advisor, Under-Secretary of Legislative Affairs, Ministry of the Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación), México City, 2002- 2003

Economic Advisor, Under-Secretary of Political Development, Ministry of the Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación), Mexico City, 2001-2002

Research Assistant for Professor Carlos Elizondo Mayer Serra, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), Mexico City, 1999- 2000

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Senior Teaching Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2008

Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT), Graduate Scholarship, 2003-2009

Best Research Award for Bachelor Thesis: "Manufacturing Industry and Trade Opening in Mexico: A Technological Sectors Analysis, 1980-1993" at the XIII National Economics Students Association Congress, Colima, Mexico, November, 2000

PUBLICATIONS/SUBMITTED PAPERS

Martínez Fritscher, André C. and Alberto Ortiz (2000), “Factores de Competitividad, Situación Nacional y Cadena Productiva de la Industria del Calzado en León, Guanajuato”, *Economía, Sociedad y Territorio*, 2(7): 533-568.

WORKING PAPERS

- “Endowments and Fiscal Federalism: Causes and Consequences of the Brazil’s 1891 Constitution”, October 2008 (Job Market Paper).
- “Endowments, Fiscal Federalism, and the Cost of Capital for States: Evidence from Brazil, 1891-1930” (with Aldo Musacchio), October 2008.
- “Origins of Fiscal Centralization in Brazil and Mexico (1870-1930)”, June 2008.

WORK IN PROGRESS

- “Regional Inequality in Brazil: Consequences of the 1891 Constitution in the Provision of Public Goods” (with Aldo Musacchio)

REFeree EXPERIENCE

Explorations in Economic History

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

- 2008 Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
- Northeast Universities Development Consortium, Boston University, MA (discussant)
- Microeconomics Graduate Workshop, Boston University, MA
- Economic History Association Meeting, Graduate Student Session Poster, New Haven, CT
- Graduate Student Poster Session, NBER Summer Institute, Cambridge, MA
- New Frontiers of Latin American Economic History, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
- Empirical Microeconomics Lunch, Boston University, MA
- Harvard Economic History Tea, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
- 2007 Harvard Economic History Tea, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

LANGUAGES Fluent in English, Portuguese and Spanish (native)

COMPUTER SKILLS: STATA, Microsoft Office

ASSOCIATIONS: Economic History Society (EHS), Economic History Association (EHA)

OTHER: Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE): District Electoral Council for Mexican Elections, 2000

CITIZENSHIP/VISA: MEXICO/F-1

REFERENCES

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January 2009

Endowments and Fiscal Federalism: Causes and Consequences of the Brazil's 1891 Constitution (Job Market Paper)

This paper is part of a broader research effort attempting to link the current high levels of regional inequality in Brazil to key provisions in the 1891 Constitution. I provide a fiscal federalism model to explain how the regional reallocation of the production of coffee changed the bargaining power of local elites in certain states, enabling them to control revenues derived from export taxes and international debt, as enshrined in the 1891 Constitution. Using newly collected archival data I demonstrate that state public revenues per capita became closely aligned with exports per capita, but only after the constitution had been enacted. Brazilian states with substantial revenue capacity obtained lower interest rates on debt contracted in international capital markets. Endogeneity between interest rates and state revenue is addressed with a simulated instruments approach.

Endowments, Fiscal Federalism, and the Cost of Capital for States: Evidence from Brazil, 1891-1930 (with Aldo Musacchio)

We study the consequences of the 1891 Constitution in the capacity of Brazil's states to borrow capital in international capital markets. Since states got the right to tax exports in the 1891 Constitution, and that some of them had significantly commodity exports, we examine if the differences in exports capacity across states determined the interest rates that Brazil states paid during the First Republic (1889-1930). For this purpose we use a newly created database of state debt quotations and a series of state level fiscal variables. We demonstrate that states with higher state public revenue increased their probability to issue international bonds and borrowed at lower interest rates. We address endogeneity with a simulated instrumental variables approach, using export commodity shares at state level and national commodity export growth to simulate exports at state level.

Bargaining for Fiscal Control: Tax Federalism in Brazil and Mexico, 1870-1930

Brazil is more decentralized than Mexico, even when controlling for economic characteristics. I use a model of fiscal federalism to analyze the historical roots of these differences. I argue that the type of endowments produced determined the bargaining power of local elites at the end of the nineteenth century. While in Brazil coffee was the most important commodity, Mexico relied heavily on mining products. Coffee was produced by local landowners who became economically powerful, allowed them to control export taxes in the 1891 Constitution. On the other hand, mining required foreign capital and technology. Foreign investment was promoted by the Mexican Federal Government, weakening the relative power of local elites.

Regional Inequality in Brazil: Consequences of the 1891 Constitution in the Provision of Public Goods (with Aldo Musacchio)

How do endowments affect long-term development? A large literature has linked endowments to institutions and economic development. In this paper we show a simple link between commodity exports (determined by endowments) and the level of state government expenditures on public goods during the first republican period in Brazil, 1889-1930. During this period Brazil had an extreme form of fiscal federalism with little redistribution among states, thus allowing us to look at the effect of endowments on state policies. Using OLS and IV techniques we use an original database of state-level variables to show that endowments affected government expenditures on public goods in the short run and (possibly) GDP per capita at the state level in the long run.